


RECORD OF THE EXPEDITIONS
AGAINST THE
NORTH-WEST FRONTIER TRIBES

SINCE THE
ANNEXATION OF THE PUNJAB.

COMPILED FROM
OFFICIAL SOURCES,
BY
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL W. H. PAGET,
COMMANDANT, 5TH PUNJAB CAVALRY,
IN 1873.



REVISED AND BROUGHT UP TO DATE
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CONTENTS.

LIST OF MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS	PAGE
... ..	xvii

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.

Description of the north-west frontier line. Frontier divided into six districts—Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, Dera Ghazi Khan. Nature of communications along the border. Defence of the frontier. Punjab Frontier Force. Frontier militia. Independent tribes beyond the border. Their fighting strength. Description of Biluch and Pathan races. Relations of the British Government with the border tribes. Fighting qualities of these tribes. Nature of outrages committed by them in British territory. Nature of punishment inflicted. Fine and compensation. Seizure. Blockade. Military expedition. Last from time to time necessary. Object of the present work.	1
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	---

CHAPTER II.

HAZARA BORDER.

CHILASI, KOHISTANI, AND CIS-INDUS SWATI TRIBES.

Description of Hazara frontier line. CHILAS. Nature of country. Inhabitants. Arms. Climate, etc. KOHISTAN (CIS-INDUS). Nature of country. Villages. Inhabitants. Trade. Tribal divisions. Fighting strength. Arms. Internal feuds, etc. ALLAI. Description of valley. Inhabitants. Origin of cis-Indus Swatis. Their characteristics. Tribal divisions of Allaiwals. Fighting strength. Arms, etc. Approaches from British territory. Relations with British Government. Attack on survey party in 1868. Raid on Battal in 1877. Blockade of the tribe. Terms offered to them. Proposals for a punitive expedition in 1881 not sanctioned. Present attitude of the tribe. NANDIHAR. TIKARI. DESHI.	15
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----

CHAPTER III.

HAZARA BORDER (*continued*).

BLACK MOUNTAIN TRIBES.

BLACK MOUNTAIN. Description. Passes and peaks. Routes from British territory. Climate. Tribes which occupy its slopes. HASSANZAIS. Tribal divisions. Fighting strength. Arms. Feuds, etc. <i>Sahib-i-Dastar</i> . AKAZAIS. Villages. Tribal divisions. Fighting strength, etc. Relations with British Government. CHAGARZAIS. Tribal divisions. Fighting strength, etc. Villages. Approaches from British territory. Relations with British Government. PARIARI SYADS. Territory occupied by them. Fighting strength, etc. Relations with British Government. EXPEDITION

AGAINST THE HASSANZAIS OF THE BLACK MOUNTAIN, BY A FORCE UNDER LIEUT.-COLONEL F. MACKESON, C.B., 1852-53. Cause of rupture. Punitive expedition ordered. Force divided into three columns and a reserve. Operations of right column, under Lieutenant-Colonel R. Napier. Operations of centre column, under Major J. Abbott. Operations of left column, under Captain W. W. Davidson. Destruction of Hassanzai villages. Retirement of the force. Lieutenant-Colonel Mackeson's despatch. Government letter. Grant of medal. Subsequent behaviour of Hassanzais. Misconduct in 1863. Punishment proposed but not carried out. Submission of tribe. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE BLACK MOUNTAIN TRIBES, BY A FORCE UNDER MAJOR-GENERAL A. T. WILDE, C.B., C.S.I., IN 1868. Attack on the Ughi thana on the 30th of July 1868. Troops ordered to Agror. Cause of the outbreak. Events in the Agror valley. Affairs of the 8th and 12th of August. Lieutenant-Colonel Rothney's despatch. Punitive expedition recommended and sanctioned. Effect of movement of troops towards the frontier. Composition, strength, and disposition of the Hazara Field Force on the 24th of September 1868. Plan of operations. Advance of the force on the 3rd of October. Capture of the Chittabut peak on the 4th, and the Muchai peak on the 5th. Submission of the tribes on the 10th. Punishment of the Pariari Syads. Return of the force to British territory through Tikari and Nandihar. Major-General Wilde's despatch. Officers mentioned by the Commander-in-Chief. General order published by the Government of India. Grant of medal. Subsequent events. Confiscation of Shatut lands. Restoration of the Khan of Agror. Continued raids on Agror frontier. Submission of Black Mountain tribes and others in 1875. Subsequent conduct of Akazais and Hassanzais. APPENDICES	26
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----

CHAPTER IV.

HAZARA AND PESHAWAR BORDERS.

YUSAFZAI AND GADUN TRIBES.

Origin of Yusafzais. Position of our feudatory, the Nawab of Amb, on this border. Independent tribes. MADA KHEL. AMAZAI. UTMANZAI. GADUN. KHUDU KHEL. CHAMLAWAL. BUNERWAL. Description of these tribes, their location, tribal divisions, fighting strength, etc. AFFAIR WITH THE HINDUSTANI FANATICS AT KOTLA, IN JANUARY 1853. Origin of the Hindustani fanatics. Syad Ahmad Shah. Hindustani colony at Sittana. Their seizure of the fort of Kotla, belonging to the Khan of Amb, in 1852. Operations of the force under Lieutenant-Colonel F. Mackeson, C.B., and expulsion of the fanatics from Kotla, in January 1853. AFFAIRS AT SHEKH JANA AND NARINJI, UNDER MAJOR J. L. VAUGHAN, IN JULY AND AUGUST 1857. State of Yusafzai border in 1857. Intrigues of Mukarrab Khan of Panjtar. Disaffection of some of the border villages. Attack on Shekh Jana and Spinkana, on the 2nd of July. Operations against Narinji on the 21st of July. Second attack on Narinji on the 3rd of August. Destruction of the village. Government letter. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE KHUDU KHEL AND HINDUSTANI FANATICS, BY A FORCE UNDER MAJOR-GENERAL SIR SYDNEY J. COTTON, K.C.B., April-May 1858. Attack on Lieutenant Horne's camp in October 1857. Punitive expedition recommended to punish this outrage. Composition of the force. Advance of main column to Chinglai by the Daran pass on the 26th of April 1858. Destruction of Chinglai and Panjtar. Operations against Mangal Thana and destruction of that stronghold. Movement against Sittana. Action on the 4th of May. Return of the force. Major-General Cotton's despatch. APPENDICES	70
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----

CHAPTER V.

HAZARA AND PESHAWAR BORDERS.

YUSAFZAI AND GADUN TRIBES (*continued*).

	PAGE
EXPEDITION AGAINST THE HINDUSTANI FANATICS (KNOWN AS THE AMBELA EXPEDITION), BY A FORCE UNDER BRIGADIER-GENERAL SIR N. B. CHAMBERLAIN, K.C.B. (AND SUBSEQUENTLY UNDER MAJOR-GENERAL J. GARVOCK), IN 1863. Conduct of Gaduns and Utmanzai tribes after the expedition to Sittana in 1858. Re-occupation of Sittana by the <i>Syads</i> and Hindustanis in 1863. Blockade of Gaduns and Utmanzais. Misconduct of Hassanzais. Military operations sanctioned for the destruction of the colony of Hindustani fanatics. Plan of operations. Advance into the Ambela pass on the 20th of October. Delay of baggage owing to the difficulties of the road. Reconnaissance into the Chamla valley on the 22nd of October. Hostile conduct of the Bunerwals. Alteration of the plan of operations necessary. Attack on the enemy's position on the "Conical" hill. Arrangement of camp defences. Attack of the enemy on the "Eagle's Nest" picquet, and the left defences generally, on the 26th of October. Their repulse with severe loss. Hostile demonstration on the front defences beaten off on the same day. Arrival of the <i>Akhund</i> of Swat to join the enemy with large reinforcements. Reasons for his joining. Composition of the enemy's forces at this time. Attack of the enemy on the "Crag" picquet on the 30th of October. Its loss and recapture. Attack on the troops covering the working parties on the 6th of November. Second attack on the "Crag" picquet on the 13th of November. Its loss and recapture by our troops. Concentration of the whole force on the heights to the south of the pass. Attack on the picquets on the 18th and 19th of November. Third attack on the "Crag" picquet on the 20th of November. Its loss and final recapture from the enemy. Brigadier-General Sir N. B. Chamberlain wounded, and obliged in consequence to relinquish the command. Despatch. Negotiations with the Bunerwals. Arrival of Major-General J. Garvock to assume the command of the force. Arrival of reinforcements. Offensive measures decided on. Attack on Lalu on the 15th, and final defeat of the enemy on the 16th of December. Dispersion of the tribes and submission of the Bunerwals. Destruction of Malka by the Amazais and Bunerwals. Termination of the campaign. Despatches. General order published by the Government of India. Grant of medal. Coercion of the Gaduns and Utmanzais by a force under Lieutenant-Colonel A. T. Wilde, C.B., in January 1864. Destruction of Mandi by the Utmanzais and Gaduns. Submission of other tribes. Subsequent history of the Hindustani fanatics. Conduct of other tribes since the Ambela expedition. Hassanzais. Mada Khels. Amazais. Utmanzais. Gaduns. Khudu Khels. Bunerwals.	
APPENDICES	102

CHAPTER VI.

PESHAWAR BORDER.

SWAT TRIBES.

Description of the Swat valley. Its climate, population, etc. Divisions and clans of Swat. BAIZAIS. British Baizai. RANIZAIS. KHWAZOZAIS. The *Akhund* of Swat. His origin and early history. Operations in

Baizai, by a Sikh force under Major G. St.P. Lawrence, in 1847. Attack on the village of Babuzai and its destruction. Punishment of village of Palli. EXPEDITION AGAINST CERTAIN REFRACTORY VILLAGES IN BRITISH AND INDEPENDENT BAIZAI, BY A FORCE UNDER LIEUTENANT-COLONEL J. BRADSHAW, C.B., IN DECEMBER 1849. Misconduct of Swat after the annexation, and refusal of the Utman Khel villages of British Baizai to pay revenue. Coercive measures sanctioned. Composition of force. Destruction of village of Sanghao. Attack on the villages of Palli, Zurmandai, and Sher Khana, and their destruction. Return of force. Government letter. Grant of medal. Subsequent conduct of villages of Sam and British Baizai. Dissensions and lawlessness. Despatch of a force to British Baizai in 1866 to restore order. Removal of the villages of Sanghao, Mian Khan, and Barmul to the plains. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE RANIZAIS, BY A FORCE UNDER BRIGADIER SIR COLIN CAMPBELL, K.C.B., IN MARCH AND MAY 1852. Disturbed state of the Ranizai frontier. Force despatched from Peshawar in March 1852 to compel submission of the Ranizai <i>maliks</i> . Advance into Sam Ranizai. Submission of the tribe. Return of force. Subsequent repudiation of the terms by the Ranizais. Force again despatched in May. Attack on the village of Skakot on the 18th of May. Destruction of Skakot, Dargai, and other villages in the Ranizai valley. Return of force. Brigadier Sir Colin Campbell's despatch. Government letter. Grant of medal. Submission of Ranizais. Proposals for a punitive expedition into the Swat valley in 1852 not carried out. Attitude of Swat tribes in 1857 and 1863. Change of policy of the <i>Akhund</i> after the Ambela expedition. Cessation of disturbances on the Swat frontier. Death of the <i>Akhund</i> in January 1877. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE RANIZAI VILLAGE OF SKAKOT IN MARCH 1878. Misconduct of this village after the <i>Akhund's</i> death. Punishment sanctioned. Surprise of the village successfully accomplished on the 14th of March 1878. Submission to the Government terms. Government letter. Events in Swat up to the present time. APPENDICES	177
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

CHAPTER VII.

PESHAWAR BORDER (*continued*).

UTMAN KHEL TRIBE.

UTMAN KHEL TRIBE. Origin. Country. Customs. Fighting strength. Territorial divisions. Tribal divisions. Feuds. Roads, etc. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE INDEPENDENT UTMAN KHELS, BY A FORCE UNDER BRIGADIER SIR COLIN CAMPBELL, K.C.B., IN MAY 1852. Misconduct of the Utman Khels after the annexation. Raid on the village of Charsada on the 20th of April 1852. Punitive expedition ordered. Destruction of the Nawadan group of villages on the 11th of May. Attack on Prangarh on the 13th of May. Destruction of the village and grain. Brigadier Sir Colin Campbell's despatch. Grant of medal. Subsequent conduct of the tribe. OPERATIONS AGAINST THE INDEPENDENT UTMAN KHELS IN FEBRUARY AND MARCH 1878. Abazai outrage on the 9th of December 1876. Successful surprise of the village of Sapri on the 15th of February 1878. Terms offered to the tribe. Operations against the Zirak and Pakhai villages on the 21st of March 1878. Complete submission of the tribe. Subsequent conduct of the Utman Khels. APPENDICES	212
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

CHAPTER VIII.

PESHAWAR BORDER (*continued*).

MOHMAND TRIBE.

	PAGE
MOHMANDS. Their country. Products. Transit dues on rafts. Roads. Customs. Tribal divisions. Fighting strength. Villages. Tribal chiefs. Affiliated clans. SAFIS. MULLAGORIS. OPERATIONS AGAINST THE MOHMANDS, BY A FORCE UNDER BRIGADIER SIR COLIN CAMPBELL, K.C.B., IN 1851-52. Mohmand <i>jagirs</i> in British territory. Raids on the Mohmand frontier. Force ordered out from Peshawar, October 1851. Destruction of the Dabb villages on the 28th and 29th of October. Construction of Fort Michni. Affair at Matta on the 8th of December. Attack on cavalry picquet on the 3rd of January. Murder of Lieutenant Boulnois. Removal of the Panjpao villages. Return of force. Brigadier Sir Colin Campbell's despatch. Government letter. AFFAIR AT PANJPAO, UNDER BRIGADIER SIR COLIN CAMPBELL, K.C.B., IN APRIL 1852. Skirmish near Shabkadar on the 31st of March. Action at Panjpao on the 15th of April. Tribal gathering broken up. Government letter. Grant of medal. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE MICHNI MOHMANDS, BY A FORCE UNDER COLONEL SYDNEY J. COTTON, IN 1854. Refusal of the Michni Mohmands to pay the tribute due. Seizure of cattle. Destruction of refractory villages ordered. Attack on Shah Mansur Khel on the 31st of August. Destruction of village. Destruction of Dabb and Sadin on the 2nd of September. Colonel Cotton's despatch. Government letter. Grant of medal. Subsequent behaviour of Mohmand tribe on our border. Continued raids. Proposals for punitive expedition to Pandiali not sanctioned. Submission of chiefs of Lalpura and Pandiali in 1860. AFFAIRS WITH THE MOHMANDS NEAR SHABKADAR, DECEMBER AND JANUARY 1863-64. Misconduct of tribe in 1863. Skirmishes on the 5th and 7th of December. Action on the 2nd of January. Hostile gathering broken up. Grant of medal. Subsequent events. Murder of Major Macdonald in 1873. OPERATIONS AGAINST THE MOHMANDS IN 1879. AFFAIR AT KAM DAKKA IN APRIL. Raids in the Kama district. Attack on the survey party at Zankai on the 28th of February. Affair at Kam Dakka on the 22nd of April. Gallant defence of the detachment of the Mhairwarra Battalion under Captain O'M. Creagh. OPERATIONS AGAINST THE MOHMANDS IN 1880. ACTION ON THE GARA HEIGHTS IN JANUARY. Hostile gathering of the tribe under Muhammad Sadik Khan and Mulla Khalil. Attack on the Mohmand position on the Gara heights on the 15th of January. Failure of column from Landi Kotal to cut off the retreat of the enemy. Destruction of the village of Rena. Colonel Boisragon's despatch. Subsequent events. APPENDICES ...	227

CHAPTER IX.

PESHAWAR BORDER (*continued*).

AFRIDI TRIBE.

KHAIBAR AND AKA KHEL AFRIDIS.

AFRIDIS. Origin. Tribal divisions. Appearance. Character. Customs. Trade. Blood feuds. Migratory habits. Description of country. Summer and winter settlements. Description of raids. Routes. Clans. KUKI KHELS. MALIKDIN KHELS. KAMBAR KHELS. KAMAR KHELS. ZAKHA KHELS. SIPAHS. AKA KHELS. Fighting strength of Afridi tribe. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE AKA KHEL AFRIDIS, BY A FORCE UNDER LIEUTENANT-COLONEL J. H. CRAIGIE, C.B., in March 1855. Mis-

conduct of Bassi Khel section. Blockade imposed. Attack on Lieutenant Hamilton's camp on the 9th of February 1855. Failure of the attempt to surprise the Aka Khel village of Alam Killi. Skirmish under Lieutenant Tyrwhitt on the 23rd of February. Successful reprisals by the troops under Major Eld. Operations of the force under Lieutenant-Colonel Craigie on the 27th of March. Destruction of Alam Killi and Mir Killi. Lieutenant-Colonel Craigie's despatch. Grant of medal. Submission of tribe. Terms granted. Removal of the blockade. Misconduct of Kuki Khel and Zakha Khel clans. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE ZAKHA KHEL AFRIDIS OF THE BAZAR VALLEY, DECEMBER 1878. Misconduct of the Khaibar Afridis at the commencement of the British occupation of Afghanistan. Punishment of the Zakha Khels of the Bazar valley sanctioned. Advance of columns from Jamrud and Dakka to Bazar. Destruction of towers and villages. Return of troops. Opposition encountered by the Dakka column in the Tabai pass. Despatches. SECOND EXPEDITION AGAINST THE ZAKHA KHEL AFRIDIS OF THE BAZAR VALLEY, JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1879. Continued misconduct of the Khaibar Afridis. Second expedition to Bazar sanctioned. Advance of different columns and junction in the Bazar valley on the 27th of January. Reconnaissance of Bokar pass on the 28th. Advance into Bara valley not carried out. Return of troops. Lieutenant-General Maude's despatch. Subsequent conduct of Khaibar Afridis. Arrangements with reference to the Khaibar pass after the withdrawal of the British troops. Subsequent events. APPENDICES ... 271

CHAPTER X.

PESHAWAR AND KOHAT BORDERS.

AFRIDI TRIBE (*continued*).

ADAM KHEL AFRIDIS.

ADAM KHEL AFRIDIS. Kohat pass. Divisions of the Adam Khels. **GALLAI.** **HASSAN KHEL.** **JOWAKI.** **ASHU KHEL.** Fighting strength of the Adam Khels. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE KOHAT PASS AFRIDIS, BY A FORCE UNDER BRIGADIER SIR COLIN CAMPBELL, K.C.B., IN FEBRUARY 1850. Attack on a party of sappers near the Kohat *kotal*. Cause of outrage. Advance of force from Peshawar towards the Kohat pass. Operations in the pass. Destruction of villages of Akhor, Zargun Khel, Khui, Sheraki, and Bosti Khel. Brigadier Sir Colin Campbell's despatch. Grant of medal. Attack on the police tower on the Kohat *kotal* on the 1st of March. Murder of Apothecary Healy. Submission of the Kohat Pass Afridis in June 1850. Infraction of agreement. Blockade imposed. Submission of tribe. Urakzais associated with the Afridis in pass responsibility in November 1850. Attack by Afridis on the Urakzai post on the *kotal* in October 1853. Closing of the pass. Fresh arrangements entered into with the Bangash tribe for the management of the pass. Submission of the Kohat Pass Afridis. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE BORI VILLAGES OF THE JOWAKI AFRIDIS, BY A FORCE UNDER COLONEL S. B. BOILEAU, IN NOVEMBER 1853. Misconduct of Jowaki Afridis. Their submission in November 1853, with the exception of the Boriwals. Operations against the Bori Afridis on the 29th of November. Destruction of Bori villages. Colonel Boileau's despatch. Government letter. Grant of medal. Submission of Bori Afridis and agreement entered into by them with the British Government in February 1854. Disturbances in the Kohat pass in 1866. Misconduct of Hassan Khel Afridis. Coercive measures ordered. Their submission in April 1867. Misconduct of Gallai Afridis in 1870. Rupture with the Gallai Afridis in

1876. Blockade imposed. Extension of the blockade to all the Adam Khel sections. Submission of the tribe. Surprise of Gaddia Khel hamlet by a small force from Peshawar on the 15th of August 1877. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE JOWAKI AFRIDIS, BY A FORCE UNDER COLONEL D. MOCATTA, IN AUGUST 1877. Behaviour of Jowakis since 1853. Misconduct in 1877. Causes of outbreak. Punitive expedition into Jowaki country ordered. Operations on the 30th of August. Colonel Mocatta's despatch. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE JOWAKI AFRIDIS, BY A COMBINED FORCE UNDER BRIGADIERS-GENERAL C. P. KEYES, C.B., AND C. C. G. ROSS, C.B., NOVEMBER TO JANUARY 1877-78. Continued hostility and aggression of Jowakis. Operations ordered to be undertaken from Kohat and Peshawar. Advance of the Kohat force into the Jowaki country in three columns on the 9th of November. Operations against Jamu on the 1st of December. Occupation of the Sarghasha ridge by the Peshawar force on the 4th of December. Destruction of villages and towers in the Bori valley on the 6th, 7th, and 8th of December. Successful attack by Brigadier-General Keyes on Ghariba on the 7th of December. Reconnaissance of the Bori Chena pass by Brigadier-General Ross on the 25th of December. Advance of Peshawar force into the Pastaoni valley on the 31st of December. Simultaneous advance of Kohat column. Second advance into the Pastaoni valley on the 15th of January, and combined operations of the Kohat and Peshawar forces in the interior of the Jowaki country. Withdrawal of the whole force towards Kohat. Negotiations opened by the Jowakis. Terms offered. Submission of the tribe on the 4th of March 1878. Despatches of Brigadiers-General Keyes and Ross. Government letter. Grant of medal. Subsequent conduct of Adam Khel Afridis. APPENDICES ... 316

CHAPTER XI.

KOHAT BORDER.

URAKZAI TRIBE.

URAKZAIS. Tribal divisions and fighting strength. Possibility of effecting reprisals against the tribe. Description of Urakzai country. Location of the different sections, and their principal villages. Routes from British territory. *Shia* and *Suni* feud. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE RUBIA KHEL URAKZAIS, BY A FORCE UNDER BRIGADIER N. B. CHAMBERLAIN, IN SEPTEMBER 1855. Misconduct of Urakzais in 1855, in which Rubia Khel section was conspicuous. Punitive measures decided on. Operations against Rubia Khel villages on the 2nd of September. Destruction of Nasin, Sangar, and Katsah. Brigadier Chamberlain's despatch. Submission of Mishti, Rubia Khel, and Shaikhan sections. Government letter. AFFAIR WITH THE BIZOTI URAKZAIS AT THE UBLAN PASS IN MARCH 1868. Misconduct of the Daulatzai division, and the Sipah section of the Muhammad Khel division. Demonstration against the Ublan towers on the 16th of January and 10th of March. Affair at the Ublan pass on the 11th of March. Failure of the attack on the enemy's position. Withdrawal of the troops. Government letter. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE BIZOTI URAKZAIS, BY A FORCE UNDER LIEUTENANT-COLONEL C. P. KEYES, C.B., IN FEBRUARY 1869. Failure of attempt to induce the friendly sections of the Urakzai tribe to coerce the others. Fresh outrage committed. Operations against the village of Gara on the 25th of February. Destruction of the village and retirement of the force. Lieutenant-Colonel Keyes's despatch. Simultaneous demonstration from the Peshawar side. Government letter. Submission of Bizoti, Utman Khel, and Sipah sections. Subsequent behaviour of Urakzai tribe. Misconduct of

	PAGE
certain sections during the British occupation of Afghanistan, 1878-80. Proposals for a punitive expedition not carried out. Our relations with the tribe at the present time. APPENDICES	382

CHAPTER XII.

KOHAT BORDER.

ZAIMUKHT TRIBE.

ZAIMUKHTS. Tribal divisions. Fighting strength. Arms. Description of Zaimukht country. Cultivation. Routes. Principal villages belonging to the different sections. Dependence of tribe on British territory, etc. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE ZAIMUKHTS, BY A FORCE UNDER BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. A. TYTLER, V.C., C.B., IN DECEMBER 1879. Misconduct of the tribe from the commencement of the British occupation of Afghanistan in 1878. Misdeeds crowned by the murder of Lieutenant Kinloch on the 29th of September 1879. Punitive measures ordered. Objects of expedition. Punishment postponed. Successful raid on the Zaimukht hamlet of Dand on the 21st of November. Affair near the Chapri post on the 22nd of November. Preliminary reconnaissances into the Zaimukht country. Advance of the expeditionary force on the 8th of December. Attack on Zawo on the 13th and 14th. Destruction of Zawo and other Khadu Khel hamlets. Destruction of Yasta on the 18th. Coercion of the villages of the Sangroba valley. Return of force to British territory. Brigadier-General Tytler's despatch. Result of the expedition. Government letter. Subsequent conduct of the tribe. APPENDICES	413
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-----

CHAPTER XIII.

KOHAT BORDER.

TURI AND BANGASH TRIBES.

TURI TRIBE. Their origin. Tribal divisions. Appearance. Customs. External feuds. Internal factions. Trade. Former relations with the Kabul Government. BANGASH TRIBE. Origin. Tribal divisions. Characteristics. Connection with the Kohat pass. Description of Miranzai. Its villages, climate, etc. EXPEDITION TO MIRANZAI, BY A FORCE UNDER CAPTAIN J. COKE, IN 1851. Unsettled state of the Miranzai valley after the annexation. Advance of a force to Thal and Biland Khel in October 1851. Settlement made with the Miranzai villages. Return of force. EXPEDITION TO MIRANZAI, BY A FORCE UNDER BRIGADIER N. B. CHAMBERLAIN, IN 1855. Unsatisfactory condition of the Miranzai valley. Expedition sanctioned to enforce the submission of the Miranzai villages. Advance of force into the valley. Affair near Darsamand on the 30th of April. Return of force. Government letter. Grant of medal. EXPEDITION TO MIRANZAI AND KURAM, BY A FORCE UNDER BRIGADIER N. B. CHAMBERLAIN, IN 1856. Misconduct of the Turis after the annexation. Agreement made with them in 1853. Continued misconduct. Expedition to Miranzai and Kuram ordered. Successful surprise of the village of Torawari on the 25th of October. Advance of force to the Kuram fort by the Darwaza pass. Submission of Turi and Bangash <i>maliks</i> . Return of force to Thal. Murder of grass-cutters by Waziri marauders. Surprise of the Miami encampments, and their acceptance of the Government demands. Return of force to Kohat. Government letter. Subsequent conduct of the Miranzai villages. Conduct of Turis since 1856. Friendly attitude during the occupation of Afghanistan, 1878-80. Independence granted to them in 1880. Present unsettled state of tribe. APPENDICES	431
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-----

CHAPTER XIV.

KOHAT AND BANNU BORDERS.

WAZIRI TRIBE.

DARWESH KHEL WAZIRIS.

	PAGE
WAZIRIS. Origin. Tribal divisions and fighting strength. General description of the Waziris. DARWESH KHELS. Utmanzai and Ahmadzai clans. Sub-divisions of these clans, and their location. Immigration of the Ahmadzais in former times to the plains of Bannu. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE UMARZAI WAZIRIS, BY A FORCE UNDER MAJOR J. NICHOLSON, IN 1852. Misconduct of the Umarzais after the annexation. Punitive measures sanctioned in 1852. Plan of operations. Surprise and destruction of the Umarzai settlements on the 21st of December. Government letter. Submission of the Umarzais. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE KABUL KHEL WAZIRIS, BY A FORCE UNDER BRIGADIER-GENERAL N. B. CHAMBERLAIN, C.B., 1859-60. Attack on Bahadur Khel by the Kabul Khels in 1850. Subsequent misconduct. Settlement with them in 1855. Murder of Captain Mecham on the 5th of November 1859. Refusal of the Kabul Khels to give up the murderers. Coercive measures necessary.	
• Advance of force from Thal on the 20th of December. Attack on the enemy's position on the 22nd, and destruction of their encampments. Subsequent operations. Submission of the various sections. Return of force. Government letter. Grant of medal. Subsequent surrender and execution of principal murderer. Misconduct of Kabul Khel and Tazi Khel sections in 1869. Complications with the Muhammad Khels in 1870. Their unconditional surrender in September 1871. Punishment of the Umarzai, Bizand Khel, and Sudan Khel sections for aiding the Muhammad Khels. Misconduct of the Zalli Khels on the Gumal border in January 1879. Destruction of the Jatta post, and plunder of the Gumal bazar. Reprisals effected. Submission of the Zalli Khels. Misconduct of different sections of the Darwesh Khel Waziris in 1880. Attack on Turi caravan. Attack on Khatak labour camp. Attack on the Chapri post. Proposals for a punitive expedition against the Mahmit Khel and Tori Khel Waziris not carried out. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE MALIK SHAHI WAZIRI SETTLEMENTS, BY A FORCE UNDER BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. J. H. GORDON, C.B., IN OCTOBER 1880. Object of the expedition. Surprise of the Malik Shahi settlements successfully accomplished on the 28th of October. Realisation of fines due from the Kabul Khel and Malik Shahi sections. Government letter. Subsequent events. APPENDICES	458

CHAPTER XV.

BANNU AND DERA ISMAIL KHAN BORDERS.

WAZIRI TRIBE (*continued*).

MAHSUD WAZIRIS AND BATANIS.

MAHSUD WAZIRIS. Tribal divisions. Description of country. Customs, etc. BATANIS. Tribal divisions. Their location. Accessibility from British territory. Trade, etc. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE MAHSUD WAZIRIS, BY A FORCE UNDER BRIGADIER-GENERAL N. B. CHAMBERLAIN, C.B., IN 1860. Misconduct of the Mahsuds after the annexation. Proposals for punitive expedition. Demonstration by a large body of Mahsuds against Tank in March 1860. Their repulse by a detachment of the 5th Punjab Cavalry. Punishment of tribe sanctioned. Advance of force on the 17th of April. Unsuccessful attempt to surprise the village of Shingi

Kot. Advance up the Shahur Zam. Attack on Lieutenant-Colonel Lumsden's camp at Palosin on the 23rd of April. Unsuccessful negotiations. Advance of force. Forcing of the Barari pass on the 4th of May. Arrival at Kaniguram on the 5th. Town spared on payment of fine. Advance to Makin. Destruction of town and villages on the 11th of May. Return of force to British territory by the Khasora valley. Brigadier-General Chamberlain's despatch. Government letter. Grant of medal. Submission of the Mahsuds in June 1862. Subsequent events. Continued misconduct of the tribe. Submission of the Shaman Khels in 1873, and of the Bahlolzais in 1874. OPERATIONS IN THE GUMAL VALLEY AGAINST THE SULIMAN KHEL PAWINDAHS AND OTHERS, IN JANUARY 1879. Raid on Tank on the 1st of January. Disorders on Tank border. Military measures taken. Successful attack on a Suliman Khel <i>kiri</i> near Girni on the 5th of January. Report of the Brigadier-General commanding the Punjab Frontier Force on these operations. Dispersion of the Mahsuds assembled at the mouth of the Tank Zam on the 19th of January. Skirmish in the Larzan pass on the 21st of February. Restoration of order on the Tank border. Punishment of Mahsuds deferred. Terms imposed on the tribe. AFFAIR WITH THE BATANIS OF JANDULA AT THE HINIS TANGI, IN APRIL 1880. Passage given by the Batanis of Jandula to a body of Mahsud raiders. Punishment of Batanis sanctioned. Advance of force towards Jandula on the 12th of April. Affair at the Hinis Tangi. Destruction of Jandula. Return of force. Lieutenant-Colonel Rynd's despatch. Government letter. Submission of the Batanis. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE MAHSUD WAZIRIS, BY A COMBINED FORCE UNDER BRIGADIERS-GENERAL T. G. KENNEDY C.B., AND J. J. H. GORDON, C.B., IN 1881. Continued misconduct of Mahsuds in 1880. Punitive expedition sanctioned in March 1881. Advance of the Tank column on the 18th of April. Surrender of the proscribed headmen with one exception. Affair at Shah Alam on the 3rd of May. Arrival of the force at Kaniguram on the 5th, and at Makin on the 10th of May. Advance of Bannu column by the Khasora valley, and arrival at Razmak on the 9th of May. Return of the Tank column to British territory by the Tank Zam, and of the Bannu column by the Shaktu valley. Despatches. Complete submission of the Mahsuds at the end of 1881. Removal of the blockade. Subsequent events.	
APPENDICES	498

CHAPTER XVI.

BANNU BORDER.

DAWARI TRIBE.

Dawar valley. Upper and Lower Dawar. Fighting strength of Dawaris. Villages of Lower Dawar. Villages of Upper Dawar. Tochi stream. Climate of Dawar valley. Cultivation. Trade. Character of Dawaris. Waziri raids. Passes from British territory. Roads. History of Dawar valley previous to the annexation. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE DAWARIS, BY A FORCE UNDER BRIGADIER-GENERAL C. P. KEYES, C.B., IN MARCH 1872. Misconduct of Dawaris in 1870. Submission of men of Upper Dawar. Unsuccessful efforts to obtain reparation from the inhabitants of Lower Dawar. Coercive measures necessary. Advance of force from Edwardesabad towards the Tochi pass on the 6th of March 1872. Occupation of the Shinki *kotal* by Waziri levies. Cowardly conduct of the levies. Advance of force into Dawar valley on the 7th of March. Attack on the village of Haidar Khel. Destruction of the village. Submission of the Dawaris. Return

of force. Brigadier-General Keyes's despatch. Government letter. Subsequent conduct of Dawaris. Attack on police guard in August 1877. Blockade of Lower Dawar. Submission in June 1878. Misconduct of Dawaris during the occupation of Afghanistan, 1878-80. Raids on the Thal-Bannu and Thal-Kuram roads. Attack on the Baran post in April 1880. Proposals for punishment of tribe in 1881. Plan of operations. Proposals negatived by the Supreme Government. Subsequent events. APPENDICES	561
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

CHAPTER XVII.

DERA ISMAIL KHAN BORDER.

SHIRANI AND USTARANA TRIBES.

SHIRANIS. Tribal divisions. Fighting strength. Appearance. Dress. Food, etc. Villages. Intercourse with British territory. USTARANAS. Formerly <i>Pawindahs</i> . Divided into two clans. Fighting strength. Villages. Trade, etc. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE SHIRANIS, BY A FORCE UNDER BRIGADIER J. S. HODGSON, IN 1853. Misconduct of the Shiranis after the annexation. Raids on British territory. Affair on the 10th of March 1853. Successful attack on the Shirani position in the Draband pass on the 14th of March. Punitive expedition ordered. Advance of force into the Shirani country by the Shekh Haidar pass on the 31st of March. Operations on the 1st and 2nd of April. Return of force. Brigadier Hodgson's despatch. Grant of medal. Subsequent conduct of the tribe. Border responsibility of Gandapur chief enforced in 1873. Attack of Shiranis on party of Gandapur workmen on the 22nd of March 1875. Misconduct of Shiranis in 1882. Refusal of Chuhar Khel section to send in their representatives. Blockade of the tribe. Their submission in July 1883. SURVEY EXPEDITION TO THE TAKHT-I-SULIMAN MOUNTAIN IN 1883. Desirability of surveying the Takht-i-Suliman recognised. Expedition sanctioned in 1883. Frontier crossed on the 18th of November. Opposition encountered on the 26th. Completion of survey operations. Return of force to British territory on the 6th of December. APPENDICES	578
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

CHAPTER XVIII.

DERA GHAZI KHAN BORDER.

KASRANI, BOZDAR, KHOSA, LAGHARI, AND KHETRAN TRIBES.

KASRANIS. BOZDARS. KHOSAS. LAGHARIS. KHETRANS. Tribal divisions, fighting strength, etc., of these tribes. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE KASRANIS BY A FORCE UNDER BRIGADIER J. S. HODGSON, IN APRIL 1853. Misconduct of the Kasranis after the annexation. Attack in force by Kasranis on Dera Fateh Khan on the 17th of March 1852. Blockade of the tribe. Punitive expedition sanctioned in the spring of 1853. Forcing of the Bati pass on the 12th of April. Destruction of Bati and other hamlets. Retirement of force. Brigadier Hodgson's despatch. Grant of medal. Subsequent arrangement entered into with Kasranis. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE BOZDARS, BY A FORCE UNDER BRIGADIER N. B. CHAMBERLAIN, IN MARCH 1857. Allowances to Bozdars continued after the annexation. Numerous outrages committed by the tribe. Allowances discontinued in 1856. Punitive measures sanctioned at the beginning of 1857. Advance of force by the Sangarh pass on the 6th of March. Forcing of the Khan Band on the 7th. Plan of attack. Successful execution. Brigadier Chamberlain's despatch. Subsequent operations in the Bozdar country. Submission of the tribe to the Government demands on the

15th of March. Return of force. Grant of medal. Good effect of punishment on the Bozdar tribe. Attack on the Bozdars by the Khetrans and other tribes in 1861. Lieutenant Grey carried off into the Kasrani hills, but subsequently released, in 1868. Successful measures adopted to punish this outrage. Violation of British territory by the Khetrans, in pursuance of a quarrel with the Bozdars, in December 1875. Fine realised from the tribe. Similar misconduct of the Bozdars, in pursuance of a quarrel with the Bugti tribe. Offending section blockaded. Submission of the tribe. Visit of the district officer to the Bozdar hills in 1878. Settlement of cases against the tribe. Subsequent events on their border. APPENDICES 596

CHAPTER XIX.

DERA GHAZI KHAN BORDER.

GURCHANI, MAZARI, MARRI, AND BUGTI TRIBES.

GURCHANIS. MAZARIS. MARRIS. BUGTIS. Tribal divisions, fighting strength, etc., of these tribes. Operations of a British force in the Bugti and Marri hills in 1839. Advance of a detachment under Captain Brown, in May 1840, to garrison Kahan. Destruction of two parties of British troops by Marris on the 16th of May. Garrison of Kahan besieged. Failure of relieving force, under Major Clibborn, to force the Nuffusak pass on the 31st of August. Disastrous retreat to British territory. Evacuation of Kahan, and retirement of garrison, on the 28th of September 1840. Operations against the Bugtis, by a force under Major-General Sir Charles Napier, G.C.B., in 1845. Continued misconduct of the Bugtis. Successful raid on British territory, in December 1846. Affair between the Bugtis and a detachment of the Sind Irregular Horse, under Lieutenant Merewether, on the 1st of October 1847. Submission of Bugti chief. Raid on the Kasmor post on the 7th of April 1849. Conduct of the Mazaris and Gurchanis after the annexation. Successful raid by Marris and Gurchanis on the 17th of August 1857. Operations against the Marris by the Khan of Kelat in 1859. Raid on Harrand on the 26th of January 1867. Subsequent conduct of the tribes on this border. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE MARRIS, BY A FORCE UNDER BRIGADIER-GENERAL C. M. MACGREGOR, C.B., C.S.I., C.I.E., IN 1880. Misconduct of Marris in August 1880. Punitive expedition ordered. Terms offered to the tribe. Advance of force to Quat-Mandai on the 13th of October. March through the Marri country to Kahan. Submission of the tribe to the Government demands. Retirement of the force to British territory. Brigadier-General MacGregor's despatch. Government letter. Final settlement made with the Marris in January 1881. Subsequent conduct of the tribe. Conduct of the Gurchanis up to the present time ... 623

CHAPTER XX.

APPENDICES.

APPENDIX I.—Composition of the Punjab Frontier Force at the present time.

APPENDIX II.—List of outposts on the North-West Frontier held by troops of the Punjab Frontier Force and Militia, on the 1st of January 1884. APPENDIX III.—Extracts from orders issued to the Field Forces under his command by Brigadier-General Sir N. B. Chamberlain, K.C.B.

APPENDIX IV.—Table of expeditions undertaken against the frontier tribes since the annexation of the Punjab 647


GLOSSARY 656

INDEX 660

RECORD OF THE EXPEDITIONS
AGAINST THE
NORTH-WEST FRONTIER TRIBES

SINCE THE
ANNEXATION OF THE PUNJAB.

COMPILED FROM
OFFICIAL SOURCES,
BY
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL W. H. PAGET,
COMMANDANT, 5TH PUNJAB CAVALRY,
IN 1873.



REVISED AND BROUGHT UP TO DATE
BY
LIEUTENANT A. H. MASON,
ROYAL ENGINEERS,
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PREFACE.

THE first edition of this work was published in 1873, and was compiled by Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Paget, 5th Punjab Cavalry.

For some years before that, the Punjab Government had considered it desirable that "a record should be composed of the expeditions made from time to time against the frontier tribes, with such further information as might render the work a valuable guide to those who might have future dealings with these turbulent neighbours." In 1866, Colonel J. L. Vaughan, C.B., 5th Punjab Infantry, had been selected to compile such a history, but was obliged to decline, owing to ill-health; and no further steps were taken in the matter until 1873, when Lieutenant-Colonel Paget was selected to carry out this object.

In 1883, the first edition being out of print, and the Government being desirous of republishing the work, with the information revised and brought up to date, I was nominated for the duty.

In the first edition a certain number of copies were issued *confidentially*, and only differed from the others in containing some thirty pages of additional information which it was not considered desirable to make public. In the present edition all confidential matter has been omitted, with one exception, *viz.*, the fighting strength of the different tribes. There was considered to be no objection to this being given, and it certainly increases the usefulness of such a work as the present, as it shows at a glance the relative importance of the different tribes and clans.

Since 1873 there has been a considerable amount of new matter to add to the history of the frontier tribes, and in addition to the operations against the Jowaki Afridis (1877-78), the Utman Khels (1878), the Zakha Khel Afridis (1878 and 1879), the Zaimukhts (1879), the Mohmands (1879 and 1880), the Batanis (1880), the Marris (1880), the Mahsud Waziris (1881), and other minor affairs, the war in Afghanistan has added largely to our information of many of the tribes on our border ; and this information, as far as the objects of the work allow, has been introduced into the present edition. The date up to which the history of the different tribes described in this volume has been brought is, in every case, the 1st of April 1884.

Our increased knowledge of the frontier has resulted in the publication of more accurate maps by the Surveyor-General of India, and advantage has been taken of this in illustrating the different operations described. It has also been sought to make the present edition more complete by adding an index, glossary of words, etc.

In carrying out this work, I have been allowed every facility of access to the records of the Punjab Government, and have received cordial assistance from officers who have had experience of the border tribes, more especially from Mr. W. R. H. Merk, C.S., Under-Secretary to the Punjab Government, who has given me the benefit of his knowledge of the frontier, and has in other ways helped me.

LAHORE,

A. H. M.

1st of April 1884.

CONTENTS.

LIST OF MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS	PAGE
					xvii

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.

Description of the north-west frontier line. Frontier divided into six districts—Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, Dera Ghazi Khan. Nature of communications along the border. Defence of the frontier. Punjab Frontier Force. Frontier militia. Independent tribes beyond the border. Their fighting strength. Description of Biluch and Pathan races. Relations of the British Government with the border tribes. Fighting qualities of these tribes. Nature of outrages committed by them in British territory. Nature of punishment inflicted. Fine and compensation. Seizure. Blockade. Military expedition. Last from time to time necessary. Object of the present work.	...	1
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-----	---

CHAPTER II.

HAZARA BORDER.

CHILASI, KOHISTANI, AND CIS-INDUS SWATI TRIBES.

Description of Hazara frontier line. CHILAS. Nature of country. Inhabitants. Arms. Climate, etc. KOHISTAN (CIS-INDUS). Nature of country. Villages. Inhabitants. Trade. Tribal divisions. Fighting strength. Arms. Internal feuds, etc. ALLAI. Description of valley. Inhabitants. Origin of cis-Indus Swatis. Their characteristics. Tribal divisions of Allaiwals. Fighting strength. Arms, etc. Approaches from British territory. Relations with British Government. Attack on survey party in 1868. Raid on Battal in 1877. Blockade of the tribe. Terms offered to them. Proposals for a punitive expedition in 1881 not sanctioned. Present attitude of the tribe. NANDIHAR. TIKARI. DESHI.	...	15
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-----	----

CHAPTER III.

HAZARA BORDER (*continued*).

BLACK MOUNTAIN TRIBES.

BLACK MOUNTAIN. Description. Passes and peaks. Routes from British territory. Climate. Tribes which occupy its slopes. HASSANZAIS. Tribal divisions. Fighting strength. Arms. Feuds, etc. <i>Sahib-i-Dastar</i> . AKAZAIS. Villages. Tribal divisions. Fighting strength, etc. Relations with British Government. CHAGARZAIS. Tribal divisions. Fighting strength, etc. Villages. Approaches from British territory. Relations with British Government. PARIARI SYADS. Territory occupied by them. Fighting strength, etc. Relations with British Government. EXPEDITION	
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	--

AGAINST THE HASSANZAIS OF THE BLACK MOUNTAIN, BY A FORCE UNDER LIEUT.-COLONEL F. MACKESON, C.B., 1852-53. Cause of rupture. Punitive expedition ordered. Force divided into three columns and a reserve. Operations of right column, under Lieutenant-Colonel R. Napier. Operations of centre column, under Major J. Abbott. Operations of left column, under Captain W. W. Davidson. Destruction of Hassanzai villages. Retirement of the force. Lieutenant-Colonel Mackeson's despatch. Government letter. Grant of medal. Subsequent behaviour of Hassanzais. Misconduct in 1863. Punishment proposed but not carried out. Submission of tribe. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE BLACK MOUNTAIN TRIBES, BY A FORCE UNDER MAJOR-GENERAL A. T. WILDE, C.B., C.S.I., IN 1868. Attack on the Ughi thana on the 30th of July 1868. Troops ordered to Agror. Cause of the outbreak. Events in the Agror valley. Affairs of the 8th and 12th of August. Lieutenant-Colonel Rothney's despatch. Punitive expedition recommended and sanctioned. Effect of movement of troops towards the frontier. Composition, strength, and disposition of the Hazara Field Force on the 24th of September 1868. Plan of operations. Advance of the force on the 3rd of October. Capture of the Chittabut peak on the 4th, and the Muchai peak on the 5th. Submission of the tribes on the 10th. Punishment of the Pariari Syads. Return of the force to British territory through Tikari and Nandihar. Major-General Wilde's despatch. Officers mentioned by the Commander-in-Chief. General order published by the Government of India. Grant of medal. Subsequent events. Confiscation of Shatut lands. Restoration of the Khan of Agror. Continued raids on Agror frontier. Submission of Black Mountain tribes and others in 1875. Subsequent conduct of Akazais and Hassanzais. APPENDICES	26
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----

CHAPTER IV.

HAZARA AND PESHAWAR BORDERS.

YUSAFZAI AND GADUN TRIBES.

Origin of Yusafzais. Position of our feudatory, the Nawab of Amb, on this border. Independent tribes. MADA KHEL. AMAZAI. UTMANZAI. GADUN. KHUDU KHEL. CHAMLAWALS. BUNERWALS. Description of these tribes, their location, tribal divisions, fighting strength, etc. AFFAIR WITH THE HINDUSTANI FANATICS AT KOTLA, IN JANUARY 1853. Origin of the Hindustani fanatics. Syad Ahmad Shah. Hindustani colony at Sittana. Their seizure of the fort of Kotla, belonging to the Khan of Amb, in 1852. Operations of the force under Lieutenant-Colonel F. Mackeson, C.B., and expulsion of the fanatics from Kotla, in January 1853. AFFAIRS AT SHEKH JANA AND NARINJI, UNDER MAJOR J. L. VAUGHAN, IN JULY AND AUGUST 1857. State of Yusafzai border in 1857. Intrigues of Mukarrab Khan of Panjtar. Disaffection of some of the border villages. Attack on Shekh Jana and Spinkana, on the 2nd of July. Operations against Narinji on the 21st of July. Second attack on Narinji on the 3rd of August. Destruction of the village. Government letter. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE KHUDU KHEL AND HINDUSTANI FANATICS, BY A FORCE UNDER MAJOR-GENERAL SIR SYDNEY J. COTTON, K.C.B., April-May 1858. Attack on Lieutenant Horne's camp in October 1857. Punitive expedition recommended to punish this outrage. Composition of the force. Advance of main column to Chinglai by the Daran pass on the 26th of April 1858. Destruction of Chinglai and Panjtar. Operations against Mangal Thana and destruction of that stronghold. Movement against Sittana. Action on the 4th of May. Return of the force. Major-General Cotton's despatch. APPENDICES	70
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----

CHAPTER V.

HAZARA AND PESHAWAR BORDERS.

YUSAFZAI AND GADUN TRIBES (*continued*).

	PAGE
EXPEDITION AGAINST THE HINDUSTANI FANATICS (KNOWN AS THE AMBELA EXPEDITION), BY A FORCE UNDER BRIGADIER-GENERAL SIR N. B. CHAMBERLAIN, K.C.B. (AND SUBSEQUENTLY UNDER MAJOR-GENERAL J. GARVOCK), IN 1863. Conduct of Gaduns and Utmanzai tribes after the expedition to Sittana in 1858. Re-occupation of Sittana by the <i>Syads</i> and Hindustanis in 1863. Blockade of Gaduns and Utmanzais. Misconduct of Hassanzais. Military operations sanctioned for the destruction of the colony of Hindustani fanatics. Plan of operations. Advance into the Ambela pass on the 20th of October. Delay of baggage owing to the difficulties of the road. Reconnaissance into the Chamla valley on the 22nd of October. Hostile conduct of the Bunerwals. Alteration of the plan of operations necessary. Attack on the enemy's position on the "Conical" hill. Arrangement of camp defences. Attack of the enemy on the "Eagle's Nest" picquet, and the left defences generally, on the 26th of October. Their repulse with severe loss. Hostile demonstration on the front defences beaten off on the same day. Arrival of the <i>Akhund</i> of Swat to join the enemy with large reinforcements. Reasons for his joining. Composition of the enemy's forces at this time. Attack of the enemy on the "Crag" picquet on the 30th of October. Its loss and recapture. Attack on the troops covering the working parties on the 6th of November. Second attack on the "Crag" picquet on the 13th of November. Its loss and recapture by our troops. Concentration of the whole force on the heights to the south of the pass. Attack on the picquets on the 18th and 19th of November. Third attack on the "Crag" picquet on the 20th of November. Its loss and final recapture from the enemy. Brigadier-General Sir N. B. Chamberlain wounded, and obliged in consequence to relinquish the command. Despatch. Negotiations with the Bunerwals. Arrival of Major-General J. Garvock to assume the command of the force. Arrival of reinforcements. Offensive measures decided on. Attack on Lalu on the 15th, and final defeat of the enemy on the 16th of December. Dispersion of the tribes and submission of the Bunerwals. Destruction of Malka by the Amazais and Bunerwals. Termination of the campaign. Despatches. General order published by the Government of India. Grant of medal. Coercion of the Gaduns and Utmanzais by a force under Lieutenant-Colonel A. T. Wilde, C.B., in January 1864. Destruction of Mandi by the Utmanzais and Gaduns. Submission of other tribes. Subsequent history of the Hindustani fanatics. Conduct of other tribes since the Ambela expedition. Hassanzais. Mada Khels. Amazais. Utmanzais. Gaduns. Khudu Khels. Bunerwals.	
APPENDICES	102

CHAPTER VI.

PESHAWAR BORDER.

SWAT TRIBES.

Description of the Swat valley. Its climate, population, etc. Divisions and clans of Swat. BAIZAIS. British Baizai. RANIZAIS. KHWAZOZAIS. The *Akhund* of Swat. His origin and early history. Operations in

Baizai, by a Sikh force under Major G. St.P. Lawrence, in 1847. Attack on the village of Babuzai and its destruction. Punishment of village of Palli. EXPEDITION AGAINST CERTAIN REFRACTORY VILLAGES IN BRITISH AND INDEPENDENT BAIZAI, BY A FORCE UNDER LIEUTENANT-COLONEL J. BRADSHAW, C.B., IN DECEMBER 1849. Misconduct of Swat after the annexation, and refusal of the Utman Khel villages of British Baizai to pay revenue. Coercive measures sanctioned. Composition of force. Destruction of village of Sanghao. Attack on the villages of Palli, Zurmandai, and Sher Khana, and their destruction. Return of force. Government letter. Grant of medal. Subsequent conduct of villages of Sam and British Baizai. Dissensions and lawlessness. Despatch of a force to British Baizai in 1866 to restore order. Removal of the villages of Sanghao, Mian Khan, and Barmul to the plains. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE RANIZAIS, BY A FORCE UNDER BRIGADIER SIR COLIN CAMPBELL, K.C.B., IN MARCH AND MAY 1852. Disturbed state of the Ranizai frontier. Force despatched from Peshawar in March 1852 to compel submission of the Ranizai <i>maliks</i> . Advance into Sam Ranizai. Submission of the tribe. Return of force. Subsequent repudiation of the terms by the Ranizais. Force again despatched in May. Attack on the village of Skakot on the 18th of May. Destruction of Skakot, Dargai, and other villages in the Ranizai valley. Return of force. Brigadier Sir Colin Campbell's despatch. Government letter. Grant of medal. Submission of Ranizais. Proposals for a punitive expedition into the Swat valley in 1852 not carried out. Attitude of Swat tribes in 1857 and 1863. Change of policy of the <i>Akhund</i> after the Ambela expedition. Cessation of disturbances on the Swat frontier. Death of the <i>Akhund</i> in January 1877. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE RANIZAI VILLAGE OF SKAKOT IN MARCH 1878. Misconduct of this village after the <i>Akhund's</i> death. Punishment sanctioned. Surprise of the village successfully accomplished on the 14th of March 1878. Submission to the Government terms. Government letter. Events in Swat up to the present time. APPENDICES	177
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

CHAPTER VII.

PESHAWAR BORDER (*continued*).

UTMAN KHEL TRIBE.

UTMAN KHEL TRIBE. Origin. Country. Customs. Fighting strength. Territorial divisions. Tribal divisions. Feuds. Roads, etc. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE INDEPENDENT UTMAN KHELS, BY A FORCE UNDER BRIGADIER SIR COLIN CAMPBELL, K.C.B., IN MAY 1852. Misconduct of the Utman Khels after the annexation. Raid on the village of Charsada on the 20th of April 1852. Punitive expedition ordered. Destruction of the Nawadan group of villages on the 11th of May. Attack on Prangarh on the 13th of May. Destruction of the village and grain. Brigadier Sir Colin Campbell's despatch. Grant of medal. Subsequent conduct of the tribe. OPERATIONS AGAINST THE INDEPENDENT UTMAN KHELS IN FEBRUARY AND MARCH 1878. Abazai outrage on the 9th of December 1876. Successful surprise of the village of Sapri on the 15th of February 1878. Terms offered to the tribe. Operations against the Zirak and Pakhai villages on the 21st of March 1878. Complete submission of the tribe. Subsequent conduct of the Utman Khels. APPENDICES	212
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

CHAPTER VIII.

PESHAWAR BORDER (*continued*).

MOHMAND TRIBE.

	PAGE
MOHMANDS. Their country. Products. Transit dues on rafts. Roads. Customs. Tribal divisions. Fighting strength. Villages. Tribal chiefs. Affiliated clans. SAFIS. MULLAGORIS. OPERATIONS AGAINST THE MOHMANDS, BY A FORCE UNDER BRIGADIER SIR COLIN CAMPBELL, K.C.B., IN 1851-52. Mohmand <i>jagirs</i> in British territory. Raids on the Mohmand frontier. Force ordered out from Peshawar, October 1851. Destruction of the Dabb villages on the 28th and 29th of October. Construction of Fort Michni. Affair at Matta on the 8th of December. Attack on cavalry picquet on the 3rd of January. Murder of Lieutenant Boulnois. Removal of the Panjpao villages. Return of force. Brigadier Sir Colin Campbell's despatch. Government letter. AFFAIR AT PANJPAO, UNDER BRIGADIER SIR COLIN CAMPBELL, K.C.B., IN APRIL 1852. Skirmish near Shabkadar on the 31st of March. Action at Panjpao on the 15th of April. Tribal gathering broken up. Government letter. Grant of medal. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE MICHNI MOHMANDS, BY A FORCE UNDER COLONEL SYDNEY J. COTTON, IN 1854. Refusal of the Michni Mohmands to pay the tribute due. Seizure of cattle. Destruction of refractory villages ordered. Attack on Shah Mansur Khel on the 31st of August. Destruction of village. Destruction of Dabb and Sadin on the 2nd of September. Colonel Cotton's despatch. Government letter. Grant of medal. Subsequent behaviour of Momand tribe on our border. Continued raids. Proposals for punitive expedition to Pandiali not sanctioned. Submission of chiefs of Lalpura and Pandiali in 1860. AFFAIRS WITH THE MOHMANDS NEAR SHABKADAR, DECEMBER AND JANUARY 1863-64. Misconduct of tribe in 1863. Skirmishes on the 5th and 7th of December. Action on the 2nd of January. Hostile gathering broken up. Grant of medal. Subsequent events. Murder of Major Macdonald in 1873. OPERATIONS AGAINST THE MOHMANDS IN 1879. AFFAIR AT KAM DAKKA IN APRIL. Raids in the Kama district. Attack on the survey party at Zankai on the 28th of February. Affair at Kam Dakka on the 22nd of April. Gallant defence of the detachment of the Mhairwarra Battalion under Captain O'M. Creagh. OPERATIONS AGAINST THE MOHMANDS IN 1880. ACTION ON THE GARA HEIGHTS IN JANUARY. Hostile gathering of the tribe under Muhammad Sadik Khan and Mulla Khalil. Attack on the Mohmand position on the Gara heights on the 15th of January. Failure of column from Landi Kotal to cut off the retreat of the enemy. Destruction of the village of Rena. Colonel Boisragon's despatch. Subsequent events. APPENDICES ...	227

CHAPTER IX.

PESHAWAR BORDER (*continued*).

AFRIDI TRIBE.

KHAIBAR AND AKA KHEL AFRIDIS.

AFRIDIS. Origin. Tribal divisions. Appearance. Character. Customs. Trade. Blood feuds. Migratory habits. Description of country. Summer and winter settlements. Description of raids. Routes. Clans. KUKI KHELS. MALIKDIN KHELS. KAMBAR KHELS. KAMAR KHELS. ZAKHA KHELS. SIPAHS. AKA KHELS. Fighting strength of Afridi tribe. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE AKA KHEL AFRIDIS, BY A FORCE UNDER LIEUTENANT-COLONEL J. H. CRAIGIE, C.B., in March 1855. Mis-

conduct of Bassi Khel section. Blockade imposed. Attack on Lieutenant Hamilton's camp on the 9th of February 1855. Failure of the attempt to surprise the Aka Khel village of Alam Killi. Skirmish under Lieutenant Tyrwhitt on the 23rd of February. Successful reprisals by the troops under Major Eld. Operations of the force under Lieutenant-Colonel Craigie on the 27th of March. Destruction of Alam Killi and Mir Killi. Lieutenant-Colonel Craigie's despatch. Grant of medal. Submission of tribe. Terms granted. Removal of the blockade. Misconduct of Kuki Khel and Zakha Khel clans. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE ZAKHA KHEL AFRIDIS OF THE BAZAR VALLEY, DECEMBER 1878. Misconduct of the Khaibar Afridis at the commencement of the British occupation of Afghanistan. Punishment of the Zakha Khels of the Bazar valley sanctioned. Advance of columns from Jamrud and Dakka to Bazar. Destruction of towers and villages. Return of troops. Opposition encountered by the Dakka column in the Tabai pass. Despatches. SECOND EXPEDITION AGAINST THE ZAKHA KHEL AFRIDIS OF THE BAZAR VALLEY, JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1879. Continued misconduct of the Khaibar Afridis. Second expedition to Bazar sanctioned. Advance of different columns and junction in the Bazar valley on the 27th of January. Reconnaissance of Bokar pass on the 28th. Advance into Bara valley not carried out. Return of troops. Lieutenant-General Maude's despatch. Subsequent conduct of Khaibar Afridis. Arrangements with reference to the Khaibar pass after the withdrawal of the British troops. Subsequent events. APPENDICES ... 271

CHAPTER X.

PESHAWAR AND KOHAT BORDERS.

AFRIDI TRIBE (*continued*).

ADAM KHEL AFRIDIS.

ADAM KHEL AFRIDIS. Kohat pass. Divisions of the Adam Khels. GALLAI. HASSAN KHEL. JOWAKI. ASHU KHEL. Fighting strength of the Adam Khels. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE KOHAT PASS AFRIDIS, BY A FORCE UNDER BRIGADIER SIR COLIN CAMPBELL, K.C.B., IN FEBRUARY 1850. Attack on a party of sappers near the Kohat *kotal*. Cause of outrage. Advance of force from Peshawar towards the Kohat pass. Operations in the pass. Destruction of villages of Akhor, Zargun Khel, Khui, Sheraki, and Bosti Khel. Brigadier Sir Colin Campbell's despatch. Grant of medal. Attack on the police tower on the Kohat *kotal* on the 1st of March. Murder of Apothecary Healy. Submission of the Kohat Pass Afridis in June 1850. Infraction of agreement. Blockade imposed. Submission of tribe. Urakzais associated with the Afridis in pass responsibility in November 1850. Attack by Afridis on the Urakzai post on the *kotal* in October 1853. Closing of the pass. Fresh arrangements entered into with the Bangash tribe for the management of the pass. Submission of the Kohat Pass Afridis. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE BORI VILLAGES OF THE JOWAKI AFRIDIS, BY A FORCE UNDER COLONEL S. B. BOILEAU, IN NOVEMBER 1853. Misconduct of Jowaki Afridis. Their submission in November 1853, with the exception of the Boriwals. Operations against the Bori Afridis on the 29th of November. Destruction of Bori villages. Colonel Boileau's despatch. Government letter. Grant of medal. Submission of Bori Afridis and agreement entered into by them with the British Government in February 1854. Disturbances in the Kohat pass in 1866. Misconduct of Hassan Khel Afridis. Coercive measures ordered. Their submission in April 1867. Misconduct of Gallai Afridis in 1870. Rupture with the Gallai Afridis in

1876. Blockade imposed. Extension of the blockade to all the Adam Khel sections. Submission of the tribe. Surprise of Gaddia Khel hamlet by a small force from Peshawar on the 15th of August 1877. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE JOWAKI AFRIDIS, BY A FORCE UNDER COLONEL D. MOCATTA, IN AUGUST 1877. Behaviour of Jowakis since 1853. Misconduct in 1877. Causes of outbreak. Punitive expedition into Jowaki country ordered. Operations on the 30th of August. Colonel Mocatta's despatch. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE JOWAKI AFRIDIS, BY A COMBINED FORCE UNDER BRIGADIERS-GENERAL C. P. KEYES, C.B., AND C. C. G. ROSS, C.B., NOVEMBER TO JANUARY 1877-78. Continued hostility and aggression of Jowakis. Operations ordered to be undertaken from Kohat and Peshawar. Advance of the Kohat force into the Jowaki country in three columns on the 9th of November. Operations against Jamu on the 1st of December. Occupation of the Sarghasha ridge by the Peshawar force on the 4th of December. Destruction of villages and towers in the Bori valley on the 6th, 7th, and 8th of December. Successful attack by Brigadier-General Keyes on Ghariba on the 7th of December. Reconnaissance of the Bori Chena pass by Brigadier-General Ross on the 25th of December. Advance of Peshawar force into the Pastaoni valley on the 31st of December. Simultaneous advance of Kohat column. Second advance into the Pastaoni valley on the 15th of January, and combined operations of the Kohat and Peshawar forces in the interior of the Jowaki country. Withdrawal of the whole force towards Kohat. Negotiations opened by the Jowakis. Terms offered. Submission of the tribe on the 4th of March 1878. Despatches of Brigadiers-General Keyes and Ross. Government letter. Grant of medal. Subsequent conduct of Adam Khel Afridis. APPENDICES ... 316

CHAPTER XI.

KOHAT BORDER.

URAKZAI TRIBE.

URAKZAIS. Tribal divisions and fighting strength. Possibility of effecting reprisals against the tribe. Description of Urakzai country. Location of the different sections, and their principal villages. Routes from British territory. *Shia* and *Suni* feud. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE RUBIA KHEL URAKZAIS, BY A FORCE UNDER BRIGADIER N. B. CHAMBERLAIN, IN SEPTEMBER 1855. Misconduct of Urakzais in 1855, in which Rubia Khel section was conspicuous. Punitive measures decided on. Operations against Rubia Khel villages on the 2nd of September. Destruction of Nasin, Sangar, and Katsah. Brigadier Chamberlain's despatch. Submission of Mishti, Rubia Khel, and Shaikhan sections. Government letter. AFFAIR WITH THE BIZOTI URAKZAIS AT THE UBLAN PASS IN MARCH 1868. Misconduct of the Daulatzai division, and the Sipah section of the Muhammad Khel division. Demonstration against the Ublan towers on the 16th of January and 10th of March. Affair at the Ublan pass on the 11th of March. Failure of the attack on the enemy's position. Withdrawal of the troops. Government letter. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE BIZOTI URAKZAIS, BY A FORCE UNDER LIEUTENANT-COLONEL C. P. KEYES, C.B., IN FEBRUARY 1869. Failure of attempt to induce the friendly sections of the Urakzai tribe to coerce the others. Fresh outrage committed. Operations against the village of Gara on the 25th of February. Destruction of the village and retirement of the force. Lieutenant-Colonel Keyes's despatch. Simultaneous demonstration from the Peshawar side. Government letter. Submission of Bizoti, Utman Khel, and Sipah sections. Subsequent behaviour of Urakzai tribe. Misconduct of

	PAGE
certain sections during the British occupation of Afghanistan, 1878-80. Proposals for a punitive expedition not carried out. Our relations with the tribe at the present time. APPENDICES	382

CHAPTER XII.

KOHAT BORDER.

ZAIMUKHT TRIBE.

ZAIMUKHTS. Tribal divisions. Fighting strength. Arms. Description of Zaimukht country. Cultivation. Routes. Principal villages belonging to the different sections. Dependence of tribe on British territory, etc. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE ZAIMUKHTS, BY A FORCE UNDER BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. A. TYTLER, V.C., C.B., IN DECEMBER 1879. Misconduct of the tribe from the commencement of the British occupation of Afghanistan in 1878. Misdeeds crowned by the murder of Lieutenant Kinloch on the 29th of September 1879. Punitive measures ordered. Objects of expedition. Punishment postponed. Successful raid on the Zaimukht hamlet of Dand on the 21st of November. Affair near the Chapri post on the 22nd of November. Preliminary reconnaissances into the Zaimukht country. Advance of the expeditionary force on the 8th of December. Attack on Zawo on the 13th and 14th. Destruction of Zawo and other Khadu Khel hamlets. Destruction of Yasta on the 18th. Coercion of the villages of the Sangroba valley. Return of force to British territory. Brigadier-General Tytler's despatch. Result of the expedition. Government letter. Subsequent conduct of the tribe. APPENDICES	413
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-----

CHAPTER XIII.

KOHAT BORDER.

TURI AND BANGASH TRIBES.

TURI TRIBE. Their origin. Tribal divisions. Appearance. Customs. External feuds. Internal factions. Trade. Former relations with the Kabul Government. BANGASH TRIBE. Origin. Tribal divisions. Characteristics. Connection with the Kohat pass. Description of Miranzai. Its villages, climate, etc. EXPEDITION TO MIRANZAI, BY A FORCE UNDER CAPTAIN J. COKE, IN 1851. Unsettled state of the Miranzai valley after the annexation. Advance of a force to Thal and Biland Khel in October 1851. Settlement made with the Miranzai villages. Return of force. EXPEDITION TO MIRANZAI, BY A FORCE UNDER BRIGADIER N. B. CHAMBERLAIN, IN 1855. Unsatisfactory condition of the Miranzai valley. Expedition sanctioned to enforce the submission of the Miranzai villages. Advance of force into the valley. Affair near Darsamand on the 30th of April. Return of force. Government letter. Grant of medal. EXPEDITION TO MIRANZAI AND KURAM, BY A FORCE UNDER BRIGADIER N. B. CHAMBERLAIN, IN 1856. Misconduct of the Turis after the annexation. Agreement made with them in 1853. Continued misconduct. Expedition to Miranzai and Kuram ordered. Successful surprise of the village of Torawari on the 25th of October. Advance of force to the Kuram fort by the Darwaza pass. Submission of Turi and Bangash <i>maliks</i> . Return of force to Thal. Murder of grass-cutters by Waziri marauders. Surprise of the Miami encampments, and their acceptance of the Government demands. Return of force to Kohat. Government letter. Subsequent conduct of the Miranzai villages. Conduct of Turis since 1856. Friendly attitude during the occupation of Afghanistan, 1878-80. Independence granted to them in 1880. Present unsettled state of tribe. APPENDICES	431
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-----

CHAPTER XIV.

KOHAT AND BANNU BORDERS.

WAZIRI TRIBE.

DARWESH KHEL WAZIRIS.

	PAGE
WAZIRIS. Origin. Tribal divisions and fighting strength. General description of the Waziris. DARWESH KHELS. Utmanzai and Ahmadzai clans. Sub-divisions of these clans, and their location. Immigration of the Ahmadzais in former times to the plains of Bannu. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE UMARZAI WAZIRIS, BY A FORCE UNDER MAJOR J. NICHOLSON, IN 1852. Misconduct of the Umarzais after the annexation. Punitive measures sanctioned in 1852. Plan of operations. Surprise and destruction of the Umarzai settlements on the 21st of December. Government letter. Submission of the Umarzais. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE KABUL KHEL WAZIRIS, BY A FORCE UNDER BRIGADIER-GENERAL N. B. CHAMBERLAIN, C.B., 1859-60. Attack on Bahadur Khel by the Kabul Khels in 1850. Subsequent misconduct. Settlement with them in 1855. Murder of Captain Meham on the 5th of November 1859. Refusal of the Kabul Khels to give up the murderers. Coercive measures necessary.	
• Advance of force from Thal on the 20th of December. Attack on the enemy's position on the 22nd, and destruction of their encampments. Subsequent operations. Submission of the various sections. Return of force. Government letter. Grant of medal. Subsequent surrender and execution of principal murderer. Misconduct of Kabul Khel and Tazi Khel sections in 1869. Complications with the Muhammad Khels in 1870. Their unconditional surrender in September 1871. Punishment of the Umarzai, Bizand Khel, and Sudan Khel sections for aiding the Muhammad Khels. Misconduct of the Zalli Khels on the Gumal border in January 1879. Destruction of the Jatta post, and plunder of the Gumal bazar. Reprisals effected. Submission of the Zalli Khels. Misconduct of different sections of the Darwesh Khel Waziris in 1880. Attack on Turi caravan. Attack on Khatak labour camp. Attack on the Chapri post. Proposals for a punitive expedition against the Mahmit Khel and Tori Khel Waziris not carried out. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE MALIK SHAHI WAZIRI SETTLEMENTS, BY A FORCE UNDER BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. J. H. GORDON, C.B., IN OCTOBER 1880. Object of the expedition. Surprise of the Malik Shahi settlements successfully accomplished on the 28th of October. Realisation of fines due from the Kabul Khel and Malik Shahi sections. Government letter. Subsequent events.	
APPENDICES	458

CHAPTER XV.

BANNU AND DERA ISMAIL KHAN BORDERS.

WAZIRI TRIBE (*continued*).

MAHSUD WAZIRIS AND BATANIS.

MAHSUD WAZIRIS. Tribal divisions. Description of country. Customs, etc. BATANIS. Tribal divisions. Their location. Accessibility from British territory. Trade, etc. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE MAHSUD WAZIRIS, BY A FORCE UNDER BRIGADIER-GENERAL N. B. CHAMBERLAIN, C.B., IN 1860. Misconduct of the Mahsuds after the annexation. Proposals for punitive expedition. Demonstration by a large body of Mahsuds against Tank in March 1860. Their repulse by a detachment of the 5th Punjab Cavalry. Punishment of tribe sanctioned. Advance of force on the 17th of April. Unsuccessful attempt to surprise the village of Shingi

Kot. Advance up the Shahur Zam. Attack on Lieutenant-Colonel Lumsden's camp at Palosin on the 23rd of April. Unsuccessful negotiations. Advance of force. Forcing of the Barari pass on the 4th of May. Arrival at Kaniguram on the 5th. Town spared on payment of fine. Advance to Makin. Destruction of town and villages on the 11th of May. Return of force to British territory by the Khasora valley. Brigadier-General Chamberlain's despatch. Government letter. Grant of medal. Submission of the Mahsuds in June 1862. Subsequent events. Continued misconduct of the tribe. Submission of the Shaman Khels in 1873, and of the Bahlolzais in 1874. OPERATIONS IN THE GUMAL VALLEY AGAINST THE SULIMAN KHEL PAWINDAHS AND OTHERS, IN JANUARY 1879. Raid on Tank on the 1st of January. Disorders on Tank border. Military measures taken. Successful attack on a Suliman Khel <i>kiri</i> near Girni on the 5th of January. Report of the Brigadier-General commanding the Punjab Frontier Force on these operations. Dispersion of the Mahsuds assembled at the mouth of the Tank Zam on the 19th of January. Skirmish in the Larzan pass on the 21st of February. Restoration of order on the Tank border. Punishment of Mahsuds deferred. Terms imposed on the tribe. AFFAIR WITH THE BATANIS OF JANDULA AT THE HINIS TANGI, IN APRIL 1880. Passage given by the Batanis of Jandula to a body of Mahsud raiders. Punishment of Batanis sanctioned. Advance of force towards Jandula on the 12th of April. Affair at the Hinis Tangi. Destruction of Jandula. Return of force. Lieutenant-Colonel Rynd's despatch. Government letter. Submission of the Batanis. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE MAHSUD WAZIRIS, BY A COMBINED FORCE UNDER BRIGADIERS-GENERAL T. G. KENNEDY C.B., AND J. J. H. GORDON, C.B., IN 1881. Continued misconduct of Mahsuds in 1880. Punitive expedition sanctioned in March 1881. Advance of the Tank column on the 18th of April. Surrender of the proscribed headmen with one exception. Affair at Shah Alam on the 3rd of May. Arrival of the force at Kaniguram on the 5th, and at Makin on the 10th of May. Advance of Bannu column by the Khasora valley, and arrival at Razmak on the 9th of May. Return of the Tank column to British territory by the Tank Zam, and of the Bannu column by the Shaktu valley. Despatches. Complete submission of the Mahsuds at the end of 1881. Removal of the blockade. Subsequent events.	
APPENDICES	498

CHAPTER XVI.

BANNU BORDER.

DAWARI TRIBE.

Dawar valley. Upper and Lower Dawar. Fighting strength of Dawaris. Villages of Lower Dawar. Villages of Upper Dawar. Tochi stream. Climate of Dawar valley. Cultivation. Trade. Character of Dawaris. Waziri raids. Passes from British territory. Roads. History of Dawar valley previous to the annexation. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE DAWARIS, BY A FORCE UNDER BRIGADIER-GENERAL C. P. KEYES, C.B., IN MARCH 1872. Misconduct of Dawaris in 1870. Submission of men of Upper Dawar. Unsuccessful efforts to obtain reparation from the inhabitants of Lower Dawar. Coercive measures necessary. Advance of force from Edwardesabad towards the Tochi pass on the 6th of March 1872. Occupation of the Shinki *kotal* by Waziri levies. Cowardly conduct of the levies. Advance of force into Dawar valley on the 7th of March. Attack on the village of Haidar Khel. Destruction of the village. Submission of the Dawaris. Return

of force. Brigadier-General Keyes's despatch. Government letter. Subsequent conduct of Dawaris. Attack on police guard in August 1877. Blockade of Lower Dawar. Submission in June 1878. Misconduct of Dawaris during the occupation of Afghanistan, 1878-80. Raids on the Thal-Bannu and Thal-Kuram roads. Attack on the Baran post in April 1880. Proposals for punishment of tribe in 1881. Plan of operations. Proposals negatived by the Supreme Government. Subsequent events. APPENDICES	561
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

CHAPTER XVII.

DERA ISMAIL KHAN BORDER.

SHIRANI AND USTARANA TRIBES.

SHIRANIS. Tribal divisions. Fighting strength. Appearance. Dress. Food, etc. Villages. Intercourse with British territory. USTARANAS. Formerly <i>Pawindahs</i> . Divided into two clans. Fighting strength. Villages. Trade, etc. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE SHIRANIS, BY A FORCE UNDER BRIGADIER J. S. HODGSON, IN 1853. Misconduct of the Shiranis after the annexation. Raids on British territory. Affair on the 10th of March 1853. Successful attack on the Shirani position in the Draband pass on the 14th of March. Punitive expedition ordered. Advance of force into the Shirani country by the Shekh Haidar pass on the 31st of March. Operations on the 1st and 2nd of April. Return of force. Brigadier Hodgson's despatch. Grant of medal. Subsequent conduct of the tribe. Border responsibility of Gandapur chief enforced in 1873. Attack of Shiranis on party of Gandapur workmen on the 22nd of March 1875. Misconduct of Shiranis in 1882. Refusal of Chuhar Khel section to send in their representatives. Blockade of the tribe. Their submission in July 1883. SURVEY EXPEDITION TO THE TAKHT-I-SULIMAN MOUNTAIN IN 1883. Desirability of surveying the Takht-i-Suliman recognised. Expedition sanctioned in 1883. Frontier crossed on the 18th of November. Opposition encountered on the 26th. Completion of survey operations. Return of force to British territory on the 6th of December. APPENDICES	578
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

CHAPTER XVIII.

DERA GHAZI KHAN BORDER.

KASRANI, BOZDAR, KHOSA, LAGHARI, AND KHETRAN TRIBES.

KASRANIS. BOZDARS. KHOSAS. LAGHARIS. KHETRANS. Tribal divisions, fighting strength, etc., of these tribes. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE KASRANIS BY A FORCE UNDER BRIGADIER J. S. HODGSON, IN APRIL 1853. Misconduct of the Kasranis after the annexation. Attack in force by Kasranis on Dera Fateh Khan on the 17th of March 1852. Blockade of the tribe. Punitive expedition sanctioned in the spring of 1853. Forcing of the Bati pass on the 12th of April. Destruction of Bati and other hamlets. Retirement of force. Brigadier Hodgson's despatch. Grant of medal. Subsequent arrangement entered into with Kasranis. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE BOZDARS, BY A FORCE UNDER BRIGADIER N. B. CHAMBERLAIN, IN MARCH 1857. Allowances to Bozdars continued after the annexation. Numerous outrages committed by the tribe. Allowances discontinued in 1856. Punitive measures sanctioned at the beginning of 1857. Advance of force by the Sangarh pass on the 6th of March. Forcing of the Khan Band on the 7th. Plan of attack. Successful execution. Brigadier Chamberlain's despatch. Subsequent operations in the Bozdar country. Submission of the tribe to the Government demands on the

15th of March. Return of force. Grant of medal. Good effect of punishment on the Bozdar tribe. Attack on the Bozdars by the Khetrans and other tribes in 1861. Lieutenant Grey carried off into the Kasrani hills, but subsequently released, in 1868. Successful measures adopted to punish this outrage. Violation of British territory by the Khetrans, in pursuance of a quarrel with the Bozdars, in December 1875. Fine realised from the tribe. Similar misconduct of the Bozdars, in pursuance of a quarrel with the Bugti tribe. Offending section blockaded. Submission of the tribe. Visit of the district officer to the Bozdar hills in 1878. Settlement of cases against the tribe. Subsequent events on their border. APPENDICES 596

CHAPTER XIX.

DERA GHAZI KHAN BORDER.

GURCHANI, MAZARI, MARRI, AND BUGTI TRIBES.

GURCHANIS. MAZARIS. MARRIS. BUGTIS. Tribal divisions, fighting strength, etc., of these tribes. Operations of a British force in the Bugti and Marri hills in 1839. Advance of a detachment under Captain Brown, in May 1840, to garrison Kahan. Destruction of two parties of British troops by Marris on the 16th of May. Garrison of Kahan besieged. Failure of relieving force, under Major Clibborn, to force the Nuffusak pass on the 31st of August. Disastrous retreat to British territory. Evacuation of Kahan, and retirement of garrison, on the 28th of September 1840. Operations against the Bugtis, by a force under Major-General Sir Charles Napier, G.C.B., in 1845. Continued misconduct of the Bugtis. Successful raid on British territory, in December 1846. Affair between the Bugtis and a detachment of the Sind Irregular Horse, under Lieutenant Merewether, on the 1st of October 1847. Submission of Bugti chief. Raid on the Kasmor post on the 7th of April 1849. Conduct of the Mazaris and Gurchanis after the annexation. Successful raid by Marris and Gurchanis on the 17th of August 1857. Operations against the Marris by the Khan of Kelat in 1859. Raid on Harrand on the 26th of January 1867. Subsequent conduct of the tribes on this border. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE MARRIS, BY A FORCE UNDER BRIGADIER-GENERAL C. M. MACGREGOR, C.B., C.S.I., C.I.E., IN 1880. Misconduct of Marris in August 1880. Punitive expedition ordered. Terms offered to the tribe. Advance of force to Quat-Mandai on the 13th of October. March through the Marri country to Kahan. Submission of the tribe to the Government demands. Retirement of the force to British territory. Brigadier-General MacGregor's despatch. Government letter. Final settlement made with the Marris in January 1881. Subsequent conduct of the tribe. Conduct of the Gurchanis up to the present time ... 623

CHAPTER XX.

APPENDICES.

APPENDIX I.—Composition of the Punjab Frontier Force at the present time.

APPENDIX II.—List of outposts on the North-West Frontier held by troops of the Punjab Frontier Force and Militia, on the 1st of January 1884. APPENDIX III.—Extracts from orders issued to the Field Forces under his command by Brigadier-General Sir N. B. Chamberlain, K.C.B.

APPENDIX IV.—Table of expeditions undertaken against the frontier tribes since the annexation of the Punjab 647

GLOSSARY 656

INDEX 660

LIST OF MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

	PAGE
(1) General map to illustrate the Record of Expeditions against the North-West Frontier tribes	<i>Frontispiece.</i>
(2) Skeleton map, showing the country of the Chilasis, Kohistanis, and cis-Indus Swatis	24
(3) Map of the Black Mountain and country adjoining Agror, illustrating the operations against the Hassanzais, by a force under Lieutenant-Colonel F. Mackeson, C.B., 1852-53; and against the Black Mountain tribes, by a force under Major-General A. T. Wilde, C.B., C.S.I., 1868.	68
(4) Sketch of the affair at Narinji, by a force under Major J. L. Vaughan, August 1857	88
(5) Map of part of the Peshawar and Hazara borders, to illustrate the military operations against the Hindustani fanatics and certain refractory villages in 1853, 1857, 1858, and 1863-64	100
(6) Sketch of British position above Panj Dara, or the Ambela pass	108
(7) Map of part of the Peshawar border, to illustrate the military operations against certain refractory villages, and against the Swat, Utman Khel, and Mohmand tribes, from 1849 to 1878	206
(8) Explanatory sketch of the engagement on the heights of Panjpao, fought on the 15th April 1852	238
(9) Rough sketch to illustrate the affair with the Mohmands at Kam Dakka on the 22nd April 1879	254
(10) Map of the Mohmand country, to illustrate the affairs of Kam Dakka, 22nd April 1879, and the Gara heights, 15th January 1880	264
(11) Map to illustrate the operations against the Zakha Khel Afridis in the Bazar valley, in December 1878 and January 1879, under Lieutenant-General F. F. Maude, V.C., C.B.	294
(12) Map of a portion of the Afridi country, to illustrate the military operations against the Aka Khel Afridis in 1855, and against the Adam Khel Afridis in 1850 and 1853	320
(13) Map of the Adam Khel country, to illustrate the military operations against the Jowaki Afridis, 1877-78	372
(14) Rough sketch of the Ublan pass, to illustrate the operations against the Bizoti Urakzais on the 11th March 1868	396
(15) Sketch to illustrate the operations against the Bizoti Urakzais on the 11th March 1868	398
(16) Sketches illustrating the operations of a force under Lieutenant-Colonel C. P. Keyes, C.B., against the Bizotis, 25th February 1869	402

	PAGE
(17) Map to illustrate the movements of the Miranzai Field Force in 1851, 1855, and 1856; and the operations against the Urakzai tribe in 1855, 1868, and 1869, and against the Zaimukhts in 1879 ...	408
(18) Sketch to illustrate the attack on the Zawo heights. Advanced guard operations, 13th December 1879 ...	422
(19) Sketch to illustrate attack on Zawo, Zaimukht country, under Brigadier-General J. A. Tytler, V.C., C.B., 13th and 14th December 1879 ...	424
(20) Map to illustrate the operations against the Umarzai Waziris in 1852; of the force, under Brigadier-General N. B. Chamberlain, C.B., against the Kabul Khel Waziris in 1859-60; and against the Malik Shahi winter encampments, under Brigadier-General J. J. H. Gordon, C.B., in 1880 ...	494
(21) Rough sketch of camp, Palosin, Mahsud Waziri expedition, 23rd April 1860 ...	514
(22) Sketch to illustrate the attack in the Barari pass by the force under Brigadier-General N. B. Chamberlain, C.B., on the 4th May 1860 ...	518
(23) Sketch of position occupied by the Waziris in the affair of Shah Alam, on the 3rd of May 1881 ...	546
(24) Map of the Mahsud Waziri country, to illustrate the operations of the force under Brigadier-General N. B. Chamberlain, C.B., in 1860; and of the combined force under Brigadiers-General T. G. Kennedy, C.B., and J. J. H. Gordon, C.B., in 1881 ...	552
(25) Sketch of Lower Dawar, to illustrate the operations of the force under Brigadier-General C. P. Keyes, C.B., in March 1872 ...	568
(26) Map of the Dawar valley, to illustrate the operations of the force under Brigadier-General C. P. Keyes, C.B., in March 1872 ...	570
(27) Map of part of the Shirani country, to illustrate the operations of the force under Brigadier J. S. Hodgson, in 1853; and the route followed by the survey expedition to the Takht-i-Suliman in 1883 ...	592
(28) Explanatory sketch of the forcing of the Khan Band, held by the Bozdar tribe against a force under Brigadier N. B. Chamberlain, on the 7th March 1857 ...	608
(29) Map of Marri country, to illustrate the movements of the expeditionary force under Brigadier-General C. M. MacGregor, C.B., C.S.I., C.I.E., October and November 1880 ...	646

RECORD OF EXPEDITIONS

AGAINST THE

NORTH-WEST FRONTIER TRIBES.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.

THE north-west frontier line commences from the top of the Khagan glen (a dependency of Hazara), near Chilas on the north-west corner of the Maharaja of Kashmir's territory, and then passes round the north-west boundary of Hazara to Torbela; crossing the Indus, it winds round the north and north-western boundary of the Peshawar valley to the Khaibar pass. From there it skirts the Afridi hills, and follows the north-west boundary of the Kohat district along the Miranzai valley to Thal. Turning to the east it encloses the Waziri hills, and then runs almost due south at the base of the Suliman range to a point near Kasmor on the Indus, on the borders of Sind. The frontier line has never been strictly defined, and the boundary shown on maps is merely that of the topographical survey, the limits of which were influenced by considerations of departmental convenience, and not of general policy.

*Description of
the north-west
frontier line.*

The Punjab frontier comprises the six districts of Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan and Dera Ghazi Khan. The total length of this frontier is about 704 miles.*

Of the six districts mentioned, two, Hazara and Kohat, are hilly and in parts mountainous. The other four are almost level plains, only broken by deep ravines and torrent beds, which make even the Peshawar valley difficult for the movements of cavalry and guns. The characteristics of the people inhabiting them differ very greatly, and it is necessary, in as few words as possible, to describe each district before giving an account of the independent tribes beyond the border.

				Length of frontier of district
Hazara...	120 miles
Peshawar	170 "
Kohat	60 "
Bannu	60 "
Dera Ismail Khan	124 "
Dera Ghazi Khan	170 "

*Frontier
districts :
Hazara,
Peshawar,
Kohat.*

The Hazara district is the most northern. The upper portion of it, especially that known as Khagan, is entirely composed of mountain ranges covered with magnificent forests; the lower portion of the district is, although elevated, more level, and, possessing an abundant supply of water, produces excellent crops. The population is generally peaceable and unwarlike. Its largest element consists of immigrants expelled, some centuries ago, from the neighbouring Swat valley, a physically weak and contemptible race. These form nearly a third of the inhabitants of the Hazara district; nearly half the remainder is composed of descendants from Rajput and other Hindu tribes, Gujars, Ghakkars, Dunds, and Karals, who have for the most part adopted the Muhammadan creed. They are industrious and good cultivators, and form the best part of the Hazara population. Descendants of Afghan immigrants, related to the Yusafzai and other tribes in the neighbourhood, constitute a fifth of the whole.

The Peshawar district contrasts remarkably with that just described. Consisting of a wide and level plain, it is abundantly watered by the large rivers of Swat and Kabul, and is broken only by deep ravines which intersect it in every direction. The length from north to south is fifty miles, but the border adjoining independent territory is 170 miles long, adjoining the lands of the Gaduns, Bunerwals, Baizais, Ranizais, Utman Khels, Mohmands, and Afridis, all independent and fanatical tribes. From Sikh and Afghan days Peshawar has had an infamous reputation for the character of its inhabitants, who required for their control the sternest administrators the Sikh Government had at its command, and for its climate, which, owing to excessive irrigation from the streams and rivers, and also from the valley being enclosed by lofty hills, is, at certain seasons of the year, pestilential in the extreme. The inhabitants are strangely mixed. Ninety-five per cent. are Muhammadans, the few Hindus being found as bankers, merchants, and shopkeepers in the city of Peshawar and the larger villages. This observation, indeed, applies to all the districts south of Peshawar. The total population of this district is rather more than half a million, of which about one-sixth are Yusafzais, an Afghan clan inhabiting the high plain to the north. After the Yusafzais the most important tribe is the Mohmand, about 30,000 in number, and related to the independent tribe of the same name beyond the border. The remainder of the population is made up of numerous Afghan tribes, representing all the tribes and clans on the Peshawar border, and Punjabi Muhammadans from cis-Indus districts.

The district of Kohat is almost entirely composed of a system of low, barren hills, from which it derives its name, intermingled with small but fertile valleys. The importance of the district is due to the existence of extensive salt mines, the produce of which is used throughout trans-Indus territory and Afghanistan, and which, chiefly from political considerations, is taxed much more lightly than the produce of the Jhelum mines, which supply the greater part of Northern India to the east of the Indus. Recently the price of salt at the Kohat mines has been raised, and this subject will again be referred to further on, when we come to speak of our relations with the Afridis, who are the principal carriers of the Kohat salt. The city of Peshawar is the central depôt of the salt trade, whence it is taken by traders to Jalalabad, Kashmir and Kashgar, and exchanged for the produce of these countries. About two-thirds of the population of the Kohat district are Afghans, and of these one-third are Khataks, who inhabit the north of the district, and are one of the finest tribes on the whole frontier,

and supply our regiments with many of their best soldiers. The Bangash tribe is almost as numerous, and is generally quiet and well disposed.

*Frontier districts:
Bannu, Dera
Ismail Khan,
Dera Ghazi
Khan.*

The Bannu district consists of a flat open plain like Peshawar, and, like it, is abundantly watered by the Kuram and Gumbela rivers. The rainfall being very scanty, cultivation is almost entirely dependent upon irrigation from the streams. In the trans-Indus portion of the district are the Bannuchis, a mongrel Afghan tribe, who are about the worst specimens of the race on the frontier. Their physique, owing to the malarious climate, is as degraded as their morals. They are cowardly and unwarlike, and on this account give less trouble than the next most important section of the population, the Waziris, who are in appearance and in character immeasurably their superiors. The south of the Bannu district is inhabited by the Marwatis, a high-caste Pathan race, brave, simple and honest, who form as great a contrast as can be conceived to their northern neighbours, the Bannuchis.

In the Dera Ismail Khan district, owing to the rainfall being very small and irrigation wanting, the country for the most part is little better than a desert, and can only be cultivated in those exceptional years when abundant rain may happen to fall. That portion of the district, however, which has a sufficiency of irrigation, and especially the Tank valley, is fertile. The country on the west of the Indus falls with an almost imperceptible slope from the independent hills to the Indus. The original population of the district seems to have been Jat. Then came an immigration of Biluchis from the south, forming the bulk of the present population of the Kulachi sub-division, below the Ustarana country, few being found north of the town of Dera Ismail Khan. In the south they are the dominant class; in the country cis-Indus, they are mixed with, and practically on an equality with the Jats. The only Biluch tribe found together in any numbers are the Kasranis, inhabiting the country about Daulatwala. The Pathans occupy the north of the district up to Isa Khel, together with Marwatis, all recent settlers, and rapidly increasing in numbers.

The characteristics of the Dera Ghazi Khan district resemble closely those of the trans-Indus portion of Dera Ismail Khan. It consists of a strip of country lying between the Indus and the hills, here entirely occupied by Biluch tribes. The character of its independent neighbours has exercised as great an influence upon the interior of Dera Ghazi Khan as it has in the districts to the north. One-third of the population is Biluch, one-half are Jats, originally of Hindu descent, but Muhammadans for many generations past, and the remainder is composed of Pathan immigrants, and a larger proportion of pure Hindus than are found elsewhere on the border. The character of the population of Dera Ghazi Khan may generally be described as being as well disposed and law-abiding as that of any district in Northern India.

With regard to the communications along the frontier, these are still very defective, which is partly owing to the nature of the country. Communications are carried on for the greater portion of the length of the frontier by two roads, one in the interior of the districts, connecting the principal towns, and the other, close to the border, connecting the military out-posts. All travelling has to be done on horses or camels, and during the rainy season, owing to the nature of the soil, this is difficult, as the ground becomes very slippery. The only break in the frontier line is where a narrow

*Defence of
the frontier.*

strip of independent territory intervenes between the important stations of Peshawar and Kohat.

The military defence of the frontier is, one district excepted, entrusted to the Punjab Frontier Force,* under the immediate orders of the Lieutenant-Governor of the province. This force consists of:—

- 4 Regiments of Punjab Cavalry,
- 1 Regiment Corps of Guides, Cavalry and Infantry,
- 4 Mountain Batteries of Artillery,
- 1 Garrison Battery of Artillery,
- 4 Regiments of Sikh Infantry,
- 5 Regiments of Punjab Infantry,
- 1 Regiment of Gurkhas,

and is commanded by a Brigadier-General.

The exception, above mentioned, is the Peshawar district. Peshawar itself is the headquarters of a brigade of the Bengal Army, and, with Nowshera and five outlying fortresses in the valley, absorb nearly a fourth of the whole Bengal force in the Punjab.

A large proportion of the men in the Punjab Frontier Force are recruits from independent territory, who take service readily and make excellent soldiers. All the troops of the Frontier Force are supplied with carriage, and ready to move out at a moment's notice.

In addition to the regular troops, there are the frontier militia, who are enlisted for the protection of the border, and hold the intermediate outposts not occupied by troops.

We now come to the consideration of the independent tribes beyond the border. The following list gives the principal tribes, and also shows the districts which they adjoin, and their estimated number of fighting men. The figures, however, must be accepted only as an approximation. They comprise all the adult males in the tribes capable of bearing arms; and in the case of no single tribe would it be possible to bring into the field much more than half the numbers here given, even were it not that, with the Afghans, feuds of the most deadly description between the numerous sections of a particular tribe prevent them from coalescing as a whole, except in the presence of extreme danger threatening the safety of the whole tribe:—

Locality.	Tribe.	Race.	Number of fighting men.
Adjoining Hazara ...	Cis-Indus Swatis ...	Pathan	10,846
	Hassanzais ...		2,000
	Akazais ...		700
	Chagarzais ...		5,340
	Pariari Syads ...		400
	Mada Khels ...		3,000
	Amazais ...		1,500
	Utmanzais ...		400
	Gaduns ...		2,500
	Khudu Khels ...		1,800
Adjoining Peshawar ...	Chamlawals ...	Pathan (dependent on Kabul)	1,000
	Bunerwals ...		8,000
	Swat Baizais ...		6,000
	Swat Ranizais ...		3,000
	Utman Khels ...		5,000
	Mohmands (including Safis 2,500, and Mullagoris 400) ...		20,300

* See Appendix I, Chap. xx.

Locality.	Tribe.	Race.	Number of fighting men.	Independent frontier tribes.
Adjoining Peshawar & Kohat	Afridis	Pathan	26,500	
Adjoining Kohat	Urakzais		24,880	
	Zaimukhts		3,500	
Adjoining Kohat, Bannu, and Dera Ismail Khan	Turis		6,100	
	Waziris		41,530	
Adjoining Bannu	Batanis		3,015	
	Dawaris		9,000	
Adjoining Dera Ismail Khan	Shiranis		3,500	
	Ustaranas		900	
Adjoining Dera Ghazi Khan	Kasranis	Biluch	1,500	
	Bozdars		2,700	
	Khosas		4,000	
	Lagharis		3,700	
	Khetrans	Pathan and Biluch	2,250	
	Gurchanis		2,600	
	Mazaris	Biluch	2,000	
	Marris		3,000	
	Bugtis		1,500	

The two great nations, the Biluch and Pathan, thus hold the whole country to the west of the Punjab, the former lying to the south and the latter to the north of a line drawn from the western face of the Sulimans opposite Dera Ghazi Khan almost due west to Quetta.

But in the trans-Indus valley and on the Punjab face of the Suliman range the Biluchis have pushed much further north than this, and the southern border of the Dera Ismail Khan district roughly marks the common boundary, while on this side of the river the Biluchis again stretch somewhat further to the north than on the other.

The Biluchis and Pathans* are both foreigners in the Punjab proper, and have entered its political boundaries within the last few hundred years, though it is not impossible that in doing so the Pathans only re entered a country which their ancestors had left more than a thousand years before. Yet their freedom from the irksome and artificial restrictions of caste, and the comparative licence which their tribal customs permit them in the matter of intermarriage, have caused their example to produce a marked effect upon the neighbouring Indian races; and it is the proximity of these races, and the force of that example daily set before them by nations living next door, to which, far more than to the mere political supremacy of a Muhammadan dynasty, or adoption of the Muhammadan creed, may be attributed the laxity of caste rules and observances which characterises the people of our western plains.

The Biluch presents in many respects a very strong contrast to his neighbour the Pathan. Both have most of the virtues and many of the vices peculiar to a wild and semi-civilised life. To both, hospitality is a sacred duty and the safety of the guest inviolable; both look upon the exaction of "blood for blood" as the first duty of man; both follow strictly a code of honour of their own, though one very different from that of modern Europe; both believe in one God, whose name is *Allah* and whose prophet is Muhammad. But the one attacks his enemy from the front, the other from behind; the one is bound by his promises,† the other by his interests; in short, the Biluch is less turbu-

* This account of the Biluch and Pathan races is taken from Ibbotson's Report of the Census, 1881.

† There is in the hills above Harrand a "stone or cairn of cursing", erected as a perpetual memorial of one who betrayed his fellow.

Biluch race.

lent, less treacherous, less bloodthirsty, and less fanatical than the Pathan; he has less of God in his creed and less of the devil in his nature. His frame is shorter and more spare and wiry than that of his neighbour to the north, though generations have given to him, too, a bold and manly bearing. Frank and open in his manners, and without severity, fairly truthful when not corrupted by our courts, faithful to his word, temperate and enduring, and looking upon courage as the highest virtue, the true Biluch of the Derajat is a pleasant man to have dealings with. As a revenue payer he is not so satisfactory; his want of industry, and the pride which looks upon manual labour as degrading, making him but a poor husbandman. He is an expert rider; horse racing is his national amusement, and the Biluch breed of horses is celebrated throughout northern India. He is a thief by tradition and descent, for he says, "God will not favour a Biluch who does not steal and rob," and "The Biluch who steals secures heaven to seven generations of his ancestors." But he has become much more honest under the civilising influences of our rule. His face is long and oval, his features finely cut, and his nose aquiline; he wears his hair long, and usually in oily curls, and lets his beard and whiskers grow, and he is very filthy in person, considering cleanliness as a mark of effeminacy. He usually carries a sword, knife, and shield; he wears a smock-frock reaching to his heels and pleated across the waist, loose drawers and a long cotton scarf, and all these must be white, or as near it as dirt will allow of, insomuch that he will not enter our army because he there would be obliged to wear a coloured uniform. His wife wears a sheet over her head, a long sort of night-gown reaching to her ankles, and wide drawers; her clothes may be red or white; and she plaits her hair in a long *queue*.

As the true Biluch is nomad in his habits, he does not seclude his women; but he is extremely jealous of female honour. In cases of detected adultery, the man is killed and the woman hangs herself by order. Even when on the war trail, the women and children of his enemy are safe from him. The Biluch of the hills lives in huts or temporary camps, and wanders with his herds from place to place. In the plains he has settled in small villages; but the houses are of the poorest possible description. A tally of lives due is kept between the various tribes or families, and when the account grows complicated, it can be settled by betrothals, or even by payment of cattle.

The Biluchis are nominally Musalmans, but singularly ignorant of their religion and neglectful of its rites and observances; and though, if their ejection from Arabia be true, they must have originally been *Shia*, they now belong almost without exception to the *Suni* sect. The Biluchis themselves claim to be Arabs by origin, while some hold them to be of Turkoman stock; their customs are said to support the latter theory; their features certainly favour the former. Their language is a branch of the old Persian, but it is being gradually superseded on the Punjab frontier by Multani or Jatki. They have no written character and no literature; but they are passionately fond of poetry, chiefly consisting of ballads describing the events of national or tribal history, and of love songs; and local poets are still common among them.

When the Biluchis moved northwards towards our border, they were divided into two great branches, the Rind and the Lashari, and at the present day all the Biluch tribes consider themselves as belonging to one or other of these divisions.

Sohrab Khan, the chief of the Dunki, a Rind tribe, is the nominal head of the Biluchis, or at any rate of those on our frontier; while all the northern tribes beyond our border acknowledge the supremacy of the Khan of Kelat, a

supremacy the reality of which has always varied with the personal character of the *Khan*, and which it is probable that our own frontier policy has lately saved from total extinction. But for all practical purposes the frontier tribes are independent both of foreigners and of one another, and are held together by a common nationality against outsiders only. *Biluch race.*

The tribe, at least in its present form, is a political and not an ethnic unit, and consists of a conglomeration of clans bound together by allegiance to a common chief. Probably every tribe contains a nucleus of two, three, or more clans descended from a common ancestor, but round these have collected a number of affiliated sections; for, the cohesion between the various parts of a tribe or clan is not always of the strongest, and it is not very uncommon for a clan or portion of a clan to quarrel with its brethren, and, leaving its tribe, to claim the protection of a neighbouring chief. They then become his *hamsayas*, or dwellers beneath the same shade, and he is bound to protect them and they to obey him. In this manner a small section, formerly belonging to the Laghari tribe and still bearing its name, has attached itself to the Kasranis. Thus, too, Rind tribes are sometimes found to include Lashari clans. So when Nasir Khan, the great Khan of Kelat, who assisted Ahmad Shah in his invasion of Delhi, reduced the Hasani tribe and drove them from their territory, they took refuge with the Khetrans, of which tribe they now form a clan. Even strangers are often affiliated in this manner.

The tribe (*tuman*), under its chief or *tumandar*, is divided into a small number of clans (*para*) with their *mukadams* or headmen, and each clan into more numerous sections (*phali*). Below the *phali* come the families, of which it will sometimes contain as few as a dozen. The clans are based upon common descent; and identity of clan name, even in two different tribes, almost certainly indicates a common ancestor. The section is of course only an extended family. The tribal names are often patronymic, ending in the Biluch termination, *ani*, such as Gurchani; or in some few cases in the Pushtu, *zai*.

An individual is commonly known by the name of his clan, the sections being comparatively unimportant. Marriage within the section is forbidden, and this appears to be the only restriction. The Biluchis freely marry Jat women, though the first wife to a chief will always be a Biluchni.

The Pathan, as already stated, presents in many respects a strong contrast to the Biluch. He is bloodthirsty, cruel, and vindictive in the highest degree; he does not know what truth or faith is, insomuch that the saying *Afghan be iman* has passed into a proverb among his neighbours; and though he is not without courage of a sort, and is often reckless of his life, he would scorn to face an enemy whom he could stab from behind, or meet him on equal terms if it were possible to take advantage of him, however meanly. It is easy to convict him out of his own mouth. Here are some of his proverbs: "A cousin's tooth breaks upon a cousin"—"Keep a cousin poor, but use him"—"When he is little, play with him; when he is grown up, he is a cousin; fight him"—"Speak good words to an enemy very softly; gradually destroy him root and branch."* At the same time he has his code of honour, which he observes strictly, and which he quotes with pride under the name of *Pakhtunwali*. It imposes upon him three chief obligations—to shelter and protect even an enemy who comes as a suppliant; to revenge by retaliation; and to give open-handed hospitality to any who may demand it. And of these

* The Pushtu word *tarbur* is used indifferently for *cousin* or for *enemy*.

Pathan race. three, perhaps the last is the greatest. And there is a sort of charm about him, especially about the leading men, which almost makes one forget his treacherous nature. As the proverb says, "The Pathan is one moment a saint and the next a devil." For centuries he has been, on our frontier at least, subject to no man. He leads a wild, free, active life in the rugged fastnesses of his mountains; and there is an air of masculine independence about him which is refreshing in a country like India. He is a bigot of the most fanatical type, exceedingly proud, and extraordinarily superstitious. He is of stalwart make, and his features are often of a markedly Semitic type. His hair, plentifully oiled, hangs long and straight to his shoulders;* he wears a loose tunic, baggy drawers, a sheet or blanket, sandals, and a sheepskin coat with its wool inside; his favourite colour is dark blue;† and his national arms, the long, heavy Afghan knife and the matchlock or *jazail*. His women wear a loose shift, wide, wrinkled drawers down to their ankles, and a wrap over the head. Both sexes are filthy in their persons.

Such is the Pathan in his home among the fastnesses of the frontier ranges. But the Pathans of our territory have been much softened by our rule, and by the agricultural life at the plains, so that they look down upon the Pathans of the hills, and their proverbs have it—"A hill man is no man"; and again, "Don't class burrs as grass, or a hill man as a human being." The Pathans are extraordinarily jealous of female honour, and most of the blood feuds for which they are so famous originate in quarrels about women. As a race, they strictly seclude their females; but the poorer tribes and the poorer members of all tribes are prevented from doing so by their poverty. The Pathan pretends to be purely endogamous, and beyond the border he probably is so; while even in British territory the first wife will generally be a Pathan, except among the poorest classes. At the same time, Pathan women beyond the Indus are seldom if ever married to any but Pathans. They intermarry very closely, avoiding only the prohibited degrees of Islam. Their rules of inheritance are tribal and not Muhammadan, though some few of the more educated families have lately begun to follow the Musalman law. Their social customs differ much from tribe to tribe, or rather perhaps from the wilder to the more civilised section of the nation. The Pathans beyond and upon our frontier live in fortified villages, to which are attached stone towers in commanding positions, which serve as watch towers and places of refuge for the inhabitants. Raids from the hills into the plains are still not uncommon; and beyond the Indus, the people, even in British territory, seldom sleep far from the walls of the village.

With regard to the tribal organisation of the Pathans, the tribe is probably far more homogeneous in its constitution than among the Biluchis. Syad, Turk, and other clans have occasionally been affiliated to it; but as a rule, people of foreign descent preserve their tribal individuality, becoming merely associated, and not intermingled, with the tribes among whom they have settled. Even then they generally claim Pathan origin on the female side, and the tribe is usually descended, in theory at least, from a common ancestor.

The *hamsaya* custom, already mentioned, by which strangers are protected by the tribe with which they dwell, is in full force among the Pathans

* This is not the case with the northern Pathans, who shave their heads and often their beards also.

† The colour and cut of the clothes vary greatly with the tribe.

as amongst the the Biluchis. But with the former, though it does protect in many cases families of one tribe who have settled with another, it seldom accounts for any considerable portion of the tribe; and its action is chiefly confined to traders, menials, and other dependents of foreign extraction, who are protected by, but not received into, the tribe. The nation is divided genealogically into a few great sections which have no corporate existence, and the tribe is now the practical unit, though the common name and tradition of common descent are still carefully preserved in the memory of the people. Each section of a tribe, however small, has its leading man, who is known as *malik*, a specially Pathan title. In many, but by no means in all, tribes, there is a *Khan Khel*, usually the eldest branch of the tribe, whose *malik* is known as *Khan*, and acts as chief of the whole tribe. But he is seldom more than their leader in war and their agent in dealings with others; possesses influence rather than power; and the real authority rests with the *jirga*, a democratic council composed of all the *maliks*. The tribe is split up into numerous clans, and these again into sections. The tribe, clan, and section are alike distinguished by patronymics formed from the name of the common ancestor by the addition of the word *zai* or *khel*; *zai* being the corruption of the Pushtu word *zoe*, meaning son, while *khel* is an Arabic word meaning an association or company. Both terms are used indifferently for both the larger and smaller divisions.*

The stock of names being limited, the nomenclature is extremely puzzling, certain names recurring in very different tribes in the most perplexing manner. Moreover, the title which genealogical accuracy would allot to a tribe or clan is often very different from that by which it is known for practical purposes, the people having preferred to be called by the name of a junior ancestor who had acquired a local renown. The frontier tribe, whether within or beyond our border, has almost without an exception a very distinct corporate existence; each tribe, and within each tribe each clan, occupying a clearly defined tract of country, though they are in the Indus valley often the owners merely, rather than the occupiers, of the country, the land and smaller villages being largely in the hands of a mixed population of Hindu origin, who cultivate subject to the superior rights of the Pathans. These people are included by the Pathans under the generic and semi-contemptuous name of Hindki—a term very analogous to the Jat of the Biluch frontier, and which includes all Muhammadans who, being of Hindu origin, have been converted to Islam in comparatively recent times.

The original Afghans are probably a race of Jewish or Arab extraction, and the Pathans of Indian origin; but on this point there is a great conflict of opinion, and not a few deny that there is any distinction whatever between the original Afghan and Pathan stocks. But, however this may be, the nation to which the names are now applied indifferently in Persian and Pushtu, respectively, are without exception Musalmans, and for the most part bigoted followers of the *Suni* sect, hating and persecuting the *Shias*.

In a report on the relations of the British Government with the frontier tribes in 1855, Mr. Temple, the Secretary of the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab, thus wrote of their character:—"Now these tribes are savages—noble savages, perhaps—and not without some tincture of virtue and

* When our ill-fated Resident, Sir Louis Cavagnari, was lately living at Cabul under the Amir Yakub Khan, those who favoured the British were known as Cavignarizai, and the national party as Yakubzai. The ending *zai* is never used by the Afridis.

*Relations of
the British
Government
with the
frontier tribes
in 1855.*

generosity, but still absolutely barbarians nevertheless. They have nothing approaching to government or civil institutions. They have, for the most part, no education. They have nominally a religion, but Muhammadanism, as understood by them, is no better, or perhaps is actually worse, than the creeds of the wildest race on earth. In their eyes the one great commandment is blood for blood, and fire and sword for all infidels, that is, for all people not Muhammadans. They are superstitious and priest-ridden. But the priests (*mullas*) are as ignorant as they are bigoted, and use their influence simply for preaching crusades against unbelievers, and inculcate the doctrine of rapine and bloodshed against the defenceless people of the plain. The hill men are sensitive in regard to their women, but their customs in regard to marriage and betrothal are very prejudicial to social advancement; at the same time they are a sensual race. They are very avaricious; for gold, they will do almost anything, except betray a guest. They are thievish and predatory to the last degree. The Pathan mother often prays that her son may be a successful robber. They are utterly faithless to public engagements; it would never even occur to their minds that an oath on the *Koran* was binding, if against their interests. It must be added that they are fierce and bloodthirsty. They are never without weapons. When grazing their cattle, when driving beasts of burden, when tilling the soil, they are still armed. They are perpetually at war with each other. Every tribe and section of a tribe has its internecine wars, every family its hereditary blood feuds, and every individual his personal foes. There is hardly a man whose hands are unstained. Every person counts up his murders. Each tribe has a debtor and creditor account with its neighbours, life for life. Reckless of the lives of others, they are not sparing of their own. They consider retaliation and revenge to be the strongest of all obligations. They possess gallantry and courage themselves, and admire such qualities in others. Men of the same party will stand by one another in danger. To their minds, hospitality is the first of virtues. Any person who can make his way into their dwellings will not only be safe, but will be kindly received. But as soon as he has left the roof of his entertainer, he may be robbed or killed. They are charitable to the indigent of their own tribe. They possess the pride of birth, and regard ancestral associations. They are not averse to civilisation whenever they have felt its benefits. They are fond of trading, and also of cultivating; but they are too fickle and excitable to be industrious in agriculture or anything else. They will take military service, and, though impatient of discipline, will prove faithful, unless excited by fanaticism. Such, briefly, is their character, replete with the unaccountable inconsistencies, with that mixture of opposite vices and virtues, belonging to savages.

"Such being their character, what has been their conduct towards us? They have kept up old quarrels, or picked new ones with our subjects in the plains and valleys near the frontier; they have descended from the hills and fought these battles out in our territory; they have plundered and burnt our villages and slain our subjects; they have committed minor robberies and isolated murders without number; they have often levied blackmail from our villages; they have intrigued with the disaffected everywhere, and tempted our loyal subjects to rebel; and they have for ages regarded the plain as their preserve, and its inhabitants their game. When inclined for cruel sport, they sally forth to rob and murder, and occasionally to take prisoners into captivity for ransom. They have fired upon our own troops, and even killed our officers in our own territories. They have given an asylum to every malcon-

tent or proclaimed criminal who can escape from British justice. They traverse at will our territories, enter our villages, trade in our markets; but few British subjects, and no servant of the British Government, would dare to enter their country on any account whatever.

*Relations of
the British
Government
with the
frontier tribes
in 1855.*

“In return for this, what has been the conduct of the British Government towards them? It has recognised their independence; it has asserted no jurisdiction with regard to them; it has claimed no revenue from them, and no tribute, except in one case, and that as a punishment. But it has confirmed whatever fiefs they held within its territory; it has uniformly declared that it seeks no fiscal or territorial aggrandisement; and that it only wants, and is resolved to have, tranquillity on the frontier. It has never extended its jurisdiction one yard beyond the old limits of the Sikh dominions. Nothing has been annexed that was not a portion of the Punjab as we found it. Whatever revenue has been paid to the British Government was equally paid to its predecessors, only at a higher rate. In one solitary case has it accepted tribute in satisfaction for offences; in all other cases of misconduct, it has avoided making any pecuniary demand on its own behalf. It has claimed no feudal or political ascendancy over the independent hill tribes; it has abstained from any interference in, or connection with, their affairs; it has taken no part in their contests, and has never assisted either party; it has striven to prevent its own subjects from entering into disputes with them. Though permitting and encouraging its subjects to defend themselves at the time of attack, it has prevented them from retaliating afterwards and from making reprisals. Though granting refuge to men flying for their lives, it has never allowed armed bodies to seek protection in its territory, nor to organise resistance or attack. It has freely permitted hill people to settle, to cultivate, to graze their herds, and to trade in its territories. It has accorded to such the same protection, rights, privileges, and conditions as to its own subjects. Its courts have been available, and its officers accessible, to them; its markets have been thrown open to them; all restrictions on trade and transit, all duties (except one)* which would be imposed by any native government, have been removed and remitted for them. It has freely admitted them to its hospitals and dispensaries; its medical officers have attended scores of them in sickness, and sent them back to their mountain homes cured. The ranks of its service are open to them, and they may eat our salt and draw our pay, if so inclined. What more can a civilised Government legitimately do for its rude neighbours than the above?

“There is, perhaps, one method to which the Government might resort more extensively than it does at present, and that is the payment of blackmail. It does, indeed, purchase the good offices of the tribes round the Kohat pass. It does permit a section of the Mohmands to hold a fief, and more unworthy feudatories could not be found. It does also make payments to certain Derajat chiefs such as the Bozdars.† But the other chiefs who receive money are British subjects, and really perform responsible police duties in return. In the case of the Afridis, Mohmands and Bozdars, however, the Government only continued a concession originally granted by its predecessors. It has originated no new grants of blackmail, though it enhanced one grant. There is reason to believe that such grants would embolden rather than ward off depredation; once bought off, the hill people would molest us with greater

† This payment was discontinued in March 1856.

*Relations of
the British
Government
with the
frontier tribes
in 1855.*

zest than ever, in order to be bought off again. They would actually resort to plundering as a means of extorting blackmail. The appetite once gratified would become sharpened. Such concession would be regarded by the tribes as a confession of weakness, and would absolutely operate as an incitement to mischief. Certain chiefs are known to commit depredations in the hope of being bought off by riefs, and one mode of avoiding annoyance is to let it be known that under no circumstance will the Government be induced to compromise by grants of blackmail."

The character of the hill tribes given in the above report applies rather to the Pathan than the Biluch tribes. The latter are free from the religious bigotry which forms such an important element in the character of the former. Afghans are blindly subservient to their priests, and this is the chief reason that European life is so insecure in their hills, while it is safe among the Biluchis, there being no instance on record of a European being assassinated by them. The absence of this religious bigotry in the Biluchis makes their control comparatively easy, for there is not the perpetual fear of some outbreak of fanatical rage against the infidel which to the north, and among Afghan tribes, has always to be guarded against. Another fact which renders the control of the Biluch more easy than that of the Pathan tribes is that the former recognise the authority of their acknowledged chiefs, and pay them loyal obedience and service, and their chiefs thus become the natural channel of communication with their tribesmen, through whom control can be effectively exercised on the tribe. This manner of influencing the Biluch tribes has, for many years past, been followed in the Dera Ghazi Khan district, and generally with success. With the Pathan tribes, on the other hand, this mode of control is impossible, for every tribe is divided and subdivided into numerous sections, each independent of the other, and yielding but small obedience to its own petty headmen; hating each other with the hatred begotten of generations of blood feuds, and only uniting under the most exceptional circumstances against a common enemy.

With regard to the fighting qualities of the border tribes, these vary considerably in the different tribes; those on the Hazara border are contemptible as soldiers, their extreme religious bigotry alone making up for their absence of martial qualities. To the south, between the Swat river and Dera Ismail Khan, the Afghan tribes are both fanatical and brave in an extraordinary degree. Courage with them is the first of virtues, and cowardice the worst of crimes. The Biluchis, as turbulent, and formerly of habits quite as predatory as their neighbours, are still of a far milder and more amiable disposition. They are as brave as the Afghans; but they are animated by no fanatical hatred of the English; they have not the military genius of the Afghans, and as an enemy on the hill side they are far less formidable.

The outrages which these independent tribes are in the habit of committing in British territory are of various kinds. Sometimes raids in force have been made across the border. Such was the attack by the Kasranis on Dera Fateh Khan in 1852, and more recently the audacious raid on Tank by Mahsud Waziris on the 1st of January 1879. On the northern frontier, especially on the Peshawar border, fanaticism has excited bigoted men to attempt the life of individual Europeans, believing that the assassination of an infidel was the sure passport to Paradise. To this fanaticism may be attributed the deaths of the customs officers, Messrs. Carne and Tapp, in 1851, on the Hazara border; of Lieutenant Boulnois, of the Engineers, near

Michni, in 1852; of Lieutenant-Colonel Mackeson, C.B., Commissioner of Peshawar, in 1853; of Captain Meham, of the Artillery, near Latamar, in 1859; of Major Adams, the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar, and Lieutenant Ommanney of the Guides, both at Peshawar, in 1865; of Major Macdonald on the Mohmand border in 1873; and still more recently of Surgeon Smyth and Lieutenant Kinloch on the Zaimukht frontier in 1879. Nor have Europeans alone been the object of attack: native officials have also been the victims of assassination; and villagers and others, who have given no cause of offence whatever, as in the case of the Abazai outrage in 1876, have been brutally murdered in cold blood. Besides these more special frontier offences, there are the offences which might naturally be expected from wild tribes inhabiting barren hills, impregnable except to a large force, such as horse-stealing, house-breaking, and, above all, cattle lifting. For the defence of the border, and to prevent incursions of hill robbers, there is a line of posts, military and militia, along the frontier. On the border of the Hazara, Peshawar, and Kohat districts, these are comparatively few and far between, but in the three southern districts the posts are smaller and more frequent, only ten or twelve miles apart, and situated so as to command one or more of the numerous passes leading into the hills.*

It now only remains to note the manner in which offences committed by independent tribes beyond the border are punished. The most simple way of punishing a refractory tribe, and in many cases the most effectual, is to inflict a fine and demand compensation for plundered property, or for lives lost. When the tribe is dependent upon trade with British territory, or when a portion resides within British limits, or is easily accessible from the plains to an attack of a military force, the demand for payment of fine or compensation is generally acceded to, and being paid, the tribe is again received into favour. Should the demand be refused, hostages are demanded, or members of the tribes and their property found within British territory are seized, until such time as the compensation and fine are paid. Against some tribes, as in the case of the Afridis of the Kohat pass in 1876-77, a blockade is an effective measure of punishment. It can only be employed against such tribes as trade with British territory, and while it lasts, any member of the offending tribe found within our border is at once seized and detained. This means of punishment has often been found effectual, and if effectual, it is preferable to a military expedition, which often leaves behind it bitter memories in the destruction of property and loss of life. Last, as a means of punishment, comes the military expedition, which is only resorted to in exceptional circumstances, and when every other means of coercing a hostile tribe has failed.

Mr. Davies, the Secretary to Government, Punjab, in 1864, thus alludes to the necessity there is for expeditions from time to time:—"Whilst any hasty exertion of physical pressure, to the exclusion of other methods of adjustment, is confessedly impolitic, there is a point beyond which the practice of forbearance may not be carried. As without physical force in reserve there can be no governing power, so under extreme and repeated provocation its non-employment is not distinguishable from weakness. In each case separately, therefore, it must be judged whether or not offensive measures have been justified. It must be noted that the despatch of an expedition into

*Nature of
the outrages
committed
by the
frontier tribes.*

*Necessity from
time to time
of punitive
expeditions.*

the hills is always in the nature of a judicial act. It is the delivery of a sentence, and the infliction of a punishment for international offences. It is, as a rule, not in assertion of any disputed right, or in ultimate arbitration of any contested claim of its own, that the British Government resolves on such measures, but simply as the only means by which retribution can be obtained for acknowledged crimes committed by its neighbours, and by which justice can be satisfied or future outrages prevented. In the extreme cases in which expeditions are unavoidable, they are analogous to legal penalties for civil crime,—evils in themselves, inevitable from deficiencies of preventive police, but redeemed by their deterrent effects. Considerations of expense, of military risk, of possible losses, of increasing antagonism and combination against us on the part of the tribes, all weigh heavily against expeditions; and to set them aside, there must be an irresistible obligation to protect and to vindicate the outraged rights of subjects whom we debar from the revenge and retaliation they formerly practised.”

The object of the following pages is to present to the reader a complete record of the expeditions which the British Government have been compelled from time to time to undertake against the independent tribes on the Punjab frontier, and the particular circumstances which have led in each case to the necessity of these expeditions; and at the same time to give a short account of the various tribes against which these punitive measures have been undertaken.

CHAPTER II.

HAZARA BORDER.

CHILASI, KOHISTANI, AND CIS-INDUS SWATI TRIBES.

THE upper, or north and north-western, portion of the British district of Hazara is divided into the valleys of Agror and Konsh and the glens of Bhogarmang and Khagan (see Map, p. 24), inhabited by Swatis, Gujars,* and some influential families of *Syads*. The British boundary towards the north is formed by the crest of a range of mountains rising to sixteen thousand feet in elevation in Khagan, and twelve to fourteen thousand in Bhogarmang. After skirting the northern limits of the latter glen, the boundary turns sharp southwards along the crest of a spur, averaging ten thousand feet in elevation, and continues in that direction for eight miles; then in the next eight miles it makes a semi-circular bend westward, with an average elevation of six thousand feet, dividing Konsh from the independent valleys of Nandihar and Tikari; from here the boundary turns due west, skirting the north of the Agror valley, where its elevation falls to five thousand feet, and then rises again to the Chittabut peak of the Black Mountain range, elevation nine thousand; thence the boundary follows the crest of that range thirteen miles southward, till it ends on the banks of the Indus, nearly opposite the junction of the Barandu river with the Indus. From this point the Indus is the boundary line down to Torbela.

The country between the British frontier, as above described, and the river Indus, is divided into *Chilas* and *Kohistan*, north of Khagan; *Allai*, south of Kohistan; *Nandihar* and *Tikari*, lying west of Konsh and north of Agror; *Deshi*, which is the name given to a portion of the eastern slopes and base of the Black Mountain; and *Kala Dhaka*, or Black Mountain, with its spurs down to the Indus.

Chilas is conterminous with British territory on its southern side for a distance of about ten miles. It is bounded on the east by the Kashmir frontier, on the north by the river Indus, and on the west and south by Kohistan and the Khagan valley. Its total area is about one thousand square miles. The mountains which compose it rise to a height of 26,000 feet, and

* The *Gujars* are a tribe found in different parts of the Peshawar division, and also among the independent tribes beyond the border. Their occupation is chiefly cattle rearing and the cultivation of the soil, which they hold in lease from the owners. They are a fine, healthy race, and in many points resemble the Pathans among whom they dwell. They are supposed to be the descendants of the possessors of the country previous to the arrival of the Pathans. As a rule, they are comfortably off, and maintain more independence than other settlers. They are a quiet people, industrious and frugal.

Chilas.

are for the most part snow and rocky wastes above an elevation of 10,000 or 11,000 feet, but below this juniper bushes and birch trees begin to appear, and these are succeeded lower down by grand forests of pine to about 5,000 feet. The spurs, where thus forest-clothed, are generally broad and bold, with sloping sides covered with a luxuriant growth of grass and wild vegetables, rhubarb, onions, carrots, etc. On these slopes thousands of cattle and sheep, tended chiefly by Gujars, graze during the summer months. The village of Chilas lies in an open plain on the banks of the Indus, surrounded by fields of wheat. The village contains from ten to twelve hundred houses or huts, some few scattered here and there among the fields, but the greater number clustered in one large group. The inhabitants resemble in physique, clothing, habits, and perhaps in language, their neighbours in Astor and Gilgit. They are not Pathans. In creed they are Muhammadans, and appear very subservient to their priests; their government seems to be patriarchal, a government by *jirga*. The inhabitants of Chilas itself, at least, acknowledge the suzerainty of the Maharaja of Kashmir, and pay a nominal tribute of a few shawls, blankets, wool, and gold dust. This appears to have been customary since the Sikh armies first occupied upper Hazara. The Maharaja of Kashmir at one time proposed to send an expedition into Chilas and overrun the country, but a settlement was come to and the project was abandoned. In 1857, the mutinous sepoys of the 55th Native Infantry from Peshawar fled to Chilas and there surrendered up their arms.

The inhabitants are a quiet, peace-loving people, but are said to be brave. Their clothing consists of short woollen jackets and trousers, round caps, with the edges rolled up, made of cloth or knitted wool, grass or plaited raw-hide sandals, and gaiters on their feet and legs. Their traders penetrate to Kashgar and Yarkand on one side, and to Amritsar on the other, taking with them gold dust, shawls, and blankets, their *ghi* and hides being sold nearer home.

The population of Chilas is estimated at 3,372 families, and the fighting-men are said to number 6,000. These numbers include a few
McNeile. Pathans and Swatis who have settled in the country.

The arms used are guns, swords, and shields, spears, and a few knives or daggers. The guns are called "lum cher", that is, "carry far." They are long flintlocks; some two-thirds possess these. Saltpetre and sulphur are natural products of the country, and the Chilasis manufacture their own gunpowder, but import lead.

There are no rains in Chilas, and it is said to have an excessively hot climate. One fall of rain during the year is considered an unusual circumstance. Cultivation is carried on by irrigation from the mountain torrents, and supplies are said to be plentiful, but transport would be difficult. At present there are no roads between Chilas and British territory, except goat tracks, and the country is difficult. The inhabitants of Chilas are in no way dependent on British territory, although they sometimes come in to purchase cloths. Up to the present time we have not interfered with Chilas, and they have given no trouble to the British Government.

Kohistan (cis-Indus) is the name applied to the country to the south and west of Chilas, between the Khagan glen in British territory and the river Indus. It comprises an area of over one thousand square miles, and is bounded on the north-west by the river Indus, on the north-east by Chilas, and on the south by Khagan, the Chor glen, and Allai.
Scott.

Kohistan consists roughly of two main valleys running east and west, and

separated from each other by a mountain range over 16,000 feet in elevation. *Kohistan.* The more northern of these is known as the Chicharga valley, and is in its upper portion covered with fine grass and vegetable; lower down, Indian-corn, wheat, and barley are extensively cultivated, and near the Indus, round the villages of Jalkot, rice is largely grown. The other valley is known as the Nila Naddi, and is formed by the combination of several streams. The principal of these is the Chordara, which drains the Chor glen, an elevated valley occupying the south-east corner of Kohistan. The Nila Naddi falls into the Indus near the two villages of Palas. The Chor glen has been long in dispute between the Kohistanis and their neighbours the Allaiwals. Its possession was coveted by the latter, who required summer grazing grounds at a higher elevation than they formerly possessed. They consequently invaded and occupied it, and commenced thereby a feud with the Kohistanis which periodically leads to sharp fights, in which sometimes the one and sometimes the other is successful; but, on the whole, victory and the possession of the valley has been on the side of the Allaiwals. The inhabitants of the neighbouring British territory, being Swatis, favour the claims of the Allaiwals, and benefit by being permitted to use the glen for their cattle and sheep every summer.

Like the mountains of Chilas, those in Kohistan are snow and rocky wastes from their crests to about twelve thousand feet. Below this the hills are covered with fine forest and grass down to five or six thousand feet, and in the valleys, especially near the Indus, are fertile basins covered with cultivation. The principal villages on the river-banks downwards from Chilas are Harban, Sazin, Band-i-Sazin, Jalkot, Palas, Koli and Kotera. Above Jalkot, up the Chicharga valley, and also in the Nila Naddi above Palas, are numerous small villages, but these are merely hamlets, and are for the most part deserted in the winter, whereas the villages on the Indus are large, and generally consist of four or five hundred houses, surrounded by rice-fields and fruit trees.

The Kohistanis are Muhammadans, but not Pathans, and appear to be closely allied to the Chilasis. The inhabitants are a powerful, well-built, brave, but quiet race. Though forced by a Moslem invader to become Muhammadans, they are not fanatical, nor are they particularly zealous in their religious observances, but are reputed to be hospitable. They have never submitted to the Pathans, and are independent of all central government, being obedient to their local chiefs. Their language is much the same as that of the men of Gilgit and Ladakh. Their clothing is of woollen cloth, like *puttoo* or coarse flannel, and consists of a jacket and knickerbockers. Some wear the small round cap like the Chilasis, but lately blue turbans, like those worn by their neighbours in British territory, have been almost universally adopted.

The produce of their flocks and herds, wool, goats' hair, *ghi*, blankets and shawls are the principal articles of their wealth and trade; they also wash gold dust on the river-banks, and cut timber in large quantities for timber merchants from Peshawar, Attock, etc. The Kohistanis carry on a trade with British territory, getting, in exchange for their gold, cloths and indigo; but they cannot be said to be in any way dependent upon us.

The country opposite Kohistan, on the north side of the Indus, is similar both in its physical features and in the characteristics of its inhabitants.

Kohistan.

McNeile.

The divisions of the Kohistanis are as follows :—

Kur Khel Onair,
Kaluch,
Sheen,

and the population is said to consist of 4,000 families, of which 400 belong to the first division, 100 to the second, and 3,500 to the last.

The fighting men are estimated at 4,000, or one to each family. Peaceful in their social relations, they are said to fight resolutely when roused. Their arms are matchlocks, very long and heavy, resting, when fired, on iron forks, good *talwars* and knives, and all carry spears, or rather iron-pointed alpenstocks, with which weapon they fearlessly attack the bears that at times, when wild roots are scarce, make raids on the sheep folds. About three-fourths of the men possess matchlocks. They manufacture their own gunpowder from local products, but import the lead.

The Sheen villages of Palas and Koli are frequently at feud, and these constantly embroil the others, and cause the tribe to be split up into two factions.

In the event of their country being invaded, they could obtain help from three sources, *viz.*, Allai, Kohistan (trans-Indus), and Chilas. During the winter, however, the roads from Allai are closed except by the river. With regard to the supplies, the agricultural products are only sufficient for the wants of the inhabitants, and supplies would have to accompany any force advancing into the country. This would be difficult, owing to the nature of the approaches. There are no roads, properly so called, in Kohistan, although traders do take laden mules up the Indus, but detours have to be made at places over rocky precipices on its banks, where the road is extremely difficult. Traders generally cross and re-cross the river, and alternately proceed up the opposite banks. There are ferries at Palas, Jalkot, and Sazin. There are also several passes from Khagan into Kohistan, but these are only goat tracks, and impracticable for laden animals. It would be possible, however, to open a good road through one of the passes into the Khagan glen, or by the pass into the Bhogarmang glen from the Chor valley.

The British Government has never had any real difficulties with Kohistan. There have been occasionally slight differences with them in the Khagan and Bhogarmang ranges, and these usually when our Gujars, during the summer months, take their herds to graze in Chor; but these have always been amicably arranged.

At the present time the Kohistanis have a claim of Rs. 26,000 for timber against the Kaka Khel wood merchants of Peshawar. In order to secure payment of this debt they began lately to create disturbances on the border, and made a raid into Kaghan, in which 360 goats were carried off. The plundered property was, however, all returned, and the Kohistani *jirga*, which waited on the district officer on the 26th March (1884), has been invited to detail four of its number to proceed to Peshawar to prosecute the claim against the Kaka Khels.

Scott. *Allai* is a valley bounded by Kohistan on the north and east, by the Bhogarmang valley, Nandihar and Deshi on the south, and by the river Indus on the west. With the exception of the valley known as the Chor glen, which has been mentioned above, and which has been now practically annexed to Allai from Kohistan, the whole of Allai is drained by one main stream running from east to west into the Indus.

Allai is divided from Kohistan on the north by a high range of mountains, *Allai.* rising to a height of over fifteen thousand feet. On the south it is divided from Nandihar and Deshi by another range running from the British boundary to the Indus above Thakot. The country of the Allaiwals is conterminous with British territory to the north of the Bhogarmang valley, but they are separated from one another by a range of mountains rising from eleven to thirteen thousand feet. The main stream, known as the Allai Sirhan, which runs through the whole valley, has its source in this range, whence, running west, after receiving several lesser streams, it falls into the Indus near the village of Thandul, opposite Barkot, about eighteen miles from its source. The average breadth of the valley is about twelve miles, and the total area about two hundred square miles. Its eastern end is a succession of grass and forest covered mountain slopes; as the elevation becomes less, fields of wheat, barley, and Indian-corn begin to appear, and near the Indus extensive rice cultivation is carried on. The valley is studded by numerous hamlets, but none of them are fortified, nor is their position, as a rule, good for defence.

Politically, the two principal villages are Bandi, the village of the late Khairulla Khan, and Pokul or Shingari, the village of Arsala Khan. There were formerly two leading *maliks* in the tribe, Jamal Khan and Khairulla Khan. These two had an old-standing enmity, but both are now dead. Arsala Khan is the son of Jamal Khan, and has made himself the Khan of Allai, and has no rival. There are, however, some discontents, who only want a leader. The Allaiwals are ever engaged in internal feuds, and are always at war among themselves. Blood-feuds are rife and carried on for ages, and these often embroil the whole tribe.

The Allaiwals are nearly all of the Swati tribe, and intermarry with the Swatis of Bhogarmang and Nandihar. The cis-Indus Swatis
MacGregor. have no connection with the Yusufzai Pathans who now occupy the Swat valley. When the Pathans came eastward from Kabul and took possession of the Peshawar valley, they also seized the adjacent hill tracts on the north, and either drove before them the ancestors of these Swatis, or reduced them to a state of servitude, from which they released themselves by leaving their country, under the leadership of Syad Jalal Baba, the son or descendant of Pir Syad Ali, more generally known as Pir Baba, who settled in Buner and died there, and the common ancestor of the Khagan *Syads*, the *Syads* late of Sittana, and several other *Syad* communities who live amongst the tribes along our border. These Swatis, under their religious leader, were comprised of the original inhabitants of Swat, and a few Pathans, probably, who possessed no landed property, and did not belong to the conquering Pathan clan. This force went eastwards towards the Indus, and, crossing that river, took possession of the countries now occupied by their descendants. When the country had been taken full possession of, one-fourth of the whole was set aside as the share of the *Syad* leader and his family, and the Mada Khel and Akhund Khel religious fraternity. The Swatis are now spread over upper Hazara in British territory, and besides Allai, in independent territory, Nandihar, Deshi, and Tikari are peopled by this race.

The Swatis are a miserable lot, both as regards their courage and their physique. They appear to have all the vices of the Pathan rankly luxuriant, and, as with them, cold-blooded murder and grinding avarice are the salt of life; but those in British territory can only indulge the first taste at the risk of unpleasant consequences. They certainly have not any of the courage of the Pathan, and the bold, frank manner of the latter is replaced with them by the

Allai.

hang-dog look of a whipped cur. They are all *Suni* Muhammadans, and are very bigoted.

McNeille.

The population of Allai consists of 5,830 families, and they are divided as follows:—

Swatis	4,100
Syads, Tirimzai	430
Mada Khel	440
Akhund Khel	520
Gujars and others	340

The fighting men are about 8,720, viz.—

Swatis	6,490
Syads, Tirimzai	580
Mada Khel	570
Akhund Khel	980
Gujars and others	100

Their arms are guns, swords and shields, and pistols. About two-thirds of their fighting men are armed with guns, and these are for the most part matchlocks, with a few muskets. They have neither flintlocks nor rifles. Their pistols are flintlocks. Every man is supposed to be armed, and they are said to be good marksmen, but are not considered brave. They purchase their gunpowder and lead from Swat and Chakesar. In the event of their country being invaded they might get aid from the neighbouring Swati tribes, and also from Kohistan, but the latter would be doubtful, as there is enmity between the Allaiwals and the Kohistanis.

In the event of a British force entering their country, the people of Nandihar and Tikari would hardly dare to give them assistance, as they are themselves open to attack from British territory. Supplies in Allai are sufficient for the inhabitants, but a force entering the country would have to take its own. These could be had from Konsh and Agror. Grass, fuel, and water are, however, plentiful. The Allaiwals are but little dependent upon British territory. At the best of times few of them come down, and these only to purchase cloth; but the Gujars of Allai come into our limits to graze their goats during the winter, when their own country is under snow. With this exception the Allaiwals keep within Allai, both summer and winter, except some few, who take their cattle to graze in the Chor valley during the summer.

From the south, Allai may be entered either through the Bhogarmang valley, or through Nandihar, or along the bank of the river Indus. The easiest routes are those through Nandihar. Of the passes which lead from Nandihar to Allai the Ghabri is the shortest and most used. From the top of the pass three roads lead into different parts of Allai. The Ghorapher pass to the west of the Ghabri is also known to be practicable for laden mules. The Dabrai pass, still more to the west, was reconnoitred and reported practicable by Major C. C. Johnson, Assistant Quarter-Master General with the Hazara Field Force, in 1868, when it was proposed to punish the Allaiwals for an attack on a survey party under Mr. G. B. Scott in Bhogarmang in August 1868. The intention of entering the Allai valley was subsequently abandoned, as it was considered inexpedient to extend the military operations at that time. A fine of Rs. 500 was imposed on the Allaiwals for the attack on the survey party; but up to the present time the fine has not been realised, and is still an outstanding claim against the tribe. In November 1874, the Allaiwals, headed

by their chief, Arsala Khan, made a raid within British territory upon a party of Kohistanis, murdering three men and carrying off their flocks. This was at once punished by the seizure of some 60 Allaiwals, with flocks numbering 4,000 head, in British territory; a blockade of the tribe was proclaimed, and, notwithstanding the sympathies of our own Swati subjects with the marauders, the *jirga* of the tribe, for the first time in their history, came in and made their submission to the British Government. For the next three years the Allaiwals gave no trouble; but in November 1877 they again committed an act of aggression on the British border, which rendered a blockade of the tribe necessary. It was committed on the village of Battal in the Konsh valley, on the 16th of November, at the instance of Arsala Khan, who was himself present in person, and was the leader of the gang of raiders. He is a fanatical man, a disciple of the late *Akhund* of Swat, and avoids intercourse with English officers. The main cause of the raid was the rivalry existing between Arsala Khan and Samandar Khan, *jagirdar* of Garhi Habibulla, an Honorary Magistrate under the British Government, who is also a man of large influence in independent Nandihar. In this raid two Hindus of Battal were killed and twelve carried off. Houses were also set on fire, and property, valued at Rs. 37,000 by the owners, was carried off. The raiders were estimated to have lost thirteen killed, and twelve were taken prisoners; their numbers were about 300. It was reported that the ostensible object of the raid was to kidnap Samandar Khan, who was at that time in Battal, but the raiders failed to effect this object.

On the 2nd December, Nilban, in the Konsh glen, was attacked by Khawas Khan, son of Abbas Khan, with Allaiwals. Two villagers were killed and one wounded. The loss inflicted was estimated at Rs. 4,250, consisting of cattle and other property. On the 9th of the same month an attack was made on Jabbar by Khawas Khan. Five men were wounded and one woman carried off; the loss inflicted amounted to Rs. 1,876. The raiders lost two men killed and one wounded. The cattle, however, were recovered by the villagers. In consequence of the serious affair at Battal, which is the largest village in Konsh, the Allaiwals were blockaded, and men and cattle found in the district were seized. Arsala Khan, in February 1879, in person, menaced the border at the head of a large armed following; but finding himself opposed to the Swatis of Pakli, entered into negotiations with their leaders and dispersed his following.

The raids conducted by the son of Abbas Khan were probably made with the intention of directing the attention of Government to the case of his father (the notorious robber chief who had been captured at the beginning of 1878 by Samander Khan, and was then a prisoner in the jail at Rawal Pindi), and obtaining his release. This latter object they, of course, failed to attain, and Abbas Khan was removed from Rawal Pindi to the Central Jail at Lahore.

The operations of the blockade progressed but slowly, although a certain number of the people of Allai, mostly of the Gujar class, were captured in British territory, and detained with their cattle. As already pointed out, Allai is but little dependent upon us, and consequently an effective blockade is most difficult to carry out. About the middle of June 1879 a *jirga* of the Allaiwals came in to the Deputy Commissioner. It was not accompanied by Arsala Khan, or by any other influential man, and it proposed that neither fine nor compensation should be demanded, and that the Allaiwal prisoners should be surrendered previous to the Hindus being given up. These proposals could not, of course, be listened to, and the *jirga* was dismissed. The

Allai.

Allaiwals were at the same time given distinctly to understand that no terms would be made with them until the British subjects who were in their hands were released. When this demand had been complied with they would be informed of the fine and compensation they would be called upon to pay. Up to the end of the year the Allaiwals had shown no signs of giving in, and the Government of India considered that the difficulty had reached a stage at which it was highly expedient that effective measures should be taken for the punishment of the tribe. Owing, however, to the absence of so large a force on service in Afghanistan, the time was not considered convenient to resort to an expedition. The blockade was therefore ordered to be continued until it should be convenient to send a punitive force into Allai.

On the 14th August 1880, the arrival of the Allai *jirga* at Abbottabad, bringing with them the Hindu prisoners, was reported. Arsala Khan, however, did not accompany the *jirga*, pleading as an excuse that he was afraid to do so. In consideration of the surrender of the Hindu captives, the twenty-nine members of the tribe who had been seized in reprisal were released, and the following terms, which the Government demanded, were then made known to the *jirga*:—

- (1) The raiders captured in the attack on Battal to be released on the payment of a ransom of Rs. 500.
- (2) Payment of a fine of Rs. 5,000 on account of the raid on Battal.
- (3) Payment of Rs. 500 on account of the attack on Mr. Scott's survey party in 1868.
- (4) Submission of Arsala Khan.

The *jirga* was then dismissed.

On the 16th February 1881, a deputation, with the ransom money, arrived at Abbottabad, and the eight surviving prisoners in the jail at Rawal Pindi were sent for and released in the presence of the *jirga*, who then departed. The other conditions, however, remained unfulfilled, and in the autumn of 1881 the necessity of a military expedition was again considered. The Brigadier-General commanding the Frontier Force was called on to submit proposals for such an expedition; but the Government considered that the operations proposed by him would have been on a scale out of proportion to the results to be obtained, and it was, therefore, decided to defer the use of military force. Since then the tribe and Arsala Khan, its chief, have evinced a desire to assume a more conciliatory attitude, and at the present time, owing to his quarrels with Muzaffar Khan of Nandihar, who is his rival, Arsala Khan is too much occupied to give trouble on the border, even if he were inclined to do so, which does not seem to be the case. The terms, however, imposed on the tribe still remain unfulfilled.

Nandihar is a valley lying to the south of Allai, and adjoining the British valleys of Bhogarmang and Konsh on the east.

It is divided by a spur of the hills into two long open glens, and the drainage, after joining that from the adjoining valley of Tikari, falls into the Indus at Thakot. In Nandihar, water is abundant, and rice is largely cultivated, as well as Indian-corn, wheat, and barley. Up the hillsides every culturable plateau, no matter how small, is brought under the plough. Its area is about ninety square miles, and the elevation of the valley is about four to five thousand feet. The inhabitants are Swatis, and are divided into four clans—

- (1) Khan Khel.
- (2) Panjmiral.
- (3) Panjghol.
- (4) Dodal.

The total number of families is estimated at 1,380, viz.—

	Khan Khel	326
McNeile.	Panjmiral	394
	Panjghol	286
	Dodal	374

There are about 1,000 fighting men, each clan supplying 250 men. Their arms are guns, swords, and spears. The greater part of the guns are matchlocks, with some flintlocks and a few muskets. About half the fighting men possess guns of one sort or the other. Aid could be had from Tikari, Deshi and Thakot, as they are all Swatis, and their borders join.

The Nandiharis are constantly at feud among themselves, and cannot even unite against outside oppression or aggression. With regard to supplies, these are plentiful, but fuel is scarce. There are routes from the Konsh glen or from Agror, which are practicable for laden mules.

Nandihar is not dependent at all on British territory, and trade carried on with us is very small, but, being so easily accessible, it is completely at our mercy. Sirdar Hari Singh, during the Sikh rule, invaded their country and made them pay tribute. Major-General Wilde's force, also, in 1868, traversed their country and recovered the fines due from them (*see* Chap. III). At the present time Muzaffar Khan, the chief of Nandihar, is engaged in a feud with Arsala Khan of Allai, and in this quarrel he is supported by the men of Tikari, Deshi, and Pariari. This feud, however, has not hitherto affected the peace of the border.

Tikari is a valley lying to the south of Nandihar, and between that valley and Agror in British territory. It is a pretty little tract about eight miles in length and five miles in breadth, covering an area of forty square miles, and about 4,500 feet above the sea-level, having good streams of water running through it. There is a fair amount of rice cultivation, irrigated from the main and small tributary streams, but the principal produce is Indian-corn. The nature of the soil is very fertile, but the valley is singularly bare of trees. Firewood is a difficulty, even brushwood on the slopes of the hills being deficient. The valley can be entered either from Konsh or Agror, but the latter is the best and easiest, and is the route chiefly used.

The inhabitants are Swatis, and could obtain aid in case of being attacked from the neighbouring Swati tribes, and also from the Chagarzais, Akazais, and Hassanzais of the Black Mountain.

The population consists of 700 families, and are divided as follows:—

Malkhel	300
Ashlor Naror	320
Syads, Assi	80

There are only 400 fighting men, or one to every two families. Their arms are similar to those of the Nandiharis.

Supplies within Tikari are plentiful, and water abundant. A good deal of grain is exported thence by the Black Mountain tribes. The Tikariwals occasionally bring down grain to British territory and purchase cloth from us, but they can scarcely be said to be dependent on us. There is an old standing

Tikari.

feud between the Ashlor Naror and the Malkhel sections, and they constantly keep Tikari embroiled in their disputes. At the present time Rahim Khan is the head of the Malkhels, and Abdul Ghafur Khan of the Ashlor Narors. The latter is the more powerful, but their neighbours, the Deshiwals, can always be called in by either party, and are interested in keeping them apart.

Sirdar Hari Singh, during the Sikh rule, overran Tikari, and, after levying fines, retired. In 1868, Major-General Wilde's force traversed the valley and levied fines on the inhabitants, aggregating Rs. 2,000 (*see* Chap. III). In 1879 a fine of Rs. 100 was recovered from Abdul Ghafur Khan, *Khan* of the Ashlor Narors, owing to his son having joined Arsala Khan of Allai in an intended raid on British territory.

Deshi is the name given to the country to the north of Agror and lying to the west of Nandihar. It comprises a portion of the eastern slopes of the Black Mountain, and is a succession of bold, forest-covered spurs, with steep, rugged, intervening water-courses, on the banks of which lie the hamlets of the tribe, and round each of these a few acres have been cleared of forest and cultivated.

The streams which drain the valleys of Nandihar and Tikari, after uniting three miles below the village of Trund, run along the foot of the Black Mountain, dividing Nandihar from Deshi, and join the Indus near Thakot, a large village said to contain two thousand houses. Most of the principal villages of Deshi are situated along the banks of this stream, and rice cultivation is carried on to a considerable extent; the stream is always fordable except after heavy rain. The village of Thakot on the Indus is one of some importance, and it is unfortunate that it was not visited by British troops in 1868, as the inhabitants now consider themselves beyond punishment, and are ready at all times to harbour criminals and permit the residence of the fanatics of Sittana and others.

The population of Deshi consists of 880 families, which are apportioned among the six sections into which the tribe is divided as follows:—

Jador	220
Kuchelai	110
Rama Khel	160
Khan Khel	120
Warojai	170
Palolai	100


The fighting men number about 726, or less than one man per family.

Their arms are guns, pistols, and swords. About three-fourths of the fighting men are armed with guns. They have some eighty muskets, and the rest are matchlocks. Although Swatis, the tribe bears a good name among its neighbours for fighting qualities. They seldom quarrel among themselves, and never to any great extent, and readily unite when danger threatens from without. In the event of being attacked they could get aid from the neighbouring Swati tribes. The Deshi territory could be approached by a force moving along the crest of the Black Mountain, or from Agror through Tikari, or thirdly, from Konsh through Nandihar. The second route would be most suitable for a force to adopt, and is easy throughout.

Supplies of grain, etc., are enough for the inhabitants, but would not suffice for even a small force, and would therefore have to be taken with the

SKELETON MAP
 showing
 THE COUNTRY OF THE
 CHILASIS, KOHISTANIS,
 AND
 CIS-INDUS SWATIS.

SCALE
 1 Inch = 12 Miles.



troops. Fuel, grass, and water are plentiful. The tribe is not dependent on *Deshi*. British territory; but, although not immediately on the British border, they are easily accessible and exposed to attack. They have a standing quarrel with their neighbours, the Syads of Pariari, and, in some fighting which took place in 1871, they had decidedly the best of it. They took part with the other tribes in the invasion of the Agror valley in 1868, and were fined Rs. 1,000 for their share in the disturbances of that time. Since then they have given little • trouble, though a few of their members are said to have been engaged with Arsala Khan of Allai when he menaced the border in February 1879. During the last year they have committed two small raids on hamlets of Agror, to answer for which the *Deshi jirga* has now been summoned.

CHAPTER III.

HAZARA BORDER—(*continued*).

BLACK MOUNTAIN TRIBES.

The Black Mountain.

IN the previous chapter some account has been given of the Chilasis, Kohistanis, and the cis-Indus Swatis between the British frontier and the river Indus. We now come to the Yusafzai tribes inhabiting the slopes of the Black Mountain lying to the east of the Indus, and occupying the south corner formed by that river and the British boundary.

Before describing the tribes which inhabit this tract of country, it will be well to give a brief description of the Black Mountain itself. Its total length is about twenty-five to thirty miles, and its average height about 8,000 feet above the sea. It ascends from the Indus basin at its southern end near the village of Kiara, and so up to its water-shed by Bruddur; thence it runs north-east by north to the point on the crest known as Chittabut. From Chittabut the range runs due north, finally descending by two large spurs to the Indus (*see Map, p. 68*). Thakot lies at the foot of the more eastern of these two. The Indus, after passing Thakot, runs westward along the northern foot of the mountain till it washes the western of the above two spurs, when it takes a sharp bend south, and runs below and parallel to the western foot of the range.

The Black Mountain may be described as a long, narrow ridge, with higher peaks at intervals, and occasional deep passes; the general outline of the crest is more rounded than sharp. Numerous large spurs project from the sides, which are often precipitous and rocky, with deep, narrow glens or gorges lying between them, in which lie the villages of the tribes. The soil of the hillsides is for the most part rocky and stony. When uncultivated, the lower slopes are covered with thorny bushes and grass; further up, forest replaces this, and the whole of the upper portion of the spurs and crest is thickly wooded. The trees found are varieties of pine, oak, sycamore, horse-chestnut, wild cherry, etc. Along the crest frequent open glades occur in the forest, which, with the exposed slopes of higher peaks, are covered with short grass.

The following are the most important passes and peaks along the crest of the mountain from south to north, *viz.*—

<i>Names.</i>	<i>Height.</i>
Pubbul Gali 	6,930 feet.
Panji Gali 	7,772 „
Akhund Baba-ka-Chura ...	9,157 „

<i>Names.</i>		<i>Height.</i>	<i>The Black Mountain.</i>
Kahi Gali	}	not ascertained.	.
Jabai			
Chapra			
Chittabut			
Doda			
Muchai	...	9,803 feet	
Khand-ka-Dana	..	9,429	„
Gunthur	...	9,572	„
Kumesur	...	9,775	„

From the last peak the descent to Thakot and the Indus commences. None of the points from Kahi Gali to Doda can be much less than 9,000 feet elevation. The Black Mountain is bounded on the south by Tanawal; on the east by Agror, Pariari, and the Swati tribes of Tikari, Nandihar, and Deshi; on the northern extremity is the Indus and the Thakot Swatis; and on the west, between the crest and the river Indus, the slopes are occupied by the Yusafzai Pathans. The Indus in this part of its course is deep and rapid, with a rocky bed. Its width is from 70 to 150 yards, and it is said to be 300 in some places, but this is probably an exaggeration. It is crossed at eleven different points by ferries. The boats will hold from twenty to thirty passengers, but do not accommodate animals, which have to swim over alongside. They are strongly built, and are worked by oars placed fore and aft, and are also assisted by ropes when necessary. The natives of the country also cross the river at nearly every point on inflated skins, and the rapidity with which this can be done was exemplified in the expedition of 1852-53, when the enemy, who had collected on the right of the Indus, crossed over to follow up our troops when they commenced to retire.

The routes by which troops can ascend the mountain necessarily lie along one or more of its spurs. From British territory all routes ascend either from Tanawal or Agror, and are as follow: 1st, from Tanawal at the southern end of the mountain, by the Bruddur spur, by the village of that name, there is a path—used for retirement by the force in 1852-53—which leads on to the water-shed overlooking the Tarla Hassanzais. Near to this, on another spur, is the Chamberi outpost, a fort of the Nawab of Amb. The Bruddur plateau affords room for encamping a force, and water is obtainable. 2nd, from Shunglai (a Tanawali fort), which lies in a gorge between two spurs, a road ascends the southern of these to Pubbul Gali, a point on the crest of the mountain, which is steep and difficult, but which troops can get along. The left column of the force in 1852 went up this way. 3rd, a road goes from Chutta, a village lying on the north of the above two spurs. Above Chutta it is joined by the Sambalbut spur from Agror, and then runs up to Jabai; this is one of the best routes for an ascending force. The right column of the force in 1852 moved by this route. On gaining the top of the Kahi Gali, a pass leading down to the Hassanzai villages is commanded. The water-shed of this spur forms the boundary between Agror and Tanawal. 4th, there is a small spur lying opposite Shunglai between the two above mentioned, by which the centre column of the force in 1852 ascended. It is steep and difficult. 5th, from Agror by the Sambalbut spur there is a road open and easy of ascent (although rather steep in parts) which joins the Chutta spur higher up. 6th, from Chajri there is a steep and exposed road, unfitted for troops. 7th, from Barchar a road rises steeply from the valley for about 1,500 feet. The

The Black Mountain.

village is situated at the top of this first rise, and might be held by an enemy, who could, however, be dislodged by artillery fire from below. From the village upwards the slope is more gradual and open for some distance, where fine forest commences, and on the right flank the ground gets a little steeper, with one or two knolls. The last four or five hundred feet are very steep, with dense forest on the right flank. The left is open and exposed to view from the crest. The point of junction with the top is called Barchar-ka-Chapra. The levies went up by this route in 1868. 8th, from Kungali a road goes to a spur running down eastward from Chittabut to the village of Kungali, thence it again ascends, still going east, and joins the Kabbal mountain, which lies east of Agror. The water-shed of this ridge forms the boundary between Agror and Pariari and Tikari. The main column of the force ascended from Kungali in 1868; half-way up, a large hog-backed mound, named Mana-ka-Dana, rises on the crest of the spur. The ascent to this point is easy. From Mana-ka-Dana the range dips for about 800 yards, and the forest commences chiefly on the right flank; then the ascent recommences, and, passing upwards over some steep and wooded knolls, affords good cover for an enemy. Beyond this point the hill becomes steeper and more wooded right up to the knoll of Chittabut. On the crest a determined enemy could give much trouble. A path leads round the Agror face of Chittabut among rocks and pine trees. Mules can pass along, but it is dangerous in places. The Kungali ridge is the most northern spur ascending from British territory.

From Chittabut the path is practicable for troops and mountain artillery over Dodo to the Muchai peak, the highest point of the mountain, distance three and a half miles. From Akhund Baba to Muchai on the west are the Akazais. A similar practicable spur runs from Muchai to the Indus, dividing the Akazais from the Chagarzais on the north.

About two and a half miles beyond Muchai is the Dunda peak; from it runs rather a difficult spur to the Indus, near the village of Judbai, where some of the Hindustani fanatics crossed during the operations of 1868. Their encampment was at Bihar, on the other side of the river; Judbai is about seven miles from the crest as the crow flies, or fourteen by the path.

These villages and the tents of the fanatics were clearly seen from Muchai in 1868. From Dunda to the east runs a like practicable spur, ending at Trund. Between this spur and the Kungali are the Pariari Syads; the distance from Dunda to Trund is about six miles. Water is found in numerous springs along the slopes; and near the crest the hillsides are covered with fields of Indian corn, affording, in the proper seasons, large quantities of forage. The range is well wooded on both sides.

The view from Muchai is very fine. The panorama begins with the Gandghar and Mahaban mountains, the Indus running between, and Attock seen in the distance between the opening. On the north of the Mahaban nestles the old Hindustani settlement of Malka, destroyed in 1863. The Ambela pass, with the lofty peak of Guru, is prominent to its west. The "Crag" picquet and the "Conical" hill, which played so important a part in the Ambela expedition, stand out clear; through the gorge of the pass is dimly seen the cantonment of Hoti Mardan. From the pass the pretty valley of Chamla slopes towards the Indus. Next, Mount Ilam shows boldly against the sky, the great barrier between Buner and Swat. Away on the far horizon glistens the snow-capped Hindu Kush, then the valley of Upper Swat, and the lofty snow peaks of the Laram range beyond the mountains of Kohistan, Khagan, and Kashmir, and lastly the well-known Pir Panjal range.

In the foreground are the valleys of Pakli and Konsh, and the sanitarium of Murree and Thandiani. *The Black Mountain.*

The spur from Mana-ka-Dana to Chirmang, through Bilankot, is very easy, and the distance is five miles. This was the route taken by Major-General Wilde's force in 1868 on its way to the Tikari valley.

The climate of the Black Mountain is very fine in spring, summer, and autumn, but the winter is severe, and snow falls in sufficient quantity to stop communication over the crest. From the near proximity of the mountain to the sultry valley of the Indus, the heat in summer, even at the highest elevation, is considerable, and along the bank of the river itself the climate is nearly as warm as that of the plains. Heavy rain generally falls in the spring and early autumn, and storms are of frequent occurrence.

The tribes which inhabit the western face of the Black Mountain are the Hassanzais, the Akazais, and the Chagarzais.

On the east face are the Syads of Pariari and the Deshiwals. The latter are Swatis, and have been described in the previous chapter.

The *Hassanzais* are a section of the Isazai clan of Yusafzai Pathans (see Appendix A, Chap. IV). Isa, the second son of Yusaf, had three sons, Hassan, Aka, and Mada, from whom are descended the Hassanzais, the Akazais and the Mada Khels. The Hassanzais reside on both sides of the Indus; those cis-Indus occupying the most southern portion of the western slopes of the Black Mountain, those trans-Indus living immediately opposite to them. It is, however, with the former only that we are immediately concerned. These are bounded on the north and east by the Akazais, on the West by the Indus, and on the south the Hassanzai border adjoins the territory of the Nawab of Amb.

The Hassanzais are divided into ten sub-divisions, which are as follows :

				<i>Fighting men.</i>
Khan Khel	300
Kotwal Khel	440
Mir Ahmad Khel	140
Zakaiya Khel	140
Lukman Khel	160
Kaka Khel	300
Mammu Khel	90
Nanu Khel	70
Nasrat Khel	80
Dada Khel	50

In addition to these, the Syads of Tilli could furnish a contingent of 230 fighting men, making a total of 2,000, all of whom are Pathans. The greater part of the remainder are Khatris, who are non-combatants. The Khatris are the tenants of the Pathans for the most part.

It may be taken for granted that nearly every man possesses a sword and shield, and there are said to be 1,100 matchlocks in the tribe. They manufacture their own swords, and import them also; they also manufacture some of their gunpowder, the rest being imported from Darband, as well as all their lead.

The tribe is not noted for its bravery, and is said to be very avaricious. In the event of being attacked, the Hassanzais could depend on getting aid

Hassanzais.

from the other two sections of the Isazai Yusafzais, *viz.*, the Akazai and the Mada Khel. The latter have their settlements trans-Indus only. It is said that these three sections can concentrate their fighting men in one day.

The Hassanzais are constantly at feud among themselves, but would unite in the presence of a common danger. At present there are two parties among them, the *Kishardala* and *Mishardala*. The latter consists of all the men who were formerly acknowledged as headmen, but who have now been repudiated by the rest of the tribe (the *Kishardala*), because they do not divide to all, as they should, the annual blackmail paid to them by the Nawab of Amb. Thus the *Kishardala* forms the numerical majority; the *Mishardala* consists of the principal *maliks* and their dependents. This tribe is not dependent on British territory, as they procure their requirements from Chamla, Buner, Nandihar, Tikari, and Darband. A blockade would do them no harm. Supplies would have to accompany a force moving into their country.

There is a *Sahib-i-Dastar*, who has charge of the affairs of the *Khan Khel*, and is known by the title of "Khan of the Isazais". At the beginning of the British rule, Hassan Ali Khan was *Sahib-i-Dastar*, then his son Kabul Khan, who was succeeded in turn by his son, Malik Aman. This chief was murdered by his kinsman, Feroz Khan, and his cousin Ahmad Ali Khan became *Khan*, but he also was murdered by Feroz Khan at the beginning of 1880. The present *Sahib-i-Dastar* is Hashim Ali Khan, the brother of Ahmad Ali Khan. Hassan Ali's daughter was the wife of Ata Muhammad, Khan of Agror, and their son, Ali Gauher Khan, is the present Khan of Agror, and is betrothed to the sister of Hashim Ali Khan. The Khan Khels are the most troublesome of the Hassanzais.

During Sikh rule, Sirdar Hari Singh, with two regiments, made an expedition into the Hassanzai country, *via* Darband and Bruddur, and burnt some of the villages.

The *Akazais*, like the Hassanzais, are a section of the Isazai clan of Yusafzais, and inhabit a portion of the crest and western slopes of the Black Mountain to the north of the Hassanzais, having on their east part of Agror and the Pariari Syads, to the north the Chagarzais, and on the west the Indus. They have no territory trans-Indus, with the exception of part of one village, which they share with the Hassanzais. Their principal villages are the two known as Khund, Bimbul, and Biliyani. The first two belong to the Painsa Khel sub-division, and are the nearest to the crest of the Black Mountain. They are situated on flat, open ground, but the approaches are difficult. The descent from Khund to Bimbul is very steep and rocky. The Akazais are divided into four sub-divisions, and consist of 580 families, which furnish 500 fighting men, or nearly one to each family.

MacGregor.

McNeile.

	<i>Fighting men.</i>			
Painsa Khel	210
Barat Khel	90
Aziz Khel	110
Tasan Khel	90

In addition to the above, it is probable that the members of other tribes now settled in the Akazai territory would be able to furnish a contingent of 200 fighting men, giving a total of 700. Of these, about two-thirds possess matchlocks, and all have swords and shields. Their characteristics are very

similar to those of the Hassanzais, from whom they could get aid, as well as *Akazais*. from the Mada Khels, in case of necessity.

Their territory could not furnish supplies for troops advancing into their country, and these would, therefore, have to accompany the force. They are not dependent on British territory. Since 1875 the *jirga* comes in when summoned, and on their return take with them cloth purchased at Abbottabad. The principal hold we have over this tribe is two-fold; the power to attack them, and the knowledge we have gained of the valuable and accessible rice, wheat, and other crops cultivated by them in the Tikari valley; they hold one or two entire villages there, and shares in several others, all acquired by Pathan encroachment on the unwarlike Swatis.

During the Sikh rule they held the village of Shatut in the Agror valley, and they continued to occupy it until the expedition of 1868.

The Akazais have only in the last few years begun to give trouble. In the expedition against the Hassanzais in 1852 they afforded their neighbours but little assistance, nor did they appear openly against us in the Ambela campaign. They, however, took part in the attack on the Ughi *thana* in Agror in July 1868. They seem to have been chiefly incited to break with us by the insidious counsel of Ata Muhammad Khan of Agror, who represented that the location of a *thana* in Agror was but the forerunner of their independent village of Shatut being assessed highly like all the Agror villages.

The *Chagarzais* are a section of the Malizai clan of the Yusafzai tribe of Pathans (*see* Appendix A, Chap. IV). They are descended from Chagar, the son of Mali, who was one of the sons of Yusaf. They inhabit the country on both sides of the Indus. Those cis-Indus are located on the western slopes of the Black Mountain immediately to the north of the Akazais. The Chagarzais are divided into three sub-divisions:—

Nasrat Khel.

Ferozai.

Basi Khel

The first and last are cis-Indus, with a few villages on the right bank. The Ferozai are entirely trans-Indus, and occupy the slopes of the Duma mountains towards Buner.

McNeile. The cis-Indus Chagarzais are, again, sub-divided as follows:—

	<i>Basi Khel.</i>			<i>Fighting men.</i>	
Daud Khel	320
Kasan Khel	850
Shahu Khel	550
Babujan Khel	210
Khwaja Khel	150
Chur Khel	150
Kalandar Khel	50
Nasar Khel	60
	<i>Nasrat Khel.</i>				
Hanju Khel	100
Haidar Khel	50
Lukman Khel	350
Badha Khel	100
Total					2,940

Chagarzais.

In addition to this, a religious body, the Akhund Khel, and also some *Syads*, hold lands in the Chagarzai territory. Their numbers are variously estimated, but their fighting strength may be taken at 400 at the outside. They have no reputation as a warlike race. It is more difficult to estimate the strength of the Chagarzais trans-Indus, but it is probable that 2,000 would be the outside number of the contingent they could furnish. The total number of fighting men of the tribe may, therefore, be estimated at 5,340. Their arms are similar to those of the Hassanzais and Akazais, but their spears are made entirely—head and shaft—of iron.

The Chagarzais have been estimated by different authorities at a much larger figure than the above; but, making due allowance for the exaggerated statements Pathans always make of their numbers, the above total may be considered a fair estimate of the strength of the tribe. In this total the various craftsmen, Hindus, *fakirs*, and others who reside among the tribesmen, but who would not add to the fighting strength that they could bring into the field, are not included.

The southern boundary of the cis-Indus Chagarzais is contiguous with the Akazais, and follows the spur of the Black Mountain which runs from the Muchai peak to the Indus. The south face of this spur belongs to the Akazais, and the north to the Chagarzais. On the west and north the Indus forms the boundary, and on the east the Chagarzais are bounded by the Deshiwals and the Pariari Syads.

The southern part of the Chagarzai country is occupied by the Basi Khel sub-division. Their principal villages are Pakhun and Chomung. Scott. The best approach to the former is from the Muchai peak. The descent to the Indus from Pakhun is about the easiest descent from the crest beyond the Chittabut, and mules could go by that route to Judbai on the Indus, opposite to which is Bihar, which was formerly a settlement of the Hindustani fanatics of Malka.

Succeeding Pakhun to the north are the villages of Gugiani and Jalkai, in a small basin similar to that of Pakhun, occupied by a colony of *Syads*. They only occupy the basin of one branch of a stream and the upper slopes. Below them the Nasrat Khels occupy Dumail and some lesser hamlets, as well as Judbai on the Indus, and Bihar and the two large villages of Kubulgraon trans-Indus. Next comes another portion of the Basi Khels, occupying Kalish, rented from the Akhund Khels by the chief of the Basi Khels, who, with a large body of his section, live there, but there are also some families of Akhund Khels and Nasrat Khels. The village is on the top of a spur in the middle of a small plateau richly cultivated. This is about the largest village on that side of the Black Mountain. The descent to Kalish from the crest of the mountain is easy.

The characteristics of the Chagarzais are similar to those of the Hassanzais and Akazais already described, but they are considered braver.

In case of aggression the two tribes above mentioned might be expected to afford aid, and help could also be obtained from Swat and Buner.

The chief wealth of the Chagarzais is in cows, buffaloes, and goats. Troops advancing into their country would have to take supplies with them.

No reliable information is to be had regarding the interior communications in their territory. A force proceeding against the tribe, cis-Indus, would naturally, as a first step, gain the crest of the Black Mountain by one or more of the spurs ascending from Agror; that of Mana-ka-Dana, which runs up from Kungali, being the best for many reasons. The crest of the

mountain gained, the Muchai peak seized, a force advancing northward along the water-shed would find the glens of Pakhun, Judbai, etc., lying below it on the west face of the mountain, and roads leading down to each of them, and troops could easily descend for the purpose of destroying the villages, etc.; but owing to the steep and rugged nature of the spurs between which the glens lie, and the thick forest with which the whole of this upper portion is clad, an active enemy, well acquainted with the ground, would have every facility for annoying the troops and opposing the ascent and descent. About three miles north of Muchai is the high peak of Gunthur, and the pass leading from Pariari to Pakhun lies on the crest between these two points. The ground here is broken and precipitous, and flanked by thick pine forests, and in all probability is a strong position, from which the passage of a force advancing from Muchai on Gunthur could be disputed. From this point, which lies in a deep hollow on the crest, the ascent to Gunthur, though steep in places and everywhere flanked by forest, is not of any great difficulty. Beyond Gunther the advance along the crest would be easier, and though the glens below are steep and difficult, a sufficient force left on the top of the mountain, and covering parties sent along the spurs flanking the descent, would enable troops to move down for the attack of all the principal cis-Indus villages of the tribe.

The Chagarzai tribe is in no way dependent upon British territory. They purchase cloth, copper and brass vessels, and indigo from us, but if they were under blockade they could obtain these articles through the intervention of other tribes. They have occasionally quarrelled with our subjects, and there have been some instances of forays and petty raids perpetrated by them, but we never came into hostile contact with them until 1863, when they joined the ranks of the *Akhund* of Swat at Ambela. They made one attack there on the "Crag" picquet, but being defeated, they went straight off home again.

It was believed at first that they were principally concerned in the attack on the Ughi *thana* on the 30th July 1868, but Major F. R. Pollock, the Commissioner, stated that, as a tribe, they took no part in it, the Chagarzais who were present being some who were in the service of the Pariari Syads. On the occasion of the advance of the British troops in October 1868 to the Black Mountain, they, on the 4th, in company with other tribes, took part in a noisy demonstration of defence of the Mana-ka-Dana peak, but immediately retreated on the artillery opening fire, and on the 10th they gave in their submission.

The *Pariari Syads* occupy two glens on the eastern face of the Black Mountain to the north of the Agror valley, from which they are separated by the Kungali spur; on the west side their boundary runs up to the top of the Muchai peak. On the north they are bounded by Deshi, and on the east by Tikari. The whole of the land originally belonged to *Syads*, who are still the nominal proprietors, but a large number of the villages are held by Basi Khel Chagarzais, either by rent or mortgage. Settlers of nearly all the surrounding Pathan and Swati races are to be found in Pariari, the *maliks* of the villages being, however, invariably *Syads*, who, from their spiritual influence and position as original proprietors, exercise considerable influence over their tenants.

MacGregor.

Pariari Syads.

McNeile.

There are about 400 fighting men, viz.—

Syads,	100
Basi Khel Chagarzais,	200
Gujars, etc.,	100

Of these, not more than half are armed with matchlocks, the others being armed with swords or spears. They have no reputation for bravery. They are constantly embroiled in internal feuds, but would at once unite to oppose a common enemy.

Water is plentiful, but a force would have to take supplies with them from Agror; this is, however, only three or four miles distant, and there is a road practicable for mules. The tribe deals and has relations with British territory, and a blockade would cause them serious injury, and an attack, *viâ* Agror, could easily be effected. A road from Mana-ka-Dana runs down the spur on to Bilankot, and so on to Chirmang and Trund. Troops passing by this route completely dominate the valley and the villages lying in it.

The tribe is most ignorant and intolerant, and has given some trouble on the border. In 1868, Major-General Wilde's force burnt some of their villages for the part they had taken in the attack on the Ughi *thana*. The leading *malik* at that time was Kudrat Shah, who was an active fomenter of disturbance against the British Government. In 1871, owing to some quarrel, the *Syads* were attacked by the Deshiwals, and had to seek safety in flight, Kudrat Shah's own village being burnt by the enemy. Subsequently, having murdered his uncle and his uncle's children in a mosque, he was in his turn murdered by a Chagarzai.

The only offence of importance committed by the tribe recently was a raid on the village of Bagrian in March 1881, in pursuance of a private feud. On account of this the tribe was blockaded, but subsequently paid up the fine of Rs. 300 demanded, and since then have remained quiet.

Expedition against the Hassanzais of the Black Mountain, by a force under Lieut.-Colonel F. Mackeson, C.B., in 1852-53.

The first time the Hassanzai tribe came into notice was on the occasion of the murder of Messrs. Carne and Tapp, officers of the Customs Department. Up to this time no one (except perhaps Major J. Abbott, the Deputy Commissioner,) had ever heard of their existence, but this act at once raised them to the first rank of border scoundrels.

Shortly after annexation, a preventive line was established along the left bank of the Indus, as far as British jurisdiction extended, to prevent trans-Indus salt being brought into the Punjab. In 1851 this line extended five miles beyond Torbela to a point on the Indus, where the cis-Indus territory of the Khan of Amb (Jehandad Khan) commenced.

During the autumn of that year, Mr. Carne, head of the Customs Department, desired to visit this border, with a view to any eventual extension of the line. The Board of Administration objected to the measure, and directed him not to go there.

During November, however, Mr. Carne, accompanied by one of his officers, Mr. Tapp, proceeded, against the advice of the district officer, Major J. Abbott, to reconnoitre the frontier. Having marched up the border, and returning towards Torbela, Mr. Carne dismissed all attendants, except a few of the men belonging to his own department. Shortly afterwards, the two officers, near the Hassanzai limits, but still within Jehandad's bounds, were murdered

by a band of armed Hassanzais. These Hassanzais had no concern whatever in Mr. Carne's views. Even if the line had been extended, it would not have affected them. Afterwards, when called to account for the deed, they never pretended that they ever entertained any apprehension in regard to the salt line. The Hassanzais may have entertained some unjust suspicions regarding Mr. Carne's intention, but neither their bounds nor their rights were infringed, and they crossed into British territory for the purpose of murdering British officers in cold blood, because they were Englishmen, infidels, defenceless travellers, with a little property about them.

Expedition against the Hassanzais of the Black Mountain in 1852-53.

As the murder happened in his fief, Jehandad Khan was called to account, and he at once delivered up such Hassanzais as he could find in his territory as hostages to the British authorities. The Hassanzais immediately made war upon him, and laid waste his border villages, seized his forts of Chamberi and Shunglai, stirred up his subjects to rebel, and at last reduced him to considerable straits. It was evident that the whole tribe approved of the murder, and sheltered the murderers. British interference became at last necessary, both to vindicate ourselves and support Jehandad Khan, who had failed in his attempts to recover the forts of Chamberi and Shunglai.

Commissioner's report.

Orders were therefore given for the assembling of a force to punish the Hassanzais; and in December 1852 the troops, as per margin, were concentrated at Shergarh, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel F. Mackeson, C.B., the Commissioner of Peshawar.

5th Troop, 1st brigade, Horse Artillery (4 guns).
Mountain Train Battery (6 guns).
16th Irregular Cavalry.
7th Company Sappers and Miners
3rd Native Infantry.
*Kelat-i-Ghizai Regiment.
Corps of Guides (4 companies).
1st Sikh Infantry.
Rawal Pindi Police (176 men).
Two Regiments of Dogras (Kashmir)
Levies (1,760 men):

The force was formed into three columns and a reserve. The right column was placed under the command of Lieut.-Colonel R. Napier, Bengal Engineers (now Lord Napier of Magdala), and consisted of—

2 guns Mountain Train Battery.
350 bayonets, Corps of Guides, under Lieutenant W. S. R. Hodson.
300 " 1st Sikh Infantry " Captain G. Gordon.
176 " Rawal Pindi Police " Lieutenant S. B. Cookson.

The centre column, under Major J. Abbott, Deputy Commissioner, consisted of two companies of Police, two companies of Dogras and about 1,400 levies, with 5 *zamburaks*† and 6 wall-pieces. The left column, under Captain W. W. Davidson, 16th Irregular Cavalry, consisted of four guns Mountain Train Battery, and the two regiments of Dogras, of the Kashmir army. The remainder of the troops formed the reserve under Lieut.-Colonel J. Butler, 3rd Native Infantry.

On the 19th, a reconnaissance of Shunglai was made, and on the 20th that fort was recovered without loss, and the next few days were spent in rendering it defensible; no attempt was made to hinder the work by the enemy, who occupied the heights above. Lieut.-Colonel Napier was at Chutta, Major Abbott at Shunglai, Captain Davidson at Sosni, and the reserve at Shergarh (see Map, page 68).

During the rebuilding of the fort an advance might at any time have been forced upon the troops, for the posts of the Hassanzais and Akazais occupied the crest of the Black Mountain, and

Lieut.-Col. Mackeson's despatch.

* The present 12th Regiment of Native Infantry.

† Native wall-pieces.

*Expedition
against the
Hassanzais
of the Black
Mountain in
1852-53.*

their picquets approached to within a few hundred yards of our posts at Chutta, whilst they waved their flags and flourished their sabres in defiance, sometimes at Panji Gali, sometimes in front of Chutta, and sometimes at Pubbul; and on the 21st a reconnoitring party under Lieutenant Hodson was fired upon by the enemy's picquets near Chutta.

On the occupation of Shunglai, Hassan Ali Khan, the chief of the Hassanzais, who had harboured the murderers of Messrs. Carne and Tapp, and had been the instigator of the attacks on Jehandad Khan's territory, sent in to say he had no objection to our rebuilding Shunglai, but that the troops must at once be withdrawn. In reply he was informed that the force, after repairing Shunglai, would march along the crest of the Black Mountain, over ground that was common both to the Hassanzais and Jehandad Khan, to the fort of Chamberi, and that on this march the troops would molest no one, unless they were molested and met with opposition; and at the same time he was invited to send in a *jirga* to amicably arrange his hostilities with Jehandad Khan, which kept the British border in a state of disquiet, and which we were consequently very anxious to arrange, particularly as the cause of quarrel appeared to be Jehandad Khan having seized certain Hassanzais on our requisition. Hassan Ali Khan's answer was a refusal to send any *jirga*, and a warning that he could not restrain the thousands of allies, Chargarzais and Akazais, who had joined him, if the force moved as stated.

It was a question how the regular troops could be used as a support to most advantage. The orders of the Board of Administration were, that these troops were not to be employed on the mountain top at that late season, and at Shergarh they were in a confined, narrow valley, encumbered with impedimenta, double-poled tents, *doolies*, *palkies*, and hundreds of camels; in short, the column was equipped as if for an ordinary march and not for mountain warfare, and yet it had passed through mountain defiles to its present position, and must pass through such defiles whatever direction it took. Lieut.-Colonel Mackeson determined, therefore, to throw off this support from his rear, and endeavour to pass it as quickly as possible on to the plain of the Indus, more especially as it could there be used to turn the enemy's position on the crest of the mountain.

The heights the attacking columns would have to climb were so difficult, that a hundred resolute men, not appalled by the undefined terror of the irresistible prowess of disciplined troops, could have effectually stopped the bravest assailants. To have attacked such heights *en face* without an effort to turn them would have savoured of rashness, and Lieut.-Colonel Mackeson preferred, therefore, to move the support round to the banks of the Indus, behind the Black Mountain, and thus to turn the position on the heights; and to let each column of attack trust to a small reserve of its own, and to the fort of Shergarh in the rear, if all were beaten back. Such was the plan proposed by Lieut.-Colonel Mackeson at this period of the operations.

Lieut.-Colonel Butler's column accordingly marched on the 24th and 25th December from Shergarh. Owing to the narrowness of the road through the defile to Darband, and the immense amount of baggage with the column, three instead of two marches had to be made from Shergarh to Darband, and it was fortunate that the points occupied by the irregular portion of the force at Chutta, Shunglai, and Sosni formed, with the assistance of intermediate posts, a complete screen, behind which the encumbered regular column laboriously, but securely, threaded its way through the mountain defile.

As already stated, Lieut.-Colonel Mackeson had determined not to ascend

the Black Mountain till the regular brigade had been placed between the Black Mountain and the Indus, in sight of the Hassanzai villages in the plain, thereby threatening the rear of the parties who might oppose the columns on the mountain top.

*Expedition
against the
Hassanzais of
the Black
Mountain
in 1852-53.*

The weather had been very favourable; snow had not fallen, and the nights were bright moonlight.

On the 27th, Lieut.-Colonel Mackeson made a reconnaissance, and from a height was enabled to obtain a view of the Hassanzai country. As a result of this he decided to alter his plans somewhat. The main force of the regular troops were to be placed at Bruddur, with four companies in Chamberi, to make demonstrations on the heights in front of Chamberi. It was considered that the enemy's hold of his position on the mountain would be sufficiently shaken by this disposition of the regular troops, and all idea of their movement, lightly equipped, up the banks of the Indus to a point in the rear of the enemy's position, was abandoned, as such a move would have entangled those troops in difficult ground; for the reconnaissance had shown that there was, with the exception of one spot below Kotkai, little plain between the Black Mountain and the Indus.

On the 28th December these dispositions of Lieut.-Colonel Butler's force were effected, and orders given for the advance of the three other columns on the 29th, the Hassanzai stronghold of Panji Gali being the point where they were ultimately to unite.

The columns were told they had nothing to fall back upon, and that the word must be "forward"; but that, in the event of a repulse, the right column should make good its retreat by Shunglai towards the left column, and that all would then endeavour to reach Chamberi by keeping the road on the crest; or, failing that, to reach Bruddur by the Nikapani road. The view Lieut.-Colonel Mackeson had of the Hassanzai country had convinced him that danger from a snow-storm was not insurmountable. The elevated plateau of Tilli, suspended in air, midway between the crests of the Black Mountain and the river Indus, would afford a resting-place, even for a month, free from snow, and nothing could have prevented supplies and reinforcements reaching that place from the plains, *via* Chamberi, so long as the force chose to remain there; and the force in possession of that elevated plain could beat off all the tribes that could be collected against it. The difficulty that presented itself was the crossing over the heights for seven or eight miles in snow, but, as it turned out, the columns found little snow to contend with.

On the 29th, the repair of the Shunglai fort having been finished, the force advanced. The right column, under Lieut.-Colonel R. Napier, marched in the following order. The advanced guard, consisting of three companies of the Guides, under Lieut. W. S. R. Hodson, as skirmishers, with one company under Ensign F. McC. Turner as a support. The main body, consisting of two guns, Mountain Train Battery, and 300 bayonets 1st Sikh Infantry, under Captain G. Gordon. The rear guard, consisting of 176 bayonets, Rawal Pindi Police, under Lieut. S. B. Cookson. The ground which this column had to traverse consisted of a rocky ridge rising for about a mile, and terminating in a small wooded hill which lay at the foot of the first steep ascent on which the enemy (apparently about 300 in number) were posted; shortly before daybreak a company of the Guides was sent to reconnoitre and to occupy, if undefended, the small wooded hill. This was successfully done, and proved a great advantage, as it enabled the column to advance from its position, through some difficult ground, without opposition.

*Expedition
against the
Hassanzais of
the Black
Mountain in
1852-53.*

The first position held by the enemy was a steep and thickly wooded shoulder of the mountain, rising abruptly for nearly a thousand feet, with some open ground near the summit. The enemy had made an abatis at the bottom of the ascent, from which they opened a matchlock fire whilst the guns were being brought into position. About eight o'clock the guns opened with good effect, and considerable impression having been made on the enemy, Lieut.-Colonel Napier gave the order to advance, whereupon the Guides rapidly ascended in skirmishing order, supported by the 1st Sikh Infantry, and cleared nearly the whole of the ascent, when the enemy, finding themselves unable to answer the fire, charged boldly, sword in hand, on the advanced skirmishers, whose eagerness had carried them a little too far beyond their supports, and drove them back in some confusion. Order was, however, quickly restored, and a firm advance up the hill drove the enemy from their ground, which they defended step by step; a bold attempt to make a second charge was checked by the guns and the leading companies of the Guides.

On the summit of the ascent was a fine piece of open tableland, upwards of a mile long and several hundred yards broad, beyond which the enemy retreated to the second steep ascent. After a short rest, the guns having closed up, the column advanced to the second hill, between which and the tableland was a hollow, studded with rocks and pine trees; the lower part of the ascent was similar to the previous one, but of a more rugged character, broken by inaccessible cliffs on one side and a dense wall of pine trees on the other, which confined the operations to a very narrow front. The enemy had felled a number of trees at the foot of the ascent to retain their assailants under fire, keeping themselves to the upper and more open ground. The skirmishers of the Guides were posted in the broken ground at the foot of the ascent, whilst the guns were being put in position; when they were ready to open, the advance was again made, covered by their fire. The skirmishers of the Guides, supported by a company of Sikhs, under Lieutenant C. H. Brownlow, on the left, and a party of Guides, under Ensign F. McC. Turner, on the right, crowned the heights. The enemy made several bold attempts to charge, coming within twenty spaces of the skirmishers, but were unable to face the close fire of the rifles and the excellent practice of the Artillery, and at length abandoned their position, carrying with them their wounded.

The column had thus arrived near the summit of the Black Mountain, which was open and beautifully wooded; a broad spur forming the top of the range occupied by the Akazais, branched off from this point at an elevation probably of 9,000 feet. By this ridge the enemy retreated, and it was thought necessary to hold the ground there for some time until the rear guard had come up, lest any of the enemy should return. No further defence of the hill was made; a small party followed up the rear guard, but were easily dispersed by Lieutenant Cookson. Shortly before sunset the advanced party of the Guides under Lieutenant Hodson arrived at the shoulder of the mountain above Panji Gali, where the main body of the enemy still held their position, but at the first appearance of the Guides they commenced a rapid retreat, pursued by the Kashmir troops. The main body of the right column did not come up till dark, when it was too late to descend the shoulder of the mountain to Panji Gali, and it bivouacked for the night, having traversed the crest of the mountain for a distance that Lieut.-Colonel Napier estimated at not less than eight miles. There was snow on the ground, but the troops behaved with the utmost cheerfulness, and not a complaint was heard. Lieutenant Hodson, with the

advanced party of the Guides, bivouacked at Panji Gali, where the main body of the right column joined him in the morning.

To turn now to the centre column. Major J. Abbott commenced his operations by sending on 500 men of the levies at 3 a.m. on the 29th to seize a hill which commanded his proposed line of advance, and, having given them three hours' start, he marched about sunrise with two companies of Dogras, two Police companies, and about 900 levies, with the 5 *zamburaks* and the 6 wallpieces. Having ascended about half-way to Panji Gali, the force came suddenly upon the main body of the Hassanzais, strongly posted upon a steep eminence in the centre of the main ravine. They formed what seemed to be a solid square of 600 matchlock men, their skirmishers lining the ravine, which could not be attacked from the front, as the forest and brushwood were so dense that the men had to break their way at every step. Major Abbott, therefore, formed his line on a spur running from the hill above mentioned to the main ravine, when, after some skirmishing, he succeeded in turning the enemy's flank. The Hassanzais then fell back on a strong position at the head of the pass, followed by Major Abbott, who had been joined by the Gandghar matchlock men. At about 2 p.m. the left column, under Captain Davidson, effected a junction with this column, but the position of the enemy was so strong, that Lieut.-Colonel Mackeson determined to await its being taken in reverse by Lieut.-Colonel Napier's column; on the appearance of the head of which column the Hassanzais retreated, followed by the Dogras, as already related.

*Expedition
against the
Hassanzais of
the Black
Mountain in
1852-53.*

The left column, which was under the command of Captain W. W. Davidson, was accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Mackeson. At 3 A.M. it commenced its march towards Panji; on reaching the village of Agror, as the second regiment of Dogras had been detained by the guns, Captain Davidson pushed on with the first regiment, and, turning Pabbul, found himself close upon a hill overlooking Tilli. Here a small picket of the enemy fired upon the head of the column; they were immediately dislodged, and a strong party posted on the summit of the hill. At this place the column halted until the guns and the other regiment came up. About 2 P.M. the column, now complete, made good its junction with the centre one under Major Abbott, close to Panji Gali, when, as stated above, the arrival of Lieutenant-Colonel Napier's column was awaited to turn the enemy's position.

On the 30th, the whole of the levies, with two companies of Dogras, were employed in destroying the Hassanzai villages. In the afternoon the different columns received orders to move to the plateau of Tilli, but, night coming on, the columns bivouacked on the hillside, and marched for Tilli the following morning in a light fall of snow; the Rawal Pindi Police being left to hold the crest of the mountain.

On the 31st, the work of destruction was continued; and the villages and hamlets in the deep glens between Abu and Tilli were destroyed. Shingur and other villages between Kotkai and Bruddur, along the banks of the Indus, were burnt on the same day by Jehandad Khan and his Tanawalis, who had crossed over from Amb.

On the 1st January 1853, at daybreak, Major Abbott being joined by Jehandad Khan and his people from Shingur, destroyed Kotkai; the enemy, aided by allies trans-Indus, following up the column as it retired. At 11 A.M. the whole force marched for Chamberi, *viâ* Panji Gali. On the following day the retirement was continued to Bruddur, where the reserve under Lieutenant-Colonel Butler was encamped.

The losses of the attacking columns are given, as far as can be ascertained,

*Expedition
against the
Hassanzais of
the Black
Mountain
in 1852-53.*

in Appendix A. That of the Hassanzais was computed at from fifteen to twenty killed, the number of wounded being unknown.

Lieutenant-Colonel Mackeson, in his despatch on the above operations said, the hardships from exposure to cold and fatigue and from long fasting, were shared cheerfully and pretty equally by all the troops. The fighting fell to the share of the Guides, who, under their gallant leader, Lieutenant Hodson, shewed themselves well deserving of the post of honour and of their well-earned fame. He remarked that the fact of the highest summits of the Black Mountain having, when clad with snow, been climbed by British and Kashmir troops in the face of all the opposition that its mountain defenders, prepared and resolute to oppose them, could bring against them, needed no amplification, but would carry the conviction that those troops were resolute, and that their leaders were not easily appalled by difficulties.

Lieut.-Colonel Mackeson spoke of his deep obligations to Lieut.-Colonel R. Napier for the skilful way in which he had conducted his column, and of the valuable assistance he had received from Captain W. W. Davidson. It was true, he said, the enemy were but peasantry, but peasantry that were inured to war, and masters in hill warfare, in which the troops he then commanded were but as yet novices. He also alluded to the willing assistance of Lieutenant-Colonel J. Butler to forward the operations, and bore testimony to the energetic exertions of Major J. Abbott in the operations, and his arrangements to keep the troops supplied with provisions, which were, with trifling exceptions, generally successful, and reflected credit on his management. Captain Davidson had borne high testimony to the commanders of the two Dogra regiments, and to the soldier-like qualities of those troops, and their patient endurance of hardships. Lieutenant-Colonel Mackeson particularly alluded to their equipment for mountain warfare: and their mode of carrying mountain guns, he said, was worthy of adoption. The men were ready to move at a moment's notice, and their blanket tents, which afforded sufficient protection for native troops during a few days' exposure, moved with them on the heads of *coolies* without causing any delay or obstruction. In his report, Lieutenant-Colonel Napier mentioned the names of Captain G. Gordon, commanding, and Lieutenant C. H. Brownlow, Adjutant, 1st Sikh Infantry; of Lieutenant W. S. R. Hodson, commanding, Ensign F. Mc C. Turner, Adjutant, and Assistant Surgeon R. Lyell, Corps of Guides; and Subadar Mir Sunder Ali, Mountain Train Battery; Captain Davidson—that of Assistant Surgeon A. J. Gee; and Major Abbott—those of Muhammad Ghous Akhundzada and others.

The Governor-General in Council directed that Lieutenant-Colonel Mackeson should be informed that the moral courage with which he resolved to prosecute the measures he had suggested, and not less the gallantry, skill and judgment with which he had carried them into effect, were highly and justly estimated by the Government; and the hearty appreciation by the Governor-General in Council of the energetic, resolute, and cheerful manner they had encountered the fatigues and difficulties so peculiarly associated with mountain warfare were to be conveyed to—

Lieutenant-Colonel R. Napier, Bengal Engineers,
Major J. Abbott, Deputy Commissioner,
Captain W. W. Davidson, 16th Irregular Cavalry,
Lieutenant W. S. R. Hodson, Corps of Guides,
Captain G. Gordon, 1st Sikh Infantry,
Lieutenant-Colonel J. Butler, 3rd Native Infantry,

who were in command of columns and corps, and to the officers and men under their orders.

The Indian medal with a clasp for the "North-West Frontier" was granted in 1869 to all survivors of troops engaged in the above operations against the Hassanzais.

G. G. O. No.
812 of 1869.

*Expedition
against the
Hassanzais of
the Black
Mountain
in 1852-53.*

It being considered that the destruction of the Hassanzai villages, with all their grain, etc., had been sufficient punishment for the murder of the two British officers, the hostages in our hands who had been seized by the Khan of Amb were then sent back, and the tribe was informed "that the British Government did not covet their possessions, nor those of other neighbouring tribes, with whom it desired to be at peace; but that it expected tribes would restrain individual members from committing unprovoked outrages on British subjects, and afford redress when they are committed; that when a whole tribe, instead of affording redress, seeks to screen the individual offenders, the British Government has no alternative but to hold the whole tribe responsible."

After this lesson the Hassanzais for a time remained quiet, and no overt act of hostility was committed by them. In April 1855 they had a dispute with the people of Agror relative to a marriage, and threatened to ravage that tract; but a message was sent reminding them of the lesson of 1852, and they desisted.

On the disturbances breaking out in 1863, which led to the expedition to Ambela, complications with the Hassanzais again arose. In August of that year, instigated, it is supposed, by emissaries of the Hindustanis of Sittana, but some do not hesitate to say, incited to the movement by the Agror chief, who was hostile to the Khan of Amb, they made a raid in force (500 to 600) on a nest of hamlets, rather than villages, in the Shunglai valley on the eastern face of the Black Mountain, in which the most advanced outpost of Amb territory is situated. Seven hamlets were burnt, one man who resisted was killed, and some cattle were carried off. The fort of Shunglai, which is in the midst of these villages, was not molested, but it was useless for the purpose of protecting them, as it had a garrison of only five men.

After this the Hassanzais appeared at one time to threaten an attack on Chamberi, and a portion of the Mada Khels crossed the Indus with the intention of assisting; but the frontier line having been greatly strengthened by the Amb authorities, the gathering broke up, and the Mada Khels re-crossed the river. Soon after an attack was made by the Hassanzais on the Amb troops on the Black Mountain border, and one jemadar and seven men were reported killed and six wounded.

In the first plan of operations, proposed in October 1863, for the expulsion of the Hindustani fanatics from Malka, it was intended that the force should afterwards cross the Mahaban mountain to the Indus, and punish the Hassanzais of the Black Mountain; but, owing to the unexpected course of events, this plan was not executed.

The Hassanzais subsequently waited on the Deputy Commissioner of Hazara at Darband, and entered into engagements which were adhered to till 1868, when they were induced by Ata Muhammad, Khan of Agror, to join in the attack on the Ughi thana.

*Expedition
against the
Black Moun-
tain tribes
in 1868.*

Expedition against the Black Mountain tribes by a force under Major-General A. T. Wilde, C.B., C.S.I., in 1868.

In November 1867 it was determined to establish a body of police in the Agror valley, and they were temporarily located in the village of Ughi, until a fortified police post could be built. At daylight on the morning of the 30th July 1868, this body of police, numbering 22 men, was attacked by some 500 men belonging to the Chagarzai, Akazai, and Hassanzai tribes. The Syads of Pariari also took part in the raid. The enemy were, after a hand-to-hand fight, driven off, leaving six dead bodies in the hands of the police; our casualties were, three policemen wounded, two horses killed, four carried off, besides other property plundered.

Troops were immediately called for from Abbottabad, and a force consisting of the Peshawar Mountain Battery and 350 men of the 5th Gurkhas, under Lieut.-Colonel O. E. Rothney, of that regiment, marching from Abbottabad four hours after the receipt of the intelligence, reached Ughi before midnight on the 31st, having marched forty-two miles in twenty-five hours. Captain E. L. Ommanney, the Deputy Commissioner, was with Lieut.-Colonel Rothney's camp at Ughi, and on the 2nd of August he was joined by Akram Khan, the chief of Amb, and a body of his levies. The cause of the raid was considered to be due to the intrigues of Ata Muhammad Khan, the Khan of Agror. This chief held a *jagir* in the Agror valley, which had been given to him by the Sikhs in 1841, and had been continued by the British Government on annexation. He was, however, discontented, and wanted to occupy a more independent position, like his neighbour the Khan of Amb. He had not disguised his dissatisfaction at the location of the police post in the valley, the establishment of which would have the effect of lessening his dignity, diminishing his influence, and repressing his unlawful exactions. He was, therefore, strongly suspected of having incited the independent tribes beyond the border to make the raid on Ughi in order to procure the removal of the post. He was consequently seized by order of the Commissioner, and sent off under military escort to Abbottabad. His cousin, Aladad Khan, also a *jagirdar* in the Agror valley, being suspected of complicity, was likewise made a prisoner.

On the 4th August, orders were sent for the march of a squadron of the Guide Cavalry from Yusafzai to Abbottabad, and on the 5th the Commissioner and Brigadier-General Wilde, commanding the Punjab Frontier Force, recommended a native regiment being sent up from Rawal Pindi, and the working parties of the British regiments on the Murree and Abbottabad road being warned for service.

The following day a requisition was made for 200 of the men of the working parties to be at once sent to Abbottabad, and three troops of the native cavalry regiment were asked for from Rawal Pindi. A wing of the 2nd Punjab Infantry was sent from Abbottabad to Agror, to reinforce Lieut.-Colonel Rothney, and the services of the Kashmir regiments at Muzaffarabad were also applied for.

In the meanwhile the following events had been passing in the Agror valley. On the 2nd August, the enemy threatening the village of Dilbori, a small fort in the village was occupied by the Khan of Amb's men. The Akazais, Hassanzais, Tilli Syads, and the Swati clans, had been ordered to send in deputations to the Deputy Commissioner, but the Akazais refused to come in, saying

they had never done so to the Sikhs, and the others replied they would do so if all came in, and demanded the release of Ata Muhammad Khan. The following day Dilbori was again threatened, and the Agror and Swati levies, being sent out to support the Tanawalis, were led into a trap, and suffered pretty severely by being beaten twice down the hill. Fortunately heavy rain stopped the match-lock fire, and the few police with carbines and the Tanawalis covered the retreat down the hill.

*Expedition
against the
Black Moun-
tain tribes
in 1868.*

• On the 5th August, another attack was made on the village, when one or two houses were set on fire, but the enemy were driven off by the Tanawalis with some loss. On the 6th, Dilbori was again attacked, when, according to orders, the Tanawalis retired, setting fire to the fort,—their retirement being covered by Lieut.-Colonel Rothney's detachment, which had moved out from Ughi for the purpose. The enemy meantime fired six villages in the valley.

During these days, the relations of the Khan of Agror had all left the valley, with the exception of his eldest son, who, on the night of the 6th, went over to the enemy, setting fire to his village before doing so, his flight being assisted by the Akazais of Shatut and others.

On the 7th, a general advance of the enemy took place, the Pariari Syads and Chagarzais acting in the centre of the valley, the Swati clans, who had now freely joined, acting along the Kabbal hill, the Akazais and Khan Khel section of the Hassanzais acting on the Black Mountain. The Agror and Swati levies were, with very few exceptions, disorganised and untrustworthy, and Lieut.-Colonel Rothney again moved out and withdrew the Tanawalis from a ridge in front of his camp (to which they had been withdrawn on the 6th), to the Manchura ridge, still nearer Ughi.

The whole of the Swati tribes beyond the border, except Allai, were now up and rapidly joining the ranks of the enemy, and our own Swati levies were deserting in numbers to their homes; some of the headmen of the villages had already gone off, whilst those that remained were not to be trusted. Six more villages close to Manchura had been burnt, and the rear of the position was threatened.

On the 8th, Lieut.-Colonel Rothney again moved out to cover the withdrawal of some advanced Tanawali pickets to Manchura and to the ridge to the north of Ughi, which had been shamefully abandoned by the Mansehra levies the night before. The Amb men were the only levies to be relied on, and Lieut.-Colonel Rothney said he could not speak too well in praise of the conduct of the *Khan*. During the morning, whilst reconnoitring from Manchura, these levies showed the stuff they were made of by recklessly galloping across a country, studded with Indian corn-fields and trees, and in possession of the enemy, in the unavailing attempt to recover a horse that had strayed into the hands of the enemy. In the afternoon, when the troops, after locating the Tanawalis in Manchura, were returning to camp, the enemy moved down the hill in great numbers, and with yells charged down on Manchura. The Tanawali horse made a most gallant charge up the hill, but were eventually driven out of Manchura, which was fired, as well as two other villages.

On the 9th, the force at Ughi was reinforced by a wing of the 2nd Punjab Infantry; 200 men of the working parties (1-19th Regiment) having come down to Abbottabad. On the 10th, the villages at the foot of the Susal pass were burnt by the enemy. Lieut.-Colonel Rothney had no cavalry in his camp, and he could do little more than act on the defensive; but his great anxiety was in regard to his communications with Pakli, as the Susal pass was only held by levies, on whom no reliance could be placed. However, on the

*Expedition
against the
Black Moun-
tain tribes
in 1868.*

11th the pass was occupied by the 2nd Gurkhas from Rawal Pindi, when reinforcements, consisting of detachments, 2nd Punjab Infantry and 5th Gurkhas, and a wing of the 16th Bengal Cavalry, arrived at Ughi, where the enemy were making demonstrations from time to time against the camp.

On the 12th, Lieut.-Colonel Rothney, hearing that the enemy had determined to make a combined attack upon his camp, resolved to take the initiative. Accordingly, early on the morning of the 12th, he moved out with the mountain battery, 50 sabres of the 16th Bengal Cavalry and 350 infantry, in the direction of Banda, where the enemy were in strength. Two mountain guns and detachments of cavalry and infantry were left as a guard for the camp, a detachment of 50 sabres of the 16th Bengal Cavalry under Captain G. C. Ross sweeping round the valley. The enemy were in large clusters at Banda, and all along the base of the Kabbal hill, and along the spur running down to Manchura. Lieut.-Colonel Rothney, having driven them from their position near Banda, forced them to retire up a spur of the Kabbal mountain, where they made a stand in force on a small mound thickly covered with brushwood. Lieut.-Colonel Rothney then ordered a rush to be made on it by two companies of the 5th Gurkhas, and one company 2nd Punjab Infantry, supported by some Tanawali horse, and covered by the fire of the mountain guns under Major Hughes. From this position the enemy were driven with scarcely any resistance, and fled in all directions over the Kabbal spur; and Akram Khan, the Amb chief, without waiting for orders, with a body of his sowars, followed by a few footmen, made a gallant dash up and along the spur of the Kabbal mountain down to the hill overlooking Manchura. By 3 P.M. not a flag or an enemy was to be seen in the valley, although their numbers had previously been estimated at 3,000 or more. The troops were then withdrawn to camp without any molestation on the part of the enemy, and from this time no further attempts were made in the Agror valley.

Lieutenant-Colonel Rothney, in his report of this affair, stated that he had received able assistance on this as on all occasions from Major T. E. Hughes, commanding the Peshawar Mountain Battery; and that he was indebted to Captain G. C. Ross, commanding the detachment 16th Bengal Cavalry; Captain H. Tyndall, commanding detachment 2nd Punjab Infantry; and Captain E. C. Codrington, commanding detachment 5th Gurkhas; as also to Captain E. L. Ommanney, Deputy Commissioner, who had tendered his services when the troops moved out.

The casualties had been six wounded, including Lieut.-Colonel O. E. Rothney and Major T. E. Hughes (the latter by an accident), besides six men and two horses of the levies wounded. The enemy had some thirty killed and wounded.

Whilst the detachment, 16th Bengal Cavalry, was moving round the valley, the villagers and a body of levies, seeing a support so near, attacked and recovered a number of cattle which the enemy were driving off from the village of Shumdarra, when seven of the enemy were killed and two Chagarzais made prisoners.

A few days before these events, the Deputy Commissioner had given permission to the chief of Amb to hold communications with his partizans amongst the Hassanzais, which not only had the effect of creating suspicion of that tribe in the minds of the rest of the enemy, but caused the Hassanzais to refrain from taking any active part in the affair on the 12th.

The effects of this engagement, the arrival of British troops at Abbottabad, further reinforcements at Ughi, and the arrival of the Kashmir regiments in the Pakli valley, enabled Brigadier-General Wilde on the 16th August to report that the safety of the Hazara district was secured, and that he only awaited the arrival of reinforcements to carry out any punitive measures that might be ordered.

Up to this date, twenty-one British villages, which for the most part lay in the irrigated part of the valley, had been burnt, and our total casualties (see Appendix B) had been sixty-four.

The Commissioner of the division then recommended that a punitive expedition should be sent against the tribes of the Black Mountain, and this proposal was strongly supported by the Lieutenant-Governor, who said that it was absolutely necessary for the security of the frontier and the vindication of the British character that the clans engaged in this outrage should be suitably punished for their invasion of British territory and their attack upon Ughi.

But whilst the Governor-General in Council fully approved of the proposal to undertake an expedition against these tribes, and any others who might join in helping them against the British Government, he remarked—“It is obviously very desirable that the efforts of the avenging force should be limited to what is essentially necessary to accomplish the object in view, as well as to what may be feasible, with reference to the character of the mountainous country in which the operations will have to be carried on, and its general accessibility to the troops. Care should be taken to respect the possessions of all adjacent tribes who may not have joined, or who may subsequently not join, the enemy; and should it be necessary to march through any portion of their lands, arrangements should be made, as far as it may be practicable, to give them assurance beforehand that no hostile measures against them are intended.”

A feeling of uneasiness was at this time perceptible amongst the tribes trans-Indus, and news-writers from Kabul, Peshawar, and Swat, agreed in prophesying coming disturbances, instigated from Swat, along the Peshawar border, where for many months the Salarzai section of the Bunerwals had been blockaded for having, in February 1867, had the audacity to attack and burn the British village of Pirsai in Yusafzai. The Commander-in-Chief therefore determined, instead of weakening the garrison of Peshawar, or drawing troops from the posts along the border, to supply the force for operations from the rear stations in the Punjab, and from the North-West Provinces; whilst the whole front of the border stations, which was held by the regular troops in Peshawar and by the Frontier Force along the border, was preserved intact.

D-F Royal Horse Artillery.

E-19 Royal Artillery.

2-24th „ „

1-6th Regiment.

1-19th „

Two companies 77th Regiment.

16th Bengal Cavalry.

2nd Gurkha Regiment.

24th Punjab Native Infantry.

The troops, as per margin, had been already ordered from Rawal Pindi to Hazara, and some of these had arrived to reinforce Lieutenant-Colonel Rothney before the skirmish on the 12th August took place. On the march to Abbottabad the 6th Regiment had thirty-eight men struck down by heat apoplexy, eight of whom died.

The troops, as per margin, were now ordered to march to Hazara. The

38th Foot.

2nd and 7th Companies, Sappers and Miners.

1st Gurkha Regiment.

20th Punjab Native Infantry marched a distance of 232 miles from Lahore to Abbottabad, in ten days, in the month of August. The 38th Foot moved in like manner from Sialkot, and finally reached Darband. The 1st and 4th Gurkhas coming from the distant hill stations of

Expedition against the Black Mountain tribes in 1868.

*Expedition
against the
Black Moun-
tain tribes
in 1868.*

4th Gurkha Regt.
20th Punjab Na-
tive Infantry.
31st Punjab Native
Infantry.

Bukloh and Dharmsala emulated the exertions of the above corps and joined Brigadier-General Wilde in a wonderfully short space of time, considering the distance traversed. The 31st Punjab Native Infantry marched a distance of 422 miles, and the two companies of Sappers and Miners actually covered nearly 600 miles, by forced marches, in twenty-nine days!

Other regiments, as per margin, left their several stations of Campbellpur, Lahore, Aligarh, Amritsar, and Cawnpore, and took post at Rawal Pindi as the immediate reserve, with the exception of the 9th Bengal Cavalry, which was moved on to Darband. The Commander-in-Chief recorded that when it was recollected that all these necessary movements were carried through in the deadly heats of August and September, it was impossible to exaggerate the alacrity of the officers and men, or the efficiency of the Commissariat Department, aided by the civil officers.

A line of telegraph was in the meantime ordered to be laid down to connect Abbottabad and Ughi with the general system of India.

But the movement of these troops towards the frontier, and their gradual concentration in Hazara, had, even before any offensive movements had taken place, commenced to most happily affect our political relations trans-Indus. The *Akhund* of Swat, conscious of past misdeeds deserving of retribution, evidently conceived objects on our part beyond the punishment of the immediate offenders on the Black Mountain. As the direction of our objective seemed rather to threaten the valley of Swat, the *Akhund* immediately took action against the Wahabi Hindustanis, so long located on the slopes of the Mahaban, and headed by a chief generally stated to be Feroz Shah, son of the last King of Delhi. The expulsion of this colony, then located at Sittana on the Indus, was the cause of the expedition of 1858 under Major-General Sir Sydney Cotton (*see* Chap. IV), and also, on its removal to Malka on the opposite slopes of the mountain, of the Ambela campaign in 1863 (*see* Chap. V); consequently it was but natural for the *Akhund* to look upon this hornets' nest as the possible object of further punishment. On the 26th of August a large force of the *Akhund's* Swat followers were reported to have attacked and defeated the Wahabi Hindustanis, whose leader forsook them, and fled, it was said, towards Kabul, and further drove these malcontents from place to place until they sought refuge in the country of the Chagarzais trans-Indus. At the same time, at the dictum of the same high sacerdotal authority, the Salarzai Bunerwals, already referred to as under blockade for the burning of Pirsai, came in and sought terms of forgiveness from the British civil authorities in Yusafzai.

The territory of our ally, the chief of Amb, had been frequently threatened by the trans-Indus clansmen of the inimical portion of the Hassanzai tribe, and on the 17th September the Mada Khel tribe attacked the *Khan* in force, but were repulsed; it became necessary, therefore, to afford immediate support to this chief on the left flank of our front of operations. The 38th Foot, with the 9th Bengal Cavalry and the 31st Punjab Native Infantry, were therefore directed on Darband, the whole under the command of Colonel F. A. Willis, C.B., 38th Foot, to support the *Khan* of Amb.

*Expedition
against the
Black Moun-
tain tribes
in 1868.*

Wilde had submitted the following recommendations. The enemy, he said, were thus divided—

- I.—Hassanzais, Akazais, and Mada Khels.
- II.—Pariari Syads, Chagarzais.
- III.—Swatis.

With regard to the Hassanzais, they had not been as hostile (with the exception of the Khan Khel section) as the rest of the enemy. They had been defeated in 1852, and the good influence of the Khan of Amb having been brought to bear on them, they were already sending in to the Commissioner, saying they desired to treat. The Swatis, too, were also petitioning to be allowed to treat, and with the punishment of the independent tribes beyond the border, Major-General Wilde considered quiet would again be brought about. He proposed that, making the valley of Agror the base of his operations, a force should ascend to the tops of the Black Mountain which dominate all the spurs running north and west towards the river Indus, on which the lands of the Akazais and Chagarzais are situated; the Hassanzai territory being situated on the more southern slopes. At the same time, a corps of observation was to be placed at Darband as a moral support to the Khan of Amb, to distract the attention of the enemy, and to cut off, if possible, the retreat of the trans-Indus tribes if they crossed the river to aid their brethren on this side.

Major F. R. Pollock, the Commissioner, in his letter to Government recommending an expedition, had said that it would be difficult to explain how slowly the tribes accepted the fact that our long-suffering Government was really bent on coercing the border and calling them to account; and there seems no room to doubt but that the Khan of Agror had continuously led the tribes to believe that nothing would induce the Government to sanction a punitive expedition. When, however, our preparations and the formal declaration of our intentions altered their views, the people of Tikari and Nandihar spontaneously proffered payment of fines to expiate their offence, and even commenced to apportion amongst the members of their tribes, according to the means of each, the sums which they were led to suppose would be required of them; and by the time the force was prepared to advance, the representatives of these two tribes had come in and engaged to hold aloof, sending hostages to accompany our troops during their ascent up the Black Mountain.

The Hassanzais, who had, as already stated, entered into friendly communication with the Tanawali chief as far back as the 10th or 11th of August, and had consequently held aloof from the affair on the 12th of that month, similarly sent in representatives, with apologies for those of their tribe who had offended, and with the assurance of their willingness to abide by the terms of their engagement entered into with Major H. W. H. Coxe at Darband at the close of the Ambela campaign (*see* Chap. V).

It was true that they had not acted against us as a tribe, and there was force in what they urged, that in August they actually prevented their trans-Indus brethren, Mada Khels and others, from crossing to the Hazara bank and joining in the attack on the Agror detachment; that this was the case Major Pollock had ascertained reliably from other independent sources. Although the tribe was not, as it endeavoured to make out, free from blame, Major Pollock felt justified, looking to the importance of detaching them from the

other tribes, in dealing leniently with them. They were directed, if sincere in their professions of friendship and submission, to tell off representatives to accompany the force through their country, and warned that, in the event of resistance being offered to our troops, they would be liable to the destruction of their villages and crops, and their representatives would be detained in custody.

*Expedition
against the
Black Moun-
tain tribes
in 1868.*

Another significant proof of the overawing effect of the force assembling in Agror was afforded by the gradual return into British territory of the families and relations of the deported *Khans*—Ata Muhammad and Aladad Khan. The adjacent hills no longer afforded them safe asylum, and they preferred surrendering themselves to seeking shelter trans-Indus.

The troops in Hazara had, however, still to deal with the large Chagarzai and Akazai tribes; with the Deshi and Thakot Swatis; with the Pariari Syads and their followers; and not improbably with the Hindustani fanatics and large bodies of trans-Indus Pathans.

By the end of September the preparations for an advance were completed; the sick and weakly men were to be left at Ughi, where the camp remained standing, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Rothney. The two Dogra regiments moved into the valley of Agror, to hold the following posts during the expedition, *viz.*—the Jalgali pass, the Susal pass, and the camp at Ughi. Preparatory to the advance of the troops into the mountains, proclamations were issued by the Commissioner, both to the cis-Indus and trans-Indus tribes, and these are given in Appendix F.

On the 1st October the Wahabi Hindustanis were reported to have crossed to the Hazara side of the Indus, to the village of Judbai. On the same date Major-General Wilde reported that the presence of the brigade of troops at Amb, in support of the *'Khan* of that place, had produced the effect of causing the Amazai and Mada Khel tribes to express a desire to make peace with that chief.

On the 3rd October the troops advanced from British territory (*see* Map, p. 68). At daybreak, on that day, the force marched out from the camp at Ughi. One day's cooked rations were carried in their haversacks by the troops, and seven days' supplies for the whole force were carried on mules.

Major-General
Wilde's despatch.

The object of the first day's operations was to occupy the Jalgali pass, leading from the valley of Agror into those of Tikari and Nandihar, belonging to the independent Swatis, so as to secure through the Kungali village a line of communication with Ughi. The village of Kungali is situated a short distance up a spur of that name, by which it was intended one of the columns should ascend the Black Mountain. To effect these objects it was essential to carry the hills on both sides of the pass. Moreover, the movement would at once test the sincerity of the professions of neutrality which had lately been made by the Swatis of Tikari and Nandihar, as, since the commencement of hostilities, the enemy had always defiantly shown themselves on these hills.

Brigadier-General J. L. Vaughan, C.B., commanding the 2nd Brigade, with the troops marginally noted, advanced by the direct road from Ughi as far as the village of Bagrian, situated at the foot of one of the spurs of the mountain, and the 1-6th Regiment and Peshawar Mountain Battery were there halted, whilst the 2nd Gurkhas, in skirmishing order, supported by the 3rd Sikh Infantry, advanced up the Kiarkot

Peshawar Moun-
tain Battery.
1-6th Regiment.
2nd Gurkha Regi-
ment.
3rd Sikh In-
fantry.

*Expedition
against the
Black Moun-
tain tribes
in 1868.*

mountain, the crest of which was reached at 11-30 A.M., a few long shots only being fired by the enemy. In the course of the afternoon the Kiarkot mountain was occupied by the levies, and the troops then bivouacked for the night, preparatory to the ascent, the following day, of the Black Mountain, by the Sambalbut spur, the remainder of the 2nd Brigade joining Brigadier-General Vaughan at Kilagai.

Hazara Moun- tain Battery. 1-19th Regiment 1st Gurkha Regi- ment. 20th Punjab Native Infantry.	Brigadier-General R. O. Bright, with the troops as per margin, moved, covered by the 20th Punjab Native Infantry, on the village of Kungali, up to which point no opposition was offered by the enemy, but on arrival at Kungali, the enemy began to collect on a height above it. Although Brigadier-General Bright had received no instructions to proceed further than Kungali, he determined to continue his advance to prevent the enemy collecting in large numbers, which they had not yet done, and to disperse them. Brigadier-General Bright reached the position of Mana-ka-Dana about midday, where, it being easily defensible, he determined to remain the night.
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Mana-ka-Dana is a shoulder of the Kungali spur, rising to a point in the centre, from which the ground descends to a small plateau, and then dips again at a steep angle until it joins a narrow and nearly level ledge connecting it with the continuation of the ascent. The right of the ridge was very steep and broken, and thickly wooded. The high point in the centre was occupied by the 20th Punjab Native Infantry under Lieutenant-Colonel C. H. Brownlow, C.B., and the small plateau beneath was held by strong picquets from that regiment. The Hazara Mountain Battery was on the ridge in rear, facing the village of Shatut. On the right rear of the peak the Bilankot spur joins the Kungali spur. This approach was held by the 1st Gurkhas under Major J. S. Rawlins, with the 1-19th Regiment in support of them and of the guns.

The troops had not been long halted before the enemy began to fire upon the advanced picquets from the wooded and broken ground on the right flank, when some marksmen of the 1-19th under Lieutenant W. Bennett, Musketry Instructor, were sent to assist in dislodging them, the superior range of the Enfields and the good practice of the men having a telling effect. As dusk approached, the enemy again commenced firing, and a little before nightfall made a really determined attack on the advanced picquets, but it was gallantly repulsed.

As the 1st Brigade pressed on to Mana-ka-Dana, the reserve and head-quarters moved forward and occupied the village of Kungali, with the 5th Gurkha Regiment posted in advance to maintain the communications with that brigade, and at the same time 400 of the Kashmir troops, with some wall-pieces, moved out from Ughi to hold the Jalgali pass.

From the increasing boldness of the enemy, Brigadier-General Bright supposed that, having now ascertained our line of approach, they were collecting in numbers, and really intended to dispute our advance in earnest; he accordingly applied for reinforcements, and the 5th Gurkhas under Major H. P. Close were pushed forward, reaching Mana-ka-Dana about midnight. In the meanwhile, Lieutenant-Colonel Brownlow, who was with the advanced picquets, had been reinforced by two guns from the Hazara Mountain Battery, and was supported by four companies, 1-19th foot. The guns did good service, as by shelling the ridge in front of the picquet the enemy were prevented from forming in force; and, although some demonstrations of a

renewed attack were made, none of a really determined character took place. Our loss during the day had been two killed and six wounded.

On the 5th Gurkhas being sent forward, their place was taken by the 2nd Punjab Infantry, 200 of the Kashmir troops being brought up at the same time to Kungali.

*Expedition
against the
Black Moun-
tain tribes
in 1868.*

Major-General Wilde had originally intended to ascend to the crest of the mountain in three columns, the 1st Brigade advancing by the Kungali, while the 2nd Brigade and levies moved up the Sambalbut and Barchar spurs respectively, as a diversion. But the 1st Brigade having already gained the very advanced position of Mana-ka-Dana, the necessity for carrying out this operation in its entirety passed away; moreover, Mana-ka-Dana afforded an excellent temporary base for operations against the Chittabut and Muchai peaks, and the 2nd Brigade was therefore ordered to abandon the line of advance up the Sambalbut spur and support the 1st Brigade, leaving the levies to carry out their part in the original plan of moving up the Barchar spur.

At 2 A.M. on the 4th, the 2nd Brigade moved on to Mana-ka-Dana. As the day dawned, the enemy were observed to draw off from Brigadier-General Bright's position to their own, which was on a high grassy knoll, some eight hundred yards in front of Mana-ka-Dana, where they had erected an abatis with small stone breastworks. The approach to this knoll was along a narrow ridge connecting it with the Mana plateau, and below this ridge to the right, as well as around the knoll, was a dense forest of fir. Arrangements were made at once by Major-General Wilde to carry this position.

Covered by the fire of D Battery, F Brigade, Royal Horse Artillery, which had come up on elephants, the 1st Brigade under Brigadier-General Bright moved out in the order marginally noted; after advancing some distance, the mountain batteries came into action on the ridge; a heavy artillery fire was thus directed on the enemy's position, and, as the 1st and 5th Gurkhas ascended the knoll and entered

1st Gurkha Regiment.
5th Gurkha Regiment.
Hazara Mountain Battery.
Peshawar Mountain Battery.
20th Punjab Native Infantry.
1-19th Regiment.
2nd Punjab Infantry.

the abatis, but few of its defenders remained to contest it. Continuing his advance with his brigade, Brigadier-General Bright reached Chittabut about 3.30 P.M. The last part of the road was nearly impracticable, and two mules belonging to the mountain batteries were killed by falling down precipices.

The casualties in the 1st Brigade were—1st Gurkhas, three men; 20th Punjab Native Infantry, two men; and 5th Gurkhas, two men, wounded.

The ground on the summit of the Chittabut peak was surrounded by thickly-wooded ravines, and breastworks were at once thrown up to resist an attack, in which work the two companies of sappers afforded material assistance.

Whilst these operations were going on, the levies under Shahzada Ibrahim Saduzai were ascending the Barchar spur. Near its summit they met with a faint resistance on the part of the enemy, from which five casualties occurred; but, the enemy retiring, the levies joined the 1st Brigade at Chittabut, and bivouacked there for the night.

On the night of the 4th, the head-quarters and the 2nd Brigade (with the exception of the Peshawar Mountain Battery, temporarily attached to the 1st Brigade) bivouacked at Mana-ka-Dana, the 2nd Gurkha Regiment and 3rd Sikh Infantry being thrown forward to occupy the breastworks of Mana-ka-Dana.

Major Pollock's
report.

*Expedition
against the
Black Moun-
tain tribes
in 1868.*

the enemy had been driven in the morning, and to keep open communication with the 1st Brigade.

On the morning of the 5th, the 1st Brigade, reinforced by the 2nd Gurkhas, and with both the mountain batteries, was ordered to advance from Chittabut, along the crest of the mountain, for the capture of the Muchai peak, five miles distant.

There had been great difficulty in procuring water at Chittabut, and the rations for the British troops had been delayed owing to the badness of the roads; so, until the men could get their breakfast, Brigadier-General Bright detached the 20th Punjab Native Infantry and 5th Gurkhas to take possession of a hill which intervened between Chittabut and Muchai, called Doda, and from which the enemy had fired upon the troops the preceding evening. At noon the remainder of the brigade marched off, and, joining these two regiments, proceeded towards Muchai, the 2nd Punjab Infantry being left as baggage and rear guard.

From Doda the road descends to the Muchai Gali, flanked on each side by wooded ravines and broken ground. After descending about a mile, it opens out into a small level space, divided by a low rocky ridge from the base of the Muchai mountain. The ravines and broken ground about the descent and plateau were held in considerable force by the enemy, who opened a fire upon the advancing troops; but the fire of the mountain guns, which came into action by alternate batteries, and the determined rush of the 20th Punjab Native Infantry, supported by the 5th Gurkhas, soon drove them off.

On reaching the rocky ridge at the end of the plateau, these two regiments were halted under cover, whilst arrangements were being made for carrying the Muchai peak.

Major-General Wilde stated that he had never, in the border hills, seen such a naturally strong and defensible position as this peak. The ascent of the mountain was steep and rugged in the extreme. It could only be ascended with a narrow front, as the ground on the left was precipitous, and on the right thickly wooded. The following were Brigadier-General Bright's arrangements for its attack:—The two mountain batteries were brought into action in rear of the ridge where the two leading regiments were halted. The 20th Punjab Native Infantry was to lead the advance, closely supported by the 5th Gurkhas, with the 1st Gurkhas one hundred yards in the rear, and the 1-19th in reserve.

Covered by a most accurate and effective fire from the mountain batteries, the troops advanced, but the enemy retired as they came on, and with only eight casualties the position was taken, the enemy flying down the spurs into the valley bordering the Indus.

Whilst this assault was going on, the enemy, who had been dislodged from the Muchai Gali, crept round the ravines to the rear, and commenced firing into a company of the 5th Gurkhas left in support of the guns; but these, being reinforced by four companies of the 1-19th, soon drove them off.

Brigadier-General Bright then made the following dispositions for the night:—The 5th Gurkhas to hold an advanced position of the Muchai peak somewhat lower than the peak itself. The 20th Punjab Native Infantry, the 5th Gurkhas, and the Hazara Mountain Battery, in the centre of the position on the Muchai, with the 1-19th on a shoulder of the hill about 100 yards in rear, the plateau below being held by the 2nd Punjab Infantry and the Peshawar Mountain Battery.

The whole of the troops were employed, whilst daylight lasted, in improving the defences.

The losses during the day had been—5th Gurkhas, one killed and two wounded; 20th Punjab Native Infantry, five wounded.

*Expedition
against the
Black Moun-
tain tribes
in 1868.*

The remainder of the Hazara Field Force was echeloned as follows:—At Chittabut, the 2nd Gurkhas (which had been sent up there from the 2nd Brigade) and 800 levies; below Chittabut, 3rd Sikh Infantry; and at Manak-Dana the head-quarters of the force, the remainder of the 2nd Brigade, D-F Royal Horse Artillery, 2-24th Royal Artillery, and the Commissariat stores.

The night passed off with but little annoyance from the enemy. Below, rain fell; but on the Muchai peak the night was bitterly cold, with snow as well as rain, and for the troops, who were without tents, it was one of great discomfort.

That so little opposition had been shown on the part of the enemy, Major-General Wilde attributed to the following circumstances:—

1st.—That the tribes never believed that the troops would have attempted the ascent of the Black Mountain, where no roads existed, and where they had to find their way by paths through dense forests, and over slopes broken up by huge masses of rock, or intersected by deep ravines.

2nd.—That these tribes had never before been exposed to artillery fire.

3rd.—That, knowing the Swatis of Tikari and Nandihar were the original offenders, and seeing the ease with which those valleys could be overrun, the Black Mountain tribes believed that operations would be carried on against them alone. Another cause being that no halt or check had occurred in the advance to the highest peak of the mountain.

On the preceding evening only a scanty supply of water had been found on the Muchai peak, but a good spring was discovered on the morning of the 6th on the eastern slope beneath the shoulder occupied by the 1-19th Foot. The supply was increased by opening fresh springs at the same spot, and by forming tanks, and eventually an ample supply for the whole force was obtained. Water was also found, but in small quantities, near the ground occupied by the 5th Gurkhas. A supply of good spring water had been obtained at Chittabut, and also at Doda, and Major-General Wilde, whose head-quarters had been moved up to the Muchai, was now in possession of the most commanding plateau of the range, and, with seven days' food and abundance of water, and with the line of communications with Agror secure, he was in a position to carry out any measures that might be necessary. Beyond the mere fact of our prestige among the hill-men having been considerably raised by the late achievements, the Major-General had in his hands the power of inflicting considerable damage and loss on all the villages of the Pathan tribes situated on the slopes near the top of the mountain; and while the troops held the ridge and upper spurs, it was easy to let loose the Hazara levies—men as light-footed as the hill-men themselves—for this work of destruction.

The 6th was passed in making a road to the water, and up the crest of the mountain, to enable supplies and ammunition to be moved up; the 1st Gurkhas were also moved to reinforce the position held by the 5th Gurkhas. On the same day the Deshi *jirga* had come in to the Commissioner and submitted to the terms already given to their Tikari and Nandihar brethren.

*Expedition
against the
Black Moun-
tain tribes
in 1868.*

when they repeated what they had formerly asserted, that their country being so close to that of the Pathans, they had not dared to act in opposition to them until we had shown ourselves in a commanding position in the Pathan country.

On the 7th, the enemy having made no signs of submission, Major-General Wilde, with the concurrence of the Commissioner, ordered the 24th Punjab Native Infantry, under Lieut.-Colonel G. N. Cave, to move down the Bilankot spur, covered by the fire of D-F, Royal Horse Artillery, from the camp at Mana-ka-Dana to protect a large body of levies, who had been sent down to burn some villages of the Pariari Syads; this was accomplished with but little opposition, the troops and levies being back at their bivouacs before night. This day the head-quarters, 2nd Brigade, with 2-24th, Royal Artillery, and the 1-6th Regiment, were advanced from Mana-ka-Dana to Doda, and arrangements were made to carry out more extensive punitive operations against the Pariari Syads; but, on the representation of the *jirgas* in camp that the *Syads* had determined to submit, the orders for the movement of the troops were countermanded.

On the 8th and 9th October, the Pariari, Chagarzai and Akazai headmen waited on the Commissioner, leaving no tribe unrepresented, except the Thakot section of the Swatis and the Allaiwals; the latter, however, as a tribe had held aloof from the attack on Agror.

During the 9th, the 24th Punjab Native Infantry was moved up to the Muchai to assist in the protection of the commissariat stores, and on the same day Lieutenant-Colonel E. Atlay, commanding Royal Artillery, succeeded in bringing two elephants up to the top of the peak, establishing the fact that, if required, the field-guns could have been brought up there also.

On the 10th, assembling the *jirgas*, Major F. R. Pollock, the Commissioner, accepted their submission, and explained to the Akazais, who had taken a leading part against us, that the village of Shatut, within the British border, would in future be held by them as British subjects and assessed; hitherto, they had been allowed, as in the time of the Sikhs, to hold this rent-free and as an independent village, in return for which they had been uniformly insolent in their tone towards us, and had for years past readily afforded an asylum to bad characters of the Hazara district. He also required their *jirga*, with the others, to accompany our force in token of submission, and as hostages for their good behaviour during our march through their country to the Agror valley, *via* the independent Swati tracts of Tikari and Nandihar.

With regard to more stringent conditions not having been imposed upon the tribes, Major Pollock said:—"To persons unacquainted with the politics of the border, and the result of former expeditions, it might well appear but reasonable that more stringent terms should be imposed; and although I am perfectly satisfied that, in acting as I did, I best served the interests of Government, which had entrusted to me a heavy and responsible task, and although I am aware that my proceedings met with the full approbation of His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor, who has from the commencement of our Hazara disturbance so generously and cordially afforded me his support, there are reasons why I should, even at the risk of being tedious, explain proceedings which, to those unacquainted with the circumstances, might seem to have been characterised by undue leniency.

"In dealing with the Pathan tribes of the border, on an occasion like the

present, our object should be rather to effect what is called, in oriental phraseology, 'lifting up their *pardahs*', than to kill numbers of them, or unceremoniously to impose fines, or to unroof or burn villages, or destroy crops: such punishments, cruel even when rightly directed, fall with the greatest severity on the least guilty members of an offending community, and our best officers, civil and military, have always held similar language.

Expedition against the Black Mountain tribes in 1868.

"As regards this particular expedition, I am satisfied that the aims and objects of Government were fully attained when our troops, at a slight sacrifice of human life, established themselves on the most commanding position in the enemy's country, and that enemy had submitted to us.

"Assuming the question to be put, could we, by pursuing a different course to that adopted, have secured better results, I unhesitatingly reply in the negative. The tribes are proud, poor, and scattered over a rugged and unproductive country; to have demanded from the heads of such a people, when tendering their submission, fines or compensation, or to surrender to undergo punishment any of their leaders, would have been to dismiss them to their homes dispirited but desperate men; and, had we used our troops in acting against them along the difficult western spurs running down to the Indus, they would have given us no chance of meeting them on equal terms, and the affair would have degenerated into a guerilla warfare, in a country where our troops would in a measure have lost their superiority by reason of their ignorance of locality, and inability to act in close order.

"In such operations we should have lost many valuable lives; at best, we should have secured no better results than we have actually secured, and at worst it is not too much to say that we might have been in a vastly inferior position; while, in any case, the expenses of the expedition must have been enormously increased."

During the progress of the negotiations, a few flags belonging to the Swatis Major-General of Thakot were visible on a distant point of the mountain, Wilde's despatch. and their presence gave the troops high hopes of a future encounter. The flags, however, disappeared as soon as the Swatis found that, consequent on their powerful allies, the Pathans, having concluded terms with us, the chance of opposing our troops with success was destroyed.

From the time of the first occupation of the Muchai peak until its evacuation, the force remained undisturbed by the enemy, except by small parties of two or three creeping up under cover and firing at the picquets and sentries at night. The position of the 2nd Punjab Infantry on the plateau below the hill was, from the nature of the ground, most exposed to these attacks, and scarcely a night passed in which they had not a man killed or wounded. During this time the troops were continually employed in improving the defences and making roads to the other positions. The experience gained by the 1-19th in making hill roads during the summer months* here came into play, and the way in which the regiment huddled themselves gave a further proof of the benefit they had derived from being so employed. In a single day they threw up shelter, which would only have required a little more labour to have afforded them protection from any kind of weather.

Terms having been made with the Black Mountain tribes, the 11th and 12th were passed in the withdrawal of the troops and commissariat stores to Mana-ka-Dana. On the 12th the Muchai was finally evacuated.

* They had been employed with the working parties on the Murree and Abbottabad road

*Expedition
against the
Black Moun-
tain tribes
in 1868.*

Not a shot was fired, nor was any loss incurred as long as the force was moving in Pathan lands. The deputation of the tribes accompanied the troops and remained, from that time to the end, faithful and true to their engagements. On approaching, however, to within a mile of the bivouac at Mana-ka-Dana, an attack was made on the rear guard, consisting of a party of the 2nd Gurkha Regiment under Lieutenant A. Battye, by some of the followers of the Pariari Syads, and the enemy suffered a loss of two killed and several wounded, without any casualty on our side. Except this incident, and the cowardly wounding, by the same miscreants, of a servant of the Commissariat in the forests below Chittabut, nothing occurred to interrupt the evacuation of the Black Mountain.

It was at one time hoped by the Major-General and the Commissioner that during the course of the operations on the Black Mountain some blow might be inflicted on the Hindustani fanatics, who were known to number some 600 or 700, and were occupying the village of Bihar, on the right bank of the Indus, opposite to the Chagarzai village of Judbai, whither they had moved after their expulsion from Buner. But after seeing the country on the western slopes of the Black Mountain, any such enterprise was not, in Major-General Wilde's opinion, feasible. Had the Hindustanis combined with the Pathan tribes (as there was a fair chance at one time of their doing) to resist our troops, an opportunity of defeating them would have occurred. They could not, however, come to any agreement with the tribes. To have sent a column against them was impossible, owing to the inaccessible nature of the country near the Indus where they were encamped, and, when terms had been given to the other tribes, to have attempted an attack would have been a breach of our engagement. When the Chagarzai *jirga* waited on the Commissioner, they voluntarily commenced by saying they would not give asylum to the fanatics, and to have made their expulsion one of the terms of peace with that tribe would, in the opinion of Major-General Wilde and of the Commissioner, have resulted in prolonging the war without any advantage, since there were no means of cutting off the retreat of these men.

During the 13th October the force halted at Mana-ka-Dana, and the *Syads* were called upon to make reparation for the attack on the rear guard, and the wounding of the Commissariat servant; but without avail.

1st Gurkha Regiment.
2nd Punjab Infantry.
24th Punjab Native Infantry.
5th Gurkha Regiment.
—
Peshawar Mountain Battery.
Hazara Mountain Battery.
1-6th Regiment.
3rd Sikh Infantry.
4th Gurkha Regiment.

On the 14th, therefore, when the head-quarters and the rest of the force (with the exception of four regiments, as per margin, which were sent under Lieutenant-Colonel C. H. Brownlow, C.B., to occupy the village of Kungali and the Jalgali pass) moved down to Chirmang in Tikari, a flying column from the 2nd Brigade under Brigadier-General Vaughan, consisting of the troops noted in the margin, with a body of levies, and accompanied by Captain Ommanney as Political Officer, was detached for the purpose of punishing the Pariari villages.

From the villages of Bilankot there was a descent into a deep intervening ravine, crossing which, the crest of the Pariari spur was gained by Brigadier-General Vaughan's detachment, without opposition, after a very laborious ascent. The crest was held by the troops (with the exception of a portion of the 1-6th Regiment and the Hazara Mountain Battery, which had been left below Bilankot to cover the retirement), whilst the police and levies

were employed burning the Pariari village of Garhi; this was effected with very slight opposition, after which the troops were withdrawn to the camp at Chirmang without any attempt at molestation by the enemy.

*Expedition
against the
Black Moun-
tain tribes
in 1868*

On the 15th, the force under Major-General Wilde marched to the village of Tikari, where it was joined by two squadrons, 16th Bengal Cavalry, from Jalgali. The following day was spent in making a road over the Shabara spur, which divides Tikari from Nandihar. The troops at the Jalgali pass were employed in improving the road through it, and the 1st Gurkhas from Jalgali, and a squadron 16th Bengal Cavalry from Tikari, were sent to Chirmang to keep open the line of communications.

On the 17th, the force marched to Maidan, in the Nandihar valley, which was found to be highly cultivated, even high up on the ranges dividing Nandihar from Allai. In Tikari some little difficulty was at first experienced in reassuring the people, but as the march through it had been attended with no act of oppression or spoliation, the Nandiharis remained quietly in their villages, and firewood, forage, etc., were freely brought into camp. In his despatch, Major-General Wilde specially adverted to the excellent conduct of the troops, both British and Native, on this occasion: he said that, on entering the valleys of the independent Swatis, he had announced that as they had submitted as suppliants, and as a fine of Rs. 12,000 had been imposed upon them, all supplies of food and forage were to be paid for, and no plundering could be allowed; and although the transition from war to peace in the feelings of the native soldier is no easy process, yet not a complaint was made, nor a single man punished in the force from the time it left the camp at Ughi till its return.

Major Pollock's
report.

The 17th and 18th were passed in making reconnaissances towards the Thakot country, which were conducted by Major C. C. Johnson, the Assistant Quarter-Master General, as far as the top of the Dabrai pass, seven miles from camp: the troops being employed in improving the road up the mountain in case an advance on Thakot was decided on.

The Thakot Swatis still remained recusant, and it was a question whether they should be coerced or not. At Paimal, a village immediately below the Dabrai pass, resided Habib Gul, a holy man of great local influence, to whom a summons was sent by Captain Ommanney, the Deputy Commissioner, on the arrival of the reconnoitring party at the Dabrai Gali, which he obeyed, accompanied by the headmen of the village and of the Thakot village of Pomang; and as, later in the day, reliable information was received that Shal Khan, the leading spirit in Thakot, had fled across the Indus, it was determined not to undertake any operations against Thakot.

The country beyond the Dabrai pass was very difficult, the lands of the Thakotis were poor and their crops were scanty, unlike the districts of Tikari and Nandihar. No valleys were visible; their principal lands were said to be on the right bank of the Indus. It would have been possible for a force to have moved down and destroyed Thakot itself, but the country was so difficult that such a project could not have been safely carried out as a military raid, and to have moved to Thakot in force would have occupied many days, and have cost much money for an inadequate object.

Major-General
Wilde's despatch.

Major Pollock's
report.

On the 19th, the force moved to Phugora at the head of the Nandihar valley, and a shot having been fired from the hillside after dark, as the rear regiment approached camp, the *maliks* of the neighbouring villages were

*Expedition
against the
Black Moun-
tain tribes
in 1868*

arrested and taken on, and subsequently released at Ughi on payment of a fine of Rs. 500, as a punishment for the outrage.

The following day the force re-entered British territory, crossing a low range into the Konsh valley,—a beautiful open valley about 6,000 feet above the sea,—and on the 22nd the camp at Ughi was reached, the troops having been absent from their tents and baggage since the 3rd of October.

Major-General Wilde commented in the following terms on the conduct of the troops that had been employed in the above operations on the Black Mountain. He said the force had traversed eighty miles of hill country, through which it had to make its own roads and carry its own supplies; and he noted the mobility displayed on this occasion by the British regiments, and their capability to partake most efficiently in hill campaigning. Nothing, he said, could exceed the high spirit and energy displayed by both the Royal Artillery and British infantry: with the exception of one blanket carried for each man, they fared as the native troops did; and their food did not actually require more carriage than that of the native troops. The men, too, of the Royal Artillery evinced their aptitude to adapt themselves to duties quite novel to them. The Horse Artillery men of D Battery, F Brigade, packed and unpacked their guns on elephants, and the gunners of the 2nd Battery, 24th Brigade, led and tended the mules carrying the mortars; from the first day not a soldier, either British or native, made a complaint, but cheerfully underwent all the hardships, labour, and exposure incidental to bivouacking on the hill side.

The officers mentioned by the Commander-in-Chief as deserving favourable notice were Brigadier-General R. O. Bright, and Brigadier-General J. L. Vaughan, C.B., and the several commanding officers of regiments, *viz.*—

Lieutenant-Colonel C. H. Brownlow, C.B., 20th Punjab Native Infantry.

„ E. Chippindall, 1-19th Foot.

„ C. O. Creagh Osborne, 6th Foot.

„ H. T. Macpherson, V.C., 2nd Gurkhas.

„ G. N. Cave, 24th Punjab Native Infantry.

Major D. Mocatta, 3rd Sikh Infantry.

„ J. S. Rawlins, 1st Gurkhas.

„ J. A. Tytler, V.C., 4th Gurkhas.

Captain R. Topham, 16th Bengal Cavalry.

„ H. Tyndall, 2nd Punjab Infantry.

„ R. B. P. P. Campbell, Corps of Guides.

And although not engaged in active operation, Colonel ~~G.~~ A. Willes, C.B., 38th Foot, commanding at Darband, and the commanding officers under his orders (Lieutenant-Colonel H. M. Wilson, commanding 31st Punjab Native Infantry, and Major H. L. Campbell, commanding 9th Bengal Cavalry). The names of the officers of the staff favourably mentioned by the Commander-in-Chief were—

Major C. C. Johnson, Assistant Quarter-Master General.

„ J. Morland, Assistant Adjutant-General.

Lieutenant-Colonel H. C. Johnstone, in charge of the Survey.

Captain W. K. Elles, 38th Foot, Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General.

Deputy Inspector-General of Hospitals G. E. Morton.

Lieutenant W. B. Holmes, Royal Engineers.

Of the Artillery—

Colonel E. Atlay, commanding Royal Artillery.

Major T. E. Hughes.

Lieutenant-Colonel G. A. Renny, V. C.

Major F. R. DeBude.

Captain M. Elliot.

„ C. S. Jackson.

*Expedition
against the
Black Moun-
tain tribes
in 1868.*

Of the Commissariat Department—

Lieut.-Colonel A. D. Dickens, to whom was due the admirable success of the commissariat arrangements.

His Excellency most specially recommended to the notice of the Supreme Government the services of Lieutenant-Colonel O. E. Rothney, commanding 5th Gurkha Regiment of the Punjab Frontier Force.

The officers commanding the Artillery and the 1st and 2nd Infantry Brigades, also brought to notice the services of the different staff officers under them.

The following General Order was published by the Government of India in regard to these operations :—

“The Governor-General in Council cordially concurs with the Commander-in-Chief in highly appreciating the services that have been performed, and desires to thank His Excellency for his able and energetic directions of the military resources of the Government on this occasion. His Excellency in Council wishes also to acknowledge the great exertions of His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, who promptly caused reinforcements to be moved into Hazara, on the serious nature of the outbreak becoming apparent, and who throughout has most actively aided the force by all the means at his command.

“To Major-General Wilde the Government of India is much indebted for his great care in superintending the proper equipment of his force, owing to which it was enabled to operate successfully in most difficult and rugged mountains. His great experience of hill warfare and excellent judgment have caused the duty entrusted to him to be carried out without accident, and in a manner which, beyond its present immediate effect, will doubtless convince the border tribes that they cannot inflict annoyance on our frontier without rendering themselves liable to punishment, despite the almost inaccessible situation of their villages. It is gratifying to the Governor-General in Council to be able to offer his hearty thanks to Major-General Wilde for his conduct in his recent command.

“The valuable and untiring exertions of Major Pollock, the Commissioner, and the services of those under his orders, will be acknowledged in the proper department of the Government; but His Excellency in Council desires here to express his satisfaction at the cordiality and good-will with which Major-General Wilde and Major Pollock acted together prior to, and throughout, the operations.

“Brigadier-General Bright and Brigadier-General Vaughan, C.B., have earned the approval of the Government by the manner in which they commanded their respective brigades, and all the commanding officers named in Major-General Wilde's reports deserve the thanks of the Government.

“Lieutenant-Colonel Rothney, commanding the 5th Gurkha Regiment, has already received the commendation of the Governor-General in Council

*Expedition
against the
Black Moun-
tain tribes
in 1868.
General Order
of the
Government
of India.*

for his prompt movement to Ughi in July last, and for his resolute conduct in maintaining his position until reinforcements enabled him to drive the enemy from his immediate vicinity.

"The staff of the force and officers of departments are reported to be deserving of approval for a correct and intelligent performance of their duty, and are therefore entitled to the thanks of the Governor-General in Council; but the very important services, from the first movement of troops, of the principal commissariat officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Dickens, upon whose exertions the success of the expedition so much depended, demand special recognition, which the Governor-General in Council is happy to accord.

"The troops employed, British and native, have exhibited some of the best qualities of soldiers, by their discipline, their cheerfulness, and their active and willing exertions under all circumstances. The opportunity of serious encounter with the enemy was denied them, but there can be no doubt from their whole conduct, and from their anxious desire for such opportunity, that, had the enemy ventured to make a serious stand, the force would have distinguished itself, and inflicted signal punishment on its adversaries.

"As it is, the troops have rendered admirable services in most difficult country, when deprived of tents and many of their usual comforts, and His Excellency in Council offers the best thanks of the Government of India to each of the corps engaged.

"Nor does the Governor-General in Council forget that various troops, European and native, moved with great rapidity from distant stations; some of whom were necessarily kept in reserve and not actively engaged. These troops underwent great fatigue at a most unfavourable season, but pressed forward with ardour in the hope that they might be of use. To all of these, and to the departmental and civil officers by whose exertions they were enabled to quit their stations with promptitude, the Governor-General in Council tenders the thanks of the Government.

"His Excellency in Council desires to express his appreciation of the prompt and gallant aid rendered by the Nawab of Amb and his retainers, and of the useful services of the Hazara levies and police, some of whom distinguished themselves; and His Excellency would finally acknowledge the assistance rendered by the troops of His Highness the Maharaja of Kashmir, placed temporarily at the disposal of the British Government, and usefully employed by Major-General Wilde."

The Government of India, in acknowledging the services of Major F. R. Pollock, desired also that its approval of the services of Lieutenant-Colonel H. C. Johnstone, of Captain E. L. Ommanney, and Lieutenant E. G. Wace, should be conveyed to them.

On the 24th October, a *darbar* was held in Agror by the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, when the title of *Nawab* was conferred on the young Tanawali Khan, and on the following day the *jirgas* were dismissed to their homes and the prisoners released.

The Indian medal with a clasp for the "North-West Frontier" was granted in 1870 to all those who actually took part in the advance under Major-General Wilde, including the force under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Rothney, which was previously engaged with the enemy at Ughi.

G. G. O. No. 86 of
1870.

The Khan of Agror, at the commencement of the disturbances, had been

sent in to Rawal Pindi, that his conduct might be investigated, and his *jagir* had been declared forfeited on account of his treasonable conduct, and he was banished to Lahore.

Conduct of the Black Mountain tribes subsequent to the Expedition of 1868.

In spite of the expedition narrated above, the raids in the valley did not cease. In July 1869, two hamlets in Agror—Barchar and Gulderi—were burnt by a party of raiders, consisting of Hassanzais, Pariari Syads, and Akazais, partisans of Ata Muhammad Khan, and four of the villagers were killed and seventeen wounded. The raiders were, however, gallantly repulsed by the men of Jaskot, a neighbouring village. In August, Jaskot itself was attacked, and several of the villagers and a police constable killed.

In consequence of these outrages, a force, as per margin, under the command of Colonel O. E. Rothney, C.S.I., was moved out from Abbottabad, a detachment of the 23rd Pioneers were ordered to march to the Susal pass to improve the road, and a blockade was established against the offending tribes.

Half Hazara Mountain Battery.	72 men
4th Punjab Cavalry.	27 "
3rd Punjab Infantry.	282 "
5th Gurkha Regiment.	296 "

Total 677 men

On the 7th October, Colonel Rothney, moving out with the greatest secrecy at half-past two in the morning, destroyed the village of Shatut, belonging to the Akazais. The troops were delayed between Jaskot and the base of the hills by water-courses and rice cultivation, and Shatut was only reached at 6 A.M. Most of the cattle had been driven off, but a few, with a large amount of property, fell into the hands of the troops. No resistance was attempted, and the troops retired without molestation.

Colonel Rothney's despatch.

The lands of Shatut were then declared confiscated, and a formal proclamation was issued prohibiting the Akazais from occupying it again.

It was now determined that a force should be permanently stationed in the valley of Agror, under a selected officer, sufficient to meet all attacks, and, if possible, to follow up raiders beyond the British border: and an order was passed by the Supreme Government removing the Agror valley from the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts, and the operations of the general laws.

During the winter of 1869-70 the valley was unmolested, but as soon as the snow melted on the Black Mountain, raids recommenced. The first was on the 9th April, when Barchar was attacked by a party of Akazais, and the headman killed. On the 15th, the village of Sambalbut was burnt by Akazais and Khan Khel Hassanzais, and on the 23rd the village of Bholu shared the same fate. As the villages were all situated on the slopes of the Black Mountain, our troops, who were encamped in the valley, were powerless to prevent these outrages, nor could they avenge them without crossing the border, and committing the Government to the probability of a frontier expedition; but the presence of the troops undoubtedly prevented more extensive outrages, and secured the safety of the villages in the valley. The force in Agror consisted now of detachments of the 3rd Punjab Infantry and 5th Gurkhas, and two mountain guns, under Colonel Rothney. On the 25th April, the crops around Shatut were destroyed by him.

Meanwhile, Captain E. G. Wace, the settlement officer in Hazara, had been engaged in the preparation of the "record of rights" for the Agror valley, and had instituted a close enquiry into the nature and history of the landed rights of Ata Muhammad Khan, the ex-Khan of Agror; the result of

*Conduct of
the Black
Mountain
tribes subse-
quent to the
Expedition
of 1868.*

but scant justice at the hands of the British Government with regard to his rights in Agror, and he was accordingly pardoned and allowed to return.

No special responsibility for the peace of the border had devolved upon the *Khan* by his restoration; his responsibility was merely that of a proprietor of seven-tenths of the valley, bound to act with the utmost loyalty, and support, as far as lay in his power, the civil and military authorities. The general feeling in Agror, and even beyond the border, was one of satisfaction at the restoration of the *Khan*, and the state of the valley justified the withdrawal of the troops late in the autumn.

On the restoration of the Agror chief, the Akazais hoped to be admitted to a share in his property, and these hopes were in all probability encouraged by Ata Muhammad Khan. The decided action of the Government, however, in absolutely refusing to permit them to rebuild Shatut, or to cultivate the land belonging to it, proved to them that their expectations were never to be realised; while the evident fear which Ata Muhammad Khan had of them encouraged them to commit raids in British territory.

The first hostile action was taken by another, though a friendly, tribe—Feroz Khan, a leading *malik* of the Hassanzais, attacking several of the Agror villages. The demonstration was, however, premature, and completely failed.

On the 4th June 1871, about 2 A.M., a raid was made on the villages of Kongu, Gulderi, and Bholu, in Agror, by a party of Akazais, numbering in all about 180 men. The raiders came down in two parties, one of which, numbering about 80 men, under a *malik* named Zarif Khan, partially burnt the village of Kongu, which is situated under the Chittabut ridge.

After setting fire to this village, these raiders moved off to join the other body. This second body, numbering probably about 100 men, came down the Barchar spur and attacked Gulderi.

From this village they met with little or no opposition. The men who were garrisoning the towers in the village, after having fired two or three shots, beat a hasty retreat on Jaskot. One of them was, however, wounded by the raiders. These latter then burnt the whole of Gulderi, except the *musjid*, and then proceeded to Bholu, which they also set on fire.

The raid was the act of the Akazais alone, and did not appear to excite the sympathy of the neighbouring tribes. Matters were, however, complicated by the Khan of Agror, without any authority, and indeed in direct opposition to the reiterated orders of Government, sending 300 men across the border to attack a small village called Ali Khan, in the Tikari country, which the Akazais held on a sort of service-tenure, as they formerly held Shatut. This village, with two hamlets belonging to it, Ata Muhammad Khan burnt, and returned to Agror without loss.

This violent and mischievous act on the part of the *Khan*, who had been prohibited from carrying his quarrels across the border line, brought down upon him the grave displeasure of Government. He was well aware that there was no intention on the part of the Government to move troops across the border, yet he deliberately circulated a story to the effect that such an expedition was in preparation; while, by his attack on Ali Khan, he hoped to force the Government to adopt active measures against his enemies.

In spite of this outbreak on the part of the Agror chief, his conduct gradually became more reasonable, and in accordance with what was hoped would be the result of his restoration to his *jagir*. His position on the border, however, was a difficult one. He was not able to put many fighting men into

the field, and, on his first restoration, found it difficult to establish his authority in such a manner as to enforce proper obedience to his calls on his tenants for service. The character of the inhabitants of Agror is such that it is difficult for any chief to use them for the defence of the border. In this favoured valley it may be truly said "man alone is vile", for a more gaunt, hungry, mean lot can scarcely be seen anywhere. Their physique is described as wretched, and their moral attributes are no better. They do not care to fight even in defence of their own villages, and, on the approach of an enemy, prefer to drive off their cattle, leaving their houses, or rather their huts, to be burnt.

Conduct of the Black Mountain tribes subsequent to the Expedition of 1868.

One action alone during the year 1872 was threatened, which, if carried out, might have had inconvenient consequences. A body of Hassanzais, owing to the road being choked with snow, and hostile clans occupying the passes, were reported to be attempting to force their passage through Agror, in order to attack their enemies, the Deshiwals. A reinforcement of British troops was immediately sent out, and the news of the approach of troops having reached the Hassanzais, they abandoned the attempt to pass through the valley, which would have been an act of deliberate defiance of British authority and violation of British territory.

During the year 1872, several offences were committed on the Agror border by the Akazais, but none of these were of a serious nature, although they showed the spirit of disaffection in the tribe on account of Shatut.

At the beginning of 1873 a section of the Hassanzais made a raid upon Nikapani (a village in the territory of the Nawab of Amb), in which four villagers were killed and six wounded. The raid was the result of intertribal disputes, with which the Nawab, part of whose territory lies beyond our border, was mixed up. The aggressors were punished by a retaliatory attack. On the 30th August another raid was made on the village of Harian, also in the territory of the Nawab of Amb. The raiders were Khan Khel Hassanzais, and the result was the death of one man and the plunder of a few cattle.

On the 1st July of the same year an attack was made by the Akazais, aided by the Nasrat Khel Chagarzais, on the village of Barchar, in the Agror valley; the raid was planned in revenge for the confiscation of the village of Shatut.

During 1874 the differences between the Nawab of Amb and the Khan Khel section of the Hassanzais, aided by the Tilli Syads, continued, and raids were made by both parties, but with insignificant results. During this year the Akazais continued to give trouble on the Agror border. They threatened Agror throughout the summer, and harassed the valley by keeping up a constant fear of raids; they carried off cattle from Ghania, and burnt houses, and carried off property in Gulderi and Kungali, British hamlets on the slopes of the Black Mountain. On the 23rd of May, 1875, the Akazais, Khan Khels, and Nasrat Khels made a combined attack upon the village of Ghania; the village was defended by a small body of police and by Ghulam Haidar Khan (son of Ata Muhammad Khan) and some followers from Jaskot, and they succeeded eventually in beating off the enemy. The Nasrat Khels, after the fight, returned home, but the Akazais and Khan Khel Hassanzais remained two days near Shatut, and then dispersed to their villages. On our side two villagers were killed, and two mounted men and four horses belonging to the Khan of Agror were wounded. The enemy were said to have had ten men wounded—six severely and four slightly.

After this, resort to military coercion appeared inevitable, but in September of this year (1875) the Akazai *jirga* came in to the Deputy Commissioner

Conduct of the Black Mountain tribes subsequent to the Expedition of 1868.

and made a complete and unreserved submission. They renounced all claim to the disputed lands of Shatut, expressed regret for the past, and pledged their faith to respect in future British territory and British subjects. In December the Hassanzais also came in to the Deputy Commissioner at Hari-pur, one party through the instrumentality of the Nawab of Amb, and the other and more important body of their own free will. Both parties agreed to respect British territory in future. Accidental circumstances favoured the submission of both these tribes. An attack of the Hassanzais upon the Akazais induced the latter to come in, while the inconvenience of their consequent isolation compelled the submission of the Hassanzais themselves.

The year 1875 saw the submission to the British Government of the Black Mountain and other tribes (Chagarzais, Hassanzais, Akazais, Tikariwals, Allaiwals, and the Syads of Pariari) who, since 1868, had set the Government at defiance, and the arrangements made on this border received the special commendation of Her Majesty's Secretary of State. Towards the end of the year, Ata Muhammad Khan, Khan of Agror, owing to whose intrigues many of the Hazara complications had arisen, died, and was succeeded by his son, then a minor.

After the settlement in 1875, the conduct of the Akazais became more satisfactory. The *jirga* at that time consented not only to a relinquishment of Shatut, but to its occupation and cultivation by others, our own subjects, amongst whom it was proposed to divide it. Action, however, was deferred in the first instance at the request of the Akazais, and the scheme was subsequently allowed to fall out of sight. It was felt that although the suggestion had been accepted by the tribe at the moment when they were inclined to submit, yet the tribe was still likely to give trouble if its occupation should be attempted. The lands were consequently allowed to lie uncultivated, and the site of the village remained uninhabited. This state of things was considered undesirable and unsatisfactory, and in 1882 the Commissioner of Peshawar recommended that on certain conditions, and in consideration of the length of time which had elapsed since the lands were confiscated, and the fine which the confiscation had involved, as well as the absence of any act of aggression or offence on the part of the Akazai tribe during the preceding six years, the British Government should consent to the re-occupation of the Shatut lands by the Akazais.

As a preliminary to any agreement, and as showing their acquiescence in the justice of the decision by which they had been for a considerable period excluded from the benefits of these lands, the tribe was required to arrange for the destruction of the crops, which, in contravention of the agreement of 1875, had been cultivated on a portion of the Shatut lands by Zarif Khan, *matik* of the Painsa Khel section of the tribe. This condition was fulfilled, and the crops were cut and handed over to the British authorities; but a small party in the tribe, headed by Zarif Khan, refused to accept the agreement, and the Government decided not to allow the re-occupation of the lands by the Akazais until the whole tribe entered into the proposed arrangement, and up to the present time no settlement of the case has been effected.

Since 1875 the Hassanzais have given less trouble on our border. In November 1878, the party among them called the *Kishardala*, quarrelled with Muhammad Akram Khan, Nawab of Amb, and in the fights that occurred lives were lost on both sides. The Nawab's party among the Hassanzais is the *Mishardala*. In 1879, a few offences, not of any political significance, were committed by Ahmad Ali Khan, chief of the Hassanzais. In February

1880, this *Khan* was murdered; a conflict then arose between Hashim Ali, his younger brother, supported by the Mada Khels and part of the Akazais, and Feroz Khan, the rival and murderer of the deceased chief, supported by a part of the Akazai tribe. The latter, however, was forced to seek refuge in the territory of the Nawab of Amb. In March 1882, Hashim Ali Khan surprised the village of Kulakka, near Ughi, at night, and took the fort of one Muzaffar Khan, and his brother, Samandar Khan, who were both charged by the Hassanzai *Khan* with complicity in the murder of Ahmad Ali Khan. After a determined resistance, Muzaffar, Samandar, and one of their servants were killed, the attacking party returning unmolested to their hills. For this raid a fine of Rs. 2,000 was imposed on Hashim Ali Khan, which, however, has not been paid up to the present time. The Hassanzais have been informed that they are, as a tribe, responsible for their chief's good conduct.

*Conduct of
Black
Mountain
tribes subse-
quent to the
Expedition
of 1868.*

APPENDIX A.

Approximate Return of Killed and Wounded in the force under LIEUTENANT-COLONEL F. MACKESON, C.B., operating against the Hassanzais, December 1852.

Corps.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	
Guides ... { Killed ... Wounded	2	1	...	Vide Regimental History.
1st Sikh Infantry and Police { Casualties..	6	
Dogras... { Killed ... Wounded	1	Vide Despatches. No details given.
Levies... { Killed ... Wounded	1 3	
Total	3	2	10	Vide Despatches.
Total killed and wounded ...					15

APPENDIX B.

Return of Killed and Wounded among the troops in the Agror valley, from the 30th July to the 2nd October 1868, inclusive.

Corps.	Killed.					Wounded.					Remarks.
	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	
Peshawar Mountain Battery	*1	1	*Major T. E. Hughes. †Lt.-Col. O. E. Rothney.
2nd Punjab Infantry	3	3	
5th Gurkha Regiment	†1	2	3	
Police	1	1	
Levies	12	12	44	44	
Total	13	13	2	49	51	

ABSTRACT.

Killed	13
Wounded	51
Total	64

APPENDIX C.

Hazara Field Force, 1868.

Major-General A. T. Wilde, C.B., C.S.I., commanding.

Staff.

Major C. C. Johnson, Assistant Quarter-Master General.

„ J. Morland, Assistant Adjutant-General.

Lieutenant-Colonel H. C. Johnstone, in charge of the Survey.

Captain W. K. Elles, 38th Foot, Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General.

„ F. J. N. Mackenzie, Staff Officer, Punjab Frontier Force.

Major W. H. Paget, 5th Punjab Cavalry, Aide-de-Camp.

„ W. Fane, 19th Bengal Lancers, Orderly Officer.

Lieutenant L. R. H. D. Campbell, 19th Foot, Orderly Officer.

„ W. B. Holmes, Field Engineer.

„ J. A. Armstrong, Assistant Field Engineer, in charge of Telegraph.

Deputy Inspector-General of Hospitals G. E. Morton, Principal Medical Officer.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. D. Dickens, Commissariat Department.

*Artillery. **

Colonel E. Atlay, commanding.

Major T. E. Hughes, Orderly Officer.

Lieutenant R. McG. Stewart, Adjutant.

1st Infantry Brigade.

Brigadier-General R. O. Bright, commanding.

Captain E. W. Evans, 19th Foot, Brigade Major.

Lieutenant J. E. Buller, 91st Foot, D. A. Q. M. G.

„ F. S. S. Brind, 19th Foot, Orderly Officer.

2nd Infantry Brigade.

Brigadier-General J. L. Vaughan, C.B., commanding.

Captain J. G. Cockburn, 6th Foot, Brigade Major.

Lieutenant W. S. A. Lockhart, D. A. Q. M. G.

„ J. D. Macpherson, 3rd Punjab Cavalry, Orderly Officer.

APPENDIX D.

Summary of composition of Hazara Field Force, 1868, exclusive of reserve.

	Detail.	Officers.	Men.	Horses.	Guns.
Staff, etc.	18
Royal Artillery	15	276	242	16
British Infantry	83	1,959
Native Artillery (Mountain Batteries)	8	302	179	8
Native Cavalry	9	707	703	...
Bengal Sappers and Miners	3	194
Native Infantry	65	5,677
Troops of Maharaja of Kashmir	1,200	...	2
Levies and Police	2,028	140	...
• Total ...		201	12,343	1,264	26

APPENDIX E.

Return of Killed and Wounded from 3rd to 22nd October 1868, among the troops composing the Hazara Field Force under the command of MAJOR-GEN. A. T. WILDE, C.B., C.S.I.

Corps.	Killed.					Wounded.					Remarks.
	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	
1st Gurkha Regiment	6	6	*Lieut. W. H. Unwin.
3rd Sikh Infantry	1	...	1	
2nd Punjab Infantry	2	2	2	2	
20th Punjab Native Infantry	2	2	2	15	17	
5th Gurkha Regiment	*1	3	4	
Total	1	4	5	1	...	2	26	29	

ABSTRACT.

Killed	5
Wounded	29
Total	34

APPENDIX F.

Translation of Proclamation addressed to cis- and trans-Indus Tribes generally in 1863.

Whereas the tribes bordering British territory, and accustomed to move freely to and fro between it and their own country, are well acquainted with our customs and ways, that Government oppresses no one unless he is guilty of committing an outrage, either of his own folly or incited by some designing person. But those who live further off from the British border, and hold less communication with us, hear nothing but what is told them by designing persons. Therefore, this notice is issued for the information of those who are in ignorance, or have been misinformed. That certain independent tribes residing on this (Hazara) bank of the Indus, incited by Ata Muhammad Khan and Aladad Khan, *jagirdars* of Agror, which is situated within the British border, attacked the *thana* of Ughi in Agror; these tribes have in no respect been interfered with or oppressed, but after attacking the *thana*, they further offended by entering our territory with arms and flags, and burning sundry villages, rendering imperative their punishment. Those who were not concerned in the above acts, and continue to hold aloof, should rest quite assured and free from apprehension. Government has no concern with them, nor will it cross the Indus to coerce them. Government calls to account and punishes only those who offend it.

M A P
 OF THE
BLACK MOUNTAIN AND COUNTRY ADJOINING
A G R O R
 ILLUSTRATING
THE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE HASSANZAIS
 BY A FORCE UNDER
COLONEL MACKESON, C.B., 1852-53.
 and against
THE BLACK MOUNTAIN TRIBES
 BY A FORCE UNDER
MAJOR GENL. A. WILDE, C.B., C S.I., 1868.

Scale 2 Miles = 1 Inch.



REFERENCES.

Places mentioned in Col. Mackeson's operations, marked thus Kotkai
 Routes taken.....do.....do.....do.....do.....
 Routes taken in General Wilde's.....do.....do.....+ - + - +
 Scene of Col. Rothney's action, 8th August.....do.....8th
 Do.....do.....do.....12th.....do.....do.....12th

To cis-Indus Tribes,

*Chagarzais, Akazais, Deshiwals, and Thakotis, residing on this (Hazard) bank of
the Indus.*

Be it known to you—

Prior to this, on sundry occasions you have interfered with Agror affairs, and now you have gratuitously attacked the Ughi *thana*. Government, which is a long-suffering one, can bear with you no further, and calls you to account for the above acts.

It will be better for you to put in an appearance and answer to the above charge, or to do so when the Government forces enter your territory. If you oppose the Government troops, whatever loss follows is on your own head. Government has no desire to take your lives and destroy your property; in such affairs many innocent persons suffer in life and property. You are hereby required to wait on us here, or when the force advances, to receive the orders of Government.

N.B.—The above was written in Persian on one side of the paper, and on reverse side in Pushtu, written in the Arabic character, which is best understood by the village *mullas* across the border.

CHAPTER IV.

HAZARA AND PESHAWAR BORDERS.

YUSAFZAI AND GADUN TRIBES.

*Yusafzai
tribes.*

THE tribes occupying the British border from the Black Mountain to the Utman Khel territory belong (with the exception of the Gaduns) to the important tribe of Yusafzai Pathans, of which the Hassanzais, Akazais, and Chagarzais, occupying the western slopes of the Black Mountain, and described in the previous chapter, are also branches. The Yusafzais inhabit the division of that name in the Peshawar district, as well as independent territory beyond the border.

They are descended from one Mandai, who had two sons, Umar and Yusaf. Umar died leaving one son, Mandan; from Mandan and Yusaf are the two primary divisions of the Yusafzais, from which are sprung all the subdivisions. The relations of the different branches of the Yusafzai tribe will be understood by referring to the table given in Appendix A. at the end of the chapter.

MacGregor. First in order of the independent tribes on the British border between the Black Mountain and the Utman Khel territory, come the Mada Khels and Amazais, adjoining the territory of our feudatory the Nawab of Amb; to the south of the Amazais lie the Utmanzais, to their west the Gaduns, and beyond them the Khudu Khels. To the north of the Khudu Khel territory is the Chamla valley, inhabited by members of different tribes, and separated from Buner by the Guru range of mountains. Next come the Nurazai and Salarzai tribes of Buner which march with our border. Between Buner and the Utman Khel limits is the district of Swat, and the portion adjoining British territory is inhabited by members of the Baizai and Ranizai tribes of Swat.

Before describing these tribes, a few words are necessary with regard to the position of the Nawab of Amb on this border, as it is, in some respects, a peculiar one. His territory may be described roughly as a square block in the north-west corner of the district of Hazara, separated on its west from the independent Pathan country by the Indus, and having the Black Mountain and Agror to the north. The Tanawal chief has also beyond the Indus two or three villages, the largest of which is Amb, which contains 300 houses, flat-roofed and built of stone and mud, but is ill-adapted for defence. The Nawab of Amb holds his cis-Indus territory as a *jagir* from the British Government on a perpetuity tenure. His villages trans-Indus are independent, but the *Nawab* is responsible that he does not misuse his power. He administers the *jagir* himself, subject to no interference

from us except in heinous criminal cases, which are comparatively few. The existence of this little principality is in many ways convenient; and the *jagir*, while really no expense to the Government, forms a stronghold upon the loyalty of the chief. Tanawal lies between Hazara and some of the most turbulent independent tribes of the frontier, with which the Tanawalis have old feuds that render coalition with them scarcely possible; moreover, his trans-Indus villages, formerly the property of the wild tribes of the Mahaban, keep the chief ever in hot water with them, and his only safe policy, therefore, is to be faithful to British interests. At the same time, he is more than a match for any of the tribes on his border, and is consequently able to keep them in order. Muhammad Akram Khan, the present chief, has shown his loyalty on more than one occasion, and did good service in 1868, for which he was granted the title of *Nawab*; as already stated, and was also made a Companion of the Order of the Star of India.

The *Mada Khels* are a section of the Isazai Yusufzais, and occupy the northern slopes of the Mahaban mountain down to the right bank of the Indus. They are bounded on the north by the Hassanzais, on the east and south by Amb territory, and on the west by the Amazais.

Their country may be described as lying between the Indus on the east, and the watershed of the northern portion of the Mahaban on the west, the eastern slopes of the range being Mada Khel, and the western Amazai.

The Mada Khel tribe is divided into three principal divisions, with 2,700 fighting men—

McNeile.

Hassanbaz Khel	900 fighting men.
Hassan Khel	900 do.
Bazid Khel	900 do.

In addition to these, the Gujars, etc., who live within the Mada Khel limits, could furnish a contingent of 300 men, making the total fighting strength of the tribe 3,000 men. They are armed with guns and swords. The guns are matchlocks and flintlocks, for the most part the former. They purchase their powder and their lead from Chamla, Buner, and British Yusufzai.

The Mada Khels have no great name for bravery. In the event of being attacked they could obtain aid from the Hassanzais and Akazais, as they all belong to the Isazai clan, and their borders join.

A blockade would give them little trouble, as they are not dependent on British territory. Their country is poor and barren, and supplies would have to accompany a force entering their hills. The majority of their villages are situated in the Mahaban range, and only two or three are on the banks of the Indus. The easiest approaches to the Mada Khel territory lie through the Hassanzai country, and this tribe would, therefore, have to be coerced, and the Nawab of Amb would have to give assistance. There is, however, a route which avoids the Hassanzai country, and crosses the river lower down, but this is hilly and impracticable for laden animals.

The Mada Khels can scarcely be said to be on our border, as the territory of the Nawab of Amb intervenes, and their dealings are for the most part with him. The *Nawab* is, as a rule, left to manage his own affairs with them. Their grand *jirga* has, however, twice been summoned, in 1863 and 1868, on both occasions in matters connected with Amb.

Amazais.

The *Amazais* are a section of the Usmanzai Yusafzais. About half of their country is settled within, and the rest beyond, the British border. The section has two divisions—1. Daulatzai; 2. Ismailzai. Within British territory the Daulatzai inhabit the Sadum valley, and their chief villages are Chargulai and Rustam. The Ismailzai occupy a strip of country in the subdivision of Yusafzai, in the Peshawar district, south of the Karamar range, and on the road from Mardan, east. Their chief village is Garhi. The Amazais beyond the border are divided into—1. Syad Khel; 2. Mubarak Khel. They are bounded on the south by the trans-Indus territory of the Nawab of Amb, and by the Gaduns; on the east by the Khudu Khels and the Chamla valley; on the north by Buner; and on the west by the Mada Khels. From the village of Birgallai, where the Amazai meets the Gadun territory, the border runs parallel with the Indus to Bedgali, including the village of Faruza in its course. From Bedgali it takes a north-west direction to the main north spur of the Mahaban mountain; it runs down this to the Barandu river, and follows that stream to the point where the north spur of the Sarpatti mountain hits it; afterwards it follows the crest of the main ridge, nearly due south of Malka, and then runs back in a south-east direction to Birgallai.

The Amazai country is divided into two districts by a northern spur from the Mahaban. All the villages lying to the east of this spur, and between it and the Indus, are called Pitao Amazai, and all to the west, Sorai Amazai. The first belongs to the Syad Khel, and the second to both sections. The Amazai country is narrow and rough, drained by many mountain torrents, all of which, except the Ashera stream, drain to the Barandu, and are perennial. It contains about thirty villages, situated along the courses of the different hill streams. Cherorai is the chief village. The whole of this district is well wooded with pines; cultivation is consequently scanty. Cattle are plentiful, and *ghi* is the product of the country.

Lumsden gives the strength of the Amazais as 8,000, but this is certainly much exaggerated. Bellew says 2,000, and Coxe and Taylor 1,500, which is probably the outside. They are considered one of the best fighting clans of all the Yusafzais. The Amazais still intermarry and communicate with their brethren under British rule, but in matters of internal government are quite distinct from them. In matters affecting the politics of the tribe, in connection with their neighbours, they side with the Bunerwals, the authority of whose chiefs they acknowledge after a fashion.

The Amazais are not dependent on British territory, and like the Mada Khels, they can hardly be said to be on our border, as all their dealings are with the Nawab of Amb. Their relations with this chief have generally been of a friendly nature, though there is a party in the tribe who are hostile to him. The nearest approach to the Amazai country from British territory is through Amb, but there is another road starting from Panjman on the Gadun border to Nagrai in Amazai territory (a distance of twenty-seven miles), which is well supplied with water, and is practicable for laden camels. This road, however, passes through the independent territory of the Gaduns and of the Khudu Khels.

The only occasion on which we have come into direct contact with the Amazais was in the Ambela campaign of 1863, and our dealings with them at that time will be described in the account of that expedition in the next chapter.

The *Utmanzais* are a division of the Mandan Yusafzais. They are divided into four sections, *viz.*, Alazai, Kanazai, Akazai, and Saduzai. The

first three are beyond the British border, and occupy the eastern slopes of the southern portion of the Mahaban mountain on the right bank of the Indus. *Utmanzais.*
Gaduns. The Saduzai section consists of five sub-divisions, viz.—(1) Aba Khel, (2) Umar Khel, (3) Mir Ahmad Khel, (4) Bilzad Khel, and (5) Khudu Khel. The first four of these are located within British territory, and occupy the south-eastern corner of the Peshawar district. The Khudu Khels are beyond the border, and occupy the western slopes of the Mahaban between the Gaduns on one side and the Chamlawals on the other. They will be described separately further on.

The Utmanama division of Yusafzai takes its name from this tribe. A considerable portion of the original Utmanzai territory, about two-thirds, is now occupied by the Gaduns, who were in former times invited to come over from across the Indus as military mercenaries, and in reward for their services were granted the lands they now hold on the western and southern slopes of the Mahaban mountain. The Utmanzais are considered better soldiers than the Gaduns, but they are numerically weak, and cannot muster more than 400 fighting men.

Alazais	60
Kanazais	150
Akazais	125
Syads	50
Gujars, etc.	15

About two-thirds of the fighting men are armed with guns, of which the greater part are matchlocks. They also possess one piece of ordnance.

There are several routes into the Utmanzai country, and owing to the fact that members of the tribe are settled in Yusafzai and Haripur, and own lands within our border, they may be said to be dependent upon us. This tribe harbours outlaws from our territory, and Government has not insisted on their surrender, possibly because they could easily send them further beyond the border. The principal villages of the Utmanzais are Kai and Khabal. The village of Sittana was also within their territory. This was given by them as a *muafi* grant to the Syads of Tiringi on their first arrival. These *Syads* are related to the Syads of Khagan and Swabi, as well as to those of Jumla and Buner.

The *Gaduns* are a tribe of Pathans who reside partly in independent territory, and partly in the Hazara district. The origin of this tribe is not very clear. They are not Yusafzais, like the tribes around them. By some they are supposed to be a branch of the Kakar tribe, which was in the first instance driven to take refuge in the Safed Koh, and afterwards in Hazara and Chach in the Rawal Pindi district. The divisions of the Gaduns are:—

I. Salar, sub-divided into (1) Matkhwazai, (2) Utazai, and (3) Sulimanzai.

II. Mansur, sub-divided into (1) Khadrzai, (2) Daulatzai, and (3) Musazai. The whole of these clans, but especially those of the Salar division, are settled along the banks of the river Dor in the Hazara district, and own a fertile prosperous tract, which they gradually possessed themselves of from the Dalazaks,* when the latter threw off their allegiance to the Emperor Jehangir.

* The *Dalazaks* are a tribe, who are chiefly settled on the left bank of the Indus in Hazara. Their origin is doubtful, and the Afghans, though acknowledging them as Pathans, say they came from India. They are probably a race of Rajput descent, and distinct from Afghans. They formerly possessed the country about Peshawar and the Indus, but were driven out by the Yusafzais coming eastward. They eventually settled on the right bank of the Indus in Hazara.

Gaduns.

Another portion of the tribe is settled trans-Indus, and owns territory on the southern and western slopes of the Mahaban mountain. They are bounded on the east by the Utmanzais, on the north by the Amazais, on the west by the Khudu Khels, and on the south by British territory.

Of the clans into which the tribe is divided, the Matkhawazai live in Babinai, in Yusafzai, in British territory. The Utazai principally inhabit Gandap. The Sulimanzai are a small clan, and are scattered about Mahaban; their principal villages are Bada, Kalagar, and Atchailai. The Khadrzai own Malka Kadi, Kadura, and Thakail. The Daulatzai own Dawal, Kaghbanai, Gadjai, and half of Bisak. The last is the principal village of the Mansur division. The Musazai own the other half of Bisak, Sukailai, and several smaller hamlets.

The villages near the foot of the hills, such as Gandap, Bisak, Malka Kadi, are chiefly dependent on rain for their cultivation, and their land is indifferent in quality. The land, however, belonging to the villages in the hills is more fertile; and wheat and rice are grown in large quantities on the slopes of Mahaban. The tribes are all cultivators or cattle owners, and their buffaloes are celebrated. Considerable quantities of *ghi* and timber are exported by them to Yusafzai, and cloth, indigo, and salt taken in return. The only level ground in the Gadun country is in front of Gandap, Bisak, and Malka Kadi.

The Gaduns say they have 12,000 fighting men, but careful inquiries prove that this is very much overstated, and James says that they have only 2,000. Taylor says the Salar have 1,300 and the Mansur 1,500, and half of them are armed with matchlocks and swords and pikes, and the other half with swords only. This estimate is probably nearer the truth, but it is doubtful whether the total number is more than 2,500. They are not, however, considered a fighting tribe.

There are two ways of coercing the trans-Indus portion of this tribe—(1) by blockade; as their cultivation is carried on in a great measure by our permission, and they depend much on their trade with the plains, this would soon render them quite helpless; (2) by invasion; if this was chosen, an expedition should start on the 1st September or 1st October, when their cattle are collected and their autumn crops cut, or early in April, when their spring crops are ready. At these seasons they could be punished by the loss of property to the value of Rs. 80,000, *viz.*, crops Rs. 30,000, cattle Rs. 25,000, houses and property Rs. 25,000. Unless they were surprised, however, they could send their cattle into Amazai territory. Their country could be overrun without other tribes being molested or approached too nearly. The hill portion would of course be the more difficult, as they have a retreat open to them. Two days would suffice for an expedition to surprise their villages and return. A blockade has on several occasions proved successful against this tribe, and a seizure can always be made. They cannot cultivate their lands in the open plain when blockaded, and they fear attack.

The Gaduns do not appear to have given any trouble on the border till 1861, when they failed to act up to their engagements to prevent the Hindustani fanatics from returning to Sittana, and were in consequence subjected to a blockade. Our subsequent dealings with the tribe will be related in their proper place.

The *Khudu Khels* are a sub-division of the Saduzai section of the Utmanzai Mandan Yusafzais. Their territory is bounded on the north by Chamla, a spur from the Sarpatti peak of the Mahaban intervening, on the west by

Yusafzai, on the south by Utmanama, and on the east by the territory of the *Khudu Khels*. Gaduns and Amazais. Its greatest length from the Sarpatti spur to Panjman is twenty-two miles, and its breadth from Narinji to Durgalai fifteen miles.

Their country is drained by the Badrai Nullah, which is dry, except after rain in the hills, when it rushes down with great violence. It rises in the Sarpatti range, and at Dandar it receives a branch from the east, and a little lower another branch from Chinglai joins it from the west; it then passes the site of Panjtar, the villages of Gurgushti, Khali Kala, and Jehangir Dara, and issues into the plains north-east of Salim Khan, and thence passes through British territory, and joins the Indus near Hund.

The Khudu Khels are divided into—(1) Usman Khel and (2) Bam Khel.

The former own half the village of Chinglai, as well as Daghi Totalai, Swawai, and minor hamlets, and the latter inhabit the other half of Chinglai, Bam Khel Totalai, Durgalai, and other villages. Mangal Thana is occupied by a colony of *Syads*. Baja and Bam Khel, in British territory, also belong to this tribe.

The Khudu Khel are now divided among themselves, and therefore are easy to manage; but if united could give a good deal of trouble. In former times, when united under Fateh Khan, and aided by the Hindustani fanatics, they were able to bring 3,000 men into the field; but at the present time, probably, they could not furnish more than 1,800 fighting men. They are not a martial people, and are dependent on British territory for their supplies and wants.

The crops are, for the spring time, wheat, barley, and mustard; for the autumn, Indian-corn, *bajra*, *mash*, *kangani*, beans, and *moth*. The dress of the residents, their food, marriage, and other customs are in no way different from what the people of Utmanama conform to. Adultery is much more stringently dealt with than in Yusafzai. Hindus are obliged to pay Rs. 20 at each marriage, and they are charged three rupees annually for protection by the *malik* of the *kandi*. The inferior class pay one rupee, and have to turn out, in case of a feud, to the aid of their respective *maliks*.

A blockade would inconvenience them very much, more especially as they have intimate relations with the people in our territories. The villages are, moreover, for the most part in the open, and exposed to attack, which gives us a greater hold over them than even the fear of a blockade. A good seizure could always be made.

Our connection with this tribe dates as far back as 1847, and in July of that year a detachment of Guide Cavalry, with a troop of Sikh

Regimental History
Corps of Guides. Regular Cavalry, marched from Yusafzai to surprise the village of Moghdara, in Khudu Khel territory. Half an

hour before daybreak they arrived at the mouth of a narrow defile, three-quarters of a mile long, leading to the village, and along which only one horseman could go at a time. The Guides, under Lieutenant H. B. Lumsden, pushed rapidly through the defile; but the Sikhs, for some unaccountable reason, did not follow. The village, however, was surprised, the inhabitants disarmed, and the head men and three hundred head of cattle were brought away by the Guides.

Again, on the 26th June 1849, a detachment of the Guides (69 sabres and 177 bayonets), under Ressaldar Fateh Khan, marched during the night from Peshawar to Yar Husain in Yusafzai, and the next morning attacked and destroyed the Khudu Khel village of Bagh and returned to Yar Husain by noon.

Khudu Khels.
Chamlawals.

On the whole, however, the tribe has given little trouble, and we perhaps owe this good conduct to its openness to attack from our territory; and there can be no doubt, should it be necessary to punish them, it would be very easy to do so, as the approaches to the country are easy.

From the year 1820, the history of the Khudu Khels has been mixed up with, and comprises the vicissitudes which have befallen Fatch Khan of Panjtar and his no less remarkable son, Mukarrab Khan, who for years has been an exile and a wanderer from his tribe, but who still is an important political factor on this part of the border. Mukarrab Khan is the representative of a family which is acknowledged to be the foremost one amongst the different sections of the Mandan clan, which inhabit this part of the frontier, and more will be said of him later on.

The *Chamlawals* are a mixture of Mandan clans, and inhabit the small valley of Chamla, to the south-east of Buner. This valley is Warburton. bounded on the north by Buner, on the west by Yusafzai, on the south by Khudu Khel territory, and on the east by the lands of the Amazais.

The valley runs east and west, its extreme length from Ambela to Garhi being ten miles, and its greatest breadth two and a half miles. A spur of the Guru mountain separates it from Buner, another from the Sarpatti peak of the Mahaban range intervenes between it and Khudu Khel territory, whilst a somewhat similar spur from the same range divides it from the country of the Amazais. In former years, when, after subjugating the country, the Yusaf and Mandan clans began to quarrel amongst themselves for their possessions, the latter located their families in the Chamla valley pending the settlement of the disturbances. The contest terminated in the Yusaf clans occupying Swat and Buner, whilst the Mandan race appropriated the plains of the Peshawar district. Chamla, though nominally a *daftar* of the Mandans, is completely subservient to its powerful neighbour Buner.

The political importance of Chamla is very small, and as soldiers the inhabitants are held in the lowest estimation.

A stream with a firm bottom runs down the middle of the valley, the water flowing on a level with the surface of the ground as far as Kuria, but beyond that the ravine deepens gradually, and the valley ceases to be open and easy. Between Ambela and Kuria, cavalry and horse artillery could manœuvre, as there are no obstacles except the stream, which could be crossed without difficulty. The elevation of the valley is little over 2,000 feet. The country produces during the spring crops, wheat, barley, peas and *masur*; during the autumn, *mash*, *moth*, rice, Indian corn, *dal*, and *kangani*. The soil is good, water abundant, and the country generally most favourable for agricultural purposes. The customs of the people are similar to those of other Pathan races; the Khudu Khels, Amazais, etc., all conforming more or less to their own peculiar tribal customs.

There are about twenty villages in the valley, of which the largest is Kogah, followed probably by Surah and Ugarai. These villages are all built with the houses joining, so as to leave few entrances, and most, if not all of them, have towers also, for musketry. The Chamlawals could muster probably about 1,000 fighting men.

The Chamla valley can be approached from the north from Buner by several passes; the easiest of these is said to be the Buner pass, which leads from Barkilli to Ambela; its length is only about two miles through the Guru

range, and, according to native reports, is practicable for laden camels. The valley can also be approached from the east by the valley of the Barandu river; through the Khudu Khel country by Chinglai to Kogah; and from British territory by the Surkhawai, Sherdara, and Narinji passes, the easiest being the Surkhawai or Ambela. *Chamlawals.*
Bunerwals.

During the campaign of 1863 the Chamlawals were at first friendly, but were afterwards forced to join against us by pressure from the other tribes.

The *Bunerwals* (*Buners*) inhabit the Buner valley, which is bounded on the north-west by Swat; north-east by the Puran valley; south-east by the Mada Khel, and Amazai territory; south by the Chamla valley; and south-west by Yusufzai. It is a small mountain valley, dotted with villages and divided into seven sub-divisions. The Mora hills and the Ilam range divide it from Swat, the Sinawar range from Yusufzai, the Guru mountain from the Chamla valley, and the Duma range from the Puran valley. From these ranges run smaller spurs, meeting one another and forming a small nucleus of inferior valleys, richly cultivated and well populated. The valley is drained by the Barandu, a perennial stream which falls into the Indus above Mahabara, after receiving the drainage of Chamla and the country of the Amazais. Its general width is about sixty feet, and has, in summer and winter, water to a depth of three or four feet, and is never less than two feet. There are about a dozen villages on its right bank, but the left bank is mostly covered with jungle, having a few hamlets at a distance. Buner is inhabited by the Iliasai and Malizai divisions of the Yusufzais, which are sub-divided into seven clans (see Appendix A), which are as follows:—

I. Salarzai. II. Nurazai. III. Ashazai. IV. Gadaizai. V. Nasozai. VI. Daulatzai; and VII. Chagarzai.

There is no finer race on the north-west frontier of India than the Bunerwals. Simple and austere in their habits, religious and truthful in their ways, hospitable to all who seek shelter amongst them, free from secret assassinations, they are bright examples of what good materials a Pathan tribe can be developed into, clinging with the fondest affection to their country and ancient customs handed down to them by their forefathers. Ignorant by nature, they hold trade in the very lowest estimation; excessively under the control of *mullas* and others of the priestly class, they are often deluded with precepts and orders said to emanate from some high religious authority, such as the late *Akhund* of Swat. They are still perfectly upright in their dealings with enemies and strangers. Their word once given through the general council of the tribe, may be depended on with greater certainty than that of any other border race, even when unaccompanied with the usual security for the fulfilment of the contract. Though poor, they are free from those thievish propensities which disgrace nearly every other tribe on the Peshawar border. This is a curious and, at the same time, a most exemplary trait in their character.

The Bunerwals have always been inimical towards us, and stand aloof, generally speaking, from intercourse with British officers; but they do not allow bands of robbers to come into our limits for the purpose of annoying the British border villages nearest to them; and though they harbour outlaws from our territory, they never join with them in committing depredations. We seldom hear of a raid in which they are participators, and when they are, it is generally found that they were instigated to it by men in our limits,

Bunerwals.

receiving grants from Government and holding influential positions in Yusafzai. Men from British territory are sometimes seized and detained because of some debt due by another in our limits, but they are immediately released on the amount being liquidated, or security given for payment.

The Bunerwals, if well united and prompted by a common cause, could bring 8,000* fighting men against us in the field, independent of those which other tribes could send to their assistance in case of need. When thus united they formed the most powerful coalition which has yet been raised against us on the north-west frontier, and it is strange, when we consider this, how little trouble this powerful tribe has given us from the day the Peshawar district came into our hands to the present moment. This is not due to fear, for they fought us bravely in 1863, and would do so again if attacked; but the true reason is, that the Bunerwals, if left to themselves, are too proud to interfere with the arrangements of their neighbours.

The case is almost unheard of in which a stranger, taking shelter amongst them as an outlaw from our territory, or otherwise, has been permitted to be assassinated by his enemies. The tribe would never put up with such an affront, or permit the *malik* to commit so treacherous an act. Different is the case in Chamla, and in the Khudu Khel and Gadun countries. One murder, that of Zaidulla Khan of Daggar, has cast a deep reproach on the Bunerwals, but his death was fanned by religious zeal and the earnest exhortations of the *Akhund* of Swat.

The climate of Buner is said to be very severe in winter, snow falling to a considerable extent on the surrounding hills and continuing for some time, but in the valleys it seldom remains longer than a week or ten days. The hot weather sets in later than in the plains, but is more oppressive and continuous, owing to the confined nature of the valley. The frequent storms that burst over these hills do not cool the air, but on the contrary produce a hot, steamy atmosphere in the valley below. It is said to be unhealthy in summer, from the coarse, gravelly soil becoming heated and radiating its heat during the night, making the air very close and oppressive. In the spring and autumn malarious exhalations rise from the porous soil, and fevers become rife during both these seasons.

The autumn crops consist of Indian corn, rice, and *mash*; the spring crops consist of wheat and barley. The grain cultivated is not, however, sufficient to meet the wants of the inhabitants of the valley, and has to be imported from other quarters. A force would, therefore, have to bring its own supplies if it entered Buner. The inhabitants are rich in cattle, specially buffaloes, and are almost entirely occupied in the tending of their herds and the cultivation of the soil.

The betrothal and marriage ceremonies are similar throughout all the sub-divisions, varied in some places, with reference to the lower classes, at the will of some *malik*, whose authority may be more arbitrary and oppressive than that of his neighbours. A poor man has generally to pay Rs. 50 to Rs. 60 for his bride, the middle classes Rs. 120, the others from Rs. 200 to Rs. 300, the man being further bound to feed the relations of the girl, both at the betrothal and the marriage, with rice, *ghi*, and sugar. The musician receives a fee of Rs. 2 at the betrothal and Rs. 5 at the marriage,

* MacGregor gives their fighting strength as 2,000, but this is certainly under the mark. Warburton, on the other hand, gives it as 15,000, but this is probably too high an estimate, and the number given in the text, viz., 8,000, is more likely to be correct.

the shortest interval between the two events being two months and the longest two years. The age of the bridegroom usually ranges from twenty to twenty-two, that of the girl being fifteen to seventeen. This seems a move in the right direction, the girl being older than custom usually permits in Muhammadan countries, where parents allow their daughters of twelve or thirteen to marry and cohabit with their husbands. The punishment for adultery with the higher classes is death, and nothing short of this will satisfy them. The lower orders, if poor, are sometimes satisfied, after a period of two or three years, with a *surra*. This means that the man who has enticed away the daughter or wife of another gives a sister or other female relation to the aggrieved party in exchange. There is no fixed rule as to what the father is to give on the birth of a child.

All *hamsayas*, such as Gujars, have to pay Rs. 5 annually; but of this number, those who are not artisans have to take up arms in time of necessity and fight for their *maliks*, being fed by them as long as the feud lasts.

With regard to the communications between Buner and the surrounding countries, there are three passes leading from Buner into Swat, but they are all difficult, and only used by footmen. On the east, the Indus being crossed at Mahabara, Buner can be entered, but with difficulty, by the defile of the Barandu. From British territory, the Malandri pass and the Surkhawai or Ambela pass lead into Buner, and are both said to be practicable for laden animals. There are several other routes from Yusufzai, but they are difficult.

The trade of the country is principally in the hands of the Hindus of Rustam and Bazar in British territory, with agencies at the principal villages in Buner. *Ghi* is exported in large quantities, also honey, timber, etc., the imports being chiefly cotton fabrics and salt. Goats, sheep, and cattle are annually purchased in Buner for the Peshawar market.

The Bunerwals are independent of us for the necessities of life, and fear a blockade less than any of the other tribes. For villages adjoining our border a blockade has been found to be successful; but for others it is impossible.

Having written so much regarding the country, customs, etc., of the Bunerwals, it is now necessary to notice briefly the different clans of the tribe. The positions of these will be seen by referring to the map at the end of the chapter, and from that it will appear that the clans which border on British territory, and therefore most nearly affect us, are the Salarzais and the Nurazais.

The *Salarzais* are a powerful clan, and are said to be able to bring 1,800 men into the field. They are sub-divided into the Mali Khel and the Aib Khel. They have fourteen villages, of which Jowar is the largest and most important. The residents of this village belong to both sections of the clan. The Salarzais have more communications with our subjects than any other clan of the Bunerwals.

The *Nurazais* adjoin British territory to the south-east of the Salarzais, and are separated from the Chamla valley by the Guru range. They communicate with British territory by the Malandri and Ambela passes, which lead direct to their country. They are divided into two sections, the Panjpan and the Ali Sher Khel. The former have always been favourably disposed towards the British. Their *maliks* have invariably attended to the summons of the Assistant-Commissioner of Yusufzai, when called upon to do so, and have done their best to smooth any difficulties that might arise between them and us.

Bunerwals.

Were they more powerful, they would probably go further; but they are aware that too great solicitude for us would draw upon them the anger of the rest of the tribe. This friendship of theirs is due to the constant intercourse they have with our villages in the Sadum valley. The Ali Sher Khel *maliks*, on the contrary, are the most troublesome people we have to deal with in Buner. The principal villages of the Panjpan section are Nowikilli and Krapa, and of the Ali Sher Khel, Regah, and Barkilli. The *maliks* of the last two places have the greatest influence in the Nurazai country. The clan is said to be able to turn out 1,400 fighting men.

The *Ashazais* are located at the base of the isolated Jaffer hill, having the Salarzais on their west and the Nurazais on the south. It is the most war-like clan in Buner, and its central position gives it a prominent place in the politics of the country, of which they are not slow to avail themselves. They are divided into four sections, the Khadin Khel, Aya Khel, Musara Khel, and the Khakizai. The first live in Angapur; the Aya Khel and Musara Khel divide Tursak, which is the largest village of the Ashazai; and the Khakizai are settled in Elai.

The *Gadaizais* occupy the southern slopes of the Ilam and Dosirri mountains. They are too far located from our border for their chiefs ever to be brought into political contact with our officers. They are divided into four sections, Ibrahim Khel, Hassan Khel, Ali Sher Khel, and Seni Khel.

The *Nasozais* occupy the western slopes of the Duma mountains to the south-east of the Gadaizais. They are divided into two sections, the Panjpan and the Makhozai. Their most important village is Bagra, and, during the Ambela campaign, the *Khan* of that place and the *Khan* of Daggar, also belonging to the Panjpan section of the Nasozais, were considered the most important chiefs in Buner.

The *Daulatzais* occupy a portion of the valley on both banks of the Barandu stream to the north of the Chamla valley. They are divided into three sections, Ismailzai, Mandizai, and Barkazai. The principal village of the first is Kulpanai; of the Mandizai, Bajkatta; and of the Barkazai, Shalbandi. Some of their villages are flourishing places, and have an extensive trade through Hindus with Sadum, more especially Bajkatta and Kulpanai. The *maliks* of this clan, in case of any dissensions among the Chamlawals and Chagarzais, obtain large sums of money for helping and assisting the rival pretenders to power.

The *Chagarzais* have already been described under the heading of the Black Mountain tribes. Of the three sections into which the clan is divided, *viz.*, Nasrat Khel, Ferozai, and Basi Khel, the second only is located in the Buner valley, and inhabit the western slopes of the Duma mountains, and its principal villages are Tangor and Batora.

Affair with the Hindustani fanatics at Kotla in January 1853.

About the year 1823, one of those famous saintly adventurers made his appearance on the Yusafzai frontier, who have at all times
Warburton. managed to beguile the credulous and simple Pathan race for

their own ends, and have been the means of creating discord, upheaving society, and fomenting rebellions, which have been checked and crushed with the utmost difficulty. This man was Syad Ahmad Shah of Bareilly. At one period of his life he was the companion-in-arms of the celebrated Amir Khan Pindari, who was himself a Pathan, born in the valley of Buner. Syad Ahmad studied Arabic at Delhi, and then proceeded to Mecca by way of Calcutta. It was during this journey that his doctrines obtained the ascendancy over the minds of the Muhammadans of Bengal, which has ever since led them to supply this colony with fresh recruits. Although the *Syad* in after life attempted to disguise the fact, his doctrines were essentially those of the *Wahabi* sect, inculcating the original tenets of Islam, and repudiating commentaries on the *Koran*, the adoration of relics, etc. It was in 1824 that the adventurer arrived by way of Kandahar and Kabul amongst the Yusufzai tribes of the Peshawar border, with about forty Hindustani followers.

Affair with the Hindustani fanatics in 1853.
Origin of the Hindustani fanatics.

It was just the time to raise the spirits of the Yusufzais and other Pathans (which had been lowered by the crushing defeat they and the Peshawar *Sirdars* had received from Ranjit Singh at the battle of Nowshera), by religious exhortation.

Syad Ahmad gave out that he was a man of superior sanctity, and divinely commissioned to wage a war of extermination, with the aid of all true believers, against the infidel; amongst a race so simple and superstitious, the mission of all enthusiasts like Syad Ahmad is eminently successful. Animated by a spirit of fanaticism, and with the desire of freeing themselves from their Sikh oppressors, a numerous, although ill-disciplined, army was soon at his disposal. His own Hindustani followers had been increased by recruits till they now numbered 900 men. In addition to this, the Peshawar *Sirdars*, feeling the influence of the movement, and hoping to break the Sikh rule, joined in the crusade.

Collecting his army together, and strengthened by the contingents of Khadi Khan of Hund, Ashraf Khan of Zeyda, and the followers of the Peshawar *Sirdars*, the *Syad* proceeded to Nowshera with the intention of laying siege to the fort of Attock. He found Ranjit Singh warned. Hari Singh with a large army awaited him on the Indus, and Budh Singh was sent across the river with a considerable force. Moving up to Saidu to meet the fanatics, he entrenched his army. The *Syad* surrounded his force, and in time reduced it to great distress. Budh Singh at length determined to fight, and warning the Peshawar *Sirdars* of the near approach of Ranjit Singh and the fate that awaited them if they acted with Syad Ahmad, commenced the battle. The *Sirdars*, with Yar Muhammad at their head, accepting the warning, fled immediately. This act of treachery had the desired effect, and the Muhammadans were routed with great slaughter by the Sikh soldiery. Yar Muhammad derived little benefit from his act, for Ranjit Singh doubled the amount of the Peshawar tribute, desecrated the mosques, despoiled the country, and ultimately retired, taking Yar Muhammad Khan's son as hostage.

Syad Ahmad, after this defeat, which occurred in the spring of 1827, escaped with a few followers, *via* Lundkhwar, to Swat. Thence he proceeded to Buner, and ultimately, at the invitation of some of the *Khans*, returned to Yusufzai. It leaked out then that the *Syad's* attempt on Attock had been a failure through the treachery of Khadi Khan of Hund, who had disclosed the *Syad's* intention to Ranjit Singh, and who since the defeat of Syad Ahmad had withdrawn his allegiance and support from him. The Pathans still believed in his miraculous powers, thousands swarmed round his standard, and being joined by Mir Baba the Sadum chief, and others, he determined to chastise the

*Affair with the
Hindustani
fanatics in
1853.
Origin of the
Hindustani
fanatics.*

Khan of Hund for his misconduct. The parties met, with no decisive result; but by an act of treachery, in which he was aided by the late *Akhund* of Swat, the *Syad* induced Khadi Khan to visit him in a friendly way, and had him seized and slain instantly.

After this he proceeded to Panjtar, and was heartily welcomed by Fateh Khan, the chief of the Khudn Khels. This connection strengthened his position among the Pathans. Aided by Fateh Khan and his own bands of Hindustanis, the *Syad* commenced a series of exploits which eventually placed the whole of Yusafzai and Peshawar under his control. He subdued the Khans of Hund and Hoti, and levied tithes from the Yusafzai clans. In 1828, by a night attack he defeated the Barakzai force, which had advanced against him as far as Zeyda. Subsequently, he took possession of Amb. In 1829, having again defeated the Barakzais at Hoti, he occupied Peshawar. But his successful career was now brought to a close. His exactions had become oppressive to the Pathans, and an attempt on his part to put a stop to their taking money on the betrothal of their daughters was still more distasteful. There was a general insurrection against him, and many of his followers, including the deputy left at Peshawar, were massacred. Fateh Khan also, having derived every advantage from the *Syad's* presence at Panjtar, was now desirous of getting rid of his obnoxious ally. He therefore joined heartily in the scheme for the assassination of the *Syad's* followers; but when the beacon was lighted on the top of Karamar, which was the arranged signal of slaughter, Fateh Khan found that Syad Ahmad and his compact little army of 1,600 Hindustanis under Mulla Ismail, was a force which he dared not attack openly. Finding the Mahaban no longer a safe asylum, the Hindustanis crossed the Indus and proceeded to Balakot. Here the followers of the *Syad* again rallied round him, and an army under Sher Singh marched against him. In spite of the disparity of numbers, and the warning of his friends, he determined to fight. Three times did his small band of Hindustanis beat back the Sikh regiments. At last, overpowered by numbers, they were defeated and destroyed, only three hundred of their number escaping, the *Syad* himself being slain.

Of his disciples who escaped with their lives a portion found their way to Sittana. This village, as already stated, had been given as a *muafi* grant by the Utmanzais to the Syads of Tiringi on their first arrival. The village then belonged to one Syad Akbar Shah, a man who was held in great veneration by the Utmanzais, Gaduns, and neighbouring tribes, and who was a declared enemy of the Sikhs. Sittana was at that time the refuge for outlaws and offenders from Yusafzai and Hazara, and was the rendezvous of all the discontented *Khans* and their followers. Syad Akbar had served as treasurer and counsellor to Syad Ahmad, and on this account he willingly allowed the Hindustanis to gather round him. Here they settled, and established a colony, and also constructed a fort near Sittana, which they called Mandi. After the British annexation of the Peshawar valley, Abdul Ghafur, the well-known *Akhund* of Swat, prevailed on the people of Swat to receive Syad Akbar as their king, and he was accordingly proclaimed King of Swat.

The first occasion of our coming into collision with this Hindustani colony occurred in 1853, after the expedition against the Hassanais, related in the previous chapter.

The Hindustani fanatics had co-operated with the Hassanais against Jehandad Khan of Amb, and had actually seized a small fort of his, named Kotla, in the Amb territory, on the right bank of the Indus, and it was necessary that it should be recovered and restored to the Amb chief. Accordingly,

after the conclusion of the operations in December 1852 and January 1853, described in the previous chapter, under Lieut.-Colonel Mackeson, C.B., a force was moved down to the left bank of the Indus, opposite Kotla. *Affair with the Hindustani fanatics in 1853.*

None of the tribes around, the Amazais, Mada Khels, or Gaduns, had joined the Hindustani fanatics; but the latter, in answer to the warning to them to withdraw from Kotla to their own settlements, gave no written reply, and according to some verbal reports, sent a defiance—Maulvi Inayat Ali Khan, the leader of the Hindustanis, declaring he had come to die.

Feeling confident, after seeing the ground, that the crossing and re-crossing could well be protected, and the garrison reduced to extremity if they offered opposition, Lieut.-Colonel Mackeson determined to send a force across, though there were only two boats available for the passage, each capable of carrying 100 men at a time.

On the 6th January, the troops, as per margin, were crossed over from Kirpilian under the command of Major J. Abbott, to retake the fort. As there were doubts if the mountain guns would suffice to reduce the fort, two Horse Artillery guns were held ready to be sent across, to ascend the mountain on elephants: or to be dragged up on sledges formed of hollowed trees, the other two being kept on the left bank to cover the crossing and retirement.

The village of Ashera rises in terraces on a spur of the mountain from the bank of the Indus to an elevation of 200 feet, and the fort of Kotla is higher up on the same spur, at an elevation of 1,000 feet or more from the river.

It was known that there was no spring or well in the fort, and it was intended that Jehandad Khan's men should assault the village under cover of the Horse Artillery guns on the left bank of the river, whilst Major Abbott's column should move round and gain possession of the heights above it, whilst the crossing opposite Sittana was threatened by the regular troops from their encampment at Rargarh.

The heights above Kotla had, however, been held since the day before by Jehandad Khan's matchlock men, so that a position for the troops, which commanded the interior of the fort, and their unopposed advance to occupy that position, had already been secured.

In spite of the boasts of the Hindustanis, on the two Sikh regiments and mountain guns commencing to ascend the hill, they were all, to the number of from 200 to 300, in full flight from the fort of Kotla and village of Ashera, and, being pursued by Jehandad Khan's people, some thirty or forty were cut up. They retired very doggedly, the Tanawalis following cautiously.

The Hindustanis had removed everything from their settlement at Sittana, in order to strongly occupy Ashera and Kotla; and Lieut.-Colonel Mackeson did not think it necessary to burn their empty houses at Sittana, as he considered their flight, without offering resistance, would generally increase the contempt in which they were held by the surrounding tribes, and be more useful to us than any persecution of them could be.

The troops bivouacked for the night at Ashera, and re-crossed the Indus the following day. . .

Lieut.-Col. Mackeson's despatch.

Mountain Train
Battery, 2 guns.
1st Sikh Infantry.
3rd " "
Two regiments of
Dogras of the Kash-
mir army.
6 Wall pieces.
6 Zamburaks.

Affairs at Shekh Jana and Narinji under Major J. L. Vaughan, in July and August 1857.

*Affairs at
Shekh Jana
and Narinji
in 1857.*

The only portion of the Peshawar district in which advantage of the Sepoy Mutiny was taken by the people to disturb the country was on the Yusufzai frontier, and this was principally due to the presence of the Hindustani fanatics, who were supported by contributions of men and money, from traitorous princes and private individuals in Hindustan.

The Yusufzai country is controlled by the fort of Mardan, which was usually garrisoned by the Corps of Guides; but in the middle of May 1857, this regiment moved down to form a portion of the Punjab Movable Column, its place being taken by the 55th Native Infantry. At the end of May the 55th Native Infantry broke into mutiny, when about 100 sepoys were put to the sword, and 150 taken prisoners by a column which had moved out from Peshawar under Lieut.-Colonel John Nicholson, some 600 sepoys of the regiment making good their escape to Swat.

Two powers had hitherto reigned in Swat—the *Akhund*, or priest, and the *Badshah*, or king, whom the *Akhund* had set up for carrying on the temporal government. Had these two been united in harbouring the 55th Native Infantry, and at that moment proclaimed a *jahad* against us, there can be no doubt that it would have set fire to the valley of Peshawar, and placed us in considerable difficulties. But Syad Akbar, the king, had just died. He had long survived his popularity, and had he been then alive, would not have been allowed by the *Akhund* and chiefs of Swat to entertain a disciplined army of Hindustani sepoys. The crisis roused these chiefs to the preservation of their liberties, and they first expelled Syad Mubarak Shah, the son of the late king, and lastly, the refugees of the 55th Native Infantry, who were conducted by disciples of the *Akhund* through mountain paths to the river Indus, which they crossed at a point far above our territory, with the desperate design of making their way to Kashmir and seeking an asylum with Maharaja Golab Singh; but they were destroyed before they arrived at their destination.

A few of the sepoys of the 55th regiment had, however, shrunk from encountering the perils of the journey to Kashmir, and had joined the young Syad Mubarak Shah, who had taken up his abode at the village of Panjtar. Not far from this village, at a place called Mangal Thana, a settlement of Hindustanis under some *maulvis* of the *Wahabi* sect had sprung up, being a branch of the parent colony at Sittana. Mukarrab Khan, chief of Panjtar, was also hostile to us. In order to understand the cause of his hostility, it is necessary to refer briefly to his history since the death of his father, Fateh Khan, in 1841, when he succeeded to the position of *Khan*. For the first eight years he seems to have managed the Khudu Khels well, and the tribe remained quiet and contented. Dissensions did now and then break out, but the parties were appeased, till at last Mukarrab Khan seized, deprived of his sight, and slew Sirkar, *malik* of Bam Khel Totalai, a man who had been his father's, Fateh Khan's, agent. This act of his seems to have been the commencement of all the troubles which have since overtaken him. It was about this time that he rendered himself useful to Major James Abbott, who was then holding Hazara, and on the annexation of the Punjab he presented himself to our officers. Even then his oppression had made him at variance with his subjects, and the object of his visit was to obtain British aid against them, which it is needless to remark was refused.

Nothing particular was done by him for several years after this, but in 1855 he made a petition claiming our aid against the Hindustani fanatics at Mangal Thana who had assembled there to the number of 420 men under Syad Abbas, with the intention of attacking the *Khan's* villages. The sincerity of Mukarrab Khan was considered doubtful, and it appeared probable that the agitation was got up by the *Khan* himself, who was at variance with his subjects, the Totalaiwals, and wanted the fanatics to help him against them. The cause of this difference was that the *Khan* claimed a house and tithe tax at the rate of Rs. 2 per harvest, whilst the Totalaiwals declined to pay anything beyond Rs. 2 a house per annum.

*Affairs at
Shekh Jana
and Narinji
in 1857.*

The dispute was referred to the British authorities, and a decision was given against Mukarrab Khan, and he was informed at the same time by the Chief Commissioner that he would be held responsible for the good conduct of the Hindustani colony at Mangal Thana. This so displeased him that from that time he did not hide his hostility to the British. Matters continued in an unsatisfactory state, and it was apprehended that there would be an armed movement into British territory. In October 1856 sanction was given by the Supreme Government for a force to be employed against the *Khan* should necessity warrant such a measure. On the 30th August 1856, previous to the receipt of the above sanction, a raid on Swabi and Salim Khan being expected, a detachment of Guide cavalry and 200 infantry, under command of Major H. B. Lumsden, moved out to protect the threatened villages. But the force soon returned, as no attack was anticipated, and the fanatics were to be used against the Totalaiwals and not against the British villages.

On the 5th October 1856 the *maliks* of Totalai and Mobaraz Khan of Chinglai, cousin of Mukarrab Khan, having joined together, determined to raise the whole of the Khudu Khels against Mukarrab Khan, if he did not instantly dismiss the fanatics. On the 7th October 1856 the *Khan* wrote to the Assistant Commissioner at Mardan, informing him that the Hindustanis had been dismissed, and he had made peace with his subjects. During the troubles of 1857 Mobaraz Khan invited the Hindustani fanatics under Maulvi Inayat Ali Khan to his village without consulting his cousin; the Khudu Khels joined him, and Mukarrab Khan found himself isolated at Panjtar.

It was at this time that some of the western villages began to give way to the influences by which they were tempted to disaffection, and, having refused to pay their revenue, they appealed to Mobaraz Khan of Chinglai and to the Hindustanis to come down and begin a war for Islam.

The defaulting village of Shekh Jana was accordingly occupied by 200 men from Chinglai under Baz Khan, the nephew of Mobaraz Khan, and by 50 horsemen under a partisan soldier, named Jan Muhammad, besides men from the neighbouring villages.

The fort of Mardan, after the mutiny of the 55th Native Infantry, had been garrisoned by the 5th Punjab Infantry and two guns of the Peshawar Mountain Train Battery, the whole under Major J. L. Vaughan, 5th Punjab Infantry. The Assistant Commissioner, Lieutenant J. C. Horne, having called upon that officer to act, he moved out on the afternoon of the 1st July with the detachment as per margin, and the next morning attacked Shekh Jana (*see* Map, page 100). A considerable number of matchlock men, with the horse, were drawn up along the eastern bank of the *nullah* on which the village is built. A few rounds from the guns speedily threw them into disorder; when the

Regimental History,
5th Punjab Infantry.

Peshawar Mountain
Train Battery 2 guns.
2nd Punjab Cavalry,
80 sabres.

5th Punjab Infan-
try, 270 bayonets.

*Affairs at
Shekh Jana
and Narinji
in 1857.*

skirmishers of the 5th Punjab Infantry cleared the village, and the 2nd Punjab Cavalry, pursuing the fugitives over the open plain in its rear, drove them into the adjoining village of Spinkana.

This village was then attacked and carried, and the enemy pursued to the hills by the cavalry and some levies, under Lieutenant G. A. Graham, when several were cut up and some twenty-five taken prisoners. The only casualties on our side were two sowars, 2nd Punjab Cavalry, and three of the levies, wounded.

Major Vaughan stated that the conduct of the troops had been admirable, and the pursuit by the cavalry very spirited. Baz Khan was amongst the slain, and Jan Muhammad, having been taken prisoner, was tried and executed, as were, subsequently, seven of the villagers.

A fortnight after the affair of Shekh Jana, the Hindustani fanatics, under the leadership of Maulvi Inayat Ali Khan, crossed the border and raised the standard of religious war at the mountain village of Narinji.

Narinji is on the extreme border, and, being very difficult of access, had become an asylum for bad characters, and had several times defied the authorities in Yusafzai; at the last moment, however, the *maliks* had always hitherto saved the place from destruction by submission and reparation.

Captain James's
report.

The villagers were proud that the place had more than once been attacked by a Sikh force without success.

The number of Hindustani followers with the *Maulvi* was about 150, and he had also some 30 or 40 of the men of the late 55th Native Infantry. The fighting men of Narinji were about 400, and 40 horsemen had joined the party from Panjtar, under the brother of Mukarrab Khan. A few horsemen had also come down from Swat, and several of the fugitives from Shekh Jana were with the *Maulvi*. Mobaraz Khan of Chinglai remained aloof, and refused to give assistance.

Peshawar Mountain Train
Battery, 4 guns.
2nd Punjab Cavalry, one
troop.
4th Punjab Infantry, 300
bayonets.
5th Punjab Infantry, 400
bayonets.
Mounted police, 40 sowars.
Multan levy, 100 sowars.

On the night of the 18th July, a force, as per margin, marched from Mardan, under the command of Major J. L. Vaughan, 5th Punjab Infantry, and accompanied by Captain H. R. James, the Deputy Commissioner, to Yar Husain, thirteen miles. The 4th Punjab Infantry, under Captain A. T. Wilde, had marched from Nowshera on the 18th, but had been so much delayed in crossing the Kabul river that it was necessary to halt on the 20th to give them a rest.

This route was adopted in order to conceal the object of the movement, which was further effected by the laying in of supplies at Salim Khan, as if the troops were proceeding to Panjtar, the people in the vicinity of which commenced to remove their property.

On the night of the 20th the troops marched to Parmali, nine miles, and, after a short halt, advanced towards Narinji, five miles, which was sighted at daylight. The surprise was complete, the enemy making such hasty preparations as were possible after the troops were seen; but Captain S. J. Browne with the troop, 2nd Punjab Cavalry, making a spirited advance beyond the village, succeeded in capturing 100 head of cattle.

The position of the village was very strong. It was built in terraces, and situated at the foot of a precipitous hill, the rocky spurs of which surrounded it on three sides, but in the front the ground was open and practicable for cavalry. A broad sandy *nullah* ran along the foot of the hill, on the other side of which

nullah, facing Narinji, was another range of heights. The slopes of the hill above Narinji were very steep, though practicable for infantry.

*Affairs at
Shekh Jana
and Narinji
in 1857.*

Major Vaughan's force was not strong enough to enable him to crown the heights above the village before attacking it in front; moreover, the men had had a long night's march, the season of the year was very trying, and it was unadvisable to attempt the long and laborious operation of crowning the heights, or, whilst the enemy's strength was undeveloped, to divide the force. So taking up a position favourable for artillery fire, the mountain guns opened with shot and shell on the place.

The *maliks* had been previously called upon to give up the *Maulvi*, but as in their reply they ignored his presence, the infantry advanced in skirmishing order, and after a tenacious resistance on the part of the enemy, made them-

Captain James's
report.

selves masters of the lower part of the village, and of the rocks which flanked it. There were several strong breastworks in the upper part of the village, and the enemy, who were very numerous, then pressed down to try and drive the infantry out of the position they had won; but though they fought with great bravery, and some even descended into the plain, they were driven back with loss, and the destruction

Major Vaughan's
despatch.

of the village was commenced. A desultory fire was maintained on the troops from above, whose efforts to destroy the village were thus materially impeded, but soon columns of smoke rose in all directions, and the lower village was destroyed.

About 8 A.M. Major Vaughan determined on retiring, as it was not probable that further injury could be inflicted that day.

The troops had been severely worked, and would soon have become exhausted from the almost intolerable heat. To show the trying nature of the weather, it is only necessary to say that the force had forty men, soldiers and camp-followers, struck down by the sun during the day before, nine of whom died, including the farrier sergeant of the Peshawar Mountain Train Battery. The supply of water, too, would have become scarce, as it had to be brought from the villages in rear by the people and on donkeys. The villagers behaved well in this respect, and there was an abundant supply during the time the troops were employed.

Captain James's
report.

The retirement was effected without the slightest opposition on the part of the enemy, although the ground was most favourable for them, and the troops reached their camp at 10 A.M.

The losses of the enemy had been very severe. Independently of those who must have been killed or wounded by the guns on the higher slopes above the village which the infantry did not reach, fifty of the enemy fell in the lower village alone; many of these were Hindustanis. The wounded were estimated at about fifty more.

Our loss had been five killed and twenty-one wounded (see Appendix B); this Captain James considered small, compared with the results attained; observing that in warfare of this nature experience had shown us that our own losses usually equalled those of the enemy.

Major Vaughan stated that he was much indebted to all the European officers with the force, that the conduct of the troops of all arms was excellent throughout, and that the mounted police had been most useful, cutting up several of the enemy who had ventured down from the hill. He said he was also much indebted to Captain H. R. James for the excellence of his arrangements and the assistance rendered throughout.

*Affairs at
Shekh Jana
and Narinji
in 1857.*

But the people of Narinji remained stubborn, and would not expel the *Maulvi*, and soon afterwards a raid was made on cattle in British territory, and nothing remained to be done but to renew the attack on the place. It was known, too, that

Mobaraz Khan of Chinglai, and Alam Khan, brother of Mukarrab Khan of Panjtar, had taken money from the *Maulvi*, and succeeded in purchasing the aid of the chief men of Buner, who promised to bring assistance three days after the festival of the *Eed*. Chamla had already sent seven standards (probably 200 men), and other parties were daily arriving. Promises had been made from Swat, and reinforcements of Hindustanis had arrived from Mangal Thana and Sittana.

Major Vaughan's camp had been established at Parmali after the affair at Narinji, and on the 31st it was moved to Shewa, as affording better shelter for the European troops, and partly to conceal our intentions. On the morning of the 2nd August, Major Vaughan received reinforcements from Peshawar, but his force had been previously weakened by the departure of the 4th Punjab Infantry.

It had been intended that these reinforcements should have reached on the 31st, as it was known that, with the exception of the *Maulvi* and his followers, all others had left Narinji to keep the *Eed* at their homes, but a heavy fall of rain had delayed the troops. Their movements, therefore, became known, and on the 2nd there were 1,000 men in Narinji, the Buner men being expected in two days.

At 1 A.M. on the 3rd August, a column of the strength marginally noted marched from Shewa, under Major J. L. Vaughan, with Captain H. R. James as Political Officer, on Narinji. Captain James had information that there was a bye-road branching off about one mile and a half before reaching Narinji, by which a column could ascend to the rear of the village. A force of 300 bayonets, 5th Punjab Infantry, and 50 bayonets, 87th Royal Irish Fusiliers, was therefore detached under the command of Lieutenant W. D. Hoste, 5th Punjab Infantry, to take the enemy in flank and rear, (*see accompanying sketch*). The existence of this road was known when the first attack was made, but the force was then too weak to detach any portion of it.

The main body came in sight of Narinji soon after sunrise. Rumours which had exaggerated our weakness now turned our hundreds into thousands, and as the force approached many of the auxiliaries fled. *Maulvi Inayat Ali Khan* was among the first to leave the village.

As soon as the main body had come into position opposite the village, fire was opened upon it, and upon the clusters of men observed upon different parts of the mountain, from the 24-pounder howitzers and mountain guns. This was feebly replied to by a matchlock fire from the *sangars* above the village and along the heights.


* This regiment is the present 1st Native Infantry.

† The 16th Punjab Infantry was raised at Peshawar on the 5th June, 1857, and was called the Peshawar Sikh Battalion. At the beginning of August of the same year its designation was changed to the 16th Punjab Infantry, and it is now the 24th Punjab Native Infantry.

Sketch
OF THE AFFAIR AT
N A R I N J I

BY A FORCE UNDER
MAJOR J. L. VAUGHAN

August 1857.



After this had continued for about half an hour, the column which had been detached to ascend the hill made its appearance far away on the right. Its progress was vigorously opposed by the enemy, but the latter were dislodged from every point where they attempted to make a stand, and the column passed on in the most brilliant manner, and without a check, until the rear of the village was gained. The upper portion of the village, which is very strong and commanding, and other points overlooking the village, were then rapidly taken possession of at the point of the bayonet by a portion of Lieutenant Hoste's men, whilst the remainder continued their advance in pursuit of the enemy, until the heights westward of the village were also cleared.

*Affairs at
Shekh Jana
and Narinji
in 1857.*

As soon as the success of Lieutenant Hoste's column was no longer doubtful, a detachment of the 6th Punjab Infantry, under Lieutenant G. N. Saunders, was sent to ascend the heights which enclose the village to the left, and intercept the retreat of the fugitives. This service was well performed, and twenty-five or thirty of the enemy were killed. Amongst the slain were several *purbeahs*, believed from their arms and accoutrements to be men of the late 55th Native Infantry. Simultaneously with the movements last described, the 16th Punjab Infantry and 50 bayonets of Her Majesty's 70th Regiment entered the village from the front and found it deserted.

The work of destruction then commenced. Not a house was spared; even the walls of many were destroyed by elephants. The towers were blown up under the direction of Lieutenant F. S. Taylor of the Engineers, and the village was soon a mass of ruins. Three prisoners were taken—one was a Bareilly *maulvi*, the second a Chamla standard-bearer, and the third a vagrant of Charouda: they were all subsequently executed.

When the destruction of the village was completed, the troops were withdrawn. Not a shot had been fired at them during the six hours they held possession of the village; nor was a shot fired at them as they withdrew.

Though not actively engaged, the large force of cavalry gave security to the movements of the guns and infantry in the bed of the *nullah*, and the foot levies were useful in occupying the heights opposite the village from which possible annoyance was anticipated. Our losses had been only one killed and eight wounded (*see Appendix C*).

Major Vaughan stated that he was deeply indebted to Captain H. R. James for his cordial assistance and co-operation, to which, in a great measure, might be attributed the success of the operations.

The Governor-General in Council requested that his satisfaction might be conveyed to Major Vaughan, 5th Punjab Infantry, to Captain James, the Deputy Commissioner, to Lieutenant J. C. Horne, Assistant Commissioner, and to Lieutenant W. D. Hoste, attached to 5th Punjab Infantry, for the excellent service they had rendered in the course of these operations.

These acknowledgments were, it was stated, specially due to Major Vaughan, for the discretion with which all his arrangements were made, and the vigour with which they were carried into execution; and to Captain James, for his able, zealous, and judicious co-operation with the military officers.

*Expedition
against the
Khudu Khels
and Hindu-
stani fanatics
in 1858.*

Expedition against the Khudu Khels and Hindustani fanatics by a force under Major-General Sir Sydney J. Cotton, K.C.B., April-May 1858.

At the end of October following the destruction of Narinji related above, Lieutenant J. C. Horne, Assistant Commissioner of Yusafzai, whilst encamped at Shekh Jana with a small escort, was attacked by the Hindustanis and Chinglai Khudu Khels, aided by the Narinji and Shekh Jana people. Lieutenant Horne was forced to fly (as Shekh Jana would not receive him), and take refuge in a ravine. Being favoured by the darkness, he saved his life. All his baggage was, however, taken, and five of his servants were killed. There is no doubt that Mukarrab Khan, Mobaraz Khan, and nearly all the *maliks* of Shekh Jana were in league with the fanatics.

To punish this flagrant outrage, Lieutenant-Colonel H. B. Edwardes, the Commissioner of Peshawar, strongly urged that as soon as troops were available, due punishment should be inflicted for these wanton and unprovoked hostilities.

Total of all Ranks.

	European.	Native.	Total.
Artillery ...	131	88	219
Cavalry ...	16	535	551
Infantry ...	632	3,475	4,107
Grand Total	779	4,098	4,877

Accordingly, on the 22nd April 1858, a force as per margin (*see* Appendix D), assembled on the left bank of the Kabul river, opposite Nowshera, under the immediate command of Major-General Sir Sydney J. Cotton, K.C.B., where it was joined by Lieutenant-Colonel H. B. Edwardes, C.B., the Commissioner. The

force was divided into two brigades, commanded respectively by Lieutenant-Colonel H. Renny and Major A. T. Allan, both of H. M. 81st Regiment.

On the 25th of April, the frontier village of Salim Khan was reached by the troops (*see* Map, page 100), when reconnoitring parties, one under Captain T. Wright, and the other under Lieutenant-Colonel H. B. Edwardes, C.B., were at once sent forward.

The approaches to Panjtar were held by the people of Totalai, who had for several years been resisting the payment of tithes demanded by Mukarrab Khan, as already stated. When, therefore, the Totalai people saw the reconnoitring parties approaching, they not only turned out to welcome them, but rushed ahead with all their men to try and seize Mukarrab Khan, and that chief, supposing probably that the reconnoitring parties were followed by a column of attack, abandoned his position, and fled with about 60 horsemen to Chinglai; seeing which, the Totalai people dashed in and set fire to Panjtar before troops could come up. Thus our first object was unexpectedly and easily attained.

1st Column.

*Peshawar Light Field Battery, 4 guns.
Peshawar Mountain Train Battery, 2 guns.
98th Regiment, 260 bayonets.
7th Irregular Cavalry, 100 sabres.
Guide Cavalry, 200 sabres.
Peshawar Light Horse, 30 sabres.
Sappers and Miners, 100 bayonets.
†21st Native Infantry, 300 bayonets.
Guide Infantry, 300 bayonets.
9th Punjab Infantry, 400 bayonets.
18th Punjab Infantry, 400 bayonets.

2nd Column.

81st Regiment, 200 bayonets.
18th Irregular Cavalry, 100 sabres.
Sappers and Miners, 47 bayonets.
Kelat-i-Ghilzai Regiment, 200 bayonets.
8th Punjab Infantry, 450 bayonets.

* The Peshawar Light Field Battery was raised on the 5th of June 1857, and the Peshawar Light Horse on the 3rd of June. The latter was known also as Fane's Horse, and is now the 19th Bengal Lancers.*

† The 21st Native Infantry is the present 1st Native Infantry; the 8th, 9th and 18th Punjab Infantry are now the 20th, 21st and 26th (Punjab) Native Infantry respectively; the Kelat-i-Ghilzai Regiment is the present 12th Native Infantry, and the 7th and 18th Irregular Cavalry are now the 5th and 8th Bengal Cavalry respectively.

** Non sense! The Peshawar Light Horse was a corps of European Cavalry, formed from men of the 27th, 70th and 87th Regts. — Fane's Horse, now the 19th B.L., was raised in 1850, for service in China. — Captain F. Fane 87th Commanded*

3rd Column.

81st Regiment, 105 bayonets.
 98th Regiment, 10 bayonets.
 7th Irregular Cavalry, 25 sabres.
 18th Irregular Cavalry, 25 sabres.
 Guide Cavalry, 60 sabres.
 Kelat-i-Ghilzai Regiment, 254 bayonets.
 21st Native Infantry, 155 bayonets.
 Guide Infantry, 76 bayonets.
 8th Punjab Infantry, 54 bayonets.
 9th Punjab Infantry, 137 bayonets.
 18th Punjab Infantry, 185 bayonets.

Before crossing the frontier the force was divided into three columns, as per margin. *Expedition against the Khudu Khels and Hindu-stani fanatics in 1858.*

Salim Khan was made the base of operations, where the camp remained standing. The Major-General was to proceed, accompanied by Lieut.-Colonel Edwardes, with the first column, furnished with two days' provisions, so as to enter the Khudu Khel territory by the Daran

pass, whilst Lieut.-Colonel H. Renny, 81st Regiment, proceeded in command of the second column direct to Panjtar, with orders to destroy that place; the

third column, under Major A. T. Allan, 81st Regiment, remaining in charge of the standing camp at Salim Khan. Lieutenant-Colonel Edwardes's report.

Not a single tent was to be taken by officers or men, and the baggage consisted simply of two days' provisions and abundance of ammunition.

At one o'clock on the morning of the 26th April, the first column, under the command of the Major-General, left camp for Chinglai, and at daylight entered the Daran pass, which is a remarkably narrow defile, of about two miles in length. It is not formidable to disciplined troops, because the heights on either side have only to be crowned to cover the safe passage of the force; and the length of the pass is so limited that, if stoutly contested, it could not resist for more than a couple of hours. There is a well of spring water in the pass at the foot of the last ascent. The enemy did well, therefore, not to attempt any resistance, and to allow the troops to ascend unmolested into the elevated valley of Chinglai.

Near the entrance of the valley, in a wooded nook of the hills, stands the village of Bagh, inhabited by *Syads*. A stream of water runs through its shady groves of mulberry trees, and it is a favourite halting place for marauders when making raids on our territories. The Major-General and the Commissioner visited the *Syads* to call them to account, but on their pleading their real inability to refuse a shelter to the robbers, their village was not destroyed; a fine of one rupee a house was taken from them, with an injunction in future to give information of any raids that were contemplated.

The column, after reaching the top of the Daran pass, proceeded at once to the village of Chinglai, which was a large village and contained about 1,000 houses, very substantially built. Here resided Mobaraz Khan, who had a substantial little fort of wood and stone. No resistance, however, was attempted.

During the day it was observed that some of the village people with their property had endeavoured to secrete themselves in ravines on the mountain side, overlooking the village of Chinglai; and the 9th Punjab Infantry, under Captain J. B. Thelwall, was accordingly ordered to ascend the mountain by a circuitous route, with a view to cutting off their retreat into the Chamla valley; whilst a party of the 98th Regiment, under Captain L. S. Cotton, aide-de-camp to the Major-General, proceeded straight up the hill to dislodge them from their position. A few shots only were exchanged, and then the enemy hastily escaped, leaving several killed on the ground. During the day the troops were employed, under the direction of Captain H. Hyde, of the Engineers, in destroying the fort, village, and crops, and at night they bivouacked on a ridge near Chinglai.

*Expedition
against the
Khudu Khels
and Hindu-
stani fanatics
in 1858.*

On the 27th April, the force, having completed its work at Chinglai, returned to Salim Khan, not by the Daran pass through which it came, but through the heart of the country by Swawai and Panjtar, which enabled Lieutenant F. S. Taylor, of the Engineers, to survey the country through which the troops moved.

The direct road by which the column returned from Chinglai to Salim Khan proved to be about equal in length to the road *via* the Daran pass, but there can be no question but that the Daran route is the easier road for an army. From Salim Khan to Chinglai *via* Daran is an open plain, with one difficulty in it, *viz.*, the pass itself, which can soon be surmounted. From Salim Khan to Chinglai *via* Panjtar is chiefly through a broken country, winding amongst ups and downs of jungle and ravines, very embarrassing to a column, and at one point passing through a rocky defile called Tarali (the bed of the stream which flows under Panjtar), which would be very much more formidable than the Daran pass if disputed by the enemy.

Mukarrab Khan's horsemen and footmen were seen lurking about our line of march during the day, but apparently only in hopes of preying on stragglers from the force. Nothing, in fact, could more strongly mark the badness and unpopularity of the *Khan's* character than his total inability to work up his own clan to defend what had hitherto been considered a strong country.

When Major-General Cotton started on the 26th, the second column, as previously arranged, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Renny, had proceeded direct to Panjtar, with the double object of destroying that place, and of forming a reserve at Chinglai if necessary. When the first column arrived at Panjtar scarcely a vestige was left of the fine villages from which it took its name; so thoroughly had its demolition been completed by these troops, employed under the direction of Lieutenant J. T. Tovey, 24th Foot, Assistant Field Engineer.

Both Panjtar and Chinglai being now destroyed, the column returned to Salim Khan. It might have moved on at once to Sittana; but there was a stronghold in Mukarrab Khan's country, which he had made over to the *Syads* and Hindustanis, and to which he only resorted himself in the last extremity.

The name of this place was Mangal Thana. It stands on one of the chief spurs of the Mahaban mountain, and it was the head-quarters of Maulvi Inayat Ali Khan, who had so perseveringly endeavoured, at Narinji and other places, to raise Yusafzai in rebellion in 1857. This *maulvi* died about the beginning of April 1858, and his followers were said to have gone off from Mangal Thana to Sittana, to place themselves under another Hindustani *maulvi* there. But Mukarrab Khan's family and property were reported to have been removed for safety to the vacant fort of Maulvi Inayat Ali Khan at Mangal Thana; and to render the chastisement of the *Khan* more complete and memorable, it was determined to destroy this last remaining fastness.

By all accounts the road from Panjtar to Mangal Thana was practicable, though difficult. The Totalai people were our allies, and would show the troops the road. The troops were well suited to such an expedition, and the Major-General and the Commissioner, therefore, determined on the expediency of attacking this stronghold.

On the 28th April, the force was again divided into three columns as per margin; the first column to act against Mangal Thana, the second to proceed and halt at Panjtar as a support to the first column, and the third to remain in reserve at Salim Khan, and to protect the camp, which was left standing.

Expedition against the Khudu Khels and Hindustani fanatics in 1858.

1st Column.

Peshawar Light Field Battery, 2 guns.
Peshawar Mountain Train Battery, 2 guns.
81st Regiment, 200 bayonets.
Guide Cavalry, 50 sabres.
Sappers and Miners, 50 bayonets.
Kelat-i-Ghilzai Regiment, 400 bayonets.
Guide Infantry, 400 bayonets.
8th Punjab Infantry, 400 bayonets.
18th Punjab Infantry, 400 bayonets.

2nd Column.

98th Regiment, 200 bayonets.
Guide Cavalry, 250 sabres.
9th Punjab Infantry, 450 bayonets.

3rd Column.

Peshawar Light Field Battery, 2 guns.
7th Irregular Cavalry, 125 sabres.
18th Irregular Cavalry, 125 sabres.
21st Native Infantry.
Detachments of all corps over the regimental baggage.

a shot had been fired at the troops as they laboured up the steep and wooded road, and on entering Mangal Thana the fort was found abandoned, with every sign of a hasty and recent flight.

Mangal Thana consisted of two villages, upper and lower. The lower consisted of thirty or forty houses, and was occupied by *Syads*, who were peaceful and inoffensive. Upper Mangal Thana stood on a plateau in the midst of three crests, which were themselves out-works while held by the garrison, but as soon as carried by an enemy commanded the place. On this plateau stood, first, the fortified house of Inayat Ali Khan, with enclosures for Hindustani followers; secondly, the fortified residence of the *Syad* leader — Syad Abbas; and thirdly, Syad Abbas's citadel — a white masonry tower. The whole had about thirty or forty houses clustered round them. These fortifications had been laboriously constructed of large stones and fine timber, and the Hindustani fanatics and thieves who flocked around Syad Abbas must have lived there in great enjoyment and security, and it was easy to understand the prestige that surrounded them.

The advanced troops bivouacked at Mangal Thana for the night, the sappers being engaged all night, under Captain Hyde's instructions, in mining the buildings. At daylight on the 30th April, the troops being drawn off, the mines were fired, and when the dust and smoke cleared away, Mangal Thana existed no longer.

The site of Mangal Thana was probably between 5,000 and 6,000 feet above the level of the sea. The trees grew thickly, and the scenery about it was much like that of Murree.

On the 30th April, the whole of the troops at Mangal Thana, Dukara, and Panjtar returned to their camp at Salim Khan, and there halted on the 1st May.

It now only remained to deal with the colony of fanatics at Sittana, for which purpose the force, under the command of Major-General Cotton, proceeded towards Khabal, distant from Sittana about four miles, where it encamped on the morning of the 3rd May.

Between Amb, on the right bank of the Indus, which was the stronghold

*Expedition
against the
Khudu Khels
and Hindu-
stani fanatics
in 1858.*

Lieutenant-Colonel
Edwardes's report.

of our feudatory, Jehandad Khan, and our frontier village of Topi, lies a narrow strip of land on the bank of the river under the shadow of the spurs of Mahaban, which forms part of the Utmanzai territory.

It contains, in addition to the two or three small hamlets of Topi, the villages of Upper and Lower Khabal (exactly opposite Torbela), Upper and Lower Kai, and Sittana, Mandi and Upper Sittana.

At the beginning of April 1858, there were two leaders among the Syads of Sittana—Syad Umar, who kept a gang of thieves, and Syad Mubarak Shah, son of the late Syad Akbar of Swat. The Hindustanis had one or two *maulvis*, but none of any reputation.

It was at this time that the Syads of Sittana most unwisely began to press the Utmanzais of Kai and Khabal to pay them tithes. Not content with the church lands given them at Sittana, they must needs demand tithes from the laity.

The Utmanzais resisted, but were divided amongst themselves. Major Becher, the Deputy Commissioner of Hazara, encouraged them to unite against the *Syads*. The people of Kai and Khabal had been for two years under a blockade by us, on account of a murder they had committed. To get this blockade removed was a motive urging them to serve us and oppose the *Syads*. One day, therefore, when the *Syads* sent out their followers to cut the crops of the refractory laymen of Kai, the Utmanzais beat to arms and turned out; a battle royal ensued on the Sittana plain, and by singular good fortune Syad Umar was killed, and Syad Mubarak Shah was badly wounded in the foot. An irreparable breach was thus created between the monks of Sittana and the lords of the manor, and Major Becher, who had from the opposite bank been a spectator of the fight, seized the opportunity to remove our blockade and condone the past offences of the Utmanzais.

When, therefore, Sir Sydney Cotton's force appeared on the 3rd May at the independent village of Khabal, it was welcomed as an ally, though at no former period of our rule would it have been regarded otherwise than as an enemy.

By previous arrangements, Major J. R. Becher, the Deputy Commissioner of Hazara, moved down simultaneously to the left bank of the Indus with the troops as per margin, with a view to crossing the river so as to co-operate with the force under the com-

mand of Major-General Sir S. J. Cotton, in making a general attack on the enemy's villages at Sittana.

The Major-General having, on the evening of the 3rd May, reconnoitred the hills and villages of the enemy, determined the following morning to make the general attack. Major Becher, therefore, with his troops crossed the Indus early on the morning of the 4th, whilst the force under the command of Major-General Cotton marched out of its encampment at Khabal towards the enemy's position, thus coming upon him from the east and south simultaneously. The chief of Amb, Jehandad Khan, who was our ally, had occupied the hills northward of Upper Sittana, and by doing so completed the general co-operation.

As the force approached Lower Sittana, skirmishers from the regiments

Peshawar Mountain Train Battery, 2 guns.
Hazara Mountain Train Battery, 3 guns.
2nd Sikh Infantry, 300 bayonets.
6th Punjab Infantry, 450 bayonets.
12th " " 300 bayonets.

98th Regiment.
Guide Infantry.
9th Punjab Infantry.
18th " "

as per margin, were thrown forward against the enemy's position. At the same time, the 2nd Sikhs and the 6th Punjab Infantry were detached from Major Becher's column to move up the mountain

Expedition against the Khudu Khels and Hindustani fanatics in 1858.

which forms the rear defence of Sittana.

The 18th Punjab Infantry, under Lieutenant J. Williamson, supported by the 9th Punjab Infantry, under Captain J. B. Thelwall, having without opposition reached the crest of the mountain above Lower Sittana, and having moved northward along the same, and also on a pathway on the side of the mountain, in two divisions, first came in contact with the enemy, and drove them from the main position, which they desperately defended, with considerable loss. The 18th Punjab Infantry would then have carried the second position also, had not the fire of the 6th Punjab Infantry, under Lieutenant T. Quin, been already pouring into it; that regiment had ascended the northern spur of the range, thus taking the enemy's position in rear, and the 6th Punjab Infantry, following steadily up with the bayonet, drove the enemy out of this position towards the 18th Punjab Infantry, and a hand-to-hand struggle of several minutes ensued, till every Hindustani in the position was either killed or taken prisoner. The fanatics had Pathan allies from the neighbouring Gadun tribe, but their heart was not in the business, and they fled precipitately.

The fighting of the Hindustanis was strongly marked with fanaticism; they came boldly and doggedly on, going through all the preliminary attitudes of the Indian prize ring, but in perfect silence, without a shout or a word of any kind. All were dressed in their best for the occasion, mostly in white; but some of the leaders wore velvet cloaks.

The detachment of the 98th Regiment, the 2nd Sikh Infantry, and the Peshawar Mountain Train Battery, had also been employed against various positions of the enemy; and two guns of this battery did good service on the crest of the hill. The labour to both the mules and artillerymen had been very great, the loads having often to be carried by hand for fifty yards or more in the worst places.

Whilst these operations were going on, Upper Sittana was held by a wing of the 81st, under Lieutenant-Colonel H. Renny, and the Sappers and Miners, under Captain H. Hyde, were employed in destroying the village.

The position of the enemy having been carried at all points, and their villages destroyed, the Major-General determined to withdraw the troops. In the afternoon, the enemy, chiefly Pathans, rallied again upon another height; they had been joined by considerable numbers during the day, but the Major-General, in concert with the Commissioner, determined to adhere only to the object in hand, and not pursue the enemy further into the hills, where the troops would have come in collision with the Gadun and other independent tribes.

As the troops withdrew, the enemy followed up closely, but were kept in check by a detachment of the 98th Foot, the Guide Infantry, and two 5½-inch mortars. This was the first time that the Enfield had been used in the hills, and the fire of the men of the 98th, who were thus armed, was most effective, and evidently made a great impression both on the minds of the enemy as well as on those of the native chiefs who accompanied the force.

It was dusk before all the troops had descended the hill, and the force encamped for the night on the Sittana plain by the bank of the Indus.

Our losses are given in Appendix E. Those of the enemy were—Hindu-

Lieutenant-Colonel
Edwardes's report.

*Expedition
against the
Khudu Khels
and Hindu-
stani fanatics
in 1858.*

stanis fifty, Pathans ten, killed. The number of the wounded was not known, but the enemy acknowledged that they were numerous. Two Hindustanis were taken prisoners, one a native of Rampore, the other a Bengali, and they were summarily hanged at Sittana. On the 5th the force returned to Khabal.

The *Syads* and Hindustanis, expelled from Sittana by the Utmanzais, had taken refuge with the Upper Gaduns, and it was probable that on the force disappearing, the Gaduns would come down and compel the Utmanzais to re-admit the fanatics. Indeed, the Utmanzais besought Lieut.-Colonel Edwardes to take measures to prevent this, and a force was therefore sent to surround the Gadun villages of Gandap and Bisak, which are close to the Yusafzai border. The headmen came in at once, but declared their inability to coerce the Upper Gaduns, and they were therefore sent to them to say that, unless they agreed to our terms, coercive measures would be adopted; in proof of which a force of about 1,000 horse and foot was detached under Lieut.-Colonel W. E. Mulcaster, commanding 7th Irregular Cavalry, to our frontier village of Maini—a demonstration which took rapid effect; and on the night of the 8th May, the Upper and Lower Gaduns sent in their representatives, when they signed an agreement in full conclave of Utmanzais and Gaduns, by which both sides bound themselves to unite in expelling and keeping out the *Syads* and Hindustanis, and in resisting any third tribe which should endeavour to bring them back.

The objects for which the troops had taken the field being now fully accomplished, the force marched back to Nowshera, where it was broken up.

Major-General Sir Sydney Cotton, in his despatch, stated that the conduct and discipline of the whole of the troops in the field deserved his most unqualified admiration, and that he was deeply indebted to Lieutenant-Colonel H. B. Edwardes, C.B., the Commissioner of Peshawar, for his very able co-operation and advice. He also alluded to the excellent service performed by Major J. R. Becher, the Deputy Commissioner of Hazara, who commanded the Hazara column, and whose dispositions in the attack of Sittana contributed in no small degree to the success gained. The names of the other officers mentioned by Sir Sydney Cotton were—

Lieut.-Colonel H. Renny,	Commanding 1st Brigade.
Major A. T. Allan	2nd "
Lieutenant-Colonel W. E. Mulcaster,	Commanding Cavalry.
Captain T. Brougham,	Commanding Artillery.
Major F. Peyton	" Detachment H.M.'s 98th.
Captain W. B. Browne	" " 81st.
" S. Stallard	" Peshawar Light Field Battery.
" T. Pulman	" Mortar Detachment.
Lieutenant F. R. Butt	" Hazara Mountain Train Battery.
" J. E. Cordner	" Detachment Peshawar Mountain Train Battery.
Major W. H. Ryves	" Detachment 18th Irregular Cavalry.
" H. Milne	" Detachment 21st Regiment Native Infantry.
Lieutenant G. A. Brown	" " " "
Captain G. W. Harding	" 2nd Sikh Infantry.
Lieutenant G. C. Rowcroft	" Kelat-i Ghilzai Regiment.
" T. Quin	" 6th Punjab Infantry.

Lieutenant C. H. Brownlow, Commanding 8th Punjab Infantry.
 Captain J. B. Thelwall „ 9th Punjab Infantry.
 „ T. C. Blagrove „ 12th Punjab Infantry.
 Lieutenant J. Williamson „ 18th Punjab Infantry.
 „ T. G. Kennedy „ Corps of Guides.
 „ J. C. Lockwood „ Detachment Peshawar Light Horse.

Captain T. Wright, Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General.
 Lieutenant G. R. Greaves, Acting Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General.
 Captain W. Cooper, Deputy-Assistant Quarter-Master General.
 Lieutenant R. Whigham, Adjutant, Peshawar Light Horse.
 Captain L. B. Jones, Deputy-Judge Advocate.
 „ L. S. Cotton, Aide-de-Camp.
 „ F. Fane, Peshawar Light Horse.
 „ V. Tonnochy } Brigade Majors.
 „ E. J. Ellerman }
 Lieutenant E. Tierney, Staff Officer of Artillery.
 „ H. R. Osborn, Staff Officer of Cavalry.
 „ M. J. White, Staff Officer to Hazara Column.
 Captain H. Hyde, Commanding Sappers and Miners.
 Lieutenant J. T. Tovey, 24th Regiment, Assistant Field Engineer.
 „ W. Henderson, Bengal Engineers, Assistant Field Engineer.
 „ F. S. Taylor, Bengal Engineers, Assistant Field Engineer.
 Surgeon G. S. Mann, Field Surgeon.

In publishing the despatches, it was notified that the Governor-General fully appreciated the ability and judgment of Sir S. J. Cotton in the conduct of the expedition, and that it would afford His Lordship great satisfaction to bring to the favourable notice of the Home Authorities the eminent merits of the Major-General, and the excellent services of the officers and troops.

Great satisfaction at the judgment and vigour shown by Lieutenant-Colonel Edwardes and Major Becher was also expressed.

G. G. O. No. 812
of 1869.

S. J. Cotton.

The Indian medal with a clasp for the "North-West Frontier" was granted in 1869 to all survivors of the troops engaged in the above operations under Major-General Sir

APPENDIX A.

Table showing the relationships of the different branches of the Yusafzai Pathans.

MANDAN	{	Usmanzai	{	Kamalzai	{	Mishranzai.																																																
								{	Amazai	{	Daulatzai.																																														
															{	Alazai.	Kanazai.	Akazai.	Saduzai	{	Aba Khel.																																					
																								{	Razar	{	Ako Khel.																															
																														{	Malikzai.	Khidrzai.	Mamuzai.	Manizai.	{	Umar Khel.																								
																																					{	Hassanzai.	Akazai.	Mada Khel.	{	Mir Ahmad Khel.																		
																																											{	Salarzai	{	Bihzad Khel.												
																																																	{	Gadaizai	{	Khudu Khel.						
																																																							{	Iliaszai	{	Mali Khel.
{	Nasozai	{	Ibrahim Khel.																																																							
						{	Hassan Khel.	Ali Sher Khel.	Seni Khel.	{	Khadin Khel.																																																	
												{	Aya Khel.	Musara Khel.	Khakizai.	{	Panjpan.																																											
																		{	Daulatzai	{	Makhozai.																																					
																								{	Chagarzai	{	Ismailzai.																															
																														{	Nurazai	{	Mandizai.																									
																																				{	Baizai	{	Barkazai.																			
																																										{	Akozai	{	Nasrat Khel.													
																																																{	Ranizai	{	Ferozai.							
																																																						{	Khadakzai	Abazai	{	Basi Khel.		
{	Khwazozai	{	Panjpan.																																																							
						{	Ali Khel.	Utmanzai.	Khwazo Khel.	Bahram Khan Khel.	Usman Khel.																																																Sultan Khan Khel.	
												{	Adinzai.	Shamuzai.	Nikpi Khel.																																													

APPENDIX B.

Return of Killed and Wounded in the operations against Naringi, on the 21st July 1857, under MAJOR J. L. VAUGHAN.

Corps.	Killed.					Wounded.					Remarks.
	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	
4th Punjab Infantry	1	2	3	3	5	8	One horse belonging to 2nd Punjab Cavalry was killed, and one mule belonging to the Peshawar Mountain Train Battery was wounded.
5th " "	2	2	...	1	...	12	13	
Total	1	4	5	...	1	3	17	21	

ABSTRACT.

Killed	5
Wounded	21
Total	26

APPENDIX C.

Return of Killed and Wounded in the operations against Naringi, on the 3rd August 1857, under MAJOR J. L. VAUGHAN.

Corps.	Killed.					Wounded.					Remarks.
	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	
5th Punjab Infantry	5	5	
6th " "	1	1	1	1	
16th " "	2	2	
Total	1	1	8	8	

ABSTRACT.

Killed	1
Wounded *	8
Total	9

APPENDIX D.*Sittana Field Force, 1858.*

Major-General Sir Sydney J. Cotton, K.C.B., Commanding.

Staff.

Captain T. Wright, Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General.

Lieutenant G. R. Greaves, Acting Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General.

Captain W. Cooper, Deputy-Assistant Quarter-Master General.

„ L. B. Jones, Deputy-Judge Advocate.

„ L. S. Cotton, Aide-de-Camp.

„ H. Hyde, Bengal Engineers, Field Engineer.

Lieutenant W. Henderson, Bengal Engineers, Assistant Field Engineer.

„ F. S. Taylor, Bengal Engineers, „ „ „

„ J. T. Tovey, 24th Foot, „ „ „

Artillery.

Captain T. Brougham, Commanding.

Lieutenant E. Tierney, Staff Officer.

Cavalry.

Lieutenant-Colonel W. E. Mulcaster, Commanding.

„ H. R. Osborn, Staff Officer.

1st Infantry Brigade.

Lieut.-Colonel H. Renny, Commanding.

Captain V. Tonnochy, Brigade Major.

2nd Infantry Brigade.

Major A. T. Allan, Commanding.

Captain E. J. Ellerman, Brigade Major.

Hazara Column.


Major J. R. Becher, Commanding.

Lieutenant M. J. White, 12th Punjab Infantry, Staff Officer.

M A P
OF
PART OF THE PESHAWAR AND HAZARA BORDERS
to illustrate
THE MILITARY OPERATIONS
against
THE HINDUSTANI FANATICS
AND
CERTAIN REFRACTORY VILLAGES


in 1853, 1857, 1858 and 1863-64

Scale 1 Inch = 4 Miles.




REFERENCES.

PLACES NAMED IN ACCOUNT OF	{	Operations, 1858	
		" 1863-64	
ROUTES TAKEN BY COLUMNS IN	{	Operations, 1858	
		" 1863-64	
ACTIONS	{	Operations, 1853	
		" 1857	
		" 1858	
		" 1863-64	



S K E T C H
 of
 B R I T I S H P O S I T I O N
 above
 P A N J D A R A O R A M B E L A P A S S


Scale 1 Inch to the Mile.



REFERENCE.

Village Site.....○

Route.....~~~~~



Lithographed at the Survey of India Offices Calcutta, November 1883.

From an Original Drawing by Colonel H. C. Johnstone, Revenue Surveyor, N. W. Frontier.

APPENDIX E.

*Return of Killed and Wounded among the troops under the command of
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR SYDNEY COTTON, K.C.B., in the action of
Sittana on the 4th of May 1858.*

Corps.	Killed.					Wounded.					Remarks.
	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	
21st Native Infantry	1	1	*Lieutenant T. E. Vander Gucht.
6th Punjab Infantry	1	1	5	5	
9th " "	1	1	...	1	...	6	7	
18th " "	1	...	3	4	*1	15	16	
Total	1	...	5	6	1	1	...	27	29	

ABSTRACT.

Killed	6
Wounded	29
Total	35

CHAPTER V.

HAZARA AND PESHAWAR BORDERS.

YUSAFZAI AND GADUN TRIBES—(*continued*).

Expedition against the Hindustani fanatics (known as the Ambela expedition) by a force under Brigadier-General Sir Neville B. Chamberlain, K.C.B. (and subsequently under Major-General J. Garvock), 1863.

*Events which
led to the
Ambela expe-
dition of 1863.*

AFTER the engagements taken from the Gadun and Utmanzai tribes (mentioned in the previous chapter) not to allow the Hindustani fanatics to reoccupy Sittana, they settled at Malka, on the north side of the Mahaban mountain. But in 1861 they came down to a place named Siri, just overhanging their old haunt at Sittana, and commenced sending robbers into Hazara to carry off Hindu traders. The offence of the Gaduns was that, in contravention of their agreement, they allowed free passage to the Hindustanis through their territory when proceeding on and returning from their kidnapping and marauding expeditions.

The nature of these outrages is thus described by Lieut.-Colonel R. G. Taylor, the Commissioner of Peshawar: "A trader loads his mules at one of our chief towns, and starts across country (though there have been extreme cases of the offence taking place on the highroad) to a village he hopes to reach by nightfall. On the road, in some lonely spot, he is seized, gagged, and taken aside into the jungle or some mountain nook, and there kept close under drawn swords till dark, when the whole party starts by well-known, but unfrequented, tracks to the mountainous river bank, where he is ferried across the Indus, and is detained till his relations pay up the required ransom. His chief danger lies in the day dawning, or other obstruction occurring, before the kidnapping party reach the Indus, in which case the encumbrance, in the shape of a gagged idolator, must be got rid of. They might, perhaps, let him go if they could afford it, but the locality and route would be described by him, and individuals perhaps recognised, and so he is knocked on the head, and thrown into a mountain crevice."

Of the difficulties of exercising any preventive measures against these acts, the Commissioner observed that, "From the nature of the country it has been found impossible to deal with these acts merely by protective police arrangements. The actors are bold men, and actuated by a thirst for money for the actual needs of life, sharpened by hostility to us; while it would take the whole of the Hazara force one day to search one mountain, and at the end they would be quite knocked up and useless. What, then, could be hoped from a limited body of police in a tract of country containing a constant succession of such mountains? These are crimes which nothing but pressure on

the head and source of the offence can check. The men who send out these brigands, and those who harbour and give them passage through their lands, must be reached and made to suffer, and then, and then alone, will the activity of their emissaries be checked." *Events which led to the Ambela expedition of 1863.*

In order to bring them to a sense of their responsibilities, the Utmanzais and Gaduns were accordingly placed under blockade, and on the 2nd October 1861 they came in and made their submission, and consented to enter into fresh engagements to exclude the *Syads* and Hindustanis.

During the autumn of 1862, and ensuing cold season, there was a considerable immunity from these kidnapping practices; but in the spring of 1863 two murders were committed, which were generally attributed to Mubarak Shah's men, and on the 5th July it was reported that the *Syads* and Hindustanis had suddenly reoccupied Sittana. No attempt to prevent their doing so was made by the Gadun or Utmanzai tribe, and some of their members actually invited them. These tribes, being called upon for their reasons for having thus broken the engagements they had entered into, only afforded evasive replies; the Gaduns laying the blame on the Utmanzais, and the Utmanzais on the Gaduns; and as the *Syads* and Hindustanis were sending threatening messages to our feudatory, the chief of Amb, a blockade of the Gadun and Utmanzai tribes was again imposed, and militia were entertained for the defence of the territory of the Amb chief.

After the expedition to Sittana in 1858, a somewhat remarkable man, named Amir Shah, who had for years been the chief counsellor of Syad Akbar, the late king of Swat, waited on Lieut.-Colonel H. B. Edwardes, who was then the Commissioner, and solicited that some employment should be given to the remaining *Syads* and Hindustanis. If a *jagir* could be given to Mubarak Shah, the son of the late Syad Akbar, "he and his people could come in and settle peaceably within the British dominions." Lieut.-Colonel Edwardes told him that it was impossible to bestow lands on *Syads* as *Syads*, but if Mubarak Shah would take military service, he should have it. This had, however, been already discussed between them, and Mubarak Shah had instructed Amir Shah to decline such an offer on his own part, but to accept it for his uncle, Syad Amran, and about 60 horsemen, for whom there was no longer any means of subsistence. Considering the advantage of absorbing these elements of trouble, the Commissioner offered them service to the extent of one troop.

On the reduction of the troops, this party was disbanded, and about this time (July 1863) Colonel R. G. Taylor, C.B., the Commissioner, heard that they had returned to Sittana.

The dispositions for the blockade were as follows:—

Shergarh	On the Hassanzai border of the Amb territory } held by Amb troops ...	Left bank of Indus.
Shunglai		
Chamberi		
Chamba		
Darband	50 Police and mounted levies ... 100 Foot levies ...	Ditto.
Kirpilian	Hazara Mountain Train Battery 50 sabres, 5th Punjab Cavalry... 1st Punjab Infantry ...	Ditto.
Naogiran	50 Police over the boats ... 85 Foot levies ...	
Tawi		
Khanpur	37 Police and levies ...	Ditto.
Torbela	55 Levies ...	
Dalmohat	One company, 5th Gurkhas ... 20 Police over the boats ...	

Events which
led to the
Ambela expe-
dition of 1863.

Amb	{	100 Amb mounted levies	} Right bank.
		300 Amb foot levies	
		135 Hazara levies	
Topi	{	150 Cavalry of the Guides	} Ditto.
		300 Infantry of the Guides	
Swabi Manairi ...	{	2 9-Pounders from Kohat	} Ditto.
		Head-Quarters of the Guides	

The 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers were also ordered to Hazara.

The *Syads* and Maulvi Abdulla were now acting with their Hindustani followers in the bitterest spirit against the British Government; the leaders of the colony expressly declared they were embarked in determined opposition to the infidel, and called upon all good Muhammadans to quit the friendship of the unbelieving, and join the would-be martyrs of the faith. A letter to this effect was sent to the chief of Amb.

On the night of the 3rd September, Maulvi Abdulla, with his Hindustanis, and accompanied, it was said, by Malik Esau, Gadun, attempted to attack the camp of the Guides at Topi. The attacking force had arrived within a short distance of the camp, when they came upon a cavalry patrol of one duffadar and four sowars, of the Guide Corps. The duffadar had been previously warned of the neighbourhood of a body of men, and on coming on an advanced party he immediately attacked them. Two men were cut down, and the rest, rushing back on the main body, communicated a panic, which ended in a general and disgraceful flight. The Hindustanis then erected a breastwork on the right bank of the Indus, from which they continued to annoy the picquet held by the levies at Naogiran.

About the middle of September, the Hassanzai tribe, instigated, it was supposed, by the *Maulvi* of Sittana, made an unprovoked attack on the hamlets in the little Shunglai valley of the Black Mountain, in which the most advanced outpost of the Amb territory is situated. The fort was not molested, but some six or seven hamlets were destroyed, and one man, who resisted, was killed.

The Hassanzais then threatened an attack on Chamberi, and a portion of the Mada Khels crossed the Indus with the intention of assisting; but the frontier line having been greatly strengthened by the Amb authorities, the gathering broke up, and the Mada Khels recrossed the river. Shortly afterwards, the Hassanzais made an attack on the Amb levies on the Black Mountain border, in which one jemadar and seven men were killed, and several of the levies wounded.

It was now considered that the time had arrived when it became absolutely necessary to have recourse to military operations. Hitherto the hostilities and provocations had been offered by detached tribes, but now, for the first time, the majority, if not the whole of the Hazara border tribes, were arrayed against the British Government. In the opinion of the Lieutenant-Governor, it was perhaps possible, though very doubtful, to avert a campaign by making use of the feuds and factions of the different tribes to sow discord in their councils; but this could only put off the day of reckoning a little further. Delay, which with these tribes is little understood, might encourage other tribes to action, and a favourable opportunity might thus be lost for putting an end to the chronic frontier irritation which existed. That an expedition against these tribes would be forced on the British Government sooner or later appeared inevitable, and condonation without chastisement would only be an inducement for them to repeat their offences.

Despatch from the
Punjab Government

An expedition was accordingly sanctioned by the Supreme Government, the first object of which was to effectually rid the frontier of the chronic cause of disturbance,—the Hindustani fanatics. Their mere expulsion from the right bank of the Indus back upon their old posts at Malka and on the south bank of the Barandu, was not considered enough; nor was it thought advisable that they should find shelter in Swat, and make that powerful tribe the future focus of disturbance on the frontier. If possible, the line of retreat of the fanatics towards the Barandu was to be cut off; and although their extirpation might not be possible, yet their dispersion would be on lines of direction favourable to their capture, if the co-operation of the well-disposed sections of the tribes could be obtained. The punishment of the Gaduns was to be a secondary consideration to the primary one of crushing effectually the small, but troublesome, horde of fanatics.

Ambela expedition, 1863.

With regard to the plan of operations. In a memorandum drawn up by Lieut.-Colonel A. T. Wilde, C.B., commanding the Corps of Guides, it was stated that the expedition of 1858, although successful, had not been conclusive as to its results. The Gadun tribe had not felt the power of the British Government; and although the Hindustanis had been turned out of Mangal Thana and driven from Sittana, they had retreated on Malka, more from the pressure put upon them by the Gadun tribe than from the defeats they had sustained from our troops. For the future peace of the border, Lieut.-Colonel Wilde said the destruction of this colony of priests and fanatics was a necessity, and that they must be removed by death or capture from the hills, and a treaty made with the hill tribes not to allow them to reside in their territories. He considered that the plan of campaign would have to be totally different in its nature from that pursued in 1858. The force to be employed would have to be a strong one, and it would be necessary to occupy temporarily the country to the north of the Mahaban; the military object in view being to attack the Hindustanis from the north, and force them to fight with their backs to the plains: operating, in fact, on their line of retreat, instead of, as before, advancing from the plains, driving them out of Mangal Thana and Sittana, and allowing them a safe retreat and passage into the hills. To effect this, two columns were to be employed, the base of operations of one column being in the Peshawar valley, and that of the other in Hazara.

The Peshawar column was to be assembled at Nawakila and Swabi Manairi, with the avowed object, as in 1858, of moving on Mangal Thana (which would be naturally expected); but, when ready to march, the column was to pass through the Ambela defile (or more properly, the Surkhawai pass) and occupy the village of Kogah, in the Chamla valley, thirteen miles by a camel road chiefly over our own land, and stated then to be "easy in the extreme". The next day the force was to march to Cherorai, sixteen miles, an open plain near the river Barandu, when, simultaneous with the occupation of Cherorai, the Hazara column was to drop down the Indus and drive the enemy out of Sittana, occupying that place; the Peshawar column moving on the third day to Malka.

No hostilities were anticipated from the Bunerwals, as they had no sympathy as a body with the fanatics, holding different tenets, and forming part of the religious constituency of the *Akhund* of Swat, who was known to be bitterly opposed at that time to the Hindustani party, the members of which he denounced as *Wahabis*, coupling them with his special rival, the Kota Mulla, whom, with his disciples, he had not scrupled to stigmatise as *kafirs*, for certain heterodox theories opposed

Colonel R. G.
Taylor's report.

Ambela expedition, 1863.

to his (the *Akhund's*) rulings in matters affecting the Muhammadan faith. The Buner tribe had always been peaceable, and for fifteen years had never given us any trouble : they were known as great traders, and that was nearly all that was known of them ; for their leaders and headmen had come so little in contact with us that neither did we know them, nor did they know us except by common report. Secrecy regarding the line of proposed operations was of the utmost importance, and it was under the circumstances, impossible to examine the route by questioning those in our own territory best acquainted with it, without raising suspicions as to the line it was intended to take on entering the hills ; and for the same reason it was not advisable to consult the Buner *jirga*, nor to consult the chiefs of the Sadum valley, Ajab Khan and Aziz Khan, the men who knew most about the tribe and the Chamla valley.

With regard to the Chamla valley, it was known to be inhabited by mixed clans, some of them settlers from our own Yusafzai plains, some from Buner, others belonging to the Khudu Khel tribe, who were known to be desirous of remaining friendly with us ; the rest being Amazais, who were in some measure implicated as enemies, from the fact of the Hindustani colony at Malka being in their territory. The valley was not claimed by, or considered as under, the protection of any large clan, and it was known to be divided from Buner by a lofty range of mountains called the Guru.

Of its advantages as a military position, Colonel R. G. Taylor, the Commissioner of Peshawar, said a force would be here able to take its stand in open ground, in rear of the whole of the enemy's tract, which it would fully command, and from which, by rapid excursions, it would be able to do all its work and deal with all difficulties, returning, when convenient, to its standing camp ; such a position would render the tribes on the southern slopes of the Mahaban mountain well-nigh powerless, as they would be surrounded, and would be at the mercy of an army which could descend upon their strongholds, and carry out its ends with irresistible advantage.

Brigadier-General Sir Neville B. Chamberlain, commanding the Punjab Irregular Force, who had been selected by the Commander-in-Chief for the command of the expedition, decided upon adopting this plan of operations, with the exception that the Hazara column was not to take any active part in the movements against the Hindustanis, but simply to remain stationary at Darband, with the sole object of overawing the Hassanzais and other tribes on both banks of the Indus, and protecting the Hazara frontier from attack ; the active operations against Sittana being confined entirely to the column under his personal command.

The following troops were to hold the line of the Indus, Hazara, and Yusafzai :—

Darband	...	{ 3 Guns. 350 European infantry (51st Regiment). 250 Native infantry.
Torbela	...	{ One squadron of native cavalry. Details of native infantry.
Topi	...	{ 2 Guns. 150 Native cavalry. 250 Native infantry.
Abbottabad	...	{ 3 Guns. One company of European infantry (93rd Highlanders). 50 Native cavalry. Depots of two regiments of native infantry.

Rustam Bazar { 300 Native cavalry.
 Details of native infantry.
 Mardan ...Depôt of the Guide Corps.

Ambela expedition, 1863.

To form the expeditionary force, all the northern stations had been considerably weakened, and there was no reserve nearer than Lahore.

On the 13th October, Brigadier-General Sir Neville Chamberlain arrived at Swabi, the place at which it had been arranged that the troops proceeding from Hazara were to assemble; but, owing to the insufficient number of boats available for the passage of the Indus opposite Topi, the troops were delayed in crossing, and it was advisable, therefore, to delay proportionately the arrival at the rendezvous at Nawakila (ten miles north-west of Swabi) of the troops proceeding *via* Nowshera. If the force had been allowed to assemble at Nawakila, it would have been necessary to supply the troops from the commissariat stores collected there for the expedition; whereas, by keeping them in the rear, they were supplied from villages in the neighbourhood of their camps. However, this delay did not defer the commencement of operations, as neither the commissariat nor the ordnance arrangements were then completed.

On the 18th October the troops, as per margin, marched to the mouth of the Daran pass. This is the pass by which the force under Major-General Sir S. J. Cotton entered the hills in 1858; and by this movement the impression was, of course, conveyed that the force was about to enter the hills by the same route as before. The other troops of the expeditionary force moved up at the same time to Nawakila from their camps in the rear.

On the afternoon of the 19th, when it was too late for the Chamla or other tribes to make any preparations on a large scale for impeding the march of the troops through the Ambela pass, a proclamation was forwarded by the Commissioner to the Chamla, Khudu Khel, Gadun, Amazai, Mada Khel, and Buner tribes (*See* Appendix H), stating the object for which the force was about to enter the Chamla valley, and assuring them that it was with no intention of injuring them or of interfering with their independence, but solely because it was the most convenient route by which to reach the Hindustani fanatics, and to effect their expulsion from the Mahaban.

At 9 P.M., on the 19th October, the troops marginally noted, marching from Nawakila, effected a junction at Parmali with the troops which had been sent on before to the mouth of the Daran pass, and the united detachments, under Lieutenant-Colonel A. T. Wilde, C.B., moved upon the Surkhawai or Ambela pass (*see* Map, p. 100).

This column was accompanied by Colonel R. G. Taylor, C.B., the Commissioner. It entered the pass at sunrise, and the *maliks* of our own village of Surkhawai, situated inside the mouth of the pass, were taken on by the Commissioner. They told him that the advance was then easy, but that opposition would certainly be shown in the pass the following day.

The column halted for an hour just within the pass, to rest the men who had been marching across country during the whole night. About 9 A.M., the baggage being left at the entrance of the pass, under an escort of the 11th Bengal Cavalry, the troops advanced, the Guide Infantry and the 1st Punjab Infantry leading, supported,

Brigadier-General
 Chamberlain's
 despatch.

Peshawar Mountain
 Train Battery.
 Hazara Mountain
 Train Battery.
 1st Punjab Infantry.
 5th Gurkha Regt.

100 sabres, Guide
 Cavalry.
 100 sabres, 11th
 Bengal Cavalry.
 Guide Infantry
 5th Punjab Infantry.
 20th (Punjab)
 Native Infantry.

Colonel R. G.
 Taylor's report.

Lieut.-Colonel
 Wilde's despatch.

Ambela expedition, 1863.

respectively, by the 20th Punjab Native Infantry and the 5th Punjab Infantry. The 5th Gurkhas remained as an escort to the two mountain batteries.

About one-third of the pass had been traversed, when information was received that the advance would be opposed. Reports brought down by cattle graziers differed as to the numbers of the enemy, and the thickly wooded nature of the country rendered it difficult to ascertain what points of the hills were occupied, but it was said that the head of the pass was held by the people of Buner.

At 12 o'clock the enemy commenced firing from the rocks in the vicinity of the road, but were gradually dislodged by the advanced guard of the column; in this manner two-thirds of the pass was traversed, when the end of the defile, called the Ambela Kandao, appeared in sight. The hills on both sides were high, covered with low brushwood and jutting rocks, but perfectly practicable for good light troops. On many of the most prominent rocks small parties of the enemy showed themselves, and fired occasional shots.

The infantry of the Corps of Guides, under Lieutenant F. H. Jenkins, were directed to take the crest of the hills to the right, and the 1st Punjab Infantry, under Major C. P. Keyes, to move up the valley slowly; and it was left to Major Keyes to act as his judgment directed. Lieutenant-Colonel J. L. Vaughan with his regiment, the 5th Punjab Infantry, protected the flank of the column, which some parties of the enemy threatened. By 2 P.M. the top of the pass was secured. Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde stated that Major Keyes and Lieutenant Jenkins had displayed both skill and knowledge of hill warfare in the management of their corps.

The number of the enemy was estimated at from 200 to 250 men, and their loss amounted to two killed and three wounded, besides one captured. On the side of the troops there were no casualties. Sir Neville Chamberlain considered that the duty was satisfactorily performed, and that credit was due to Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde and to the officers and troops employed under his orders.

Half C Battery, 19th Brigade, R.A.
71st Highland Light Infantry (550).
101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers (500).
Company of Sappers and Miners.
3rd Punjab Infantry.
6th Ditto.
32nd Punjab Native Infantry (Pioneers).

The main column, composed of the troops as per margin, marched from Nawakila at 1 A.M. on the 20th October, and reached Rustam at 7 A.M. The road was a mere village track, and as any attempt to improve it earlier would have revealed our intended route, it had only received such repairs as the sappers could hastily give it. Late in the afternoon of the 19th, when concealment was no longer necessary or practicable, the civil authorities aided in removing obstructions by employing large parties of villagers, who worked at the road by torchlight, and a line of fires marked the route by which the troops were advancing.

The main column halted for a short time at Rustam for the troops to rest and get breakfast, and the opportunity was taken of selecting the best available position for the depot of sick and weakly men, etc., to be left at that place. At about 9 A.M. the troops were again in motion. As far as the village of Surkhawai the track was tolerably good, and lay through small open valleys; but at a little distance from Surkhawai the pass itself commences. In regard to the Ambela pass, Brigadier-General Chamberlain said: "As a road for troops, it certainly presents great difficulties. The

track lies up the bed of a stream, encumbered with boulders and large masses of rock, and is overgrown with low trees and jungle. The hills on either side rise to some height, but for the most part with a gradual slope, so that infantry can ascend them without difficulty, except for the obstacle presented by thick, thorny jungle." The guns were drawn by horses as far as possible, and then transferred to elephants. The progress of the force was, of course, extremely slow, as in most parts it was only practicable to move in single file. The British troops were much fatigued; but the plentiful stream of water which flowed through the pass prevented their suffering from thirst, and late in the afternoon the rear of Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde's column was reached. *Ambela expedition, 1863.*

Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde's force had not been strong enough to post flanking parties at more than a few of the most important points in the pass. Detachments were, therefore, posted from the main column wherever it seemed necessary, and the entire 5th Gurkha Regiment, which had advanced with the main body, was left about three-quarters of a mile from the crest of the pass in a commanding situation, where it served as a support to the small flanking parties, and also protected the baggage. The 32nd Punjab Native Infantry formed the rear-guard, but did not get beyond Surkhawai on the night of the 20th.

Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde had encamped the advanced column, on and beyond the crest of the pass, on tolerably open and level ground, which afforded sufficient room for the main column also to bivouac as it came up; but it was 10 P.M. before the guns reached camp. The whole of the cavalry had been sent on with the advanced column, under the idea that the pass was much easier and shorter than it proved to be, in view to pushing them forward, supported by some infantry and mountain guns, to reconnoitre the road down the pass and the head of the Chamla valley. But when it was found what difficulties the pass presented even to the march of the troops, and how long it would necessarily be before the whole of the baggage could come up, it was thought prudent to make no further movement in advance. The ammunition mules of the infantry had with difficulty been able to keep up with the rear of their respective regiments, but with this exception not a single baggage animal reached the camp during the night of the 20th.

The position which the troops occupied on that night is thus described by Brigadier-General Chamberlain (*see accompanying sketch*). "On the left the position was enclosed by the Guru mountain, which divides the Ambela pass from Buner. This mountain, which is estimated roughly to be 6,000 feet, rises in a succession of ridges, steep but not precipitous, running, generally, parallel to the pass; occasional plateaux and knolls are found on its sides, which afforded convenient and safe situations for our picquets; and about 1,000 feet above the camp was a very remarkable heap of enormous granite rocks, which formed a conspicuous object from the entrance and throughout the pass, and marked the point at which the crest or water-shed is reached, which separates Yusafzai from Chamla. The sides of the Guru mountain were clothed with fir trees of large growth, interspersed on the lower slopes with the wild fig and the date tree: a remarkable mixture of the vegetation of a cold and of a tropical climate. To the front of the camp the pass widened as it descended, and opened out into little plateaux, which at last met the plain of Chamla. The latter was distant about three miles from the camp, and had the appearance of being well cultivated, with a stream flowing through the middle of it, the head of which gave water to the camp. A range of hills, much lower than the Guru, was on the right, and

Ambela expedition, 1863.

was crowned by our picquets. To the rear, but far below, was seen the plain of Yusafzai."

One of the *maliks* of Ambela had been made prisoner while opposing the advance of Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde's column. From him it was ascertained that the slight opposition met with in the pass was made by the people of his own village (situated at the mouth of the pass in the Chamla valley, and therefore belonging geographically to Chamla, but paying tribute to one of the Buner tribes), and by a few of the Chamla villagers. He was sent to his people by the Commissioner, together with a wounded man, and they were allowed to take away the bodies of their men who had been killed. The *malik* was charged with a verbal message corresponding with the terms of the proclamation, and informing the Chamla people that if they would bring supplies they would be liberally paid for.

Up to the evening of the 21st, but a small portion of the baggage had reached the camp, partly in consequence of the difficulties of the road, and partly from the inferior nature of much of the carriage and the incompetence of the drivers. The road in many places was overgrown with brushwood and overhung with trees, which proved a serious cause of detention to the baggage. Time had not sufficed, after the assembly of the troops, for the arrangement of all details, such as the careful distribution of loads according to the strength and efficiency of the cattle. The large amount of mule and pony carriage necessary had naturally resulted in the presence of a good many animals very little fitted for their work. Loads were knocked off, or thrown by cattle unfit to take them up again, and this, of course, choked the line. It was further necessary, as night fell, to push on certain stores for the use of the Europeans; this effort increased the already existing difficulties in narrow passages, and the result was a stoppage of the whole line, which was not easily set in motion again.

The Buner *malik*, who had been allowed to go back to his village the day before, returned in the morning to the camp with the *maliks* of Ambela and Kogah, with fowls, etc., and professions of a full intention to assist the force; and in this manner the *maliks* of all the principal villages of the Chamla valley came in, bringing offerings; but all these friendly symptoms subsequently received a check when Buner threw itself into opposition.

It has already been stated that on the 19th a proclamation had been sent to the Buner tribes with others; to this a reply was this day received by the Commissioner from the two chief *maliks*, saying that the force was at liberty to follow its own enemies, and that the Buner people would only be prepared to defend their own country should it be attacked; in return, an agent was sent to them by Colonel R. G. Taylor to fully explain our intentions.

On the morning of the 22nd, the rear-guard being then at no great distance from the camp, it was considered that the preliminary steps might be taken for moving the force forward. Accordingly, in the forenoon, a detachment of sappers (details of the 4th and 5th Companies) was set to work to improve the descent of the pass. The road was fair, and the pass, about two miles in length, was unoccupied by the enemy. The sappers were supported by the 20th Punjab Native Infantry, under Major C. H. Brownlow, and, as

* Guide Cavalry,
50 sabres.
11th Bengal Cavalry, 100 sabres.

soon as the road was reported tolerably good, were followed by the cavalry* under Lieutenant-Colonel D. M. Probyn, V.C., C.B. The sappers were then sent back to camp, and the cavalry proceeded to reconnoitre, supported by the 20th

Punjab Infantry, which occupied the gorge of the pass, the reconnaissance being conducted by Lieutenant-Colonel A. Taylor, C.B., Royal Engineers, accompanied by Lieutenant R. G. Sandeman, Assistant Commissioner, with whom were the Sadum *Khans*. *Ambela expedition, 1863.*

The information which had been received in camp was to the effect that a considerable body of the Buner tribe were occupying the pass which leads from Chamla into Buner from near Ambela, but that their intentions towards us were peaceable; and, as already narrated, Colonel R. G. Taylor, the Commissioner, had been in communication with them, when they had avowed their intention of merely acting on the defensive, and of opposing us only in the event of our attempting to enter the Buner country. Sir Neville Chamberlain, being most desirous that no cause of offence, or even of suspicion, should be given to the Buner people, had instructed Lieutenant-Colonel A. Taylor to act with the greatest circumspection.

From the foot of the pass there were two roads through the Chamla valley: one passed by the village of Ambela, and lay under the hills which divided Chamla from Buner on the north side of the valley; the other road was by Kogah and along the south side of the valley; and as Ambela, though actually in Chamla, was regarded by the Buner people as one of their own villages, the orders to Lieutenant-Colonel A. Taylor were to proceed by the Kogah route, to guard in every possible way against giving offence to the Buner people, and to prove to them our desire to hold entirely aloof from them and their country.

As the cavalry passed the *Kotal* leading into Buner, which was on their left, distant about two and a half miles, it was seen that it was occupied in force by the Bunerwals; but from all that could be learned, none had descended into the valley.

Lieut.-Colonel
A. Taylor's report.

On arrival at Kogah (four miles from camp), the reports that the valley was quite unoccupied were confirmed, and it was considered by Lieutenant-Colonel A. Taylor desirable to take advantage of such a favourable state of affairs to push down the valley as far as was compatible with the Brigadier-General's order to be in camp by sunset. Leaving the main body of the cavalry at Kogah, Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor accordingly proceeded with a small escort to Kuria (seven miles beyond Kogah), and reached Kogah again about 4.30 P.M.

From Ambela to Kuria the surface of the valley was level, free from obstructions, and quite practicable for field artillery. The *nullah* banks were all low, water was abundant, and the land highly cultivated. Fuel, however, had to be supplied from the hills, as there was no jungle in the valley. Beyond Kuria the country was rugged and difficult.

On arrival at the foot of the Ambela pass, it was found that the Bunerwals had been, and were still, descending in considerable numbers, with the view of preventing the return of the reconnoitring party. They attempted to gain possession of a patch of very broken ground at the extreme end of the valley through which the road lay. It was necessary to prevent this, and to check them until Major Brownlow could come up in support; with this view the cavalry charged in the most spirited way, and sabred six of the enemy. Major Brownlow then occupied the broken ground with two companies, and the cavalry, under a small escort of infantry, returned to camp.

The rear-guard duties now devolved on Major Brownlow. Emboldened by the continued retreat of the party, the enemy recovered from the effects of

Ambela expedition, 1863.

the cavalry charge, and, by the time the pass was fairly entered, had assembled in great numbers, and had surrounded a picquet under Lieutenant G. M. Richmond on the north side of the pass, which it took some time to withdraw. By this time daylight had quite gone, and the remainder of the retirement was effected in dim moonlight. The enemy pressed Major Brownlow very closely, and several times came in amongst his men sword in hand. Eventually, as the troops drew into camp, the picquets became engaged, and there was a general attack upon them in the front and on the flanks of the camp, which continued at intervals until midnight; but the enemy were repulsed with but trifling loss to the troops (*see* Appendix C), Lieutenant W. A. B. Gillies, R.A., of the Hazara Mountain Train Battery, being, however, amongst the killed.

The nature of the ground, which was very broken and covered with brushwood, enabled the enemy to carry off most of their dead during the hours of darkness; but eight of their bodies were taken up in the morning, and from the reports of spies, it appeared that about fifty of them had been killed, amongst these being some people of influence.

Sir Neville Chamberlain considered that in covering the retirement of the cavalry, the 20th Punjab Native Infantry had behaved with great steadiness, and that Major Brownlow's conduct was most praiseworthy; that Lieutenant Richmond had exhibited great gallantry; and that Lieutenant J. Browne, Royal Engineers, who had joined the 20th Punjab Native Infantry, had also distinguished himself.

At this time a very remarkable paper fell into the hands of the Commissioner, *viz.*, a letter from Maulvi Abdulla,* the military leader of the Hindustani fanatics, and Syad Amran, an uncle of Syad Mubarak Shah, to the Buner chiefs, warning them that, with reference to the assembly of troops in Yusafzai, we might probably assert it was to punish the Hindustanis, whereas it was in reality to lay waste and annex Chamla, Buner, and Swat. The letter was not dated, but had evidently been written before the proclamations, and must have roused the worst suspicions of the Buner people, as the predictions contained in it anticipated almost word for word portions of the proclamations.

That the Buner people should thus have taken a decidedly hostile part against us was extremely serious, and not only altered our position in the hills, but required a change in the plan of operations. The security of the communications of the force with the rear had first to be arranged for, and the wing of the 14th Native Infantry was ordered up from Nawakila to Rustam, and application made for another native infantry regiment to be sent from Peshawar. Sir Neville Chamberlain requested the Commissioner to arrange for the occupation of the lower portion of the pass with his foot levies, and thought it probable that he should have to ask for more native infantry before the communications with the rear could be considered secure, even so long as the force occupied its position on the crest of the Ambela pass.

The plan of operations, as already shown, was to use the Chamla valley as a route to reach the Hindustani settlement on the Mahaban, but it now became doubtful if it could be adhered to. With a powerful and warlike tribe like the people of Buner in declared hostility on the left flank of the proposed line of march, and in a position to which they could always return,

Colonel R. G.
Taylor's report.

Brigadier-General
Chamberlain's
despatch.

* See Appendix I.

even though once dislodged and beaten, it would perhaps be impossible to persevere in this plan of operations. Moreover, as information had been received that the Buner people had summoned the Hindustanis to their aid, and that at least a portion of them had obeyed the summons, it was probable the fanatics would be either encountered in our present position, fighting with the people of Buner, or have to be sought elsewhere than on the spurs of the Mahaban; indeed, an advance on the Mahaban would not find them, but would leave them in the rear to harass the march of the troops.

Ambela expedition, 1863.

A deputation, consisting of almost all the influential men of the Gadun tribe, came into camp to the Commissioner this day (the 22nd), and many of the Chamla *maliks* were also in camp.

Both the British and native troops had to undergo considerable discomfort from the baggage having been delayed, but the plentiful supply of firewood had fortunately enabled them to keep up large watch-fires; and the troops generally were healthy, except those who had brought Peshawar fever with them.

On the 23rd October the strength of the Yusafzai Field Force was as given in Appendix B. On the morning of the 24th, the sick, both British and native, all baggage except that absolutely necessary for efficiency, and all carriage rendered spare by this arrangement, were sent to the rear under a strong escort; whilst an infantry regiment occupied a spur of the Guru mountain, thereby preventing any attack by the Bunerwals on the convoy as it filed down the pass. At the same time, parties from the camp were employed in improving the road and in removing the worst of the obstacles. The enemy remained quiet, but large bodies of men, with numerous standards, were observed approaching the mouth of the pass, consisting of the tribes from the Northern Indus, as per margin, with some of the Hindustanis.

Hassanzais.
Chagarzais.
Mada Khels.

On the night of the 24th, the 1st Punjab Infantry, under the command of Major C. P. Keyes, occupied the advanced picquets of the right defence, and a little after daylight, on the morning of the 25th, the enemy showed on a ridge of hills opposite these picquets, which it was considered dangerous to let them hold in force because of its vicinity to the picquets. Calling upon Lieut.-Colonel A. T. Wilde, C.B., who was in command of the right defences, for support, Major Keyes advanced to dislodge the enemy from the ridge. Major Keyes had then about 200 men, 100 of whom he sent, under Lieutenant J. P. Davidson, his second in command, to take the enemy in flank; and when he had advanced sufficiently far on the ridge occupied by the enemy, Major Keyes moved at the double to attack them in front, and drove them from height to height, until he obtained a position which could be safely held till reinforced.

Major C. P.
Keyes's despatch.

The position Major Keyes had now taken up was on a ridge overlooking a plain 200 yards broad, over which the enemy had been driven. On the other side of this plain was a conical hill, the summit of which commanded the ridge at a range of 700 yards. On this the enemy were collecting from the plain by the villages of Lalu and Kogah. As they appeared to be coming in considerable force (eventually between 2,000 and 3,000 men), Major Keyes sent off for a mountain battery and another regiment, and ordered the 1st Punjab Infantry to keep under cover, and not to return the fire of the enemy.

Owing to the distance from camp and the nature of the ground, these reinforcements did not arrive till 2 P.M.; 150 men of the 71st Highland Light

*Ambela
expedition,
1863.*

Infantry and 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers being the first to arrive. The marksmen of this party were selected and placed along the ridge, the men of the 1st Punjab Infantry being recalled and drawn up out of sight of the enemy, as also the 5th Gurkha Regiment, which joined shortly afterwards. As soon as the Peshawar Mountain Train Battery arrived, they were brought up as near the ridge as possible without showing themselves to the enemy. The guns were then dragged up by hand into position, and immediately opened fire with shrapnel at a distance of 600 yards, the marksmen opening fire at the same time.

The "Conical" hill was rocky and very precipitous, but essentially a weak position, having a line of retreat that would expose the retreating enemy to great loss if closely pursued.

After the guns had fired two rounds, the 1st Punjab Infantry were advanced at the "double", supported by the 5th Gurkha Regiment, the whole of the British troops keeping up the fire from the ridge.

The enemy did not stop to defend their position, but, after firing a few shots, retreated at their utmost speed. To the admirable practice of the guns, and the withering fire of the marksmen, may be attributed our obtaining the hill without any loss. The enemy left several bodies on the ground, and their total loss was afterwards ascertained to have been 33 killed and upwards of 40 wounded.* Our loss was only one sepoy, 1st Punjab Infantry, wounded on the first advance from the picquets. As soon as the enemy were seen to have repassed the village of Lalu on their way to the plains, the troops were dismissed to their quarters.

Major Keyes stated that great credit was due to Captain T. E. Hughes, commanding the Peshawar Mountain Train Battery, for the admirable manner in which he brought up his guns over the very difficult ground he had to traverse, and his very effective practice when brought into action; also to Major J. P. W. Campbell, commanding the 5th Gurkha Regiment, and the officers commanding the European troops, for the manner in which they carried out the object in view of masking all movement until the moment of attack. He further stated that Lieutenant J. P. Davidson, 1st Punjab Infantry, took up his flanking party with great spirit, and performed essential service in driving back the enemy, and that the energy, intelligence, and zeal of Lieutenant H. W. Pitcher, 1st Punjab Infantry, who was foremost in every movement, rendered most effective aid.

Sir Neville Chamberlain, in his despatch, said this affair was most skilfully managed by Major Keyes, and in forwarding that officer's report for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, brought to notice the officers therein named.

Whilst this affair was being conducted by Major Keyes on the right, the heights above the left flank picquets were crowned by large bodies of the enemy, and it afterwards became known that a simultaneous attack on both flanks of the camp had been arranged; but the Buner people who were to have attacked the left flank failed to keep their agreement. This gave great offence to the tribes engaged in the right attack; and the Mahaban tribes were so disgusted by this reverse that they trooped off the same day down the valley to their homes, and did not rejoin the enemy for some weeks.

* Amongst the killed was the brother of a *Syad* of some note, residing in Chamla, although this

The camp arrangements at this time were as follows (*see Sketch of British position, p. 108*). The front picquets were under command of Colonel W. Hope, C.B., 71st Highland Light Infantry, those on the right under Lieut.-Colonel A. T. Wilde, C.B., Corps of Guides, and those on the left under Lieut.-Colonel J. L. Vaughan, 5th Punjab Infantry. The heights which commanded the camp were occupied by strong parties of infantry and stockaded picquets. The approach to the camp from the gorge was defended by a breastwork and guns in position, and the rear was also secured from attack.

The defences consisted of loopholed stone walls, abatis, and branches of trees pointing upwards. As will be afterwards seen, the enemy generally singled out one position at a time to attack; and, owing to the nature of the ground, which was broken and wooded, they were enabled to get close up and attack in such large numbers, and with such boldness, that in some instances they pulled down the stone walls and threw the stones at the defenders.

Reports were now rife that the Buner people had solicited the aid of the *Akhund* of Swat. If he joined in the war, bringing, as he would doubtless do, an immense accession of material as well as moral strength, an advance by the Chamla valley would become still more difficult; but Sir Neville Chamberlain considered that in the meantime the halt of the force at the crest of the pass was not without its advantages. The situation was a menacing one, it obliged the enemy to keep a large body of men together whom they found it difficult to feed, and it made it indispensable for them to become the attacking party, when all the advantage was on our side.

It has been mentioned above that a simultaneous attack upon both the right and left flanks of the camp had been arranged by the enemy to come off on the 25th, but the Buner men failed in their agreement to carry out the attack on our left. But as large bodies of men had then been seen collected upon the Guru mountain, it was necessary to provide against the threatened attack on the left, and also against the possibility of the enemy making an attempt from the spurs of the Guru upon a convoy of sick, baggage, etc., which was about to be sent to the rear. Accordingly, on the morning of the 26th, the left picquets, under Lieutenant-Colonel J. L. Vaughan, were reinforced with the troops noted in the margin.

The troops proceeded to the neighbourhood of the "Eagle's Nest" picquet. This picquet occupied the top of a very steep, rocky knoll, which rises out of the southern face of the Guru, and was the apex of that portion of the mountain which overlooked the left flank of the camp.

It was necessary to hold this position with a picquet by day, in order to give security to the grass-cutters, etc., of the camp; but its distance from camp, and the consequent difficulty of reinforcing it quickly, had made it unadvisable to hold it by night until the ground below had been securely occupied, and the picquet had been consequently withdrawn at sunset to a lower position. The knoll had been hastily prepared for defence, the preceding afternoon, by the erection of a breastwork of stones on high ground, showing a semi-circular front of about 90 feet. Below this the ground was level, and commanded by the work, and beyond the plateau, the hill, which was well wooded and studded with rocks, rose again, and its crest (distant about 500 yards from our breastwork) was protected by a similar work of the enemy.

Brigadier-General
Chamberlain's
despatch.

Hazara Mountain
Train Battery.
30 marksmen,
71st and 101st
Regiments.
200 men, 71st
Regiment.
5th Punjab In-
fantry.
6th Punjab In-
fantry.

Major C. H.
Brownlow's
despatch.

*Ambela
expedition,
1863.*

*Ambela
expedition,
1863.*

Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan now made the following dispositions. The "Eagle's Nest" was held by thirty marksmen of the 71st and 101st Regiments, under Lieutenant G. V. Fosbery, and eighty marksmen of the 20th Punjab Native Infantry, the whole being under the command of Major C. H. Brownlow, 20th Punjab Native Infantry.

As the picquet itself was only capable of holding about 110 men, some large rocks at the base of the knoll were made to shelter 120 more, *viz.*, 50 men of the 3rd Punjab Infantry, and 70 men of the 20th Punjab Native Infantry.

The rest of the force was drawn up on and about a small Mamelon, 400 yards west of the "Eagle's Nest" picquet, in the following order from right to left:—

Detachment 71st Highland Light Infantry under Major A. C. Parker.

6th Punjab Infantry " Captain W. D. Hoste.

Hazara Mountain Train Battery " Captain F. R. DeBude.

5th Punjab Infantry " Lieutenant C. E. Stewart.

The last regiment in extended order lined the crest of the Mamelon, with three companies in support of the guns. The 71st Highland Light Infantry was in connection with the "Eagle's Nest" picquet.

The breastwork on the crest of the hill was occupied by about 2,000 of the enemy, and at about noon on the 26th the Bunerwals, who had hitherto fired only an occasional shot, commenced to move down from their position by the different spurs, and with loud shouts attacked at once the picquet and the troops. The steady fire, however, with which they were received, rendered their very gallant efforts to enter the defences unavailing. In attacking the picquet, the matchlock-men of the enemy posted themselves most advantageously in the wood, and opened a galling fire, while their swordsmen and others advanced boldly to the attack, charging across the plateau in front in the most determined manner. The nature of the ground prevented the guns from being brought to bear at first upon those who assailed the picquet, and they were thus able to swarm up the steep sides of the knoll, and to plant their standard close under the breastwork. All the efforts of the garrison failed to dislodge the enemy from this position for some time, notwithstanding that the direct fire from the breastwork was aided by a flanking fire from the mountain guns and from the Enfield rifles of the 71st Highland Light Infantry. The enemy were ultimately driven back up the hill, leaving the ground covered with their dead; their matchlock men only maintaining the fight, and continuing to harass the picquet.

Whilst this was occurring at the "Eagle's Nest", an attack was also being made on the rest of the troops on the Guru mountain. The mountain guns opening fire with shrapnel, common shell, and round shot, soon checked those of the enemy who were advancing against the troops in position (though not those moving against the "Eagle's Nest" picquet). This check of the enemy by the Hazara Mountain Train Battery affording a favourable opportunity, the 6th Punjab Infantry, which was in reserve, made a very bold charge upon the enemy, headed by their commander, Captain Hoste; but unfortunately, carried too far in the ardour of pursuit, this regiment lost heavily in its retirement, *viz.*, four native officers and forty sepoy wounded, and two non-commissioned officers and nine sepoy killed.

Brigadier-General
Chamberlain's
despatch.

The retirement of the 6th was covered by a company of the 5th Punjab Infantry, and the fire of the Enfields and the mountain guns. *Ambela expedition, 1863.*

On the advance of the 6th Punjab Infantry, the enemy had again come down the hill, and with loud yells rushed, sword in hand, to the assault of the "Eagle's Nest", but were again finally repulsed.

During the course of the action, Lieut.-Colonel Vaughan, seeing how desperate were the attacks on the "Eagle's Nest", and how hardly pressed was its garrison, sent one company of the 71st Regiment and one company of the 5th Punjab Infantry to reinforce the picquet. In one of the sallies made by the troops who were holding the rocks below the "Eagle's Nest", Lieutenant R. Clifford, Adjutant of the 1st Punjab Cavalry, who was on leave when the force was formed, and joined it as a volunteer with the 3rd Punjab Infantry, was killed whilst gallantly leading his men.

After the repulse of the enemy's second attack on the "Eagle's Nest", no further attempt was made on Lieut.-Colonel Vaughan's position. During the rest of the day they kept up a heavy fire from the low hills and broken ground in front of the troops, but the ground affording excellent cover, little damage was done to our men.

While this attack was going on at the left defences of the camp, a demonstration was also made by the enemy in the front, when Lieutenant T. H. T. Drake, of the 32nd Punjab Native Infantry was wounded.

The determined attack on the "Eagle's Nest" had, of course, been productive of severe losses (*see* Appendix C). Amongst the killed was Lieutenant G. M. Richmond, 20th Punjab Native Infantry, whose reckless gallantry whilst encouraging his men by his personal example, cost him his life, and the Subadar-Major, Mir Ali Shah, of the same regiment, who died like a gallant soldier at the side of his commanding officer, recommending, with his last breath, his son to Major Brownlow's protection.

Amongst the wounded was Lieutenant W. Barron, R.A., attached to the Survey Department, who had joined Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan in the morning for the purpose of sketching the ground.

The enemy suffered very severely ; some 250 were killed, whilst numbers of the wounded had been carried to their homes, or crawled to the nearest Buner villages.

The attacks had been made by the Hindustanis and the Bunerwals, and as amongst the killed were large numbers of the Salarzai, Daulatzai, and Gadaizai sections of the Bunerwals, it was apparent how general was the combination of that tribe against us.

On this occasion Sir Neville Chamberlain reported that Lieutenant-Colonel J. L. Vaughan's management of the troops was excellent, and he considered himself indebted to his clear judgment for the very successful result of the action ; that Major C. H. Brownlow had again greatly distinguished himself by his ready resource and gallant personal bearing, and that his regiment (20th Punjab Native Infantry) had evinced the greatest steadiness and gallantry ; that Captain W. D. Hoste's charge at the head of the 6th Punjab Infantry had been very bold, also that the fire of Captain F. R. DeBude's guns had been ably directed and of the greatest service ; that the detachment of the 71st Highland Light Infantry had behaved with steadiness under Major A. C. Parker, and greatly assisted the retirement of the 6th Punjab Infantry ; that the 5th Punjab Infantry, under Lieutenant C. E. Stewart, had been chiefly employed to cover and support the guns, but one company

*Ambela
expedition,
1863.*

under Lieutenant S. Beckett, did excellent service in supporting the advance of the 6th Punjab Infantry, and that it had withdrawn in the best order after the 6th had regained its position.

Captain T. A. Butler, V.C.	...	101st Regiment.
Lieutenant G. V. Fosbery,	...	104th Regiment.
" J. Bartleman,	...	20th Punjab Native Infantry
Assist. Surgeon R. T. Lyons...	...	101st Regiment.
Private Stewart	...	} 71st Regiment.
" Clapperton	
" Barber	101st Regiment.
Subadar Oudu	} 20th Punjab Infantry.
Havildar Mir Muhammad	...	
Sepoy Lena Singh	
" Jowala	

Major Brownlow said that the conduct of all under his command during the day had been admirable, but that he would desire especially to bring to notice the officers and men named in the margin, whose coolness and gallantry were conspicuous.

Lieut.-Colonel Vaughan, who had mentioned the officers named by Sir Neville Chamberlain, also stated he was under the greatest obligations to Major T. Wright, Assistant Adjutant-General to the Field Force, whom the Brigadier-General, at his special request, had allowed to accompany him.

It had been originally intended to bring the troops back to camp by sunset, and to withdraw the "Eagle's Nest" picquet at the same time; but the enemy were in such force on the mountains, and the importance of continuing to hold the position was so apparent, that Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan determined to hold it during the night. The troops under him, therefore, bivouacked on the ground they had held during the day, the Bunerwals, who had evidently suffered severely, making no further hostile demonstrations of any kind, although there was some firing by Hindustanis and others.

On the following day, the 27th, the "Eagle's Nest" picquet was strengthened, and another, called "Vaughan's" picquet, on an adjoining eminence, which supported the "Eagle's Nest", was erected, and it was determined that these positions should be held permanently,—the "Eagle's Nest" by 40 British infantry and 300 native infantry; "Vaughan's" picquet by the Hazara Mountain Train Battery, 60 British and 300 native infantry.

When, on our invitation, the Bunerwals came down to carry off their dead who had fallen the previous day, opportunity was taken to try and reason with them as to the unnecessary loss they were causing to their tribe, but with little effect.

Their demeanour was courteous, and they conversed unreservedly with Sir N. B. Chamberlain and the Commissioner, Colonel R. G. Taylor; but it was evident from their manner that they were not in the least humbled.

Upwards of thirty bodies of the Hindustanis were counted upon the ground during the short truce. It was observed that both the wounded and dead bodies of the Hindustanis on this and subsequent occasions were left by their allies, who seemed to look upon the Hindustanis as they might upon earthen vessels, to be thrown at our heads in the day of battle, when no doubt their utility was appreciated, but of which it was quite superfluous to think of picking up the fragments if they happened to get broken in the fray. But what their allies would not do was performed by the Christian soldiers, whom their tongues had been so ready to curse and consign to perdition; for, under the orders of Sir Neville Chamberlain, these mutilated rebels of our own territories, together with some wounded Bunerwals, were taken into our hospitals and carefully and tenderly treated. Two of the wounded Hindustanis were apparently soldiers of the late 55th Native

Infantry, and many of them young men, apparently from Bengal; they used the old pattern musket and Government ammunition. *Ambela expedition*
1863.

The duty of the troops was now very heavy, the effective strength of the regiments having been considerably reduced by casualties and by sickness. The camp was this day, the 27th, however, reinforced by the arrival of the 14th Native Infantry under Major C. C. G. Ross.

On the 26th, it had been reported that the Bunerwals had induced the *Akhund* of Swat to espouse their cause, and news was this day received that the *Akhund* had actually joined the Bunerwals, and that he had brought with him from Swat 120 horsemen and upwards of 100 standards, each standard representing probably from thirty to forty footmen. Besides the tribe with which he was more immediately connected, *viz.*, the Yusufzais of Swat, he had summoned the people of the remote country of Bajour*, the Malazais of Dir† under their chief, Ghazan Khan, and other distant tribes whose names even were hardly known, except to officers who had served long on the frontier.

In the next chapter, the country of Swat and its inhabitants will be described, and some account will then be given of the rise of this remarkable man, known as the *Akhund* of Swat. Suffice it here to say that originally a *Syad* of Buner, he had passed his life in close study and asceticism, and at this time must have been about seventy years of age. He had gained an immense ascendancy over the minds of Muhammadans in general, and more particularly over the tribes on the Peshawar frontier, and his position towards them at this time can best be illustrated by comparing it with that of the Pope of Rome.

It is remarkable that up to the present time the *Akhund*, with the solitary exception of forcing a king upon the people of Swat, had always held himself aloof from worldly affairs, and had, even in 1857, counselled peace to his disciples, who flocked to him for advice. He also was ostensibly opposed to the tenets of the Sittana fanatics. The previous year, it was said, he had been unusually busy in attempting to refute some religious views held in Peshawar which were opposed to his own. But for the time all sectarian differences were forgotten; the *Akhund* and the Sittana *Maulvi* were said to be on the most friendly terms, and it was known that the whole Hindustani colony were either at, or on their way to, Ambela. Colonel R. G. Taylor believed (and his belief was shared by the native chiefs, best able to judge, who were in the camp at the time) that the *Akhund* had moved in fear that if he did not show sympathy with Buner on the occasion, he might lose influence with the tribe, who were his natural constituents; and possibly to this was added anxiety lest Mubarak Shah, who was an aspirant to his father's position of *Badshah* of Swat, might, by having joined the war with the Hindustanis, gain some of the influence which he, the *Akhund*, would lose. It was also known that the adjurations of the Buner chiefs and people had been most

* *Bajour* is an independent district of Yaghistan, bounded north by Panjkora, east by the Utman Khels and Momands, south by the Momands, and west by the Kunar range. It is chiefly a pastoral country, the inhabitants possessing large herds of cattle, sheep and goats. Faiztalab, the chief of the best part of Bajour, was said to be the most powerful of all the chiefs around. He was styled Haji Sahibzada, as he had made the pilgrimage to Mecca, and his influence extended beyond his own province. In 1842, during the Afghan war, the chief of Bajour had been present with a contingent at the siege of Jalalabad.

† *Dir* is a valley to the north-east of Swat. The present chief is Rahmatulla, the son of

*Ambela
expedition,
1863.*

passionate, all the *mullas* of the country, with many of the women, having been deputed to beseech him to adopt their cause.

The *Akhund* was accompanied by the two chiefs of Swat, Sobat Khan and Sherdil Khan, usually at bitter feud with each other, but now, for the time being, the best of friends.

The Hindustani fanatics were under the leadership of Maulvi Abdulla. They numbered at the commencement about 900 men, most of whom had been wrought up to a pitch of fanaticism, and were all prepared to lay down their lives. It is, indeed, only men animated by this spirit who can be found willing to leave their homes in India, and to take up their residence in these rugged mountains. Widely separated in language, manners, and interests from the people amongst whom they dwelt, receiving only a bare subsistence from the *Maulvi*, who entertained them, and paying exorbitantly for all the supplies they consumed, their life was passed in a manner by no means congenial to natives of Hindustan. They were drilled on our system, and some were clothed like the sepoys of the old Indian army. Three of their jemadars had been non-commissioned officers in the late 55th Native Infantry. The *Maulvi* himself had been about four years in these parts. He was the nephew of that Maulvi Inayat Ali Khan who gave so much trouble in 1857 at Narinji, and was a man of good ability. He it was who appropriated all the contributions received from India for the colony from which he derived a rich income.

With these Hindustanis were associated the family of the Sittana *Syads*. The only one, however, who took a prominent part against us was Syad Muhammad Shah, who had been in our service for some time. For, after the expedition of 1858, the eldest representative of the family, Mubarak Shah, took no active part in the proceedings.

An account of the Bunerwals has been given in the previous chapter. Their chiefs at this time were Zaidulla Khan, Ahmad Khan, and Nawab Khan, the two first named being closely allied by marriage to our own chiefs of the Sadum valley, Ajab Khan, of Chargulai, and his brother Aziz Khan. They were said to be able to bring 12,000 to 15,000 men into the field, but this was probably an exaggeration.

The village of Chamla likewise sent their quota—the Amazais of Cherorai being well represented—and the Mada Khels also came in force.

In addition to these, there were small parties of men from other tribes who had joined the enemy. In fact, there was a general combination of almost all the tribes from the Indus to the boundary of Kabul; and the total number of men in arms against the force at this time was computed at about 15,000. Old animosities were for the time in abeyance, and, under the influence of fanaticism, tribes usually hostile to each other had joined, or were hastening to join, the *Akhund's* standard, and to fight for the sake of their common faith.

Independently of these, however, was a mischievous gathering of our own subjects, who associated with bands of the enemy in infesting our lines of communication. Chief amongst these were the Utman Khels, an Afridi clan, long settled in the upper parts of the Lundkhwar valley, but who had retained all the wild habits and plundering propensities of their race. They were joined by men from Narinji, and by bigots and malcontents, who, individually, or in parties of two and three, slipped away from a great number of our villages. They numbered only a few hundreds in all, but were of great use to the enemy in harassing our rear.

Such being the state of affairs, it is easy to understand how entirely the situation had altered since the force entered the Ambela pass. *Ambela expedition, 1863.*

Brigadier-General Chamberlain's despatch. Instead of having to deal with the Mahaban tribes, with a view to the expulsion of the Hindustanis from that tract, the force was now engaged in a contest with the enormous coalition above mentioned. Brigadier-General Chamberlain felt certain that it would not be advisable to make any advance into the Chamla valley with his present force against such numbers. He could only do so by giving up the Ambela pass. If the force moved into the valley, with a view to continue its advance towards the Mahaban, to carry out the original views of Government, it would be exposed to the enemy's incessant attacks, both by day and night, in flank and rear, and it would be impossible, in the face of such numbers, to protect adequately a long line of laden animals, to which would be daily added an ever-increasing number of sick and wounded. On the other hand, if the force merely moved into the valley, with a view to take up a position in open ground, it would still lose its communications with the rear, and whenever it required fresh supplies of provisions or ammunition, or to clear the camp by sending sick and wounded to the rear, it would have to retake the pass, and to re-occupy, at great sacrifice of life, the very ground from which it had advanced. Further, if the force was seriously compromised by a hazardous movement in advance, there were not, within a reasonable distance, the troops necessary to meet any difficulty which would under such an eventuality be certain immediately to arise, either within or beyond the border. In fact, Sir Neville Chamberlain considered that, with the present numbers, the only way to uphold the honour of our arms and the interests of the Government was to act on the defensive in the position the force now held, and trust to the effect of time and of the discouragement which repeated unsuccessful attacks were likely to produce upon the enemy, to weaken their numbers, and to break up their combination.

To continue now the narrative of the operations. During the 27th a demonstration was made by the enemy in front of the camp, but without any result, and news was received that the *Maulvi* had sent for more Hindustanis.

On the 28th the sick and wounded were sent back to Rustam, and the breast-works were strengthened to enable the force to move out to attack the enemy below. Many of the enemy's skirmishers who endeavoured to annoy the picquets were killed daily by the British marksmen. News was received in camp that some 280 Hindustanis, with treasure and more men from Swat, had joined the enemy, and that the *maliks* of Buner and Swat had elected the *Maulvi* to command the united force. There was little firing during the day, but a night attack was threatened.

On the 29th it was reported that the *Akhund* had called upon the Utmanzais, Ranizais, Momands, and people of Bajour, for support. The 4th Gurkhas and two guns of No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery* joined the camp on this day. This was a Thursday—the Muhammadan day commences

Colonel R. G. Taylor's report. at sunset—and an attack in force by the enemy was reported as intended either during the night or the next morning. From the nature of the ground, the position held by the troops was both extensive and difficult, and required half the native troops to guard it.

* This battery belonged to the Punjab Irregular Force. The Artillery attached to the force at this time consisted of three Horse Light Field Batteries, one garrison company of artillery, and the Peshawar and the Hazara Mountain Train Batteries.

*Ambela
expedition,
1863.*

On the 30th October the first result of the combination between the *Akhund* and the *Maulvi* showed itself. The advanced picquets of the right defence were held by the 1st Punjab Infantry and a company of the Guide Corps, and were under the command of Major C. P. Keyes. Above the main picquets was a high rock, subsequently always known as the "Crag". The ascent to this was most precipitous, the path leading to its top narrow and difficult, and when the summit was reached there was but little level ground to stand upon; it was, however, necessary to occupy it, as it commanded the lower picquets, and Major Keyes placed a small party of twelve men in it, which was as much as it would conveniently hold. About half an hour before daylight heavy firing commenced on the "Crag", and it soon appeared that the picquet was hard-pressed by the enemy. All the men from the lower picquets that could be spared were immediately detached in support, and accompanied by Lieutenant H. W. Pitcher, Adjutant of the 1st Punjab Infantry, Major Keyes himself, with about twenty picked men, advanced to their assistance; but before the top of the "Crag" was reached, the small party holding it had been overpowered and driven off the rock, though they were still holding the ground lower down the hill.

Finding this important position lost, the men were ordered to take cover from the enemy's fire beneath the overhanging rocks, about twenty paces from the summit, and Major Keyes determined to wait till daylight should enable him to distinguish friends from foes, and reinforcements should arrive from Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde, who was commanding the right defences.

As the day broke, the 20th Punjab Native Infantry, under Major C. H. Brownlow, entered the main picquet, and Major Brownlow became the senior officer on the ground. Major Keyes now, feeling convinced of the danger of allowing the "Crag" to remain even for a short time in the hands of the enemy, and foreseeing that, should the enemy (many hundreds of whom were in the rear) once understand that their advanced party had gained an advantage over our troops, they would quickly occupy the position in force, and render the lower picquets untenable from their raking fire, suggested to Major Brownlow that he should advance by a ridge which ran to the right of the "Crag", and threaten the enemy in rear, while he (Major Keyes) attacked the position in front. To this Major Brownlow at once assented, and there is no doubt that this flank movement most materially aided the success of Major Keyes's attack, though it deprived Major Brownlow of the opportunity of sharing in the actual conflict at the "Crag".

From the nature of the approach to the top of the "Crag", owing to the large rocks, one or two men only could advance at a time. Ordering his men to fix swords, Major Keyes ascended with his party by one path, while Lieutenants G. V. Fosbery and H. W. Pitcher were directed to push up different paths, each at the head of a few men. The party under Major Keyes was led to the assault with a perseverance and intrepidity seldom surpassed, and Major Keyes spoke in equally laudatory terms of the way in which Lieutenants Fosbery and Pitcher led their respective parties. Lieutenant Fosbery was the first man to gain the top of the "Crag". Lieutenant Pitcher had led his men up to the last rock, when he was knocked down and stunned by a large stone. As soon as our men had reached the top, a most exciting hand-to-hand fight ensued, in which Major Keyes was wounded; the enemy, however, being driven out at the point of the bayonet, the position recovered, and three

standards taken. No sooner had the "Crag" been recaptured than a panic seized the remainder of the enemy who were attacking on the right, and they quickly disappeared down the mountain. *Ambela expedition, 1863.*

This attack had been made by the Hindustani fanatics, who lost fifty-four killed on the spot, and seven wounded.

Sir Neville Chamberlain considered that the recapture of the "Crag" by Major Keyes was a most brilliant exploit, and that the decision and determination he had displayed stamped him as possessing some of the highest qualifications of an officer; he also considered that the distinguished conduct of Lieutenant Pitcher and Lieutenant Fosbery rendered them fully deserving of the Victoria Cross, a distinction which Major Keyes had also well deserved.*

Lieutenant Fosbery had been on duty the day before at Major Keyes's picquet, with a party of sharp-shooters of the 71st and 101st Regiments, and remained there during the night, expecting to be on duty in the morning, but when the attack commenced he had joined the 1st Punjab Infantry.

Almost simultaneously with the attack by the Hindustanis on the right defences, an attack was made on the front of the camp by the Swat contingent, which was repulsed without difficulty, under the personal superintendence of the Brigadier-General, by the good practice of the artillery under Captain J. S. Tulloh, and the fire of the 71st Highland Light Infantry and the 101st

Brigadier-General Royal Bengal Fusiliers under Colonel W. Hope, C.B., and Chamberlain's Lieutenant-Colonel F. O. Salusbury, respectively. Some of the enemy behaved with considerable boldness, making an

attempt to assault the 9-pounder battery in the gorge, when some of the assailants were killed within the battery. This afforded the 5th Gurkha Regiment an opportunity of making a spirited charge, and they quickly drove the enemy down the slope.

The enemy left forty-five dead bodies on the ground, which were recognised as men from Swat and Ranizai, and must have lost heavily in addition; though, according to custom, they carried off as many of their dead as they could.

At the same time a demonstration was made against the upper left flank picquets, where the 5th Punjab Infantry lost three killed.

By 10 A.M. the enemy had been driven off at all points, and the effect of their defeat was so great that they proceeded at once to the village of Ambela, and from thence carried off their great priest, the *Akhund*, in perfect flight, to the other side of the Buner pass; he was, in fact, in full retreat to Swat when he was overtaken by the Buner chiefs and induced to return, as they represented that, if he deserted them, their country would be lost.

Our losses during the day had been fifty-five killed and wounded. (See Appendix C.) On the 31st the wounded of the previous day were sent to the rear, and the enemy invited to carry off their dead, which, however, they did not do.

Between the 31st October and the 5th November, the enemy attempted nothing more serious than firing as usual at our exposed breastworks and picquets, and advancing from time to time with standards, as if to attack the camp; these demonstrations were met with alacrity by the marksmen and the field guns in position, with some loss to the enemy, and little or none to the troops. In the meanwhile, the inactivity of the enemy enabled the troops to improve the breastworks and defences generally, as well as the interior communications of the camp, and a 24-pounder howitzer was sent up to strengthen the "Eagle's Nest" picquet.

* Lieutenants Pitcher and Fosbery subsequently received the Victoria Cross.

*Ambela
expedition,
1863.*

During this time communications were entered into with the Buner tribe by means of the Sadum chiefs, and by the agency of two Buner *maliks*, residents of the Malandri pass in our own territory.

From the moment that the Buner tribe had declared hostilities, it was evident that the line of communications by the Ambela defile could no longer be depended upon, and it became indispensable to seek some new line further removed from the Guru mountain, thereby enabling communications to be kept up with British territory beyond the reach of the Buner tribe. A line of road between the villages of Khanpur and Sherdara had accordingly been selected by Lieut.-Colonel A. Taylor, the Commanding Royal Engineer, for this purpose, and its construction was commenced. The base of operations was changed, after its completion, from Rustam to Parmali, the nearest village in the plains where water was obtainable. Working parties had also been employed for some days in making a road in the direction of Ambela along the western slopes of the right ridge. This road was to supersede that by the gorge, which was extremely bad, and commanded on both sides, and would enable the troops, whenever the time came, to march forward without coming under fire from the Guru mountain.

On the 28th October the march of the 93rd Highlanders from Sialkot, and of the 23rd and 24th Punjab Native Infantry from Lahore, was ordered. The last two regiments were on escort duty with the Viceroy's camp at that place. On the 5th November the 7th Fusiliers, which also formed part of the escort, marched towards the frontier.

Foreseeing the demand that would arise for carriage suitable to the hills, the Punjab Government at this time ordered its collection, and during November and the beginning of December 4,200 camels and 2,100 mules were assembled from all parts of the Punjab at Nowshera.

In the absence of regular troops, a party of police, 200 foot and 75 horse, were sent to Nawakila to aid in protecting the rear communications which had been threatened.

On the morning of the 6th November Sir Neville Chamberlain had gone down with the troops covering the working parties on the road which was being made towards Ambela; on his return to camp he placed this covering party under command of his orderly officer, Major G. W. Harding, 2nd Sikh Infantry, whose conduct on previous occasions had led the Brigadier-General to place entire confidence in his coolness and judgment. Major Brownlow, who was commanding the advanced picquets on the right, had detached 100 men of the 20th Punjab Native Infantry, under Lieutenant J. Bartleman, to cover the immediate front of the working parties, and had posted a similar number of the 1st Punjab Infantry, under Lieutenant W. H. Unwin, on the head of the ridge, beyond that at the foot of which the parties were at work. Lieutenant Unwin was instructed to send patrols down the ridge as far as he could with reference to their safety, and Lieutenant Bartleman's orders were to keep two or three hundred yards in front of the working parties.

About eleven o'clock Lieutenant Bartleman's party had been pushed forward to a spot low down the ridge, the top of which was in possession of Lieutenant Unwin's party. At half-past twelve, hearing that Major Harding was anxious lest the enemy should get above him, and wished the party of the 1st Punjab Infantry strengthened, Major Brownlow sent a company of the Guides, under Lieutenant W. Battye, to join Lieutenant Unwin; and about

the same time instructions were received from Lieut.-Colonel A. T. Wilde, commanding the right defences, for the working parties to be withdrawn, and the covering parties to retire up the hill. These instructions were forwarded at once to Major Harding, who was at the time on the top of the hill with a detachment of the 1st Punjab Infantry, he having gone up to see the positions of the detachments holding his line of retreat. The working parties were at once withdrawn; but why the lower covering parties were not at the same time withdrawn can never be known, Major Harding having been subsequently killed. There appears no doubt, however, that he found it difficult to bring away some of his party who had been wounded, and that consequently, remaining too long, he permitted himself to be surrounded; probably on his return from the top of the hill he found his lowest detachment involved with their assailants, and encumbered with killed and wounded.

At about two o'clock Major Brownlow, observing that the enemy were moving in considerable numbers, sent all the available men he had as reinforcements for the ridges, *viz.*, two companies of the Guide Corps, under Lieutenant F. H. Jenkins, and 80 bayonets of the 1st Punjab Infantry, under Lieutenant J. P. Davidson.

At about half-past three o'clock Lieut.-Colonel Wilde, receiving information that Major Harding was being attacked in force by the enemy, proceeded to the advanced picquets, sending to head-quarters for reinforcements. In about an hour the Peshawar Mountain Train Battery and 350 bayonets of the 4th and 5th Gurkha Regiments arrived at the main (Major Keyes's) picquet.

One hour only of the day remained, and it became necessary to endeavour to cover Major Harding's retreat by the shortest route; accordingly Captain C. W. R. Chester, commanding the 4th Gurkha Regiment, was ordered to proceed across the lower spurs in the direction of the beleaguered picquet, whilst the guns of the mountain battery, protected by the 5th Gurkhas, took up a position on one of the lower spurs, checking the advance of the enemy on the picquet, and covering Captain Chester's advance to its assistance.

Whatever error Major Harding may have committed in too long delaying his retirement, when he found himself overmatched and in difficulty, he behaved like a gallant soldier, and probably saved his detachment by his coolness and determination.

Colonel R. G. Taylor writes: "It was on seeing the approach of the 4th Gurkhas that Major Harding finally resolved on retiring. I saw myself the detachments fall in very steadily for retirement and move off, a portion being engaged

all the time with an enemy we could not see." Major Harding was the last man to leave the picquet. "After the detachment had passed out of our sight, the enemy appear by a rush to have broken in between two of the detachments. Major Harding had been previously shot through the neck, and was being carried by a Gurkha sepoy,

and it was at this time that he and Lieutenant T. B. Dougal, of the 79th Regiment, were killed." The latter officer had left the advanced breast-works without leave, and accompanied

by a single sepoy had gone down to join the covering party. During this time Captain Chester, with the 4th Gurkhas, had advanced as far as the nature of the ground and light permitted, and some of his men had reached the spur upon which Major Harding's detachment were fighting; a movement which enabled the remainder of the covering party, which was fighting its way up the ridge, to reach the crest, and the troops to get back to camp, though not till after dark.

*Ambela
expedition,
1863.*

*Ambela
expedition,
1863.*

The losses in this affair are given in Appendix C. In addition to Major Harding and Lieutenant Dougal, Ensign C. B. Murray, of the 71st Highland Light Infantry, had fallen early in the action at the head of his men, and Lieutenant W. Battye, of the Guides, and Lieutenant J. S. Oliphant, of the 5th Gurkha Regiment, had been wounded. In a subsequent despatch Sir Neville Chamberlain alluded to the excellent service rendered by the two companies of the Guides, under Lieutenant F. H. Jenkins, which were in support of the covering party, and with which Lieutenant Battye was wounded.

As already stated, night had come on before the covering party got back to camp, and it had been impossible to recover the bodies of the killed on the previous evening. Accordingly, early on the morning of the 7th, the troops, as per margin, moved out under the command of Lieut.-Colonel A. T. Wilde, C. B., for this purpose. Small parties of the enemy appeared on that portion of the ground where Major Harding's picquet had been situated; these were quickly dispersed and driven into the plain, and, having collected the bodies of seven British and twenty-eight native officers and men, the force returned to camp without any casualty. It appeared that the enemy had suffered severely the day before, as they were seen by this column removing many of their slain, and they showed no inclination to meet the troops, although they had displayed great boldness on the previous day, charging sword in hand. They consisted of the Ranizais of Swat, under Sobat Khan, assisted by some of the Mahaban tribes—the chief *malik* of the Mada Khels being amongst the killed.

On the 8th, the new road to the rear was reported practicable, and easier than the Ambela pass, which was no longer to be used, the supplies and supports being moved to Parmali.

A flag of truce was this day exhibited by the enemy at the spot previously fixed on, and Captain A. A. Munro and the Sadum *Khans* went out to communicate with the Buner chiefs, but nothing could be arranged.

On the 9th, a large body of Bajouris, under Zeman Khan, son of Faiztalab Khan, the Bajour chief, joined the enemy.

As it was intended shortly to concentrate the whole force on the south side of the Ambela pass, which would save much picquet duty, and give a stronger position, the commissariat stores were now being moved for this object.

The nights were getting colder, and Sir Neville Chamberlain considered it necessary to sanction a moderate issue of meat, rice, and rum, at fair prices, to the native troops, to keep away sickness.

On the 10th, a flag of truce being again shown, Captain Munro and the *Khans* again went down to meet the Buner chiefs who were to return and consult with the rest, but the war party, *viz.*, the men of Swat, the Bajouris, Hindustanis, and the Mahaban tribes, were still in the ascendant.

Two more roads had been opened up to the ridge on the right of the camp, and the Peshawar Mountain Train Battery, the 5th Gurkha Regiment, and the 14th Native Infantry, had been moved up to strengthen that flank.

On the 11th* the enemy showed in large numbers about Ambela,

* At this time, as uneasiness was felt, owing to sympathy evinced by the border villages of the Lundkhwar valley for the *Akhund's* cause, the 11th Bengal Cavalry, then at Parmali, was ordered to Mardan, so as to hold a more central position in Yusafzai.

Brigadier-General
Chamberlain's
despatch.

whence considerable bodies ascended the hills in the direction of Lahu, on our right front, evidently with the intention of attacking the picquets on that flank of the camp. These picquets were accordingly reinforced, and their breastworks and defences strengthened. The "Crag" picquet in particular had been much enlarged and strengthened since the occasion of its being attacked on the 30th October, and was now capable of containing a garrison of 160 men. It was also supported by the guns of the Peshawar Mountain Train Battery, which were placed in position in the main picquet.

*Ambela
expedition,
1863.*

Major C. H. Brownlow assumed command of the "Crag" picquet at 4 P.M. on the 12th; the garrison then consisted of 160 marksmen of the following regiments,—15 men of the 101st Regiment, 30 of the 14th Native Infantry, and 115 of the 20th Punjab Native Infantry.

Two of the four guns of the Peshawar Mountain Train Battery which were in the main picquet had been placed in position by order of Major C. C. G. Ross, 14th Native Infantry, who was commanding the advanced picquets, to command the left shoulder of the hill on which was the "Crag" picquet, as well as the front of the "Centre" picquet below. The enemy occupied a level ridge, about 250 yards in front of the "Crag" picquet, their position extended more than half a mile in a direction facing our own. Between the two positions lay a smooth hollow intersected by a ravine. The ground on the right and rear of the "Crag" was precipitous, and almost unassailable in any force. The left face of the post was its weak point, rocks and trees affording shelter to an attacking party till within a few yards of it.

Anticipating an attack, Major Brownlow had urged Lieutenant J. Bartleman, 20th Punjab Native Infantry, who commanded the picquet during the day, to use his utmost exertions in improving the position as much as he could, by heightening the breastwork, constructing an abatis, etc.; a duty which was admirably performed by that officer.

Before dark every man was in his place for the night, with strict orders as to the nature of his duties, and the direction of his fire in case of attack. About 10 P.M. the enemy's watch-fire showed that they were in movement, and descending in great numbers to the hollow in front of the picquet, which in half an hour was full of them. Their suppressed voices soon broke into yells of defiance, and they advanced in masses to the attack, their numbers being, as far as could be judged, at least 2,000. They were allowed to approach within a hundred yards of the picquet, when a rapid and well-sustained fire was opened upon them from the front face, which, Major Brownlow believed, did great execution, and soon silenced their shouts and drove them under cover, some to the broken and wooded ground on the left, and the remainder into the ravine below. In half an hour they rallied, and, assembling in increased numbers, rushed to the attack, this time assailing both the front and left of the picquet. They were received with the greatest steadiness, and again recoiled before our fire. These attacks continued until 4 A.M., each becoming weaker than the last, many of them being mere feints to enable them to carry off their dead and wounded.

The post was at one time in great danger of being forced at its left front angle, which, from its position, was badly protected by our fire. The enemy clambered up, and assailing its occupants with stones from the breastwork, stunned and drove them back; at this critical moment the gallantry of the men of the 20th Punjab Native Infantry, whose names are noted in

*Ambela
expedition,
1863.*

Havildar Alan Khan
Naik Chatar Singh
Sepoy Gulbadin.

„ Muhammad Khan.
„ Ala Mir.

the margin, saved the post. Answering Major Brownlow's call when others wavered, they followed him into the corner, and hurling stones on the enemy, who were close under the wall and sheltered from musketry, they drove them back, and rebuilt the parapet, holding that point for the rest of the night.

The Peshawar Mountain Train Battery rendered Major Brownlow very valuable assistance during the night. From its position, about 250 yards below and in the right rear of the "Crag", it made most successful practice, being guided as to direction and range by voice from the picquet. Two shells were pitched by it into the watch-fire of the enemy before the attack commenced, and must have done considerable damage.

In the morning not more than eight or ten of the enemy were in sight. In his despatch Sir Neville Chamberlain stated that the repeated assaults upon the "Crag" picquet had been repelled by the steadiness of the defenders, most ably directed by Major C. H. Brownlow.

Major Brownlow stated that the casualties (*see* Appendix C) were not very serious, as, owing to the darkness of the night, the enemy did not fire much or effectively.

Major Brownlow's men having been forty-eight hours on picquet duty, during which time they had worked all day and watched all night, were completely worn out, while their muskets were so foul that they could scarcely load; they were, therefore, relieved at 8 A.M. on the 13th by a detachment of the 1st Punjab Infantry under Lieutenant J. P. Davidson.

A short time after Lieutenant Davidson had taken over the "Crag" picquet from Major Brownlow, Major C. P. Keyes, commanding the 1st Punjab Infantry, received a note from Lieutenant Davidson asking for reinforcements, as he did not consider the 90 men he had with him sufficient for its defence. At this time Major Keyes was on the "Standard" hill, with Lieutenant E. R. Conolly of the Peshawar Mountain Train Battery, who was preparing a platform for his guns on the side of the hill. Constant firing had been heard at the "Crag", but it did not attract any particular attention, as heavy firing had been kept up there all night, and was continued at intervals after the relief of the picquet. On Lieutenant Davidson's requisition being received, Major Keyes immediately sent him up a reinforcement of 30 bayonets under a native officer, being all that could be spared, as a serious attack was expected on the "Centre" and "Cliff" picquets.

Shortly after this reinforcement reached the "Crag" picquet, Major Keyes observed, as he was descending the "Standard" hill, the men of the "Crag" picquet rushing down in confusion. He did not see the commencement of the retreat, as the position was not visible from the platform where he was at the time. Proceeding immediately to the breastwork across the road by which the main post was approached from the "Crag", he rallied all the men that could be got together, and kept up a heavy fire, which was taken up by the guns of the Peshawar Mountain Train Battery. This checked the advance of the enemy; but, as many wounded soldiers and others who had been garrisoning the "Crag" rushed past the breastwork and could not be stopped, a panic was communicated to the camp followers, who took to flight and increased the confusion. These men retreating had a visible effect upon all, and Major Keyes felt the necessity for an advance to reassure those that were wavering, and to further check the enemy until reinforcements

should arrive; he therefore directed a few men to remain in the breastwork, and ordered the rest to charge. Considering that his presence at the breastwork was absolutely necessary to keep the men together, the duty of leading the charge devolved upon Lieutenant H. W. Pitcher, 1st Punjab Infantry, who was accompanied by Lieutenant H. R. Young of the same regiment. Lieutenant Pitcher led many yards in advance of the foremost of his party, and his gallant bearing was the admiration of all spectators. He was ably assisted by Lieutenant Young, who made himself conspicuous by his coolness and gallantry. The assaulting party of the 1st Punjab Infantry were supported by a small detachment of the Corps of Guides, under Lieutenant W. J. Forlong of that regiment; but in spite of the coolness and daring with which the assault had been conducted (in which Lieutenant Pitcher had been severely wounded, rendering it necessary that he should be carried back), the detachments were too weak to be able to retake the "Crag", and they had to fall back upon the rocks beneath it.

*Ambela
expedition,
1863.*

Major C. C. G. Ross, commanding the advanced picquets, on seeing that the "Crag" had been carried by the enemy, who were pouring a heavy fire into the camp, which was in great confusion, collected as many men of the 14th Native Infantry and the other regiments as possible, and passed in front of the camp, where he was joined by Lieutenant A. D. C. Inglis, 14th Native Infantry, and Lieutenant H. R. Young, 1st Punjab Infantry, who assisted him in getting men together to try to retake the "Crag" picquet. Owing to the confusion this was not immediately possible. However, on Major Ross reaching the steep rocks of the picquet itself with some men of the Guides, 1st Punjab Infantry, and 14th Native Infantry, a heavy fire was opened on the top of the rock until reinforcements could arrive, which was taken up by the mountain guns.

On receiving the news of the disaster which had occurred at the "Crag", Lieutenant-Colonel A. T. Wilde, commanding the right defences, ordered up the 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers, and proceeded at once from his camp with three companies of the Guide Corps towards the "Crag", meeting on his way the head of the 101st, which the Brigadier-General had already ordered to move at once to the advanced picquets.

Sir Neville Chamberlain was in the camp below when the "Crag" fell into the hands of the enemy, and his attention had been accidentally drawn to the dust and confusion caused by the unusual rush of camp followers and animals down the hill. Feeling convinced that some reverse had occurred, he immediately ordered the 101st, which was fortunately under arms for another purpose, to move towards the "Crag"; and, shortly afterwards receiving information from Lieut.-Colonel Wilde of what had occurred, Sir Neville Chamberlain gave orders to Lieut.-Colonel F. O. Salusbury to move his regiment up the hill as fast as possible, and retake the position at any sacrifice.

The "Crag" from its locality was the key of the whole position, and its loss rendered the lower picquets untenable. On Lieut.-Colonel Wilde's arrival at the advanced picquets the state of affairs was as follows—Major Ross was half-way up the "Crag" hill, gallantly holding the enemy in check, but unable, with the few men he had rallied round him, to advance and retake the lost picquet. Parties of the enemy were attacking the lower picquets, but were kept back by the steadiness of the fire of Captain T. E. Hughes's mountain guns. The 1st Punjab Infantry, 20th Punjab Native Infantry,

*Ambela
expedition,
1863.*

and two companies of the Corps of Guides still held the breastworks, but numerically the garrison was too weak to resist the numbers of the enemy advancing to its capture.

Lieut.-Colonel Wilde then directed Lieut.-Colonel Salusbury to assault the "Crag" with his regiment, leaving one company as a support in the main position. Fatigued as they were by their rapid march to the relief of the troops in advance, the 101st never halted nor broke till they had stormed the height and secured the picquet. Led on by Lieut.-Colonel Salusbury and his officers, they soon reached Major Ross's party on the hill, and together repulsed the enemy, driving them over the hills beyond. Lieutenant F. H. Jenkins, commanding three companies of the Guide Corps, leading his men up the "Crag" hill, drove the enemy back from the right of the position with great gallantry, whilst the detachments of the 14th Native Infantry and 1st Punjab Infantry, which, with some of the Guides, had so gallantly held their ground until the arrival of the 101st, joined in and vied with the British regiment in the attack.

With this success on the part of our troops, all opposition ceased, and order was as quickly restored as it had been previously disturbed by the suddenness and force of the enemy's attack.

In their retreat, the enemy, who chiefly consisted of Bunerwals, under Zaidulla Khan, with men of Swat and some of the Hindustanis, suffered so much that they desisted from all further attempts that day along the whole line of defences.

Their loss was fifty-seven killed and left on the ground, thirty-two killed and carried off, and one hundred and forty wounded; amongst the first was a Bajouri *malik* of consequence.

Whilst the attack was going on, on the right, the enemy made demonstrations both against the front and left defences of the camp; but these were not of a serious nature, and were only made as diversions.

The defenders of the "Crag" appear to have been seized with an unaccountable panic, but the nature of the ground and the thickness of the brushwood enabled the enemy to concentrate a large force upon the weak picquet, unobserved; Lieutenant J. P. Davidson, who commanded, behaved in a most heroic manner, and, after endeavouring in every way to recall his men to a sense of their duty, was killed at his post.

The temporary loss of the "Crag" picquet was, of course, a cause of great mortification to the officers and men of the regiments concerned; but it is worthy of record that the same regiments which furnished the picquet when it was lost were those by which it was retaken.

Sir Neville Chamberlain solicited the favourable notice of the Commander-in-Chief of the officers named in the margin, in particular of Major Brownlow, to whose determination and personal example he attributed the preservation of the "Crag" picquet throughout the night of the 12th; of Lieutenant Pitcher, who was severely wounded while gallantly leading his men; and he also drew attention to the distinguished conduct of Lieutenant Young.

Lieut.-Col. A. T. Wilde, C.B., commanding Guide Corps.
Lieut.-Col. F. O. Salusbury, commanding 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers.
Major C. C. G. Ross, commanding 14th Native Infantry.
Major C. H. Brownlow, commanding 20th Punjab Native Infantry.
Major C. P. Keyes, commanding 1st Punjab Infantry.
Captain T. E. Hughes, commanding Peshawar Mountain Train Battery.
Lieutenant A. D. C. Inglis, 14th Native Infantry.
Lieutenant H. W. Pitcher, 1st Punjab Infantry.
Lieutenant H. R. Young, 1st Punjab Infantry.
Lieutenant E. R. Conolly, Royal Artillery.
Lieutenant S. E. Pemberton, Royal Artillery.

The loss of the "Crag" was met for the time being (Sir Neville Chamberlain said) in the most resolute and praiseworthy way by Major Ross, who commanded the advanced defences, and by Major Keyes, commanding the 1st Punjab Infantry, and the other officers, Lieutenants Young, Pitcher, and Inglis; the Brigadier-General added that Captain Hughes, commanding the Peshawar Mountain Train Battery, and his two subalterns, Lieutenants Conolly and Pemberton, had, by the correctness of their fire and their readiness of resource under most trying circumstances, materially aided in arresting the torrent of the enemy which was about to pour down, and in preventing them from improving their advantage till reinforcements could come up, and that they had well sustained the honour of the Royal Artillery. Lieut.-Colonel Wilde, commanding the right defences, he observed, was entitled to great credit for his promptness and decision when the picquet was driven in, and for the excellent and complete arrangements he made for its recapture. In a subsequent despatch Sir N. B. Chamberlain alluded to the excellent service rendered by the three companies of the Guide Corps, under Lieutenant F. H. Jenkins, the second in command of that corps, in the retaking of the "Crag".

Ambela expedition, 1863.

Subadar-Major Sikandar Khan, 14th Native Infantry.
 Sepoy Jowahir Singh, 14th Native Infantry.
 Sepoy Anup Singh, 14th Native Infantry.
 Sepoy Sher Singh, 14th Native Infantry.
 Sepoy Nihal Singh, 14th Native Infantry.
 Sepoy Syad Khan, 1st Punjab Infantry.
 Sepoy Ganda Singh, 1st Punjab Infantry.
 Sepoy Sharaf Khan, 1st Punjab Infantry.
 Sepoy Zarif Khan, 1st Punjab Infantry.
 Sepoy Fateh Khan, 1st Punjab Infantry.

The native officers and men who are named in the margin were said, by Majors Ross and Keyes, to have particularly distinguished themselves.

From the 14th to the 17th November no serious attempts were made by the enemy, and in anticipation of the change of position already alluded to, by which the whole force was to be concentrated on the south side of the pass, the commissariat stores, reserve ammunition, etc., were gradually removed to the eastern ridge.

On the 15th the defences were strengthened, and the 101st Regiment was ordered up to the ridge on the right flank. The enemy had sent marauders to harass the line of communications to the rear; it was therefore unsafe, except for strong, armed parties. A demonstration was made by the enemy in front of the camp, but they soon withdrew. Half the Bajouris were said to have returned to their homes after the action of the 13th, but the *Akhund* was reported to be trying to stop these desertions. The enemy were said also to be much depressed at their losses and want of success.

On the 16th the *Akhund* was on the top of the Buner pass to prevent his followers going home. Owing to the communications with the rear being unsafe, the mules, which had come up with a convoy the day before, were sent back by the Ambela pass, getting down unmolested, the enemy not expecting this movement. The Sappers and Miners, Pioneers, and fatigue parties were employed daily, under engineer officers, in strengthening the defences, but the tools were deficient in number and of bad quality.

On the 17th, the *Akhund* was still on the summit of the Buner pass, where he had built a temporary mosque for shelter. News was received that the Haji Sahib of Kunar, a valley to the north-east of Jalalabad, had been sent for. He was reputed to be very holy, and gifted with the power of counteracting the effect of bullets. Intimation was received that a party of the Utman Khels of the Lundkhwar valley had been told off to intercept convoys between the camp and Sherdara. Battery horses, being in the way and consuming the camp supplies of grain and forage, were on this day sent

*Ambela
expedition,
1863.*

to the rear. An attempt to impede their march resulted in loss to the marauders only. Late on the evening of the 17th, the guns of Captain Griffin's battery (C-19th R.A.) were removed from the advanced breastworks in front of the camp to a new position to cover the withdrawal of the picquets from the Guru mountain, two guns of the Hazara Mountain Train Battery being sent down from the Guru to take their place temporarily.

At daylight on the morning of the 18th, the whole of the troops on the Guru mountain, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel J. L. Vaughan, consisting of the Hazara Mountain Train Battery, and the 3rd, 5th, and 6th Punjab Infantry, were withdrawn, and the entire camp and troops transferred to the heights on the south of the pass. Every precaution had been taken to prevent the enemy from suspecting the intended movement, and the troops both on the Guru and in the front line of defence continued to strengthen up to the last moment their breastworks and defences. These precautions were successful, and though the enemy's picquet on the Guru was not 400 yards distant, the withdrawal was effected without their knowledge, and in the most perfect order.

The concentration of the whole of the troops on the eastern heights made it necessary to extend the position, and particularly to secure the full command of the water, on which the whole force was now dependent.

With this view, the troops, as per margin, moved out under the personal command of Sir Neville Chamberlain, as soon as the change of position was completed, to drive the enemy from what was afterwards known as the "Water" ridge. This was very quickly effected by the advance of the 1st and 6th Punjab Infantry, with a loss on our side of three men wounded, whilst some of the enemy were killed. The

troops were then placed in position to protect the 5th Punjab Infantry and 32nd Punjab Native Infantry, employed as a working party under the direction of Lieut.-Colonel A. Taylor, C.B., Commanding Royal Engineer, in stockading a picquet to command the water. These troops were withdrawn to camp in the evening under the direction of Lieut.-Colonel Vaughan, 5th Punjab Infantry, the new work having been completed and occupied.

On discovering the camp and picquets on the Guru to have been vacated by the troops, the enemy seemed to have supposed that the force was in retreat, and with this idea came into the gorge in great numbers, both from Ambela and from the Guru, and thence, about 11 A.M., commenced an attack upon what had now become the left front of the position. The defences at the point principally attacked consisted of some small breastworks, thrown up on the side of the hill to cover the picquets connecting the advanced right picquets with the camp in the gorge below. It was not intended to hold these breastworks permanently after the camp had been removed from the gorge; but it was necessary to hold them this day to prevent the enemy from pressing upon the camp and firing into it before the troops were thoroughly established in their new position. These picquets were rather advanced and exposed to be taken in flank, and they were, from natural features, not easily defensible.

Major Ross commanded at this point, and the breastworks were held by

Two companies, 71st Highland Light Infantry.	130 men of the 14th Native Infantry, who being greatly outnumbered by the enemy, were, in the first instance, compelled to give way, but being reinforced by the troops as per margin, retook the post and drove back the enemy. The enemy, however, having gained a large accession of numbers, again attacked the picquets,
One company, 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers.	
One company, 5th Punjab Infantry.	
Three companies, 5th Gurkha Regiment.	

when it became necessary for the two lowest down on the hill to fall back on the third, which was nearer the camp breastworks. The picquet upon which the lower picquets had retired was withdrawn after dark. On its withdrawal the enemy pressed on, and some few of them endeavoured to annoy the camp until a late hour of the night, but without making any serious attack.

*Ambela
expedition.
1863.*

Our loss on this occasion was considerable (*see* Appendix C), and the enemy were known to have lost one hundred and thirty killed and upwards of two-hundred wounded.

Among the killed were Captain C. F. Smith, of the 71st Highland Light Infantry, Lieutenant T. S. G. Jones, attached to that regiment, Lieutenant H. H. Chapman, Adjutant of the 101st Regiment, and Lieutenant W. F. Mosley, of the 14th Native Infantry. Among the wounded was Lieutenant A. D. C. Inglis, of the 14th Native Infantry.

Sir Neville Chamberlain stated that the conduct of Major C. C. G. Ross, 14th Native Infantry, merited his approval, and he again begged to recommend him to the notice of the Commander-in-Chief.

On the 19th, it was found that the picquet erected the day before to command the water, was more advanced than necessary, and it was therefore abandoned, and a new position chosen and stockaded about 300 yards to the rear.

During the day the enemy kept up a fire upon the "Crag" and "Water" picquets, when Captain R. B. Aldridge, 71st Highland Light Infantry, was killed at the latter, and Ensign C. M. Stockley, 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers, severely wounded at the former post.

The troops had now been very hard-worked, day and night, for a month. Having continually to meet fresh enemies, it was difficult to repel the attacks and at the same time to provide convoys for supplies and wounded sent to the rear. There were at this time 166 wounded and 286 sick men in the camp. Every animal not urgently needed in camp had been sent to Parmali.

The *Akhund* about this time issued a proclamation that any deserter from his camp should have his property confiscated. Some men were reported to have joined him from Kabul. The *Akhund*, it was known, was averse to the proposal of the Buner tribe to treat, and said he would not be bound by any engagement they might make; he also abused the tribes for want of success.

Major H. R. James, C.B., Commissioner of Peshawar, having returned from furlough, took over political charge from Colonel R. G. Taylor, C.B., on this day, the 19th; but Colonel Taylor, at his own request, remained with the force, to be of any use he could.

On the 20th November the garrison of the "Crag" and "Water" picquets were as marginally noted. About 9 A.M. the enemy began to collect

"Crag" picquet.
101st Regiment, 100 bayonets.

20th Punjab Native Infantry, 100 bayonets.

"Water" picquet.
71st Regiment, 100 bayonets.

3rd Punjab Infantry, 100 bayonets.

in great numbers near these picquets, the "Crag" being, as before, the point principally threatened. They were, however, checked in some degree by the fire of the Peshawar Mountain Train Battery, Captain T. E. Hughes, from previous experience and his acquaintance with the ground, knowing exactly on what points to bring his fire with most effect, even though the enemy were not visible from the battery. The "Crag" and "Water" picquets also mutually supported one another by their cross-fire at 450 yards.

*Ambela
expedition,
1863.*

Up to a late period of the afternoon the enemy had made no impression upon the "Crag" picquet, though numerous standards had been gradually advanced under cover to within a few yards of the breastworks, but about 3 P.M. the unaccountable conduct of a portion of the garrison gave the enemy possession of the post. This was not, however, accomplished without affording the officers and men who held the lower portion of the picquet the opportunity of distinguishing themselves by the resolute way in which they endeavoured to hold their portion of the post under very discouraging circumstances, abandoning it only when it was no longer tenable. These officers were Major H. G. Delafosse of the 101st Regiment, who commanded the picquet, Captain R. G. Rogers, of the 20th Punjab Native Infantry, and Ensign A. R. Sanderson and Assistant Surgeon W. Pile, both of the 101st Regiment. The last two officers were killed at the breastwork whilst endeavouring to rally their men. The above officers were well supported by some men of the 101st Regiment, and by some of the 20th Punjab Native Infantry.

On the fall of the "Crag" coming to the notice of Sir Neville Chamberlain, he immediately ordered the 71st Highland Light Infantry and the 5th Gurkha Regiment to be got under arms and proceed to the upper camp; and at the same time directed Captain Griffin's half battery (C-19th R.A.), and the two 24-pounder howitzers of No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery, under Captain Salt, to open fire upon the "Crag", which they did in so efficient a manner (joined to the fire of Captain Hughes's mountain guns) as effectually prevented the enemy from attempting to occupy it in anything like large numbers.

On the 71st and 5th Gurkha Regiments reaching the upper defences, Colonel W. Hope, C.B., commanding the former, was ordered to storm the "Crag" in front, and Lieutenant-Colonel J. L. Vaughan, with the 5th Gurkhas and 5th Punjab Infantry, to go round the hill, so as to take the lower portion of it in flank. The 71st discharged their duty in the most steady and soldier-like manner, led by Colonel Hope, who, with his Sergeant-Major, was the first to enter the work, which was retaken without much loss on our side. The 5th Gurkhas, with detachments of the 5th and 6th Punjab Infantry, supported on the left; Lieutenant S. Beckett, of the 5th Punjab Infantry, being the first to enter the work on the left.

Thus for the third time the "Crag" picquet was lost and won—a spot which, from the heavy losses sustained there on both sides, had become known in the country as *Kutlgar*, or the place of slaughter. Lieutenant-Colonel J. L. Vaughan and Major J. P. W. Campbell, commanding the 5th Gurkhas, were both wounded.

Brigadier-General Chamberlain accompanied the storming column, and when near the crest of the slope received a severe wound, which, though it did not prevent him pressing on and entering the work at the time, subsequently obliged him to relinquish the command of the force; and Lieutenant W. C. Anderson, 3rd Punjab Cavalry, his orderly officer, was also wounded.

Colonel Hope then pushed forward in pursuit of the enemy, having been joined by Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan's column, and drove them for some distance over the heights in the direction of Lahu. After continuing the pursuit as far as seemed prudent, Colonel Hope withdrew the troops towards the "Crag", and was severely wounded whilst superintending the reoccupation of the picquet, which, at his special request, was garrisoned for the night by 200 men of his own regiment.

The excellent service rendered by the artillery, both previous to and during the assault of the "Crag", elicited Brigadier-General Chamberlain's highest commendation, especially that of the Peshawar Mountain Train Battery, the guns of which were served under a heavy fire; their position, *viz.*, on the upper defences immediately adjoining the "Crag", making their assistance most valuable at a very critical moment. With reference to the part taken by the artillery in this day's proceedings, Sir Neville Chamberlain in his despatch specially brought to the notice of the Commander-in-Chief the officers named in the margin, who were commanding

Ambela expedition, 1863.

Captain F. C. Griffin, C Battery, 19th Brigade, Royal Artillery.
 Captain T. H. Salt, No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery.
 Captain T. E. Hughes, Peshawar Mountain Train Battery.

batteries.

For the list of casualties, see Appendix C. The enemy's loss was reported to be one hundred and twenty killed and two hundred wounded. Large reinforcements were stated to have joined the *Akhund* this day.

The action of the 20th seemed to have had a depressing effect upon the enemy, notwithstanding that they had gained a temporary success, and had wounded the Brigadier-General, which last injury it would have been natural for them to make and think a great deal of. However, from the 20th November to the 15th December (as will be seen hereafter), they made no further attack in force, and at one time their gathering had dwindled down so much, that there appeared a possibility of their giving up the game altogether.

Early on the morning of the 21st, Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan, commanding the advanced picquets, moving out, drove off a few of the enemy in the vicinity, and recovered without any casualty all the bodies of our men slain on the 18th. Twelve of the enemy were killed. The "Crag" picquet defences had been improved, and the troops were in the same position they occupied before the previous day's attack.

On the 22nd the enemy came, at the invitation of the Commissioner, and removed their dead. The sick and wounded officers and men were safely escorted to Parmali. The defences of the "Crag" picquet being now completed, that post was occupied by two hundred bayonets of a British regiment, held on alternate days by the 71st and 101st Regiments. The health of the troops was good, and the weather mild.

On the 23rd, 24th, and 25th, the enemy still remained quiet, but on the last of these dates large numbers appeared in the plain near the village of Ambela, and an attack was expected either on the 26th or 27th. The defences of the "Crag" and "Water" picquets had been much strengthened by Lieut.-Colonel A. Taylor, Royal Engineers. Communication with the rear had also been greatly improved by the completion of a second line of road to Khanpur, by a low ridge of hills easily occupied by our troops. The men were hutting themselves, and as the nights were getting very cold, arrangements were being made for getting up tents.

Sir Neville Chamberlain's wound proved more serious than he had expected, and it was with the greatest regret he had to request to be relieved of the command of the force, which devolved temporarily on Lieutenant-Colonel A. T. Wilde, C.B., who had been in charge of the camp since the Brigadier-General was first wounded.

In relinquishing the command, Sir N. B. Chamberlain thus spoke of the

*Ambela
expedition,
1863.*

The nature of the service had made the duty unusually heavy, and the troops had been under arms night and day. On no occasion, however, had there been the least murmur on this account, and every duty had been performed with the most cheerful alacrity.

He felt sure it would be considered most satisfactory that, though the ranks of the native regiments contained members of almost every tribe on the frontier, including those who were fighting against us, there had been no desertions and no backwardness in any instance to engage the enemy.

He said the services of every regiment with the force had already been alluded to, with the exception of the 32nd Punjab Native Infantry (Pioneers) under Major W. D. Morgan, and the 4th and 5th Companies of the Sappers and Miners, under Lieutenant L. H. E. Tucker. The nature of the service had made it indispensable to employ the 32nd altogether on the defences and lines of communication, and he, therefore, took this opportunity of saying that its services and those of the sapper companies had been of the greatest value to the force. With regard to the 32nd, such was the paucity of men that, even when they had laboured during the day at the breastworks and roads, it was impossible to avoid putting a portion of them on duty at night for the defence of the camp. The discipline of this regiment, and its conduct, reflected great credit on Major Morgan and his officers.

He added, that although there was no scope for the employment of the few cavalry (11th Bengal Cavalry and Guides) retained in camp, yet they always took dismounted duty, and were most useful in aiding in the night defence of the camp.

He brought to the notice of the Commander-in-Chief the very meritorious conduct of the whole of the officers of the force, from all of whom he said, he had at all times received the most cordial support.

The officers he wished particularly to bring to notice were—

Colonel W. Hope, C.B., commanding 71st Highland Light Infantry, who had command of the front defences from the time of the arrival of the force in the Ambela pass until the time of its changing position to the eastern heights, and whose distinguished conduct at the retaking of the "Crag" picquet on the 20th November has already been mentioned.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. T. Wilde, C.B., commanding Corps of Guides, who commanded the right defences, and who, although the position his regiment occupied in camp did not give him the opportunity of gaining distinction in actual conflict with the enemy, rendered the most constant and valuable aid. The excellent arrangements he made for the recapture of the "Crag" picquet when it was taken by the enemy on the 13th November were particularly alluded to.

Lieutenant-Colonel J. L. Vaughan, commanding 5th Punjab Infantry, who commanded the left defences from the time of the arrival of the force in the Ambela pass until the change of position to the right heights. He at all times rendered the most cordial assistance and support, and was considered by the Brigadier-General a most intelligent officer.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. Taylor, C.B., R.E., Commanding Royal Engineer with the force, who afforded throughout the most hearty co-operation, and whose services were of great assistance to the force. With Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor's name were associated those of his subalterns, Lieutenants H. F. Blair, J. Browne, and T. T. Carter, all of the Royal Engineers, who, whether when engaged with the enemy, or when employed in their more regular duties, well upheld the reputation of their corps. Lieutenant Carter

joined the force to carry out the objects of the trigonometrical survey, and volunteered his services under Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor.

*Ambela
expedition,
1863.*

Captain J. S. Tulloh, Commanding Royal Artillery, who most carefully overcame all difficulties, and in whose opinion, in all matters connected with his arm of the service, perfect confidence was held by Sir Neville Chamberlain. With Captain Tulloh's name were associated those of Captains F. C. Griffin, T. H. Salt, F. R. DeBude, and T. E. Hughes, all of whom have been previously alluded to. In Captains DeBude and Hughes, Sir Neville Chamberlain said that the service had two officers most admirably fitted for the command of mountain batteries, who by their zeal had, he believed, brought that arm of the service to as great a degree of efficiency as the ordnance then in use would admit of.

Lieutenant-Colonel F. O. Salusbury, commanding 101st Bengal Royal Fusiliers, who had been most zealous in the discharge of every duty, and who was specially noticed for his distinguished conduct in the retaking of the "Crag" picquet on the 13th November.

Major C. C. G. Ross, commanding 14th Native Infantry, an officer of most soldierly determination, whose excellent conduct on the 13th and 18th November has already been specially noticed.

Major C. H. Brownlow, commanding 20th Punjab Native Infantry, who particularly distinguished himself when covering the retreat of the reconnoitring party, 22nd October, when commanding the "Eagle's Nest" picquet, 26th October, and when commanding the "Crag" picquet on the night of the 12th November. Sir N. Chamberlain stated that, in addition to any other mark of approval the Commander-in-Chief might consider this officer to deserve, he would most strongly recommend him as having well earned the distinction of the Victoria Cross by his personal gallantry on each occasion of his being engaged.

Major C. P. Keyes, commanding 1st Punjab Infantry, whose distinguished conduct on every occasion of his being engaged has already been specially noticed, and whose services were of the utmost value to the force.

Captain W. D. Hoste, commanding 6th Punjab Infantry, whom the Brigadier-General begged to thank for his cheerful and soldierly bearing, and for his marked gallantry at the head of his regiment on the 26th October.

Surgeon W. Simpson, 71st Highland Light Infantry, senior medical officer with the British portion of the force, on whom it devolved to make all arrangements for the sick and wounded of the British troops, which duty he performed to the Brigadier-General's entire satisfaction.

Surgeon H. B. Buckle, 1st Punjab Infantry, senior medical officer with the native portion of the force, whose superintendence of all arrangements for the numerous native sick and wounded, in the most zealous and efficient manner, Sir Neville Chamberlain particularly wished to bring to the notice of the Commander-in-Chief.

Captain J. H. Jenkins, in charge of the Commissariat Department, to whom the force was highly indebted for his untiring exertions to keep it throughout as well supplied as if it had been in cantonments, and whose services the Brigadier-General desired to bring specially to the notice of His Excellency.

Lieutenant-Colonel D. M. Probyn, V.C., C.B., commanding the small party of cavalry in camp, who, although he was only afforded the opportunity of conducting the reconnoitring party into the Chamla valley on the 22nd October, and of charging the enemy who endeavoured to cut off his return to camp, Sir Neville

*Ambela
expedition,
1863.*

Chamberlain wished to bring to notice for his extreme desire to have his men employed on every duty where it was possible to employ dismounted cavalry, as also the cheerful manner in which he made his own services available on every possible occasion.

In giving prominence to the names of the above officers, Sir Neville Chamberlain begged to express a hope that the services of officers whose names had been brought to notice in previous despatches, but who were not mentioned in the above list, would also obtain the favourable consideration of the Commander-in-Chief; and he would also beg to acknowledge the services of his staff, *viz.*, Lieutenant-Colonel G. Allgood, Assistant Quarter-Master General, who had discharged his duties satisfactorily, and afforded every assistance; Major T. Wright, Assistant Adjutant-General; and Lieutenants F. J. N. Mackenzie (Staff Officer, Punjab Irregular Force), W. C. Anderson, and H. S. Jarrett, who had acted as orderly officers, and given perfect satisfaction.

Private William Clapperton.	} 71st Regiment.	sioned officers and men named in the margin, as having displayed distinguished gallantry before the enemy.
Private George Stewart.		
Private William Malcolm.		
Sergeant Jeremiah Brosnan.	} 101st Regiment.	Sir Neville Chamberlain, in conclusion, acknowledged the hearty co-operation he had received throughout from Colonel R. G. Taylor, C.B., who had been, up to within a few
Lance-Corporal G. Simister.		
Private Francis Barber.		
Private Daniel Lane.		
Private Francis Elliott.		
Private Charles Fitzpatrick.		

days of his (Sir Neville Chamberlain's) retirement, chief civil and political officer in the camp. He stated that Colonel Taylor had used every possible endeavour to procure information of the movements and proceedings of the enemy; and when the situation of affairs afforded little scope for political negotiations, both he and his assistant, Captain A. A. Munro, Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar, resumed their position as military officers, and accompanied the troops when engaged with the enemy.

On the 26th November the enemy assembled in small parties on the ridge above the advanced picquets, and reinforcements were sent to the upper camp, with orders to attack, should the enemy attempt to descend. No collision, however, took place, and the day passed off quietly. This day was Friday, a day on which, owing to the superstitious reverence of the enemy (it being the Muhammadan sabbath), it had hitherto been customary with them to attack in force.

But although, since the 20th, there had not occurred anything of importance in the field, the work of the political officers had been steadily going on. Major H. R. James had done all that was possible by negotiations to weaken the enemy, and met with considerable success, due in some degree to the losses they had sustained. He had succeeded in drawing off Ahmad Khan, with the greater portion of the Ashazai and Salarzai sections of the Buner tribe; the Ranizais of Swat were also induced to return to their homes, to the number of 2,000; Sobat Khan sent home his immediate followers; minor personages acted in a similar manner, and amongst those who remained a mutual mistrust prevailed. These desertions were becoming so numerous that the *Akhund* issued denunciations, as already stated, against all who should leave the field, and the *Maulvi* redoubled his efforts to bring back the wavering.

On the 25th a deputation had been received from the Buner *jirga*; and

both from conversation with those composing it, and with men who arrived at intervals by permission to take away their slain, it was evident that the main body of the Bunerwals were really inclined for peace. It was hoped that the *jirga* would now come to terms, and agree to a brigade passing up the Chamla valley to Malka. The greater portion of them were certainly inclined to do so; but the negotiations were broken off by Zaidulla Khan, who was informed by the *Maulvi* that his rival, Ahmad Khan, had received large sums of money from the Commissioner. However, the negotiations resulted in the retirement of Ahmad Khan, with two important sections of the tribe.

*Ambela
expedition,
1863.*

Meanwhile, the above desertions were more than counterbalanced by the arrival of large reinforcements to the enemy. Some 3,000 men arrived at intervals from Bajour, under Faiztalab Khan, the chief of that country. The Haji of Kunar arrived with about 500 men; and his repute for sanctity rendered his advent a matter of great rejoicing to the war party. Still it was noted that, notwithstanding these accessions, the enemy were so divided and mistrustful of each other, that they were unable to resume the attack, even on a Friday, as previously stated.

On the 30th November, Major-General J. Garvock arrived in camp, and assumed command of the force, which was now organised into two brigades, the details of which are given in Appendix G.

Some time previous to this it had been in contemplation to create a diversion on the Swat border, and for this purpose the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Hugh Rose, ordered a column under Colonel R. Y. Shipley, consisting of the troops as per margin, to advance to Shergarh on the Swat frontier, and threaten the Malakand pass. But Major James had meanwhile, unknown to Major-General Garvock, promised the Swat chiefs that

Battery Royal Horse Artillery.
A-19th Royal Artillery.
7th Hussars.
7th Fusiliers.
Guide Cavalry.
3rd Sikhs.

no British troops should enter their country, and he now wished this force to be used to punish the villages of British Baizai for their recent misconduct. This use of the force was, however, not considered advisable by the military authorities, as the object was considered inadequate. Owing, therefore, to the misunderstanding caused by Major James having kept his negotiations with the Swat leaders secret from the General Officer Commanding, the arrival at Ambela of the 7th Fusiliers and the 3rd Sikhs, which were destined to reinforce Major-General Garvock's force, was much delayed. The other reinforcements which arrived to strengthen the Yusufzai Field Force consisted of the 93rd Highlanders and the 23rd Punjab Native Infantry (Pioneers).

Although the enemy had been so disheartened by their defeats that after the 20th November they had made no further attempts on the camp, and the Bunerwals were really desirous for peace, the reinforcements which they had received made them still believe they could successfully oppose our advance; and as the 93rd Highlanders, the last of our reinforcements, marched into the camp, the bands playing them in, the plains below and around Ambela were covered with formidable masses of armed men, evidently paraded as a counter-display to ours.

The force had at this time two parties in its front to deal with.

1. The Buner and Chamla tribes, originally fighting for their country, but now crediting our repeated assertions that we had no intention to invade them; weary of the war, divided amongst themselves, and subject to innumerable vexations and inconveniences by the presence amongst them of so large a host.

Major James's
report.

*Ambela
expedition,
1863.*

2. The *Maulvi* and his fanatics, with the *Akhund* and his allies, a mixed assemblage of men from far and near, whose ranks had been reinforced by Ghazan Khan, the chief of Dir, with 6,000 men, and who imagined they were beginning to realise their dream of years, viz., the expulsion of the British from the country trans-Indus.

Major James's communications with the tribes were now beginning to have effect. On the afternoon of the 10th December a deputation from the Buner tribe had come into camp, where they remained all that night. Every chief of influence was there, and after several lengthy discussions they had agreed—

1st. That they would accompany the Commissioner with a force and destroy Malka.

2nd. That they would expel the Hindustanis from their country.

They left on the morning of the 11th, to obtain the sanction of the *Akhund* and his allies to these arrangements.

At first, by the complete silence of the enemy, the withdrawal of some of their picquets and other indications, a pacific reply was anticipated; but on the 13th, the day fixed for a decision, repeated firing of musketry, welcoming fresh arrivals, and the reports of proclamations issued by the *Akhund*, fulminating anathemas against any one who spoke of peace, prepared the Commissioner for the message which arrived early on the morning of the 14th, to the effect that the *jirga* had been overruled by Ghazan Khan and other new-comers, and that they were therefore unable to return to the camp. It was further intimated that a general attack on the camp was to be made on the 16th, and they advised our taking the initiative, when they, the Bunerwals, would take no prominent part in the action.

Offensive measures for the next day were, therefore, at once decided on by the Major-General, in communication with the Commissioner, in order to anticipate further reinforcements expected by the enemy.

At this time there was a force of some 4,000 of the enemy at Lalu, including some 300 Hindustanis; and as no attack could well be made on Ambela with that force on its flank, it was determined to attack the former place.

The increasing boldness of the enemy was apparent from the fact of parties taking possession during the night of all the roads to the rear, preventing any messengers leaving camp, which appeared to be their sole object, for they vanished in the morning.

First column.
Hazara Mountain Train Battery.
7th Royal Fusiliers.
One Company Sappers and Miners.
3rd Punjab Infantry.
4th Gurkha Regiment.
23rd Punjab Native Infantry (Pioneers).
32nd Punjab Native Infantry (Pioneers).

Second column.
Peshawar Mountain Train Battery.
101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers.
One Company Sappers and Miners.
Corps of Guides.
3rd Sikh Infantry.
5th Gurkha Regiment.

After the arrival of the 7th Fusiliers, 93rd Highlanders, 3rd Sikhs, and 23rd Punjab Native Infantry, the force consisted of about 9,000 men.

On the 14th, orders were issued for the attack on Lalu to be carried out on the following day. The attacking troops were to be formed into two columns, as per margin, and were under the command respectively of Colonel W. W. Turner, C.B., 97th Regiment, and of Lieut.-Colonel A. T. Wilde, C.B., Guide Corps. Rations for two days were served out to the troops.

Lieut.-Colonel J. L. Vaughan was to be left in camp with 2,900 men, to protect it. *Ambela expedition, 1863.*

Major-General
Garvock's
despatch.

At daybreak on the 15th December the attacking force, consisting of 4,800 men, unencumbered by tents or baggage, was ready to move.

The first column assembled at the base of the "Crag" picquet, and on receiving the order to advance, it moved off in the following order:—

4th Gurkhas, three companies skirmishing and three in support.

3rd Punjab Infantry, four companies skirmishing and four in support, covering right flank.

Main Body.

7th Royal Fusiliers.

Sappers and Miners.

Hazara Mountain Train Battery.

23rd Pioneers.

32nd Pioneers.

The advance was made from the right flank of the "Water" picquet; on reaching the crest of the heights overlooking that position, the enemy's picquets were encountered, and driven with some loss to the "Conical" hill.

From the "Conical" hill the first column was separated by a valley about 200 yards wide, and Colonel Turner therefore directed the troops to line the crest of the heights, overlooking it from our own side, to await the arrival of the mountain guns, which, on coming up, were forthwith brought into action. Under cover of their fire, the 23rd Pioneers, supported by the 32nd Pioneers, were moved up into a valley on the right, and secured a height which enabled the left of the enemy's position to be turned.

As soon as the first column had passed out of the main position of the upper camp, the second column was formed in the following order:—

5th Gurkha Regiment.

101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers.

Peshawar Mountain Train Battery.

Sappers and Miners.

Corps of Guides.

3rd Sikh Infantry.

Artillery reserve ammunition.

Infantry " "

the rear being brought up by a detachment of the 3rd Sikh Infantry. Colonel R. G. Taylor accompanied Lieut.-Colonel Wilde throughout the operations.

The column advanced under the "Crag" picquet, the skirmishers of the 5th Gurkha Regiment quickly reaching the low ridge of rocks immediately in front of the enemy's position, which was held in strength behind stone breast-works. The following dispositions were made for the assault: the Peshawar Mountain Train Battery moved up and opened sufficient fire to keep down the matchlock fire from the heights; the 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers and Corps of Guides were formed in line of contiguous columns out of fire beyond the ridge; the other two regiments being held in reserve, in column of sections, to preserve the left flank during the coming attack.

Both columns were now ready to assault the "Conical" hill, which was a most formidable position. The hill sides were rocky, precipitous, and scarped by nature, and the summit, strongly occupied, was strengthened by stone breast-works offering no ordinary obstacle. The ascent would have been a matter

*Ambela
expedition,
1863.*

of considerable difficulty under any circumstances. Below it, and to its proper left, was the hamlet of Banda, strongly protected by artificial defences. Beyond it stretched a narrow ridge, terminating in a hill of lesser elevation; and then came a small, picturesque level, backed by a lofty range containing the village of Lalu.

On the bugle sounding for the assault, under cover of the mountain guns, which were admirably served, the two columns advanced to the assault. The first column advanced down the hill, across the valley, and in ten minutes was driving the enemy down the opposite side of the heights. In the second column the 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers made straight for the highest peak, a strong work crowded with the Hindustani fanatics and their Pathan allies; the Corps of Guides taking a point a little below, with the object of taking the pressure off the 101st, to whom the most difficult part of the assault had been safely assigned. The 101st, leaping into the breastwork, bayoneted some thirty of its defenders, and the Corps of Guides, turning the position under a shower of stones, shot and cut down numbers as they retreated; while the reserve, under the personal direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde, secured the line of hills on the left overlooking the Chamla valley, and drove small parties of the enemy before it.

The enemy, some 2,000 in number, were now in full flight towards the hamlet of Banda, and were rapidly pursued by the men of both columns; the Guides and the 23rd Pioneers having the honour of reaching the hamlet at the same time.

The village of Lalu now appeared about a mile and a half on the right flank of the first column. Colonel Turner therefore pressed the pursuit in that direction, leaving five companies to guard and bring up the guns, and followed the enemy so closely that they retreated in the utmost confusion down the hills towards Ambela.

As soon as the main position of the enemy had been gained by the second column, Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde moved the Peshawar Mountain Train Battery to the end of the ridge, and placed the two regiments which were in reserve in position to watch the spurs of the mountain leading up from the Ambela plain, agreeably with Major-General Garvock's instructions. The enemy, evidently under the impression that the force had pressed on too far, leaving its left unguarded, came out in large numbers from the village of Ambela, and threatened both the left of the camp and the communications of the second column. Ascending the spurs of the heights, they commenced a vigorous assault on Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde's position.

In the meanwhile, having secured possession of the village of Lalu, Colonel Turner found himself on a line of heights flanking the approach to the "Conical" hill. Seeing the attack which was now being made on the second column, the fire of the guns of the Hazara Mountain Train Battery was brought to bear on the flank of the enemy.

As soon as the enemy's attack was developed, Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde sent for reinforcements. Before this requisition reached the Major-General, he had already despatched two companies, 7th Fusiliers, to support the second column, and, on receiving Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde's requisition, the 101st Fusiliers, with the exception of four companies left at the "Conical" hill and on the ridge beyond it, was sent to Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde's support, who was at this time rejoined by the Corps of Guides.

Passing these troops along the rear, Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde reoccupied all the ground close up to the "Crag" picquet, and thus received the enemy's

attack. A gallant attempt to force the line of communications with the camp was made at the point held by the 3rd Sikhs, under Lieutenant-Colonel R. Renny, but was successfully beaten back by that regiment. *Ambela expedition, 1863.*

Shortly afterwards, Major-General Garvock directed a forward movement to be made, and the Guides, and a portion of the 5th Gurkhas and of the 3rd Sikhs, charged down one of the spurs, and the 101st down another, when the enemy were driven off with great slaughter, leaving a standard in the hands of the Gurkhas, and in their flight coming under the fire of the guns of Colonel Turner's column.

Whilst these operations were being carried on at the front, a desultory attack was made by a considerable number of the enemy upon the front and left flank of the upper camp. Being met by the fire of the only one of Captain Griffin's guns (C-19th Royal Artillery) which could be brought to bear upon them from the "Standard" picquet, and by the musketry fire from the breastworks, the enemy were reduced to taking cover amongst the rocks and broken ground, from which they caused, from time to time, considerable annoyance to the upper camp, also to C-19th Royal Artillery, and to the adjoining breastworks.

Later in the forenoon, successive bodies of the enemy endeavoured to approach the camp by the gorge from the direction of Ambela, but coming under the fire of the guns of C Battery, in the lower camp, they broke away to the left, and, ascending the ravines and spurs to the front of the position, joined in the attack upon the upper camp.

The advanced picquet upon the ridge below and in front of the "Crag" (consisting on this day of 50 men, 1st Punjab Infantry) had been threatened from early morning by a constantly increasing body of the enemy. The ground occupied by the advanced picquet, from which the whole of the centre of our position could be commanded, and on which the "Crag" picquet could not, from the nature of the ground, maintain an effective fire, was the point the enemy strove to gain. This point was so important to the safety of the main position, that Lieutenant W. H. Unwin, 1st Punjab Infantry, was instructed by Major C. P. Keyes, commanding that regiment, to hold it as long as he could with any degree of safety. The enemy repeatedly crept up, under cover of the rocks, within a few yards of the picquet, having driven in a small party placed there for observation. Lieutenant Unwin was then reinforced, and subsequently had 200 bayonets at his disposal, including sixty men of the 5th Punjab Infantry, under Lieutenant E. S. Fox,—all that could be spared from the reduced force. The enemy made two vigorous attempts, in considerable strength, to take the position, but were repulsed on each occasion by the picquet, who charged down upon them, and inflicted a loss of forty killed.

At this time (about 2 P.M.) Major C. H. Brownlow, 20th Punjab Native Infantry, who had command of the right defences of the upper camp, observing that the enemy seemed much dispirited by the ill-success against Lieutenant Unwin's picquet, determined to assume the offensive from the camp, and accordingly about 100 men of the 1st Punjab Infantry, led by Major Keyes, advanced from the breastworks, and by a succession of well-executed charges upon the different points occupied by the enemy, completely cleared the whole front and left flank of the defences, driving the enemy in great confusion into the plain below, leaving their dead on all sides.

All opposition having now ceased in every part of the field, and the enemy being in full retreat, arrangements were made for bivouacking for the

*Ambela
expedition,
1863.*

night. Colonel Turner occupied the ground he had gained in the vicinity of Lali, and Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde that between the camp and the "Conical" hill. Not a shot was fired during the night. Our losses are given in Appendix C. Those of the enemy were four hundred killed and wounded.

Major-General Garvock, in his despatch, drew special attention to the distinguished gallantry of Major C. P. Keyes and Lieutenant W. H. Unwin. Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan stated that the 1st Punjab Infantry deserved the greatest credit for their conduct. Major Keyes alluded to the way in which Lieutenants F. J. Keen and A. Vallings, 1st Punjab Infantry, had led the attack on the right and left, and to the assistance afforded to Lieutenant Unwin by Lieutenant T. T. Oliphant. The men marginally noted were specially mentioned as having distinguished themselves.

Early on the morning of the 16th, four hundred sabres of the 11th Bengal Cavalry and Guide Corps, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel D. M. Probyn, V.C., C.B., were brought from camp, and the order was given to advance towards the plain.

Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde's column, which was accompanied by Major-General Garvock, passed down by the spurs in its immediate front, the mountain guns attached to it descending with the cavalry by a steep path, which ran down a hollow on the right. The plain was reached about mid-day, and the column having been formed, as per margin, Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde advanced across the valley towards the Buner pass, the troops in high spirits, confidently hoping for an engagement on ground comparatively easy to what they had been previously accustomed to.

Advanced guard.
One company Guide Corps.
Main column.
Guide Corps.
101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers.
Peshawar Mountain Train
Battery.
Sappers and Miners.
5th Gurkha Regiment.
3rd Sikh Infantry.
Ammunition dandies.
Rear guard.
One Company, 3rd Sikh
Infantry.

As the column debouched into the open country, the enemy appeared in great force on a low ridge of hills, which completely covered the approach to Ambela, and numerous gay standards of all colours were visible on the prominent hillocks. Major-General Garvock determined, after a careful examination of the ground, on attacking the enemy's position, and turning their right.

The position occupied by the enemy was one singularly well chosen; it was of great strength, and peculiarly capable of defence. The enemy, however, seeing that his left would be effectually turned by Colonel Turner's column, which was now advancing, and by the cavalry, abandoned this position, and, almost without firing a shot, retreated slowly towards the pass leading to Buner.

As soon as the second column had begun to descend from the "Conical" hill, the first column, having the shortest line to pass over, had moved in echelon of regiments from the left. The 3rd Punjab Infantry passed down the spur which ran parallel to that by which Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde's column was descending, and protected the right flank of that column; the 4th Gurkhas marched down the next parallel ridge, and the main body, consisting of the 23rd Pioneers in advance, left wing Royal Fusiliers, Hazara Mountain Train Battery, Sappers and Miners, and right wing Royal Fusiliers, proceeded down the gorge leading from the village of Lali to that of Ambela and to the Chamla valley; while the 32nd Pioneers crowned the heights and

effected a parallel movement, covering the right flank. The pathway was steep, and in parts precipitous and rocky and it was with great difficulty that the mountain guns could be brought down; but Captain F. R. DeBude, by his energy and perseverance, overcame all obstacles, a company of Sappers and Miners, under Lieutenant L. H. E. Tucker, rendering most valuable service. At 2.30 P.M., Colonel Turner found himself able to debouch into the plain with the leading regiments, and the left wing of the Royal Fusiliers.

*Ambela
expedition,
1863.*

The 3rd Punjab Infantry and the 4th Gurkhas had now effected their junction with the right of Lieut.-Colonel Wilde's column, and with it were in possession of the extreme right of the enemy's position, which was about a mile and a half from, and facing the entrance to, the Buner pass.

Up to this time the cavalry had remained concealed behind a projecting spur; they were now ordered to advance, and passing on at a gallop, under Lieut.-Colonel D. M. Probyn, and Captain C. W. Hawes of the Guides, passed round the left of the enemy's position, now in our possession, swept into the valley

Major James's
report.

beyond, and halted to the eastward of Ambela. The village, which had been previously abandoned, was immediately fired, large stores of grain falling into our hands.

The main portion of the second column had deployed immediately opposite the village of Ambela, and Colonel Turner was now ordered to try and cut off the rear of the enemy from the pass, as they were retreating before Lieut.-Colonel Wilde, but at the same time not to compromise himself in the pass. He therefore formed a line of the 23rd Pioneers and left wing of the 32nd Pioneers, with the right wing of that regiment in column of companies at wheeling distance, left in front, and directed their advance along the south-western face of the village of Ambela, the left wing of the 7th Royal Fusiliers forming the reserve, in quarter-distance column, in rear of the centre of the line. After passing the village, which was in flames, the right wing of the 32nd was brought up in prolongation of the line to the right, which brought the right near the base of the hill which shut in the mouth of the pass. The advance was steadily continued in the same order to within about 800 yards of the mouth of the pass, when the enemy opened a furious fire of matchlocks and *zamburaks*, which was returned by the line as it continued to advance. As a large body of the enemy were observed moving to their right and beyond the left flank, Colonel Turner moved two companies from the reserve of the Royal Fusiliers, and placed them in an oblique position covering the left, whilst at the same time Lieut.-Colonel Probyn moved a body of his men into a position which still further covered the left flank.

Seeing these movements, the enemy made a furious onset, sword in hand, upon the left flank of the line, which was now in broken ground covered with jungle. The 23rd and 32nd Punjab Native Infantry were staggered for the moment by the suddenness of the onslaught, but turning quickly on their assailants, they destroyed the whole of them, not allowing one to escape. Upwards of two hundred of their bodies lay upon the field, forty of whom were Hindustanis. Lieutenant G. Alexander, of the 23rd, was killed, and Captain C. F. F. Chamberlain and Lieutenant C. D. P. Nott, of the 23rd, and Major T. Wheler and Lieutenant F. H. B. Marsh, of the 32nd, were wounded.

Flushed with success, the pioneer regiments now pushed forward into the pass, driving the enemy before them. But the day was far spent, the hostile position was occupied in great force, and Major-General Garvock was moreover

*Ambela
expedition,
1863.*

aware that the Government did not desire to invade Buner. The withdrawal of the troops was therefore ordered. This was effected in echelon of regiments from the right under cover of the fire of the guns of the Hazara Mountain Train Battery, and C-19th R.A. The guns of the latter battery had been brought on elephants from the camp, and were now fully horsed. No molestation whatever was offered by the enemy, who, in immense numbers and in sullen silence, lined the heights above.

The number of the enemy in the field during these two days, *viz.*, the 15th and 16th, was 15,000. The Bunerwals gave signal proof of their sincerity by taking no prominent part in the actions, the men who fought having been chiefly Hindustanis, Bajouris, and the men of Swat and Dir. Thus the punishment inflicted fell, as the Commissioner had hoped, on those who had in such an unprovoked manner joined in the contest, and over-ruled the Bunerwals in their desire for peace.

On the night of the 16th the columns bivouacked in the neighbourhood of Ambela. During the night Faiztalab Khan and the Bajouris, Ghazan Khan and his clansmen from Dir, with the miscellaneous gatherings from more distant parts, were all in rapid flight towards their homes. The *Akhund*, with the *Khans* and people of Swat, alone remained on the crest of the Buner pass, not as before, with flaunting standards, but behind the hill, out of sight, and all prepared to run in the event of the troops advancing. Thus enabled to act independently, the Buner *jirga* returned to Major James on the morning of the 17th, not even talking of terms, but simply asking for orders.

There were two plans, either of which could be adopted. The first was to send a strong brigade to Malka to destroy it, and to return by the Chamla valley to Ambela. But in this case it would be necessary to call up another convoy from Parmali, and this would necessitate a delay of seven days in the advance of this brigade, during which time the *Akhund* and *Maulvi* would have time to collect their scattered forces and to receive reinforcements of fresh men on their way to join them; this delay also would give the Amazais, Mada Khels, Hassanzais, and other northern tribes, time to collect and organise resistance; and, moreover, on the retirement of the brigade there would be no guarantee that the Hindustanis would not be allowed to return to Malka by the neighbouring tribes stirred up by these proceedings. This plan was not therefore approved.

The second plan was to require the Buner men to destroy Malka without any aid from our troops. Its advantages were, that the success already gained would be at once completed, collision with distant tribes in a rugged country would be avoided, and the Hindustanis would be cut off from every hope of a resettlement on the spurs of the Mahaban; for the Buner men would be obliged to associate with themselves, the Amazais, and Mada Khels, and if these tribes committed themselves thus openly against the fanatics, it would be a sure guarantee that they would not re-admit them.

But the destruction was to be real, not nominal; and it would be necessary that some British officers should accompany the *jirga* to see the work carried out. This would necessitate the sending of an escort with them sufficient to protect them from any individual or factious acts of treachery. Of more extended faithlessness Major James had not the slightest anxiety. Half the *jirga* were to remain with him. The force was in possession of the Chamla valley, and Buner itself was at our mercy. At the same time it was known that Malka was deserted, and that there could be no opposition which the Buner tribes would be unable to overcome. Major-General

Garvock concurring in the Commissioner's views, the following requisitions were made on the Buner *jirga*, to which they unanimously consented :—

*Ambela
expedition,
1863.*

- I.—To dismiss the army of all kinds on the Buner pass.
- II.—To send a party to destroy Malka completely, to be accompanied by British officers and such escort as might be considered necessary.
- III.—To expel the Hindustanis from the Buner, Chamla, and Amazai lands.
- IV.—To leave as hostages the whole of their chief men till the above requirements should be fully carried out.

Leaving the greater part of their number with the Commissioner, a few returned to the pass, and by the next morning the army on its crest, including the Swat *Khans* and people, were hastening to their homes.

Colonel R. G. Taylor, from the first, had been unremitting in his inquiries regarding the nature of the country, and to no safer and more chivalrous hands could the important and delicate duty about to be undertaken have been entrusted. He was, therefore, deputed to proceed with the Buner *jirga*. Escorted by the Corps of Guides, under Lieutenant F. H. Jenkins, Col. J. M. Adye, C.B., R.A. and a body of levies, under the Sadum chief, Aziz Khan, and accompanied by the officers marginally noted, the party advanced from Ambela on the 19th, and reached Kuria, at the upper end of the Chamla valley, that evening. Here they were detained on the 20th by heavy rain, and it then became apparent, from the diminished number of the Bunerwals, that the *jirga* intended rather to carry out their engagements by friendly overtures to the Amazais than by coercion. Colonel R. G. Taylor, fully appreciating the policy which had been adopted, and supported by the evident frank determination of the Buner *maliks* to fulfil their engagements, determined to acquiesce in this plan of operations.

On the morning of the 21st, the weather having cleared, the march was continued (*see* Map, page 100). On turning to their right, the party entered Amazai territory. From Kuria to Nagrai is seven miles. Soon after leaving the former, a narrow defile, which could be easily rendered defensible, was entered. The road, for about a mile, followed the stony bed of the *nullah*, and then turned up over a spur of the ridge; this spur, though not a very stiff one, would have been a good place to offer opposition to an advance. On arrival at Nagrai, a party of the Amazais appeared on a hill commanding the onward march, under their chief, Mouza Khan, in full warlike array, with standards and drums, and it became known that they had been joined by parties of the Mada Khels.

To those unacquainted with the real nature of the case, it must have seemed a critical moment, and undoubtedly it was one requiring the utmost tact and firmness on the part of the political officer; but Colonel R. G. Taylor, fortunately, was an officer who eminently possessed those qualities. It appeared that the Mada Khels were either marching to join the war, and had only heard, on reaching the Mahaban tract, of the complete collapse of the tribes, or that Mouza Khan, having heard that the Bunerwals had given in, and were going to force the burning of Malka on the Mahaban tribes, had called them up to see what aid they could afford to mitigate the evils.

The Buner chiefs, advancing, held council with those of the Amazais, and, after a long conference, the *lashkar* of the latter withdrew. Mouza Khan and their other headmen now joined Colonel R. G. Taylor, and with this accession of

Colonel R. G. Taylor's
report.

*Ambela
expedition,
1863.*

strength, the party proceeded to Malka, where it arrived late in the afternoon, and where, owing to the delay caused by the above interruption, it took up its quarters for the night.

Malka was situated on an elevated plateau, on a northern spur of the Mahaban range. It was a much larger and more substantial place than any known in those hills, containing several large edifices, among which the *Ma'wi's* hall of audience, barracks for the soldiers, stabling, and a powder manufactory, formed conspicuous objects. There were no regular fortifications, but the outer walls of the houses were connected, and formed a continuous line of defence with posterns. There was also a tower at the gateway.

The place was found deserted, and on the morning of the 22nd December the Bunerwals and Amazais commenced to burn and destroy it. An effort was at first made by the Amazais, and afterwards by the Buner *Khans*, to save a large portion of the place, on the plea that it had been occupied by men of their tribe, and not by the Hindustanis; but Colonel R. G. Taylor was firm, and determined to destroy the whole place, which was completely done by noon. The escort witnessed the burning, but were in no way employed in the work of destruction. Whilst this was going on, information was brought that the Amazais were going down the valley to join the Mada Khels, who had remained at Nagrai, which, of course, caused Colonel R. G. Taylor much anxiety.

The Shergarh pass, by which the column had to return, was a difficult one; and if the smouldering sparks in the minds of the hill-men had blown up into a flame, the position would have been a most critical one; but Colonel R. G. Taylor never wavered in his determination. Shortly afterwards, Aziz Khan, the Sadum chief, who was in a manner in general charge of the proceedings, sent word that he wished for leave to go down the valley to look after what was going on, and Colonel Taylor agreed at once, putting full trust in the honest intentions of the Bunerwals to carry out their engagements. Matters were speedily arranged by Aziz Khan, who directed the baggage, which had begun moving towards Kuria, but which had been stopped on the above untoward report, to come on.

Colonel R. G. Taylor spoke to the Amazais who were present, but they were sullen, and not inclined to answer in good spirit; however, they were saved the trouble by Zaidulla Khan, one of the Buner chiefs, who stepped in front of them, and, grasping his beard with his one remaining hand, said—"I am answerable for these men, both for their conduct now, and for their excluding the Hindustanis in future." This incident illustrates the fact that the Mahaban tribes, though strong, and not to be despised with their stiff country, are yet powerless to resist the will of Buner.

If things at times looked a little lowering and uncertain, it was but the natural result of the position in which this force was placed; their task had taken them through a narrow defile into a cup of wild, mountainous country, never previously visited by our troops. The force found themselves in the presence of strong tribes, certainly not over well pleased with their visitors, or the errand on which they had come; but from the first, Colonel R. G. Taylor felt confident that the representatives of the stronger tribe that accompanied him could carry out their engagements, and overcome the would-be recusants.

Colonel Taylor said the spectacle of a tribe like the Bunerwals doing our bidding and destroying the stronghold of their own allies in the war, at a distant spot, naturally under the protection of other tribes of well-known prowess and strength, with British witnesses looking on, must have been a

thoroughly convincing proof to the surrounding country of the reality of our success, and of the indubitable prostration felt by the powerful Buner tribe, which had been the foremost in opposing us. *Ambela expedition, 1863.*

The party returned to Kuria that evening, and on the morning of the 23rd marched to the camp in the Ambela pass, accompanied by some of the Amazai *maliks*.

On the departure of Colonel R. G. Taylor's party, the troops had returned to their former position in the pass; and the 1st, 5th, and 6th Punjab Infantry and the 20th Punjab Native Infantry had commenced their march towards their different cantonments. The remainder of the force now commenced its return to the plains, all being assembled at Nawakila on the 25th December.

The British loss during the whole of the above operations (*see* Appendix D) had been 15 British and 4 native officers, 34 British and 185 native rank and file—total 238, killed; 21 British and 27 native officers, and 118 British and 504 native rank and file—total 670, wounded; grand total 908.

Major James, the Commissioner, estimated the loss of the enemy at 3,000 killed and wounded. A nominal roll of the British officers killed and wounded is given in Appendices E and F.

Major-General Garvock, in his despatch, mentioned the valuable services of Colonel W. W. Turner, C.B., and Lieut.-Colonel A. T. Wilde, C.B., commanding brigades; of the efficiency of his staff, Lieut.-Colonel G. Allgood and Major T. Wright; he commended the arrangements of Surgeon W. Munro, Principal Medical Officer, and of Assistant-Surgeon J. H. Sylvester, who was in charge of the sick and wounded at Nawakila; and the efficient discharge of his arduous duties by Captain J. H. Jenkins, Principal Commissariat Officer.

The names also of the following officers were favourably mentioned:—

Major H. C. Johnstone, Revenue Survey.

Captain F. B. Norman, Assistant Quarter-Master General.

Captain J. S. Tulloh, commanding Royal Artillery.

Captains F. C. Griffin, T. E. Hughes, F. R. DeBude, and T. H. Salt, commanding batteries.

Lieutenant H. S. Clarke, Royal Artillery, Commissary of Ordnance.

Lieutenant L. H. E. Tucker, commanding Sappers and Miners.

Lieut.-Colonel D. M. Probyn, V.C., C.B., commanding the cavalry.

Captain C. W. Hawes, commanding Guide Cavalry.

Colonel R. Y. Shipley, commanding 7th Fusiliers.

Lieut.-Colonel F. O. Salusbury, commanding 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers.

Major C. P. Keyes, commanding 1st Punjab Infantry (who led his regiment, although suffering from a wound received in a previous action).

Lieut.-Colonel R. Renny, commanding 3rd Sikh Infantry.

Captain H. P. Close, commanding 5th Gurkha Regiment.

Major W. D. Morgan, commanding 32nd Pioneers.

Captain C. F. F. Chamberlain, commanding 23rd Pioneers.

Lieut.-Colonel J. L. Vaughan, commanding 5th Punjab Infantry.

Major A. C. Parker, commanding 71st Highland Light Infantry.

Major C. H. Brownlow, commanding 20th Punjab Native Infantry.

Major C. C. G. Ross, commanding 14th Native Infantry.

Captain J. A. Tytler, V.C., commanding 4th Gurkha Regiment.

*Ambela
expedition.
1862*

Major F. W. Burroughs, commanding 93rd Highlanders.
 Captain A. U. F. Ruxton, commanding 3rd Punjab Infantry.
 Lieutenant F. H. Jenkins, commanding Guide Infantry.
 Captain C. W. R. Chester, 4th Gurkhas. } Brigade Majors.
 Lieutenant J. H. Campbell, 71st H.L.I. }
 Lieutenant A. Scott, 32nd Pioneers, Baggage Master.

He expressed his best thanks to Colonel J. M. Adye, C.B., Deputy Adjutant-General, Royal Artillery, and to Major F. S. Roberts, V.C., Assistant Quarter-Master General, attached to the force on particular service; also to Lieutenant F. J. N. Mackenzie, Staff Officer, Punjab Irregular Force; Lieutenant H. S. Jarrett, 1st Punjab Cavalry, Orderly Officer; and Captain E. M. Jones, 20th Regiment, Aide-de-Camp.

Major-General Garvock also alluded to the hearty co-operation of Major H. R. James, C.B., the Commissioner, and he expressed his thanks to Colonel R. G. Taylor, C.B., Commissioner of the Derajat.

Colonel Turner, who commanded the 1st Brigade, favourably noticed the following officers:—

Lieutenant G. C. Jackson, 11th Bengal Cavalry, Orderly Officer.
 Captains F. G. E. Warren and F. R. Butt, and Lieutenant E. J. de Lautour, of the Royal Artillery.
 Lieutenant J. Browne, Royal Engineers.
 Captain F. D. Ogilvie and Lieutenant F. Cardew, 3rd Punjab Infantry.
 Major T. Wheler (severely wounded), Lieutenant F. H. B. Marsh (twice wounded), and Ensign T. P. Stevens, 32nd Pioneers.
 Assistant Surgeon G. N. Cheke, 23rd Pioneers.

In the 2nd Brigade, Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde mentioned the names of—
 Major G. C. Lambert and Captain N. T. Parsons, 101st Regiment.
 Lieutenant J. Cook, 3rd Sikhs.
 Lieutenant E. C. Codrington, 5th Gurkhas.

In his report Colonel R. G. Taylor alluded to the services of—

Major H. W. H. Coxe, Deputy Commissioner of Hazara.
 Captain A. A. Munro, Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar, who accompanied the force.
 Lieutenant R. G. Sandeman, Assistant Commissioner, who had charge of the levies, etc., and said the levies did good service both in Hazara and Yusafzai.

And Major James, after mentioning these officers, alluded to the services of—

Lieutenant P. W. Powlett, Assistant Commissioner.
 Mr. Faichnie, Post Master.
 Mr. Brown, Telegraph Department.

Of the services of the native chiefs, Major James regretted that on this occasion he had but a limited number to notice. He observed general apathy and indifference amongst those who could have rendered us important services, yet failed to do so; but there were a few bright exceptions of men who brought their entire energies and influence to bear in our favour.

Chief amongst these were Ajab Khan and Aziz Khan, the Sadum *Khans*. From first to last their active co-operation was conspicuous, and in the highest degree valuable. They were called upon to furnish a contingent

of 120 men, and they not only selected a really useful body, but kept up nearly double the number at their own charges. To these *Khans* and their men were entrusted a part of the breastworks and the convoy of *daks* and stores through the Sherdara pass; and the duties cheerfully performed by them throughout were incessant, and accompanied at times with considerable danger. They afforded a strong contrast to the useless bodies of men furnished by the other *Khans* of the district, who were unable to take upon themselves even the most trivial duties. Ajab Khan and Aziz Khan were further constantly employed by Major James in difficult and delicate business connected with the negotiations, and in every way they proved themselves loyal and true to the British Government. Closely associated with them was Mian Muhammad Shah of Ismaila, who on all occasions exerted himself honestly in our cause.

*Ambela
expedition,
1863.*

With regard to the conduct of the troops, Major James said that, although their general bearing throughout an unusually harassing and trying campaign would doubtless be brought elsewhere to the notice of Government, there were a few circumstances connected with it which might be appropriately referred to by him. Mischievous rumours were being recklessly circulated throughout the country by officious but irresponsible native agents that some of the Sikh regiments of the force were about to declare against us, when there was never the slightest ground for such rumours, and when at the very time the Sikhs were fighting bravely and falling in our cause. It was also a fact well worthy of being noted by Government that under very peculiar circumstances the Pathan portion of the troops gave singular proof of their loyalty. It cannot be supposed that to fight against the *Akhund* was more agreeable to them than to other Muhammadans, and yet in no single instance did his advent amongst the enemy influence their conduct. The casualties amongst the Pathans were fully as numerous as those of any other race: many of our soldiers were closely allied to some of the hostile tribes; on one occasion, when the enemy came to our picquets to remove their dead, a young sepoy of Buner had the pain of recognising his own father among the slain.

Colonel R. G. Taylor, whilst bearing like testimony to the good conduct of the Pathan soldiery, said the personal influence of officers will always be found to be the only stand-by for the Government interests when the religious cry is raised and the fidelity of our troops is being tampered with. Pay, pensions, and orders of merit, may and would be cast to the winds when the honour of the faith was in the scale; but to snap the associations of years, and to turn in his hour of need against the man whom he has proved to be just and worthy, whom he has noted in the hour of danger, and quoted to his family, is just what a Pathan will not do—to his honour be it said. The fact was that the officers in camp had been so long and kindly associated with their soldiers, that the latter were willing to set them before their great religious Panjandrum himself.

In forwarding the despatches relating to the campaign, the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Hugh Rose, stated that he desired to bring to the special notice of the Government of India the services of Brigadier-General Sir N. B. Chamberlain, K.C.B., and Major-General J. Garvock, who had successively commanded the Yusufzai Field Force, and to recommend that they might receive a suitable reward for the very important services they had rendered to the State.

He also brought under the notice of Government the very good service

*Ambela
expedition,
1863.*

performed by Colonel Turner and Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde in command of brigades. The latter officer had served throughout the whole of the operations, and after Brigadier-General Chamberlain was wounded, temporarily exercised the command of the force, during which time he earned the Commander-in-Chief's special approbation.

The Commander-in-Chief entirely concurred in the encomiums bestowed by Brigadier-General Chamberlain and Major-General Garvock on the officers and men of the field force at large for the excellent spirit they had displayed. The duties devolving on the picquets were specially prolonged and hard, but the troops, British as well as native, performed them with a cheerfulness and good feeling characteristic of their high discipline.

His Excellency stated that it was due to military merit, and devotion of the highest order, and might be some consolation to the relatives of the officers in question that he should record how nobly three officers of the greatest promise died in action.

Lieutenant G. M. Richmond, of the 20th Punjab Native Infantry, when about to be relieved at the expiration of his tour of duty, prevailed on his commanding officer, because it was a post of danger, to allow him to remain for four successive days in charge of the "Eagle's Nest" picquet, where he was killed by a bullet through the head.

Lieutenant H. H. Chapman, of the 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers, although knowing that he was dying of a mortal wound, bound up the wounds of a brother officer, and sent an important message to the position.

Lieutenant J. P. Davidson, of the 1st Punjab Infantry, rather than retire from his post, died fighting to the last against overwhelming numbers, with a heroism that elicited the admiration of one of the principal chiefs of the Buner tribe.

The following General Order was published by the Government of India :—

"His Excellency the Governor-General in Council, in publishing the despatches received from His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, regarding the late operations against the enemy in the Mahaban mountain and the Chamla valley, embraces with much satisfaction the opportunity now afforded him of thanking the troops for their services.

"The gallantry, fortitude, and endurance which have been displayed throughout the expedition are worthy of the highest praise, and His Excellency will have much satisfaction in bringing them to the notice of Her Majesty's Government.

"The Governor-General in Council cordially acknowledges the very distinguished services of Brigadier-General Sir N. B. Chamberlain, K.C.B. (whose wound and impaired state of health are much regretted by His Excellency), and of Major-General J. Garvock, in successive command of the Yusafzai Field Force.

"He also thanks the political officers, Major H. R. James, C.B., the Commissioner of Peshawar, and Colonel Reynell G. Taylor, C.B., for their valuable services.

"While the acknowledgments of the Governor-General in Council are due to the whole of the officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers composing the late Yusafzai Field Force, for the excellent spirit they displayed from first to last, he desires especially to commend those who have been prominently brought to notice in the several reports of engagements by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and more particularly Colonel Turner,

C.B., and Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde, C.B., in command of brigades, the latter of whom served throughout the operations, and for a time commanded the whole force to the entire satisfaction of the Commander-in-Chief. *Ambela expedition, 1863.*

“The Governor-General in Council also desires especially to thank those officers who held the command of corps or batteries, or who performed responsible staff duties, and earned the approbation of the commanders of the force, and of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

“The successful exertions of the Commissariat Department, under Captain Jenkins, and the services of Surgeons Simpson, Munro, and Buckle, and of the Medical Department generally, are much appreciated by the Governor-General in Council.

“It will afford the Governor-General in Council the highest satisfaction to submit to Her Majesty’s Government the names of such British officers and soldiers as may be recommended by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief for distinction or reward. The rewards bestowed by the Major-General commanding the force on native officers and soldiers, in anticipation of sanction, are confirmed by the Government of India.

“The Governor-General in Council laments the severe loss sustained by the troops in their gallant encounters with a brave and determined foe, and joins with His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in admiration of the noble spirit of the officers named by His Excellency who died at their posts under circumstances most honourable to their memory.”

In acknowledging the receipt of the despatches regarding these operations, the Secretary of State for India observed that they had been conducted with great skill by the military officers employed, and the negotiations with the tribes, no less so, by the political officers who accompanied the force; that the result had been eminently successful, and that Her Majesty’s Government heartily concurred in the commendations which the Government of India had bestowed upon the principal military and political officers who had conducted these operations to a successful close. The Secretary of State stated that the services of Brigadier-General Sir Neville Chamberlain and Major-General J. Garvock would be noticed in the Military Department; that the excellent judgment displayed by Major H. R. James in his negotiations with the tribes, and especially the manner in which he converted the Bunerwals into serviceable allies, and employed them in the destruction of the stronghold of the fanatics at Malka, indicated in a still higher degree those qualities which had already earned for him the confidence of the Government of India; whilst Colonel R. G. Taylor had also earned the thanks of Her Majesty’s Government by the judicious manner in which he had performed the duties entrusted to him in regard to the operations against Malka.

G.G.O. No. 812 of
1869.

The Indian medal with a clasp for “Ambela” was granted in 1869 to all survivors of the troops engaged in the above operations of the Yusafzai Field Force.

The attitude of the Gaduns during the campaign had been, on the whole, satisfactory. Most of their chiefs were present in camp with the political officers, and there was no general collection of any part of the tribe against us. Individuals, undoubtedly, joined the enemy, but not nearly to such an extent as did our own subjects in Yusafzai. Only two men of the tribe

Coercion of the
Gaduns and
Utmanzais
after the
Ambela
expedition.

Peshawar Mountain
Train Battery.
Hazara Mountain
Train Battery.
101st Royal Bengal
Fusiliers.
One company of Sap-
pers and Miners.
Corps of Guides.
3rd Sikh Infantry.
3rd Punjab Infantry.
5th Gurkha Regi-
ment.

were killed or wounded. One of the headmen, Malik Isa, of the Mansur section, however, did not present himself the whole time, and it being considered necessary to require security from the Gaduns generally after the Ambela campaign was over, a brigade, consisting of the troops noted in the margin, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel A. T. Wilde, C.B., marched from Nawakila to Maini (see Map, p. 100) on the 28th December 1863, being accompanied by Major H. R. James, C.B., as Political Officer.

Ten days' supplies were carried with the force, with ammunition at two hundred rounds per native soldier, and one hundred and forty rounds per British soldier.

The remainder of the troops of the Yusafzai Field Force marched back to their respective cantonments.

The Gadun tribe, as already stated, is divided into two chief sections, the Mansur and the Salar. The former had generally formed the recusant party in dealings with us, under the leadership of Isa Khan; but associated with him had been Jehangir Khan, of the Salar section.

On the 30th December the troops arrived at Maini, and on the following day all the chiefs of the tribe had assembled in the villages of Bisak and Gandap, the headquarters of the Mansur and Salar sections respectively, and both situated about four miles distant. Isa Khan was with them, but, actuated by fear, he did not come in to the Commissioner with the rest, though he counselled them to perfect submission. However, on Major James again sending for him, he came in and joined the *jirga*.

On the 1st of January the Commissioner had a discussion with them on the subject of their offences, which they admitted, at the same time pleading certain things in extenuation; it only remained, therefore, to take guarantees for the future.

When the *Syads* and Hindustanis had returned in the previous July, they had occupied Mandi, a place adjacent to Sittana, and had built there a kind of fort of loose stones. The village itself belonged to *Syads* not connected with Mubarak Shah's family, and it had been spared in 1858, as they were considered to be blameless for what had then happened. As the Hindustanis had, however, again found the place ready to their hand, and occupied it, it became as necessary to remove a powerless as a disloyal colony. By requiring the Gaduns and Utmanzais to perform this work, a guarantee in their case would be obtained similar to the security we had in regard to the Bunerwals and Amazais at Malka. Believing this to be a more complete and satisfactory termination than the taking of hostages, regarding which there were several difficulties, Major James made a demand on them for its execution, to which they expressed their consent.

During the night, however, worked on by interested parties, and at the instigation of Jehangir Khan, the men of Gandap left the camp, and declined to be parties to the agreement. The ostensible cause was declared to be that it was proposed to take the force *viâ* Gandap, the direct road to Khabal, which portended mischief to the village. It was a case to be promptly met, and Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde, therefore, moved out on the morning of the 2nd, and occupied the low hills in rear of, and over, the village of Gandap. The ascent was steep and difficult. The village was a strong one, situated among low

Major James's
report.

hills, and consisting of about a thousand houses full of cotton and other property. The place was completely at our mercy ; but being most anxious not to be forced to extremities, the Commissioner sent men of the Gadun *jirga* (all of whom, together with those of the Utmanzai *jirga*, had accompanied him) to reason with the Gandap people, when they all came in, and agreed to join in the allotted work : the troops accordingly returned to camp at sunset without a shot having been fired.

*Coercion of the
Gaduns and
Utmanzais
after the
Ambela
expedition.*

The following day the force proceeded to Khabal, where the Utmanzais were formally associated with the Gaduns. Leaving the camp there, Major James proceeded on the 4th to Mandi, accompanied by Lieut.-Colonel Wilde and a portion of the troops. It had been recently much improved, and contained some substantial houses. The whole was destroyed and burnt by the *jirgas*, and the walled enclosure, denominated a fort, was levelled. Sittana was found still a ruin, as it had been left by Sir S. J. Cotton in 1858. On the 5th the troops returned to Pihur, where the Gaduns and Utmanzais executed fresh agreements, individually and collectively, and, at their intercession, the Gandap men were pardoned for their foolish conduct on the 2nd of January.

All the objects of the expedition trans-Indus having been thus accomplished, and the season being too far advanced for any active measures against the Hassanzais of the Black Mountain, Lieut.-Colonel Wilde's force was broken up, and the troops returned to their respective cantonments.

On the 9th January 1864 the *jirga* of the Mada Khels came in to Major Coxe, the Deputy Commissioner of Hazara, who was with the troops watching the Hassanzais and protecting the Amb territory, and asserted that they had entertained no hostile feeling towards the British Government, but had been compelled by the pressure of the neighbouring tribes, which they were unable to resist, to join the hostile movement organised by the Bunerwals and the *Akhund* of Swat. They then executed an agreement to maintain in future friendly relations with the Tanawali chief, and on no account to grant the Hindustanis countenance or habitation within the limits of their country.

Report of Punjab
Government.

Two days afterwards, that section of the Amazais which had not previously waited on the Commissioner at Ambela, came in to Major H. W. H. Coxe, and also executed an agreement to exclude the Hindustanis altogether from their limits. Later on, he also received the submission of the Hassanzais, with the exception of Kabul Khan, the son of the chief.

- The history of the Hindustani fanatics subsequent to the Ambela campaign is not very easy to follow, but it appears that

Pollock.

after their expulsion from Malka, the greater number of the fanatics, led by Maulvi Abdulla, retreated into the Chagarzai country, north of the Barandu river. After a time they obtained from the Chagarzais grants of the villages of Tangor and Batora, where they made permanent settlements, and remained undisturbed up to the commencement of 1868. Their position was, however, by no means comfortable. The people amongst whom they dwelt made them pay dearly for the protection afforded them, and for the supplies they received ; and it was only by the greatest efforts that their agents in Hindustan were enabled to forward to them sufficient money for their support. They were, moreover, frequently threatened with expulsion by their hosts, who forcibly prevented the completion of two towers which the *Maulvi* had commenced to erect in Batora. The *Akhund* also looked upon

*History of the
Hindustani
fanatics subse-
quent to the
Ambela
expedition.*

them with no friendly eye: their *Wahabi* inclinations were abhorrent to him, and their position in the country was a standing menace; for their leaders maintained their position only by intrigue, and were ready tools in the hands of the rival faction in Buner and elsewhere, followers of the *Kota Mulla*.*

It is not surprising that, with this constant pressure on them, both at home and abroad, the community was several times on the point of dissolution. During the autumn of 1866, Muhammad Isak and Muhammad Yakub, two of their leaders, made several attempts to open communications with Colonel J. R. Becher, C.B., the Commissioner of Peshawar, through the instrumentality of Syad Muhammad (formerly in our service); their letters were received, and messages sent to them, but their plans were entirely frustrated by the vigilance of Maulvi Abdulla, who appears to have gained an entire ascendancy over all the other leaders. Matters remained thus until the beginning of 1868, the fanatics being too much engaged with their own quarrels and intrigues to annoy us or continue the system of highway robbery in our territories, which had first led to the recommendation by the Punjab Government for punitive expeditions in 1858 and 1863.

In February 1868 news was received that the fighting men of the Hindustanis, numbering 400 or 500, had moved from Tangor and Batora to Bajkatta in Buner, on the invitation of Azim Khan of Bajkatta, an opponent of the *Akhund* and firm supporter of his rival, the *Kota Mulla*. Azim Khan offered to give the Hindustanis houses and lands in his village if they would bring over their families and settle there permanently; his offer was accepted, and the fanatics accordingly abandoned Tangor and Batora. Nothing more was heard of them until the 18th of April, when the arrival of Feroz Shah, the son of the last King of Delhi, at Bajkatta was reported by Azim Khan himself, who wrote to the Commissioner of Peshawar to make his excuses for harbouring men whom he knew to be mortal enemies of the British Government. Feroz Shah had arrived some months before at Saidu, the residence of the *Akhund*, in great poverty, and with only four attendants; he was well received, and reported to be in high favour, until the evil news of the arrival in Buner of his countrymen reached the *Akhund*.

The movement of the fanatics into Buner was fatal to them; at a distance they might have been tolerated, and in time possibly have regained their prestige. The *Akhund* now lost no time in exerting all his influence to get rid of what he well knew would be a fruitful source of trouble to him.

By skilful management he was enabled to conciliate and bring over all the Buner tribes of the opposite faction, Azim Khan, Zaidulla Khan, Nawab Khan, and a few other chiefs alone holding aloof. On the 25th of May, at a large meeting of all the Buner tribes convened by Mirji Khan, the most trusted of the itinerant *Shekhs* of the *Akhund*, it was determined that the Hindustanis should be expelled from Buner, their presence being displeasing to the *Akhund* and contrary to the terms of the treaty made with the British Government. In consequence of this resolve, the fanatics, to the number of about 700 fighting men, accompanied by Feroz Shah and Azim Khan, made a precipitate retreat to Malka, where they commenced to rebuild their houses, and made arrangements with the Amazais for supplies. In the meantime Maulvi Abdulla in person visited the *Akhund*, and found means to turn away his anger, for Mirji Khan was recalled, and permission

* Kota is a village in the south-west corner of Yusafzai. Syad Amir, better known as the *Kota Mulla*, was at this time one of the rivals of the *Akhund* in the religious world.

given to the Hindustanis to resettle in Buner; the greater portion of them returned to Bajkatta, but had not been there very long before the intrigues of their leaders again brought them into trouble. Maulvi Abdulla was induced to join a league that had been founded by Azim Khan and other Buner chiefs, together with the Amazais and Mukarrab Khan, ex-chief of the Khudu Khels, to oppose the influence of the *Akhund*, and obtain for Mukarrab Khan recovery of his former possessions and reinstatement at Panjtar. Mukarrab Khan, who, after his expulsion from the Totalai villages and the destruction of Panjtar and Mangal Thana by our troops, had come into the Commissioner of Peshawar, and been allowed to reside in British territory, was the prime mover in this plot, by which he sought to regain his former position; his money cemented the various alliances, and purchased the neutrality of some of the Buner chiefs. On the 2nd of August Zaidulla Khan committed the first overt act of hostility by seizing a number of Swat traders passing through his lands. The *Akhund* immediately mustered his followers, and directed the Buner tribes to break up the league by expelling the Hindustanis and putting to death the refractory chiefs. In pursuance of his orders, Zaidulla Khan was treacherously assassinated in his own house. On the 12th they arrived, together with the *Akhund's* followers, before Bajkatta, and sent a message to the *Maulvi*, giving him one day to remove all his followers, women, and children.

*History of the
Hindustani
fanatics subse-
quent to the
Ambela
expedition.*

The fanatics at first thought of resistance, and exchanged a few shots with the Salarzais, but were induced by Azim Khan to give in and commence preparations for a retreat. The next day the whole body evacuated Bajkatta, the women and children being sent on ahead, and the rear brought up by a guard of fifty or sixty men armed with rifles. For the first few miles all went well, the Buner men being occupied in plundering and burning the deserted settlement; but as the fugitives neared the pass between Bajkatta and Batora they saw that the hills on both sides were held by the *Akhund's* followers. The mass of the fugitives, including Maulvi Abdulla, Azim Khan, and the Buner chiefs, pushed on through the pass, and made their escape with slight loss, but the rear-guard was cut off, and, after a gallant stand, entirely destroyed. From Batora the fugitives fled to Gulima Bori, in Chagarzai territory; here they obtained a short respite, and even conceived hopes of being able to establish themselves permanently, being promised support, in the event of an attack, by the Amazais and one section of the Chagarzais.

The power of the *Akhund*, increased by his complete triumph over the rival faction in Buner, was, however, too great for them. The Chagarzais, in obedience to his orders, expelled the fanatics, who continued their flight through Tangor to Bihar, on the right bank of the Indus, where they arrived about the 18th of September with some twenty or thirty wounded men. Later accounts of them are very conflicting, but it is certain that the *Maulvi*, with some hundreds of followers, came over to Judbai, and that many of them remained there till the British force arrived on the crest of the Black Mountain in 1868. The fanatics were welcomed and given the grant of a hamlet in Judbai, and were enabled to purchase several rafts, thus getting the command of the river, and making themselves independent of the extortionate Pathan ferrymen whilst at Judbai. The *Maulvi* received letters in 1868, it is said, from the Tikari chief, who offered to give the whole body of fugitives an asylum in his fort, and land in the Tikari valley, and also from the Allai *jirga* and the chief of Thakot, who promised to come to Judbai to hold a great council and discuss measures of resistance against the British. Mubarak Shah was also summoned, and the war party, cis-Indus, was daily

*History of the
Hindustani
fanatics subse-
quent to the
Ambela
expedition.*

increasing. It seems probable that a month later, the force under Major-General Wilde would have found a powerful coalition and some organised plan of defence, but our rapid approach disconcerting them, the fanatics hastily recrossed the river, deserting their Chagarzai hosts, thereby departing from their profession as soldiers of the faith, and destroying the last remnant of their former prestige, already injured by the treatment they had met with at the hand of the *Akhund* and his disciples. The main body of them then went to Palosi, a village of the trans-Indus Hassanzais, who refused, however, to allow them a permanent settlement. From Palosi they went to Thakot, but, finding no resting-place there, moved down the river to Bihar and Judbai of the Chagarzais, and being obliged to abandon this refuge also, they at last threw themselves on the mercy of the Hassanzais. Here they received some land near the village of Palosi, which is on the right bank of the Indus, about fifteen miles from Darband. The settlement now comprises a mud fort surrounded by huts, all erected by the Hindustanis themselves. They are said to muster five hundred efficient fighting men, and, though not so well equipped and armed as they were at Ambela, they are still better armed than the neighbouring tribesmen, which fact, combined with their superior intelligence, gives them a certain amount of influence. They possess percussion muskets with bayonets, and manage to obtain caps for them. They also are reported to have two small guns.

In 1880, with the permission of the Mada Khels, they established a small outpost at Smatsai, a cave village of Gujars, dependent on the Mada Khels, their object apparently being to use this as a stepping-stone towards obtaining a position again in Malka, or on the Mahaban; but the Amazais, acting up to their agreement with the British Government at the conclusion of the Ambela campaign, refused to give shelter to them, and the colony was withdrawn in 1881, the garrison retiring to Palosi. During 1882, an internal dispute arose, which resulted in some of them leaving the settlement for a time. During the past year the Hindustanis have been negotiating with the Nurazai Bunerwals for a settlement within their territory. In their letter to the Nurazai leaders, they stated that their wish was to raise a religious war, but their real reason appears to be that the Hassanzais demand a very high payment for the land occupied by them. The negotiations, however, fell through, and the Hindustanis are still at Palosi. The colony is said to be dwindling away for want of support, which is being received very scantily now. The neighbouring Pathan tribes regard the colony with little favour, and give them no assistance except in allowing them to purchase grain for cash.

The behaviour of the Hassanzai tribe subsequent to the Ambela campaign, and their misconduct in 1868, has already been narrated in Chapter III.

The Mada Khels, Amazais, and Utmanzais have given no trouble on our border since the settlement made with them in 1864.

The case with the Gaduns has been different, and they entirely failed to act up to the engagements into which they entered in 1864. In 1866 a meeting was held, with their sanction and in their country, to consider whether the fanatics should be permitted to reoccupy Sittana. In January 1867, they permitted one of the leaders of the fanatics to occupy Siri, and in April they made a request that he might be permitted to remain. Being

refused, they reiterated their request, but with no better success. They then, on the 27th of April, came down and attempted to build a tower near our border, but, being attacked by the Utmanzais, were worsted, and obliged to desist, having lost thirteen killed and fourteen wounded. They then desisted on the further threat of a blockade. *History of the Gaduns subsequent to the Ambela expedition.*

Their conduct continued to be so unsatisfactory that, on the 15th of June 1870, a blockade was declared against them. Thereupon, they commenced raiding in our territory, attacking the villages of Bara, Gazai, and Pihur. They were, however, in every case, driven off by the men of Topi and Maini. On the 14th of July it was reported that they had sent for aid to the Hindustanis at Palosi.

On the 16th of July 1870 they assembled in considerable force in a ravine called the Kondel, and erected a high and strong barricade, apparently for the purpose of shelter, in the event of their being driven back in any attack on Panjman, Jhanda, and Boka. At this barricade 300 men were stationed. In the course of two or three days, however, it was swept away by heavy rain, and was not rebuilt.

On the 17th of July 1870, a party of Gaduns made a feint of a night attack on Panjman. Shots were exchanged, but without loss on either side. The Gaduns retired at noon of the same day. Four or five Gaduns, headed by Mirbaz, an outlawed British subject, made an attempt to drive off by stealth a herd of cattle belonging to the village of Jhanda. The manœuvre was discovered in time, and the plunderers got away to the hills, but without their booty.

On the 18th July a night attack was made on Maini by some fifty Gaduns, but the Maini men, being on the alert, drove off the assailants without loss.

On the 19th July one Akhtarai, a chain-carrier employed in the settlement, was met, as he was going in the evening from Topi to Bara, by a roving band of Gaduns, and murdered, his body being afterwards blown up with powder.

On the 20th July some *zamindars* of Maini, out ploughing, were threatened by fifty Gaduns, who made a descent on them. The armed escort of the *zamindars* accompanying them fired on the Gaduns, who returned the shots, but fled as the men of Maini came moving out to the rescue. Later in the day, the watchmen of Datugrah were fired at by a small band of Gaduns, who retired before they could be attacked. The Gadun headquarters were now moved from Gudjai to Malka Kadi, and preparations were made for a grand assault on Maini, Topi, and Panjman.

On the 22nd July an attempt was made during the night to surprise and do some damage to Pihur, but failed, as the police were on the look-out. The outlying picquets of Jhanda and Boka were fired at by straggling parties, but without effect.

On the 24th July the Gaduns lifted a herd of fifteen cattle from the boundaries of the village of Salim Khan.

On the 25th July it was reported that, notwithstanding these numerous petty attacks, no large force had entered British territory, but they were collected in large numbers at the village of Gudjai in a threatening attitude. Their application for assistance to the Bunerwals, Swatis, Amazais, and Hindustanis was said to have met with a promise of compliance in case they should be attacked.

On the 26th the Deputy Commissioner visited the border to see the

*History of the
Gaduns subse-
quent to the
Ambela
expedition.*

arrangements made for the defence of the villages. Two towers were built at Panjman, and were constantly manned with a force of 125 men.

On the afternoon of the 28th, about 4 P.M., some 300 Gaduns came down and established themselves in a strong position on a mound near Maini, and thence commenced firing at long ranges. The Maini men got together, and went out to attack them, but they were largely reinforced, and it was not until near 10 P.M. that the Maini men, reinforced by reliefs from Topi, were able to attack. Four men and a horse of the attacking party were wounded, the Gaduns fleeing at once. Their loss is not known. One of the wounded, Saidulla Khan, a *malik* of Maini, afterwards died. His death caused a great sensation amongst the Utmanzais, to the family of whose *Khans* he belonged. On the 3rd August three cows and three oxen, belonging to one Zebar Shah, grazing within the boundaries of Babinai, were carried off by two Gaduns and an outlawed British subject to the Gadun village of Gudjai. There was reason to suspect the *maliks* of Babinai, themselves Gaduns, of complicity.

On the 4th September 100 Gaduns came to Bara, in British territory, on pretence of taking part in the funeral obsequies of Aslam Ali Khan, a man of some influence, who had died there. After the *fatihah*, they made a feint of attacking Pihur, but, after firing a number of shots without harm, retired. On the same date Shahdad Khan of Hund and Ibrahim Khan of Zeyda, both of whom with their levies were guarding Panjman, at the desire of the Gaduns, met their *jirga* on the boundary, they having been authorised by the Deputy Commissioner to open communications with them. The Gaduns expressed their desire for peace, and readiness to come in and hear on what terms they could again be admitted to our friendship. At the same time they expressed their readiness to return cattle and other property taken from any British subjects, except Utmanzais, and did, in fact, in several cases return such property. As to the exceptions, it is to be remarked that, owing to the position of the Utmanzais immediately on the Gadun frontier, the collisions that had taken place had been, so far as British subjects were concerned, almost entirely with Utmanzais, and the deaths that had taken place on either side had caused a bitter feeling between the two; to which may be added that Khabal, with which the Gaduns had long had a feud, was Utmanzai. It being deemed desirable to get in the *jirga*, the two *Khans* were directed to encourage their attendance, if they were in reality disposed to come to terms. A guarantee of safe conduct was with the same view forwarded, and the Utmanzais strictly prohibited from hostile demonstrations of any kind; at the same time careful watch was enjoined, lest all this should be a mere feint to throw us off our guard, and enable them to make a damaging attack on some of our frontier villages—a not uncommon trick of these people. The Deputy Commissioner was at once informed of the aspect of affairs, and instructions requested as to the terms that should be offered in case the *jirga* came in. It was suggested that—

1st. A fine of at least Rs. 1,000 should be imposed, in addition to the Rs. 1,000 forfeited on account of violated engagements, the refusal to pay which had caused the present complications.

2nd. All property destroyed should be compensated for, and all carried away returned.

3rd. Fresh engagements taken from the principal men, binding them, under a fine, to respect British territory, and not enter it at any time with an armed force.

On the 9th August a great number (reported as 6,000 or 7,000, but

no doubt greatly exaggerated) of Gaduns came into the Maini lands with flags, etc., and remained some hours, expecting the Maini men to come out and attack them; a body of some 500 advanced to within a few hundred paces of the village and fired upon it. The Maini men, interpreting too strictly the orders prohibiting them from aggressive hostilities, remained in their village, and after a time the assailants withdrew. No injury was inflicted.

*History of the
Gaduns subse-
quent to the
Ambela
expedition.*

On the 15th August Captain W. G. Waterfield, Deputy Commissioner, reported that the Gadun council desired to make terms. They were ordered to pay Rs. 3,285, and give security for Rs. 500 more, and also to bind themselves for Rs. 1,000 not to violate British territory.

On the 22nd August the Assistant Commissioner of Yusafzai reported that Shahdad Khan of Hund and Ibrahim Khan of Zeyda had brought in the *jirga*, 115 in number, fully representing every section and interest in the tribe; and on the 10th September it was finally reported that the above terms had been accepted.

After the settlement thus effected, the tribe continued to behave well. In December 1873, however, several robberies were committed in British territory by the Salar Gaduns of Gandap, and a *baramta* was therefore ordered, the tribe being placed under blockade until they paid a fine of Rs. 500, which they did at once. In 1881 they were again fined Rs. 200 for a raid on the village of Salim Khan, from which they carried off some cattle, which were subsequently returned, and the fine was paid without demur. The only other serious offence recorded against this tribe up to the present time was a murder committed in British territory in the prosecution of a private quarrel, in May 1882. For this offence they were ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 500. Since then the tribe generally has remained quiet, and given no trouble.

With regard to the conduct of the Khudu Khels subsequent to the Ambela expedition. Although they do not seem to have joined, as a tribe, against us during that campaign, yet there is no doubt that many members of the tribe were opposed to us. Mukarrab Khan, the chief of the tribe, at the commencement of the operations was a refugee in British territory, and living at Baja, but during the campaign he was present with the British troops, and remained in attendance on the Commissioner, receiving a subsistence allowance of Rs. 3 a day. On the termination of hostilities he begged for some provision being granted him, and requested that his *daftar* in Baja should be held by him rent free. This was granted on the understanding that if he left British territory and returned to his own country, he would forfeit the asylum granted him. In 1868, owing to his disobedience of orders, his lands in British territory were resumed by the Government. In 1874 he returned to his own country, and attempted, with the aid of the Amazais, to recover his Khanship in the tribe; and in August of that year he was guilty of a base crime in the assassination of the Khudu Khel *jirga* (80 in number), whom he had entrapped into his power. After varying fortunes, which it is not necessary here to follow, being deserted by his allies he had at length to abandon the attempt to recover the Khanship. In August 1879, however, he succeeded in regaining his power among the Khudu Khels, and for two years his relations with the tribe seem to have been fairly amicable; but in March 1881 he quarrelled with some of the leading men of the Bam Khel section, and, in the fighting which ensued, he lost his only son, Akbar Khan. This event led to

*History of the
Khudu Khels
subsequent to
the Ambela
expedition.*

extraordinary exertions on his part, and, spending money freely, he called in the Gaduns and Amazais to his assistance, and with them and a small contingent from Amb, invested, in June 1881, the village of Bam Khel Totalai, the stronghold of his opponents, but without success. His auxiliaries then dispersed, and the Bam Khels summoned the Nurazai Bunerwals to their aid, and burnt Panjtar. Fruitless negotiations and desultory skirmishes followed throughout July and August, in which the Nurazai and Daulatzai Bunerwals alternately offered to assist the contending parties, but confined themselves to accepting subsidies without committing themselves to anything more than promises. Eventually, with the connivance of a few of the Bam Khels, Mukarrab Khan and the Gaduns occupied Totalai on the 30th of August, and immediately burnt the village. The traitors among the Bam Khels were themselves seized by Mukarrab Khan, and only escaped with their lives owing to the intercession of a local *mulla*. The Bam Khels having now fled to British territory, arrangements were made to intern them at a safe distance from the border. In the flush of this success the Gaduns and Mukarrab Khan were tempted to commit excesses. The former carried off some cattle belonging to the British village of Salim Khan, which were grazing near the border, and detained a messenger despatched to demand their release; but subsequently the messenger was released and the cattle were returned: and Mukarrab Khan instigated two attacks, one of which proved fatal, within British territory, upon Bam Khel refugees. For these offences a fine of Rs. 200 was imposed upon the Gaduns, which was paid, as already stated, without demur, and a fine of Rs. 800 was imposed on Mukarrab Khan, which was also paid. In January 1882 the Bam Khels left British territory and began to collect in the villages of Chamla and Buner, contiguous to the Khudu Khel country, preparatory to an attack on the *Khan*, with the explicit understanding that, if unsuccessful, they would not be permitted to seek refuge again in our territory. The *Khan* had, however, failed to learn moderation and prudence from the reverses of many years, and he had succeeded by his tyrannical and oppressive behaviour in thoroughly alienating his own party, who began secretly to encourage his enemies. In July the Bam Khels had succeeded in gaining possession of some Khudu Khel villages with the connivance of Mukarrab Khan's faction, and, by the end of the month, he was again in flight, and seeking protection in British territory. As he continued to intrigue against the Bam Khels, making arrangements to renew hostilities, he was directed to recross the frontier. He took up his residence in a Gadun village. Half of that tribe were inclined to assist him; but, by judicious management, the Bam Khels contrived to neutralise their influence. Unable to procure help from the Gaduns, Mukarrab Khan next turned to the Bunerwals. By liberal gifts of money and promises he induced a body of Ashazai, Daulatzai, and Nurazai Bunerwals to move in March 1882 on the village of Chinglai. The Bam Khels in turn bribed the men of Buner to retire, which they were not loath to do, after fleecing both parties among the Khudu Khels; and Mukarrab Khan, after an eventful feud with his tribe, which has now extended over a period of thirty years, finds himself an exile in his old age. Major H. R. James and Sir H. B. Edwardes have placed on record their opinion regarding the character he bore in days gone by, and in his declining years—one might say on the brink of the grave—oppressed with cares and want, the old septuagenarian has not belied the evil reputation which has clung to him, and which his own race attributed to him twenty-eight years ago, *i.e.*, that he was a man whom no ties would bind, and on whose word no reliance could be placed.

It now only remains briefly to notice the conduct of the Bunerwals subsequent to the Ambela campaign. In March 1868 a party of the Salarzais came down and burnt the village of Pirsai, in the Sadum valley, in British territory, in the prosecution of a private feud. A blockade was established, but in April 1869 they came to terms, rebuilt the destroyed village, and paid a fine to the British Government. During the above complications it was proposed to try and surprise Chor Banda and burn it, but the idea was never carried out.

*History of the
Bunerwals
subsequent to
the Ambela
expedition.*

At the end of 1868 the fine old chief, Zaidulla Khan of Daggar, who was by far the most influential man in Buner, and who, as we have seen, took a prominent part in the Ambela expedition, was treacherously murdered, as already mentioned, and since his death there has been no chief of note among the Bunerwals.

The tribe continued to behave well till 1877, when a serious raid was committed on the border villages of the Sadum valley in the month of July. Considerable damage was done, both in burning villages and property and killing several of the peasants. They were, however, so severely punished by the villagers themselves, supported by the British police post, that they retired, with the loss of twenty-one killed, thirty wounded, and fourteen prisoners.

The cause of the raid was traced to Ajab Khan of Chargulai, the chief, who, with his brother Aziz Khan, had done us such good service, as already shown, during the Ambela campaign. Through this chief all matters connected with the Buner frontier had been managed, but, finding that his personal importance had become much lessened in the eyes of the political authorities, in consequence of his intriguing conduct across the border, he determined to create complications which should have the effect of bringing himself to notice, as he fully expected that he would be employed in restoring order, and would acquire credit for so doing. It was with this object that he incited the Bunerwals to send a raiding party against the Sadum villages, but in doing this it is probable that he never intended that more than a demonstration should take place, accompanied with the burning of a few huts and stacks in the outlying hamlet of Baringan. The results which followed, ending in much loss of life and property, could only be viewed as the natural consequences of the incitement given, and Ajab Khan was therefore tried on the criminal charge of abetment of *dakaiti*, accompanied with murder. He was convicted and sentenced to death, and was publicly executed in front of the Peshawar jail on the 27th of June 1878. With regard to the Bunerwals, they were placed under blockade; but, in consideration of the powerful instigation they had acted under, and also in consequence of the severe punishment they had met with during the raid, the Government was pleased to sanction that no further demand should be made from the tribe beyond requiring the restoration of the property carried off. Towards the end of September, the Nurazai and Daulatzai sections made their submission; but the third section implicated in the outrage, the Ashazai, continued contumacious, and a fine of Rs. 700 was accordingly imposed upon them. At length, in consequence of the military punitive measures adopted on other parts of the border of the Peshawar district at this time, the Ashazais discovered that it was to their interest to submit to the terms ordered by the Government, and accordingly they came in to the Assistant Commissioner of Yusufzai in April 1878, and a final settlement with the Bunerwals was effected. The execution of Ajab Khan is said to have produced a very marked impression on the tribe, who

*History of the
Bunerwals
subsequent to
the Ambela
expedition.*

never for a moment expected that a *Khan* of such local importance would be hanged as a common malefactor.

During December 1878 and January 1879 the excitement was very great in Buner, owing to the fanatical preaching of certain *mullas*, who were trying to create a *jahad*. At one time it was feared that nothing could prevent a disturbance on our border, and the Gadaizais and Salarzais had actually sent their quota to Tursak for a move by the Malandri pass. The friendly attitude of certain Buner chiefs, and the resolute behaviour of the Sadum villagers, prevented a rupture.

In January 1880 reports were received that a raid on Sadum was being organised by one faction of the Bunerwals. Their intention, however, was frustrated by the opposition of their enemies at home, and by the prompt measures taken to reinforce the border by the movement of some native cavalry from Mardan to Rustam. The action taken by the Nurazai and Daulatzai clans in the Khudu Khel troubles has been noticed above. The proceedings in connection with the decennial *vesh*, or redistribution by lot of holdings among the Ashazai, Salarzai, and Gadaizai clans of the Bunerwals has lately absorbed the attention of the tribe. During the past year a dispute, which has led to some trouble, occurred between the Nurazais and the frontier village of Narinji, but the conduct of the tribe, as a whole, continues to give little cause for complaint.

APPENDIX A.*Yusafzai Field Force, October 1863.*

Brigadier-General Sir N. B. Chamberlain, K.C.B. (Commandant, Punjab Irregular Force), commanding.

Staff.

Major T. Wright, Assistant Adjutant-General.
 Lieutenant-Colonel G. Allgood, Assistant Quarter-Master General.
 Lieutenant F. J. N. Mackenzie, Staff Officer, Punjab Irregular Force.
 Major G. W. Harding, Orderly Officer.
 Lieutenant H. S. Jarrett „ „
 „ W. C. Anderson „ „
 Lieutenant-Colonel A. Taylor, C.B., R.E., commanding Royal Engineer.
 Lieutenant H. F. Blair, R.E., Assistant Field Engineer.
 „ J. Browne, R.E., „ „ „
 „ T. T. Carter, R.E., „ „ „
 Surgeon W. Simpson, Principal Medical Officer, British Troops.
 „ H. B. Buckle, „ „ „ Native Troops.
 Captain J. H. Jenkins, Principal Commissariat Officer.

Artillery.

Captain J. S. Tulloh, commanding Royal Artillery.
 „ F. C. Griffin, commanding Half C-19th Royal Artillery.
 „ T. E. Hughes, commanding Peshawar Mountain Train Battery.
 „ F. R. DeBude, commanding Hazara Mountain Train Battery.

Cavalry.

Lieutenant-Colonel D. M. Probyn, V.C., C.B., commanding 11th Bengal Cavalry.
 Captain C. W. Hawes, commanding Guide Cavalry.

Engineers.

Lieutenant L. H. E. Tucker, commanding Sappers and Miners.

Infantry.

Colonel W. Hope, C.B., commanding 71st Highland Light Infantry.
 Lieutenant-Colonel F. O. Salusbury, commanding 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers.
 „ „ A. T. Wilde, C.B., commanding Guide Corps.
 Major C. P. Keyes, commanding 1st Punjab Infantry.
 Major P. F. Gardiner, commanding 3rd Punjab Infantry.
 Lieutenant-Colonel J. L. Vaughan, commanding 5th Punjab Infantry.
 Captain W. D. Hoste, commanding 6th Punjab Infantry.
 Major C. C. G. Ross, commanding 14th Native Infantry.
 „ C. H. Brownlow, commanding 20th Punjab Native Infantry.
 „ W. D. Morgan, commanding 32nd Punjab Native Infantry (Pioneers).
 Captain C. W. R. Chester, commanding 4th Gurkha Regiment.
 Major J. P. W. Campbell, commanding 5th Gurkha Regiment.

Political Officers.

Colonel R. G. Taylor, C.B., Commissioner.
 Captain A. A. Munro, Deputy Commissioner.
 Lieutenant R. G. Sandeman, Assistant Commissioner.

Survey Officers.

Major H. C. Johnstone, Survey Department.
 Lieutenant W. Barron, Survey Department.

With the troops which subsequently joined.

Captain T. H. Salt, commanding No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery.
 Colonel R. Y. Shipley, commanding 7th Fusiliers.
 Major F. W. Burroughs, commanding 93rd Highlanders.
 Lieutenant-Colonel R. Renny, commanding 3rd Sikhs.
 Captain C. F. F. Chamberlain, commanding 23rd Punjab Native Infantry (Pioneers).

APPENDIX B.

Present state of the Yusafzai Field Force on the 23rd October 1863.

Corps.	Effective.					Sick.					Remarks.
	British Officers.	Native Officers.	Sergeants, Duffadars, Havildars.	Buglers, Trumpeters, Pipers.	Rank and File.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	Sergeants, Duffadars, Havildars.	Buglers, Trumpeters, Pipers.	Rank and File.	
Half C-19th Royal Artillery ...	3	..	5	1	46	1	..	13	
No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery	1	1	43	4	
Peshawar Mountain Train Battery	3	3	8	2	115	1	..	9	
Hazara " " "	3	2	145	7	
71st Highland Light Infantry ...	20	..	21	19	418	1	..	1	..	14	
101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers ...	20	..	30	18	431	1	..	20	
Guide Cavalry ...	2	4	56	1	
11th Bengal Cavalry ...	3	5	75	1	
Sappers and Miners ...	1	1	71	
14th Native Infantry ...	4	8	22	9	229	..	2	5	..	79	
Guide Infantry ...	4	17	46	19	475	1	1	4	2	29	
1st Punjab Infantry ..	7	10	19	14	308	..	2	5	..	55	
3rd " " ...	6	14	30	9	381	10	
5th " " ...	6	10	23	12	357	..	2	2	..	17	
6th " " ...	5	5	15	12	273	..	3	1	..	28	
4th Gurkha Regiment ...	7	11	36	11	333	2	1	40	
20th Punjab Native Infantry ...	6	4	24	6	293	..	1	1	2	36	
32nd Pioneers ..	6	1	39	10	479	26	
5th Gurkha Regiment ...	4	8	30	7	318	1	..	1	..	41	
Total ...	111	104	348	149	4,846	3	11	25	5	430	

APPENDIX C.

Return of Killed and Wounded—Yusafzai Field Force, 1863.

Corps.	Date.	Engagement.	Killed.			Wounded.			Horses.	Mules.	Remarks.
			British Officers.	Native Officers.	Non-Commissioned Officers and men.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	Non-Commissioned Officers and men.			
Hazara Mountain Train Battery ...	22nd October.	Reconnaissance and attack on camp.	1	3	1	1	<i>Killed.</i> Lieut. W.A.B. Gillies, R.A., Hazara Mountain Train Battery.
Guide Cavalry	1	2	
11th Bengal Cavalry	2	
1st Punjab Infantry	2	
3rd " "	2	
20th Punjab Native Infantry			2	11	
32nd Punjab Native Infantry (Pioneers)	2	
Total	1	..	2	..	1	22	1	3	1 1

Return of Killed and Wounded—Yusafzai Field Force, 1863—continued.

Corps.	Date.	Engagement.	Killed.			Wounded.			Horses.		Mules.		Remarks.
			British Officers.	Native Officers.	Non-Commissioned Officers and men.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	Non-Commissioned Officers and men.	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.	
101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers	26th Octr.	"Eagle's Nest" picquet	2	<i>Killed.</i> Lieut. R. Clifford, 1st Punjab Cavalry, attached to 3rd Punjab Infantry. Lieut. G. M. Richmond, 20th Punjab Native Infy.
3rd Punjab Infantry			1	...	2	1	
20th Punjab Native Infantry			1	1	8	...	1	27	
Total	2	1	10	...	1	30	
Hazara Mountain Train Battery	26th Octr.	With Lieut. Col. Vaughan	1	2	<i>Wounded.</i> Lieut. W. Barron, R.A.
71st Highland Light Infantry			1	...	5	
5th Punjab Infantry			3	...	5	1	...	
6th " " "			11	...	42	
Survey Department...			1	
Total	15	1	6	54	1	...	
C-19th Royal Artillery	26th Octr.	Front attack	<i>Wounded.</i> Lieut. T. H. T. Drake, 32nd Punjab Native Infantry.
1st Punjab Infantry			1	
32nd Punjab Native Infantry (Pioneers)...			1	
5th Gurkha Regiment			1	...	1	
Total	1	1	2	1	...	
C-19th Royal Artillery	30th Octr.	First attack on "Crag" picquet	2	<i>Wounded.</i> Major C. P. Keyes, 1st Punjab Infantry. Lieut. H. W. Pitcher, 1st Punjab Infantry.
Peshawar Mountain Train Battery			1	
71st Highland Light Infantry			3	
101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers			1	...	7	
Guide Infantry			1	...	1	
1st Punjab Infantry			4	2	1	16	
5th Punjab Infantry			3	
5th Gurkha Regiment			...	1	4	...	1	7	
Total	1	13	2	2	37	
71st Highland Light Infantry	6th Nov.	When covering working party	2	...	4	4	<i>Killed.</i> Major G. W. Harding, 2nd Sikh Infantry. Lieut. T. B. Dougal, 79th Highlanders. Ensign C. B. Murray, 71st Highland Light Infnty.
Guide Infantry			1	1	...	2	
1st Punjab Infantry			2	5	
4th Gurkha Regiment			5	4	
20th Punjab Native Infantry			...	1	15	...	2	14	
5th Gurkha Regiment			7	1	...	7	
Staff ...			1	
Total	3	1	34	2	2	36	<i>Wounded.</i> Lieut. J. S. Oliphant, 5th Gurkhas. Lieut. W. Battye, Corps of Guides.

Return of Killed and Wounded—Yusafzai Field Force, 1863—continued.

Corps.	Date.	Engagement.	Killed.			Wounded.			Horses.		Mules.		Remarks.
			British Officers.	Native Officers.	Non-Commissioned Officers and men.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	Non-Commissioned Officers and men.	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.	
Peshawar Mountain Train Battery	13th November.	Second attack on "Crag" picquet	2	6	<i>Killed.</i> Lieut. J. P. Davidson, 1st Punjab Infantry. <i>Wounded.</i> Lieut. H. W. Pitcher, 1st Punjab Infantry.
101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers			5	16	
14th Native Infantry			...	1	17	...	2	14	
Guide Infantry			1	
1st Punjab Infantry			1	...	23	1	...	53	
3rd Punjab Infantry			1	
5th Punjab Infantry			1	...	1	
20th Punjab Native Infantry			2	9	
5th Gurkha Regiment			2	
Total	1	1	49	1	3	103	
Peshawar Mountain Train Battery	18th November.	Attack on Ross's picquets	1	<i>Killed.</i> Captain C. F. Smith, 71st Highland Light Infantry. Lieut. T. S. G. Jones, 79th Highlanders. Lieut. H. H. Chapman, 101st Roy. Bengal Fusils. Lieut. W. F. Mosley, 14th Native Infantry. <i>Wounded.</i> Lieut. A. D. C. Inglis, 14th Native Infantry.
71st Highland Light Infantry			2	...	3	5	
101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers			1	...	2	3	
14th Native Infantry			1	...	25	1	...	49	
Guide Infantry			1	
1st Punjab Infantry			4	
5th Punjab Infantry			1	
6th Punjab Infantry			2	
20th Punjab Native Infantry			1	
5th Gurkha Regiment			9	8	8	
Total	4	...	39	1	...	74	9	
Peshawar Mountain Train Battery	19th November.	Picquet duty	1	<i>Killed.</i> Captain R. B. Aldridge, 71st Highland Light Infantry. <i>Wounded.</i> Ensign C. M. Stockley, 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers.
71st Highland Light Infantry			1	...	1	1	
101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers			1	...	1	
14th Native Infantry			1	
3rd Punjab Infantry			1	
20th Punjab Native Infantry			1	
Total	1	...	1	1	...	6	
Peshawar Mountain Train Battery	20th November.	Third attack on "Crag" picquet	1	2	2	<i>Killed.</i> Ensign A. R. Sanderson, 101st Roy. Bengal Fusils. Assist. Surgeon W. Pile, 101st Roy. Bengal Fusils. <i>Wounded.</i> Brigadier-Genl. Sir N. B. Chamberlain, K.C.B. Col. W. Hope, C.B., 71st Highland Light Infantry. Lieut.-Col. J. A. Vaughan, 5th Punjab Infantry. Major J. P. W. Campbell, 5th Gurkhas. Lieut. W. C. Anderson, 3rd Punjab Cavalry.
71st Highland Light Infantry			7	1	...	25	
101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers			2	...	11	24	
1st Punjab Infantry			1	1	
3rd Punjab Infantry			3	
5th Punjab Infantry			1	1	5	
6th Punjab Infantry			2	
20th Punjab Native Infantry			3	32	
5th Gurkha Regiment			2	1	...	10	
General Staff			2	
Total	2	...	25	5	1	104	2	

Return of Killed and Wounded—Yusafzai Field Force, 1863—continued.

	Date.	Engagement.	Killed.			Wounded.			Horses.		Mules.		Remarks.
			British Officers.	Native Officers.	Non-Commissioned Officers and men.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	Non-Commissioned Officers and men.	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.	
Hazara Mountain Train Battery	15th December.	Operations near Lahu, and defence of Camp	1	<i>Wounded.</i> Lient. C. W. Riggs, 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers. Lient. J. K. McCausland, 4th Gurkhas.
7th Royal Fusiliers	2	
101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers			1	1	...	10	
Sappers and Miners			1	
Guide Infantry	2	7	
3rd Sikh "	1	5	
1st Punjab Infantry			9	15	
3rd " "	1	3	
4th Gurkha Regiment			1	...	5	
23rd Pioneers	16th December.	Operations towards Buner pass	2	5	<i>Killed.</i> Lient. G. Alexander, 23rd Pioneers. <i>Wounded.</i> Capt. C. F. F. Chamberlain, 23rd Pioneers. Lient. C. D. P. Nott, 23rd Pioneers. Major T. Wheler, 32nd Pioneers. Lient. F. H. B. Marsh, 32nd Pioneers.
5th Gurkha Regiment			3	...	2	6	
Total	16	2	5	60	
7th Royal Fusiliers...			1	
Guide Infantry	1	
3rd Sikh "	16th December.	Operations towards Buner pass	15	
23rd Pioneers			1	...	4	2	2	38	
32nd Pioneers	3	2	1	18	
Total	1	...	7	4	3	73	

APPENDIX D.

Abstract of Killed and Wounded in the Yusafzai Field Force from the date of its entering the Ambela pass to the 16th December 1863.

Corps.	KILLED.					WOUNDED.					TOTAL KILLED AND WOUNDED.					Remarks.
	British.		Native.		Total.	British.		Native.		Total.	British.		Native.		Grand Total.	
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.		Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.		Officers.	Men.				
General Staff	1	1	1	1	
Royal Engineers	1	1	1	1	
Survey Department	1	1	1	1	
Orderly Officers	1	1	1	1	
C-19th Royal Artillery	3	...	2	5	...	3	...	2	5	
No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery...	
Peshawar Mountain Train Battery	3	3	9	9	12	12	
Hazara " " "	1	1	7	7	1	7	8	
7th Royal Fusiliers	3	3	...	3	3	
71st Highland Light Infantry ...	3	15	18	1	49	50	4	64	68	
79th Highlanders	2	2	2	2	
101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers ...	3	19	22	2	63	65	5	82	87	
Guide Cavalry	2	2	2	2	
11th Bengal Cavalry	1	1	1	...	1	1	1	2	
Sappers and Miners...	1	1	1	1	
14th Native Infantry	1	...	1	45	47	1	...	1	69	71	2	...	2	114	118	
Guide Infantry	2	2	1	...	2	14	17	1	...	2	16	19	
2nd Sikh Infantry	1	1	1	1	
3rd " "	1	4	5	3	35	38	1	...	3	39	43	
1st Punjab Infantry	1	...	1	41	43	3	...	3	91	97	4	...	4	132	140	
3rd " "	1	1	3	3	4	4	
5th " "	6	6	1	...	2	14	17	1	...	2	20	23	
6th " "	11	11	5	44	49	5	55	60	
4th Gurkha Regiment	5	5	1	9	10	1	14	15	
20th Punjab Native Infantry ...	1	...	1	30	32	3	99	102	1	...	4	129	134	
23rd " " " (Pioneers) ...	1	6	7	2	...	4	40	46	3	...	4	46	53	
32nd " " " (Pioneers)	3	3	3	...	1	21	25	3	...	1	24	28	
5th Gurkha Regiment	1	27	28	2	...	2	44	48	2	...	3	71	76	
Total	15	34	4	185	238	21	118	27	504	670	36	152	31	689	908	

APPENDIX E.

YUSAFZAI FIELD FORCE, 1863.

Nominal Roll of Officers killed in action.

No.	Rank and Names.	Corps.	Date.	Remarks.
1	Lieutenant W. A. B. Gillies ...	R. A. Haz. Mn. Tn. B.	22nd Oct. 1863.	
2	" R. Clifford ...	3rd P. I. ...	26th " "	
3	" G. M. Richmond ...	20th P. N. I. ...	26th " "	
4	Ensign C. B. Murray ...	71st H. L. I. ...	6th Nov. "	
5	Lieutenant T. B. Dougal ...	79th Highlanders	6th " "	
6	Major G. W. Harding ...	2nd S. I.	6th " "	
7	Lieutenant J. P. Davidson ...	1st P. I. ...	13th " "	
8	Captain C. F. Smith ...	71st H. L. I. ...	18th " "	
9	Lieutenant T. S. G. Jones ...	79th Highlanders	18th " "	
10	" H. H. Chapman ...	101st R. B. F. ...	18th " "	
11	" W. F. Mosley ...	14th N. I. ...	18th " "	
12	Captain R. B. Aldridge ...	71st H. L. I. ...	19th " "	
13	Ensign A. R. Sanderson ...	101st R. B. F. ...	20th " "	
14	Assistant-Surgeon W. Pile ...	101st R. B. F. ...	20th " "	
15	Lieutenant G. Alexander ...	23rd P. N. I. ...	16th Dec. "	

APPENDIX F.

YUSAFZAI FIELD FORCE, 1863.

Nominal Roll of Officers wounded.

No.	Rank and Names.	Corps.	Date.	Remarks.
1	Lieutenant T. H. T. Drake ...	32nd P. N. I. ..	26th Oct. 1863.	
2	" W. Barron ...	R. A. Survey Dept	26th " "	
3	Major C. P. Keyes ...	1st P. I. ...	30th " "	
4	Lieutenant H. W. Pitcher ...	1st P. I. ...	30th " "	
5	" W. Battye ...	Guide Infantry	6th Nov. "	
6	" J. S. Oliphant ...	5th Gurkhas ...	6th " "	
7	" H. W. Pitcher ...	1st P. I. ...	13th " "	Second time wounded.
8	" A. D. C. Inglis ...	14th N. I. ...	18th " "	
9	Ensign C. M. Stockley ...	101st R. B. F.	18th " "	
10	Colonel W. Hope, C.B. ...	71st H. L. I. ...	18th " "	
11	Major J. P. W. Campbell ...	5th Gurkhas ...	20th " "	
12	Lieutenant-Colonel J. L. Vaughan ...	5th P. I. ...	20th " "	
13	Brigadier-General Sir N. B. Chamberlain, K.C.B.	General Officer Commanding	20th " "	
14	Lieutenant W. C. Anderson ...	Orderly Officer	20th " "	
15	" J. Browne ...	Royal Engrs. ...	22nd Oct. "	
16	" C. W. Riggs ...	101st R. B. F. ...	15th Decr. "	
17	" J. K. McCausland ...	4th Gurkhas ...	15th " "	
18	Captain C. F. F. Chamberlain ...	23rd P. N. I. ...	16th " "	
19	Lieutenant C. D. P. Nott ...	23rd P. N. I. ...	16th " "	
20	Major T. Wheler ...	32nd P. N. I. ...	16th " "	
21	Lieutenant F. H. B. Marsh ...	32nd P. N. I. ...	16th " "	

APPENDIX G.

Disposition of the Yusafzai Field Force at Ambela on Major-General J. Garvock assuming the command, 30th November 1863.

First Brigade.

Colonel W. W. Turner, C.B., 97th Foot, commanding.

Lieutenant J. H. Campbell, 71st Highland Light Infantry, Brigade-Major.

Half C-19th Royal Artillery.

Peshawar Mountain Train Battery.

71st Highland Light Infantry.

1st Punjab Infantry.

3rd " "

5th " "

20th Punjab Native Infantry.

32nd Punjab Native Infantry (Pioneers).

5th Gurkha Regiment.

Second Brigade.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. T. Wilde, C.B., Guide Corps, commanding.

Captain C. W. R. Chester, 4th Gurkhas, Brigade-Major.

Half No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery.

Hazara Mountain Train Battery.

101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers.

14th Native Infantry.

Guide Infantry.

6th Punjab Infantry.

4th Gurkha Regiment.

23rd Punjab Native Infantry (Pioneers).

APPENDIX H.

Proclamations.

Proclamation to the chiefs and maliks of Chamla (other than the Khudu Khel and Amazai).

Whereas it is well known to you that a British force entered the Mahaban hills about five years ago for the purpose of chastising the colony of *Syads* and Hindustanis located at Sittana, and professing open hostility to the British Government, and that the Gadun and Utmanzai tribes entered into a written agreement not to permit the return of the said Hindustanis to their former position at Sittana; and whereas those two tribes, in contravention of their own written agreement, have, within a recent period, allowed the *Syads* and Hindustanis to reoccupy Sittana, and the latter, since their return, have omitted no opportunity of displaying their hostility to the British Government, both by inciting the neighbouring tribes to commit aggressions on its territories, and endeavouring to tamper with the allegiance and fidelity of its feudatories: it is hereby notified to the chiefs and *maliks* of Chamla, that a military force has assembled, and is about to enter the

Mahaban tract, for the purpose of chastising the hostile colony of Hindustanis, consisting chiefly of fugitive subjects of the British Government. Should it be necessary for the British force to enter the Chamla territory for the purpose above mentioned, every care will be taken that no injury be done to crops and villages, and that proper prices be given for all supplies furnished.

CAMP NAWAKILA, }
 ● 19th October 1863. }

(Sd.) REYNELL G. TAYLOR,
 Commissioner.

Proclamation addressed to the heads of the Mansur and Salar sections of the Gadun tribe.

You are well aware that, by allowing the *Syads* and Hindustanis to return to Sittana, you have broken the engagements entered into by you five years ago, and subsequently renewed.

Every opportunity has been given you to retrieve and make amends for the error you have committed, by ejecting the *Syads* and Hindustanis from Sittana; but you have allowed them to remain up to this time.

You are, therefore, by this conduct, liable to any punishment which the British Government may deem it proper to inflict; but, on the other hand, it is a well-known fact that, from the first occupation of this country by the British, the Gadun tribe has been a well-conducted one, and has remained on terms of friendly intercourse with the inhabitants of the British border. It is also apparent that, from the commencement of the present difficulties, and the establishment of a blockade, no aggression on British territory, or other impropriety, has been committed by the Gadun tribe.

We are willing, therefore, to believe that the breach of faith committed in allowing the Hindustanis to return to Sittana was the act only of a section of the tribe, actuated by former relations with the *Syads* and Hindustani colony, or by cupidity, and it is not our wish that the generally well-conducted Gadun tribe should be ruined by this one offence; but since it is a fact that, from the commencement of this difficulty, the tribe has done nothing to recover its good name with the British Government, and the continued presence of the Hindustanis at Sittana has been the cause of great expense and trouble to Government, and also eventually of the assembly of a force for the chastisement of this professedly hostile colony, it is but right that the Gadun tribe should, on the military force entering the Mahaban tract, be expected to perform some signal service, by which (if zeal and activity are displayed in the Government interest) a more favourable view may be taken of their original breach of faith than could otherwise be the case.

You are now informed that the troops of the British Government are about to enter the Mahaban tract for the purpose of capturing or destroying this hostile colony of *Syads* and Hindustanis, most of whom are, as you know, fugitive subjects of the British Government; and whereas, in the first instance, the order given to the Gadun tribe was to effect the expulsion of these Hindustanis, you are now required not to permit them to escape.

It is therefore proper that you take immediate measures to close their avenues of retreat; and we would have you know that it is not the desire of the leaders of the expeditionary force unnecessarily to shed the blood of the men composing the Hindustani colony, many of whom we know to be poor, misguided individuals, acting under the dictation of a few designing leaders.

Such as may resist will incur the result as God may dispose it, and must of course take the consequences.

If the Gaduns, as a tribe, lend efficient aid in capturing or preventing the escape of the men comprised in this Hindustani colony, their own reconciliation with the British Government will be a matter of easy accomplishment.

Under any circumstances, bearing in mind the former good conduct of the Gadun tribe, the members of the clan may feel assured that whatever measures may be thought necessary for the punishment of their original offence (which would be greatly affected by their conduct on receipt of this communication), they will be carried out deliberately, and with discrimination.

The Gaduns need not fear that without grave cause the force will enter their country for purposes of chastisement and devastation.

With the object of arriving speedily at an understanding, the Gadun tribe is hereby informed that the British troops are about to enter the hills, and they are required to send accredited representatives from each section of their clan to the British camp, when the force has entered the hills. The position of the camp can be easily ascertained by themselves.

CAMP NAWAKILA, }
19th October 1863. }

(Sd.) REYNELL G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner.

Proclamation to the chiefs and people of Buner.

Whereas it is well known to you that a British force entered the Mahaban hills about five years ago for the purpose of chastising the colony of *Syads* and Hindustanis located at Sittana, and professing open hostility to the British Government, and that the Gadun and Utmanzai tribes entered into a written agreement not to permit the return of the said Hindustanis to their former position at Sittana; and whereas those two tribes, in contravention of their own written agreement, have, within a recent period, allowed the *Syads* and Hindustanis to reoccupy Sittana, and the latter, since their return, have omitted no opportunity of displaying their hostility to the British Government, both by inciting the neighbouring tribes to commit aggressions on its territories, and endeavouring to tamper with the allegiance and fidelity of its feudatories: it is hereby notified to the heads of all the tribes of Buner, that a military force has assembled, and is about to enter the Mahaban tract, for the purpose of chastising the hostile colony of Hindustanis, consisting chiefly of fugitive subjects of the British Government. This intimation is accordingly forwarded to the leading men (chiefs) and people of Buner, to apprise them of the intentions of Government and the destination of the force, and in order that they may entertain no anxiety regarding their own possessions, or the objects of this Government, the relations of the tribes of Buner with the British having, from the first, been entirely friendly.

CAMP NAWAKILA, }
19th October 1863. }

(Sd.) REYNELL G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner.

Proclamation to the maliks of the Khudu Khel tribe.

Whereas it is well known to you that a British force entered the Mahaban hills about five years ago for the purpose of chastising the colony of *Syads* and Hindustanis located at Sittana, and professing open hostility to the British Government, and that the Gadun and Utmanzai tribes entered into a written agreement not to permit the return of the said Hindustanis to their former position at Sittana; and whereas those two tribes, in contravention of their own written agreement, have, within a recent period, allowed the *Syads* and Hindustanis to reoccupy Sittana, and the latter, since their return, have omitted no opportunity of displaying their hostility to the British Government, both by inciting the neighbouring tribes to commit aggressions on its territories, and endeavouring to tamper with the allegiance and fidelity of its feudatories: it is

hereby notified to the *maliks* of the Khudu Khel tribe that a military force has assembled, and is about to enter the Mahaban tract, for the purpose of chastising the hostile colony of Hindustanis, consisting chiefly of fugitive subjects of the British Government. Should it be necessary for the British force to enter the Khudu Khel territory for the purpose above mentioned, every care will be taken that no injury be done to crops and villages, and that proper prices be given for all supplies furnished.

CAMP NAWAKILA, }
19th October 1863. }

(Sd.) REYNELL G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner.

Proclamation sent through Major Coxe, Deputy Commissioner of Hazara, to the chiefs and maliks of the Amazai tribe.

Whereas it is well known to you that a British force entered the Mahaban hills about five years ago for the purpose of chastising the colony of *Syads* and Hindustanis located at Sittana, and professing open hostility to the British Government, and that the Gadun and Utmanzai tribes entered into a written agreement not to permit the return of the said Hindustanis to their former position at Sittana; and whereas those two tribes, in contravention of their own written agreement, have, within a recent period, allowed the *Syads* and Hindustanis to reoccupy Sittana, and the latter, since their return, have omitted no opportunity of displaying their hostility to the British Government, both by inciting the neighbouring tribes to commit aggressions on its territories and endeavouring to tamper with the allegiance and fidelity of its feudatories: it is hereby notified to the chiefs and *maliks* of the Amazai tribe, that a military force has assembled, and is about to enter the Mahaban tract, for the purpose of chastising the hostile colony of Hindustanis, consisting chiefly of fugitive subjects of the British Government. This intimation is accordingly forwarded to the chiefs and *maliks* of the Amazai tribe, to apprise them of the intentions of Government and the destination of the force. As it is apparent that the line of retreat of the Hindustanis naturally lies through the territory of the Amazais, and that many of the positions now occupied by these Hindustanis are in the same territory, the British authorities consider it just that the Amazais should be required to prevent the escape of the *Syads* and Hindustanis across the Barandu. In consideration of assistance thus given, the Amazai tribe will be looked upon as friends of the British; and, on the occasion of a force encamping upon their lands, care will be taken that no injury be done to crops and villages.

CAMP NAWAKILA, }
19th October 1863. }

(Sd.) REYNELL G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner.

Proclamation sent through Major Coxe, Deputy Commissioner of Hazara, to the maliks and chiefs of the Mada Khel tribe.

Whereas it is well known to you that a British force entered the Mahaban hills about five years ago for the purpose of chastising the colony of *Syads* and Hindustanis located at Sittana, and professing open hostility to the British Government, and that the Gadun and Utmanzai tribes entered into a written agreement not to permit the return of the said Hindustanis to their former position at Sittana; and whereas those two tribes, in contravention of their own written agreement, have, within a recent period, allowed the *Syads* and Hindustanis to reoccupy Sittana, and the latter, since their return, have omitted no opportunity of displaying hostility to the British Government, both by inciting the neighbouring tribes to commit aggressions on its territories and endeavouring to tamper with

the allegiance and fidelity of its feudatories: it is hereby notified to the *maliks* and chiefs of the Mada Khel tribe that a military force has assembled, and is about to enter the Mahaban tract, for the purpose of chastising the hostile colony of Hindustanis, consisting chiefly of fugitive subjects of the British Government. This intimation is accordingly forwarded to the *maliks* and chiefs of the Mada Khel tribe to apprise them of the intentions of Government and the destination of the force. As it is apparent that the line of retreat of the Hindustanis naturally lies through the territory of the Mada Khel tribe, the British authorities consider it just that the Mada Khel tribe should be required to prevent the escape of the *Syads* and Hindustanis across the Barandu. In consideration of assistance thus given, the Mada Khel tribe will be looked upon as friends of the British; and, on the occasion of a force encamping upon their lands, care will be taken that no injury be done to crops or villages.

CAMP NAWAKILA,
19th October 1863. }

(Sd.) REYNELL G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner.

APPENDIX I.

Translation of a Persian letter from Syad Amran and Ubaidula (commonly known as Maulvi Abdulla), to the address of Ahmad Khan of Bagra.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS,—A large force of the infidels has arrived at Salim Khan, Yar Husain, and Shekh Jana, with the object of plundering this country. It is, therefore, incumbent on you, immediately on the receipt of this letter, to gird your waist and proceed to Chamla, and, after issuing notices to the other allies, prepare and bring them up with yourself. We are posted in strength on the crest of the pass, and you ought to occupy Sarpatti and Landai, that is, the Chinglai village, and maintain a firm hold of your position. You should not allow a moment's delay in carrying out the above instructions. Should, however, any delay occur, the evil-doing infidels will plunder and devastate the whole of the hilly tract, especially the provinces of Chamla, Buner, Swat, etc., and annex these countries to their dominions, and then our religion and worldly possessions would entirely be subverted. Consequently, keeping in consideration a regard for Islam, the dictates of faith and worldly affairs, you ought by no means to neglect the opportunity. The infidels are extremely deceitful and treacherous, and will, by whatever means they can, come into these hills and declare to the people of the country that they have no concerns with them; that their quarrel is with the Hindustanis; that they will not molest the people, even as much as touch a hair of their heads, but will return after having extirpated the Hindustanis; and that they will not interfere with their country. They will also tempt the people with wealth. It is, therefore, proper for you not to give in to their deceit, or else, when they should get an opportunity, they will entirely ruin, torment, and put you to many, many indignities, appropriate to themselves your entire wealth and possessions, and injure your faith. You will then obtain nothing but regret. We impress this matter on your attention.

Sealed by SYAD AMRAN.

Sealed by UBAIDULA.

CHAPTER VI.

PESHAWAR BORDER.

SWAT TRIBES.

THE district of Swat proper* comprises the valley of the Swat river, from its junction with the Panjkora to the village of Charurai. Above Charurai is the Kohistan of Swat, inhabited by a different race. On the north and south the crest of the bounding ranges of mountains are the limits of the district. The length of this district is about seventy miles, and the breadth varies very much according as the mountains run down close to the river; but it is probably, on an average, not under four miles. In some places it is ten miles broad, and in others only a few hundred yards.

The district of Swat consists of one long, main valley, which is intersected by ravines and glens, bringing down the drainage of the ranges on either side. This valley is intersected by the Swat river, which, however, does not run through the centre, but changes from one side to the other—the side opposite to where it hugs the mountains consisting of a space of level ground. These plains on the banks of the river are cultivated, as are the hillsides, as far as is practicable, and above is a pine-clad range.

The only river of any size is that from which the district takes its name, but numerous torrents join it on either bank. These are, however, of no importance whatever.

The only canals are those for irrigation purposes. There are no lakes in Swat.

The climate of Swat, though differing from that of the Yusafzai plain, is described as resembling that of Buner in most points. The hot weather sets in later than in the plains, but it is more oppressive and continuous, owing to the mountains around preventing the free circulation of the winds. The frequent storms that burst over these hills do not cool the air, but, on the contrary, produce a hot, steamy atmosphere in the valleys below. The district is unhealthy in summer, for, owing to the extensive surface under cultivation of rice, malaria is exhaled in great abundance. This circumstance has given the country an unenviable notoriety for its peculiar and obstinate endemic, intermittent and remittent, fevers, which affect all ages alike. The malaria, it appears, is of universal distribution throughout the valley, and very poisonous in its effects. It has impressed its mark on the people, who, in their general physical condition, are more or less fever-stricken and unhealthy.

* In addition to what is here called Swat proper, there are tracts of country to the south of the Malakand and Mora mountains, and between them and the British frontier, which are dependent on Swat, and inhabited by the same tribes, and of which more will be said hereafter.

*Description
of Swat.*

In Swat, shut in as it is by lofty snow-clad mountains, the winter is a milder season than in the open plain ; for the air is less disturbed by winds, and the frosts are also less severe. Snow does not always fall at the lower levels. At intervals of three or four years the valley everywhere receives a coating of snow ; but it seldom remains longer than a week or ten days. On the whole, the winter in this valley is a less severe season than in the plain country ; but it is more prolonged, and the atmosphere is much more humid, and persistently so, than in the open plain.

There are no camels to be found in Swat ; but there are horses, mules, asses, bullocks, oxen, cows, and buffaloes : oxen, mules, and asses are the beasts of burden.

The total population of the Swat valley is estimated at about 96,000 souls. The bulk of the population are husbandmen, who live on the produce of their cattle and fields, and whose domestic wants are supplied by a minority of merchants, petty traders, mechanics, and artizans.

The Pathan tribes generally have a great respect for the last resting-places of their own dead, at least ; but the inhabitants of Swat seem to feel little compunction or respect on this head.

The strip of land lying between the villages and the rise of the mountains is set apart for the cultivation of wheat and barley, and in that land also their burying-grounds are situated. After a few years they allow these fields to lie fallow for some time, and plough up all the burying-grounds, and in future bury the dead in the fallow land. This may be consequent on the small quantity of land available for purposes of agriculture ; but still it appears a very horrible custom.

When fighting amongst each other, the Pathans of these parts never interfere with or injure the helots of each other, nor do they injure their women or children, or their guests, or strangers within their gates ; and such might serve as an example to nations laying claim to a higher state of civilisation.

The people of Swat are said sometimes to observe the same custom as practised by the Afridi tribe of Pathans, *viz.*, that of selling, or rather bartering, their wives, sometimes for money, and sometimes for cattle or other property they may require or desire. But, considering the complete system of petticoat government under which the Pathans of Swat are said to dwell, much faith cannot be placed in their having the courage to do so. The women in this valley enjoy more liberty, and rule the men to a far greater degree, than is known amongst other Pathans, who are so very particular in this respect.

The people of Swat, like others of their race, are very hospitable. When strangers enter a village, and it be the residence of a chief, he entertains the whole party ; but if there be no great man resident in the place, each stranger of the party is taken by some villager to his house and is entertained as his guest.

As regards the physical constitution of the people of Swat, the men, for Pathans, are weakly, thin, and apparently feeble, whilst the women, on the other hand, are strong, stout, and buxom. The women of Swat are not veiled. When they meet a man advancing along a road, they look down modestly, and pass on ; but the younger women turn their backs generally, and come to a stand-still until the man has passed by. They are, however, very plain, although they still look like Pathans. The men bear little resemblance to that race in form and feature—indeed, they appear more like the Gujars of the plains.

The houses of Swat generally consist of walls built of mud; on the top of these a few rafters are laid, and dry grass spread over them, and over this a layer of plaster is laid, of the same materials as the walls. They rarely last more than a few years; but this is of little consequence, when they have to vacate them about once every three or four years. *Description of Swat.*

The Swat valley is highly cultivated and densely populated throughout its extent along the course of the river, whilst each glen and gorge has its hamlets or collections of shepherds' huts. The general surface of the ground is rough and stony, and there is a considerable slope from the foot of the hills to the bed of the river. Owing to this slope of the surface, the fields are laid out in strips or terraces, one above the other, the boundary walls being formed of the stones collected from the surface. By this arrangement the soil is cleared of stones, and made level to retain the water led on to it for irrigation.

Cultivation is general throughout the valley; the chief crops are rice, wheat, lucern, peas and beans; but sugarcane, barley, Indian corn, cotton, and tobacco are also cultivated. Generally, all the cultivation is irrigated, water being plentiful, and easily led off in canals and cuttings, both from the river and the numerous hill-streams flowing to it, and, in order to facilitate its retention in the soil, the land is laid out, as above mentioned, in terraced fields that extend from near the river's bed to the foot of the hills. The patches of land about the lower ranges, if fit, they also bring under cultivation, and when they cannot bring their bullocks to work the plough, this is done by hand. In fact, there is scarcely a square yard of tillable land neglected in the whole of Swat, for all the valley is capable of cultivation, if there are no stony places or sandy tracts, or the like, to prevent it.

There are few or no trees in the lower parts of the Swat valley, save in the smaller glens running at right angles to it. Here and there one or two may be seen in fields near the river banks, under which the peasants rest themselves, and take their food in the hottest part of the day. It is on the mountains, on either side of the valley, that trees are numerous. These mountains, as seen from the broadest part of the valley, constituting lower Swat, are of different degrees of elevation. The first, or lower, ranges are of no great height, and gentle ascent; the second are rather more abrupt, and on these there are comparatively few trees, but much grass; and the third, or highest, ranges are covered with trees. On the southern range are pines principally, but on the northern are magnificent forests of deodar.

Firewood is scarce in the lower parts of the valley, and the dry dung of animals is used instead; but in those smaller valleys at right angles to, and opening out into that of, Swat, there are woods and thickets enough. There are no shrubs or wild trees, such as is called jungle in India, save in these smaller valleys and in the higher ranges.

The exports from Swat to British territory are, rice in large quantities, fruits, honey, glue and timber; and the imports are salt, cotton goods, indigo, spices, sugar. The people of Swat are quite independent of British territory for the necessaries of life, but they dread a blockade on account of the loss their trade would suffer. A sudden seizure of their property might be made any day in the city of Peshawar, or in Lundkhwar, to a large amount.

The best road from Yusafzai to Swat is over the Malakand pass; and the next best is by the Mōra pass, which is shorter than the Malakand route,

*Description
of Swat.*

but the ascent is steeper. There is also another by Shahkot, which is still more difficult.

In the valley there are roads, tolerably well-defined, which lead from village to village on both sides of the river, which, during the cold season, is fordable almost everywhere, but during the hot weather it is not so; it is then crossed by the natives on rafts of inflated skins. During the latter season they can flood the whole valley, which is thereby splendidly irrigated, and is a luxuriant sheet of rice cultivation; but the noxious exhalations caused thereby make the country extremely unhealthy, as already mentioned, and consequently, for operations in this valley, the cold weather is the season in which they should be carried on.

The people of Swat are all *Suni* Muhammadans, and they have earned the reputation of being the most bigoted of all the Afghan tribes.

The valley of Swat is divided into five districts, *viz.*:—

1. Baizai
2. Ranizai
3. Khadakzai
4. Abazai
5. Khwazozai

Of these, Baizai and Ranizai are situated to the south, and Khadakzai, Abazai, and Khwazozai to the north, of the river Swat.

The inhabitants of Swat are the Akozais, a division of the powerful tribe of Yusafzai Pathans, of which the Bunerwals, Black Mountain tribes, etc., described in previous chapters, are also branches (*see* Appendix A, Chapter IV).

The five districts above mentioned receive their names from the five clans of the Akozais by which they are held. Of these the two clans, the Khadakzais and Abazais, are far inferior, both in power and extent of territory, to the other clans.

The three powerful clans, the Baizais and Ranizais (cis-Swat) and Khwazozais (trans-Swat), are further divided into the following *tapas* or sub-divisions:—

(1). The Baizais into—

- | | |
|---------------|--------------|
| 1. Janki Khel | 5. Aba Khel |
| 2. Azi Khel | 6. Musa Khel |
| 3. Matruzai | 7. Khan Khel |
| 4. Babuzai | |

(2). The Ranizais into—

- | | |
|----------------|---------------------|
| 1. Ali Khel | 4. Bahram Khan Khel |
| 2. Utmanzai | 5. Usman Khel |
| 3. Khwazo Khel | 6. Sultan Khan Khel |

(3). The Khwazozais into—

- | | |
|---------------|-------------|
| 1. Adinzai | 4. Sibujnai |
| 2. Shamuzai | 5. Shamizai |
| 3. Nikpi Khel | |

The sub-divisions of Khadakzais and Abazais are too insignificant to call for special notice.

(1). The *Baizais* inhabit the country on the left bank of the Swat river, beyond the British border, to the north-east of the Lundkhwar valley.

This country is divided into two territorial divisions by the Mora range of mountains. That to the north is known as Swat Baizai, and contains their chief village of Thana; whilst the southern division is distinguished by the

name of Sam, or lowland, Baizai, and contains the six villages of Sher Khana, Bazdara, Zurmandai, Jalalpur, Palli, and Mora Banda. These villages (as also the village of Thana and some hamlets to the north of the Mora range) belong to the Khan Khel section of the Baizais. The six villages named above are some little distance from the hills, but situated in a country much intersected by ravines. Each village has its separate *Khan*; but all belong to the same family, though of different branches, and hold land in Thana, as well as on this side of the Mora mountains. The *Khans* of Sher Khana, Bazdara, and Zurmandai are of one branch of the family; and though not friendly, at least to the Palli *Khan*, who is of a different branch, yet they all keep together for purposes of mutual support against their relations at Thana. *Tribes of Swat.*
Baizais.

The revenue of these *Khans* is derived from fees at betrothals and marriages, and from a share of the produce, varying from one-tenth to one-third, on half the lands of the village. Another source of revenue to the *Khans* of the Barkhor section (*i.e.*, Sher Khana, Bazdara, and Zurmandai) is from the Gujars, living in small hamlets scattered over the Mora mountain. These keep up large herds of cattle, and cultivate a little. A tax on these hamlets may be reckoned at about Rs. 700 or Rs. 800 per annum. In addition to this a *seer* of *ghi* is levied on every rupee's worth sold.

The Sam Baizais also levy dues on traders through the Mora pass, and they are themselves great carriers. They fear a blockade, as it stops their trade, and they lose their dues, and their cattle remain idle. A seizure of bullocks, on which a great deal of the merchandise of Swat is carried, can always be made in British territory. As far as grain and other necessities of life are concerned, the Sam Baizais are quite independent of us; but their villages are all in the open, and they fear attack.

The men of Palli, which is their chief village, also cultivate land in British territory, and this gives us an additional hold over them. Collectively, the Baizai clan is reckoned at 38,000 souls, and they are said to be able to muster 6,000 matchlock men.

In addition to the independent Baizais described above, some of the clan are located in the Baizai sub-division in British territory, and as the conduct of the villages in British Baizai has in the earlier years of our rule (as will be seen hereafter) necessitated punitive measures being undertaken against them, it is necessary to describe in a few words this tract of country.

British Baizai is a sub-division of the Yusafzai division of the Peshawar district, and adjoins the country of the Sam Baizais described above. Its length is twenty miles, and its breadth twelve miles. Its appearance is that of a dry plain, interspersed with villages, in which are a few trees; while in every direction the plain is traversed by ravines, which carry off the drainage of the surrounding hills. The upper part of British Baizai is open, and easy for cavalry and artillery. The ravines are not generally difficult to cross, with the exception of the Kalpani. The soil is rich, free from stones, and much under cultivation, which, however, depends upon rain. The ravines about Kasima, Tazagram, and the village of Lundkhwar, appear the most difficult in the valley for artillery. The villages are few and far between, many of them being of considerable size. Water and fuel are scarce, as also grass. *Bhusa* is procurable in abundance in all the villages.

British Baizai is inhabited by Swat Baizais, and also by Utman Khels, Khataks, etc.

The Baizais have three villages—Mata, Shamuzaï and Babuzaï—all three to the east of the valley.

Tribes of Swat.
Ranizais.
Khwazozais.

The Utman Khels, who are probably an off-shoot of the independent tribe of that name to be described in the next chapter, own seven villages, of which the proprietary right or *daftar* originally belonged to the Baizai division of Swat. The Utman Khels appear to have been allowed to settle under that protection as a defence against the country now held by British subjects of the Yusafzai plain. Their villages are Kui, Barmul, Pipal, Mian Khan, Sanghao, Kharki, and Ghazi Baba. Kharki is the most powerful and the best behaved of these villages.

The Khataks,* who formerly came to this country as mercenaries, own Lundkhwar and the adjacent villages, including Shergarh, Tazagram, and Kasima.

(2). The *Ranizais* inhabit the lower end of the Swat valley, and are said to number 13,000 souls, and to be able to muster about 3,000 matchlock men. They are all resident beyond the British border. Their country, like that of the Baizais, is divided into two territorial divisions, *viz.*, Bar, or Swat, and Sam, or lowland, Ranizai.

Bar, or Swat, Ranizai, which is the most western part of the Swat valley, is inhabited by members of all the sections into which the tribe is divided; it contains thirty-five villages, which are situated on both sides of the river. The most important of these are Aladand, Batkhela, Matkanai, and Totakhan, each of which contains more than three hundred houses. The country here is an open plain, in parts encroached on by low hill-spurs, and generally sloping more or less rapidly to the river's bed.

Sam Ranizai is a tract of plain country to the south of the Malakand mountains, lying between that range and the frontier of the Peshawar district. It is inhabited by the same people as Swat Ranizai, and, in addition, contains some Khataks and Shilmanis. The whole of the cultivation of this district is dependent on rain, the ravines being too deep, and generally having too little water in them, to permit of their being used for irrigation.

The more important villages are Skakot, Dargai, Kadam Khel, and Dobandi, all belonging to the Ali Khel section of the tribe; Totai and Garhi, of the Utmanzai and Erozhah, belonging to the Sultan Khan Khel section. The roads between Sam Ranizai and Bar, or Swat, Ranizai pass over the Malakand range. The best of these is by the Malakand pass, and this is said to be a good road. There are four other routes known, but these are only footpaths.

(3). The *Khwazozais*, the last of the three powerful clans into which Swat is divided, inhabit the country on the right bank of the river. They have little or no communication with us, and any attempt to give a detailed description of them would, therefore, be superfluous. Suffice it to say that the sections into which the tribe is divided inhabit the right bank of the river in the order given above (p. 180), commencing from the south. The first of these sections, the Adinzai, adjoin the trans-Swat Ranizais.

* The *Khataks*, of whom those mentioned in the text are a branch, are a tribe of Pathans who inhabit the south-east portion of the Peshawar, and the south and east portions of the Kohat, district. They are one of the finest tribes on the whole frontier, and supply our regiments with many of their best soldiers. Their chief, Nawab Sir Khwaja Muhammad Khan, K.C.S.I., has proved himself most uniformly loyal and well intentioned towards the Government, and has on different occasions furnished aid, in the shape of levies, as will be seen hereafter, and has assisted the district officers in the management of the frontier tribes.

The government of Swat is like that of all Pathan tribes, a most complete democracy. The country is split up into as many factions almost as there are villages. Each sub-division of each section of each tribe has its separate quarrels and supports its own chief, who is generally at mortal feud with either his own relations or his neighbours, and who is seldom obeyed one instant longer than is convenient; so that nothing short of pressing danger to the whole community from without could ever bring together all the divisions into which Swat is divided; but that which could not be effected by ordinary means, has, in a measure, been brought about by the influence of one individual working on the religious feelings of a mass of grossly ignorant and proportionally bigoted people, such as the inhabitants of Swat are; this man was the late *Akhund* of Swat.

The *Akhund* has exerted such a powerful influence, as already seen in the Ambela expedition, not only over the district of Swat, but over the whole of the Yusafzai border, that an account of him somewhat in detail will not here

be out of place. His original name was Abdul Ghafur, and

Plowden. he was born about the year 1794 at Jabrai, a small shepherds' hamlet in Bar Swat. His parents, of whom nothing certain seems to be known, were poor and obscure people. His boyhood was passed tending his father's cattle, but it is related of him, even at that early age, that he was remarkable amongst his neighbours as a sober, thoughtful lad, with a decided predilection for a life of religious seclusion. As a shepherd-boy, it is related of him that he refused to drink of the milk of any of the cows of his herd save his own, which he led daily to pasture by a halter to prevent its trespassing on the crops of others, and thereby rendering its milk unlawful. In his later life it is said that he ordered his goats to be muzzled when driven out to graze, lest they should take a sly nibble at a neighbour's crop in passing. At the age of eighteen he proceeded to Barangola, where he first learnt to read and write, and became acquainted with the first rudiments of his religion.

Thence, after a time, he set out as a *talib-ul-ilm* or "enquirer after wisdom", and arrived at Gujar Garhi, a village about three miles from Mardan, in British Yusafzai. Here he took up his abode in the mosque of one Abdul Hakim Akhundzada, and, after a few months' stay, again set out on his travels. At Tordhair he became the disciple of one Sahibzada Muhammad Shwaib, who was held in high repute for sanctity in those parts. His tutor was a *fakir* of the Kadiriya order, to which most of the *Suni maulvis* on the north-west frontier belong, and the *Akhund* there resolved to exchange the mosque for the hermitage, and to become a recluse of the same order as his master.

He accordingly, about the year 1816, retired to a lonely spot on the bank of the Indus, below the small village of Beka (some four miles east of Tordhair), and there he led a life of austerity, religious seclusion and meditation, according to the rules of his order, for twelve years. His diet during the whole of this time is said to have been confined to *shamakha*—a very inferior species of millet, which grows as a weed in rice-fields, and is only eaten by the very lowest classes—and water. This grain is said to have been his chief food for many years after he left Beka, but the water was replaced by buffalo's milk, and more lately by strong tea, in which he indulged freely, with the view to keeping himself awake at night, so that he might duly perform his religious exercises. His first fame as a saint dates from his sojourn at Beka, for there the people of the surrounding country first flocked to his cell to solicit from him a blessing or an intercessory prayer, and therefore it is

Akhund of Swat.

that he is now known, even in the most distant parts of Persia, as “the Hermit of Beka”, and that some persons erroneously regard it as the place of his birth.

Owing, however, to his unwise interference in the quarrel between Khadi Khan of Hund and Syad Ahmad, which has already been referred to (page 82) he was forced to abandon his retreat at Beka. For some years he wandered about the country unknown and uncared for, but at length settled down in a *ziarat* at Ghulaman, a village of British Yusafzai, where he soon recovered his former name for sanctity and piety, and was resorted to by crowds of eager worshippers.

Thence, in time, he, at the invitation of the inhabitants of Salim Khan,* removed to their village, and, being regarded by the people at large as a saint (*wali*), had the title of *Akhund* conferred on him by the learned Moslem doctors of the day.

Meanwhile, his fame had reached the ears of Dost Muhammad Khan, the Amir of Kabul, who, in the year 1835, invited him to join his camp at Shekhan (near the present fort of Bara, in the Peshawar district), and bring with him a body of fanatical religious disciples to attack the Sikh camp. This the *Akhund* promptly did, and his small army of champions had one or two smart encounters, in conjunction with other *ghazis* in the Amir's army, with the Sikh troops. But the arrival of the Maharaja Ranjit Singh to command the Sikh force in person soon changed the aspect of affairs, and the Amir, finding himself surrounded, retreated precipitately, on the 11th May 1835, through the Khaibar, the *ghazis* in his force being the foremost to plunder the *bazar* of his army.

The *Akhund* fled panic-stricken to Bajour, with a few followers, who also, in a short time, deserted him. He, therefore, once again resumed his former ascetic and secluded life, and after a while, settled down in the village of Kaldara, in the Utmanzai canton of lowland Ranizai.

After a few years' residence there, he removed to the village of Saidu Mandz, in the Babuzai canton of the Baizai district of Swat, where he resided till his death, that is, for a period of over thirty years.

During his residence in Saidu, the *Akhund* married a woman of the Akhund Khel of the neighbouring village of Salampur, by whom he had issue two sons—Abdul Manan, *alias* Mian Gul, and Abdul Khalik—and one daughter.

The *Akhund* was consulted in all difficulties, but frequently (though in his later years such cases became more rare), after his opinion had been given, a chance of procuring plunder proved too powerful for religious reverence, and led the chiefs to follow the bent of their inclinations, though opposed to his expressed command. The following are instances of this sort:—When the inhabitants of Babuzai and Palli in 1847 drove Major Lawrence, in charge of the Peshawar valley, to destroy those villages, the *Akhund* strongly advised the people of Swat not to support the rebels; nevertheless they flocked to Palli in great numbers. Again, in 1849, the *Akhund* exerted his utmost influence to persuade the headmen of Palli to discontinue their depredations,

and to discharge the gangs of professional highwaymen then in their pay; this counsel being disregarded, they brought on themselves the punishment inflicted by Lieutenant-Colonel Bradshaw, which will shortly be narrated.

* In the south-east of British Yusafzai, and on the frontier of the Khudu Khel tribe.

The *Akhund* gained such an ascendancy over the minds of Muhammadans in general, that they believed all kinds of stories about him ; for instance, that he was supplied by supernatural means with the necessities of life, and that every morning, on rising from his prayers, a sum of money sufficient for the day's expenditure was found under the praying carpet. He was in the habit of keeping open house for the pilgrims who thronged to consult him, and had never been known to receive a present since his arrival in Swat.

Akhundof Swat. Punishment of the villages of Babuzai and Palli in 1847.

The first time we came into contact with the people of Swat was the occasion mentioned above, in 1847. In October of that year, Major George St. P. Lawrence, who was then holding the Peshawar valley for the Sikhs, was fired on from the village of Babuzai, when reconnoitring with Lieutenant H. B. Lumsden, of the Guides, and as the *maliks* would not come in to tender their allegiance, Major Lawrence determined to attack the village. Babuzai contained about two hundred houses, and was situated in a deep *cul-de-sac*, formed by two short, steep, and rugged spurs from the lofty ridge of hills which divides Lundkhwar from Sadum. The village was situated at the further extremity of this *cul-de-sac*, which was about 500 yards long and 300 yards broad. A direct attack was therefore unadvisable ; indeed, the village had the previous year successfully repulsed a superior force under Sirdar Sher Singh.

Major Lawrence's despatch.

Major Lawrence's force consisted of a brigade, composed of cavalry and infantry, with 6 guns, Horse Artillery, of the troops of the Sikh Durbar, aided by the newly-raised Corps of Guides.

A reconnaissance, made by a duffadar of the Guides, showed that the heights above the village could be occupied, and Major Lawrence therefore determined to turn the position from these heights. Mir Baba,* the chief of Sadum (whom Major Lawrence had released from captivity in the fort of Attock), had tendered his services, which were accepted by Major Lawrence, as Mir Baba expressed great anxiety for an opportunity of evincing his gratitude.

On the 10th October Major Lawrence detached a small party (one native officer and thirty bayonets of the Guides), with orders to join Mir Baba's men in the Sadum valley, under pretence of collecting cattle, the property of the enemy, and from thence to ascend the range during the night, so as to gain the heights in time to co-operate with the main attack at day-break. This party, as soon as they saw the main column in position, was to descend the spurs and clear the village of its defenders.

Major Lawrence struck his camp on the night of the 10th, and, after placing his baggage in a convenient and defensible position under a suitable escort, moved with the main body over an open country along the base of the hills. At 6 A.M. the troops advanced to the attack, covered by skirmishers from each of the regiments under Lieutenant Lumsden, the infantry in two divisions, with the cavalry in reserve—the infantry under Colonels Mehtab Singh and John Holmes, and the cavalry under Khan Singh Rosa.

* This chief was the father of Ajab Khan of Chargulai, whose ignominious end was related in the previous chapter.

Punishment of the villages of Babuzai and Palli in 1847. A detachment was sent to the left to cut off any assistance from the neighbouring villages.

The action commenced by the enemy opening a sharp fire from the right on the skirmishers, when the guns opened without much effect. The skirmishers were then ordered to occupy the spurs on each side of the defile. In trying to effect this, the left column was driven back; but the head of the rear attack being now seen descending on the village, a general assault was ordered, and the village was soon carried,—the Sikhs, under Lieutenant Lumsden, ascending and clearing the heights, and the Guides pursuing the discomfited foe.

The village had been deserted, the enemy having previously removed their families and property; and as there was no other means of punishing the villagers of Babuzai, and of deterring others, Major Lawrence was reluctantly compelled to order it to be fired.

Major Lawrence said that, throughout the affair, the gallantry, activity, judgment, and coolness displayed by Lieutenant H. B. Lumsden were conspicuous, and infused a like spirit into the troops, of whose conduct he reported most favourably.

The Guide Corps in this, their first skirmish, did good service, and Major Lawrence advocated their being armed with rifles.

The casualties on our side had been only one killed and thirteen wounded.

In this affair it appears that the village of Babuzai was assisted by the men of Palli, in Sam Baizai, and accordingly, on the 14th, the force under Major Lawrence proceeded to that village. The Guides, under Lieutenant Lumsden, crowned the heights on the left of the village, while the Sikhs occupied those on the right, and a detachment of the Guide Cavalry, making a successful charge along the valley, cut up several of the enemy with the loss to themselves of only two horses wounded. Having destroyed the village, the force then retired.

A few days after this, ten villages made their submission, several of which had never before tendered allegiance to the Durani rulers or to the Sikhs. For these services the thanks of the Governor-General were communicated to Major G. St. P. Lawrence and to Lieutenant H. B. Lumsden, and also to the Corps of Guides, for their gallant conduct.

Expedition against certain refractory villages in British and Independent Baizai by a force under Lieutenant-Colonel J. Bradshaw, C.B., in December 1849.

After the annexation of the Peshawar district in 1849, the inhabitants of Swat uniformly proved themselves bad neighbours to the British. They seemed to regard the plains of Peshawar, especially Hashtnagar, as a hunter does his hunting grounds. Plunderers and marauders, in bands, sometimes in twos and threes, sometimes on foot, and sometimes mounted, issued from Swat, passed through Ranizai, and proceeded to the plains of Hashtnagar and Yusafzai. They would not usually make regular raids, and they would refrain from molesting

Temple.

Pathans, their fellow clansmen; but they would attack persons of all other classes—cultivators, petty traders, cattle-graziers, wayfarers, and the like. They would carry off Hindus in particular, for the purpose of putting them to ransom. Again, the inhabitants of Swat harboured renegades, refugee criminals, internal malcontents, and external enemies, the names of whom are too numerous to mention. For years the valley was a rendezvous for any and every person hostile to the British Government; and among them were several persons who had been dismissed from the British service, and one man named Mukaram Khan, who had been dismissed from the Peshawar Police in particular, was received with great favour, and enjoyed a large landed grant in Swat. Not only did Swat receive and support enemies of the British, but encouraged them to commit depredations in British territory. Further, the people of Swat took every opportunity of inciting British villages to set authority at naught. They invited their fellow Pathans to throw off British yoke and acknowledge a nominal allegiance to Swat. For this purpose they would not only assemble troops in Ranizai or Baizai, but they would even send horsemen into British villages, partly as emissaries, and partly as representatives of authority.

*Expedition
against British
and Independ-
ent Baizai
villages in
1849.*

In October 1849 it was reported by Lieutenant H. B. Lumsden, Assistant Commissioner of Yusafzai, that the whole of the Utman Khel villages of British Baizai had positively refused to pay revenue; that they had warned the native revenue collector against sending any Government servants into the country; and that the people were all busy preparing for war. In reporting this matter to Government, and urging the despatch of a military force, Lieutenant-Colonel G. St. P. Lawrence, the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar, said the Sikhs were in the habit of sending yearly from 1,200 to 1,500 men, with some guns, to collect the revenue in Yusafzai, which, though it harassed the country, had a salutary effect; and as no troops of ours had up to that time been seen beyond the cantonment of Peshawar, an impression had got abroad among the ignorant hill tribes throughout the frontier that we had either no force or were afraid to approach their fastnesses.

Lieutenant Lums-
den's report.

In sanctioning the employment of such a force, the Governor-General recorded that in "all ordinary cases the employment of British troops for the mere collection of revenue is a measure to be avoided. But the refusal of the villages in Lundkhwar to pay the little revenue demanded of them is not merely a denial of the revenue which they owe, but is, in fact, a test and trial of the British power, and of the authority which is to be exercised over them. It is, therefore, quite indispensable that the demands of the Government shall be fully enforced, and a conspicuous example made of these men, the first in this newly-conquered province who have dared to resist the orders of the British officers." It was further ordered that if resistance should be attempted, it was to be put down severely, but without any unnecessary harshness; and, under any circumstances, the headmen of the villages were to be brought prisoners to Peshawar, there to await the pleasure of the Government. It was added, that if any foreigners should aid these villages in force, they were of course to be dealt with like any other enemy, and punished with a severity proportioned to the unjustifiable and predatory nature of the attack they might make.

Immediately after Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence had sent in his report, two forays on British territory were made by horsemen from the village of Palli.

*Expedition
against British
and Independent
Baizai
villages in
1849.*

On the 3rd December 1849, the force, as per margin, moved from Peshawar, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel J. Bradshaw, C.B., 60th Rifles; Captain H. Richards, 3rd Bombay Native Infantry, acted as Staff Officer to the force; and Lieutenant F. A. St. John, 60th Rifles, as Orderly Officer to Lieutenant-Colonel Bradshaw. The force was accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel G. St. P. Lawrence, the Deputy Commissioner, as Political Officer.

2nd Troop, 2nd Brigade, Horse Artillery.
200 bayonets, 60th Rifles.
300 bayonets, 61st Foot.
13th Irregular Cavalry.
One company, Bombay Sappers and Miners.
3rd Bombay Native Infantry.

Lieutenant H. B. Lumsden, with 200 men of the Guides, was sent on ahead of the troops to lay in supplies, and, on his approach, nearly all the recusant villages waited on him, and paid up their revenue.

On the 11th December, Lieutenant-Colonel Bradshaw, with the whole of his force, which had been strengthened by the Guides and 100 men of the 1st Punjab Infantry, attacked and destroyed the insurgent village of Sanghao (*see* Map, page 206), which had refused to submit.

This village was situated in a very strong position, immediately beneath an apparently precipitous rock about 2,000 feet high, from which two spurs projected some 900 yards into the plain, forming a *cul-de-sac*.

Lieut.-Colonel
Bradshaw's despatch.

This position had been reconnoitred the previous day by Lieutenant-Colonel Bradshaw, who determined to attack it on both flanks and in front simultaneously.

The cavalry were to protect the baggage and the left flank of the operations. The detachment of the 60th Rifles, supported by four companies of the 3rd Bombay Native Infantry, was to crown the spur on the left of the village, covered by two guns of the Horse Artillery; while the Guide Corps, supported by the detachment, 1st Punjab Infantry, were to turn the spur on the right, with a view of cutting off the only apparent retreat the enemy possessed.

When these arrangements had been partially effected, the main body, consisting of the detachment, 61st Regiment, supported by the remainder of the 3rd Bombay Native Infantry, and covered by the fire of four guns, charged and took the village. The left attack was met by a heavy fire and showers of stones, the precipitous nature of the ground rendering the advance very difficult; but the heights were gallantly crowned, and the enemy driven off.

The enemy, finding his retreat on both flanks cut off, retired up the height in rear of the village by a path before unknown to those who had been directed to acquire information respecting the locality of the village, which path was inaccessible to the troops beyond a certain height.

Lieutenant-Colonel Bradshaw estimated the strength of the enemy at 2,500 men. The villages had been reinforced by large bodies from the Buner country, and their loss must have been very considerable. A return of our losses is given in Appendix A. Lieutenant-Colonel Bradshaw regarded them as small, considering the difficult nature of the position and the obstinate defence of it for about five hours, remarking that the celerity of the movements of the troops and their effective fire prevented heavier loss.

Lieut.-Colonel
Lawrence's despatch.

He said he had to gratefully acknowledge having received every assistance, support, and information from Lieut.-Colonel G. St. P. Lawrence, the

Deputy Commissioner; and that he was greatly indebted to Lieutenant H. B. Lumsden for his knowledge of the country, and the way in which he had conducted the right attack, ably seconded by Captain J. Coke, commanding 1st Punjab Infantry.

*Expedition
against British
and Indepen-
dent Baizai
villages in
1849.*

In addition to these, Lieut.-Colonel Bradshaw brought to notice the services of the following officers:—

Lieut.-Colonel Hallett, commanding 3rd Bombay Native Infantry.

„ „ J. Fordyce, commanding Artillery.

„ „ J. F. Bradford, C.B., 1st Light Cavalry, who joined the force as a volunteer.

Major C. C. Deacon, commanding 61st Foot.

Captain R. Richards, commanding 3rd Bombay Native Infantry.

„ H. Bingham, commanding detachment 60th Rifles.

„ T. Quin, commanding 13th Irregular Cavalry.

„ H. Richards, Staff Officer to the force.

Lieutenant W. Kendall, Bombay Sappers and Miners.

„ J. T. Walker, Bombay Sappers and Miners.

„ F. A. St. John, 60th Rifles, Orderly Officer.

On the 13th December Lieut.-Colonel Bradshaw moved his camp to a position at the mouth of the valley of Bazdara, within three miles of the insurgent village of Palli, and of Zurmandai and Sher Khana, in Sam Baizai (see Map, page 206).

A reconnaissance being made, the villages were found situated as nearly as possible in echelon—Palli being the most advanced. On the right of this village rose a hill of some 1,500 feet, which completely commanded it, and was evidently the key of the enemy's position, and this was occupied by a mass of not less than 5,000 men. The hills to the right and to the rear of the other villages were also occupied by large bodies of men. The enemy also held the valley in force, his right resting on the hill above mentioned, with the village of Palli in his rear, and his left stretching across to a range of hills which bounded the valley on the left, about a mile distant. From these, hill-spurs projected at right angles into the valley, which were also strongly occupied.

Finding that the principal strength of the enemy lay on the hill to the right of Palli, Lieut.-Colonel Bradshaw determined on seizing it, and on the 14th the operations were carried out.

The detachment, Her Majesty's 60th Rifles, six companies of the 3rd Bombay Native Infantry, and a troop of the 13th Irregular Cavalry, were detached against this hill, with four guns of the Horse Artillery, which took up a position, and commenced playing on the hill with great effect. The Guide Infantry and detachment 1st Punjab Infantry, supported by three companies of the Bombay Native Infantry, were detached to the right, in view to turning the enemy's left. Lieut.-Colonel Bradshaw, seeing that the movement against the hill on his left was likely to prove successful, pushed forward the remaining two guns, supported by the detachment, Her Majesty's 61st Regiment, and the remainder of the 13th Irregular Cavalry. The light company of the 61st moved in extended order to the right of the guns, whilst the guns opened on the enemy on the spurs on the left of their position, when the left of the enemy was admirably turned by the column which had been sent against it.

Having thus succeeded in turning one flank of the enemy, and holding the other in complete subjection, Lieut.-Colonel Bradshaw advanced with four guns up the centre of the valley (the other two being left in support with the

*Expedition
against British
and Independ-
ent Baizai
villages in
1849.*

troops, which had now gained, and were holding, the hill to the right of Palli), carrying and destroying the villages in detail, and driving off the enemy, who made for the hills in their rear and on their left. The ground being tolerably favourable, Lieut.-Colonel Bradshaw directed the 13th Irregular Cavalry to charge, which they did with great effect.

All that the Deputy Commissioner desired having been carried out, and the enemy dispersed on all sides, Lieut.-Colonel Bradshaw withdrew from the valley, covered by a strong and connected line of skirmishers, supported by infantry, cavalry, and artillery, with instructions not to leave a man of the force behind them; this was effected without a shot being fired, such had been the panic caused by the previous operations.

The inhabitants of these villages had been assisted by people from Swat proper to the extent of from 5,000 to 6,000 men, and they had literally been driven like sheep across the frontier, leaving their dead on the field—a great disgrace amongst these tribes—and there had been nothing to prevent our troops pursuing them into their own country, if it had been deemed necessary or advisable to do so.

Our losses are given in Appendix B. Lieut.-Colonel Bradshaw regarded them as small, considering the nature of the operations, and that the enemy numbered in all from 10,000 to 12,000 men.

Lieut.-Colonel Bradshaw said, when all officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of the force had behaved so admirably, it was invidious to make distinctions, and he begged to bring to the notice of the Commander-in-Chief the gallant conduct of all ranks.

The force, with the exception of the Guides Corps, then returned to Peshawar, *via* Hashtnagar and Doaba, crossing the Kabul river by a pontoon bridge, and reaching Peshawar on the 22nd December. The Guides remained behind to cover the erection of a fortified post, the sanction for which had been accorded. Lieut.-Colonel Lawrence, in his report, stated that he had been unable to carry out that part of the Governor-General's instructions requiring that the headmen should be brought into Peshawar, as the nature of the country precluded the possibility of surprising them, and there was no opportunity of seizing them either during or after the action. He added that a most severe punishment had been inflicted on them, not the least of which was the capture of a quantity of grain, roughly estimated at 3,000 *maunds*, which was partly destroyed for want of carriage.

Only one prisoner had fallen into our hands—a priest from Bajour—from whom it was ascertained that the combination against us among the hill-tribes had been very great, and it was afterwards known that reinforcements of 15,000 men were *en route* to join the insurgents, when intelligence was received of their total defeat.

The entire satisfaction of the Governor-General with the steadiness and gallantry exhibited by all of every rank and of every corps was ordered to be communicated to the officers and men, as well as to Lieutenant-Colonel Bradshaw, for the success of the operations, and the thanks of the Government were to be conveyed to all for the service they had rendered. The thanks of the Government were also to be offered to Lieutenant-Colonel G. St. P. Lawrence, to Lieutenant H. B. Lumsden, and the irregular troops under their orders.

The Indian medal, with a clasp for the "North-West Frontier", was granted in 1869 to all survivors of the troops engaged in the above operations under Lieutenant-Colonel Bradshaw.

G. G. O. No. 812 of
1869.

After the expedition above described, the villages of Sam Baizai continued to give trouble. Crime was not to be stopped at once, and Hindus were carried off, property stolen, and outrages committed. Lieutenant W. S. R. Hodson, then in charge of Yusafzai, demanded security for the future, and one Ghulam Shah Baba, who seems to have been held in considerable estimation, and who owned property in our territory and in the Bazdara valley, became responsible for them.

Memo. by Captain
J. R. G. G. Shortt.

Conduct of the
Baizai villages
subsequent to
the expedition
in 1849.

The arrangement seems to have been successful to a great extent. No open aggression was offered, but occasional affrays and some cases of exaction occurred, when parties who had received some real or fancied injury would endeavour to right themselves by seizing the person or property of one of their neighbours. This was not, however, more than might have been anticipated. Between the Palliwals and the people of Kharki there continued to be constant disputes about the right of grazing, cutting grass, wood, etc., on the hill which formed the boundary between the two.

In 1855, the Kui people gave an asylum to a number of refugees from Palli, which nearly led to an attack on Kui by the people of Sher Khana, Zurmandai, etc., assisted by a force from Buner. Arrangements were, however, made by the British authorities, by which a breach of the peace was avoided, and an amicable settlement effected. The headmen bound themselves by oath to abstain from all acts of aggression, and, should cause of complaint arise, to refer the matter for the decision of the British civil authorities at Mardan.

In the same year the village of Sanghao, which had been punished by the force under Lieutenant-Colonel Bradshaw in 1849, was fined Rs. 200 on account of its robberies and molestations of traders from Buner, and, as a further punishment, the village was ordered to be removed from its hill position. The measure of removal was carried out by a good deal of pressure, and after a considerable time; but in the confusion of 1857 the villagers crept back again, and this fact was only discovered by Lieutenant-Colonel H. B. Edwardes, the Commissioner, in 1858, after the success against Panjtar and Sittana, when, thinking there was an opportunity for leniency, he imposed a small fine, and allowed the old site to be re-occupied. During the operations at Ambela in 1863, the Utman Khels of British Baizai flocked to join the combatants, and gave a deal of trouble by cutting up stragglers between the British position and the rear. Major H. R. James, the Commissioner, recommended that a force, destined by Sir Hugh Rose, the Commander-in-Chief, for a diversion against Swat, should be sent to punish the people; but, as stated in the previous chapter, this was not considered advisable by the military authorities. After the campaign, the *maliks* of this tract were summoned, and a fine of Rs. 2,500 was imposed upon them.

It appears that the deputation which came in represented only a portion of the tribe, many of the principal men standing aloof, partly from a sense of their culpability, and partly from a disagreement among themselves and the *malik* through whom they were summoned. The fine was paid by all, but it may be assumed that those who presented themselves were generally of the party disposed towards our rule.

Soon after their return home, dissensions broke out among them. There were many latent causes, especially that of the fine; the party who stayed away reproaching the party which presented itself. The spirit of jealousy and faction ran high, the villages being divided into two parties, and the two

*Conduct of the
Baizai villages
subsequent to
the expedition
of 1849.*

villages of Kui and Pipal, situated in the plains, comprising the majority of those well disposed towards the Government, found themselves opposed to Barmul and Mian Khan, joined by Sanghao.

Intimation of approaching hostilities was given to the Assistant Commissioner of Yusafzai at the beginning of July 1864, and he sent to warn them against committing themselves. On 21st August, however, a regular fight with matchlock and sword occurred between the villages of Kui and Barmul, in which several lives were lost on both sides, and several men wounded. In this the aid of villages beyond our border was brought in, and a regular warfare between these villages went on for some time. At the end of the year attempts made by the civil officers failed to bring matters to a peaceable solution.

In February of the succeeding year (1865) a heavy fine was inflicted, and certain of the *maliks* were retained as hostages. These measures were not, however, successful, as in 1866 quarrels broke out afresh, and it was evident this state of lawlessness among our subjects must be at once suppressed, or it would infect others, and encourage them to revert to their original Pathan condition, which had only disappeared under a knowledge of our power to maintain peace and order. It was therefore determined

to move out a force to compel the attendance of all the principal men, and to destroy and remove the villages of Barmul and Sanghao to a more accessible position in the plains, these villages being then situated in a difficult part of the country.

But as three of the villages beyond our border had assisted and fomented all these disturbances, it might be necessary that they also should be punished; the position of our own villages was naturally strong, and (though this was not anticipated by the Commissioner) aid might be furnished, as it had been in 1849, by Swat and Buner; it was necessary, therefore, in determining the strength of the force, to be prepared for all contingencies.

On the 7th January 1866, 100 sabres of the 13th Bengal Cavalry and 200 bayonets of the 27th Punjab Native Infantry were detached from Peshawar to Mardan, to enable the Corps of Guides to take the field. The 20th Punjab Native Infantry had been moved up from Rawal Pindi, and a mountain battery and the 2nd Punjab Infantry from Abottabad, and on the 15th January a force, as detailed in Appendix C, was assembled at Nowshera, under the command of Brigadier-General H. F. Dunsford, C.B., with Colonel J. R. Becher, C.B., the Commissioner of Peshawar, as Political Officer.

The native troops had brought with them five days' supplies, which were to remain intact until their arrival at Mardan; the Commissariat carried twelve days' supplies for the British troops. All were supplied with sepoy's tents, and the baggage was limited to a minimum consistent with health.

On the 16th the force moved to Mardan, when the Commissioner reported that, of the four recusant villages, the headmen of Kui and Barmul had come in, that the village of Sanghao had been abandoned, and that it only remained therefore to deal with Mian Khan and the independent villages. On the 17th the force marched to Likpani, where it had to halt the following day, owing to heavy rain. The Khan of Palli then presented himself to the Commissioner, and agreed to pay certain sums that had been obtained from our subjects, at the same time binding himself not to interfere with any British villages, to submit all claims against British subjects to the proper authorities, and expressing penitence for the past.

On the 19th the force marched to Mian Khan. No opposition was

met with; so, leaving half the force to destroy the place, Brigadier-General Dunsford proceeded with the remainder to Sanghao, which was also destroyed. The inhabitants of both villages had been warned to remove their property, and it had been intended to spare the wood, that it might be used in building the new villages; but, notwithstanding the efforts to prevent it, some houses were burnt. The Khan of Palli was made to witness this destruction.

*Conduct of the
Baizai villages
subsequent to
the expedition
of 1849.*

Colonel Becher's
report.

As only representatives of the chiefs of the independent villages of Sher Khana and Zurmandai had come in, the chiefs themselves were summoned, under threat of their villages being burnt, whereupon they waited on the Commissioner. The next day rain detained the troops at Mian Khan, and on the 21st the camp was moved to Tanaki, a strong column proceeding to the villages of Kui and Barmul; but as the former was situated in the plains, and as the inhabitants sued for pardon, it was not destroyed, but a fine of two years' revenue was levied instead from the Pathan inhabitants. Barmul was then destroyed, the inhabitants unroofing the houses themselves, and the walls being destroyed by the sappers and the elephants.

The force halted at Tanaki on the 22nd whilst the Commissioner made arrangements with the *Khans* of Palli, Sher Khana, and Zurmandai; the principal *maliks*, and those concerned in the late disturbances of our own villages, were placed in confinement for judicial investigation. On the following day the force was broken up.

Colonel Becher said, the most favourable feature in the matter had been the absence of all interference with our right to punish our subjects, although the tract lay close to the Swat and Buner borders. The *Akhund* of Swat, recognising the justice of the measures taken from first to last, proclaimed that the duty of subjects was "to obey their rulers and abstain from internecine strife"—a commendable sentiment, but doubtless prompted to some extent by a reminiscence of the Ambela campaign. Colonel Becher said he was much indebted to Brigadier-General Dunsford for the hearty assistance he had given him, and for the advice which he had freely sought from him; and recorded his obligations to Lieutenant E. L. Ommanney, Assistant Commissioner, who had accompanied the force, and had very successfully arranged for supplies, carriage, etc.

After the destruction of the three villages of Sanghao, Mian Khan, and Barmul, the villagers were directed to re-establish themselves on certain sites that were fixed at reasonable distances from the hills, and arrangements were made to expedite the building of the new villages by making all the inhabitants of British Baizai assist in the work.

On the 13th of February following, the Assistant Commissioner visited the new villages which had been erected, the old sites having been completely levelled by the villagers.

But the leniency shown towards these villages had not been fully appreciated by them, for, in 1872, disturbances arose consequent on the settlement operations, when troops were moved out from Mardan, and the village of Kui was made over to Afzal Khan, a Khatak chief, who promised to hold it with levies of his own tribe. This he did for a short time; but the position was not altogether a pleasant one, and he soon asked to be relieved. The houses of the ringleaders of the outbreak at Kui were pulled down, and the people of the three villages of Kui, Barmul, and Mian Khan, who had abandoned their villages, being given to understand that their refusal to return would lead to the confiscation of their lands and houses, they gave in, and have since given little cause for complaint.

*Conduct of the
Baizai villages
subsequent to
the expedition
of 1849.*

Since 1866, the villages of independent Baizai also have continued to behave fairly well. In 1871, the Khan of Palli was fined Rs. 500 for the murder of a British subject, and the following year had to pay another fine for interfering with men of British territory. At the end of 1873 reprisals were made on the men of Palli for robbing and wounding our subjects when returning from visiting the *Akhund*. After the expedition against the Ranizai village of Skakot in 1878 (see page 205), the villages of Palli, Sher Khana, etc., in Baizai became much alarmed, and feared similar punishment, in consequence of the outlaws they were harbouring. They accordingly made overtures to the Assistant Commissioner of Yusafzai, and entered into satisfactory arrangements for settling all claims that might be proved against them. Since then, with one exception, they have given no cause of complaint. This exception was in December 1881, when a theft of property, valued at Rs. 1,300, was committed at the Mardan post-office by a *chaukidar*, acting in concert with the men of influence in Palli. The value of the property, however, was recovered from the village, and, what is rare in frontier annals, the offender was surrendered to our criminal courts.

Expedition against the Ranizais by a force under Brigadier Sir Colin Campbell, K.C.B., in March and May 1852.

The rapidity and success of Lieut.-Colonel J. Bradshaw's operations in 1849 against the Baizais opened the eyes of the Swat chiefs to the possibility of a British force one day visiting their own valley, and filled all classes with alarm. In this exigency the oracle was again consulted, and advised that the only chance of making a stand would be by appointing one chief to command the whole disposable forces, all other chiefs being sworn on the *Koran* to implicitly obey him; and that the land tax of one-tenth of the produce, authorised by the Muhammadan law, should be at once collected to provide the sinews of war.

This proposal being agreed to, the chiefs commenced a scramble for the command, which threatened to end in a general *mélée*. Ghazan Khan of Dir left the council, declaring that he could never obey any man save the *Akhund*. To end this broil, the *Akhund* proposed that a chief hitherto unconnected with Swat should be chosen, and, among other nominations, pointed out Syad Akbar of Sittana, as a man of energy, and true Muhammadan principles, qualified for the position, with the advantage of being a *Syad*. Syad Akbar was accordingly invited to become King of Swat, under the patronage of the *Akhund*, and shortly afterwards was duly installed, with the usual accompaniments of prayers from the priesthood and *nazrana* from the chiefs.

This chief was, as already related, a follower of the famous Hindustani fanatic, Syad Ahmad; and when the latter held temporary possession of Peshawar, Syad Akbar joined him in the double capacity of treasurer and prime minister. He was thus thrown in constant contact with the Hindustani soldiers in that chief's camp, and formed a friendship for them which lasted ever afterwards.

The moment his authority was a little established by the *Akhund's* good offices over the Swat chiefs, and the first year's revenue collected, Syad Akbar sent for his Hindustani levies; but they refused, under some pretext,

to join him, when he set about collecting a standing army and guns, by the aid of which he hoped to put down any chief who should afterwards dispute his authority. He so far succeeded as to collect five or six guns of sizes, 800 sowars, and 3,000 footmen, all receiving pay in grain direct from himself. *Expedition against the Ranizais in 1852.*

Towards the end of 1851 the Swatis moved bodies of troops, several thousand strong, to the foot of the Mora mountain, and into Ranizai, for the purpose of creating disaffection on our border. On the night of the 6th March 1852, a party of 180 horsemen, under the leadership of Mukaram Khan, assailed a detachment consisting of 30 sabres of the Guide Corps stationed at the British village of Gujar Garhi, in Yusafzai, under Ressaldar Fateh Khan, as an escort to a party of the Great Trigonometrical Survey. The attack was very sudden, it being believed that the approaching party were the survey officers coming into camp, and the enemy were into camp before the men had time to form. But the assailants were gallantly repelled, leaving one dead body and six disabled horses in the camp; the Guides losing one sowar killed, and two wounded.

The gallant conduct of this detachment afterwards received the approbation of the Governor-General in Council.

Mukaram Khan, the leader of the attacking party, as already mentioned, had been dismissed from the Peshawar Police, and had been given a *jagir* in Swat. Half of this grant was on this side the Malakand pass, half on the other; and, when wishing to plunder, he used to come into Ranizai, retiring to Swat when danger threatened. It was therefore determined to treat the Ranizais as a tribe, and to punish them in such a way as to make them feel they could not afford to allow refugees from our territory, or bad characters from their own, to embroil them with the British Government.

A force under the command of Brigadier Sir Colin Campbell, K.C.B., was accordingly despatched into the valley.

1st Troop, 1st Brigade, Horse Artillery.
600 bayonets, 32nd Foot.
15th Irregular Cavalry.
Wing, 29th Native Infantry.
66th Gurkha Regiment.

This force, which consisted of the troops noted in the margin, marched from Peshawar on the 11th March 1852 towards Tangi (*see* Map, page 206), accompanied by Lieut.-Colonel F. Mackeson, C.B., the

Commissioner of Peshawar.

On the 14th March, the people of Ranizai sent in to Lieutenant H. B. Lumsden, the Deputy Commissioner, offering to submit to any terms imposed, and to pay revenue; the force under Sir Colin Campbell was accordingly halted at Turangzai, and the *maliks* of Ranizai summoned. This delay had the advantage of enabling two heavy howitzers with elephant draught to join Sir Colin Campbell from Peshawar. But the *maliks* afterwards refused to come in, declaring their intention of opposing us, and that they expected assistance from Swat. It had been now clearly ascertained that Syad Akbar's nephew, accompanied by a following, had been with the party that had attacked the detachment of the Guides, and the force therefore moved on towards Ranizai, arriving at our frontier village of Shergarh, about eight miles from Skakot, on the 21st of March.

On the march to Shergarh from Gujar Garhi much rain fell on the hills around, and, just after the troops and guns had crossed a very deep *nullah*, a body of water like a wall came down it suddenly, and for a short time a

Lieut.-Colonel
Mackeson's report.

Lieut.-Colonel
Mackeson's report.

*Expedition
against the
Ranizais in
1852.*

portion of the baggage and its escort and the rear-guard were separated from the main body of the troops.

On the evening of the 21st, the *maliks* of the Lundkhwar valley had brought the intelligence to Lieutenant Lumsden that the Ranizai *maliks* wished to tender their submission, when they were told that the troops would not be halted, but would march at daybreak to Skakot. It was further intimated to them that if they came in on the road, and paid the fine originally demanded of them, and gave satisfactory security for the safety of our frontier from the depredations of marauders from Swat, and our own bad characters who had taken refuge in Swat, their villages would not be destroyed, nor their crops injured on this occasion by encamping the force in their valley, but that the troops would, in any event, be marched into the valley of Ranizai, to enable the Brigadier to see as much of it as was desired.

On the morning of the 22nd, Sir Colin Campbell's force marched towards Skakot, of which a reconnaissance had been made the previous evening. On the road the Ranizai *maliks* came in, introduced by their neighbours, British subjects of the Lundkhwar valley. They tried to obtain an abatement of the fine imposed, and on two occasions, when it was refused, broke up their council and walked towards their villages. The force then advanced again, when some of the party would return to offer to pay their own share if their particular crops were spared. This farce continued till the force was drawn up within range of their village, when they were all sent away, and given half an hour to bring a unanimous submission to the terms offered, or abide the consequences. In the meantime, the road down and up the deep chasm in front of the village was made practicable for guns.

After a while, the Ranizai *maliks* returned with a full submission to the terms, and with ten *maliks* as hostages for their fulfilment. They then pointed out a practicable road into the heart of the Ranizai valley—indeed, the high road to Swat, which passed to the right of the drainage chasm, and only crossed a small branch of it higher up the valley, where it was no obstacle.

It was now about 1 P.M., and Sir Colin Campbell gave orders for the camp to be pitched at Shergarh, where it had remained ready laden, awaiting orders. The ten prisoners, as security for payment of the fine, were made over to the civil authorities, and the force moved on, conducted by one of the *maliks* of Ranizai. The road was found to be excellent, although a little narrow, nearly all the way to Dargai; and to reach Dargai, nearly the whole breadth of the valley had to be traversed. This village was situated at the extreme western end of a spur, which from this point ran up for a distance of three miles to the foot of the Malakand pass, forming, with the Malakand range, a narrowing valley. The ground was covered with cultivation, the whole valley being closely tilled.

On reaching Dargai, it was reported that Mukaram Khan had just left that village, and, on turning the spur of the hill at Dargai, some of our cavalry, seeing two or three horsemen in the distance, galloped on towards the Malakand pass. Sir Colin Campbell also ordered a party of the 15th Irregular Cavalry up from the rear and two guns from the troop of Horse Artillery. Subsequently, five men with standards were seen through a telescope skulking away up ravines towards the pass with about one hundred footmen. From the direction in which the men were first seen, there is no doubt that they had been at Dargai all the morning, and had left the hill behind Dargai when they saw the force advancing towards it.

Sir Colin Campbell's
despatch.

The troops might, had they advanced towards the foot of the Malakand pass, have driven those people off and over the hill, and looked down into Swat; but it was late in the day, and they would have had to encamp in Ranizai, and thereby broken the engagement with the *maliks*, whose hostages were in our camp. Sir Colin Campbell would thus also have engaged in hostilities against the people of Swat proper without having orders from Government to prosecute them to an issue. He therefore waited till he saw, with the aid of a telescope, these standards borne on their way steadily up the pass in open flight, and then returned to camp, without a shot having been fired during the day.

*Expedition
against the
Ranizais in
1852.*

Lieutenant-Colonel Mackeson had fixed, with the sanction of Government, the fine to be paid by the Ranizais at Rs. 5,000; he might, however, have increased his demand, in consequence of the message of defiance sent by the Ranizai *maliks* after they had actually given Lieutenant Lumsden to understand they would come in, but he considered their position a difficult one. The Ranizais on the south of the Malakand range, as has been seen, are only a portion of the tribe, and the majority live in Bar Ranizai, above the passes. They are, therefore, too weak to control the whole of Swat, when bent on hostility; although they are strong enough to check parties of marauders, not exceeding 300 or 400 men, from going through their country (which is the principal road from Swat) to commit raids in our territory. Lieut.-Colonel Mackeson might, too, have kept a larger number of the principal men as hostages, and have concluded no terms until he heard from the Board at Lahore as to whether it was desirable to prosecute hostilities into Swat proper; but then the force must have remained out well into April, with an attendant expense. Great injury would have occurred to the crops of our own subjects near our encampment; the Swat river and the Kabul river were on the rise; the one might become unfordable, and the other might carry away our bridge, when the Mohmand tribes would not have neglected to make raids on the Doaba, seeing the communications of the force with Peshawar cut off. Under these circumstances the Commissioner thought it wiser to make a settlement of the question at once.

Lieut.-Colonel Mackeson said, our display of power in the rich, though small, valley of Ranizai, our forbearance to use force when the enemy was at our mercy, and when we could have inflicted much injury, and also our return to camp in fulfilment of our engagement, without any wanton act of injury having been committed in the valley, must have impressed our enemies with a conviction of our good faith, if they were capable of receiving any impressions.

On the morning of the 23rd, Sir Colin Campbell's force marched to Jalala, where it remained on the 24th, in consequence of heavy rain, and resumed its march to Turangzai on the 25th, *en route* to Peshawar. The ten prisoners were sent, under a guard of the 15th Irregular Cavalry, towards Peshawar, where they arrived safely on the 27th of March.

Immediate payment of the fine could not be exacted from the Ranizais, as the first intimation they had of the demand was on the morning of the 22nd, and they asked some little time to collect it, which was accordingly granted them.

The satisfaction of the Governor-General in Council was expressed at the result of these operations.

In the following month (April) some men of the Ranizai tribe were implicated in the attack on the village of Charsada (to be related in the next chapter), and letters believed to be genuine were subsequently taken, which

*Expedition
against the
Ranizais in
1852.*

proved the complicity of Swat. One letter from the *Akhund* authorised the leader of the raid, one Ajun Khan, to destroy all Europeans and Hindus in the Peshawar valley, and all Muhammadans in the British service; but enjoined him to spare all other Muhammadans.

On the conclusion of the terms with the Ranizai people, a conciliatory letter had been sent to the Badshah of Swat, to which not only was no reply received, but it was reported that the killing of the messenger had been debated, to mark the *Badshah's* determination not to hold any intercourse with the infidels.

The Ranizais, moreover, withheld the payment of the fine which had been imposed upon them, repudiated the hostages, and expelled their families from their territory, declaring their reliance on Swat. Further coercion became, therefore, necessary.

On the 15th of May, the force, as per margin, consisting of 3,270 of all arms (details of which are given in Appendix D), was assembled at Shergarh, under the command of Brigadier Sir Colin Campbell, K.C.B.

1st Troop, 1st Brigade, Horse
Artillery, (6 guns).
Detachment 3rd Company, 4th
Battalion, Artillery, and of No. 19
Light Field Battery attached,
(2 guns).
H.M.'s 32nd Regiment.
2nd Irregular Cavalry.
Guido Cavalry.
1st Punjab Cavalry.
2nd Company Sappers and
Miners.
28th Native Infantry.
66th Gurkha Regiment.
Guido Infantry.
1st Punjab Infantry.

On the 16th and 17th the force halted at Shergarh, and it was reported that considerable numbers were flocking from Swat and elsewhere to the village of Skakot to defend the Ranizai valley, and that many *ghazis* had come over the passes to fight in this cause; and it was evident that the people of Swat proper regarded an attack on Ranizai as one made on themselves. The *Akhund* and the *Badshah* were at variance on the subject of the non-payment of the fine by

the people of Ranizai,—the one being in favour of the payment, the other opposing it,—as his influence would be diminished by such a course.

On the 18th the camp was struck, and the baggage moved two or three miles to the rear, under a strong escort*; and the force then marched to dislodge the enemy, who had taken up a position in the neighbourhood of Skakot, and afterwards to proceed with the punishment of the Ranizais.

Skakot was situated between a very deep and broad *nullah* on the east, and some hills on the west. About an hour after daybreak, when two miles had been accomplished, Skakot being then distant two more, the enemy were discovered on one side of the *nullah*, stretching away in one continuous line to the village, which was the left of their position, the ground they held on the margin of the *nullah* being about a mile and a half in length.

The troops were now formed in line of columns at quarter distance in the direction of the line of march, cavalry being sent to the left to watch the extreme right of the enemy. The advance then took place in echelon of regiments from the right in open column, Sir Colin Campbell's design being to break the enemy's centre with the Horse Artillery, and attack their left, which was on their line of retreat.

A sharp cannonade was opened by Captain R. H. Baldwin's troop of Horse Artillery on the centre of the enemy's position, which, however, they stood with great firmness, availing themselves of the broken ground for protection. The two leading regiments on the right, the Guide Corps and 66th Gurkhas, now "left-wheeled into line" and stormed the *nullah*, covered by the

Majesty's 32nd Regiment and the 1st Punjab Infantry, under Captain J. Coke. The attack was well executed by the troops, the first assailants having to encounter a heavy fire and much resistance. A company of the 66th Gurkhas were engaged in a hand-to-hand fight, a party of the enemy having charged into the centre of them. *Expedition against the Ranizais in 1852.*

The Horse Artillery now rapidly changed position, and galloped to the edge of the *nullah*, which they enfiladed with great effect whenever they could fire without injuring our own men; and as soon as the two 9-pounders could be spared, they were moved rapidly to the right, and brought into action opposite the village, and a large burial-ground at right-angles to it, which were both full of the enemy,—the 32nd Foot covering the guns, and the 28th Native Infantry being kept in reserve, ready to move on any required point.

The fire of the guns was sharp and telling, and they were advanced closer and closer to the enemy as the attack on the *nullah* showed itself to be successful. The enemy at length broke, a large body swarming up the hills to the rear of the village, and another making for the Malakand pass,—the 9-pounders playing on those retreating up the hills, the Horse Artillery going in pursuit up the valley. Three miles from the scene of resistance, the Guide Cavalry, directed, at Sir Colin Campbell's request, by Lieut.-Colonel F. Make-son, C.B., the Commissioner (who had accompanied the force as Political Officer), sabred a considerable crowd trying to make their escape. The pursuit had been so rapid that this had happened before the 9-pounders had succeeded in clearing the face of the opposite hills, although no time was lost by the fugitives in that direction.

In addition to the armed villagers, about 4,000 infantry and 500 cavalry, all from Swat, had been opposed to the force, and the *Badshah* Temple. and *Akhund* had stationed themselves on the crest of the Malakand pass, overlooking the valley, to view the fight.

Great slaughter had been committed on the enemy, with comparatively trifling loss to our troops (*see* Appendix E), and large numbers of dead bodies were found all over the ground where the enemy had fought, and on their line of retreat.

The amount of ammunition expended by the troops is given in Appendix F.

Arrangements were now made for the destruction of Skakot, a large village numbering some 600 houses, many of which appeared to be of much pretension. It was thoroughly burnt, as well as the crops around.

Having echeloned various parties to prevent the possibility of further annoyance, Sir Colin Campbell proceeded to destroy Dargai, about three miles higher up the valley. This was also a very considerable place, being full of houses of the better sort, and, according to rough calculation, having some 400 altogether. No opposition was offered by the enemy.

The troops returned to Shergarh about 3 P.M.

A day's rest having been given to the troops on the 19th, the force marched round the Ranizai valley on the 20th (*see* Map, page 206), destroying the villages named in the margin, together with much grain.

On this day no opposition was encountered, and but few of the inhabitants of the valley were to be seen. The troops were under arms and in movement from 4 A.M. till half-past 6 P.M.

Warter.
Dobandi.
Sandasur.
Kadam Khel.
Harkai.
Usman Khel Garhi.
Musa Maina.
Mirdai.

*Expedition
against the
Ranizais in
1852.*

1st Troop, 1st Brigade, Horse Artillery (3 guns).	to destroy the village of Erozshah. This place had been represented to be in an open valley. It was found, however, to be situated in close ground, within matchlock range of the hills, at the head of a ravine, some two miles in extent, up which the troops moved. Besides being so strong by nature,
200 sabres, 1st Punjab Cavalry.	
2nd Company, Sappers and Miners.	
200 bayonets, 28th Native Infantry.	
300 „ 66th Gurkha Regiment.	
200 „ Guide Infantry.	
300 „ 1st Punjab Infantry.	

it was surrounded by a loopholed wall. The inhabitants had retreated to a distant range of hills, and the troops were not molested till after the destruction of the village had been effected, and they had commenced their retreat towards camp. They were then followed by a matchlock fire till quite clear of the hills and ravines. The retrograde movement having been conducted very slowly and in perfect order, no loss was sustained.

On the 24th the village of Dobandi Paia, about four miles from camp, was destroyed.

The force then marched back through Lundkhwar to Gujar Garhi, where it was broken up.

In his despatch, Sir Colin Campbell said the action of the 18th, though fought against hillmen, and amidst the difficulties of a *nullah* of extraordinary steepness and width, with broken and stony ground in its neighbourhood, was essentially one of the plains, and not of the mountains. The artillery had full scope, as had the cavalry. This circumstance accounted for the considerable results, and the very heavy chastisement the force was able to inflict on the crowds opposed, who could not have been less than 6,000 in number. The gunners had shown great resolution, and had held the *nullah* in a manner which extorted the admiration of the troops.

Sir Colin Campbell added, nothing could be more satisfactory than the conduct of all, particularly of the Guides and Gurkhas, on whom the brunt fell when making the assault on the *nullah*. With the readiness of the Guides, under Lieutenant Lumsden, he said, the Commander-in-Chief was well acquainted; and he was particularly happy in having been able to employ the 66th Gurkhas, under Lieutenant-Colonel H. Troup, in an operation requiring all those qualities for which Gurkhas are so justly famous.

He further said he had to express his thanks to all the commanding officers of corps for their readiness in carrying out his orders, *viz.* :—

Lieutenant-Colonel H. V. Brooke, C.B., commanding Her Majesty's 32nd Regiment.

Lieutenant-Colonel C. Campbell, commanding 28th Native Infantry.

Lieutenant-Colonel H. Troup, commanding 66th Gurkhas.

Captain R. H. Baldwin, commanding the Artillery.

Captain G. Jackson, commanding 2nd Irregular Cavalry.

Captain J. Coke, commanding 1st Punjab Infantry.

Lieutenant W. T. Hughes, commanding 1st Punjab Cavalry.

Lieutenant H. B. Lumsden, commanding Guide Corps.

He added he was under great obligations to his personal and general staff—

Lieutenant-Colonel W. R. Mansfield, Her Majesty's 53rd Regiment, who had placed himself at Sir Colin Campbell's disposal.

Lieutenant H. W. Norman, Brigade-Major.

Lieutenant S. C. Woodcock, Horse Artillery.

Lieutenant J. T. Walker, Bombay Engineers.

Ensign P. S. Lumsden, Deputy-Assistant Quarter-Master General.

And, in conclusion, Sir Colin Campbell said he wished to mention more especially the Artillery, under Captain R. H. Baldwin. To the readiness and intelligence of this officer, and the activity of those under him, he was indebted for having passed through the day's work with a comparatively slight loss.

*Expedition
against the
Ranizais in
1852.*

On the receipt of this despatch, a resolution of Government was published, in which the Governor-General in Council acknowledged the sterling soldierly qualities of Brigadier Sir Colin Campbell, K.C.B., and the conduct of the troops employed under his command. The officers whose names had been mentioned in the Brigadier's despatch were thanked, and the valuable assistance of Lieutenant-Colonel W. R. Mansfield, of Her Majesty's 53rd Regiment, was acknowledged. In this resolution the services of the Artillery, the Gurkhas, and the Guides were specially noticed. The thanks of Government were also conveyed to Lieutenant-Colonel F. Mackeson, C.B., the Commissioner, and to Captain H. R. James, the Deputy Commissioner, for their exertions in connection with the movements of the force.

The Indian medal, with a clasp for the "North-West Frontier", was G. G. O. No. 812 of 1869. granted in 1869 to all survivors of the troops engaged in the above operations against the Ranizai villages.

In June, the month following Sir Colin Campbell's operations, the Ranizai people, finding themselves houseless and unable to re-settle in, or to rebuild, their dismantled villages, made overtures for peace. Shortly afterwards, they tendered unconditional submission, offered to pay revenue to the British, and to allow a fortified post to be erected in their valley. The Supreme Government declined to accept any tribute or revenue from them, only requiring them to behave as friendly and peaceable neighbours. They were accordingly excused from payment of the original fine, and they bound themselves to permit no marauders from Swat or elsewhere to pass through their lands to cross the British frontier, and also to live at amity with the neighbouring British villages, Lundkhwar, and others. These arrangements were completed in September 1852.

The following is the agreement entered into on this occasion with the British Government :

1st. If the Government require us to pay revenue, we will do so.

2nd. If the Government desire to build a fort in Ranizai, they are at liberty to do so.

3rd. If we are left by the Government to re-settle by ourselves, we will do so.

4th. The *Khans* agree that they will always be ready to do service for the Government, and will not receive into their country any person evil disposed to the Government, nor give such person a road through their country.

5th. If an army comes against us too strong for us to cope with, we will come with our families into British territory.

That Swat had been the head and front of all this offending was evident ; we had never interfered with them, but they had chosen to make war upon us. Our chief fault in their eyes was Temple.

*Relations of
Swat with the
British Gov-
ernment subse-
quent to 1852.*

that we were infidels by religion, and that we were the lords of a fair and fertile valley within reach of plunder. It was at one time thought that a good opportunity presented itself of dashing up the Malakand pass and down into the Swat valley. A separate expedition, on a considerable scale, was also being organised during the summer of 1852. The military authorities at that time, however, considered that various difficulties existed in the execution of the plan, and the Government consented to postpone the expedition until the cold season of 1852-53; but the day of retribution to Swat never arrived. The Swat Government seem to have taken to heart the punishment inflicted on the Ranizais, and to have dreaded similar operations in their valley; for they subsequently abstained from annoyance or hostility against the British, and the Peshawar valley enjoyed immunity from marauders from Swat.

It might naturally have been expected that the King of Swat would have been at the head of all mischief when the troubles of 1857 overtook us. It is a remarkable fact, however, that he died on the 11th of May, the very day that the first news of the Mutiny reached Peshawar, so that Swat itself was simultaneously plunged into civil war, and entirely preoccupied with its own affairs. The question was as to the succession—king or no king. Syad Mubarak Shah, son of the deceased Syad Akbar, wished to succeed his father; but the people of Swat had grown tired of tithes, and called on the *Akhund* to excommunicate the heir-apparent; both sides called in their friends and allies, and prepared to settle it with arms. It was at this juncture that 500 of the fugitive sepoys of the 55th Native Infantry, who had escaped from Lieut.-Colonel John Nicholson's pursuit, burst upon the scene. They were at once taken into the young king's service, but, after fighting one battle, demanded pay. The king, not being in funds, borrowed Rs. 100 from the leader of the sepoys (a grey-haired jemadar), and distributed the amount among the mutineers; but when his supply was exhausted, the full extent of his folly and misery seems to have struck the hoary ringleader, for he blew out his brains. A stone being tied to his body, it was flung into the river, which, perhaps, after many days, may have carried it down through the cantonment at Nowshera, where the 55th Native Infantry had, month after month, drawn the pay of the most indulgent Government in the world, for doing little but pipe-clay belts and varnish cartridge-boxes.

Had the *Akhund* of Swat at this time, standing forward as the champion of the faith, preached a crescentade against us, and, hushing intestine strife, moved across the passes and descended into the Peshawar valley with all the prestige of the 55th Sepoys in his favour, Lieut.-Colonel H. B. Edwardes, the Commissioner, said he did not doubt that he would have excited among our subjects that spirit of religious zeal which may be overlaid for a while, but which is never extinguished by material prosperity. Instead of this, he suddenly sided with the popular party, dismissed the 55th Sepoys, with guides to conduct them across the Indus, and expelled the young king from Swat.

After this we do not appear to have again come into collision with the inhabitants of Swat until the Ambela campaign.

The important part played by the *Akhund* and his followers in that memorable campaign has been shown in the previous chapter. On the 27th of October 1863 he joined the ranks of the enemy, with 100 standards (between 3,000 and 4,000 footmen) and 120 horsemen, under the leadership of Sherdil Khan, the chief of the Ranizais, and his nephew, Sobat Khan. Later on, the priestly influence of the *Akhund* had brought to his standard large bodies of

men from Kunar and Bajour, the latter under their chief, Faiztalab Khan; and in the beginning of December 6,000 more men, under Ghazan Khan, the Khan of Dir, had joined the enemy.

Relations of Swat with the British Government subsequent to 1852.

The reasons which, in the opinion of Colonel R. G. Taylor, the Commissioner, may have influenced the *Akhund* in throwing in his lot against the British Government have already been given (*see* page 119).

It is now well known that, ever since the English obtained possession of the Peshawar valley, the *Akhund* was suspicious and apprehensive lest the valley of Swat, his adopted home, should fall into our power. "It was his policy", writes Major James, "during the whole of the reign of Syad Akbar, to, in concert with him, keep up a system of marauding on our frontier, for which purpose they offered maintenance to men of lawless habits, and to influential refugees from our districts, whom they settled in villages about Ranizai, and incited to constant deeds of depredation and violence: thus keeping up the fear of our invasion by encouraging acts which might be expected to lead to it—a fear upon which they originally founded their authority, and which is their best security for its preservation."

But this policy was much modified, if not entirely reversed, after the Ambela campaign. The *Akhund* no longer incited the people of Swat or Buner, or other independent tracts, to raid on British territory; but, on the contrary, as far as it is possible to judge, advised them to behave as good neighbours, and, if they offended and were called to account by us, to meet such demands as might be made, and comply with such terms as might be imposed.

This policy was, doubtless, the result of his experience of our power and of the faintheartedness and want of persistent energy of his own disciples, as witnessed by himself at Ambela. Feeling he could not trust to the tribes of Swat or Buner to resist the force of the British arms, he was not anxious to provoke a second attack on either country. Not that he openly avowed this. On the contrary, he gave out that it was the result of his miraculous power as a saint, and steadfast maintenance of his position on the crest of the Buner pass, which prevented the British troops, in the high tide of success, from advancing on both Buner and Swat, and bringing them under their sway. And these assertions were believed by the majority of his credulous disciples, who saw in this continuous forbearance of ours further and most convincing proof of the *buzurgi*, or saintly reputation, of the *Akhund*.

A very noticeable feature in the Ambela expedition was the alliance of the *Akhund* with the Hindustani fanatics of Sittana, whose tenets he abhorred, and whom he stigmatised as *Wahabis*. It is simply to be accounted for by the fact that the *Akhund* was really alarmed for the independence of his disciples in Buner and Swat, and considered it the wiser policy to, for a time, sink all sectarian differences. Hardly, however, had our troops withdrawn from the Chamla valley, before the religious disputations between them broke out afresh, and in August 1868 we find the *Akhund* stirring up the whole of Buner, as already described, against a small party who had given some of these fanatics an asylum in the village of Bajkatta, in the Daulatzai canton, and not only expelling them, but encompassing the death of the fine old chief, Zaidulla Khan, who had befriended them, and raising up the Bunerwals to harass them in their retreat, and prevent their finding a resting-place, until they had reached the banks of the Indus.

There can be little doubt that this expulsion was the result of the *Akhund's* suspecting that our preparations, then being made for the expedi-

Relations of Swat with the British Government subsequent to 1852.

tion against the tribes of the Black Mountain, were intended to be made use of also against the Hindustanis, and he was most unwilling to be again himself, or have the people of Buner, embroiled with us on their account.

During the later years of his life the *Akhund* desired very much to see his elder son, Mian Gul, elected King of Swat; for he saw that after his death he was not likely, owing to his want of force of character, and the number of his enemies, to acquire for himself any position of influence in the country. At the same time he never directly proposed him for the office, although on two occasions he attempted indirectly to bring it about by a plebiscite of the people of Swat. The first occasion was in May 1871, when he suggested that Syad Mubarak Shah, the son of the former King of Swat, who had died fourteen years before, should be elected king in his father's place; but the suggestion was not received with favour, and nothing came of it. The second occasion was in June 1875, when he appointed one Ahmad Shah, a *Syad*, living in the Nikpi Khel canton of the Khwazozai district, King of Swat; but deposed him again in the following month, giving as an excuse that a *ghaza* (holy war) not being imminent, a king was not required; whilst he also asserted that he had doubts as to the integrity, as a ruler and judge, of his nominee. On both occasions the *Akhund* hoped that his candidate would be indignantly rejected by the people, and a unanimous offer of the crown be made by them to his son, Mian Gul. He simply desired, when making the above proposals, to gauge public opinion, and give the people of Swat an indication of his own views.

On the 12th January 1877, the *Akhund*, Abdul Ghafur, died. During the last year of his life, in spite of great pressure from without, urging him to adopt a hostile attitude towards the British Government, he persistently refused to depart from the neutral and almost friendly demeanour he had adopted for some years past.

With regard to the real feelings of the *Akhund* towards ourselves, conflicting accounts are given; but, if he be judged by the actions and the sentiments expressed by him on certain important occasions, he will be found to have, as a rule, used his influence more to support than to frustrate or hamper our action, so long as we refrained from aggressive measures against any of the tribes in his neighbourhood, who looked up to him as their spiritual guide. The best proof of the *Akhund's* wise restraint of the evil spirits of Swat and Buner is the almost total immunity, for many years previous to his death, of that portion of our border from raids and other serious offences.

The three main objects of the *Akhund's* policy seem to have been in his later years—

- 1st. To preserve the independence of Swat for at least his own lifetime.
- 2nd. To silence all his religious rivals.
- 3rd. To bring about the election of his son, Mian Gul, to the kingship of Swat.

In the first two he was successful; in the last he was not.

When the *Akhund* died, there were two great factions in Swat, one of which was headed by Sherdil Khan, the chief of the Ranizais, supported by Rahmatulla, the son of Ghazan Khan, who had succeeded his father as Khan of Dir; the other was headed by Abdul Manan, better known as Mian Gul, the elder son of the *Akhund*. All the principal men of Swat and the surrounding countries sided with one or other of these parties. Sherdil Khan, however, had an opponent in his own district of Ranizai in the person of his nephew, Saeed Khan, whom, as might have been expected, Mian Gul

supported. These men had both, at various times, been supreme in, and *Khans* of, their clan; but, at the time of the *Akhund's* death, Sherdil Khan held that position, and had done so, with the exception of a short interval in December 1875, for the past four years or so.

Expedition against the Ranizai village of Skakot in 1878.

Expedition against the Ranizai village of Skakot in March 1878.

After the death of the *Akhund*, the Ranizais began again to give trouble on our border. Subsequent to the operations of Sir Colin Campbell's force in 1852, this part of the frontier had remained undisturbed, and the Ranizai people had fulfilled satisfactorily the engagements then entered into with the British Government. Our border was not molested by marauders from that direction, nor did any cause for dissatisfaction on our part arise. Indeed, so anxious were the Ranizai people to maintain peace with us, that afterwards, when some of the leading men, who had brought about their submission in 1852, were killed in an internal feud, a deputation came from Ranizai to the British authorities expressly to explain that, although these men were dead, the tribe still adhered to their agreements. This good behaviour continued during the lifetime of the *Akhund*, but in 1877 the village of Skakot, by harbouring outlaws, and not restraining them from committing offences within the British border, had become troublesome, and appeared disinclined to obey the orders of the Assistant Commissioner of Mardan to attend and adjust the claims recorded against the village. It was considered inadvisable to allow this state of things to continue, and a proposal was therefore sanctioned to use the Guides and the Hazara Mountain Battery at Mardan to coerce the village.

The force, as per margin, under the command of Major R. B. P. P. Campbell, of the Guides, accordingly marched from Mardan at 8.45 P.M. on the evening of the 13th of March 1878, to punish the inhabitants of Skakot (see Map, page 206).	
Major Campbell's despatch.	
<i>Hazara Mountain Battery.</i>	249 Sabres.
2 British Officers.	<i>Guide Infantry.</i>
4 Guns.	7 British Officers.
<i>Guide Cavalry.</i>	11 Native Officers.
4 British Officers.	428 Bayonets.
9 Native Officers.	

The force was accompanied by Captain P. L. N. Cavagnari, as Political Officer, and by Captain R. Warburton, as his assistant. The object was to surprise the village and capture as many of the fighting men as possible. In order to avoid giving any notice of the approach of the troops, a detour was made to avoid the village of Jalala, and the force arrived within two miles of Skakot about 2 A.M. on the morning of the 14th of March.

Skakot, at this time, was a village of about 500 houses, and reported to possess 400 fighting men. It is situated, as already stated, on the right bank of a deep ravine, which is the main drainage channel of a great portion of the Sam Ranizai country. Its direction, as it passes Skakot and enters British territory, is due north and south. The ground between the ravine and the hills on the east is practicable for cavalry, and to the north-west there is a small detached hill which commands the village, which, if held, would prevent any assistance being given by the independent villages to the north. The first object was to gain possession of this hill. Major Campbell accordingly ordered two companies of infantry, under Major G. Stewart, to cross the ravine about a mile below Skakot, and make for this hill. This was successfully carried

Captain Cavagnari's report.

*Expedition
against the
Ranizai village
of Skakot in
1878.*

out, and the party reached the crest of the hill without having alarmed the inhabitants of the village. The main body of the infantry, under Major Campbell, followed about a quarter of an hour later, and, having crossed the nullah, took up a position in front of Skakot just as the day was breaking.

The artillery and the cavalry remained on the left bank of the ravine, at a distance of about two miles from the village, with orders to wait till daybreak, when the artillery was to take up a suitable position to the south, and the cavalry, under Captain W. Battye, was to move rapidly forward and cut off the retreat of the enemy to the north and east of the village. The first thing which made the enemy aware of the presence of our troops was hearing and seeing the cavalry trotting past to take up the position assigned them. They then commenced beating drums, and it appeared as if they intended to offer resistance. At the same time, the inhabitants, chiefly women and children, began to flee towards the hill to the north-west of the village, but stopped on seeing that it was occupied by our troops. Captain Cavagnari then sent forward a man to summon the village to surrender, or take the consequences. When sufficient time had been allowed for the messenger to reach the village, the advance was sounded, and the infantry began to move forward in skirmishing order.

Seeing that resistance would be hopeless, the headmen came out and made an unconditional surrender, without a shot having been fired on either side. The troops then entered the village, and the following terms were demanded :—

- 1st. That they should pay a fine of Rs. 500 for past misconduct.
- 2nd. That they should at once adjust all claims of British subjects for compensation for losses inflicted on them within British territory.
- 3rd. That all outlaws should at once be expelled from Skakot, and suitable guarantees should be given by the headmen, binding them to refuse such persons an asylum in future.
- 4th. That hostages, or other suitable guarantee for the good behaviour of the village in future, should be furnished.

The headmen agreed to these demands without demur, and thirty-three hostages were selected from the inhabitants, and accompanied the force on its return. The neighbouring villages had made no attempt to assist Skakot, and they now sent in their headmen to pay their respects to the British officers.

The village was occupied till 10 A.M., when the return march was commenced, and the whole force arrived at Mardan the same evening, having marched nearly fifty miles within twenty-four hours.

Major Campbell, in forwarding his report of these operations, said that the troops had worked most willingly and heartily, and he brought to notice the names of Major G. Stewart and Captain W. Battye, of the Guides, Lieutenant C. C. Lindsay, commanding the Hazara Mountain Battery, Captain R. Warburton, Assistant Commissioner, and Subadar Major Admad Khan, Bahadur.

The Government of India, in acknowledging the receipt of Major Campbell's report, considered that the operations had been admirably conducted, and reflected credit on Major Campbell and the officers and men employed.

The acknowledgments of the Government were also conveyed to Captain Cavagnari and to Captain Warburton.

The relations between the British Government and the villages on the Ranizai border have remained undisturbed since the affair above described. *Events in Swat up to the present time.*

In December 1878 the two sons of the late *Akhund* endeavoured to create a *jahad*, and *mullas* were sent in all directions to raise up the *Khans* and the people. Fortunately, just then the powerful party of Sherdil Khan had been turned out of power. These were persuaded to discourage the fanatical movement in Ranizai, and, through their adherents, in upper Swat also; and, in consequence, the movement was an utter failure. In April 1880, Sherdil Khan of Aladand, who had been ill for some time, died in British territory, where he had come for medical treatment. After his death the chief political power in Swat passed into the hands of Rahmatulla Khan, the Khan of Dir. During the later months of the occupation of Afghanistan in 1880, the well-known Mulla Khalil, with other *mullas* from the Mohmand hills, worked hard to incite the tribes of Dir and Swat to commence a crusade, by an attack on the British line of communications near Jalalabad. Their efforts were, to a great extent, neutralised by the passive attitude of Rahmatulla Khan, and ere long the cry for a *jahad* died away.

For the last two years a desultory contest has been carried on between Mian Gul and the Khan of Dir, for the supremacy in Swat. In March last these two came to terms, and a more peaceful era may now be anticipated. By this agreement, Mian Gul acknowledged the authority of Dir over Malizai; Rahmatulla Khan, on the other hand, pledging himself not to interfere unasked in the affairs of Swat proper. Mian Gul is now about thirty-two years of age; he appears to be naturally indolent and careless, and is not personally popular, and the people of Swat, moreover, have a rooted aversion to seeing any one man in a position of power which may be expected to be permanent and lead to the imposition of taxes, or demand for land revenue. His younger brother, following the example of his father, leads the quiet life of an ascetic, and, at least to all outward appearances, abstains from interference in politics.

The incessant party struggles of Swat during the last few years have not disturbed the British border, nor affected the friendly relations between the people of Swat and the residents of the Peshawar district.

APPENDIX A.

Return of Killed and Wounded in the force under the command of LIEUTENANT-COLONEL J. BRADSHAW, C.B., in the attack on the village of Sanghao, on the 11th December 1849.

Corps.	Killed.					Wounded.					Remarks.
	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	
Her Majesty's 60th Rifles	*1	..	1	6	8	*Capt. H. Bingham, severely. Two horses were killed and three wounded.
Her Majesty's 61st Regiment	1	..	1	
3rd Bombay Native Infantry	3	3	
Guide Corps	1	2	1	4	2	4	6	
Total	1	2	1	4	1	...	4	13	18	

ABSTRACT.

Killed	4
Wounded	18
Total	22

APPENDIX B.

Return of Killed and Wounded in the force under the command of LIEUTENANT-COLONEL J. BRADSHAW, C.B., in the attack on the villages of Palli, Zurmandai, and Sher Khana, on the 14th December 1849.

Corps.	Killed.					Wounded.					Remarks.
	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	
13th Irregular Cavalry	1	1	One horse was wounded.
Her Majesty's 60th Rifles	1	1	2	7	7	
3rd Bombay Native Infantry	*1	11	12	*Lieut. W. Bannerman, slightly.
Guide Corps	2	1	3	
Total	1	2	3	1	...	2	19	22	

ABSTRACT.

Killed	3
Wounded	22

APPENDIX C.

Return of troops under the command of BRIGADIER-GENERAL H. F. DUNSFORD, C.B.,
January 1866.

Corps.	Officers.		Rank and file.		Guns.	Remarks.
	British.	Native.	British.	Native.		
D Battery, F. Brigade, } Royal Horse Artillery }	5	...	119	...	6	Four 9-pounder guns. } Half of the Two 24-pounder howitzers. } battery with elephant equipment.
Attock Garrison Company...	1	...	20	...	2	5½-inch mortars.
Peshawar Mountain Battery	4	3	...	128	4	Two 3-pounder guns; two 12-pounder howitzers.
Detachment, 90th Light Infantry	10	...	218	
Guide Cavalry	13	..	263	...	
Head-Quarters, 13th Bengal Cavalry	5	7	...	217	...	
Sappers and Miners, 1st and 3rd Companies	1	2	4	103	...	
Guide Infantry	8*	16	...	486	...	* Includes those with Guide Cavalry.
1st Sikh Infantry	4	6	...	249	...	
2nd Punjab Infantry	7	13	...	579	...	
20th Punjab Native Infantry	8	16	...	543	...	
23rd Punjab Native Infantry (Pioneers)	6	14	...	573	...	
27th Punjab Native Infantry	8	14	...	529	...	
	67	104	361	3,670	12	

APPENDIX D.

*Return of troops under the command of BRIGADIER SIR COLIN CAMPBELL, K.C.B.,
employed in the operations against Skakot, on the 18th May 1852.*

Corps.	British Officers.	Medical Officers.	Native Officers.	Non-Commissioned Officers.	Drummers and Trumpeters.	Rank and file.	Remarks.
1st Troop, 1st Brigade, Horse Artillery	5	1	...	6	2	76	{ Five 6-pounder guns. One 12-pounder howitzer.
Detachment, 3rd Company, 4th Battalion, Artillery, and of No. 19, Light Field Battery, attached ...	1	3	1	20	
Total Artillery ...	6	1	...	9	3	96	Two 9-pounder guns.
One Squadron, 2nd Irregular Cavalry .	1	...	4	18	2	79	
Guide Cavalry ...	1	...	11	26	3	158	
Two Squadrons, 1st Punjab Cavalry .	1	1	11	24	5	208	
Total Cavalry ...	3	1	26	68	10	445	
2nd Company, Sappers and Miners	1	4	1	38	
Her Majesty's 32nd Regiment ...	16	2	...	25	12	530	
28th Native Infantry ...	7	...	13	21	11	354	
66th Gurkha Regiment ...	11	1	14	42	12	528	
Guide Infantry... ..	2	1	9	45	10	318	
1st Punjab Infantry ...	2	...	12	28	14	511	
Total ... { Infantry ...	38	4	48	161	59	2,241	
{ Staff ...	7	
Total ...	54	6	75	242	73	2,820	
Grand Total ...	3,270						

APPENDIX E.

Return of Killed and Wounded in the operations against the village of Skakot on the 18th May 1852.

Corps.	Killed.					Wounded.					Remarks.
	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	
Guide Cavalry	6	6	In the Guide Cavalry one horse was killed and five wounded, and one horse of the Staff was wounded.
66th Gurkha Regiment	1	6	7	6	6	
Guide Infantry	1	3	4	4	10	14	
1st Punjab Infantry	3	3	
Total	2	9	11	4	25	29	

ABSTRACT.

Killed	11
Wounded	29
Total	40

APPENDIX F.

Return of Ammunition expended in the operations against the village of Skakot on the 18th May 1852.

Corps.	Number of rounds expended.
1st Troop, 1st Brigade, Horse Artillery	146
Detachment 3rd Company, 4th Battalion, Artillery, and of No. 19, Light Field Battery attached	65
Total	211
32nd Foot	30
66th Gurkha Regiment	2,958
Guide Infantry	7,500
1st Punjab Infantry	10,125
Total	20,613

CHAPTER VII.

PESHAWAR BORDER.

UTMAN KHEL TRIBE.

*Utman Khel
tribe and
country.*

THE Utman Khels are a tribe of Pathans which occupy the hills to the north of Peshawar, between the Mohmands and the Ranizais of Swat.

They are descendants of Baba Utman, a follower of Mahmud of Ghazni, who accompanied the latter in his expedition into Hindustan in the year A.D. 997, and settled in this country.

Their country is bounded on the east by Swat, on the south by British territory (Hashtnagar), on the west by the territory of the independent Mohmands, and on the north by Bajour. The whole of this country is hilly and difficult, with very few roads leading through it to Swat by which a horseman could travel. It is generally well cultivated, and its chief products are the common articles of consumption, such as *ghi*, Indian corn, and rice, the harvest depending a good deal on periodical rains. The land which is under cultivation is usually terraced, and of a dark-coloured soil.

The Utman Khels are described as tall, stout, and fair, but it is said that they often go naked from the waist upwards; that the women labour like the men, and that everything among them shows the absence of civilisation. Their dress is like that of the people of Bajour, and in their customs with respect to women, they do not differ much from their neighbours. They are a sober people, and have none of the vices of the Yusafzais. They live for the most part in small villages, of from ten to sixteen houses. They are probably less civilised than their neighbours, and the strength of their own country may tempt them to plunder, as it secures them immunity from punishment.

The Utman Khels number 17,000 fighting men in all, according to Turner; but Bellew gives their numbers at 5,000, and Elphinstone at 10,000. Of these figures, those of Bellew are probably correct.

Their country lies on both sides of the Swat river, until the latter reaches the limits of the Mohmands, when the river then forms the boundary between the two tribes. In this part of its course, the river rushes for several miles through a narrow gorge, to where, below the village of Sapri, it debouches into the Hashtnagar plain.

The Utman Khel territory to the north of the Swat river, which is the larger portion, may be roughly described as a series of valleys between spurs of the hills radiating from the lofty Koh-i-Mohr, a mountain 8,200 feet high, north of which are the homes of the Mandal, Alizai, and Mutakai branches of the Utman Khel tribe, with whom we have few dealings: while to the south of

this great central mountain peak are the important divisions called Arang, Barang, and Ambahar, inhabited by the Ismailzais. *Utman Khel
tribe and
country.*

The territory to the south of the Swat river, and between it and British territory, is known as the Laman, and is traversed by the Sulala range, rising to its highest point in mount Khanorai, north of the village of Prangarh. The Laman, as its name implies,* includes, strictly, only the country between the watershed of the Sulala range and the plains—the portion intercepted between that and the river having no special name. The chief divisions of the Utman Khel tribe are—

- | | |
|---------------|--------------|
| 1. Ismailzai. | 5. Gorai. |
| 2. Mandal. | 6. Bimbarai. |
| 3. Alizai. | 7. Sanizai. |
| 4. Mutakai. | 8. Peghzai. |

Of these, the most important, both from their numbers, their situation, and their consequent connection with the British Government, are the Ismailzais, who are divided into two branches—the Shamuzais and the Asils. The Shamuzais inhabit Arang, and also a tract of country called Tras, on the northern slopes of the hills which divide that valley from Bajour. The Asils (*see* Appendix A) are the most numerous of all the branches of the Utman Khels. A sub-division of the Asils, the Butkor, are, from its numbers and importance, sometimes spoken of as a separate division. The Asils live in Barang, a valley between Arang and Ambahar; but the Butkor sub-division occupies the last-named valley. Colonies of the Asils have settled in the Laman, and the Umar Khel Butkors inhabit also the tract between the river and the Laman, and are called Hill Umar Khels, to distinguish them from their brethren in the valley of Ambahar across the river.

The Mandal clan live between Ambahar and Bajour, the Alizai between Barang and Bajour, and the Mutakai north of Arang. The Gorai is an unimportant division, scattered on the confines of Bajour. None of these have much intercourse with British territory.

The Bimbarai, Sanizai, and Peghzai divisions inhabit Totai, a small tract on the west of Ranizai. It is divided into Bar and Kuz Totai. These branches are few in number and unimportant. They have little connection with the politics, the feuds, or the friendships of the Utman Khels of the Laman, or beyond the river, and their dealings are almost exclusively with the Ranizais of Swat. They seem originally to have settled as dependents of the last-named, but they have now become landholders or *daftaris*, and have ceased to pay a share of grain.

The earliest settlement of the Utman Khels was in Arang, whence the Shamuzais, soon becoming the most powerful division, drove out the Asils, who migrated to Barang, and, as their numbers increased, looked enviously at the open plain of the neighbouring valley of Ambahar to their west, then part of Bajour, and eventually conquered it for themselves, when it was taken possession of by the Butkor section, who now hold it. Ambahar contains more plain land than the other divisions of the Utman Khel country, and is considered more fertile. Quarrels soon ensued between the Asils who had stayed in their old home, and the emigrants to Ambahar, as to the *vesh* of the latter in the ancestral possessions in Barang. A feud then arose between the Butkors of Ambahar and the other Asils, which exists to the present day.

* The word *laman* in Pushtu is the same as the Persian word *daman*, the slopes or skirt of the hills.

Utman Khel
tribe and
country.

The Butkor section, living apart from their brethren and growing in importance and numbers, almost ceased to be looked on as Asils, which name is specially applied to the inhabitants of Barang. The Shamuzaïs of Arang are also at feud with the people of Barang, and, while the Asils are disunited, are the most powerful branch of the Utman Khel tribe.

The Laman proper is held by a variety of tribes, Utman Khel and others. The Shahdad and Pakhai sections of the Umar Khels live in Prangarh, Rangmiana, and Nasir; and the Dini Khel in Nawadan. Besides these there are a few non-Utman Khel tribes—the Zirak, who are said to be the original inhabitants of the country, in Tarakai and Bucha; and the Mullagoris, in Sapri and Nawakili. This settlement of the Mullagoris* is an offshoot of the Mullagoris of Tartara, who inhabit a tract of country to the north of the Khaibar pass, and who will be described in the next chapter. The men of the Laman being our immediate neighbours, have continual intercourse with British territory; in ordinary times they may be seen in numbers in Abazai and Tangi with grass and firewood for sale; they cultivate a large portion of the land of these two villages north of the road from Abazai to Gandhairi, and also take an active part in the factions of northern Hashtnagar.

The villages of the Laman are divided by feuds, and there is a feud of long standing between the Mullagori *Mians* of Sapri and the Kaka Khel *Mians* of Abazai. This arose in disputes about land, and may have been embittered by the jealousies of rival priestly houses.

In case of an expedition to enforce demands against the whole tribe, these feuds would of course be sunk in a general opposition to the British Government. With this view, shortly after the Abazai outrage in 1876, to be described hereafter, a leading *malik* of the Umar Khels of Ambahar, and a man of influence with the whole tribe, came into the Laman, and convened many *jirgas* to induce the rival sections and villages to take oaths of friendship to hinder evidence being obtained against the perpetrators of that massacre, and, if necessary, to be united in opposition to our Government. But the feuds are so bitter that the alliances thus patched up are only temporary, and the old feud soon breaks out again. If, therefore, it should be necessary to punish one section or one village only of the Laman, with a little management beforehand, it would be quite possible to effect the object without having to encounter any combination of the tribe.

The intercourse of the people of the Laman with British territory, and the fact of so many of their villages cultivating land and rearing valuable crops far within the British border, make a *baramta*, or reprisals, on them easy, and the existence of these crops is, until the end of the harvest, a kind of security for their good behaviour.

The roads leading into the Utman Khel country from British territory are difficult. There are three roads, or rather tracts, leading through the Laman and across the river to Ambahar and Barang, but these are all difficult and impracticable for horsemen. There is a road to Arang through Totai, by the Agra pass, which is practicable for laden animals.

In the whole course of the Swat river through Utman Khel territory there are only five rope or swing bridges ordinarily kept up. There are no other means of crossing the river, which is a swift, deep torrent, between high, precipitous banks. By going through Mohmand territory the difficulty of crossing the river could be avoided. The road from Matta, on the Mohmand border,

* Cf. Ch. II. p. 10. The Mullagoris of Tartara are said to be the original inhabitants of the country.

through Pandiali to Ambahar is a good one, and practicable for laden animals. *Utman Khel
tribe and
country.*

During the lifetime of the *Akhund* of Swat, the Utman Khels did not recognise his influence to any great extent, and he had not so much power among them as among other Pathan tribes.

The Utman Khels are in no way connected with any of the Afghan tribes which surround them, such as the Mohmands, Ranizais, Bajouris, etc., but look upon the Shinwaris as their best friends; but, taking into consideration the geographical position of each, and the fact of the Mohmands having been, till very recently, their enemies, it is difficult to understand how their friendly intercourse could have been established and maintained.

The Utman Khels have twice waged war with the Mohmands, once in 1827, and the second time at the commencement of 1850, on both of which occasions the Mohmands showed proof of their superiority. They are now on terms of peace, and the people of the one tribe mix with the other; but there is no great friendship between them.

Expedition against the Independent* Utman Khels by a force under Brigadier Sir Colin Campbell, K.C.B., in May 1852.

During the first few years after the annexation of the Peshawar valley the Utman Khels gave a great deal of trouble on the border, by constant raids in the Hashtnagar division, and on the *maira*, to the south of their hills, and at last, in 1852, they capped their misdeeds by giving an asylum to, and aiding, Ajun Khan, the fugitive Khan of Tangi. This chief was a young man of a restless, proud, and bigoted character, and, at the commencement of British rule, was residing at Tangi, a large and important village in the Peshawar district.

A large part of the village was held by him rent-free, but he desired the whole of it, and also exemption from personal attendance at our courts, and from the interference of our revenue and police officials in his village. Finding that these demands were not likely to be complied with, he adopted the course, not unfrequent during the Durani and Sikh rule, of removing to the hills, calling around him a band of adventurers, and leading them in acts of aggression upon British villages, in the hope that the Government would be induced to yield to such pressure, and grant him the privileges he sought. A native officer of the Guide Corps was sent to induce him to return, but he refused to do so unless his villages were given to him rent-free, and he was exempted from attendance at any of our courts.

This step led him to believe that we feared him, and ever after he caused annoyance to the Government. To do this most effectually, he aimed at striking fear into our villagers, and causing them to leave their lands uncultivated, by which not only a loss of revenue was to be anticipated, but a general feeling of disaffection and disquietude, leading to internal disturbances. He took up his quarters in the Utman Khel villages, to the north of the district, and received some villages in *jagir* from Syad Akbar, the King of Swat, who was himself anticipating the advent of the British, and willingly received such fugitives, locating them in his border villages to act as an advanced guard.

On the night of the 20th April 1852, Ajun Khan, with a band of 200

* So designated to distinguish them from the Utman Khels of British Baizai, mentioned in

*Expedition
against the
Independent
Utman Khels
in 1852*

horsemen, attacked the large village of Charsada, which was the head-quarters of the Hashtnagar division.

The party came from the Utman Khel villages of the Laman, and were aided by men from Ranizai (*see* page 197).

The revenue buildings had not then been constructed, and the establishments were located in native houses, with mud enclosures, and they could offer but slight resistance. The *Tehsildar*, himself a *Syad*, was murdered and cut to pieces. Several other officials were similarly treated, and the *tehsil* treasury was plundered. On the following day, in furtherance of his plans, Ajun Khan came down and occupied the village of Abazai, where he remained twenty-four hours. He then desired the *maliks* to leave the village with their cattle, and killed one man who refused to do so. Ajun Khan next proceeded to Prangarh and Nawadan, where he took up his quarters.

On the receipt of the report of this outrage, orders were at once given for a punitive expedition to be carried out against the Utman Khel villages, and on the 28th of April 1852 troops began to move out from Peshawar.

The force was under the command of Brigadier Sir Colin Campbell, K.C.B., who established his head-quarters at Abazai. Lieut.-Colonel F. Mackeson, C.B., the Commissioner, and Captain H. R. James, the Deputy Commissioner, accompanied the force.

On the 2nd of May a picquet of twenty men of the Guide Cavalry, under Lieutenant G. N. Hardinge, in advance of the line of outposts, observed the enemy advancing in force. They were at once ordered to charge, which they did with great gallantry, checking the advance of the enemy. The latter had many of their number cut up, besides losing a standard. On our side, Lieutenant Hardinge, two sowars, and one horse were wounded, and two horses killed.

On the 11th May, the Commissioner having called on Sir Colin Campbell to destroy the Nawadan group of villages, the Brigadier moved out with the troops noted in the margin.

Nawadan (*see* Map, page 206) was about four miles from Abazai, the last mile of the approach to it leading over hilly and broken ground. On the arrival of the force the villages were found deserted, but many of the hill men were seen on the neighbouring heights. As the burning proceeded, the enemy gradually gathered at different points, and commenced skirmishing with the advanced picquets of the Guides. This lasted whilst the work of destruction went on, the Guides having one jemadar and four men wounded. The ground was too broken to admit of the guns being brought up near the village.

As the troops withdrew, the numbers of the enemy appeared slightly to increase, but the retirement was conducted without loss, the village and large quantities of grain having been destroyed.

During the operations, the 1st Punjab Infantry, under Captain J. Coke, and two squadrons of the 1st Punjab Cavalry, under Lieutenant W. T. Hughes, joined Sir Colin Campbell. These troops had made an extraordinary march.

The letter from the Commissioner, sent by express to Captain Coke at Kohat, calling for his services, had miscarried, and that officer only got his orders in a second letter sent by post. The 1st Punjab Infantry, and the two squadrons

Sir Colin Campbell's despatch.

Regimental History,
Corps of Guides.

1st Troop, 1st Brigade, Horse Artillery.
Detachment, 2nd Company, 4th Battalion, Artillery (2 8-inch howitzers).
Her Majesty's 32nd Regiment, 300 bayonets.
One squadron, 2nd Irregular Cavalry.
One squadron, Guide Cavalry.
2nd Company, Sappers and Miners.
28th Native Infantry, 300 bayonets.
66th Gurkhas, 300 bayonets.
Guide Infantry.

Regimental History, 1st
Punjab Infantry.

of the 1st Punjab Cavalry, marched from Kohat at 2 A.M. on the 8th, and reached Peshawar, forty miles, the same day. On arriving at the bridge-of-boats over the Kabul river, Captain Coke found it had been swept away, and the boats carried down-stream. On the evening of the 10th the troops had got across, and on that night marched for Abazai, halting for two hours under the Shabkadar fort; and when, on reaching Abazai at daybreak, it was found the force under Sir Colin Campbell had gone out to attack Nawadan, Captain Coke pushed on, joining the force as the attack was commencing, having marched more than forty miles when Abazai was reached after the operations.

*Expedition
against the
Independent
Utman Khels
in 1852.*

On the 12th the force under Sir Colin Campbell moved about seven miles to Gandhairi, with a view to attacking Prangarh, which was generally looked on in the country as the stronghold of the Utman Khel tribe.

On the 13th, a force, of the strength given in the margin, marched a

1st Troop, 1st Brigade, Horse Artillery.

Detachment, 2nd Company, 4th Battalion, Artillery (2 8-inch howitzers).

Detachment, 3rd Company, 4th Battalion, Artillery, and of No. 19 Light Field Battery attached, (2 guns).

Her Majesty's 32nd Regiment, 300 bayonets.

One squadron, 1st Punjab Cavalry.

2nd Company, Sappers and Miners.

28th Native Infantry, 300 bayonets.

66th Gurkha Regiment, 300 bayonets.

Guide Infantry 300 bayonets.

Six companies, 1st Punjab Infantry.

little before daybreak about five miles to the foot of the hills, which were broken and very stony, but not inaccessible to artillery.

Prangarh was a large village, with its rear resting on high hills, and flanked by spurs and lower heights.

Preparations had been

made for defence, and both the place, which was surrounded by good walls, and the adjacent eminences, were crowded with men.

Sir Colin Campbell's
despatch.

They quickly opened fire on the advanced guard, which was then halted, until the guns were in position.

The guns having opened fire, cleared the road, and the men of the 1st Punjab Infantry, the 66th Gurkha Regiment, and the Guide Corps immediately advanced to the attack, Her Majesty's 32nd and the 28th Native Infantry remaining with the guns as a reserve. The only fault committed was the too great impetuosity of the men, which caused the artillery fire to be stopped sooner than Sir Colin Campbell desired.

However, the village was carried at a run, the enemy retreating to the hills behind, whence the skirmishers drove them from rock to rock, far up the side of the high mountain, rendering the destruction of the village easy and safe. The artillery made good practice, effectually aiding the skirmishers. A desultory fight was then carried on, until the object for which the Brigadier had received the Commissioner's requisition was affected, *viz.*, the destruction of the village and grain. Of the latter, a large quantity, which had been stacked in a supposed place of security, high up the mountain, was destroyed by our skirmishers.

Considering that no less than ten pieces of artillery opened on their devoted village, it must be owned that its inhabitants made a gallant defence. But for our guns we should have sustained heavy loss, the walls and flanking defences above alluded to being formidable. As it was, the number of the wounded (*see* Appendix B) showed how the villagers held their ground as soon as the skirmishers had driven them beyond the range of the artillery.

The troops retired about 11 A.M., covered by a strong rear-guard in extended order, without further loss.

The enemy, who numbered perhaps 1,000 matchlock men, were led

*Expedition
against the
Independent
Utman Khels
in 1852.*

by Ajun Khan and his father, Hamid, and were assisted by the Utman Khels of the Totai villages. They only left three dead on the ground, but it was believed that they had many casualties. Three prisoners were taken; one was a servant of Ajun Khan, who was concerned in the murder of the *Tehsildar*, and another was a student from our own village of Tangi.

Some Persian letters were found in the village by a sepoy of the Guides, one from the *Akhund*, and one from the *Badshah* of Swat to Ajun Khan, promising him assistance, assigning to him all the property of the Hindus and servants of the British in Hashtnagar as lawful prey, and desiring him not to spare them, but to keep his hands from Muhammadans not in our service.

On the 14th the force halted at Gandhairi to make various arrangements, and to allow of more crops being destroyed, in accordance with the requisition of the Commissioner.

In his despatch, Sir Colin Campbell stated that, since the force had left Peshawar, he had every reason to be satisfied with the readiness and goodwill of all the corps and detachments, whether engaged in fatiguing marches through intense heat, assisting the labours of the engineers, or operating against the enemy; and he specially mentioned—

Lieutenant-Colonel H. V. Brooke, C.B., commanding Her Majesty's 32nd Regiment.

Lieutenant-Colonel C. Campbell, commanding 28th Native Infantry.

Lieutenant-Colonel H. Troup, commanding 66th Gurkhas.

Captain J. Coke, commanding 1st Punjab Infantry.

Lieutenant H. B. Lumsden, commanding Guide Corps.

Captain R. H. Baldwin, commanding the Artillery.

Captain G. Jackson, commanding 2nd Irregular Cavalry.

Lieutenant W. T. Hughes, commanding 1st Punjab Cavalry.

Lieutenant H. N. Miller, Guide Corps, who commanded the skirmishers at Nawadan.

Sir Colin Campbell said he had also to express his obligations to—

Lieutenant H. W. Norman, Brigade Major.

Ensign P. S. Lumsden, Deputy-Assistant Quarter-Master General.

Lieutenant G. Maister, Horse Artillery, Acting Assistant Field Engineer.

Captain H. R. James, Deputy Commissioner.

Lieutenant S. C. Woodcock, Horse Artillery.

Lieutenant J. T. Walker, Bombay Engineers.

who had never failed in unremitting exertions to assist him in every possible manner.

He wished also to record his strong sense of gratitude to Lieutenant-Colonel W. R. Mansfield, Her Majesty's 53rd Regiment, who on this and previous occasions, when his regiment had been in cantonments, had, at Sir Colin Campbell's invitation, accompanied him into the field.

The Governor-General in Council fully concurred in the praise bestowed on the several officers named, and on the excellent conduct of the troops employed.

The Indian medal, with a clasp for the "North-West Frontier", was granted in 1869 to all survivors of the troops engaged in the above operations against the Utman Khel villages under Brigadier Sir Colin Campbell.

G. G. O. No. 812
of 1869.

The result of the chastisement of the Utman Khels was to restore order and security to the Hashtnagar division, and to put a stop to the flight of the chiefs on the border.

Conduct of the Utman Khels subsequent to the expedition of 1852. Swat canal outrage, 1876.

At the end of 1852, for the better security of this part of the border, the fort of Abazai was erected.

After the destruction of the village of Prangarh, Ajun Khan fled from Utman Khel territory, and wandered about from place to place,—Kabul, Jalalabad, Lalpura, Swat, etc. In 1857 he was at Prangarh, threatening to attack British territory, but was checked by a force moving out from Peshawar, accompanied by Lieut.-Colonel J. Nicholson, the Deputy Commissioner. In 1872 he suddenly returned, and, with the aid of the men of Totai and some of the Ranizai villages, built two towers and several houses at a place called Spankhara, five miles and a half north of Gandhairi. On this the Deputy Commissioner sent a warning to the council of the Ranizais, and to the various men of influence in proximity to our territory, when a hundred men of Prangarh, moving out suddenly, surprised Spankhara, killing six men, and burning the hamlet. Ajun Khan died in 1877.

Operations against the Independent Utman Khels in February and March 1878.

After the expedition against the Independent Utman Khels under Sir Colin Campbell in 1852, the conduct of the tribe had been for many years uniformly good, and in June 1875 the outstanding cases against them, all of a minor character, were settled.

On the 9th of December 1876, however, an offence of the gravest description was committed by this tribe, a number of the ill-disposed members of which, instigated by persons of influence in British territory, attacked a body of unarmed *coolies* engaged in the preliminary operations of the canal about to be taken from the Swat river at Abazai. It appears that the party, consisting of about one hundred men under the leadership of Mian Rakan-ud-din of Sapri, at about 2 A.M. on the morning of the 9th of December, surrounded the tents in which the *coolies* were sleeping, and, at a given signal, having cut the ropes of the tents, threw them down simultaneously. The unfortunate men inside were caught like birds in a net, and, as each cried for mercy or help, he was slashed at through the tent-cloth. After the butchering, the camp was robbed of almost everything it contained. Some of the dead and wounded were stripped of the very clothes on their backs. Of the sixty-five men in the tents, six were killed and twenty-seven wounded, some dangerously. After plundering the camp, the raiders successfully effected their escape to the hills before any assistance from the Abazai fort could reach the spot.

The party consisted principally of the Butkor Asils of Ambahar, in concert with the people of the Laman. The former were induced to come down by hopes of the plunder of the treasure in the camp, which was given out to be very great; but with the latter there were several other causes at work, the principal of which was the suspicion and dislike of the people on this part of border to the project of the new canal, and especially to the taking up of land for that purpose. The land near the villages of Abazai and Tangi was cultivated, as already stated, by men of independent territory. The people of Sapri, led by Mian Rakan, cultivated the land near Abazai which had

*Operations
against the
Independent
Utman Khels
in 1878.*

been taken up for the canal. The *Mians* of Sapri, as already stated, had a bitter feud with the *Mians* of Abazai, and, at the time of the outrage, the state of factions on this border was on the one hand Sapri, with the adjoining hamlet of Nawakili, aided by Mir Hassan, the Khan of Tangi, in British territory, and, on the other, Nawadan, Prangarh, and the *Mians* of Abazai. The reason why the last gave no warning of the raid, which they must have known was going to take place, is not very clear, but they probably hoped by their silence to compromise their enemies, the men of Sapri, with the Government.

After the occurrence of the raid, the *maliks* of Abazai, and also Mir Hassan of Tangi, who was suspected of complicity, were apprehended, and sent into Peshawar under a military escort. It is probable, however, that this raid would never have taken place at all if proper care had been taken for the protection of the workmen employed on the canal-works, and it cannot be denied that sufficient precautions were not taken by the officers responsible, to prevent an attack of this sort, when the work was being carried on so near the frontier; but, on the other hand, it could not have been anticipated that a Muhammadan tribe would, without provocation or without quarrel with the British Government, attack and kill an unarmed band of Muhammadan workmen—a dastardly outrage, which brought down on them the virtual excommunication of the aged *Akhund* of Swat.

In consequence of the Swat canal outrage, the Utman Khel tribe was excluded from British territory, but, owing to the exigencies of other Imperial considerations, it was not possible at that time to take more active measures against them.

At the beginning of 1878 the sanction of the Government of India was asked for an attempt being made to surprise the village of Sapri, in which it was known that Mian Rakan was residing. It was felt that while this man, who was the instigator of the outrage, was still at large, any satisfactory settlement with the tribe would be next to impossible; and with the object of his capture the proposal was sanctioned.

The village was situated close to our border, and thus offered great facilities to an operation of this kind. The success of the expedition depended on, (1) the correctness of the information obtained by the Deputy Commissioner, (2), the secrecy of the preparations made by the officer in command, and (3), the rapidity of the march of the troops to a distant point.

At seven o'clock on the evening of the 14th of February 1878, the troops, as per margin, belonging to the Corps of Guides, marched from Mardan. The infantry were mounted on ponies, and each man carried sixty rounds of ammunition. Captain Wigram Battye, of the Guides, was in command, and Captain P. L. N. Cavagnari, the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar, accompanied the troops as Political Officer.

Captain Battye and Captain
Cavagnari's reports.

Cavalry.

4 British Officers.

9 Native Officers.

255 Sabres.

Infantry.

1 Native Officer.

11 Bayonets.

The route taken was by the main road to Tangi and Abazai, skirting the village of Jalala (*see* Map, page 206). On arriving within a short distance of the village of Tangi, the column left the main road and passed through some low detached hills to the north, and then, after crossing the line of the Swat canal, proceeded to within about two miles of Abazai, and there dismounted, the horses being left in charge of sixty-three men* of the party, with orders to take them to Abazai fort at daybreak. The distance traversed to this point

was about thirty-two miles. The object of making this detour, and avoiding the villages of Tangi and Abazai, was to prevent the chance of the news of the approach of the troops being conveyed across the border.

*Operations
against the
Independent
Utman Khels
in 1878.*

After dismounting, the force proceeded on foot through some very heavy ploughed land for about two miles to the Swat river, and thence along its left bank for four miles to Mada Baba Ziarat, where a mountain torrent joins the river. Here the party ascended a narrow, steep path by the side of the torrent for about a mile, till they arrived at the *kotal* leading to the village of Sapri. The *kotal* was reached about 4 A.M., and from this point the village lay within easy rifle range. An attempt was made to reconnoitre the village, but the village dogs becoming alarmed, commenced to bark, and it was thought best to wait till daylight. From information received, the Political Officer was of opinion that Mian Rakan would be found either in the village mosque, or in his own tower, which was in the centre of the village, and which could be commanded from a spur of the hill on the west overlooking Sapri. Captain Battye, therefore, arranged to post a picquet on this spur, and with the remainder to attack the village.

Immediately daylight broke, the assault was made, and our men, rushing into the village, seized the mosque. The surprise was a complete success, and the inmates of the mosque awoke to find soldiers with drawn swords standing over them. Having secured the mosque, the party proceeded to the tower, which was, however, found deserted. Hearing that the *Mian* had taken refuge in a small building behind the mosque, the party returned there, and called upon the people inside to surrender, threatening at the same time to burn the roof and force them to come out if they refused. A duffadar of the Guides, named Turabaz, here distinguished himself by his gallantry, and succeeded in shooting Mian Rakan's nephew and wounding another man, when the door of the building was partially opened for a moment. The *Mian* was now called upon to surrender quietly, or he would have to take the consequences. Thereupon the door was opened, and he stepped out, apparently with the intention of surrendering himself; but probably the sight of his enemy, Tehsildar Ghulam Mohi-ud-din (through whom this misfortune had come upon him, and who had accompanied the troops), was too much for him, and he made an attempt to stab him with a dagger, but failed, and the next moment was shot down by our men. The others inside the house, seeing the fate of Mian Rakan, wisely surrendered quietly.

The object of the Government having been thus obtained, arrangements were made to retire. It had been intended to blow up the tower, but the powder unfortunately did not come up in time. At the request of the Political Officer the village was not fired.

The men who had made good their escape from the village had, in the meanwhile, ascended the heights above, and kept up a desultory fire on our troops. A party of them having taken up a position on a high hill to the south-east of the village, commanding the line of our retirement, were attacked by Captain Battye, and driven off with a loss of three killed, whose bodies were left on the ground. The movement to the rear was then effected deliberately, and without any hurry or confusion, the enemy making no further attempt to harass the retiring column. The number of the enemy opposed to our troops was estimated at three hundred. Their loss was seven killed (the number of wounded could not be ascertained), and six taken prisoners, three of whom were relatives of the *Mian*. Our casualties were eight wounded.

(See Appendix C.)

Operations
against the
Independent
Utman Khels
in 1878.

The troops reached Fort Abazai at 11 A.M. on the morning of the 15th. Brigadier-General C. C. G. Ross, C.B., commanding at Peshawar, had previously sent secret orders to the officer commanding the Doaba outposts to have the garrison at Abazai in readiness to afford the Guides any assistance that might be required, but, as has been seen, there had been no occasion to ask for aid.

Captain Battye, in his despatch on the above operations, acknowledged the assistance he had received from the British officers under him, especially mentioning the name of Captain R. C. Hutchinson, Corps of Guides. He also said that the native officers, non-commissioned officers, and men behaved admirably; and he brought to notice the conduct of Jemadar Jaggat Singh, of the Guide Infantry, who was severely wounded while assisting a wounded man to the rear under a heavy fire; and the cool courage displayed by Duffadar Turabaz, of the Cavalry, in the instance already narrated, and again in the attack on the enemy's position during the retirement.

In acknowledging the report of this spirited affair against the village of Sapri, the Government of India considered that "the expedition, well planned by Captain Cavagnari, was gallantly carried out by Captain Battye and the officers under his command, and, in the opinion of the Governor-General in Council, one and all concerned in the enterprise were deserving of commendation."

After the successful attack upon Sapri, the representatives of the Utman Khel tribe were summoned to hear the terms the Government required from them as a punishment for their conduct in the Abazai outrage. These terms were as follows:—

- 1st. Rupees 200 blood money for each *coolie* killed, and Rs. 100 wound money for each *coolie* injured and recovered.
- 2nd. Restitution of, or compensation for, property plundered by raiders.
- 3rd. A fine of Rs. 1,000.
- 4th. Settlement according to border rule of all recent pending cases.
- 5th. Hostages to be given for one year as a guarantee for the good conduct of the tribe generally, but especially with reference to the canal works.

The gravity of the offence would have justified far heavier penalties, but the object was to impose terms that could not reasonably be refused, and to put matters on a satisfactory footing for the future prosecution of the canal scheme. The headmen of Prangarh, Nawadan, and Sapri attended in obedience to the summons, but the representatives of the Zirak and Pakhai villages refused to come in, and, as an incomplete settlement would not have been of much advantage, the *jirga* was dismissed.

After the successful surprise of the Ranizai village of Skakot in March 1878, described in the previous chapter, the attitude of the Utman Khel villages changed, and they became most desirous of a speedy settlement. The pecuniary demands against these villages amounted to Rs. 5,000, as per detail

	Rs.	in the margin, and of this amount the representatives
Blood money ...	1,600	of Prangarh, Nawadan, and Sapri agreed to pay
Wound money ...	2,200	Rs. 5,000, leaving the balance to be recovered from
Fine ...	1,000	the recusant Zirak and Pakhai villages. On this
Value of property		understanding the submission of the <i>jirga</i> was accepted,
carried off ...	200	and proposals for the coercion of the Zirak villages
Total ...	5,000	of Tarakai and Bucha, and the Pakhai villages of

Rangmiana and Nasir, were submitted to Government, and sanction to these proposals was received on the 19th March 1878.

*Operations
against the
Independent
Utman Khels
in 1878.*

At noon on the following day (20th) the force, as per margin, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel F. H. Jenkins, commanding the Corps of Guides, marched from Mardan, and reached the Utman Khel border early on the morning of the 21st. The force was joined at a spot about two miles from the frontier by the Deputy Commissioner, Captain P. L. N. Cavagnari, who accompanied the troops as Political Officer.

Lieut.-Colonel Jenkins's
despatch.

Hazara Mountain Battery—

2 British Officers.

4 Guns.

Guide Cavalry—

2 British Officers.

243 Sabres.

Guide Infantry—

9 British Officers.

11 Native Officers.

442 Bayonets.

The column entered the hills just as day was breaking. No opposition was offered by the hamlet of Tarakai, which was passed on the left as the force entered the valley in which are situated the three villages of Bucha. These villages lie in a kind of horse-shoe shaped amphitheatre, formed by the Sulala range of hills, and this amphitheatre is divided by the Tor Tam hill in the middle into two parts, one of which contains the Zirak villages of Bucha, the other being occupied by the Pakhai villages of Rangmiana and Nasir.

A small party having been left to look after Tarakai, the main body pushed on to Bucha. Messengers had been sent on to this place to inform the inhabitants that if no resistance were offered, the villages would be spared. This allowed time for the women and children to escape, and, as our troops approached, the inhabitants were seen driving off their cattle into the interior. The first village was deserted, but a company of the Guide Infantry, under Captain A. G. Hammond, which had gone round to the eastern village, was fired on, and one man dangerously wounded. At the same time parties of the enemy showed themselves in the third village, and in the broken ground beyond and on our left. Captain Hammond, advancing with his party, at once cleared the eastern village and drove the enemy off the ground on to the tops of the Sulala range. At the same time, Lieutenant F. D. Battye, with a party of Guide Infantry, cleared the third village. The above operations against the Bucha villages were materially assisted by the fire of the mountain guns, which was directed on the enemy whenever they tried to assemble to oppose the advance of the infantry.

Leaving the cavalry to secure the position, Lieut.-Colonel Jenkins now ascended the Tor Tam hill with four companies of infantry and the mountain guns. The enemy offered little opposition, and the force, on gaining the ridge, marched along it to a point abreast of Rangmiana. This placed the remaining villages entirely at our mercy, and Captain Cavagnari now sent to summon the Zirak and Pakhai headmen to submit, as there was no desire on our part to destroy their villages and crops. This summons, after some delay, they obeyed, and they then agreed to pay the fine of Rs. 2,000 after twenty days, and in the meantime to give good security for the amount.

The cattle (about 150 head) which had been captured during the attack on the villages were then restored—a piece of moderation on our part which they had hardly expected. The demands of Government having thus been obtained, and the objects of the expedition fulfilled, the troops were ordered to retire, which they did, entirely unmolested, and bivouacked for the night at the Jhinda outpost of the Swat canal-works, having marched over forty miles since noon of the previous day. The day following the force returned to Mardan. The loss of the enemy could not be ascertained, but twelve bodies

*Operations
against the
Independent
Utman Khels
in 1878.*

were left on the ground about Bucha and the Tor Tam hill, and two men severely wounded were brought into the village while our troops were there, after the engagement. Our casualties had been only one man wounded.

Lieutenant-Colonel Jenkins, in his report of these operations, said that the conduct of the troops had been excellent, and specially mentioned the names of Major R. B. P. P. Campbell, of the Guides, Lieutenant C. C. Lindsay, commanding the Hazara Mountain Battery, and Captain R. Warburton, Assistant Commissioner of Mardan, who accompanied the force as Assistant Political Officer. Captain Cavagnari also brought to notice the services of Ghulam Mohi-ud-din, the *Tehsildar* of Daudzai, who was especially useful to him in bringing the negotiations to a successful issue; and of Ibrahim Khan, Khan Bahadur, Assistant District Superintendent of Police, who accompanied the force.

In acknowledging the report of the above operations against the Zirak and Pakhai villages, the Government of India desired that the various officers concerned might be informed that the Governor-General in Council approved "their able and effective performance of the duties entrusted to them".

The rupture on account of the Swat canal outrage having been brought to a satisfactory termination, the head-works of the canal, which had been stopped pending the submission of the Utman Khel villages, were continued.

Since the operations undertaken against them in 1878, the Utman Khels have given little trouble on our border. During 1882 the men of Sapri committed a series of thefts of cattle employed on the head-works of the canal. In order to check their misconduct, it was necessary in December 1882 to levy a fine of Rs. 300 on the village, and to enforce the restoration of the stolen property. Since then the border has remained quiet, and the Swat canal-works have proceeded undisturbed.

APPENDIX A.

Sub-divisions of the Asils.

ASILS	{ Wara Khel. Khumar Khel.				{ Muhammad Khel.				{ Khan. Ako. Bane. Salih. Shahdad. Pakhai. Karim.			
	{ Butkor				{ Umar Khel				{			
	{				{ Musa.				{			
	{ Umbar				{ Dini Khel. Aladosh. Ghazi. Shela.				{			
	{ Saibuddin. Turi Khel.				{				{			

APPENDIX B.

Return of Killed and Wounded in the force under the command of BRIGADIER SIR COLIN CAMPBELL, K.C.B., in the attack of the village of Prangarh, on the 13th May 1852.

Corps.	Killed.					Wounded.					Remarks.
	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	
1st Punjab Cavalry	2	2	
66th Gurkhas	3	3	
Corps of Guides	1	1	...	1	...	4	5	
1st Punjab Infantry	2	2	5	5	
Total	3	3	...	1	...	14	15	

ABSTRACT.

Killed	3
Wounded	15

APPENDIX C.

Return of Killed and Wounded in the attack on the village of Sapri, on the 15th February 1878.

Corps.	Killed.					Wounded.					Remarks.
	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	
Corps of Guides	1	1	6	8	
Total	1	1	6	8	

ABSTRACT.

Killed	0
Wounded	8
Total	8

CHAPTER VIII.

PESHAWAR BORDER.

MOHMAND TRIBE.

THE Mohmands are a tribe of Pathans who inhabit the hilly country to the north-west of Peshawar, and who own a nominal allegiance to the Amir of Kabul. *The Mohmand tribe and country.*

Merk.

A portion of the tribe formerly settled in the plains, and at the present time inhabit the south-western corner of the Peshawar district, but these now have no connection with their cousins in the hills, and our consideration will be confined to that portion of the tribe located beyond the border.

The country of the independent Mohmands may be defined roughly as bounded on the east by British territory, from near Jamrud to Fort Abazai, and thence by the Utman Khel country; on the north by Bajour, on the west by Kunar, and on the south by the territories of the Shinwari and Afridi tribes.

The country of the Mohmands is divided naturally into two parts, the rich alluvial lands along the bank of the Kabul river, from Jalalabad to Lalpura, and the country to the east of Lalpura, consisting of a network of hills and valleys. The principal of these latter are the valleys of Shilman, Gandao, and Pandiali. They are, as a rule, dry and arid water-courses, raging torrents in heavy rain, but usually presenting a stony and shingly bed, from which slopes of barren ground lead to the rocky spurs and ranges that flank them.

The aspect of the Mohmand hills is exceedingly dreary, and the eye is everywhere met by dry ravines between long rows of rocky hills and crags, scantily clothed with coarse grass, scrubwood, and the dwarf palm. In summer great want of water is felt, and the desert tracts radiate an intolerable heat; this, coupled with the unhealthiness of the river lowlands, probably accounts for the inferior physique of the Mohmands as compared with their Afridi and Shinwari neighbours, who in summer retire to the cool highlands of the Safed Koh. The want of water is especially felt in the Gandao* and neighbouring districts.

The villages, or rather fort clusters, are scattered along the valleys wherever a spring, or proximity of water to the surface, encourages cultivation; but in some cases the water for drinking and other purposes has to be brought from great distances, and is obtained from springs, whose supply is uncertain, and from small tanks, made to retain the rain-water. The women are employed

the Mohmand in the laborious task of bringing water from these places in skins, for the use of the village.
the Mohmand hills and country.

The crops in the Mohmand hills are almost entirely dependent on the winter and autumn rains; and, should these fail, there is considerable distress. Even in ordinary times the hills are unable to support the surplus population, which is steadily emigrating to the Yusafzai and Hashtnagar *mairas* in the Peshawar district.

The products of the Mohmand country are few and rude; a little grain, firewood, grass, charcoal, ropes and mats of *mazari*, honey and cattle from the Baizai hills—these are the chief exports. But through the Mohmand limits come to India the wood rafts from Chitral, Kunar, and Lughman, on the Kabul, and from Dir and Swat, on the Swat river; wax, hides, *ghi*, and rice from Kunar; and the iron of Bajour in lumps and bars, good ore, but imperfectly smelted. The imports are salt, cloth, paper, soap, tea, indigo, sugar, grain, tobacco, needles, scissors, and other manufactures of civilisation, purchased by the Mohmands for themselves and their northern neighbours. The through trade, therefore, is considerable, and it is with transit dues levied on trade, and the profits earned as carriers of goods on mules, donkeys, and camels to and from the trade centres of Peshawar, Jalalabad, Pesh Bolak, Lalpura, and Shabkadar, that the Mohmands supplement the scanty returns of their barren soil. In the hot weather traffic is brisk on the Kabul river. Rafts of wood and merchandise, carried on inflated skins, are floated down to British territory.

The transit dues levied on the rafts are fixed by custom and the sanction of the Amir of Kabul, and are as follows:—

- (1.) On wood rafts. The Khan at Lalpura, Rs. 40 per raft (out of which Rs. 2 are payable to the Halimzais); the Tarakzais at Michni, Rs. 45. The Michni Mohmands, however, are often guilty of unauthorised exactions.
- (2.) On merchandise carried on skin rafts. The Khan at Lalpura, Rs. 4; the Tarakzais at Michnis, Rs. 10.

There are numerous roads through the Mohmand country, as the hills, though rugged and rocky, are nowhere impassable. The most important, perhaps, of these are the roads from Peshawar to Dakka, one from Shahgai, *via* Tartara and the Shilman valley, and the other from Fort Michni, across the Kabul river by the Gutta Gudar and Shanilo ferries into the Shilman valley. These were formerly important trade routes, but, since the Khaibar has been opened to traffic, they have lost much of their importance.

At the beginning of last year (1883) Rs. 7,000 were expended on improving the first of these two roads, with the view to its adoption as an alternative route in the event of any local disturbances in the Khaibar. The road is now a fair bridle path, about seven feet in width, as far as the Shilman valley. Beyond that, and within the territory of the Khan of Lalpura, it still requires considerable repairs. For the safety of this route through their territory, the Mullagoris and Shilmani Mohmands receive an annual subsidy of Rs. 2,000 each from the British Government.

The other roads of importance from British territory are one from Shabkadar to the Gandao valley, which is practicable and good for camels, and another from Matta to Pandiali, which is not such an easy road, but is fairly good for mules.

Among the Mohmands private blood-feuds are common, and these often result in murders which are attended with much bloodshed. Generally,

in these feuds, one of the hostile parties besieges the other in their fort, and the only way to reduce them to submission, in the absence of heavy guns, is to cut off the supply of water, which is usually obtained from streams and tanks outside the village. If the place from which the water is obtained is under the fire of the besieging party, women, who are theoretically never fired at, have to undertake the unpleasant duty of bringing water to the beleaguered garrison. The feud is generally terminated by the neighbouring villages stepping in and settling the quarrel, either by an amicable arrangement, or by coercing one of the parties.

*The Mohmand
tribe and
country.*

The social and domestic customs of the Mohmands are very similar to those of the Yusafzai tribes. Each family possesses its hereditary piece of land, which it can sell or mortgage at will; and, strange to say, among so lawless a people, debts, mortgages, and sales are scrupulously respected and effected. A characteristic trait of the Mohmands is great pride and haughtiness, but they bear a bad reputation for treachery and ruthless cruelty, and their courage is open to doubt.

Some sections of the tribe, especially the Barhan Khel and the Tarakzai proper, carry on an infamous traffic in women, who are kidnapped in Swat, Bajour, and Buner, and passed on by the Utman Khels to the Mohmands; they in turn sell them to the Adam Khel Afridis and the Urakzais.

Few Mohmands enlist for service in the British army; the reason is, probably, that the regiments of the Amir of Kabul and of the local *Khans* absorb those restless spirits who are anxious to leave their homes.

The Mohmand tribe consists of four main divisions: the Tarakzai (including the Isa Khel and Barhan Khel), Halimzai, Baizai, and Khwaizai (see Appendix A), who are located in a compact body on the hills.

The affiliated clans of the Dawezai and Utmanzai are located to the north; it is further hedged in on the slopes of the Tartara range by the vassal clan of the Mullagoris, and towards Bajour by the Safis.

In tribal politics, the Tarakzais, jointly with the Halimzais, the Baizais, and the Khwaizais, occupy each a distinct and independent position. The Tarakzais include the chief of Lalpura and the chiefs of Michni and Pandiali, and occupy the hills immediately adjoining British territory.

The Halimzais are, properly speaking, a branch of the Tarakzais; but have so grown in numbers as to be considered in every way a separate clan; they are located immediately beyond the Tarakzais, and occupy territory on the north and south of the Kabul river. They also own the Panjpao lands in British territory, near Shabkadar. They are considered the best fighting men of the tribe, and possess great influence, not only from their character, but as being the principal agents in arranging for the passage of *kafilas* through Mohmand territory.

The Baizais are the largest of the Mohmand clans, and occupy the country to the north of the Kabul river, from its junction with the Kunar as far as Bajour. This is the most fertile part of the Mohmand country. The chief of the Baizai clan resides at Goshta.

The Khwaizais are located between the Halimzais and the Baizais, and are not possessed of much influence, but are a turbulent set, and often give trouble by trying to levy duties by force on merchandise going down the Kabul river.

The Utmanzais and Dawezais are two small clans situated in the north-eastern corner of the Mohmand country, having Bajour on the north, and the Utman Khel territory on the east. They are not considered a warlike people,

*The Mohmand
tribe and
country.*

and are engaged principally in agriculture. They are themselves frequently pillaged by their neighbours.

The fighting strength of the Mohmands has been variously estimated, but the following may be taken as an approximately correct statement; but it must be remembered that the whole male population would never be collected in one spot—

Merk.	Tarakzai (including Isa Khel and Barhan Khel)					2,800 men.
	Halimzai	2,600 „
	Baizai	9,000 „
	Khwaizai	1,800 „
	Utmanzai	400 „
	Dawezai	800 „

giving a total of 17,400 fighting men.

The principal Mohmand villages are Yakhdand, Kung, Lalpura, Sangi Sarai, and the river villages Girdi, Hazarnao, Basawal, Chardeh, and Lachipur. These villages number from three hundred to six hundred families, and are large enough to dispense with fortifications against tribal attacks. The largest are Lalpura, Sangi Sarai, and Yakhdand. The other villages are either single large forts, with mud walls and towers for flank defence, or a group of small detached forts. The large villages contain from one to fifty families of Hindus, who carry on business as bankers or general traders.

The chiefs, who are recognised as *Khans* of the Mohmands, are those of Lalpura, Goshta, and Pandiali. Of these, the most important are the Lalpura Khans. The influence of the Khan of Lalpura is admitted by the Tarakzai, Halimzai, Dawezai, and Utmanzai clans, and the eastern Baizais also entertain friendly relations with Lalpura, but these are viewed with jealousy and dislike by the proper *Khans* of the Baizais, the Khans of Goshta. This family, the Baizai Khan Khel, is now divided into two branches, represented respectively by the Khans of Goshta and of Chardeh. The Pandiali Khans have very little influence in the tribe compared with that of the chiefs of Lalpura and Goshta.

The relations between the Mohmands and their neighbours, the Shinwaris and the Afridis, have never been cordial, and with the former they are constantly at feud; their relations with Bajour are, however, more friendly.

The Mohmands appear in their origin to be more nearly allied to the Yusafzais than to any of the tribes by which they are surrounded.

It has been stated above that, in addition to the four main divisions and the two affiliated clans of the Mohmands, there are two vassal tribes, who hold their land on sufferance of their powerful neighbours. These tribes are the Safis, who occupy territory south of Bajour, between the Baizai and Dawezai clans, and the Mullagoris of Tartara, who hold land adjoining the British border, between the Kabul river and the Khaibar. These vassal tribes acknowledge their inferiority, and are bound to pay the Khan of Lalpura occasional tribute, and to hospitably entertain Mohmands who pass through their villages.

The *Safis* have few dealings with the British Government, as they are not near the border. They are probably converts to Islam from the Kafirs, and their fanaticism may be due to the recent date of this change. They

are divided into four sections: Kandahari, Gurbuz, Wader, and Masaud; *Vassal tribes.*
 and can muster about 2,500 fighting men, the Kandahari *Safis.*
 Merk. section being 1,500 strong. *Mullagoris.*

Our relations with the *Mullagoris* are, however, different, and it will be necessary to describe them a little more in detail.

Hastings. The origin of this small tribe is by no means clear, and they are not acknowledged by Mohmands, Shinwaris, or Afridis. According to the Shinwaris, they are the descendants of an illegitimate child found in a graveyard, who grew up to be a learned man, hence the origin of the name *Mullagori*.* However this may be, there is no doubt that the *Mullagoris* first came as settlers from the Mohmands. They occupy the northern slopes of the Tartara mountain, and are surrounded on three sides by the Mohmands, Shinwaris, and Afridis, having British territory on the fourth side. They are always at feud with the Afridis, and, if it were not for their Mohmand supporters, they would not be left long in their present settlement. They are notorious as thieves, and most of the robberies in the cantonment of Peshawar are committed by them, or with their connivance, for the Shilmani Mohmands, and the Shinwaris of the Loargai valley, have to pass through their country when returning with their spoil. The tribe is very poor, and they now gain a scanty livelihood by the sale of the ropes, mats, and sandals made of the dwarf palm, and by grazing cattle and cultivating the little ground they possess.

Conolly. The fighting men of this tribe do not number more than 400 men, and are armed chiefly with matchlocks, pistols, and swords. They have a few good rifles amongst them, stolen or purchased from our cantonments. In their tribal quarrels the *Mullagoris* would receive aid from the powerful Mohmand sections living north of the Kabul river, and also from the Mohmands living in the Shilman valley and from the Loargai Shinwaris. None of these tribes, except perhaps the Mohmands first mentioned, would be likely to give the *Mullagoris* any aid against the British. A portion of the road already mentioned, from Peshawar to Dakka, known as the Tartara route, runs through the *Mullagori* country, from Srakilli on the east, to where the road drops into the Kam-Shilman valley on the west. There is also a short road from Jamrud to the Loargai valley, which passes over the northern end of the Rotas ridge. Both of these roads could be easily traversed by a lightly equipped force, with mule carriage only, and this, combined with the fact that the whole eastern border marches with the Peshawar district, and also to the circumstance that the tribe now trades largely with Peshawar, renders the *Mullagoris* entirely dependent on the British for their livelihood, and for their very existence in their present location. Our dealings with the tribe date as far back as the first Afghan war, when Mackeson entered into arrangements with them to keep open the Tartara route through their territory. In 1866, in consequence of a number of petty offences, they were blockaded until they paid a fine of Rs. 500.

The *Mullagoris* also have a small settlement, as already mentioned, at Sapri and Nawakili, above Abazai, on the Utman Khel border, and another at Sisobi, where the Afridi boundary meets that of the Shinwaris.

* Another authority says this tribe is descended from Mulla, whose father, Bakhtiar, was a slave or follower of Pir Tarik, and was deputed to watch Akhund Darweza, the great rival of Bayazid (Pir Tarik), founder of the Boshani sect in the middle of the 16th century.

*Operations
against the
Mohmands in
1851-52.*

Operations against the Mohmands by a force under Brigadier Sir Colin Campbell, K.C.B., in 1851-52.

The first occasion on which the British Government came into contact with the Mohmand tribe was during the first war in Afghanistan, in 1838-42. At that time, Saadat Khan was chief of Lalpura. On the news of the approach of the British army, Turabaz Khan (*see* Appendix H), his cousin, and enemy, immediately started off to meet the army at Jhelum. Saadat Khan thereupon espoused the cause of the Barakzais, and Turabaz Khan was installed as Khan of Lalpura by Colonel Wade. He seems to have done loyal service for Mackeson while we held Afghanistan. After the disasters at Kabul, the whole country rose, and Turabaz Khan, at risk to himself, saved an English lady and her child from the Pesh Bolak garrison, and took her down the river on a raft to Peshawar. The officers of the *Jazailchis* stationed at Pesh Bolak escaped over the Tartara hills, and Turabaz Khan himself took refuge in British territory. He returned with General Pollock's force, but was ousted by Saadat Khan on the withdrawal of our troops. He subsequently made his peace with the Amir, and received a *jagir* in Kama.

Temple. The Mohmands, during the early years of British rule in the Peshawar valley, gave more trouble than almost any other tribe.

The Michni Mohmands, after annexation, were allowed to hold a fief in the Doaba (the fertile triangle near the junction of the Swat and Kabul rivers) from the British Government, of which they collected the revenue. A portion of the lands they cultivated themselves, the remainder they farmed out to other tribes of the plains as tenants. Many of their clansmen dwelt in the plains of Michni, and some in the neighbouring hills, and they traded largely in the Peshawar valley. The Halimzai Mohmands also held Panjpao in British Doaba as a fief, chiefly cultivated by tenants. A few of their men lived in the plains, but the majority in the hills. These also traded in the valley. The Pandiali Mohmands at a former period had held a similar *jagir* in the Doaba, but not since British rule. They had few relations, either with the Government or the people of the Peshawar valley, and inhabited a very strong locality in the hills. The fiefs were originally granted by preceding Governments to the Mohmands, as black-mail, to buy off depredations.

The first inroad of the Mohmands occurred in December 1850, in an unprovoked attack on the village of Shabkadar, organised by Fateh Khan, the son of Saadat Khan, who was still the chief of Lalpura, and who was naturally not well-disposed towards us, and did his best to incite the tribe to hostilities.

In March 1851, Lieutenant H. R. James, Deputy Commissioner, reported an intended raid on the Doaba by Saadat Khan of Lalpura from Pandiali, and in March and April two attacks were actually made on Matta by Nawab Khan, the chief of Pandiali; but both were gallantly repulsed by detachments of the Guide Corps, under Lieutenant H. N. Miller and Ressaldar Fateh Khan, respectively.

In the first affair, hearing of the intended raid, Lieutenant Miller placed two companies of the Guides, under Lieutenant H. J. Hawes, in ambush, when the enemy were attacked on their way back, Lieutenant Miller coming up with the few cavalry he

Lieutenant Miller's
report.

had with him. The enemy lost five killed and six wounded, and the Guides had one man killed.

*Operations
against the
Mohmands in
1851-52.*

Lieutenant Lumsden's report. In the second affair, the Guides had three men wounded, the Mohmands losing three killed and several wounded.

To these attacks minor depredations succeeded in July 1851, headed by one Nur Gul of Panjpao.

In August 1851, Rahimdad, a headman of Michni, deserted, and collecting 600 matchlock men, sent them to dam up the water of a village on the border, but they were driven off by the villagers, with some loss.

In October 1851, the Mohmands of Michni made a more serious attack on several British villages, and, though opposed by the villagers, they succeeded in destroying many of the crops. At length, on the 15th of October, the Supreme Government deemed it necessary to direct that the Mohmand fiefs in the Doaba should be confiscated, that the defensive posts should be strengthened, and that British troops should operate against the offending Mohmands, and destroy their chief villages.

Detachment, 3rd company, 1st Battalion, Artillery, with No. 17 Light Field Battery attached.

Two companies, 61st Foot.

Two companies, 98th Foot.

2nd Irregular Cavalry.

2nd Company, Sappers and Miners,

66th Gurkha Regiment.

Wing, 71st Native Infantry.

Accordingly, on the 25th of October 1851, a force as per margin, details of which are given in Appendix B, marched from Peshawar (*see* Map, page 206), under the command of Brigadier Sir Colin Campbell, K.C.B., towards the Mohmand frontier.

The first day's march was to a village, eight miles, where a bridge-of-boats had already been constructed over the Kabul river by Lieutenant H. B. Lumsden, at Sir Colin Campbell's suggestion, in anticipation of orders for these operations, and here the force was joined by Lieutenant Lumsden, with four companies of the Guides (about 250 bayonets).

The next day the force continued its march to Mian Khel, close to the border, having crossed the Adizai branch of the Kabul river by a ford. Sir Colin Campbell might with ease have pushed on to where he intended to operate, but it appeared to him more advantageous to allow time for the Deputy Commissioner to communicate with the influential people of the country, and the moral effect of the expedition to be felt, rather than to advance with greater haste. On the following day the force halted, and Sir Colin Campbell reconnoitred the villages of Dabb, the inhabitants of which had been most active in causing annoyance.

The villages were flanked by mud towers, commanding the river and the surrounding country. The approach to them was over a succession of low, stony hills, which increased in height and precipitousness in their immediate vicinity. The villages were found deserted. On the 28th the camp was moved to within two miles of the villages, when news was received that a considerable body of hill men were collecting in the hills in front of Matta.

Captain G. Jackson was therefore detached with the 2nd Irregular Cavalry to Matta, to protect our villages in the plains—a measure which had the desired effect, as no attempt was made by the enemy to advance into the open.

During the 28th and 29th, the Dabb villages were destroyed by a fatigue party of the Guides, and the towers, some ten in number, blown up, under the direction of Captain J. R. Oldfield, Bengal Engineers. The fati-

*Operations
against the
Mohmands in
1851-52.*

party was covered by the remainder of the force, and, both in advancing and retiring, each range of hills was successively occupied. A desultory matchlock fire was kept up by the enemy during these two days, to which Sir Colin Campbell did not think it worth while to reply; the retirement on both days was unmolested, and the villages were destroyed without any casualty on our side.

The force now remained in the position that it had taken up in order that Sir Colin Campbell might fix the site of the present fort of Michni, and to cover the workmen engaged in its erection. The 2nd Irregular Cavalry was posted at Shabkadar and Matta. For the first two nights after the demolition of the villages the picquets were molested, and on the second the hill people seemed to have increased in number; but arrangements had been made for their reception, and, after being driven off, they were followed for some distance by the Guides, without any loss to us.

Annoyance then ceased; the people of the newly-annexed valley of Michni seemed to be returning to their homes, and matters to be taking a pacific turn.

But on the 23rd of November Sir Colin Campbell reported that, although the picquets had been unmolested, which he attributed to the fact that the ground for some distance round the camp had been cleared and levelled, the people had not really returned to their villages; those that had come down having done so merely to pluck the heads of their Indian corn, and had then gone off again to the hills.

On the 22nd, a party of Mohmands murdered four of the contractor's butchers in the Peshawar cantonment, wounding three others, and carrying off some bullocks; and on the following night set fire to a Government building and killed a man. These outrages had been planned by Saadat Khan, the chief of Lalpura, who was then about six miles from the camp, in the Tartara hills, on the right bank of the Kabul river, where he had been joined by 80 *jazailchis*, and by Daria Khan, the partisan leader who had conducted the operations against us in the Kohat pass the year before (*see* Chapter X). He had also sent a threatening letter to Lieutenant H. B. Lumsden.

As an attempt by the Mohmands from the hills on some of our villages seemed probable, 120 sabres of the 15th Irregular Cavalry, under Major S. Fisher, were ordered out from Peshawar, and posted at Mian Khel, four miles to the east of the camp, to which place two companies of the Guides were also sent, and the bridge-of-boats over the Kabul river was protected by the throwing up of bridge heads.

The chief, Saadat Khan, had been busily engaged in arranging differences which had existed amongst the Mohmands. On the 26th he had moved to Gandao, twenty miles north of Shabkadar, where a meeting took place to decide on the plan of operations, and on the 30th of November he was joined by the chief of Bajour, with a large following.

On the nights of the 28th and 29th November, eluding our cavalry patrols, the Mohmands attacked respectively the villages of Uchwala and Mirzai—at the former only carrying off some bullocks, but killing two men; at the latter, wounding others, besides carrying off some property; and on the 29th November they burnt a village in the Khalil district, between Peshawar and the hills.

On the 27th a number of the enemy, creeping down from the hills, got into the sugarcane around Matta, but were quickly driven out by two companies of the Guides, under Lieutenant H. N. Miller.

At this time heavy patrols of cavalry were nightly on the move from Mian Khel, Shabkadar, and Matta along the frontier, but the numerous *nullahs* and the broken nature of the ground rendered it impossible to prevent parties passing through to our villages along such an extended line of hills, throughout which were numerous bodies of Mohmands. Besides, the people of the hills were so similar in dress, appearance, and language to those of the plains, that they could at all times resort to the plains; whilst no party could at any time leave our camps without information being immediately given in the hills.

*Operations
against the
Mohmands in
1851-52.*

Strong fatigue parties of the troops were at this time employed carrying on the heavy work necessary for the construction of the fort.

At the beginning of December the gatherings of the Mohmands had increased so considerably, that Sir Colin Campbell deemed it right to draw in Major S. Fisher's detachment, which had been reinforced by two guns and two companies of infantry, from Mian Khel, keeping up his communications with Shabkadar by strong cavalry patrols. At the same time, Captain G. Jackson at Matta was reinforced by three companies of Gurkhas and two of the Guides, having in all 415 bayonets, 320 sabres, and 2 guns.

On the 7th, without any previous information having been received, Saadat Khan suddenly moved out of a gorge in the hills to the right front of camp, quickly occupying a range of hills in front with 4,000 foot and 80 or 100 horse. Sir Colin Campbell at once moved out with a troop of the Guide Cavalry, two guns, and two companies of infantry, to cover the return of Major Fisher, who was guarding the camels at graze.

Having seen Major Fisher safely in with his charge, Sir Colin Campbell waited till sunset, and then retired very slowly, to prevent the enemy taking up his ground with the advantage of daylight: the latter, however, declined to follow. The practice of the Artillery, under Captain H. A. Carleton, was the admiration of everyone. During this time the hills to the westward, in the neighbourhood of Dabb, had also been strongly occupied by the enemy; and a party of 200 men came down to the left bank of the Kabul river, immediately in rear of the camp.

The Brigadier had, on seeing the force displayed, sent orders to Lieut.-Colonel W. R. Mansfield, Her Majesty's 53rd Regiment (who was to be at Peshawar the next day), to march on in the afternoon with the 2nd Troop, 1st Brigade, Horse Artillery, under Major R. Waller, and six companies, 53rd Regiment, and to advance to the bridge-of-boats on the Kabul river.

On the night of the 7th December a patrol of one native officer and thirty sabres of the 2nd Irregular Cavalry, from Matta, fell in with upwards of 500 horse and foot close to the village of Banda. After a short skirmish the enemy retreated to the hills, followed by the patrol; two sowars were killed, and two sowars and two horses wounded.

Captain Jackson's
report.

At noon the following day, the Mohmands, numbering from 4,000 to 5,000, under Saadat Khan, advanced in line on Matta. On the enemy coming within 900 yards, the Artillery opened, when the Mohmands, inclining to the left, tried to get to the rear of Captain Jackson's position, but were well stopped by the Guides, under Lieutenant H. N. Miller. A company of the 66th Gurkhas and one of the Guides then advanced in skirmishing order, supported by two squadrons of the 2nd Irregular Cavalry, and the enemy fell back to his original position on the low hills. The two guns at Matta were in position

*Operations
against the
Mohmands in
1851-52.*

Captain Jackson could not therefore attack them. All endeavours to draw them on to the plain again proved useless, and nothing further occurred. There were no casualties on our side, but the enemy suffered from the artillery fire.

Sir Colin Campbell, in reporting this affair, stated that Captain G. Jackson had managed it particularly well, and that great credit was due to Lieutenant E. Simeon, of the Artillery, to Captain J. F. Garstin, of the Gurkhas, and Lieutenant H. N. Miller, of the Guides; and he especially alluded to the conduct of Sikandar Khan, the headman of Matta, who turned out with 300 matchlock men, and rendered the most efficient assistance, thereby thoroughly compromising himself on our side.

All this day reports were rife that the chief of Bajour was collecting men in Pandiali in great numbers, and orders were therefore sent to Lieut.-Colonel Mansfield to collect what troops he could to meet this, and to send in to Peshawar for a detachment of Her Majesty's 61st Regiment. His force accordingly bivouacked for a few hours, and then marched at 4 A.M. to Shabkadar, on which the enemy altered their intentions, and the point of attack was to be Sir Colin Campbell's camp, near Dabb.

Orders were now sent to Lieut.-Colonel Mansfield to detach a company to Matta, and to march with the remaining five companies, 53rd, and Major Waller's troop, Horse Artillery, and take the enemy in flank, while Sir Colin Campbell engaged them till his arrival. Lieut.-Colonel Mansfield joined at 3 P.M. on the 9th, the 53rd having marched forty-two miles in thirty hours, and the Horse Artillery thirty miles in twenty-four hours.

This accession of strength at once told on the enemy, and after much consultation, instead of attacking, the gathering broke up, Saadat Khan decamping to Gandao, and then to Lalpura.

After this, nothing of moment occurred; the enemy appeared to have entirely dispersed, and the only offences were some cases of robbery with violence in the neighbourhood of the camp.

On the 25th of December the Guide Corps was detached to Yusafzai, as hostilities were threatening in the direction of Swat, and as the fort was now completed. On the 28th of December the detachment, 61st Regiment, with four guns of the field battery, returned to Peshawar, followed on the 2nd of January by the remaining two guns and detachment 98th Regiment.

On the 1st of January Sir Colin Campbell established his head-quarters at Mian Khel, leaving the garrison* of the fort under Captain R. H. Hicks, 15th Irregular Cavalry. On the 2nd the Brigadier moved to Panjpao, where the civil authorities were engaged in settling various points connected with the lands around belonging to individuals of the Mohmand tribe, and the presence of the force had a good effect in hastening the desired settlement.

On the 3rd of January the detachment 15th Irregular Cavalry returned to Peshawar. Matta was at this time held by the head-quarters 2nd Irregular Cavalry, and a company of Her Majesty's 53rd and of the 66th Gurkhas.

On this date (3rd) a picquet of twenty-three sabres, 2nd Irregular Cavalry, were posted about a mile beyond the village of Panjpao, when the enemy showed in considerable force, driving in two of the videttes. Lieutenant W. T. Hughes, second in command of that regiment, therefore proceeded at once to the picquet with twenty more sabres. Advancing to reconnoitre, the party under Lieutenant

* 12 European gun-
ners.
50 sabres, 15th Irre-
gular Cavalry.
2nd Company, Sappers
and Miners.
Three companies, 71st
Native Infantry.

Lieutenant Hughes's
report.

Hughes came suddenly upon a party of some fifty of the enemy, who, from the cover of rocks and brushwood, opened a matchlock fire upon them. *Operations against the Mohmands in 1851-52.*

Lieutenant Hughes displayed great decision and gallantry, and, setting an example which was well followed by his men, immediately charged and pursued the enemy to the foot of the first range of hills, not fewer than fifteen of their number being left dead on the ground, many more creeping away badly wounded, and one being taken prisoner. The 2nd Irregular Cavalry lost one man killed and three wounded.

The ground over which the charge had been made was ill-suited to the operations of cavalry, being much broken and intersected by ravines; and, as the enemy was mustering in masses on the heights above, Lieutenant Hughes did not think it advisable to attempt a further pursuit.

On the 15th of January, Lieutenant A. Boulnois, Bengal Engineers, ~~in command of the 2nd Company, Sappers and Miners,~~ was murdered near Michni. It appears that he had ridden out in company with other officers of the garrison to a considerable distance, and, leaving them, incautiously cantered up to a tower near the entrance of a gorge into the hills, nearly three miles from the fort. Upon his approaching the tower, some men, who had been previously concealed, fired a volley and killed him. His body was carried off, but was recovered through the instrumentality of the *Thanadar* of Mian Khel, and was interred in one of the bastions of the fort. The murderers were never punished.

On the 3rd of February Sir Colin Campbell returned to Mian Khel, to blow up some eleven or twelve towers and several fortified enclosures, the safety of the road to Michni requiring their destruction.

On the 7th the force changed ground to Shabkadar, to be present whilst the villages of Panjpao, close to the hills, were being levelled, as the inhabitants had been made by the civil authorities to remove to a site nearer the fort of Shabkadar, and consequently more under our control,—these villages having been generally the point of rendezvous of the parties who from time to time had started on plundering expeditions into the plains.

A police post had now been established at Matta, and the troops were therefore withdrawn from there.

It was said that Saadat Khan was at a place a few miles from Pandiali, but that he had failed to obtain assistance from the chief of that tract, who had kept quite aloof from him; and that the Halimzais, who had entered into terms with Captain H. R. James, the Deputy Commissioner, early in the previous month, had also refrained from assisting him.

With the additional police arrangements that had been completed, and with the military posts at Shabkadar and Michni, the civil authorities considered there was no longer any necessity for the force remaining out, and it accordingly returned on the 14th of February to Peshawar.

In his report of these operations, Sir Colin Campbell expressed his grateful sense of the willingness and alacrity displayed by the troops of all ranks during the incessant fatigue caused by the alternation of work at the fort, and the necessary vigilance for the safety of the country with the very small force at his disposal. The officers especially named by Sir Colin Campbell were, Lieutenant-Colonel H. Troup, commanding 66th Gurkhas, second in command of the force; Captain G. Jackson, commanding 2nd Irregular Cavalry; Lieutenant W. T. Hughes, 2nd Irregular Cavalry, who had been in command of a detachment at Shabkadar; Major S. Fisher,

*Affair at
Panjpao in
1852.*

commanding 15th Irregular Cavalry; Lieutenant G. N. Hardinge, commanding Guide Cavalry; Lieutenant H. W. Norman, Brigade Major; and Major E. Haythorne, 98th Regiment, Orderly Officer.

The Governor-General directed that the expression of satisfaction with which the Government of India regarded their conduct might be conveyed to Brigadier Sir Colin Campbell and the officers named by him; and it was added that the same expression of satisfaction was due to the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of the force, of whose alacrity and good conduct the Brigadier had spoken in terms of merited applause.

Affair at Panjpao under Brigadier Sir Colin Campbell, K.C.B., in April 1852.

On the 30th of March news was received at Fort Shabkadar that the Mohmands had collected in the hills in front, and detachments were held ready to turn out at a moment's warning. About 3.30 A.M. on the 31st, a shot being fired at the village of Shabkadar, Captain J. L. Walker, of the 71st Native Infantry, commanding the outpost, immediately moved out with 60 bayonets, but the enemy were in retreat before he could come up with them.

Lieutenant F. R. Tottenham, commanding a troop of the 7th Bengal Light Cavalry, had at once detached a division (40 sabres) of the troop (which had been held in readiness under Subadar* Bulwunt Singh), to cut off the retreat of the enemy, whilst he followed with the remainder.

The position taken up by this division was most favourable for the purpose, and as 250 of the enemy were advancing on it with a brisk matchlock fire, Lieutenant Tottenham, who had joined it with eight or nine men, after posting the second division to cut off the enemy's retreat in another direction, advanced to charge, but, with the exception of the subadar, and a havildar, Shekh Husain Bakhsh, and a trumpeter, Karram Ali, not a man followed him. Riding back, he entreated his men to follow him as the enemy passed their flank, but in vain; and although Lieutenant Tottenham subsequently induced this detachment to follow the enemy to the foot of the hills, no order, no entreaty, no example, could get them to charge. Both the subadar and the trumpeter had their horses wounded. The second division appear to have behaved well, killing one man and having themselves several horses wounded.

The enemy, who numbered 400 foot and 60 horse, had two killed and several wounded, and left several stands of arms on the ground, with two prisoners. Two of their horses were killed; one was recognised as belonging to Nauroz Khan, a son of Saadat Khan. Nothing was carried off by the Mohmands from the village, but a policeman was wounded.


Our casualties had been two horses killed, and two sowars and eighteen horses wounded.

From the end of the month of March, reports had been rife that Saadat Khan had been making great efforts to conciliate differences among the various Mohmand tribes, in view to again attempting the

* In the old Bengal Light Cavalry regiments, the native officers and non-commissioned officers held the same ranks as in the infantry, viz., Subadar, Havildar, etc. In the Irregular Cavalry this was not the case, and the ranks were the same as at present in the cavalry, viz., Ressaldar, Duffadar, etc.


EXPLANATORY SKETCH
OF THE
ENGAGEMENT ON THE HEIGHTS OF PANJPAO
Fought on the 15th April 1852

Scale 1½ Inches = 1 Mile.







REMARKS.

- (a a a) MOMAND FORCE moving towards and threatening Matta.
- (D) BRITISH FORCE attacking right of the enemy.
- (H) Position of BRITISH FORCE at close of evening.
- (b b) MOMAND FORCE preparatory to return of BRITISH FORCE to Shabkadar.



REFERENCES.

- British Force 
Momand Force 
Roads 
Paths 

recovery of the lands we had annexed ; and about the middle of April it was said that he had succeeded in his endeavours, and that large bodies of men had collected for the purpose. But the Commissioner, Lieut.-Colonel F. Mackeson, C.B., doubted the truth of these reports, and was averse to the display of force unless actually required, under the apprehension of investing hostile chiefs with notions of importance as to their power to draw troops out and give trouble. *Affair at Panjpao in 1852.*

However, as Captain H. R. James, the Deputy Commissioner, who was at Shabkadar collecting information, believed the intentions of the hillmen were serious, Brigadier Sir Colin Campbell, commanding at Peshawar, bearing in mind his responsibility for the posts held by detachments of regular troops, determined to strengthen Shabkadar, but not to any great extent, in deference to the Commissioner's views, and two Horse Artillery guns and 150 sabres were accordingly sent out, and Sir Colin Campbell proceeded to Shabkadar, to judge for himself of the intentions of Saadat Khan.

On the 15th of April, about 3 P.M., the Mohmands debouched from the hills, in numbers certainly not less than 6,000 matchlock men, with about 80 sowars. They moved along the foot of the first range of hills, in front of Shabkadar, in very fair order, their cavalry and a crowd of matchlock men coming across a table-land, the summit of which overhung the ruined villages of Panjpao (*see accompanying sketch*). The direction of the movement of the main body was towards Matta.

The troops at the disposal of Sir Colin Campbell numbered only 600 of all ranks (*see Appendix C*). Before displaying a single soldier, the Brigadier allowed this movement to become quite pronounced. He then issued from the fort with the troops, as per margin.

2nd Troop, 1st Brigade, Horse Artillery (2 guns).
7th Light Cavalry, 87 sabres.
15th Irregular Cavalry, 179 sabres.

The enemy's cavalry, with a crowd of matchlock men, occupied the edge of the table-land, thus screening the movement towards Matta. Having dispersed this party with a few rounds from the guns, Sir Colin Campbell crowned the low hills at a gallop, and established the guns in rear of the enemy. He was confident that this was the most certain method of averting mischief from Matta. The practice of the two guns was excellent, and the enemy soon began to shake in their purpose, and to forsake the table-land. The Brigadier followed them, but they showed great dexterity in availing themselves of the ground to avoid the artillery fire. Their masses were now broken, and the pursuit lasted for about a mile and a half, being brought to a termination by some low ravines near the foot of the hills, which were strongly held.

The gallantry and determination shown by the enemy, when on account of approaching darkness it was deemed prudent for the force to retire, were admirable. The guns were hardly limbered up, the gunners had actually not mounted, when a shout ran down their whole line, and swarms rushed forward, taking advantage of every accident of ground, and they evidently thought their turn was now come. But the guns were instantly unlimbered, and double charges of grape checked their wild, but gallant, attack. It must be remembered that these mountaineers had been for two hours exposed to a cannonade to which they had no means to reply.

The force then retreated across the table-land at a foot's pace, the guns taking up successive positions at every 300 yards, and keeping up a fire of grape ; loss was thus avoided, and the most perfect order preserved, while

*Affair at
Panjpao in
1852.*

the Brigadier had reason to know that at this juncture the enemy suffered heavily.

The infantry from the fort had been sent for by Sir Colin Campbell, thinking they might be useful in passing the ruined villages of Panjpao, but they were not found necessary.

The losses of the enemy in this affair were considerable, while our casualties had been slight (*see* Appendix D). The action had, on our side, been one of artillery, the duties of the cavalry having been restricted to covering the guns in the face of the very large body opposed to the force.

Sir Colin Campbell, in his despatch, particularly dwelt on the gallantry and steadiness of the artillery, under the command of Lieutenant W. A. Mackinnon and Lieutenant C. H. Blunt, who had accompanied the force as a volunteer. It was owing to the "firmness and dash" of this very slender detachment that he was enabled, he said, to drive back 6,000 men, and to retreat, when it was necessary, without loss.

Sir Colin Campbell said he had to return his very particular thanks to his staff officers, Lieutenant H. W. Norman, Brigade Major, and Ensign P. S. Lumsden, Deputy-Assistant Quarter-Master General, and to Captain H. R. James, Deputy Commissioner, who acted as his Orderly Officer throughout the afternoon. He also acknowledged his obligations to Captain R. H. Hicks and Lieutenant H. W. Saunders, commanding the cavalry detachments, for the steadiness and coolness with which they carried out the directions issued in the constant manœuvres required for the protection of the guns.

For some days previously, 500 bayonets of Her Majesty's 53rd Regiment had been held in readiness at Peshawar to move at an hour's notice, with the aid of elephants. And the Deputy Commissioner having made earnest representation of the fear pervading the country in consequence of the paucity of the troops, and the number of armed enemies in the immediate neighbourhood, six companies of that regiment and four guns, 2nd Troop, 1st Brigade, Horse Artillery, were ordered out on the 16th, the former coming on elephants.

But the enemy had been so disheartened by their defeat on the 15th, that on the 17th news was received of their having dispersed, and on the 18th the troops which had been sent for, returned to Peshawar.

The approbation of the Governor-General in Council, and the sense entertained by the Government of the political value of striking such a blow, were subsequently conveyed to Sir Colin Campbell and the officers and troops which were under his command, "when the combined Mohmand tribes had been defeated by so small a British force."

The Indian medal, with a clasp for the "North-West Frontier", was granted in 1869 to all survivors of the troops engaged in the above affair at Panjpao.

Expedition against the Michni Mohmands by a force under Colonel Sydney J. Cotton, in 1854.

In the month of July following the above affair at Panjpao, the Michni and Panjpao Mohmands, exiled from house and lands, and cut off from trade, and such like relations in the plains, tendered their submission; and prayed for restoration to their fiefs. They were restored on

Temple.

condition of paying a yearly tribute of Rs. 600 for Michni, and Rs. 200 for Panjpao. The amounts fixed were merely nominal; but, for example's sake, it was necessary to demand some payment, lest immunity in this respect should encourage our own subjects to misbehave, in the hope of avoiding the just dues of Government, or embolden our neighbours to harass the border in the hope of extorting landed grants. On this, as on other occasions connected with the independent tribes, the Punjab Government declared that revenue was not wanted, but only a quiet frontier.

*Expedition
against the
Michni Moh-
mands in 1854.*

The Halimzai Mohmands of Panjpao after this did not give any cause for dissatisfaction, and remained in the enjoyment of their fief. Their good behaviour may, however, have been due to the fact that they were within range of the guns at the Shabkadar fort.

The conduct of the Michni Mohmands was, however, not so good, and in the autumn of 1854 two years' tribute was due, and the chief, Rahimdad, fled from Peshawar, whither he had been summoned. Under such circumstances flight was tantamount to rebellion. The greatest patience and forbearance had been shown by Captain H. R. James, the Deputy Commissioner, in regard to the payment of these arrears; but it was now evident that there remained nothing but attaching their property to the amount of the tribute due, with the addition of a fine for giving so much trouble. The Commissioner, Major H. B. Edwardes, C.B., therefore requested that a force might be sent out to Michni, to support the Deputy Commissioner in case the Mohmands should resist the civil power; that a company of infantry might be placed in Mian Khel for its protection; and that patrols might be sent to seize all cattle moving off to the hills.

Temple.
Commissioner's
report.
1st Troop, 3rd Brigade, Horse
Artillery, (2 guns).
One squadron, 1st Irregular
Cavalry.
2nd company, Sappers and
Miners.
Three companies, 1st Native
Infantry.

On the evening of the 22nd of August, a column, of the strength detailed in the margin, moved out from Peshawar under the command of Major C. T. Chamberlain, 1st Irregular Cavalry.

On the orders reaching the fort of Michni for the capture of cattle, Lieutenant C. H. Brownlow, 1st Sikh Infantry, who was in command there, succeeded in capturing 1,100 head, in the act of being driven off across the frontier.

On the 23rd, as it was known that some 200 armed men had come down to the village of Sadin at the invitation of Rahimdad Khan, Major Chamberlain moved out with the artillery and cavalry, and, the guns opening on them, they dispersed.

The capture of Rahimdad's cattle secured a much larger amount than the tribute—Rs. 600—due to Government. But it was necessary to make arrangements for the lapsed shares of the Michni *jagir*. The *zamindars* of the

Major Edwardes's
report.
plain, our own subjects, were quite willing to become responsible for the revenue, provided that they were secured from the constant raids from the independent border villages of the fugitive hill chiefs, *viz.*, Dabb, Sadin, and Shah Mansur Khel. The two former belonged to Rahimdad; and Dabb, as already related, had been destroyed by Sir Colin Campbell's force in 1851. Shah Mansur Khel was just beyond them, on the left bank of the Kabul river, five miles from the Michni fort, and beyond it there was no other Mohmand village for many miles. If these villages were left close to our border, in the hands of hostile Mohmands, they would become nests of robbers, and convenient depositories

*Expedition
against the
Michni Moh-
mands in 1854.*

for plunder. Major Edwardes, the Commissioner, concurred in the Deputy Commissioner's opinion that the villages should be destroyed, and never allowed to be reoccupied. The necessary military measures to effect this were therefore ordered, but it was necessary that the force should be strong enough to meet any resistance the Lalpura chief might send to Rahimdad.

*2nd Company, 2nd Battalion,
Artillery, with Mountain
Train Battery attached, (4
howitzers and 2 guns).

Two companies, 22nd Foot.

One squadron, 10th Light Cav-
alry.

9th Native Infantry.

1st Sikh Infantry.

Shabkadar by three companies, 4th Native Infantry, and one squadron, 16th Irregular Cavalry. Sixty bayonets were detached to the *thana* at Mian Khel, three companies of the 1st Native Infantry relieving them at Michni.

Mountain Train Battery.

Two companies, 22nd Foot.

One troop, 10th Light Cavalry.

2nd Company, Sappers and Miners.

9th Native Infantry.

1st Sikh Infantry.

1st Troop, 3rd Brigade, Horse Artillery,
(2 guns).

2nd Company, 2nd Battalion, Artillery
(2 24-pounder howitzers).

One squadron, 1st Irregular Cavalry.

Three companies, 1st Native Infantry.

The 1st Sikh Infantry, under the command of Major G. Gordon, in skirmishing order, formed the advance of Colonel Cotton's column; but no opposition was offered at the villages of Sadin or Dabb, the enemy falling back on Shah Mansur Khel.

Colonel Cotton's
despatch.

Major Chamberlain had now advanced his guns, under Major J. Brind, to an elevated plateau commanding the village of, and approaches to, Shah Mansur Khel, and their fire had partially cleared the village; but this necessarily ceased as the head of the other column approached it, and the 1st Sikh Infantry were met by a sharp matchlock fire from the towers, walls, and houses: however, they quickly cleared the village, driving the enemy to the heights above.

Before the destruction of the village and towers could be commenced, it was necessary to seize all the commanding positions; for which purpose a strong party of skirmishers of the 9th Native Infantry, under the command of Captain J. Murray, together with two companies of the 1st Sikh Infantry, under Lieutenant C. H. Brownlow, were ordered to drive the enemy from their several positions, and to crown the heights. In carrying out this order the infantry were ably assisted by a well-directed fire from the mountain guns, under Captain T. Brougham. The hills to the north-east of the village were

On the 27th, the troops, as per margin, commenced to move on Michni. This force, which was to co-operate with that already at Michni, was commanded by Colonel Sydney J. Cotton, 22nd Foot.

The fort of Abazai was temporarily occupied by three companies, 62nd Native Infantry, and one squadron, 14th Irregular Cavalry; that of

Shabkadar by three companies, 4th Native Infantry, and one squadron, 16th Irregular Cavalry. Sixty bayonets were detached to the *thana* at Mian Khel, three companies of the 1st Native Infantry relieving them at Michni.

At daylight on the morning of the 31st August a force, as per margin (*see Appendix E*), under the command of Colonel S. J. Cotton, moved from Michni along the left bank of the river toward Shah Mansur Khel (*see Map, page 206*).

Major Chamberlain's column, consisting of the troops detailed in the margin, had been previously encamped on the right of the river, ready to co-operate with the Peshawar column.

* The Mountain Train Battery at this time was drawn by mules, and was attached to the 2nd Company of the 2nd Battalion, Artillery, at Peshawar, with 4 3-pounder guns and 4 12-pounder howitzers.

occupied and held by some companies of the 1st Sikh Infantry, under Major G. Gordon. *Expedition against the Michni Mohmands in 1854.*

The village and towers were now completely destroyed, under the direction of Lieutenant H. Hyde, of the Engineers, and Ensign A. U. F. Ruxton, commanding the Sappers and Miners; about 500 *maunds* of grain were either carried away or destroyed, the houses were levelled by elephants, and all the timber work burnt; but time did not admit of the trees being cut down.

Although the enemy only numbered some 200, the heights had not been occupied without a struggle, and the troops holding them were, during the whole time, exposed to an unceasing and galling fire from the neighbouring ridges, causing some loss (*see Appendix F*), including Lieutenant C. H. Brownlow, of the 1st Sikh Infantry, and Lieutenant C. A. McDougall, Adjutant 9th Native Infantry, who were both dangerously wounded, and whose gallantry in holding the heights had been most conspicuous. As soon as the village had been completely destroyed, these covering parties were withdrawn, under cover of the mountain guns.

The force then retired from Shah Mansur Khel, covered by the guns on the right bank of the river, and the camp was reached at 4.30 P.M.

As far as could be ascertained, the loss of the enemy had been four killed and twelve wounded.

On the 2nd September, the troops, under Colonel S. J. Cotton, advanced on Dabb and Sadin, supported by Major Chamberlain's detachment on the right bank of the river. No opposition was offered by the Mohmands, although they were in as great force as at Shah Mansur Khel, the guns on the right bank keeping them in check. The total destruction of these villages having been effected by 2 P.M., the troops returned to camp, when their return march to Peshawar was commenced.

Colonel Cotton, in his despatch, reported most favourably of the conduct of the troops, who had shown throughout the greatest activity, gallantry, and zeal. The heat had been at times excessive, and the exposure great.

He alluded to the valuable and cordial assistance of the Deputy Commissioner, Captain H. R. James, who had accompanied the force throughout.

The officers whose services Colonel Cotton specially mentioned were—Major C. T. Chamberlain, 1st Irregular Cavalry, second in command of the force.

Major G. Gordon, commanding 1st Sikh Infantry.

„ J. Brind, commanding the Artillery.

Captain T. Brougham, commanding the Mountain Train Battery.

„ G. A. Robinson, commanding detachment, Her Majesty's 22nd Regiment.

„ J. Murray, commanding 9th Native Infantry.

Lieutenant O. Wilkinson, commanding detachment, 10th Light Cavalry.

„ H. Hyde, Bengal Engineers.

Ensign A. U. F. Ruxton, commanding 2nd Company, Sappers and Miners.

Lieutenant H. W. Norman, Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General.

„ P. S. Lumsden, Deputy-Assistant Quarter-Master General.

Captain R. Blackall, Her Majesty's 22nd Regiment, Brigade Major.

Major W. W. Davidson, 16th Irregular Cavalry, Orderly Officer.

With regard to these operations, it was stated that the Governor-General in Council considered the affair reflected the greatest credit on Colonel Sydney J. Cotton, and all who were employed under him;

*Expedition
against the
Michni Moh-
mands in 1854.*

and directed that the thanks of the Government might be conveyed to Colonel Cotton, and the officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers under his command during the operations. It was further stated that "the Governor-General in Council perceives with regret that two officers, Lieutenant Brownlow, Adjutant of the 1st Sikh Corps, and Lieutenant McDougall, Adjutant of the 9th Regiment Native Infantry, have been severely wounded. His Lordship in Council observes that, while describing the conduct of all who were serving under him in very favourable terms, Colonel Cotton specially records that 'the gallantry of both of these young officers in holding the heights was most conspicuous'; such conduct, involving them in severe suffering by their wounds, is very highly appreciated by His Lordship in Council."

The Indian medal, with a clasp for the "North-West Frontier", was granted in 1869 to all survivors of the troops engaged in the above operations against the villages of Shah Mansur Khel, Sadin, and Dabb.

Immediately after these operations, the well-affected Mohmands of Michni, who had remained on the *jagir* when Rahimdad fled, deposited their quota of tribute with the Deputy Commissioner, as a proof of their adherence to the original terms pending the final orders of Government.

A settlement of the Michni fief was then made. The faithful Mohmands, who stood by their lands, continued to pay their share of the tribute. The lands of those who fled were farmed out and assessed with revenue. Rahimdad was not restored, and he continued to give trouble on this part of the border. Towards the close of 1854 he appeared at Peshawar, under a safe conduct, to pray for restoration to his fief; but as he did not, and indeed could not, offer any security for good conduct, he was sent back across the frontier, and forbidden to re-enter British territory.

After the expedition above narrated, under Colonel Sydney Cotton, the Mohmands continued to commit outrages on our territory, and on the 24th March 1855, a party, numbering 300, came down and carried off seventy-seven bullocks, when the troops, consisting of detachments of the regiments as per margin, under the command of Major G. Gordon, 1st Sikh Infantry, moved out, and a skirmish ensued, in which one duffadar of police and one villager were killed, and Ensign G. S. Bradford and four sepoy of the 62nd Native Infantry were wounded. The satisfaction of the Government at the result of the affair was conveyed to the officers concerned. On the 5th May 400 Mohmands issued from the hills, but were met by the troops and driven back with the loss of two sepoy killed on our side. Between this date and the 16th of September 1855, ten outrages were committed on this border. On the latter date a party of Mohmands came out, but were driven back, with the loss on our side of two sowars and one sepoy wounded. In these outrages the offenders had been, for the most part, Mohmands of Pandiali. At last, Lieutenant-Colonel H. B. Edwardes, C.B., the Commissioner, brought this persistent misconduct to the notice of Government, and recommended that, instead of restoring to them their allowances, we should endeavour to punish them.

Brigadier R. D. Halifax's
report.

10th Light Cavalry.
16th Irregular Cavalry.
62nd Native Infantry.
1st Sikh Infantry.

He recommended that the Amir of Kabul should be called upon either to inflict summary punishment on the Pandiali Mohmands for the past, and restrain them for the future, or else to intimate that he left them to be dealt with as we thought proper. With this report he submitted a memorandum, showing how he would propose to carry out these operations in the Pandiali valley. In this memorandum he said that nothing less than the complete destruction of every village of the Pandiali Mohmands would be sufficient to meet the case, and for this purpose he considered a force of 5,000 effective men would be required.

*Conduct of
Mohmands
from 1854 to
1863.*

Sir John Lawrence (the Chief Commissioner) supported the recommendations of Lieutenant-Colonel Edwardes; but the Government of India, while recognising the necessity of punitive measures, considered that the time was inopportune, and that immediate action should be postponed.

Nothing further was therefore done except remonstrating strongly with the Amir on the indifference shown by his Government to these raids and annoyances. These remonstrances, however, had no effect, and raids on our border continued as before, and between September 1855 and July 1857, no less than twenty-four serious outrages were committed, with the object of plunder and murder.

This continued misconduct was made the subject of conversation by Sir John Lawrence with the Amir Dost Muhammad, during his visit to Peshawar in January 1857, but no satisfactory result followed.

It was evident that the Mohmand chiefs hoped that the British Government would at last be driven, by perpetual annoyances on its border, to grant them some rich fiefs. Preliminary arrangements were under discussion for the advance of a punitive force to Pandiali, when the Mutiny broke out in India, and our attention was more pressingly directed to other quarters.

Although the sepoy outbreak gave the Mohmands an excellent opportunity of increasing their annoyances, yet they showed no signs of profiting by it; their raids continued, it is true, but they were not of a more formidable nature. But in the middle of August, a fanatical Kunar Syad, named Syad Amir, after in vain endeavouring to raise the Khaibar tribes against us, betook himself to the Mohmands of Michni. They received him with open arms, and gave him protection, while he sent incendiary letters and arms to the troops at Peshawar.

MacGregor.

On the 9th of September, with the aid of the Shah Mansur Khel Mohmands and forty or fifty rebel sepoys, he made a night attack on the fort of Michni, but the garrison, being composed of a party of the Kelat-i-Ghilzai Regiment, were staunch, and beat them off.

The Mohmands were now in a state of the highest excitement, and sent the "fiery cross" to all their neighbours, being evidently determined to strike a blow for the recovery of their fiefs.

As there were no troops to move out against them, Lieut.-Colonel Edwardes had to yield with as good grace as possible. He sent them word that they were going the wrong way to work, and that if they wanted to regain their confiscated privileges, they must render some marked service to Government, instead of adding to the embarrassments of a passing crisis. For instance, if they sent the Syad away and gave hostages for good conduct till the war was over, Lieut.-Colonel Edwardes said he would gladly ask Government to consider their case, but not on such favourable terms as formerly. The Mohmands then sent in their hostages to Peshawar, packed off the Syad

*Conduct of
Mohmands
from 1854
to 1863.*

unceremoniously, and sat down quietly to wait for the return of peace in Hindustan. A few days after, the news of the capture of Delhi having arrived, the crisis passed over without any further serious danger. Nevertheless, in spite of their professions, the Mohmands evidently did not consider themselves bound to refrain from raiding, and this went on as before.

From the beginning of September 1857 to March 1860, thirty-nine serious outrages were committed by members of this tribe, and the question of a punitive expedition was again submitted for the consideration of the Government. Within five years there had been eighty-five raids committed by parties of an average strength of 75 men, in which 14 British subjects had been killed, 27 wounded, and 55 carried off, and over 1,200 head of cattle plundered. This was exclusive of forty minor raids, in which 35 British subjects had been killed or wounded, and 267 head of cattle plundered. The Government still refused, however, to sanction an expedition, and determined to wait and see what would be the result of resolutely refusing to restore the confiscated *jagirs* of the Tarakzais, the cause of these complications.

About the 20th of March, the first really hopeful sign of a satisfactory issue to this policy occurred, when Nauroz Khan, the son and adopted heir of Saadat Khan of Lalpura, sent in, asking for permission to come in to Peshawar, and stating that he had been engaged punishing the Shinwaris for an attempt made by one of that tribe on the life of Fateh Khan, Khatak, when carrying despatches from Peshawar to Kabul. Nauroz Khan was accordingly invited to come in.

In seeking to make peace with us, Nauroz Khan's great aim was to get back the forfeited *jagirs*; but, finding that Lieut.-Colonel Edwardes, the Commissioner, was firmly opposed to this ever being brought about, and knowing that the Kabul Government had signified their intention of interfering to stop the misconduct of the tribe, the young *Khan* only asked that mortgages on lands held by some of the Michni Mohmands in the Peshawar district, who were in rebellion, might hold good if peace was made, and that prisoners might be released; this was promised in regard to political prisoners, but not in regard to criminals, who, it was declared, must be dealt with according to law.

The result of this conference was the granting of the following terms to the Mohmands:—

- 1st. That Government should accept the assurances of Saadat Khan, chief of Lalpura, and his son, Nauroz Khan, of their desire to live on good terms with the British Government, and to be responsible for the peace of the frontier, and overlook all past causes of hostility.
- 2nd. That the blockade against the Mohmands should be raised, and the tribe be free to resort to our territory, individual notorious criminals being, of course, responsible to the tribunals.
- 3rd. That Nawab Khan, chief of Pandiali, and all his branch of the tribe, be included in the amnesty.
- 4th. That such of the Mohmands as went out with Rahimdad Khan be also included on the same terms.
- 5th. That no confiscated land or *jagir* be given to any one.
- 6th. That all Mohmands who may have been apprehended during the blockade merely because they belonged to a hostile tribe, but not taken in the commission of crimes or raids, be released on payment of the reward given for their capture.

Lieut.-Colonel Edwardes's letter to Saadat Khan regarding these terms is given in full, and was as follows:—

*Conduct of
Mohmands
from 1854
to 1863.*

"I have received your letter, and, as I have no desire to injure you in any way, I can assure you that the coming in of your son, Nauroz Khan, was a great pleasure to me. From all he said, and from all you write, I believe you sincerely desire to put an end to the disturbances on the Mohmand frontier, and to come to friendly terms. I have this day addressed my own Government in your favour, and asked that your past offences may be forgiven, and bygones be bygones; and as your son, Nauroz Khan, undertakes to be responsible for the rest of the Mohmand *maliks*, such as Nawab Khan of Pandiali, and others, I have recommended that the pardon be extended to all other Mohmands (except such individuals as may be known to have committed murder or other serious crimes, of which justice must take notice), and that the blockade be taken off, and the Mohmands be admitted to come and go, and trade in the Peshawar valley. For I conceive it is beyond my discretion to forgive and condone an old-standing enmity like this, though I have every hope that Government will listen to my representations.

"As to any *jagirs* that have been confiscated, I do not think it at all advisable that they should be released; for they will only be a future bone of contention. Whoever sits on a barren hillside and enjoys a fine estate in the plain below for doing nothing, must necessarily get wind in his head. He thinks he owes it to his own strength, and the fears, not the generosity, of Government. So after a year or two he gets full and proud, and rebels; and then the whole fight comes over again, and the tribe is plunged into war to please him, and many lives are lost. In short, *jagirs* in the plain are not good for the men on the hills, and they will never be given with my consent. Don't think I say this for the sake of the money. To a great Government the sum is of no consequence; but it is bad for the administration. If there be any Mohmand mortgages in the hands of our subjects, the Mohmands will be free to sue in our courts, where every justice will be done them. And as to the prisoners in our jails, to please you I will release every Mohmand who has been seized merely because he was a Mohmand, on consideration that he pay whatever reward was given for his own seizure. But no highwayman, or murderer, or other criminal, will be released; justice must take its course with such offenders.

"My friend, I have spoken my mind out, for it is best to be plain. For the rest, I desire the honour, and welfare, and strength of you and your family, and I conceive that they will be better served by the friendship than by the enmity of the British Government."

Soon after this, Saadat Khan of Lalpura and Nawab Khan of Pandiali came in to Peshawar in person, and made their submission to the Commissioner.

Affairs with the Mohmands, near Shabkadar, December and January 1863-64.

After the submission of their chiefs, the Mohmands desisted from troubling our border until the occasion of the Ambela expedition in 1863, when the emissaries of the *Akhund* of Swat were sent all over the hills bordering on the Peshawar valley, but were only successful in exciting
MacGregor.

Sultan Muhammad Khan son of Saadat

*Affairs near
Shabkadar in
1863-64.*

Khan, owned the *Akhund's* religious supremacy, and was, moreover, ill-disposed towards us. He was a man of bad character altogether; he began life by murdering his eldest brother, and was often at feud, even with his own father. Collecting a body of Mohmands, who were joined by a miscellaneous rabble of Safis, Bajouris, and the like, he came down to the British frontier on the 5th December 1863.

Captain J. M. Earle, who was commanding the fort of Shabkadar, hearing firing on the Abazai road, moved out with 55 sabres, 6th Bengal Cavalry, and 96 bayonets, Native Infantry. The enemy were estimated at about 500, 300 of whom were posted on the summit of a slight eminence. Captain Earle advanced against them with his infantry in skirmishing order, and the cavalry on the flanks. On nearing the enemy, the cavalry charged from both flanks, and succeeded in killing seven or eight of their number, and wounding some twenty. Lieutenant St. G. M. Bishop, 6th Bengal Cavalry, who was gallantly leading the division on the left, fell, however, mortally wounded, and a sowar was also wounded during the charge.

*Captain Earle's
despatch.*

Before the infantry could come up, the enemy had gained the crest of one of the hills in the first range, when Captain Earle, having accomplished his object by driving the enemy beyond our frontier, retired leisurely towards the fort. The enemy made no attempt to follow up, but came down immediately afterwards to collect their killed and wounded.

The Shabkadar garrison was then reinforced by troops from Peshawar, under Lieut.-Colonel G. Jackson, 2nd Bengal Cavalry. On the 7th of December, the enemy having advanced from the hills and taken up a position on the ridge in front of Shabkadar, Lieut.-Colonel Jackson moved out with his force; as he gained the ridge, the enemy fell back, and were driven in half an hour to the end of the plateau into the ravines and broken ground at the foot of the hills, from the sides of which they kept up a heavy fire; Lieutenant A. FitzHugh, with a detachment of the 4th Sikhs, was closely engaged on the left front of the line, and kept the enemy at bay for some time. Evening setting in, Lieut.-Colonel Jackson recalled that officer, and retired the force. As it fell back, the enemy followed, keeping up a fire the whole way, but at a long distance; it was dark when the troops reached the fort, and a party of the enemy having got into the village about 800 yards from the fort, they were shelled out.

Our loss was, two sepoy of the 4th Sikhs killed, one jemadar and one sepoy of the 4th Sikhs and two sepoy of the 8th Native Infantry, wounded. Towards the end of December, Sultan Muhammad Khan took up a menacing position at Regmiana, a small village in the hills about five or six miles distant from Shabkadar. Nauroz Khan, son of Saadat Khan, had recently joined his brother, but Saadat Khan himself remained in the hills to the westward of Michni, pretending inability to restrain his sons, but really affording them countenance by his presence in the neighbourhood.

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*Major Munro's
report.*

When Sultan Muhammad Khan arrived at Regmiana, the number of his followers did not exceed 400 men. Nauroz Khan brought an accession of 300 more, and occupied the Mohmand village of Chingai, north-east of Regmiana.

Sultan Muhammad Khan was accompanied by a band of *mullas* from Ningrahar and other parts of Afghanistan, who assisted him in collecting the tribes, with the avowed object of carrying on a religious war. Their success in stirring up the Mohmands after the affairs of the 5th and 7th December

was not great at first. Occasional accessions of small bodies under Muhammadan priests, and a few absconded leaders of robbers from Government territory, were received; but it was not until the 31st of December that the importunities of the priests, and the efforts of Sultan Muhammad

Affairs near Shabkadar in 1863-64.

Mohmands of the	Baizai	clan	...	600 men.
"	Khwaizai	"	...	1,000 "
"	Halimzai	"	...	1,500 "
"	Tarakzai	"	...	200 "
Safis, Ghilzais, etc.,	500 "
Total				3,800 "

Khan, had collected a miscellaneous assemblage, estimated at 3,800 men, as per margin.

On the evening of the 1st January

these numbers were augmented by the arrival of 800 more Baizais, under Sultan Muhammad Khan, 500 Halimzais, and 500 others under Nauroz Khan, making the total strength of the enemy 5,600.

Having thus assembled this force, Sultan Muhammad Khan, after consultation with his brother and other leaders, and more particularly at the pressing instigation of the priests, resolved to move out to meet the British force stationed at Shabkadar.

	Officers.	Non-Commissioned Officers and Men.
D Battery, 5th Brigade, Royal Horse Artillery (3 guns) ...	2	49
7th Hussars ...	5	140
3rd Battalion, Rifle Brigade ..	27	691
2nd Bengal Cavalry ...	5	231
6th Bengal Cavalry ...	1	95
2nd Gurkha Regiment ...	7	453
4th Sikh Infantry ...	1	93
Total ...	48	1,752

This force had been considerably increased, and was now under the command of Colonel A. Macdonell, C.B., of the Rifle Brigade, and consisted of the troops noted in the margin.

At about 11 o'clock on the morning of the 2nd

January 1864, the Mohmands and others who had gathered at Regmiana made their appearance, debouching from the gorge north-west of Fort Shabkadar, and gradually forming under their leaders on the plateau* in front of it, to the number of some 5,000 matchlock men and forty horsemen.

By 2 P.M., the enemy being fully collected, their formation presented the appearance of a crescent. Having reason to believe that they would not venture far from their line of retreat, Colonel Macdonell, with a view to

* One company, Rifle Brigade.
One company, 2nd Gurkhas.

tempt them down, occupied with two companies of rifle-men* the village of Badi Shamberi in front of his centre, posting a squadron on the Michni road to attract their skirmishers to the plain, which partially succeeded in drawing the enemy's right wing forward.

On this, the cavalry dashed forward, turning and gradually folding the enemy's right on the centre.

Simultaneously the three guns of the Royal Horse Artillery, having taken up a position in front of Badi Shamberi, raked the retiring wing of the enemy with some effect.

The cavalry continued the turning movement (three times were the Mohmands charged by the 7th Hussars), and Colonel Macdonell then advanced the 3rd Battalion of the Rifle Brigade in skirmishing order, when the enemy were

*Affairs near
Shabkadar in
1863-64.*

driven beyond the border, and the troops returned after sunset, unmolested.

Colonel Macdonell stated he had received from all the most ample and intelligent support.

Our loss was as noted in Appendix G. The enemy, it was believed, lost some forty killed and as many wounded.

Many Mohmands of the Tarakzai section proceeded straight to their homes after their defeat, and a defection of at least 1,000 men took place the next morning, on the plea of scarcity of provisions, and the necessity of burying the dead at the usual places of interment. The result of the action had, too, the most dispiriting effect on the leaders, and, notwithstanding the endeavours of the priests, the gathering gradually dispersed.

The satisfaction of Government with the measures adopted was expressed to Colonel Macdonell.

The Indian medal, with a clasp for the "North-West Frontier", was granted in 1876 to all survivors of the troops which took part in the above affair at Shabkadar under Colonel A. Macdonell.

Government of India
letter No. 111 of 5th
September 1876.

On the requisition of the Commissioner of Peshawar, the Amir of Kabul now interfered in Mohmand affairs, and Sher Ali Khan sent his son, Sirdar Muhammad Ali Khan, to eject Saadat Khan, and to replace him by Riza Khan, the son of his former rival, Turabaz Khan (*see* Appendix H). Saadat Khan and his son, Nauroz Khan, were carried off prisoners to Kabul. The old *Khan* was subsequently released, and died soon afterwards.

MacGregor.

Riza Khan, having taken possession of Lalpura, considerably strengthened it. He was attacked by Sultan Muhammad Khan, son of Saadat Khan, and a large gathering; but he repulsed them with heavy loss, and Sultan Muhammad Khan then wandered about amongst the Mohmands, trying to invite them either to assemble and retake Lalpura, or to commit raids upon the British border. In August 1866 he was joined by some of the chiefs of the Khwaizai and Baizai sections, who had lost friends in the former attack on Lalpura. Their object in coming together appears to have been twofold: 1st, to retake Lalpura; and 2ndly, in the event of failure, to punish some of the Mohmand Tarakzai villages above Michni, and close the caravan routes by Krapa and Tartara to Peshawar. When some 4,000 or 5,000 men had collected, dissensions broke out, fomented by our ally, Nawab Khan, chief of Pandiali, and the gathering dispersed.

Eventually, the Amir, finding Riza Khan useless, removed him, and placed Sultan Muhammad Khan in the office of his father, at the same time releasing Nauroz Khan, who, with his son, Muhammad Sadik Khan, went off to join Sirdar Yakub Khan, the Amir's son, at Herat.

In 1870, Sultan Muhammad Khan was shot dead in the Lalpura bazar by the son of Riza Khan, who was instantly killed by the *Khan's* followers. Nauroz Khan having returned from Herat, then assumed the chieftainship, and marked his tenure of office by great vigour and energy, and endeared himself to the tribe by his generous hospitality.

After the affair near Shabkadar in 1864, the Mohmand border was not

Macdonald, the commandant of Fort Michni, was murdered in a most dastardly manner. Major Macdonald and Captain R. M. Clifford, of the 16th Bengal Cavalry, were strolling unarmed and unattended on the bank of the Kabul river, about a mile above the fort, when they were suddenly attacked by armed men. Both officers attempted to escape; Captain Clifford succeeded, but Major Macdonald was wounded in the thigh by a matchlock ball, and fell, and was thereupon pursued, and hacked to death with swords. Captain Clifford, also, would probably have lost his life if it had not been for the intervention of a party of villagers in a hamlet near the scene of the outrage, who, hearing the shots, turned out and fired upon the murderers.

*Events on
Mohmand
border from
1864 to 1878.*

From inquiries made into the circumstances of the outrage, it was established that the murder was committed under the direction of Bahram Khan, half-brother of Nauroz Khan, chief of Lalpura. Bahram Khan had been for some time in charge of an outpost in the Afghan territory at Nasir Kot, about two miles above Michni, and had the reputation of being a wild and restless character. No adequate motive for the crime was discovered, but it was proved that Bahram Khan had for some time previously formed the intention of making himself notorious by the murder of a British officer. After the murder, Bahram Khan fled to Ningrabar, and has evaded all attempts at capture; but in 1879 those of his retainers who had actually cut down Major Macdonald were seized at Dakka, and met with their well-deserved, though long-delayed, fate. For this outrage a fine of Rs. 10,000 was imposed upon the Michni Tarakzais, which they paid without demur. Though not active participators in the deed, they had failed to give warning of an act which they well knew was meditated.

At the end of the same year (1873) Captain Anderson, the officer commanding at Fort Shabkadar, was fired at, though happily without effect, by a member of the Hafizkor sub-section of the Tarakzai clan; but the insult was promptly avenged by confiscation of the lands held by members of the section, and their prohibition from entering British territory for a period of three years. From this time till the invasion of Afghanistan in 1878, our relations with the independent Mohmands continued undisturbed. In 1874, the arrest of Sirdar Yakub Khan by the Amir was the signal for rebellion at Lalpura, and Nauroz Khan, the chief at Lalpura, disobeyed the summons to go to Kabul, and retired to Gandao. The affairs of Lalpura continued in a very disturbed state, but these troubles did not extend to our border. In 1875, Muhammad Shah Khan, the son of Sultan Muhammad Khan, was installed as Khan of Lalpura. In 1877, Nauroz Khan died at Gandao, and his sons shortly after came in to Peshawar.

Operations against the Mohmands in 1879. Affair at Kam Dakka in April.

When war against the Amir, Sher Ali, was declared in 1878, Muhammad Shah Khan sent a Mohmand contingent to co-operate with the Amir's troops at Ali Musjid, but they fled without firing a shot, and Muhammad Shah Khan came in shortly after to Lieut.-General Sir S. J. Browne, at Dakka, and tendered his submission. He was recognised as Khan of Lalpura, and did fairly good service. The sons of Nauroz Khan, Muhammad Sadik Khan,

*Operations
against the
Mohmands in
1879.*

the Khan of Goshta, second in importance only to the chief of Lalpura, refused to come in, and held aloof. It is said that it was at his instigation that a raid was made by hill Mohmands on the village of Sarai, on the left bank of the Kabul river in the Kama district.

In consequence of this raid, and owing to the murder of two camel-drivers from the camp at Jalalabad while tending their camels grazing, a

Hazara Mountain Battery, 2 guns.
Guide Cavalry, 50 sabres.
Guide Infantry, 300 bayonets.

small column, as per margin, was sent into the Kama district on the 11th of January 1879, under the command of Brigadier-General F. H. Jenkins. No opposition

was met with, and the village of Shergarh was surprised, the headman of the village and a ringleader of the marauding party being captured. A party of Mohmands was observed making for the hills, and the mountain guns opened on them with effect. On the following day the column returned to camp, having accomplished the object for which it had been detached.

On the 6th of February 1879, a force of Mohmands, aided by Bajouris, and estimated at 12,000, made an attack on the village of a friendly chief in the Kama district. This chief, Azim Khan, the Khan of Chardeh, had previously tendered his submission to the British, and had been put in charge of the two districts of Goshta and Chardeh. This raid, like the previous one, was made at the instigation of Moghal Khan, the hostile Khan of Goshta.

On the 7th of February, a small force,* numbering about 900 men,

*10th Hussars, one troop.
Detachment, Rifle Brigade.
11th Bengal Cavalry, one squadron.
Detachment, 20th Punjab Native Infantry.
Detachment, 4th Gurkha Regiment.

under Brigadier-General H. T. Macpherson, V.C., C.B., was sent from Jalalabad to attack the enemy. A simultaneous movement was ordered from Basawal by Chardeh towards

Goshta, to intercept the Mohmands should they retire by the route by which they had advanced. This force† was

†2 mountain guns.
1-17th Regiment, 300 bayonets.
Guide Cavalry, one squadron.

under the command of Brigadier-General J. A. Tytler, V.C., C.B., and

was accompanied by Azim Khan and a few followers. The two columns crossed the river, but the enemy, having received information of the intended movements, did not wait to be attacked, but retreated to the hills before the arrival of the troops. The columns therefore returned to their respective stations, and by the 11th all excitement in this district had passed over.

About this time an agitation was got up by the *mullas*, and much excitement was caused among the Mohmands by their fanatical preaching. This excitement found vent in an attack on Mr. G. B. Scott, Surveyor, at Zankai, above Michni, on the 28th of February 1879.

Arrangements had been previously made by the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar, with the Tarakzai Mohmands, for the safe conduct of a party through their country for the purpose of surveying the Shanilo route from Peshawar to Dakka. Steps had also been taken to prevent any opposition on the part of the Halimzai Mohmands from Gandao. This was considered necessary owing to the preaching of a wandering mendicant *mulla*, known as the *Fakir* of Mian Isa, from the Halimzai village of that name, in British territory, where he had long resided. On the outbreak of hostilities he had taken to the hills, and soon gained influence among the ignorant clansmen. On the 26th of February Mr. Scott arrived at Michni, and the following day went to Sahib Chin, and returned without any interruption or unfriendly demonstration whatever. An

escort of seventy men of the 24th Punjab Native Infantry had been told off as a guard for him. Operations
against the
Mohmands in
1879.

On the morning of the 28th of February, Mr. Scott, taking with him only two non-commissioned officers and twenty sepoy of his guard, accompanied by the *Tehsildar* and several *maliks*, proceeded to Zankai. He was joined on the way by some men of the Tarakzai clan. On arriving at Zankai he commenced to sketch, and had been at work some little time, when he observed a body of men approaching from Gandao. He at once determined to return, and gave the order to retire. The party had gone about two miles, when a body of the enemy began to open a brisk fire on them. At first no notice was taken of it, but soon the fire became too hot, and the sepoy were ordered to return it. A skirmishing action then began, and the sepoy were ordered to retire in parties of at first ten each, and then five each, one covering the other. The country people who had remained with the party (about twenty or thirty in number), under the command of the *Tehsildar*, Shahpasand Khan, helped to keep off the enemy, but their ammunition soon failed. The retirement was continued until a mass of low hills was reached. Here Mr. Scott sent for reinforcements. Leaving the road, the party continued their retreat along an almost level spur for about half a mile, at the end of which was a steep descent to the bed of a small stream. Here the enemy charged, sword in hand, and succeeded in cutting down a naik and a sepoy, whose bodies had to be left on the ground. They were, however, eventually beaten off, and forced to seek cover.

After this they seemed to have had enough, and the retreat was continued almost unmolested to Gidarnao. About a mile beyond this village the remainder of the guard, under Captain E. G. Newnham, was met, and the whole party returned to Michni. Our loss had been—one non-commissioned officer and one sepoy killed, one sepoy shot through the foot, and, in addition to this, Hidyat Khan, a *malik* of Sena, was shot through the face.

Mr. Scott, in his report of the affair, especially mentioned the conduct of the *Tehsildar*, Shahpasand Khan, who behaved with great coolness throughout.

The cordial acknowledgments of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council were subsequently conveyed to Mr. Scott for the conspicuous gallantry he displayed on this occasion.

The sub-divisions of the Tarakzais and Halimzais implicated in this outrage were fined Rs. 2,000, which they eventually paid.

More serious than the Zankai affair was the gathering headed by the well-known Mulla Khalil, in April 1879. This man was the grandson of a Swati from Pakli, in the Hazara district. A man of little education, but of great ambition, he had at this time risen to a position of much influence among the Mohmands. For some weeks before this, rumours had been rife of gatherings of Mohmands of the Khwaizai and Halimzai clans, for the purpose of raiding on British territory, or making attacks on the British posts along the Khaibar route. On the night of the 20th April, a few Mohmands, numbering perhaps 200 or 300, began to cross over the Kabul river from Palosi to Shinpok. On the 20th April, the Khan of Lalpura sent to the officer commanding at Dakka (Major O. Barnes, 10th Bengal Lancers), to say that a large body of Mohmands were within three miles of that place, and had already exchanged shots with his outposts. The *Khan* asked for help, as he expected a night attack. Major Barnes made such arrangements as were practicable for the defence of Lalpura, but the anticipated attack did not take place.

*Operations
against the
Mohmands in
1879.*

As, however, reports from every quarter agreed in stating that the Mohmands were in large numbers, Major Barnes moved out the following morning, with the troops as per margin, to ascertain the character and number of his neighbours. The road, as far as the foot of the Kam Dakka pass, was found clear of hostile tribes. Having halted the guns and main body of the cavalry at the foot of the pass, Major Barnes pushed forward the infantry and a few mounted orderlies to Kam Dakka, which is a village on the south side of the Kabul river, seven miles east of Dakka. No opposition of any consequence was offered to this reconnaissance, a few shots only being exchanged across the Kabul river. Kam Dakka was found unoccupied by the enemy, but all reports were unanimous as to the Mohmands being in great strength in Rena and Parchao, on the north side of the river. The Kam Dakka villagers were friendly, but expressed grave fear for their own property and lives, and begged that the reconnoitring party might not be withdrawn.

The force returned to Dakka the same day without meeting any opposition, and, on a report of the intelligence gained by it being telegraphed to Lieutenant-General F. F. Maude, V.C., C.B., commanding the 2nd Division Peshawar Valley Field Force, at Landi Kotal, instructions were issued to despatch two companies of the Mhairwarra Battalion to Kam Dakka. This step was taken on the recommendation of the Political Officer (Major E. R. Conolly), who was in camp at Landi Kotal when the telegram from the officer commanding at Dakka arrived, and strongly advised that help should be sent to the people of Kam Dakka, as the inhabitants were, Major Conolly stated, friendly to the troops.

In consultation with the Political Officer, it was also decided to send a force from Landi Kotal to reconnoitre through the Shilman valley towards Kam Dakka (*see* Map, p. 264). The object of this reconnaissance was to reassure the inhabitants, who were considered to be friendly, to open up and obtain topographical information of this part of the country, some of which was unknown, and to work round on Kam Dakka, so that should any of the Mohmands have crossed the Kabul river, they might possibly be caught between the troops from Dakka and this reconnoitring column.

11-9th Royal Artillery, 2 guns.	Infantry, accompanied by Major E. R. Conolly as Political Officer, marched from Landi Kotal in command of this column, consisting of the troops noted in the margin, at 4 o'clock on the afternoon of the 21st April. On the same day, in accordance
1-12th Foot ... 2 companies.	
1-25th Foot ... 2 "	
24th Punjab Native	
Infantry ... 2 "	
Bhopal Battalion ... 2 "	

with the orders received, a detachment of the Mhairwarra Battalion, as per margin, under the command of Captain O'Moore Creagh, was despatched from Dakka at 5 o'clock in the evening to the friendly village of Kam Dakka, with instructions to protect that place against an enemy to be expected from across the Kabul river, and to hold the village for three days.

This detachment, provided with entrenching tools, and carrying spare ammunition, and rations, did not reach Kam Dakka till a quarter-past 11 o'clock that night, as great difficulty was experienced in getting the mules over the intervening hills.

4 Native Officers.
11 Non-Commissioned Officers.
4 Drummers.
119 Sepoys.

As the orders to the detachment were to occupy the village of Kam Dakka, and to entrench it, Captain Creagh concluded its inhabitants would be expecting the troops, but he nevertheless sent forward a messenger to give notice of the arrival of the detachment. *Operations against the Mohmands in 1879.*

On his arrival at Kam Dakka, Captain Creagh summoned the headmen of the village, and announced to them the object with which the troops had been sent. The villagers were, however, averse to the troops entering their village, and said they had neither asked for, nor did they require, any assistance, as they were quite able to protect themselves. They further expressed it as their opinion that the detachment would be defeated by the enemy, as it was unaccompanied by any mountain guns; they therefore had no wish to compromise themselves with their tribe on account of the troops. Their demeanour was evidently anything but friendly.

That night the detachment bivouacked outside the village of Kam Dakka, throwing out the necessary picquets for its protection; and at four o'clock on the morning of the 22nd of April the officer commanding (Captain Creagh) again summoned the headmen, but they refused to have anything to do with the troops, and refused even to furnish a messenger to Dakka, but said that in the attack which would take place they would remain neutral, and would not allow the enemy into the village of Kam Dakka.

Captain Creagh, in order to carry out his orders, took up a position covering the right and left front of Kam Dakka, with the understanding that the inhabitants of that place would themselves protect their own front, as they said they would do. He then reported all well to the officer commanding at Dakka, as the enemy did not appear too numerous, only a few of them being visible on the hill in front of his position.

About five o'clock in the morning, crowds of the enemy were seen crossing the river, and ascending the hill in front of where the troops were stationed, and threatening their flank. The impending attack was then reported to Dakka, and as the enemy opened fire upon the detachment at about half-past five o'clock, while the inhabitants of Kam Dakka became more sullen, the troops were withdrawn altogether from Kam Dakka. A fresh position was then taken up, with the right of the detachment resting on the Dakka and Kam Dakka road, and the left towards the Kabul river, with a support and reserve in rear of the right, and the baggage in rear of the left; at the same time cavalry were applied for from Dakka, as the enemy were advancing into the open.

This position was held for about an hour, while continual reinforcements joined the enemy, who kept up a heavy fire on the troops; but the right flank being again threatened, the detachment fell back slowly through some cultivated ground. At about eight o'clock in the morning, a party of the Mhairwarra Battalion, consisting of one jemadar, four non-commissioned officers, and thirty-one men, escorting ammunition from Dakka, came down through the pass to join the detachment. On seeing them the enemy withdrew to the hill tops, but continued to extend to the right.

From what this escort told Captain Creagh, he came to the conclusion that he could expect no reinforcements on that day, and therefore he resolved to take up the best available position, to enable him to maintain himself against the attack of the enemy as long as possible. Fixing upon a tomb in a graveyard to his left rear, Captain Creagh threw back the right of the detachment, and brought the skirmishers facing the hills, with the tomb in the rear (*see accompanying sketch*).

Part of the supports, the reserve, and the *doolie* bearers were set to work to

*Operations
against the
Mohmands in
1879.*

build stone breastworks flanking each other, the baggage was placed under the river bank, where it was out of fire, while the skirmishers kept up a brisk fire, which prevented the enemy from attempting to come down the hills to close quarters, although they kept up a continuous fire. The hills commanded this position at a distance of about 500 yards, but no better was available, as it was necessary for the troops to keep near the river for the sake of the water-supply, and the ruined tomb and stones round it furnished materials for the rapid construction of breastworks.

Scarcely had this entrenchment been completed, about nine o'clock in the morning, and the baggage followers and animals been brought under cover, and a supply of water been obtained in the *massaks*, when the enemy came down from the hills and completely surrounded the detachment. The attack and defence continued from nine o'clock in the morning till about three o'clock in the afternoon, the enemy several times making an assault on the entrenchment, and being repulsed only by bayonet charges. About two o'clock in the afternoon the enemy's circle had closed round the troops to a uniform distance of from sixty to a hundred yards. About three o'clock in the afternoon the ammunition began to run low, and the position became most critical, when it was noticed that the enemy were moving from right to left, while for the first time they cleared away from the rear of the position. This movement on the part of the enemy was due to the approach of reinforcements, under the command of Captain D. M. Strong, 10th Bengal Lancers, accompanied by Captain L. H. E. Tucker, Political Officer.

On the situation of the Mhairwarra detachment at Kam Dakka becoming known at divisional head-quarters, at ten o'clock on the morning of the 22nd of April, through the receipt of a telegram from the officer commanding at Dakka, Lieutenant-General Maude immediately directed the Kam Dakka detachment to be reinforced from Dakka by one company of the 1-5th Fusiliers, and by another from the Mhairwarra Battalion, ordering at the same time three companies of the 1-12th Foot, and two guns of 11-9th Royal Artillery (a mountain battery) from Landi Kotal to Dakka, and two companies of the 2nd Gurkhas, from Basawal, to the same place. One company, 1-12th Foot, and the two mountain guns were subsequently diverted to Kam Dakka, direct across country from Haft Chah, midway between Landi Kotal and Dakka.

On the arrival of the reinforcements from Dakka at the pass overlooking the Kam Dakka plain, Captain Strong, who was in command of the party, seeing the Kam Dakka detachment in a low, irregular enclosure of broken walls, surrounded by groups of the enemy with red and white standards, advanced immediately with a company of the 1-5th Fusiliers, and one of the Mhairwarra Battalion, at the same time ordering up a troop of the 10th Bengal Lancers, which was some distance in rear; while, descending from the pass to the position of the Kam Dakka detachment, a small party of the enemy was attacked by the 1-5th Fusiliers, and driven with some loss into the hills. About half-way down a detachment of the Mhairwarras was posted on a ridge, where it greatly assisted in keeping the enemy off the flank of the troops, and in maintaining communications with the rear.

On reaching the position held by the Kam Dakka detachment, it was found that the enemy were under cover about 100 yards off, while a body with standards occupied a hill 500 yards distant, the only shelter for the troops being close under the walls of the enclosure, as the enemy's bullets were dropping inside it. The troops now received orders to cease firing, as the ammunition was running short, and awaited an assault with fixed bayonets

with instructions to fire only if the enemy showed at 150 yards distant. The British officers were told off to different posts to superintend the defence, and to carry out the gradual evacuation of the position. Still it was felt that this withdrawal would be with heavy loss so long as the enemy held their well-covered position within 100 yards of the troops. The approach of Lieutenant C. E. Pollock, who had been sent to bring up the troop of the 10th Bengal Lancers, was therefore a welcome sight, as he rode across the plain to announce that the cavalry were under cover about 200 yards off.

*Operations
against the
Mohmands in
1879.*

From a point on the river bank, about 120 yards from the position of the enemy, Captain Strong, with Lieutenant Pollock, then led a charge of the cavalry through the cornfields, and dispersed the enemy, those who escaped the cavalry rushing down a steep bank into the river, their standards and turbans floating down the stream. The rest of the enemy fled to the hills on the right, from which a continuous fire poured down upon the cavalry during the charge. The Kam Dakka detachment, before retiring from the enclosure, charged the enemy, and then returned to carry off the dead and wounded, while the cavalry covered the further withdrawal of the infantry.

The mountain guns, with a company of the 1-12th Foot from Landi Kotal, had by this time arrived, and, coming immediately into action, shelled the enclosure, which, on its being evacuated by the Kam Dakka detachment, had been taken possession of by the enemy. The guns opened with common shell and percussion fuzes, and a shell from each gun having burst in the middle of the enclosure, the standards disappeared, and the enemy fled precipitately from this point, shrapnel being fired at them as they ran.

Major J. R. Dyce, 11-9th Royal Artillery, who had now assumed the command, considered it necessary to retire to Dakka. The retirement was consequently ordered, the cavalry leading, followed by the Mhairwarra Battalion, baggage, wounded, etc., then the mountain guns, with the detachments 1-5th Fusiliers and 1-12th Foot, under Major H. L. W. Phillips, of the latter regiment, covering the rear. The withdrawal of the force was conducted regularly, but much time was lost by the number of *doolies* blocking up the road, and by the baggage mules, whose loads were constantly falling off.

Major O. Barnes, commanding at Dakka, had intended that the Kam Dakka detachment should be relieved from its critical position, but that the pass leading to that village should be held for the night, and the enemy attacked the following morning with all the available troops at his disposal, and for this purpose he had despatched rations and spare ammunition to the force; but Major Dyce determined not to hold the pass or to await the rations, as he considered it highly improbable that they could reach him after dark, and knew that they could not arrive till very late. The cavalry and battery mules would have necessarily been sent away, as there was no ground for them to stand on; water would not have been procurable, and none of the troops had tasted food since breakfast. The Kam Dakka detachment had been fighting since six o'clock that morning, the detachment 1-5th Fusiliers since midday, and that of the 1-12th Foot had been on the move since half-past eleven o'clock in the forenoon, while the cavalry were without forage or water.

Major Dyce, commanding the troops, followed in rear of the guns, watching if the enemy should attempt to descend from the opposite side to open fire upon them; but when quite up to the top of the pass, as the enemy had made no advance, the guns were ordered down to a position about 300

Operations
against the
Mohmands in
1879.

yards from the point where the path through the pass leads into the plain towards Dakka Kulan.

It was half-past six o'clock in the evening when the officer commanding the rear-guard reported all the baggage and *doolies* up to the top of the pass, where the officer commanding the troops awaited his arrival, and instructed him not to hold his ground longer than absolutely necessary, as, should the enemy get close up before the rear-guard reached a spur which had to be crossed, the rear-guard would be taken in reverse.

As the position taken up by the guns was much cramped by the *doolies* and baggage animals, it was impossible to bring them into action there, so they were retired to Dakka Kulan, where they were brought into action with the cavalry on the flank. Incessant firing was now taking place, but it was too dark to distinguish friend from foe. The guns remained in position till the main body of the rear-guard were well closed up, and then fell back to Dakka, where they arrived about eight o'clock in the evening, the rear-guard coming in about half an hour later. The enemy, though pressing the rear-guard closely and keeping up a heavy fire, occasioned very few casualties, as it was quite dark, and the fire, though continuous, was misdirected.

On the following morning, the 23rd of April, a force under Lieutenant-Colonel C. J. C. Sillery, 1-12th Foot, who had now assumed command at Dakka, marched at half-past six o'clock in the morning over the same ground

C-3rd Royal Artillery.
11-9th Royal Artillery, 2 guns.
1-12th Foot, 2 companies.
1-5th Fusiliers, 1 company.
10th Bengal Lancers, 3 troops.
2nd Gurkhas, 2 companies.
Mhairwarra Battalion, 1 company.

to the pass. The column consisted of the troops as per margin. The field guns halted in advance of Dakka Kulan, and two guns were sent to the extreme left, so as to fire down the river reaches in case of the enemy attempting to

cross. The remainder crowned the pass, while the cavalry and the 2nd Gurkhas advanced.

Before reaching the pass, a raft was observed to cross the Kabul river, and men were assembling as if to embark in it. A mountain gun fired a shell at it at a range of 1,800 yards, which struck about 100 yards short, and appeared to *ricochet* into the raft. The enemy dispersed, and shortly afterwards the raft disappeared.

The 2nd Gurkhas and 1-5th Fusiliers being posted in the positions the enemy had occupied the previous day, the cavalry then advanced to Kam Dakka, and sent parties on two miles down the river.

The column under Lieutenant-Colonel F. B. Norman here joined the Dakka detachment. This column, as already stated, had marched from Landi Kotal on the afternoon of the 21st; on that night it had halted about three miles from Kam Shilman, and reached Loi Shilman on the evening of the 22nd. During the day, Lieutenant-Colonel Norman received news, by means of the heliograph, of the threatened attack at Kam Dakka, and that the villagers of that place were unfriendly, and he, at the same time, received orders to press on as rapidly as he could, and, if possible, take the enemy in flank. On the morning of the 23rd, the force pushed on through the Shilman valley and reached Kam Dakka, as mentioned above, about 2 P.M.; but found that the fighting, of which reports had been received during the morning, was over, and that the Mohmands had dispersed.

On the arrival of Lieutenant-Colonel Norman's force, the Dakka column was withdrawn to the fort. The troops under Lieutenant-Colonel

Norman remained at Kam Dakka during the 24th, and were quite undisturbed, and on the 25th they returned to Landi Kotal.

The casualties among the troops in the affair of the 22nd were six killed and eighteen wounded; those of the enemy were very considerable, and were estimated at about two hundred killed and wounded. It was computed that about 1,500 men were opposed to our troops.

*Operations
against the
Mohmands in
1879.*

The admirable gallantry displayed by the troops was amply borne testimony to by the reports of the several officers in command, and Lieutenant-General Maude in his despatch said that he considered the cool determination of Captain O'M. Creagh to do his duty, his self-possession, and the gallant example he set his little band, were most conspicuous, and he trusted his recommendation of Captain Creagh to the Commander-in-Chief "for the distinguished honour of the Victoria Cross", would meet with His Excellency's support. Of Captain D. M. Strong, 10th Bengal Lancers, the Lieutenant-General observed that he appeared to have behaved with considerable judgment, and to have led a most effective charge against the enemy at a very critical period, and he therefore ventured to recommend his name to His Excellency for favourable consideration and notice. The conspicuous courage of Syad Nur Khan and of Madari, the former a hospital assistant, and the latter a *bhisti*, of the detachment under Captain Creagh, was specially brought to notice.

The only cause for regret beyond the loss of so many gallant men was, the Commander-in-Chief considered, that the original intention of Major Barnes, to hold the pass during the night and to attack the enemy in the morning, had not been adhered to, as, had this been done, the enemy would have no doubt received a severer lesson than they got on the 23rd of April.

The Commander-in-Chief also recorded his opinion that, "but for the coolness, determination, and gallantry of the highest order, and the admirable conduct which Captain Creagh displayed on this occasion, the detachment under his command would, in all probability, have been cut off and destroyed." For his gallant conduct this officer subsequently received the Victoria Cross.

Many of the Lalpura men came down armed to Kam Dakka, and, as they did not assist the detachment, it was naturally presumed that they joined the enemy. The Kam Dakka men also, after applying for the assistance of the troops, were many of them recognised in the ranks of the enemy. On this being brought to the notice of the Political Officer (Major Conolly), he stated that the Kam Dakka men had behaved throughout in the usual Pathan manner, doing their best to pull well with both sides; while they were in a most difficult position, afraid of punishment from the troops if they were hostile to them, and afraid of the Mohmands if they gave help to the troops, lest they might cross over the Kabul river and burn Kam Dakka, to deter the inhabitants from again helping the troops, and also as an effectual way of annoying the British Government. It was to prevent any mischance of this sort, the effect of which would have been most injurious to the prestige of the Government, that he advised that Kam Dakka should be defended. The Political Officer, therefore, did not see how the inhabitants of Kam Dakka could have behaved otherwise than they did.

Lieutenant-General Maude recorded his opinion that if such were the opinions of the Political Officer, and if he considered it probable even that the

*Operations
against the
Mohmands in
1880.*

General Officer Commanding to that effect when he advised him to assist them with troops. Had he done so, the Lieutenant-General would either not have sent any of Her Majesty's troops on such an errand, or would have taken care that their supports were nearer than Dakka, seven miles off, or Landi Kotal, about fifteen miles distant.

Operations against the Mohmands in 1880. Action on the Gara heights in January.

In April 1879, the same month as the Kam Dakka affair above related, Muhammad Sadik Khan, the eldest son of Nauroz Khan, who was with Lieut.-General Sir S. J. Browne, at Gandamak, fled from the British camp and joined the Amir Yakub Khan (whose mother was a sister of Nauroz Khan (*see* Appendix H), and, as soon as our troops left Dakka in June 1879, he was appointed Khan of Lalpura in the place of Muhammad Shah Khan.

When the second advance into Afghanistan took place, Muhammad Sadik Khan of Lalpura hesitated for some days, but at length appeared at Dakka, and for two months all went well at Lalpura, and at Goshta also, where Moghal Khan sat in an attitude of passive hostility.

The journey of the Amir Yakub Khan to India gave the first shock to the Mohmands, and further agitation was produced by the news of the fighting at Kabul. Moghal Khan was the first to go, in December 1879, but his gathering was speedily broken up by a cannonade across the river from Chardeh, the *Khan* of which place again remained loyal to the English, partly from inclination, and partly from enmity to Moghal Khan. Mulla Khalil had for some time been rousing the impressionable tribesmen, and working on Muhammad Sadik Khan, who, at length, unable longer to bear the taunts and passionate messages of the *mullas*, retired from Lalpura to Rena, in January 1880, and put himself at the head of the men who had already collected there with Mulla Khalil. The movement, having gained the tribal chief as its leader, soon spread, and the Mohmands flocked down to Palosi and Rena. Meanwhile, an important diversion was effected by detaching Akbar Khan, a younger son of Nauroz Khan, who was appointed by the British Government as Khan of Lalpura in the place of his brother. Under the circumstances, he was unable to render much active assistance; but one-half of the Nauroz Khan interest, the most powerful in the tribe, was thus secured to us. On the 11th of January the enemy commenced to cross the river; and on the 14th, about 5,400 men, under Muhammad Sadik Khan and Mulla Khalil, had crossed, and taken up a strong position on the Gara heights, about two miles from Fort Dakka, and between that place and Kam Dakka. This ground had been reconnoitred on the 7th by Colonel T. W. R. Boisragon, commanding at Fort Dakka, and almost every officer in the garrison had made himself familiar with its features, in anticipation of the enemy taking up this position. It was now determined that, while a column from Dakka attacked the enemy's position in front, another column should be sent from Landi Kotal to attack them in flank and rear, so that, surrounded on three sides, and the unfordable Kabul river in rear, escape would be impossible and destruction almost

On the morning of the 15th, therefore, the Dakka column, as per *Operations against the Mohmands in 1880.* margin, under the command of Colonel T.W. R. Boisragon, 30th Punjab Native

Colonel Boisragon's despatch.

I-C Royal Horse Artillery ...	4 guns.
6th Dragoon Guards ...	94 sabres.
1-25th King's Own Borderers	110 bayonets.
17th Bengal Cavalry ...	50 sabres.
8th Native Infantry ...	100 bayonets.
30th Punjab Native Infantry	500 "

Infantry, was drawn up in position facing the Gara heights by 11 A.M. The action had been purposely delayed to allow the Landi Kotal column time to arrive (*see Map, page 264*).

Brigadier-General J. Doran, C.B., had marched six hours previously from Landi Kotal, and, it was hoped, was now in a position to cut off the enemy's retreat. The Mohmands had, as usual, strengthened their position by constructing stone breastworks on all the commanding points, and had even thrown up during the night an entrenchment along the foot of the hills.

The action was commenced by two guns of I-C Royal Horse Artillery. These opened fire at a distance of 1,000 yards on the advanced *sangars*, and the first shot burst just over the crest of the most advanced work. In the meantime, Colonel Boisragon had drawn up the infantry in the plain in a position to threaten the enemy's left flank, which appeared the most vulnerable, and had been selected as the point of attack.

The attack consisted of 300 men in skirmishing line, 200 in support, and 200 in reserve, and in this formation the advance was made at 1.55 P.M. As they reached the foot of the hill, the right, finding itself overlapped by the enemy, involuntarily edged off to the right, thus leaving a gap in the centre, which was filled up from the supports. Captain E. H. Webb, 8th Native Infantry, commanded the whole of the fighting line. Much shaken by the well-directed fire of the guns, which had lasted for about an hour and a half, the enemy abandoned their foremost line of works, and also those which immediately commanded them, as the infantry came on. The hillsides were most rugged and precipitous, but the advance was covered by the fire of all the four guns, and the enemy evacuated one position after another, until, at 2.30 P.M., the Gara heights were gained, and the enemy, utterly routed, were flying down the reverse slopes towards Kam Dakka. The reserve having charge of the ammunition, etc., and not being required to take an active part in the attack, moved to the right, and eventually crossed over the Gara pass.

In the meanwhile, two guns, with a cavalry escort, were moved to the extreme right to shell the *kotal* upon the track from Haft Chah to Kam Dakka, in case the enemy should defend it. The remaining two guns were taken to the left, and, after clearing the heights near the river, opened fire upon such of the enemy as could be seen crossing, and upon those on the other side who had already crossed.

The main body of the infantry, after gaining possession of the heights, descended the spurs into the Kam Dakka plain, and formed up on the river-bank at four o'clock in the afternoon. The Mohmands hardly attempted to hold the *kotal* on the Haft Chah and Kam Dakka road, and were easily dislodged by the infantry. As soon as the guns of the Landi Kotal column were heard, about 5 P.M., Colonel Boisragon's force pressed on and occupied the village of Kam Dakka, where they were joined by Brigadier-General Doran about half-past six o'clock.

In the meantime, the enemy had made good their escape, either towards Rena or across the river.

The advance of the Landi Kotal column had been delayed beyond all expectations by the unforeseen difficulties of the road. The troops assembled

Operations
against the
Mohmands in
1880.

a little before half-past four in the morning at the fort in the Loargai valley. An advanced guard of 100 *Jazailchis*, under Lieutenant G. Gaisford, 5th Punjab Infantry, had gone on ahead an hour earlier to seize the Anjiri Kandao, about eight miles from camp.

11-9th Royal Artillery	...	2 guns.
5th Fusiliers...	...	200 bayonets.
25th King's Own Borderers...	200	"
17th Bengal Cavalry	...	20 sabres.
C Company, Madras Sappers and Miners	...	30 bayonets.
1st Madras Native Infantry...	300	"
4th Madras Native Infantry	200	"
31st Punjab Native Infantry	300	"

The column consisted of the troops as per margin, and was under the command of Brigadier-General J. C. Doran, C.B.

Owing to the darkness of the night the progress of the troops was slow, and it was not till 7.40 that the head of the column reached the Anjiri Kandao. Here a halt was made, to enable the rear to close up, and the Brigadier-General received a report from Lieutenant Gaisford, who had ascended a peak near at hand, that no enemy was in sight.

At 8.45 A.M. the descent from the Anjiri Kandao was commenced. The track was so narrow and difficult that the troops could only move in single file. The battery mules could hardly be got along, and, although only the reserve ammunition, water mules, and a few *dandies* were with the troops, even these caused most serious delay. In fact, the path was a mere goat track; some baggage animals fell over the precipices and were lost, and the rear-guard was sixty-seven hours in covering seventeen miles. At the foot of the Torsappar hill, Brigadier-General Doran received information that the enemy were occupying the Shilman Gakhai in force. Another halt was therefore ordered, to allow the mountain guns to come up, and a company of the 5th Fusiliers was detached to crown some commanding heights in advance.

At 10.30 A.M. the troops again moved forward. The road was still most difficult, some of it being over slippery rocks, on which the horses of the cavalry detachment, and even the unshod battery mules, could not keep their footing.

At about 11.30 A.M., during a third short halt, the guns of Colonel Boisragon's force were heard. After that the path was somewhat better, and the troops advanced more rapidly. It was nearly one o'clock before the gorge of the Shilman Gakhai came in sight. The pass was held by the enemy, who showed three standards, one of which was planted in a breastwork on a conical hill in front of the pass. A company of the 5th Fusiliers was extended to seize a rocky hill, about half a mile from the crest of the Shilman Gakhai, and a company of the 31st Punjab Native Infantry occupied some heights to the left, a company of the 25th Foot connecting the two. The mountain guns opened on the enemy from the hill held by the company of the 5th Fusiliers, and the first shell caused them to abandon their advanced breastwork. The leading companies then advanced and cleared the pass of the enemy, who retired to a high hill facing and completely commanding the descent towards Kam Dakka. As this hill had, of course, to be taken, and it rose a thousand feet above the pass, a further delay was inevitable. Fortunately, the enemy made but a feeble resistance, and the hill was quickly carried by two companies of the 5th Fusiliers, supported by two of the 31st Punjab Native Infantry. Another company of the 31st Punjab Native Infantry was sent down the pass to clear some lower hills in front, in which groups of the enemy were posted. The detachments of the 5th Fusiliers and 31st Punjab Native Infantry rapidly drove the enemy before them in the direction of Kam Dakka, and by half-past two the road was clear.

In the meantime, Brigadier-General Doran had established heliographic communication with Dakka, which could be seen from the crest of the Shilman Gakhai. By this means he learnt that Colonel Boisragon had crossed the Gara heights, and was between them and the Kabul river. *Operations against the Mohmands in 1880.*

At 2.45 P.M. dense masses of the flying enemy could be seen moving down the right bank of the river and across the mouth of the *nullah* running from the Shilman Gakhai to the Kabul.

Having stayed some time trying to ascertain the whereabouts of his baggage, regarding which no information could be obtained, Brigadier-General Doran commenced the descent of the Shilman Gakhai at about 3.20 P.M. The path down to the Kabul river was nearly as bad as that between the Anjiri Kandao and Torsappar, and it was not till five o'clock that the mouth of the *nullah* was reached. Here, about six or seven hundred of the enemy were discovered on the opposite bank of the river, making their way across the sands from the ferry to the village of Rena. Another party was crossing on two rafts, and some on the right bank were making for the ferry. The mountain guns opened at a thousand yards, and a steady fire was kept up by the few British infantry at hand. Many of the enemy were seen to fall and be carried off, while a few bodies were found on the spot the next day. Brigadier-General Doran's troops reached Kam Dakka at 6.30 P.M., and there joined Colonel Boisragon's force, as already related. Both columns bivouacked without baggage, many without food, and some without even greatcoats.

The baggage of the Landi Kotal column was ordered to remain for the night near the Shilman Gakhai, but none of it got so far that night, or even the next. Very great difficulty was experienced by Lieutenant-Colonel G. C. Hodding, commanding 4th Madras Native Infantry, who was in charge of the baggage with two hundred men of his regiment, in getting the animals over the extremely difficult road. The almost impassable nature of the path beyond the Anjiri Kandao caused an immense block of animals at that place, and the confusion was increased by a false alarm, causing a panic among the mule-drivers and followers, in which some animals and loads were lost, and many drivers deserted. The baggage and guard bivouacked for the night on the Anjiri Kandao, without water. Next day (16th of January) the march was resumed, and a detachment of sappers came out from Landi Kotal to improve the road; nevertheless, in spite of the exertions of Lieutenant-Colonel Hodding and his officers, the baggage only advanced that day as far as the first water, four miles from the bivouac. On the 17th, the baggage struggled over the Shilman Gakhai, and, being met by a hundred men of the 31st Punjab Native Infantry, under Major Gordon Cumming, who came out to render assistance, the bulk of it reached Kam Dakka about half-past ten that night; some, however, did not get in till the next morning.

On the 16th of January the troops halted at Kam Dakka, and the day was spent in collecting materials for rafts; and the following day, two rafts having been prepared, five hundred men, under Colonel Boisragon, were passed over, with orders to destroy Rena. The crossing commenced at 10.30 A.M., and was completed at 4.30 P.M. Rena was reached at six o'clock, and was found to be completely deserted, as was the neighbouring village of Parchao, and the whole country for three miles down the river. On the 18th, Rena was burnt, and its one tower blown up by a party of sappers, under Lieutenant A. R. F. Dorward, Royal Engineers. Pursuant to Brigadier-General Doran's orders, the troops after this recrossed to the right bank, and, two additional rafts

*Operations
against the
Mohmands in
1880.*

The column then marched back to Dakka, which was reached at 4.30 P.M., without a shot having been fired during the day.

The defeat of the Mohmands on the Gara heights had caused a panic in the tribe, and the country was reported to be deserted for miles round. Brigadier-General Doran's column returned to Landi Kotal on the 18th January by the Gara Kandao and Haft Chah, and the baggage was sent by the Dakka pass.

Owing to the arrival of Brigadier-General Doran's column too late to intercept the enemy, the combined movement on the 15th had proved a failure. The Mohmands, however, suffered a severe defeat at the hands of Colonel Boisragon's greatly inferior force, and their loss was computed at seventy killed and one hundred and forty wounded. Out of the seventy killed, twenty-one bodies were seen by our officers lying in the ravines of the Gara heights; many were carried off, and others drowned, one shell bursting on a raft.

Our loss was slight. In the Dakka column there were only two killed and three wounded (*see Appendix I*), and among the troops from Landi Kotal there were no casualties at all. I-C Royal Horse Artillery expended, in the action of the 15th of January, 150 rounds, namely, 32 common shell and 118 shrapnel. The two guns, 11-9th Royal Artillery, with Brigadier-General Doran, expended on the same day 21 7-pounder shells. The infantry of the whole force fired 13,286 rounds of small-arms ammunition.

The Mohmand force which was opposed to us consisted of men from nearly all the large clans. The Tarakzai proper do not, however, appear to have been present, although the Isa Khel and Barhan Khel branches were well represented. The Safis, and in particular the Kandahari section, supplied a strong contingent.

In submitting his despatch on the action on the Gara heights, and the subsequent operations of his column, Colonel Boisragon acknowledged the cheerful endeavours of the troops, scantily provided with only a greatcoat and a blanket, and their excellent service during the four days' operations; and he especially recorded his obligations to Mr. W. R. H. Merk, the Political Officer, for the very valuable assistance he had rendered, both in his official position, and also during the whole of the operations as his Orderly Officer.

Major-General R. O. Bright, C.B., commanding the 2nd Division, Kabul Field Force, remarked, with regard to these operations, that a want of forethought was shown in not ascertaining with more care the nature of the route by which Brigadier-General Doran's column was intended to advance. The baggage should certainly have been sent from Haft Chah by the Gara Kandao, which would have been cleared on the retirement of the enemy before Colonel Boisragon's troops.

The moral effect of the defeat of the 15th of January was very great, and for some months after this the Mohmands remained quiet. In June 1880, the united bands of Muhammad Sadik Khan and Moghal Khan of Goshta raided on Kama, and carried off the land revenue, retiring in haste before the approach of our troops. In July, again, they attempted to close the river at Basawal for the passage of our rafts, but were attacked by Akbar Khan and dispersed at night. About the time of Ayub Khan's success at Kandahar, preparations were made for a rising among the Mohmands, which collapsed


troops from Afghanistan, Akbar Khan was confirmed as Khan of Lalpura by the new Amir. His relations with us up to the present time continue to be satisfactory, and the choice made on the defection of Muhammad Sadik Khan in January 1880 has been fully justified by the ready and loyal assistance given on all needful occasions by the present chief. In the autumn of 1882 he visited the Mohmands of Gandao and Michni; the latter were levying dues beyond the amount sanctioned by custom on rafts on the Kabul river passing their villages, and Akbar Khan was obliged to adopt punitive measures to bring them to order.

The Mohmands adjoining the British border have also remained quiet. In 1882, the inhabitants of Pandiali threatened at one time to give some trouble. Their chief, Pirdost Khan (son of Nawab Khan), a man of somewhat narrow and indolent character, was on bad terms with his younger brother, Ghani Khan, who claims a portion of the elder brother's *jagir* of Rs. 1,000 which has been granted to him in British territory. Pirdost Khan refused to admit Ghani Khan to a share, and the consequence was some ill-will, which manifested itself in petty annoyances on our border, each side endeavouring to throw the blame on the other, and thus discredit it with Government. During the past year, however, the district officer, by an energetic move, cut short all intrigues within the British border, and confined the contest to independent territory. The other clans of the Mohmands adjoining the British frontier between the Swat and Kabul rivers have lately been very well behaved, and have given no trouble.

*Conduct of
Mohmands
subsequent to
1880 up to the
present time.*

APPENDIX A.

Table showing main divisions of Mohmand tribe.



APPENDIX B.

Composition of the Field Force in October 1851.

Brigadier Sir Colin Campbell, K.C.B., Commanding.

Staff.

Lieutenant H. W. Norman, Brigade Major.

Captain J. R. Oldfeild, Field Engineer.

Political Officer.

Lieutenant H. B. Lumsden, Deputy Commissioner.

Detail of Troops.

Corps.	Officers.		Non-Commissioned Officers.		Rank and file.	
	British.	Native.	British.	Native.	British.	Native.
3rd Company, 1st Battalion, Artillery, with No. 17 Light Field Battery attached...	3	...	5	3	51	76
Her Majesty's 61st Regiment ...	6	...	10	...	174	...
Her Majesty's 98th Regiment ...	6	...	10	...	175	...
2nd Irregular Cavalry ...	4	11	...	43	...	261
2nd Company, Sappers and Miners ...	1	2	1	4	...	30
66th Gurkha Regiment ...	12	8	2	23	...	366
71st Native Infantry ...	6	8	1	17	...	274
Total ...	38	29	29	90	400	1,007
Grand Total ...	67		119		1,407	

APPENDIX C.

Return of troops under the command of BRIGADIER SIR COLIN CAMPBELL, K.C.B., engaged with the Mohmands on the heights of Panjpao, on the 15th April 1852.

Corps.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	Non-Commissioned Officers.	Rank and file.	Total of all ranks.	Horses.	Ordnance.	
							6-pounder gun.	12-pounder howitzer.
2nd Troop, 1st Brigade, Horse Artillery	2	..	2	30	34	40	1	1
7th Light Cavalry	1	3	5	88	97	97
15th Irregular Cavalry	1	10	27	181	219	219
29th Native Infantry	2	4	5	157	168
71st Native Infantry	2	1	5	74	82
Total	8	18	44	530	600	356	1	1

APPENDIX D.

Return of Killed and Wounded among the troops under the command of BRIGADIER SIR COLIN CAMPBELL, K.C.B., on the 15th April 1852.

Corps.	Killed.					Wounded.					Remarks.
	British Officers.	Native Officers.	Non-Commissioned Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	Non-Commissioned Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	
2nd Troop, 1st Brigade, Horse Artillery	1	1	Four horses were killed & eleven wounded.
15th Irregular Cavalry	2	2	2	3	5	
29th Native Infantry...	2	2	
Total	2	2	2	6	8	

ABSTRACT.

Killed	2
Wounded	8
Total	10

APPENDIX E.

Return of troops employed under the command of COLONEL SYDNEY J. COTTON, at the capture and destruction of the village of Shah Mansur Khel, on the 31st August 1854.

Corps.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Remarks.
1st Troop, 3rd Brigade, Horse Artillery	1	...	8	31) With Major Chamberlain's force on right bank of river.
2nd Company, 2nd Battalion, Artillery	2	...	6	34	
Mountain Train Battery ...	4	...	11	78	
Her Majesty's 22nd Regiment ...	7	...	14	190) With Major Chamberlain's force.
10th Light Cavalry ...	1	2	8	67	
1st Irregular Cavalry ...	2	6	15	114	
2nd Company, Sappers and Miners ...	1	2	6	42) With Major Chamberlain's force.
1st Native Infantry ...	2	4	28	195	
9th Native Infantry ...	5	11	67	396	
1st Sikh Infantry ...	3	8	49	362	
Total ...	28	33	212	1,509	

APPENDIX F.

Return of Killed and Wounded in the force under COLONEL SYDNEY J. COTTON, at the capture and destruction of the village of Shah Mansur Khel, on the 31st August 1854.

Corps.			Killed.					Wounded.					Remarks.		
			British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Camp followers.	Total.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.		Camp followers.	Total.
Mountain Train Battery	1	...	1	* Lieutenant C. A. McDougall, dangerously.	
9th Native Infantry	1	...	1	*1	1	1		3
1st Sikh Infantry	†1	...	2	8	1	12	† Lieutenant C. H. Brownlow, dangerously.
Total	1	...	1	2	...	2	10	2	16		

ABSTRACT.

Killed	1
Wounded	16

APPENDIX G.

Return of Killed and Wounded in the force under COLONEL A. MACDONELL, C.B., in the affair near Shabkadar, on the 2nd January 1864.

Corps.	Killed.					Wounded.					Remarks.
	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	
7th Hussars	2	2	1	7	8	Four horses were killed and fifteen wounded.
3rd Battalion, Rifle Brigade	1	1	
2nd Bengal Cavalry	8	8	
Total	2	2	1	16	17	

ABSTRACT.


Killed	2
Wounded	17
Total	19

APPENDIX H.

Khan Khel of Lalpura.

Zain Khan
(killed at Panipat, 1761)

Balots Khan



NOTE.—The names of those who at one time or another have held the position of Khan of Lalpura are printed in italics.

APPENDIX I.

Return of Killed and Wounded in the force under COLONEL T. W. R. BOISRAGON, in the action on the Gara heights, on the 15th January 1880.

Corps.	Killed.					Wounded.					Remarks.
	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	
I-C. Royal Horse Artillery	*1	1	* Drowned.
8th Native Infantry	1	1	
30th Punjab Native Infantry	2	1	3	
Total	1	..	1	2	2	1	3	

ABSTRACT.

Killed	2
Wounded	3
Total	5

CHAPTER IX.

PESHAWAR BORDER.

AFRIDI TRIBE.

Khaibar and Aka Khel Afridis.

THE Afridis are a large tribe, inhabiting the lower and easternmost spurs of the Safed Koh range, to the west and south of the Peshawar district, including the Bazar and Bara valleys. On their east they are bounded by British territory; on their north they have the Mohmands; west, the Shinwaris; and south, the Urakzais and Bangash.

The origin of this tribe, owing to want of written records, is very obscure. Their traditions, however, says James, would lead us to believe that, in common with other Pathan tribes, they are the descendants of Khalid-ibn-Walid, a Jew, who embraced Islamism, and whose descendants had possession of great tracts in the western portion of Afghanistan in the tenth century, at which time, upon the convulsions in the country owing to the advance of Mahmud of Ghazni, a chief, by name Afrid, owing to his enormities and feuds, was obliged to fly from his country and seek refuge with a kindred spirit, by name Wazir, in the wilds of Shir-i-Talla. Here he seems to have settled, and remained with his family for a considerable time. Turner gives something like the same story, viz., that Afrid, an individual of unknown country and parentage, came to Ghor, and there had an intrigue with a woman of the Karerai tribe, the eventual result of which was the tribe of Afridis. Cavagnari says of their origin that they are supposed to have been descended from a woman called Maimana, who had two sons, Afrid and Adam.

It is, however, of little practical value to know what the origin of the Afridis is, for all authorities are agreed to divide them into the following clans:—

- | | |
|-------------------|----------------|
| 1. Kuki Khel. | 5. Zakha Khel. |
| 2. Malikdin Khel. | 6. Sipah. |
| 3. Kambar Khel. | 7. Aka Khel. |
| 4. Kamar Khel. | 8. Adam Khel. |

The first six of these clans are known collectively as the Khaibar Afridis. The Aka Khels have no connection with the Khaibar, and are located to the south of the Bara river. The Adam Khels inhabit the hills between the districts of Kohat and Peshawar, and cannot be regarded as a part of the Afridi tribe in any other than an ethnological point of view; for, whether they are viewed with reference to their position, their interests, or their habits, they are a

Afridis.

distinct community. The consideration of this clan will therefore be reserved for a separate chapter, the subject of the present chapter being the Khaibar and the Aka Khel Afridis.

The Afridi in appearance is generally a fine, tall, athletic highlander, whose springy step, even in traversing the dusty streets of Peshawar, at once denotes his mountain origin. They are lean but muscular men, with long, gaunt faces, high noses and cheek-bones, and rather fair complexions. They are described as brave and hardy, and make good soldiers, but are apt to be somewhat home-sick withal. They are careful shots and skirmishers, waiting with the greatest patience for the chance of an easy shot at an enemy. This quality is less shown when, as soldiers of the British Government, they are supplied with unlimited ammunition, but still their *spécialité* is hill fighting. They wear a coarse, home-manufactured blue shirt, loose trousers, closing in tight round the ankles, neat sandals of straw, or the leaf of the dwarf palm, on the feet, a large turban placed jauntily on the head, with a waist-band to gird up the loins. From this may be seen obtruding the handle of a Khaibari knife, or *chura*, one or two pistols with old flint locks, together with all the paraphernalia required to carry about a magazine, in the shape of a powder-horn, cartridge-cases, flint and steel, etc.—and, to complete all, a matchlock, with a wooden fork attached to the barrel for a rest. Generally speaking, there is no doubt that the Afridis are now better armed than they have ever been; almost every fighting man possesses a gun or pistol, besides other arms; many of the fire-arms are rifled, and some have percussion locks.

Of the moral attributes of the Afridis, it is quite impossible to say anything in praise. Mackeson, writing of them, says: The Afridis are a most avaricious race, desperately fond of money. Their fidelity is measured by the length of the purse of the seducer, and they transfer their obedience and support from one party to another of their own clansmen, according to the comparative liberality of the donation. Unlike Muhammadans in general, the Afridis are said to have but little regard for the sanctity of marriage rights, although in other respects strict observers of the precepts of the *Koran*; and such is their shameless and unnatural avarice, that frequent cases occur of a man in good circumstances in the first instance marrying a good-looking girl, but, as times get harder, exchanging her for one of fewer personal attractions and a bag of money. Their women appear at all times unveiled in public, and it is a custom among them to marry the widows of their deceased brothers.

Ruthless, cowardly robbery, cold-blooded, treacherous murder, are to an Afridi the salt of life. Brought up from his earliest childhood amid scenes of appalling treachery and merciless revenge, nothing can ever change him: as he has lived—a shameless, cruel savage—so he dies. And it would seem that, notwithstanding their long intercourse with the British, and that very large numbers of them are, or have been, in our service, and must have learnt in some poor way what faith, and mercy, and justice are, yet the Afridi character is no better than it was in the days of his fathers.

Yet he is reputed brave by those who have seen him fighting. Hardy he is in his own hills, but he is very impatient of heat, and does not like work in the plains, but immediately longs for the cool breezes of Tirah. As soldiers of the British Government, they have gained a greater reputation for fidelity than in any other career. Much has been said of their fidelity in fighting against their own people for us; but when it is remembered

that an Afridi generally has a blood feud with nine out of ten of his own *Afridis*. people, the beauty of this attachment fades. They have always been more noted in action for a readiness to plunder than fight, as was the case with Shah Sujah at the battle of Ispahan. "On the whole," says Elphinstone (generally so eager to record anything good of Afghans), "they are the greatest robbers among the Afghans, and, I imagine, have no faith or sense of honour; for I never heard of anybody hiring an escort of Khaibaris to secure his passage through their country,—a step which always ensures a traveller's safety in the lands of any other tribe."

Notwithstanding this estimate, which MacGregor says some will consider harsh, the Afridi is, on the whole, one of the finest of the Pathan races on our border. His appearance, too, is much in his favour, and he is really braver, more open, and not more treacherous than many other Pathans. This much is certain, that he has the power of prejudicing Englishmen in his favour, and there are few brought into contact with him who do not at least begin with an enthusiastic admiration of his manliness. Again, with a tight hand over him, many of his faults remain dormant, and he soon develops into a valuable soldier.

Hospitality is said to be one of the virtues of an Afridi, and it is possible that if there was no chance of robbing, if not of murdering, a traveller before he came to his door, he would offer such cheer as was forthcoming; but the wanderer who breaks bread with an Afridi must be cautious; for his host, even while providing his best, will surely be concocting some devilry to entrap his guest as soon as he has left the confines of his lands, or even the shelter of his roof. Still there are not wanting instances of their giving refuge to a fugitive, and laying down their lives in his defence.

The Afridis are very ignorant, and, although nominally under the rule of their *maliks*, have but very little respect for anything like authority. The men who have most influence amongst them are their *mullas* and *syads*. They are all of the *Suni* persuasion of the Muhammadan faith.

The Afridis are seldom at feud with their neighbours, as a tribe against tribe, whatever may be the relations of individual members with those of neighbouring tribes. For some years past their extra-tribal feuds have been in a state of quiescence; but amongst themselves they are eternally at feud. Generally the quarrel is confined to the two sections between whom the dispute happens to be; but in cases where the general interests of the whole tribe are concerned, the clans range themselves in the two great factions of Samil and Gar,*—the Samil faction including the Malikdin Khel, Zakha Khel, Aka Khel, Sipah, and Kamar Khel clans; and the Gar, the Kambar Khel, and Kuki Khel. The Adam Khel belong to neither faction, but side with one or the other, as their interests may dictate.

Though in themselves the most disunited of people, in the event of a threatened invasion of their country it is probable that their *mullas* and *maliks* would induce them to lay aside their petty animosities, and unite to face the common danger and defend their common faith.

* These are the political factions on the Peshawar and Kohat borders. They are said to be derived from two brothers named Gar and Samil, who many years ago had a quarrel, one brother being aided by one party of Pathans, the other by a separate party, whence arose a feud, and now not a year passes that some men are not killed on this old story. The Gar and Samil parties are confined to the Kohat and Peshawar borders. This faction feeling has, however, not sufficient hold on the different sections of a tribe to make them side against their own tribe with outsiders, and with the Afridis the feeling has not as strong a hold as with some other tribes.

Afridis.

On such occasions it is usual to assemble a council composed of the heads of villages in each clan, and, through the medium of priests, to patch up their internal disputes. They manage this in rather a primitive manner; each negotiator takes a stone, and, placing it on the top of that of his clansman, swears a solemn vow, that, until the common cause be finally settled and these stones removed, the feud between the two parties shall be dormant; and their oaths on these occasions are seldom violated. These councils also arrange all the plans of the campaign and the number of men required from each branch of the tribe, which are furnished in quotas from villages in proportion to their numerical strength, and each party is headed by its own *malik*. On taking the field, each man brings with him a sheep-skin full of flour, and the amount of ammunition that he can manage to collect; but, should hostilities be protracted beyond the time that the supply of provisions will last, the tribes are either kept together and fed by contributions from villages in the neighbourhood, or disperse for a few days to make ammunition and to replenish their commissariat; but, should the latter contingency be adopted, it frequently happens that mistrust of each other, and the fear of treachery in their neighbours, prevent their again uniting.

When no external enemy is in the field, the different clans of this great tribe are continually warring amongst themselves, and it is no uncommon occurrence to find even one-half of a village carrying on a skirmish with matchlocks with the other half; and this may be carried on for two or three consecutive days, the parties firing from towers, or from behind rocks, or any other shelter, upon each other. After seven or eight casualties have occurred on either side, or all their ammunition is exhausted, the point at issue is generally settled by an interchange of marriages.

When not engaged in plundering, the Afridis do simply nothing; time hangs heavily on their hands; for all the common necessary duties of daily life are performed by their women, while the men sleep, or talk of the last midnight murder or robbery. All such domestic labours as fetching wood and water, and cooking, fall to the lot of the women, as they do in more civilised countries; but to the Afridi women, in addition, falls nearly all the outdoor labour in the fields. The consequence is, that they are anything but womanly in appearance, habits, or manner; indeed, they are said to be deadly shots with stones, and to frequently distinguish themselves in the defence of their homes. But the Afridis round the Kohat pass are different. Their minds have become more open to the beauties and the results of industry. They are great traders, or rather carriers. They convey the salt from the mines in the Kohat district to Swat, Bajour, and even Chitral. They also cut and sell the firewood of their hills to the British garrisons of Peshawar and Kohat. By these means they are relieved from the old necessity of robbing, and procure a comfortable subsistence.

Between 3,000 and 4,000 Afridis are scattered over India in the military service of the British Government, and of native chiefs. All the clans are represented in these emigrants, except the Zakha Khel, who, according to report, do not leave their own hills.

From the nature of their country, agricultural pursuits are limited. Rice and the common cereals are the main products. These crops are raised mostly in the Bara valley and in Maidan in Tirah. The principal crop in Bara is rice, a considerable portion of which finds its way to the Peshawar market. Most of the clans possess great stock in cattle. Cows, sheep, and goats are in plenty; but buffaloes are scarce, except amongst the Adam

Khel and Aka Khel inhabitants of the plain, who, alone of all the Afridis, *Afridis.* possess camels. Most of the clans possess a number of mares and donkeys, and breed mules largely. The Afridi donkeys and mules enjoy a local notoriety for the superiority of their breed.

The Afridis have no manufactures, except coarse mats of grass and a little very coarse cloth. Even their arms are imported, mostly, if not entirely, from British territory. The love of fire-arms is quite a trait in their character; they will enlist or work in order to get the wherewithal to buy a matchlock or a rifle, the latter being preferred; and if an Afridi at the end of his service has not sufficient to buy one, he makes no scruple of walking off with his rifle and ammunition.

They have nothing to give, save fuel, in exchange for our commodities, and so there is no trade properly so called; yet intercourse with us is necessary to them, as their own country does not produce sufficient to feed them, and consequently a strict blockade is a serious measure to most of the clans, especially the Adam Khels and Aka Khels.

Trade is much in the hands of Hindus, who hold a fairly comfortable and respectable position. But they are obliged to wear
 Merk. trousers vertically striped with red, to distinguish them from the faithful, and, idolatry being sternly forbidden on pain of death, are of necessity all Sikhs. *Dharmshalas* with the *Granth* are permitted. Every Hindu is the *hamsaya* of some Afridi *naik* or patron, to whom he pays fines on the birth, death, or marriage of a member of his family. In return, the *naik* is bound to look after his *hamsaya*, and protect his interests. This is not merely a nominal charge, and an Afridi will not accept Hindu *hamsayas* without the consent of his family to the new responsibility undertaken. The Hindus state they immigrated many generations ago from the Punjab. They have adopted many of the wild habits and martial qualities of their Muhammadan lords, and are singularly careless of restrictions about food and drink.

With the insecurity of life and general lawlessness among the Afridis, it is curious to find that sales of land should be constantly effected, and deeds be drawn up which are afterwards produced as proof of the sale. Mortgages, too, are not uncommon, and are scrupulously respected. A quarrel (what we should call a civil suit) is settled by *jirga*, or, according to Muhammadan law, by the *mullas*; but if both fail, or the parties so prefer it, there is no other means of coming to a conclusion than by arms.

Blood-feuds arise on the slightest occasion, but are spasmodically pursued, often with great bitterness; at other times the feud is, by mutual consent, allowed to slumber for years, especially if the enemies are not near neighbours. But it is a point of pride and honour to go on as long as possible with the feud. Doubtless many an Afridi who has had violent ancestors, finds his life such a burden to him, and the constant anxiety and watchfulness entailed by a handful of blood-feuds so harassing, that he willingly escapes to the haven of India, and the comparative rest obtained by service in the army; hoping that time will, before he returns home, have buried many wrongs in oblivion. In addition to private feuds, it is common to have, simultaneously, tribal feuds, when perfectly innocent strangers who happen to belong to the implicated tribes are liable to be shot.

Moreover, Afridi travellers are in constant danger from robbers. Altogether, most Afridis have to walk warily in their own country. In a matter of general interest, private and tribal feuds are laid aside. Religious leaders

Afridis.

are few, and have little influence in ordinary life, but in periods of tribal excitement they come to the front.

The great security of the Afridis lies in the strength of their country for defence. Their chief point of weakness lies in the facilities with which they can be shut up in their own hills, and cut off from communication with the outer world, provided adequate measures are adopted to effect such a purpose.

The Afridis derive their importance from their geographical position, which gives them command of the Khaibar and Kohat roads, and the history of the British connection with them has been almost entirely with reference to these two passes. Their history before the date of their connection with us can have no interest for anyone. Whatever the dynasty has been—whether Jangez, Timur, Babar, Nadar, Ahmad Shah, the Sikh, or the *Farangi* has reigned—it has ever been a record of broken faith.

The Afridis in their mountains, which they inhabit for the most part in the summer, have movable huts made of mats. They come down to the low hills in the winter, where they chiefly live in caves cut out of the earthy part of the hills. They are migratory in their habits. In the autumn months they descend from the pasture grounds about Maidan and Upper Bara with their families and flocks, and pass the winter in the Khaibar, Bazar, Kajurai, and Lower Bara districts. In these several localities, each clan has its own apportioned limits, and in all they generally live in caves, which are formed in long galleries in the cliffs and sides of the ravines in all parts of the hills. None of the sections live in tents. They have few villages formed by a collection of houses close together. As a rule, each family has its own separate dwelling, proportioned in size to the numbers of the household and their cattle and flocks. Generally, a family of brothers, with their respective children and blood relations, constitute the little communities of these separate dwellings, which are always fortified by walls and towers, and are located on commanding sites on the hills. Sometimes these little forts contain thirty or more separate houses within the enclosure. In April and May the Afridis again move up to their higher hills. A portion, however, of the Kuki Khels, Malikdin Khels, Sipahs, and nearly all the Adam Khels remain in their lower settlements throughout the year.

The area of the country inhabited by the Afridis is about nine hundred square miles. The principal streams that drain their hills are, the northern branch of the Bara river or Bara proper, the Bazar or Chura river, and the Khaibar stream, all flowing into the Peshawar valley (*see* Map, p. 294). The valleys lying near the sources of the Bara river are included in the general name of Tirah, which comprises an area of six to seven hundred square miles. The greater part of Tirah is inhabited by different sections of the Urakzai tribe, but the valleys known as Rajgal and Maidan are occupied by the Afridis.

The Rajgal valley is drained by one main stream, into which fall some lesser streams from the surrounding hills. Its length is about ten miles, and the breadth of the open country lying on either side of the central stream about four to five miles where widest, its elevation here being probably over five thousand feet. Rajgal is inhabited by Kuki Khel Afridis, and their hamlets lie near the stream in the centre of the valley. Temporary sheds are erected by the shepherds among the pine forests which clothe the sides of the surrounding mountains. On the south, Rajgal is separated from Maidan by a steep, rocky, but well-wooded, spur, eight to nine thousand feet in elevation.

Maidan is a circular valley, or basin, about ten miles in diameter, *Afridi country.* surrounded by forest-covered mountains, rising from eight to nine thousand feet in elevation. The climate is described as excellent, the heat of summer being tempered by frequent thunder-storms. In winter the absence of wind makes the cold less severe. Snow lies for three months and more, and sometimes to great depth. The valley is well drained by three or four large water-courses; that to the west, where the Malikdin Khel hamlets stand, is known as the Shilobar, which name is also applied to the entire stream after the others have joined it, *viz.*, the Sherdara, occupied by the Zakha Khels from the east; the Manakass, occupied by some families of the Jowaki and Ashu Khel sections of the Adam Khels; and the Kahudara, occupied by the Kambar Khels. These converging, form the Shilobar Toi, which, leaving Maidan, enters a narrow, rocky gorge three miles long, commanded by heights rising one thousand feet above it on either side. After emerging from this defile, the torrent flows through open country for two or three miles, then joins the Rajgal stream at Doatoi, after which the united stream receives the name of Bara. The height of the central portion of Maidan is probably not less than six thousand feet. The open lands between the water-courses are covered with wheat and barley fields, and studded with hamlets and towers. Fruit is said to abound, and Indian corn is largely cultivated on the hillsides, and potatoes are also grown. In the hot weather the central valley must be densely peopled. The banks of the streams are said to be honeycombed with cave dwellings. Towers are numerous, but there appear to be no villages of any considerable size. It is difficult to ascertain how many Afridis stay during the winter in Maidan,—probably not more than one-fifth of its summer inhabitants. In a warm winter, or if troubles were apprehended towards Peshawar, no doubt more would remain.

After the junction of the Rajgal and Maidan drainage, the united stream, as already mentioned, receives the name of Bara, and the valley through which it flows down to its exit in the Peshawar valley is also known by this name. The elevation of this valley is from five thousand feet at Doatoi to two thousand at Kajurai; on the north side it is hemmed in by the Surghar range, which divides it from the Bazar valley. This range averages from six to seven thousand feet in elevation. Its crest and sides are steep and rocky, fairly well wooded with ilex and wild olive, but few timber trees; grass covers much of the slopes. It affords excellent grazing for the cattle during the winter months. Closing in the Bara valley to the south is a range rising to eight thousand five hundred feet near Maidan, but falling gradually as it runs east. This range is also very rough and rocky, but has a few timber forests above Waran and Maidan. The slopes of these ranges north and south of the Bara valley close inwards on the stream in the centre, sometimes leaving only a narrow, difficult defile between; at other places their bases are a mile or so on either side from the bank, leaving flat or terraced ground between. In these small basins lie the hamlets and the splendid rice fields of the various clans who inhabit the valley. The heat in summer is said to be excessive, fevers prevalent, and mosquitoes very troublesome; hence the hamlets are deserted during the hottest months, even by the families that do not resort to Tirah; these take their flocks and herds with them, and live in sheds on the mountain slopes and crests. The valley is portioned out between several clans. Starting from Doatoi, in succession come the Malikdin Khel, the Kamar Khel, the Kambar Khel, the Sinah, the Zakha Khel, the Aka Khel, and the Sturi Khel (Urakzais); then again

*Afridi
country.*

at its exit into the Kajurai plain, the Malikdin Khel, the Kambar Khel, the Kamar Khel, and the Sipah clans. The principal villages in the valley are Barwan and Barkai, of the Sturi Khel Urakzais, and the numerous hamlets known as Torabela of the Zakha Khel Afridis.

Shortly after entering the Kajurai plain, the Bara river is joined by the Urakzai branch, which runs south of the main branch and parallel to it. To the north of the Urakzai Bara,* and not far from Maidan, is the Waran valley. This valley, inhabited by the Aka Khel Afridis, is a basin about ten miles long and four or five miles broad, surrounded by mountains about eight thousand feet in elevation. This valley resembles Maidan, and is often looked on as a portion of it.

Kajurai, into which the united waters of the Bara river flow, is a basin of about thirty square miles in extent. The country is undulating and open, and is covered with long grass. This tract forms the winter resort of the Malikdin Khel, Kambar Khel, Kamar Khel, and Sipah Afridis, who live in cave dwellings. There is a considerable village with several towers, on the left bank of the Bara river, about four miles from Fort Bara, called Alamgudar, or Ilamgudar. This village is occupied all the year round by Sipah Afridis. There is generally a good supply of water in the Bara river; and in ordinary years the rush of water is so heavy during the melting of the snows above Rajgal and Maidan, that the low country near Peshawar on the banks of the river is flooded.

The summer and winter settlements of the Afridi clans (exclusive of the Adam Khel) are as follows:—

<i>Kuki Khel</i>	...	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Summer.—Rajgal valley. Hamlets.—Doatoi, Michni, Surkass, etc. Winter. —Jamrud, and neighbouring hills. Hamlets.—Jamrud, Gudar, Lashora, Shangir, Sarki, Kadam, Lalachena, and other cave dwellings.
<i>Malikdin Khel</i>	...	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Summer.—Maidan and Upper Bara. Hamlets.—On banks of Shilobar Toi and Karana in Bara. Winter. —Kajurai, Chura, and Khaibar. Hamlets.—Cave dwellings, Chura hamlets, and Katta Kushtia in Khaibar.
<i>Kambar Khel</i>	...	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Summer.—Maidan and Upper Bara. Hamlets.—Kahudara hamlets, Ganamgara and other settlements. Winter. —Kajurai. Hamlets.—Hamlets and cave dwellings.
<i>Kamar Khel</i>	...	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Summer.—Maidan and Upper Bara. Hamlets.—Hamlets on Safed Koh slopes and Thakthaki. Winter. —Kajurai. Hamlets.—Cave dwellings.
<i>Zakha Khel</i>	...	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Summer.—Maidan and Bara. Hamlets.—Hamlets on Sherdara stream; Torabela hamlets. Winter. —Khaibar and Bazar. Hamlets. { <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Khaibar:—Garhi Lalabeg, Sultan Khel, Niki Khel, Walik Khel. Bazar:—China, Nikai, Halwai, Walai, etc., Bararkas, Burg, Karamna, Alachi.
<i>Sipah</i>	...	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Summer.—Bara. Hamlets.—Shundahna, Darri, etc. Winter. —Lower Bara and Kajurai. Hamlets.—Alamgudar, cave dwellings and hamlets.
<i>Aka Khel</i>	...	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Summer.—Waran and Bara. Hamlets.—Many hamlets. Winter. —Hills between Kajurai and Kohat pass. Hamlets.—Zawa, and other hamlets and caves.

* The name Urakzai Bara has been given here and elsewhere to this stream, but this name is never used in practice. The southern branch of the Bara river has really no name; the natives generally call it *Toi*, which only means *stream*, but this name they also use in speaking of the Khanki and other streams in the neighbourhood, so that the nomenclature is most confusing.

During the summer months, the winter habitations of the Khaibar *Afridi* Merk. Afridis, including Bazar, are quite deserted, if one excepts *country.* a few Kuki Khel villages around Jamrud and the Malikdin Khel villages of Chura, which are inhabited all the year round. From the list of settlements given above, will be seen the great advantage possessed by the Zakha Khels, and the hold they have over the other clans, not so much from the extent of ground they occupy—for much of it in the Khaibar and Bazar is sterile—as from their position lying between the winter and summer homes of the other sections. They alone can move from Bazar and the Khaibar to Bara, and thence to Maidan along the crest of the Torghar, without having to pass through the lands of any other clan; every other section, unless prepared and able to make a wide detour, is obliged semi-annually to take its families, cattle, and household goods through Zakha Khel territory in any circumstances, if not also through that of other clans. Naturally, in consequence, the other clans are very shy of incurring the resentment of the Zakha Khels, as a body, and, unless greatly exasperated, will endeavour to remain collectively on good terms with them. Thus, for instance, the Kuki Khels have occasionally been obliged to reach Rajgal from the Khaibar by going round Tartara, through Mohmand and Shinwari country. Other tribes have reached Maidan from Kajurai, *via* Urakzai and Aka Khel limits, when at enmity with the Zakha Khels. And for a clan of one tribe to migrate through tribes not connected with it, or its parent tribe, is a delicate experiment. So, upon the whole, by virtue of their position, the Zakha Khels enjoy pre-eminent consideration in Afridi councils. They are less amenable, too, to our control, as their winter settlements are a long way from the border, and their trade with British territory is small.

Next to the Zakha Khels, the Malikdin Khels and Kuki Khels possess the most compact settlements in the Chura and Khaibar valleys, parts of which, as mentioned above, are held summer and winter by portions of these tribes, at Chura itself, and near Jamrud.

The road through the Khaibar, as far as it passes through Afridi limits, is held by the six clans known as the Khaibar Afridis. The road is divided into six sections, which, commencing from Jamrud, are guarded as follows:—The first section is in the hands of the Kuki Khels, the second in charge of the Sipahs, the third is held by the Kuki Khels again, the fourth by the Kambar Khels and the Kamar Khels, the fifth by the Malikdin Khels, and the sixth by the Zakha Khels. The present arrangements with reference to the Khaibar will be referred to again further on.

Before proceeding to an account of the routes in Afridi country, it may not be out of place briefly to sketch the lines that are taken by Afridi raiders in attacking the road through the Khaibar or the Peshawar district. When, for whatever reason, it is determined that a raid is to be made, a few experienced old raiders, respected either for their skill in planning forays, or for their large personal following, consult together and fix upon a plan, after hearing the reports of spies, who have returned from the threatened localities. Having made up their minds what to do, a summons is sent round to well-known raiders and other young men of their tribe, giving notice that a raid is appointed for a certain date, and all willing to join are to come, with so many days' supplies, to a rendezvous. These preliminaries are always held at as great a distance as possible from the point to be attacked, in order to prevent the news from reaching; and all particulars are kept a profound secret by the chief

*Afridi raids.
Routes in
Afridi
country.*

Bara and Bazar; and though the fact that a raid in some direction is contemplated becomes known, no one but the leaders can tell where the raid will strike till it has commenced to move. Very often false reports of the direction of the raid are carefully spread to mislead informers. A sufficient number of armed raiders (with their handfuls of parched corn or flour for supplies) having collected at the rendezvous, the raid starts, and moves with the utmost rapidity on the objective point, timing itself to arrive in its immediate vicinity during the night. The raiders having probably walked continuously thirty or forty miles, lie down for a few hours' rest, and spies are thrown out to give warning of counter-attacks, or of the approaching booty. At daybreak, or as soon as practicable after it, they swoop down on their prey; whatever animals they can lay hands on are rapidly collected, the retreat commences, the cattle or beasts of burden are urged to their highest speed, and the band retires as swiftly as it came, walking or running for many miles, till beyond all danger of pursuit. If pursued, the lagging cattle are cut down, and a show of resistance is made; if the pursuit is hot, the plunder is abandoned, for to lose lives is not the object of the raid. But should the raiders succeed in carrying off their booty, they halt on reaching a place of safety, and, if it is prudent to do so, divide their spoil, break up, and go home to recruit after their exertions. Occasionally, however, it is thought expedient to get rid of the loot at once, in which case the chief raiders arrange with friendly tribes to pass on the cattle that have been robbed to distant valleys, where they are kept for a time, and then disposed of when matters have quieted down.

With regard to the roads in Afridi territory, there are two main routes from Peshawar to Maidan and Rajgal, one through the Khaibar and Bazar valleys, and the other up the Bara valley.

All routes and tracks leading from Jamrud, Ali Musjid, Landi Kotal, and Dakka to Bazar converge at China in Bazar, and have all been traversed at different times by our troops; they are, therefore, sufficiently well known. It is enough to say, taking the roads which constitute the lateral communications between the Khaibar and Bazar, that the road by Shuldanna to Chura is fair, and that the passes from Ali Musjid and Shagai over the Chura Kandao and thence to China are the best, and are practicable for cavalry and laden camels. The road from Ali Musjid to Alachi and thence to Karamna is a mule track. From Garhi Lalabeg, the Bori pass, practicable for Afridi pack-bullocks and mules, gives access to Bazar; this is the usual route for the Zakha Khels of the Khaibar when going to Bazar. From Chura to Walai and China in Bazar, elevation four thousand two hundred feet, the main road follows the bed of the stream.

The route from China continues westward up the Bazar valley for six or eight miles more, and then crosses the Jarobi pass, elevation over five thousand five hundred feet, the ascent to and from which is said to be very easy and the road broad. It then descends into the Bara valley at the Sipah village of Shundahna, on the bank of the river, in open country.

The main route from Shundahna follows the course of the Bara river upwards, six or eight miles, through open, level country, to Doatoi, the junction of the Rajgal and Maidan streams, up the banks of which there are roads leading to the valleys of these names. In addition to the main road just mentioned, three or four difficult paths cross from Chura and Bazar over the Surghar range at the Inzari, Bokar, and Halwai passes. These pathways are difficult, and seldom used except for raiding purposes.

The other route to Maidan by the Bara valley either follows the course of

the Bara river from Kajurai, or, crossing a low pass, descends to the village of Barkai. From here the road runs along the right bank of the stream to Prekri, and thence follows generally the left bank, occasionally crossing to avoid cliffs where the river takes a sudden turn, but always returning to the left bank. The Bara valley proper has never been visited by a European above Barkai. Captain L. H. E. Tucker went as far as this place in 1872, and then followed a route over the range to the south by the Uchpal pass. This route is the one used by the Aka Khels in their migrations to Waran.

Afridi clans.
Kuki Khel.

For troops approaching Maidan, no doubt the Bara route would afford more water and forage than that through the Khaibar and Bazar. What would be the approximate number of men they would probably meet it is difficult to say, as that depends not only on local Afridi politics and feelings, but also on the attitude of the neighbouring tribes, more especially the Urakzais. In early spring or late autumn the last-named tribe would be in its lower settlements, and would be less likely, *cæteris paribus*, to join the Afridis.

The seven clans of the Afridi tribe, which form the subject of the present chapter, will now be briefly described, more especially with regard to their fighting strength, arms, relations among themselves, exposure to attack, and trade with British territory.

The *Kuki Khels* are an important and powerful clan. They keep rather aloof from the other Khaibar Afridis, and boast that they do not require allies, and are capable of holding their own, if necessary, against the rest of the Khaibar. It is doubtful, however, if they could attempt to carry this boast into practice. They would probably expect the Kambar Khels, who also belong to the Gar faction, to join them in an emergency. The Sipahs, moreover, have generally been good friends with the *Kuki Khels*. There is a bitter feud between the *Kuki Khels* and the *Zakha Khels*, and no help could be expected from this clan; but, with this exception, the *Kuki Khels* could probably rely on assistance from, at all events, a strong faction in each of the other Khaibar clans if they really required it. The only other tribe likely to give any help to the *Kuki Khels* are the *Urakzais*, with whom, as a rule, they keep on friendly terms. They have a standing feud with the *Shinwaris*, whose territory adjoins their summer settlements in the *Rajgal* valley.

The *Kuki Khels* are physically fine men, and are well known as being courageous and warlike. They take care to be well armed, and could probably produce about sixty good breech-loading rifles and a large number of *Enfields*, including weapons of the latter pattern manufactured at Kabul.

Their fighting strength is estimated at 4,000 men.

With regard to their villages about Jamrud and the Khaibar, these are open to attack, but any attempt to attack them in *Rajgal* would be sure to rouse the other Afridi clans in *Tirah*.

A good many *Khatris* traders live with the *Kuki Khels* under their protection. These *Khatris* carry on a considerable trade with Peshawar. The tribesmen, of course, benefit from this, and also from any trade in firewood, grass, etc., which they carry on themselves. This fact, combined with their openness to attack in the Khaibar, renders them to a great extent dependent on the British Government for their prosperity. The hills about Jamrud, in which they reside, are of the most desolate and dreary nature, with a few

Afridi clans.
Malikdin Khel.
Kambar Khel.

ments of Peshawar, and are notorious for robbery and other offences. Many of them are serving in the British Army, and some of them have distinguished themselves as native officers; *e.g.*, Ahmad Khan, Subadar of the 6th Punjab Infantry, was shot at Ambela, fighting bravely on our side.

The *Malikdin Khels* are the *Khan Khel*, or head tribe, of the Khaibar Afridis, and though the clan has lost much of its influence lately, owing to the worthless and lazy dispositions of the present *maliks*, still all the Khaibar Afridis, with the one exception of the Kuki Khels, would probably gladly follow the lead of the Malikdin Khels.

Although this clan belongs to the Samil faction, whilst the *Kambar Khels* are Gar, still the fact that these two are descended from one ancestor, by name Mir Ahmad, seems to have induced them to keep up a somewhat close relationship. A combination between the Malikdin Khels and *Kambar Khels*, who, when united, are called *Mir Ahmad Khels*, is looked upon as most probable in the event of any large tribal disturbance. The friendship between these two clans is also strengthened by the fact that they live near each other, both in Maidan and in Kajurai, and can therefore combine easily to resist a common enemy.

The Malikdin Khels are both well armed, and are also well versed in the use of arms, owing to large numbers of them having passed through the ranks of the regular native army. They are more civilised than the other Khaibar Afridis, and possess a large number of English and Kabul rifles.

They number about 4,000 fighting men.

The Malikdin Khel winter settlements in the Kajurai valley are quite open to any force advancing from Peshawar. Their settlement of Chura, some six miles south of Ali Musjid, could also be easily reached from Peshawar, if the Kuki Khels agreed to give a passage through their territory. The Malikdin Khel settlements, however, at the west end of the Bara valley and in Maidan, would be inaccessible except to a large force prepared to deal with the whole of the Tirah tribes, and to keep up its communications the entire length of either the Bara or the Bazar valley.

The Malikdin Khels are great traders. It is said that they are the only Khaibar clan who make their women assist in the trade of wood and grass with Peshawar. However this may be, there is no doubt that a blockade to prevent them dealing with Peshawar would be most severely felt.

No supplies could be obtained in Malikdin Khel limits except grass and wood. Water is plentiful, both at Chura and in Maidan, but very scarce in the Kajurai valley, except when near the Bara river.

The *Kambar Khels* belong to the Gar faction, like the Kuki Khels, and consequently often unite with the latter; but, on the other hand, they are proud of being descended from the same ancestor, Mir Ahmad, as the Malikdin Khels, and are disposed to join with them in tribal disputes.

They are well known for their warlike disposition. A considerable number take service in our army, and, owing to these circumstances, they are generally well armed, and possess a large number of English rifles.

Their fighting strength is about 4,000.

Their winter settlements in the Kajurai valley are in open country, and easy of access, but their summer habitations in the Bara valley and Maidan are, like those of the Malikdin Khels, inaccessible, except to a strong

The Kambar Khels come into Peshawar and Kohat to trade during the winter, but they keep more apart from intercourse with British territory than any of the other Khaibar Afridis, except the wild Nasr-ud-din Zakha Khels, and, owing to this, they are little dependent on the British Government.

*Afridi clans.
Kamar Khel.
Zakha Khel.*

The *Kamar Khels*, being descended from a common ancestor with the Kuki Khels, look upon the latter as their natural allies, in spite of the fact that the Kamar Khels belong to the Samil faction, whilst the Kuki Khels are Gar. The Sipahs are also, as a rule, friendly with the Kamar Khels. The clan is a peaceable one, and interferes very little with the concerns of its neighbours; and, in fact, this section would be altogether insignificant were it not for the circumstance that they hold possession of a pass which leads from the west end of the Bara valley into Maidan, past the village of Thakthaki. Nearly all the Khaibar Afridis use this pass, which is defensible by a few men against great odds. The Kamar Khels are thus able to hold it easily, and consequently to seriously inconvenience any clan which may not be on friendly terms with them, and to whom free access is an object.

The Kamar Khels are a poor clan, and can neither afford, nor do they apparently care, to secure expensive weapons, the majority being content with matchlocks.

Their fighting strength is about 1,100.

With regard to their liability to attack from British territory, the same remarks apply as to the Kambar Khels.

The Kamar Khels trade a good deal with Peshawar, bringing in wood and grass during the winter. They would feel the loss of this trade severely in the event of a blockade, and this, combined with the fact that their winter settlements are within easy reach of the Peshawar garrison, makes them naturally anxious to keep on good terms with the British Government.

The *Zakha Khels* are the most important and most powerful clan of all the Khaibar Afridis. Their importance is chiefly due, as already explained, to their position.

This clan is divided into three main sections:—I. Badai, sub-divided into Pakhai, Anai, and Zia-ud-din; II. Nasr-ud-din Khel, sub-divided into Pain dai, Khusrogi, and Habib; III. Shan Khel, sub-divided into Turki Khel and Mughal Khel.

Hastings.

These sections hold land in Maidan, Bara, Bazar, and the Khaibar.

The Zakha Khels belong to the Samil faction, and would, therefore, expect the other three Khaibar clans of the Samil persuasion, the Malikdin Khels, Sipahs, and Kamar Khels, to join them in any important business. The Zakha Khels are also generally on good terms with the Lalpura Mohmands and the Shinwaris. The latter, however, with the exception of the Loargai branch, live too far away to care much, as a rule, about Khaibar matters, and the Loargais are not strong enough to assist or to oppose the Zakha Khels very effectively. The Lalpura Mohmands could, however, be of very great use to the Zakha Khels. The friendship of the *Khan* of Lalpura is therefore cultivated carefully, and marriages between the chiefs of Lalpura and the relations of the Zakha Khel *maliks* are not uncommon. The Zakha Khels are at feud with the Kuki Khels, and constant fights take place between these two clans.

Being a very warlike tribe, they take care to be well armed. They

Afridi clans.
Zakha Khel.
Sipah.
Aka Khel.

also a large number of Enfield rifles, taken from the late Amir Sher Ali's troops at Ali Musjid in 1878. Every man carries a pistol and knife, and a good rifle, or at least a matchlock.

The number of their fighting men is estimated at 4,500.

They carry on an extensive trade with Peshawar in the winter, and they would consequently feel a blockade; but, unfortunately, a punishment of this sort would fall most heavily on the Pakhai section in the Khaibar, the one which is most in our power, and which is the best behaved. The other sections, living, as they do, in valleys which are difficult of access, are independent of the British Government to a great extent, and the only way to make these feel their dependence on us is to insist on their being properly coerced by the united Khaibar *jirgas* when they give trouble.

The Zaka Khels, like the other Khaibar Afridis, are not able to raise sufficient crops to maintain themselves, except perhaps in the case of a few fortunate villages in the Bara valley and Tirah Maidan, and China in the Bazar valley. No dependence should therefore be placed on supplies to be obtained from their villages. There would be no difficulty about water, except perhaps in the Bazar and Pakhai valleys, where there is but a scanty supply.

The Zakha Khels have always been noted as the most active thieves in the Peshawar valley, although we never came into actual contact with them till 1878.

The *Sipahs* are a small clan. They belong to the Samil faction, and would therefore naturally look to the other Samil clans for assistance. At the same time, the Khaibar Afridis do not, as a rule, pay much attention to the distinctions of Gar and Samil; and the extent to which the *Sipahs* could rely on any one section for support would really depend on the nature of the relations existing between the parties at the time the assistance was asked for, and on the character of the *malik* then in power.

The *Sipahs*, though famed for their courage and fighting qualities, are too few in number to hold their own without allies. They are all well armed. They have a few breech-loading rifles, and about one-third of the tribe have Enfields of either English manufacture or made in Kabul; the remainder of the tribe carry matchlocks.

They have about 1,200 fighting men.

With regard to their exposure to attack, both in their winter settlements in Kajurai and in their summer habitations in Upper Bara, the same remarks apply as in the case of the Kambar Khels. With regard to their dependence on British territory, what has been said about the other clans occupying Kajurai in the winter equally applies to them.

The *Aka Khels* do not belong to the Khaibar Afridis. They inhabit the hills to the south-west of Peshawar, near Akhor. The clan is sub-divided into six sections—

Bassi Khel.
 Sher Khel.

Sanzal Khel.
 Sultan Khel.

Mada Khel.
 Miri Khel.

Of these, the Bassi Khel are the most important, and are sub-divided into Maruf Khel and Marghat Khel. The Miri Khel hardly exist now as a separate section.

obtain drinking water from springs, and cultivate some wheat and barley. In summer they proceed with their women and families to Waran, and return in winter. They do not construct houses for their residence, but live in caves, or *gura*. They sell wood in the Peshawar city and cantonments. Matchlocks and *churas* are their chief arms, and almost all of them possess them. *Afridi clans.*
Aka Khel.

Their fighting men are estimated at about 1,800.

Putla, a grass with which mats are prepared, grows abundantly in their territory; it resembles a small palm tree, but with softer leaves. It is used especially in preparing mats, baskets, ropes, etc., which are in great request, both in Peshawar and the Punjab. Owing to their trade with British territory, and the exposure of their winter settlements to attack, the tribe may be said to be dependent upon us, and a blockade would be most injurious to them.

The fighting strength of the Khaibar and Aka Khel Afridis is therefore as follows:—

Kuki Khel	4,000
Malikdin Khel	4,000
Kambar Khel	4,000
Kamar Khel	1,100
Zakha Khel	4,500
Sipah	1,200
Aka Khel	1,800
Total				20,600

This, added to the number of fighting men of the Adam Khel clan, estimated at 5,900, gives a total of 26,500 as the fighting strength of the Afridis, which is probably nearly correct.

Expedition against the Aka Khel Afridis by a force under Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. Craigie, C.B., in March 1855.

British connection with the Afridis commenced in 1839, when Colonel Wade, with a contingent of Sikh troops, forced the Khaibar.

The first occasion, however, after the annexation of the Peshawar valley, in which we came into actual conflict with any of the Afridi clans which form the subject of the present chapter, was at the end of 1854.

In that year the Bassi Khel section of the Aka Khels, not finding themselves admitted to a share in the allowances of the Kohat pass, commenced a series of annoyances and depredations on the Peshawar border, with a view of extorting from Government a participation in those allowances. Amongst other acts, they murdered a syce belonging to the force at Matanni, collected and threatened that village, and finally filled up a well which was being dug at Aimal Chabutra.

On this, Major J. H. Craigie, C.B., commanding a detachment at Bazid Khel, went in pursuit. This party was fired at by the Bassi Khels, but was too late to catch them in the plain. On the 9th of December 1854, a Khatak

*Expedition
against the
Aka Khel
Afridis in
1855.*

British subject was murdered near Akhor by them, in order to implicate the Adam Khels, with whom they were at feud, and it became necessary to institute a blockade of the tribe.

At this time the camp of Lieutenant W. Hamilton, Bengal Artillery, Assistant Civil Engineer, together with his office and treasure chest, happened to be pitched near Badabir, about ten miles from the foot of the hills, and on the night of the 9th of February 1855, the Bassi Khels descended on this camp to kill and rob. Lieutenant Hamilton fought bravely for his life, and escaped with some wounds, after shooting one of his assailants; but sixteen of his people were killed and thirty wounded, the Bassi Khels carrying off some Rs. 10,000 of Government treasure and property, besides some private effects.

Detachments were at once sent out to Matanni and Fort Bara to watch the Aka Khel border.

Soon after this, Captain H. R. James, Deputy Commissioner, who was out on the frontier, reported that those branches of the tribe whose winter settlements are between Jana Garhi and the Bara river continued to bring their cattle into the grazing grounds at the foot of the hills, as they felt themselves secure from any sudden attack in consequence of the broad and stony plain, about nine miles in breadth, lying between them and the nearest point where troops were located, the crossing of which would give them ample notice of any attack. On this, Major L. P. D. Eld, 9th Native Infantry, commanding a detachment at Fort Bara, attempted to surprise the village of Alam Killi by marching across the plain at night, so as to arrive there at early dawn. The march was made in excellent order and perfect silence; the detachment arrived at a ravine, about a mile from the village, an hour before daybreak; but as it was entering broken ground, it became necessary to halt till daylight, and some scouts were sent on to reconnoitre. When these had advanced a short distance from the head of the column, they suddenly found themselves confronted by a picquet of twenty men in a hollow.

Being surrounded, they were compelled to fire, and the picquet fled to the village, firing signals as they went. The detachment then advanced as soon as the light admitted, and found the Afridis had reached the hills, up which they rapidly retreated. To have pursued them further would have involved the troops in a day's skirmishing on the hills without the prospect of inflicting much injury upon the enemy, and it was therefore considered better to return to camp, and await another opportunity.

On the 23rd of February there was a spirited little affair between a force of Lieutenant Tyrwhitt's report. noted in the margin, under Lieutenant E. Tyrwhitt, 14th Irregular Cavalry, and the Bassi Khels. The cavalry patrol from Fort Mackeson, finding a body of Bassi Khels in a ravine under the Akhor hills, pursued them, the Akhor people joining in the pursuit, and setting fire to the first Bassi Khel village, when Lieutenant Tyrwhitt, coming up with the infantry, drove the enemy from the hills above. The enemy then came down to a small plateau, about three-quarters of a mile distant; on this, Lieutenant Tyrwhitt charged them with the cavalry, driving them up to the village of Zawa, when he had to retire, coming under the matchlock fire from the hills. The retirement, which was pressed by the enemy, was very steadily covered by the 9th Native Infantry, although the enemy were in considerable numbers.

The enemy lost some seven wounded. Our loss was—two sowars of the

14th Irregular Cavalry, one sepoy of the 9th Native Infantry, and one sowar of the levies, besides four horses, wounded. *Expedition against the Aka Khel Afridis in 1855.*

After Major Eld's operations, the cattle were not brought out of the hills for some days, but the Aka Khels gradually reacquired confidence, and every day advanced further into the plain, putting out strong picquets at night. On the 26th of February the scouts brought in the intelligence that the flock had come down to the grazing grounds near Sadat Garhi. Captain James thought, therefore, that by locating a party in one of the ravines in that neighbourhood he might be enabled to intercept them. He accordingly arranged a plan for doing so with Major Eld, and, considering it better to carry out the design at once, Major Eld marched from Fort Bara at 3 A.M. with the rifle and light companies, 9th Native Infantry, and a troop of the 16th Irregular Cavalry. The march was performed without the least noise, and the men were located before dawn in a ravine lined with tangled grass and brushwood, scouts being placed in the trees in the vicinity and other places. The detachment remained quiet in this situation for about six hours, and at 11 A.M. the Afridi cattle were seen emerging on to the plain, with a party of armed men in advance, who narrowly inspected the brushwood and broken ground about them, the cattle following at a distance. Had they continued in this way an hour longer, they would have placed the detachment between them and the hills, and a large number of cattle and men would have fallen into its hands. Unfortunately, however, the bearers, with two *doolies* who had fallen to the rear, found themselves at daybreak in the plain without a sign of the detachment, and, returning to camp, they set out again under the escort of a few sowars to join it. The Afridis soon observed them, and began to return with their cattle. Seeing this, Major Eld determined to pursue them, and took the cavalry towards the hills for that purpose; the infantry also advanced at a rapid pace over the low hills in their front, when all were soon engaged with detached parties of the Afridis, who did not expect to be so warmly pursued. The detachment succeeded in capturing 100 head of cattle, killing, as far as could be ascertained, three of the Afridis, and wounding five, though probably the number of the latter was greater. Major Eld then arranged for the retirement of the force; this was effected in excellent order, the skirmishers holding the Afridis, who had gathered to the number of upwards of 300, in check. The detachment returned to camp at 4.30 P.M., with a loss of only one man wounded.

After this raid the cattle of the Aka Khels were taken further south, to the village of Mandan, which appeared to offer a perfectly safe retreat, as the village is situated close to the Bassi Khel villages, is strongly placed between two hills, and is approached only by a stony road, passing over much broken ground and several ravines with eminences, upon which their picquets were placed to guard against surprise. For some days the cattle went into the ravines to graze, but on the 5th of March Captain H. R. James arranged with Major L. P. D. Eld to attempt another surprise.

Accordingly, at 11 P.M., that officer moved out of camp with 300 men of the 9th Native Infantry and a troop of the 16th Irregular Cavalry; the party was conducted by Captain James in the direction of Matanni, and up a ravine which leads to the Bassi Khel villages. At about a mile from Mandan a good place of concealment was found, where the detachment remained till the break of day. As soon as the dawn admitted of an examination of the vicinity, scouts were placed on all the commanding points, and the approach of the cattle awaited; at about 11 A.M. strong guards came out of the village,

*Expedition
against the
Aka Khel
Afridis in
1855.*

and carefully examined every bush and ravine in their front, picquets were placed on various hills upon which low breastworks had been erected, and a party even came down a portion of the ravine in which the detachment was concealed. It was evident that they only anticipated attack from the direction of the camp, and they did not suspect that by making a circuitous march the detachment could get in rear of them.

The above precautions having been taken by the Afridis, their cattle emerged from the village, and were soon grazing on the low hills in front of it. It was not deemed advisable to wait much longer, for the neighing of a horse might now have discovered the detachment, which was not in a position to receive a large party in case of attack. It therefore moved a little further up the ravine, and then, gaining the high ground, advanced rapidly towards the village, thus intercepting the party that had gone out with the cattle.

Major Eld obtained a commanding position in front of the village, and parties were sent to collect the cattle, the whole of which was soon on the road to camp. The Afridis were taken so much by surprise, that they fled precipitately until they gained the hills in the vicinity of the village, where they rallied; and, their numbers increasing with incredible speed, they attempted to cut off some of the parties returning with the cattle. A company was detached to cover the latter, and, when the animals had been all secured, the detachments were called in, the cavalry sent to the rear, and the retirement covered by the riflemen of the 9th Native Infantry. All was effected in perfect order; but the Afridis pressed the detachment warmly for about three miles, till it had cleared the broken ground. At this point the infantry proceeded towards the camp, the cavalry remaining to meet the hillmen, should they venture into the plain; for this, however, they were not prepared, and returned to their village. The detachment arrived in camp about 4 P.M.

On this occasion Major Eld secured 1,000 animals, including bullocks, cows, donkeys, sheep, and milch-goats. Three of the Aka Khels were killed, one of whom, Gul Khan, was a man of much influence and wealth, and three others were wounded; but those who were watching stated that more were carried away. The loss sustained by the detachment was very trifling—one sepoy slightly wounded and one horse killed.

After this, those sections of the tribe against which these efforts had been directed evinced their submission in a mode most humiliating to Pathans, by sending in a deputation of their chief women to sue for peace on any terms.

Captain James informed them that he would allow the elders of their portion of the tribe to come to him and state their willingness or otherwise to conform to what might be dictated to them, including of course the restitution of the property plundered at Badabir, and the furtherance of the punishment of the remaining portion of the tribe.

On the 25th of March 1855, intelligence having reached Captain James that the Aka Khels had returned with their cattle to the villages of Alam Killi and Mir Killi for the purpose of grazing, he suggested to Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. Craigie, C.B., who had succeeded to the command of the troops, the expediency of driving them out of those places, and compelling them to give up the idea of resettling in the low hills without permission, when, too, some of their cattle might be secured.

Lieut.-Colonel Craigie's
despatch.

Peshawar Mountain Train
Battery.

Two troops, 16th Irregular
Cavalry.

Detachment 4th Native
Infantry.

9th Native Infantry.

20th Native Infantry.

Accordingly, at midnight on the 26th of March, Lieutenant-Colonel Craigie moved off from his camp at Mashu Khel (*see* Map, p. 320), with the force marginally noted. *Expedition against the Aka Khel Afridis in 1855.*

To engage the Bassi Khels, and to prevent their coming to the assistance of the other sections of the Aka Khels, a force of 500 infantry were to move from Fort Mackeson at 2 A.M. towards the village of Zawa, whilst the Akhor men were to act on the left of this detachment above Akhor.

On arriving, at half-past 6 A.M., on the crest of a ridge of hills overlooking those occupied by the enemy, Lieutenant-Colonel Craigie, who was accompanied by Captain H. R. James, the Deputy Commissioner, detached 300 men of the 4th Native Infantry, under the command of Major C. Pattenson, to the village of Alam Killi, with instructions to destroy it, and then rejoin; which was successfully accomplished.

A party of similar strength from the 20th Native Infantry, under the command of Lieutenant A. I. Shuldham, followed after a short interval by the main column, was directed on Mir Killi, a village on the Bara river, the occupants of which fled on the approach of the troops, when the village was destroyed, as also a number of wood stacks.

The main column then proceeded towards the hills, on which the enemy had posted themselves, covered by the rifle and light companies of the 9th and 20th Regiments, under the command of Major L. P. D. Eld, of the former corps.

The hills over which the troops had to advance were rocky, and most of them steep, and they afforded complete cover to the enemy, whose numbers amounted, it was ascertained, to 1,000 men. Lieut.-Colonel Craigie was obliged, from the number of hills they occupied, to throw out additional skirmishers, both to the front and flanks, so much so that two-thirds of the infantry were thus employed. The force then advanced about a mile and a half, driving back the enemy from hill to hill,—the sepoys behaving most gallantly; and as, in their eagerness to close with the enemy, they neglected to take full advantage of the cover afforded by the nature of the ground, they suffered more loss than they would otherwise have done.

At 8 A.M., seeing that the country in front was apparently much stronger than that over which the troops had passed, and Captain James being of opinion that no advantage would be gained by proceeding further, Lieut.-Colonel Craigie decided upon retiring. The crest of the hills in the rear was accordingly occupied successively by skirmishers, and the mountain guns sent back to take up a position on the range of hills from which the column had in the first instance descended.

The main body then began slowly to retire; on which the enemy returned in large numbers, and were enabled, from their knowledge of the ground, to press on the troops, their matchlock fire continuing to be heavy until the troops neared, at half-past 10 A.M., the ridge of hills where the mountain guns were in position.

The return march towards camp was commenced at 11 A.M., skirmishers having been previously thrown out to the rear and right flank of the column, until the ground became sufficiently open for cavalry, when the 16th Irregular Cavalry, under Lieutenant F. H. Smith, formed the rear guard; but the enemy

*Expedition
against the
Aka Khel
Afridis in
1855.*

Our losses in this affair are given in Appendix A, and the expenditure of ammunition by the troops is shown in Appendix B.

Lieut.-Colonel Craigie said he was much indebted to all for their steady and gallant conduct, and mentioned the following officers:—

Captain T. Brougham, commanding Peshawar Mountain Train Battery.

Major C. Pattenson, commanding detachment of the 4th Native Infantry.

Captain J. H. G. Taylor, commanding 20th Native Infantry.

Lieutenant F. H. Smith, commanding detachment of the 16th Irregular Cavalry.

Lieutenant G. D. Barbor, of the Staff.

The principal object of the expedition had thus been fully attained; the

Captain James's
report.

Aka Khels had been driven out of an apparently secure retreat, which they could never reoccupy so long as they were under blockade, and which would cause them great distress.

The Indian medal, with a clasp for the "North-West Frontier", was granted in 1869 to all survivors of the troops engaged in the above operations under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Craigie.

G. G. O. No. 812
of 1869.

After this the tribe was forced to seek a temporary settlement amongst the Sipahs at a spot higher up the river, where there was but little pasturage for their cattle, and they were therefore soon forced to return to Waran.

Throughout the ensuing hot weather but little went on, the Aka Khels being in their summer settlements. On the return of the cold season they came down again to the plains; but the Commissioner, Lieutenant-Colonel H. B. Edwardes, C.B., obtained orders to keep up the blockade till the tribe surrendered at discretion.

Lieut.-Colonel
Edwardes's report.

The blockade was accordingly resumed, and not a man of the Aka Khel clan could venture into the Peshawar market; their wood trade fell into the hands of other tribes exclusively; and unusually large demands for wood for the public works raised the price of that article to an unprecedented height.

About December the loss of annual profits began to be intolerable, and the Aka Khel *jirga* took into their serious consideration the question whether it would be better to make another burst of devilry upon the frontier, in hopes of being bought off, or to give in, and accept any terms that might be imposed. In consequence, all the police posts were strengthened and put on the alert while this point was under debate.

Deputations from the Aka Khels went about from hill to hill beseeching the co-operation of the neighbouring tribes in one more campaign, but their neighbours had got the wood trade, and declined.

All this while the flocks and herds of the Aka Khels could not be grazed upon the open plain for fear of being surprised by the police, and another hungry winter was setting in.

The case being hopeless, in the middle of December the Aka Khels sent in to make overtures of submission.

But, looking back to the origin of these annoyances, the Commissioner

that one Deputy Commissioner should not be played off against another. The Aka Khel *jirga* were therefore referred to Captain B. Henderson, commanding the 3rd Punjab Infantry, and Assistant-Commissioner at Kohat, to whom instructions were sent to accept their overtures of peace on the following conditions:—

1st. A fine of Rs. 2,500.

2nd. Forfeiture of all blackmail for the future. (The Bassi Khels received Rs. 600 from the Kohat pass allowances.)

3rd. Refund to Government of all rewards paid for capturing members of the tribe.

After the usual number of deputations, and excuses, and evasions, the terms dictated by Captain Henderson at Kohat were agreed to by the tribe.

Still, Lieut.-Colonel Edwardes refused to take off the blockade until the payment of the fine. The tribe urged that, if allowed to bring their wood to the market at Peshawar, they would realise the amount immediately; but that officer replied that justice required the fine to be paid before the slightest kindness was shown to them.

They then proposed to pay in wood, and, as the Executive Engineer required all he could get, it was settled that they might deliver wood to the amount of the fine at two outposts—one being Badabir, the scene of the outrage.

But, remarked Lieut.-Colonel Edwardes, “getting a fine out of Afridis is like getting blood out of a stone.” There was no alacrity in paying up, even with the certainty that they could not get at the Peshawar market till it was done. With heavy hearts and at lazy intervals they brought in the loads, but at last, seeing the cold season drawing to a close, they made up their minds to part with the rupees; even then they came repeatedly with Rs. 500 short, Rs. 300 short, Rs. 50 short, or a security for Rs. 20; however, at last the contest ended by about forty-nine of the *maliks* coming in and depositing the cash in two leathern bags upon the floor, and the blockade was at once removed, and the Aka Khel bullocks streamed into Peshawar.

The Aka Khels estimated their losses during the blockade at Rs. 77,120, and the Commissioner did not consider this to be an exaggerated estimate.

An agreement was then entered into with the Aka Khels by which they bound themselves, in addition to paying the above fine, to abstain from raids; not to harbour refugees and criminals; in disputes with British subjects to refer the matter to our tribunals, etc.

Thus, said Lieutenant-Colonel Edwardes, ended the struggle of the Aka Khel Afridis with a settled Government. Instead of haughtily exacting from the British blackmail for the safety of the Kohat road, they paid a judicial fine for a highway robbery.

The reasons of the Bassi Khels having been originally admitted to a share in the Kohat pass allowances will be given in the next chapter, when describing the arrangements with regard to that pass; but it may be here briefly stated, that it was in consequence of their claiming a portion of land called Kalamsada, extending from Kotkai to Aimal Chabutra, at the mouth of the pass. Our subsequent dealings with the Bassi Khels with regard to this piece of land will also be given in the next chapter.

Our next dealings of importance with the Afridis, forming the subject of the present chapter, was with the Kuki Khel clan. In January 1857, when the Amir Dost Muhammad was encamped at Jamrud after his defeat with Sir John Lawrence, whose camp was a few miles nearer

*Settlement with
the Aka Khel
Afridis.*

*Relations of
Khaibar
Afridis with
the British
Government
prior to 1878.*

Peshawar, a party of young officers rode beyond the Amir's camp towards the Khaibar pass, and were fired on by the Kuki Khels. One of the number, Lieutenant T. M. Hand, was so severely wounded that he died during the night. The crime having been brought home to the tribe, they were blockaded, and many of their members fell into our hands. During these hostilities the Mutiny broke out, but the blockade was continued in full force, and was so injurious to the interests of the clan, that they paid down a fine of Rs. 3,000, and entered into the following agreement, *viz.*, not to harbour criminals; to resort to our courts in regard to quarrels with British subjects; to send, when required, an agent to the Deputy Commissioner, etc.

At the commencement of the Mutiny the Zakha Khel clan was also under blockade for innumerable highway robberies, but, strange to say, they did not take advantage of the opportunity afforded them of troubling us, and on the 14th of August they made their submission, and entered into an agreement similar to that made by the Kuki Khels.

In the early part of 1861 a party of Zakha Khels made a raid on British territory in the neighbourhood of Kajurai. This tract of country is occupied, as already stated, during the winter months by the Malikdin Khel, Kambar Khel, Kamar Khel, and Sipah clans, and these tribes had for a long time refused, on various pretexts, to become jointly responsible for this part of the border.

On the occurrence, however, of this raid, in which one man was killed and three wounded, some of the Kajurai men were seized, and further proceedings threatened unless immediate reparation was made, and an agreement entered into of joint responsibility for the future. The tribes concerned sent their representatives to Peshawar, paid a fine of Rs. 1,000, and entered into the desired agreement, which closed that corner of the district against Zakha Khel and other robbers. The agreement with the Sipah and Kamar Khel tribes was made on the 24th of April 1861; that with the Malikdin Khel and Kambar Khel shortly afterwards, and was of the same tenor, *viz.* :—

“We agree on our own parts, and in behalf of our respective tribes, of our own free will and accord, as follows :

“(I.) During the six months of the cold weather, when we reside in the lands called Kajurai, we will be responsible that no theft or crime is committed on any British subject by any member of our tribes, or by any member of the Zakha Khel or other tribes passing through the said lands of Kajurai.

“(II.) So long as the Zakha Khels may remain at feud with the Government, we will not allow members of that tribe to take up their residence in the Kajurai settlements.”

The tribes concerned acted fairly up to the engagements entered upon, but it was found necessary to enforce their responsibility by making reprisals on them in 1874, when they allowed some Zakha Khel robbers a passage through their lands. Accordingly, 113 persons and 360 head of cattle were seized, the latter being restored when the Kajurai clans paid the small fine which had been imposed upon them.

The Zakha Khel, and also the Kuki Khel clan, continued to give trouble on our border, and maintained their reputation as the most inveterate and audacious robbers, whose depredations up to the very walls of Peshawar,

days of the Sikh rule. On the night of the 4th of December 1874, the bandmaster of the 72nd Highlanders, stationed at Peshawar, was carried off by a party of raiders belonging to the Zakha Khel clan, and taken to the Khaibar pass, when he was released uninjured, after a short detention, through the instrumentality of Arbab Abdul Majid Khan. Subsequently the representatives of the tribe repudiated the acts of the robbers, and in token thereof burnt the house of the leader of the gang, and returned the small amount of property taken from the bandmaster. At the beginning of 1875 attempts were made, with some success, to conciliate the Zakha Khels by inducing them to send in representatives to Peshawar. In January 1877 the Khalil *arbabs*,* Abdul Majid Khan, who, under the direction of the Deputy Commissioner, had held the management of the Khaibar Afridis for many years past, died, and was succeeded in his duties by his son, Fateh Muhammad Khan, who, however, did not carry them on for long. Since 1878 our dealings with the Khaibar Afridis have been carried on direct with the tribes, through the officer in charge of the Khaibar. During the Jowaki complications, to be described in the next chapter, the Zakha Khels sent a contingent of 400 men to their help, but these did not go further than the Kohat pass, when they turned back. None of the other Afridi clans responded to the appeal of the Jowakis for help.

*Relations of
Khaibar
Afridis with
the British
Government
prior to 1878.*

Expedition against the Zakha Khel Afridis of the Bazar valley, December 1878.

From the time that the British army advanced into Afghanistan, on the 21st of November 1878, the Afridis of the Khaibar pass began to give trouble. On the 28th of November a signalling party, consisting of a few men under Major H. P. Pearson, Deputy-Assistant Quarter-Master General, on the Shagai hill, overlooking the Khaibar, was attacked by Afridis. Major Pearson's horse and grass-cutter, with one man of the 81st Regiment, were killed, while another man of the same regiment and five mules were wounded.

In order to punish the perpetrators of this outrage, who were traced to the village of Kadam, two guns, supported by detachments of the 9th Foot and 45th Sikhs, accompanied the Political Officer, on the 1st December, to assist the *maliks* of the Kuki Khel tribe in attacking the village of Kadam. Some of the marauders gave in at once, while others opened fire on the *jirga*. The supporting party on the heights above the village sent a shell amongst these, which dispersed them at once. The *jirga* then fired the towers and houses of the parties opposed to them. The punishment inflicted was purely a tribal affair, as our troops acted only as a support to the headmen.

The Afridis after this continued to harass our troops on the line of communications in the Khaibar, and firing into our camp at Ali Musjid was a thing of nightly occurrence. The marauders belonged chiefly to the Zakha Khel clan.

On the 1st of December, Major P. L. N. Cavagnari, C.S.I., the Political Officer on the Khaibar line, led an armed body of Kuki Khels, supported by mountain guns, against the Zakha Khels, and took them by surprise. Punishment was inflicted by burning some of their towers and houses, and it was hoped that

* The *Khalils* are a tribe who inhabit a portion of the Peshawar district between the Khaibar

*Expedition
against the
Zakha Khel
Afridis in
1878.*

the hostile combination was broken up; but on the 9th of December Major Cavagnari expressed his opinion that the conduct of the Zakha Khels of Bazar and Bara necessitated their being punished as soon as military arrangements for doing so could be completed. An expedition into the Bazar valley was therefore determined upon. A force composed of troops from the 2nd Division, Peshawar Valley Field Force, the head-quarters of which were then established at Jamrud, was to carry out this operation, while troops of the 2nd Brigade of the 1st Division were to co-operate with the movement from Dakka.

Jamrud Column.

D-A, Royal Horse Artillery	...	3 guns.
1-5th Fusiliers	...	300 bayonets.
51st King's Own Light Infantry	...	200 "
11th Bengal Lancers	...	1 troop.
13th Bengal Lancers	...	1 "
2nd Gurkha Regiment	...	500 bayonets.
Mhairwarra Battalion	...	400 "

Dakka Column.

11-9th Royal Artillery	...	2 guns.
1-17th Regiment	...	300 bayonets.
8th company, Bengal Sappers and Miners	...	41 "
27th Punjab Native Infantry	...	263 "
45th (Ratray's) Sikhs	...	114 "

The force consisted of the troops as per margin. The column from Dakka was under the command of Brigadier-General J. A. Tytler, V.C., C.B., the whole force being directed by Lieutenant-General F. F. Maude, V.C., C.B., commanding the 2nd Division.

As it was important to cut off the enemy's retreat by the Sisobi pass, the troops from Dakka were to move into the Bazar valley by that route (*see accompanying Map*).

At five o'clock on the evening of the 19th of December the troops of the Jamrud column assembled a short distance below Ali Musjid, and, taking the road by the Chura Kandao, the column marched forward during the night. The night was dark, as there was no moon till three o'clock on the following morning, while the mountain road was only a pathway. The head of the column had not consequently reached further at four o'clock on the morning of the 20th than within half a mile of Chura.

Captain L. H. E. Tucker, the Political Officer with the column, then reported that he had been misinformed as to the distance to Chura. Bazar was still at least eight miles further on, and the road to it lay through the bed of the Chura stream, which had to be forded constantly, about knee-deep, by the infantry.

There was consequently no longer any hope of surprising the enemy at daybreak. As the troops from Jamrud had already been under arms since nine o'clock on the morning of the previous day, and as no advantage was to be gained by advancing any further until daylight broke, a halt was ordered until daybreak at the place where the column had arrived, so that the men might get something to eat.

The column then moved on, passing the village of Chura, inhabited by the friendly Malikdin Khels, up the bed of the river.

After passing Chura, the heights on both sides of the river were crowned by flanking parties of the 2nd Gurkhas. Lieutenant-Colonel M. H. Heathcote, with a troop of the 13th Bengal Lancers, was sent forward to reconnoitre, and reported that there were no signs of an enemy.

The column moved forward without opposition, except a few long shots fired from the surrounding hills, and reached Walai, the first village of Bazar, soon after noon, but found it deserted.


The first object now was to open communication with the Dakka column,

MAP
to illustrate
THE OPERATIONS
against the
ZAKHA KHEL AFRIDIS
in the
BAZAR VALLEY
in December 1878 & January 1879,
under
LIEUT. GENERAL F. F. MAUDE, C.B., V.C.,

Route in first Expedition ————
Do. second do. ————

Scale 1 Inch = 4 Miles.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Miles



a reply to it received before the evening, stating that though the road he had advanced by had proved very difficult, he had reached the Sisobi pass, and would effect his junction with Lieutenant-General Maude on the following day. The troops of the Jamrud column bivouacked for the night at Walai. *Expedition against the Zakha Khel Afridis in 1878.*

Captain Tucker having offered certain terms to the Zakha Khels of the Bazar valley, to be complied with by nine o'clock on the following morning, it was arranged that, in the event of these not having been accepted by the time fixed, the troops should move forward to destroy their towers and villages.

The terms offered were:—

1st. The payment of a fine of Rs. 1,000.

2nd. The surrender of six hostages, to be named by the Political Officer.

3rd. The acceptance of Khawas, the chief of the friendly sections of the Zakha Khel tribe, as the chief of the whole clan.

In the meanwhile, the column under Brigadier-General Tytler marched from Dakka at 12.30 A.M. on the 19th, with two days' rations, and bivouacked in a grassy plain about eight miles distant from that place, resuming its march at five o'clock on the morning of the 20th of December, as soon as the moonlight enabled it to see the road. By sunrise the column had reached the village of Chenar.* The headman came out to make his submission, and he and another villager accompanied the troops as guides. At this place the two mountain guns and the detachment of the 27th Punjab Native Infantry, which had been ordered by Brigadier-General Tytler to follow him from Dakka, joined the column.

From Chenar the road runs in a south-easterly direction to the Sisobi villages,† against which the Dakka column had been directed to operate. After a march of three or four miles along a valley of moderate breadth, the villages became visible over the slightly rising ground on the right as the troops approached, about nine o'clock in the morning.

As soon as the Brigadier-General had reconnoitred this position, he lined the heights on either side of the villages, and then sent on the Chenar guides to bring in the headmen. They shortly returned with the *maliks* of all the five villages, who tendered their submission and made offers of assistance to the troops. They were accordingly promised protection from damage, and the two most intelligent of the headmen were directed to attend the column as guides on its further advance. The force then halted for breakfast at a stream of water which ran between the villages.

The march was resumed about 12.30 A.M. in a south-easterly direction, through a well-cultivated valley, which here began to be wooded. After moving for a mile and a half through this valley, the column turned to the right, up a zigzag path, where it could advance in single file only, to the top of the Sisobi pass. This ascent was estimated at 1,200 feet up a hillside covered with oak forest.

* This is a Shinwari village which had recently received punishment at our hands. A party of grass-cutters, under the escort of some men of the Guide Cavalry, had been surprised on the 8th of December by marauders, who were subsequently traced to this village, and had lost three men and one horse of the escort killed, and one man and one horse wounded. In consequence of this outrage, the fort of Chenar had been destroyed on the 10th of December by a small force from Dakka, under the command of Brigadier-General J. A. Tytler, V.C., C.B.

† These are inhabited by Mullagoris, who are a branch of the Mullagoris of Tartara, described in the previous chapter.

*Expedition
against the
Zakha Khel
Afridis in
1878.*

From the top of the pass a great portion of the Bazar plain was visible, extending apparently for ten or twelve miles in length, and varying in breadth from two to five miles, and studded with numerous trees. A similar zigzag path led the column through a gorge into the Bazar valley. Continuing in a south-easterly direction, the march was directed towards the largest tower at the foot of the opposite hills, about four miles distant. This place was reached at four o'clock in the afternoon, and was found to consist of a large cave village of about sixty dwellings, which was entirely deserted. Large quantities of grass and *bhusa* were found stored here for winter use, but other supplies had been removed. Here the column was halted to bivouac for the night, and here the communication from Lieutenant-General Maude, above alluded to, reached Brigadier-General Tytler, as the camp of the Jamrud column was only about three miles to the east.

The troops of the Jamrud column paraded at nine o'clock on the morning of the 21st of December, when the Political Officer reported that the terms offered had not been complied with. Exactly at the same hour, Brigadier-General Tytler, having ridden over from his bivouac, reported himself in person to Lieut.-General Maude. His opportune appearance at that particular time excited in no small degree the admiration of the friendly chiefs. He received instructions to destroy the village of Nikai, four or five miles to the westward of his bivouac, and any towers near his position: After destroying Nikai, Brigadier-General Tytler was directed to return to Dakka. His supplies were at the same time supplemented by a quarter of a day's rations for Europeans from the Jamrud force.

Shortly after nine o'clock on the morning of the 21st, the Jamrud column, having detached a sufficient guard for the camp, marched for the village of China. A troop of the 13th Bengal Lancers, under Major W. H. Macnaghten, was sent forward by a different route to the west end of the Bazar valley, to the village of Halwai, with orders to cut off any of the enemy who might be driven out of China, and to destroy Halwai if possible.

Major Macnaghten performed the duty entrusted to him most efficiently, and having taken possession of the village of Halwai, destroyed it.

When the column arrived at China it was found to be deserted; the 2nd Gurkhas therefore, under Lieutenant-Colonel D. Macintyre, V.C., were detached to the south of the valley, while a detachment of the Mhairwarra Battalion, under Captain O'M. Creagh, was ordered to the east of China. In this manner, every village in the valley of any importance was visited and its towers destroyed. The troops then returned to Walai, having demolished ten of these towers, and bivouacked again at that place.

The enemy had everywhere escaped with all his cattle and movable property, which was not altogether to be regretted, as the destruction of the towers and the capture of a large quantity of grain sufficiently punished them, as well as adequately marked their inability to cope with our troops.

On the 22nd, the Jamrud column returned to Ali Musjid. On the return march, the inhabitants of the small Zakha Khel village of Bararkas succeeded in carrying off several mules, two of which were laden with the blankets of the men of the 5th Fusiliers. To punish this robbery a company of the 5th Foot and one of the 2nd Gurkhas were detached to burn their tower. While doing this, a small party of Zakha Khels was observed in a narrow gorge near the road. They were very soon dislodged, and two or three of their number killed; but this, unfortunately, did not happen until a

Gurkha sepoy had received a severe wound, from the effects of which he subsequently died. *Expedition against the Zakha Khel Afridis in 1878.*

In the meanwhile, the Dakka column, after destroying three villages and two of their towers in the vicinity of their bivouac, marched at 11 A.M. on the 21st for Nikai. This village was also burnt, and some bags of *ata* were secured from it, which were subsequently issued to the native troops and followers. It was now too late to reach the Sisobi pass before nightfall, and there was no water nearer than the Sisobi villages. Learning, however, that there was water and a camping-ground some few miles off in another pass, called the Tabai pass, the Brigadier-General resolved to halt the force there for the night, and to move on to Dakka the next day by this new route. The column therefore renewed its march from Nikai through the main valley, in which several towers were still visible, and which it would have been desirable to destroy had time permitted. At a great distance large herds of cattle were to be seen, apparently tended by women, but they were too far off to allow of their being captured. The road followed by the column shortly entered a wooded valley with a gradual ascent for about four miles. At half-past four o'clock in the afternoon the column reached the camping-ground, which consisted of several grassy plots in wooded ground. The water-supply was obtained from a *nullah* a hundred yards to the right.

The ground was commanded on all sides by hills, which were at once occupied by outlying picquets. It soon became evident that the enemy were assembling round the camp. The head of the column had scarcely reached the camping-ground when it was reported that the rear guard had been attacked; several shots were fired into it close to the camping-ground, and one man of the 1-17th Foot was shot through the upper part of the thigh.

The force having all arrived, strong picquets were posted to hold the gorge above and below the bivouac, and also in the *nullah* where the spring was, from which water for the troops was obtained. The heights on the right of the road were also occupied, but those on the left were inaccessible; therefore the enemy could cause the troops no annoyance from that side. Chiefly owing to the careful disposition of these numerous picquets, the troops were quite undisturbed during the night, and were thus enabled to get the rest so needful in view of the arduous operations of the following day. There was little doubt, however, that the enemy were gathering during the night to molest the retirement of the column.

The guides were carefully examined as to the nature and direction of the roads. The top of the pass was about a mile distant, and from there one road diverged to the left to Pesh Bolak, while the other turned to the right to Dakka. The road up to the pass was overhung on the left by a high, precipitous mountain, inaccessible on that side, while to the right the road was commanded by a series of hills of practicable access. The guides stated that there was little risk of attack from the left, but that the right should be carefully guarded.

The Afridis notoriously attack the baggage guard in preference to any other part of a force, and it was therefore determined altogether to change the usual order of march. Orders were consequently issued for each corps to take its own baggage with it. The artillery and sappers, being most encumbered with mules, were to follow close to the advanced guard. A very strong rear guard was to be left behind, which being quite unencumbered

*Expedition
against the
Zakha Khel
Afridis in
1878.*

Shortly after daybreak on the morning of the 22nd of December, a detachment of the 45th Sikhs, under Lieutenant H. N. M'Rae, was ordered to occupy the heights to the right of the pass in advance, and to join the rear guard as it passed.

Two companies of the 27th Punjab Native Infantry, under Captain J. Cook, were sent to the top of the pass to examine and secure the road leading in from the left, and to check any enemy who might hold the high hill on the left.

These dispositions had not been completed when two shots were fired from above the water gorge to the right of the position. These were believed to have been signal shots to give notice to the enemy that the troops were beginning to move. A company of the 1-17th Foot was at once despatched up the gorge, with orders to drive back any enemy it met with, and to rejoin the column further on, under the protection of the flanking parties. A considerable body of the enemy was driven back without any loss on our side. The column commenced its march at half-past eight o'clock in the morning. The road was winding, steep, and very difficult for mules, the ascent being about 1,000 feet, and the distance to the top of the pass about a mile and a quarter; but the path was mostly covered overhead with foliage. The troops had scarcely begun to move when a lively fusilade was commenced from the high hill on the left, and from behind rocks on its sides. Owing, however, to the distance, and to the road being hidden by trees, it proved harmless.

As the column neared the top of the pass, the positions of the enemy became more exposed, and the flanking parties on the right fired across the valley, but, owing to the great range, with little effect. At the same time the two companies of the 27th Punjab Native Infantry had gone some distance along the road to the left, to examine and secure it. Seeing the Afridis on the top of the steep hill becoming troublesome, Captain J. Cook directed Lieutenant H. P. Leach, R.E., with his half-company of sappers, who had just reached the crest, along with a party of the 27th Punjab Native Infantry under Lieutenant G. A. Williams, to take the summit of the hill. The position was gallantly carried, the advance of the sappers and of the 27th Punjab Native Infantry being covered by the fire of the troops on the crest. In this operation one sapper was shot through the arm. This hill was then occupied and held by a detachment of the 27th Punjab Native Infantry, until the whole force had passed. Meanwhile, the advanced guard, guns, and the different corps, each as compact as possible, with the baggage animals in the centre, had pushed down the pass at a steady pace.

The Brigadier-General and his staff remained in rear to superintend the movements, and did not reach the top of the pass till a quarter to ten o'clock.

Before this time, the rear guard, consisting of one company of the 1-17th Foot and of the 27th Punjab Native Infantry respectively, under the command of Captain W. Lonsdale, of the former regiment, had become hotly engaged, and was reinforced by a second company of the 1-17th, which had now descended from the hill. Even then it had much trouble in keeping back the enemy, owing to the dense forest and consequent difficulty in seeing them. It was 11 A.M. before the rear guard reached the summit of the pass. Captain Lonsdale was then directed to hold the crest of the pass with one company of the 1-17th Foot, and two companies of the 27th Punjab Native Infantry, until the flanking parties were withdrawn, when the rear guard was to follow the column. The hills on the flanks had been occupied by parties of the 45th Sikhs, which had been judiciously posted by Lieu-

tenant II. N. M'Rae. Notwithstanding this, the main body had been more or less molested in several places.

About three miles below the summit of the pass the road passed through a narrow defile about five or six feet broad, with high, perpendicular walls of rock on either side. The water of the stream was there frozen into thick masses of ice, which it was found difficult for the mules to travel over. The entrance, as well as the outlet of this defile, was commanded from the heights by the flanking parties of the 45th Sikhs. Nevertheless, a deep and narrow gorge from the right enabled a party of the enemy, estimated at about one hundred men, to creep down unperceived, and to occupy a sheltered position about two hundred yards from the outlet. As the 1-17th Foot and the 27th Punjab Native Infantry successively emerged in some confusion, they were met by a heavy fire from the enemy; one man of the 1-17th Foot and a sepoy of the 27th Punjab Native Infantry were wounded, and the man of the 17th, who had been wounded the previous evening, was shot dead whilst being carried in a *doolie*. Half a company of the 1-17th Foot moved up the hill to dislodge the enemy; but so dangerous did the position appear, that the Brigadier-General left his Orderly Officer, Captain G. W. Rogers, 4th Gurkhas, with a detachment of thirty men of the 45th Sikhs, to hold this position until the rear guard should have passed.

The enemy, as had been anticipated, returned, but were kept in check by the fire of this party.

About four miles from the top of the pass the valley opens out into a plain with cultivated land, owned by the then friendly Shinwaris.

Here the column halted for the rear guard, which shortly afterwards joined it. It had been a continuous skirmish with the enemy from the top of the pass to the mouth of the gorge, where the party, under Captain Rogers, had been posted.

The enemy seized the positions of the rear guard and of the flanking parties as soon as they were abandoned, but when the cultivated ground was reached, all opposition ceased.

The troops were now mustered, and it was found that no man and no property whatever were missing, while the casualties only amounted to one man killed and seven wounded, one of whom died the following day. The small number of casualties was attributed in some measure to the cover afforded by the heavy tree-jungle. The column resumed its march from this spot at two o'clock in the afternoon, and followed for some distance the dry bed of a stream. After a march of three miles, the troops passed the villages of Shulgarhi, which were strongly fortified, and overhung a narrow, rocky gorge. The headmen of these villages came out to pay their respects as the troops passed, and seemed to be well-disposed towards us. A few miles further on the column emerged on waterless grassy plains. After darkness set in the advanced guard fired the grass along the route to mark the way for the main body of the column. Dakka was reached by the advanced guard shortly after nine o'clock in the evening, but a difficult pass about three miles from that place so lengthened out the column, that it was half-past eleven at night before the whole force arrived at Dakka. The distance traversed in this day's march was estimated at twenty-two miles. The number and losses of the enemy could not be estimated, owing to the broken nature of the ground and the large area over which fighting took place simultaneously, but several of the Afridis were seen to fall.

*Expedition
against the
Zakha Khel
Afridis in
1878.*

*Expedition
against the
Zakha Khel
Afridis in
1878.*

the Dakka column, brought to special notice the gallant bearing and soldier-like qualities of all the officers and men composing this column. The men, he said, had throughout displayed gallantry, endurance, and coolness under fire, which elicited his admiration. There was no hurry, and mules which had thrown their loads were quietly loaded again under fire. The small number of rounds expended, namely 1,028, proved the entire absence of hurried firing. The endurance of officers and men was sufficiently evident when it was considered that the column was fighting and marching continuously, without food, from eight o'clock in the morning till eleven o'clock at night, through an unknown and very difficult country.

Brigadier-General Tytler specially mentioned the names of the following officers to whom he expressed himself much indebted, and who rendered him throughout most valuable assistance :—

Lieutenant-Colonel W. D. Thompson, 1-17th Foot.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. H. Utterson, 1-17th Foot.

Captain J. Cook, 14th Native Infantry.

Lieutenant H. N. M'Rae, 45th Sikhs.

Lieutenant O. S. Smyth, R.A.

Lieutenant H. P. Leach, R.E.

Major A. H. A. Gordon, 65th Regiment, Brigade Major.

Major A. A. A. Kinloch, 60th Rifles, Deputy-Assistant
Quarter-Master General.

Captain G. W. Rogers, 4th Gurkhas, Orderly Officer.

Lieutenant W. Peacocke, R.E.

Surgeon-Major G. J. H. Evatt.

Brigadier-General Tytler also reported that he received much valuable assistance from Ressaldar Adul Beg, Guide Cavalry, who acted as interpreter with the native guides. He also desired to bring to notice his indebtedness to Mr. A. Forbes, Special Correspondent, who accompanied the column throughout the day, and, being on the spot when two men were wounded, bandaged their wounds and looked after them until the arrival of the medical officer.

Among the troops of the 2nd Division, Lieutenant-General Maude considered that the spirit of officers and men was excellent, and he specially mentioned the name of Brigadier-General J. Doran, C.B., second in command; and recorded the valuable assistance he had received from Colonel C. M. MacGregor, C.S.I., C.I.E., of the Quarter-Master General's Department, on special service, who was with him during the expedition.

The list of casualties, and also the return of ammunition expended by the Dakka column, from the 20th to the 22nd of December, is given in Appendices C and D.

Second Expedition against the Zakha Khel Afridis of the Bazar valley, January-February 1879.

After the expedition into the Bazar valley in December 1878, the Afridis of the Khaibar pass continued to give trouble. On the 31st of December the road between Jamrud and Ali Musjid was temporarily closed by a party of about thirty Kuki Khels, who occupied the Shagai ridge, cut the telegraph wire, and killed a camp follower. Troops were ordered out from Ali Musjid, but, before their arrival, the road had been cleared by the *Jazailchis*. The stoppage did not last more than an hour, and the telegraph was quickly

On the 2nd of January, a guard of *Jazailchis* on the road between Jamrud and Ali Musjid was attacked by Kuki Khels; assistance was, however, promptly sent out from the latter place, and the enemy were beaten off. *Expedition against the Zakha Khel Afridis in 1879.*

The camp of the 6th Native Infantry was also fired into from the heights above Ali Musjid, and one man was killed and another wounded. Efforts were made by the Political Officers to break up the tribal combination of the Afridis, and on the 8th of January it was reported that the pass was perfectly quiet. The Kuki Khels and the Kambar Khels came in and tendered their submission, but the attitude of the Zakha Khels continued to be unsatisfactory; and the Political Officer, Major P. L. N. Cavagnari, C.S.I., reported that he thought a good effect would be produced by a temporary occupation of the Bazar valley, and by deliberately visiting in rotation recusant villages in the Bazar and Bara districts. He further considered that any measures adopted for the punishment of the refractory sections would not be calculated to interfere with the political arrangements entered into with the Khaibar tribes. In consequence of these opinions, Lieutenant-General F. F. Maude, V.C., C.B., commanding the 2nd Division, Peshawar Valley Field Force, applied on the 16th of January for the sanction of the Commander-in-Chief in India to the proposed expedition, in co-operation with a force from the 1st Division.

The plan of operations proposed by Lieutenant-General Maude was to send a column from Jamrud by the direct road to the Bazar valley, and a second column, also from the 2nd Division from Ali Musjid, by the Alachi route to the same destination. When these two columns had effected a junction, they were to proceed to join the column of the 1st Division from Basawal, at the head of the Bazar valley.

The three columns having united, were to be employed for three days in scouring the Bazar valley from this central position, but no opposition was expected during this part of the operations. Sufficient information had not been obtained to mature a plan of operations in Bara, but Lieutenant-General Maude, who was to take the command himself of the whole force, anticipated that the troops which would then be under his orders would be sufficient to carry out successfully any operations decided on in that direction.

The expedition was sanctioned, but, owing to a misapprehension of the proposed plan of operations, its duration was limited to ten days. This time was insufficient to carry out Lieutenant-General Maude's original proposals, as he had contemplated a concentration of the whole force in the Bazar valley on the fifth day, and no advance to Bara till at least the ninth day; but the Lieutenant-General considered that it would be out of place for him to question the decision of Government, and he therefore issued the necessary orders for the march of the different columns.

<i>Jamrud Column.</i>		<i>All ranks.</i>
D-A Royal Horse Artillery, (2 guns on elephants)	...	28
11-9th Royal Artillery (2 guns)	...	22
5th Fusiliers	...	313
1-25th Foot	...	316
13th Bengal Cavalry	...	145
Madras Sappers and Miners	...	55
24th Punjab Native Infantry	...	356

The Jamrud column, consisting of the troops detailed in the margin, marched from Jamrud on the 24th January, and, taking the road by the Khaibar stream, passed the Kuki Khel villages of Kadam, Gagrai, and Jabagai (*see Map, page 294*).

This column halted for the night in the bed of the river below Shul-

*Expedition
against the
Zakha Khel
Afridis in
1879.*

given by the Political Officer accompanying the troops (Captain L. H. E. Tucker) that no armed men were to appear, none were seen, and the attitude of this section of the Afridis was perfectly peaceful.

The following morning this column continued its march by Taoda Mela and the Chura Kandao to Bararkas, arriving there without opposition at four o'clock on the same afternoon. That part of the baggage of the Ali Musjid column which was on camels came also by the Chura Kandao, but did not reach Bararkas till half-past eight o'clock in the evening, having been fired on about a mile before reaching camp. Almost immediately after dark, a few of the enemy opened fire on the troops, killing one horse and wounding a mule, but, being replied to by the picquets, they soon desisted.

On the same day, the 25th of January, Brigadier-General F. E. Appleyard,

Ali Musjid Column.

	<i>All ranks.</i>
11-9th Royal Artillery (2 guns) ...	18
51st Foot ...	213
Madras Sappers and Miners ...	31
2nd Gurkha Regiment ...	312
Mhairwarra Battalion ...	320

From Landi Kotal.

6th Native Infantry ...	311
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C.B., marched from Ali Musjid by the Alachi route to Karamna, where, at noon, the column under his command effected a junction with the 6th Native Infantry, under Colonel G. H. Thompson, who had marched the same morning from Landi Kotal by the Bori pass. The rest of the day was occupied in blowing up the towers of

Karamna, in accordance with the request of the Political Officer.

At seven o'clock on the morning of this day, the troops from the 1st

Basawal Column.

	<i>All ranks.</i>
11-9th Royal Artillery (2 guns) ...	25
1-17th Foot ...	361
4th Battalion, Rifle Brigade ...	210
Guide Cavalry ...	32
Bengal Sappers and Miners ...	43
4th Gurkha Regiment ...	201

Division, strength as per margin, under the command of Brigadier-General J. A. Tytler, V.C., C.B., marched from Basawal. At the request of the Political Officer (Mr. A. F. D. Cunningham), who accompanied this column as far as Chenar, four companies, under Colonel H. R. L. Newdigate, 4th Battalion, Rifle Brigade, were detached *en*

route to destroy a cave village inhabited by robbers. The inhabitants had fled from it, but the village was, as far as possible, destroyed.

This column reached Chenar at three o'clock in the afternoon, where it

Dakka Column.

	<i>All ranks.</i>
1-17th Foot ...	52
27th Punjab Native Infantry ...	104
45th (Rattray's) Sikhs ...	257

was joined by a force, strength as per margin, from Dakka, under Lieutenant-Colonel F. M. Armstrong, commanding 45th Sikhs. Chenar was deserted by its inhabitants, but, as the villagers of this place had been concerned in cattle

robberies from Dakka, their two towers were blown up, and the village destroyed.

On the 26th this column continued its march. Five hundred infantry with a party of sappers were detached under Lieutenant-Colonel Armstrong to attack and destroy the village of Kasaba.* This was effected with slight resistance, the villagers taking to the mountains. Their tower was blown up, and the detachment rejoined the main column as it was moving off at eleven o'clock in the forenoon.

A short march of four miles brought the column to the Sisobi villages, the inhabitants of which had also been concerned in cattle-stealing. The villages were found deserted, the inhabitants of which, having taken refuge on the hills, refused to come in when invited to do so by the Brigadier-General. The villages were therefore destroyed, but the towers were left standing, out of consideration for the services rendered by some of the people as guides during the former expedition. *Expedition against the Zakha Khel Afridis in 1879.*

Meanwhile, the Ali Musjid column marched on the morning of this day, the 26th of January, on Burg, to which place some troops were detached from the Jamrud column at Bararkas to effect a junction with it. These two columns, having united at Burg and blown up the towers of that place, continued their march to the Bazar valley.

The remainder of the Jamrud column had in the meanwhile continued its advance, but, during the march, the rear guard was attacked by the enemy near the Obcha Tangi, and two Gurkhas were wounded; and it was greatly due to the excellent dispositions made by Major A. Battye, of the 2nd Gurkhas, that there were not more casualties on our side.

During this night there was a good deal of firing at the picquets, and this extended at one time or another all round the camp; one private of the 1-25th Foot was killed, and two men of the same regiment were wounded.

On the morning of the 27th of January, four companies of infantry with a party of sappers were detached from the Basawal column at seven o'clock in the morning, to seize and repair the Sisobi pass, which had been partly blocked. It was occupied without opposition, and the road made practicable for camels, before they reached that point with the baggage.

This column resumed its march at half-past nine o'clock in the morning, and, on arriving at the summit of the pass, was met by a detachment of 400 men, under Colonel C. M. MacGregor, from the Jamrud force. The further advance of this column was entirely unopposed, so that at four o'clock in the afternoon the three columns were united in the Bazar valley under Lieutenant-General Maude.

At daybreak on this date, the 27th of January, 300 men, under Colonel J. A. Ruddell, 1-25th Foot, were detached from the Jamrud column to scour the China hill, while a party of cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel R. C. Low, 13th Bengal Lancers, was sent round to the west of the hill to cut off the retreat of any of the enemy in that direction. These measures were so far successful that some seven or eight of the enemy who remained on the hill were killed. Three hundred men, under Major E. B. Burnaby, 51st King's Own Light Infantry, were also detached to scour the hills round the Prang Dara to the south-east of the valley from which the enemy, the day before, had harassed the rear guard. This force scarcely came in contact with the enemy, who at once retreated to the high hills out of range.

After the Basawal column arrived in the afternoon, the camp of the whole force was moved into the plain to a strong position, as the site hitherto occupied was not satisfactory, being partly commanded by the neighbouring hills.

There could be no doubt of the hostile feelings of the Zakha Khel Afridis towards the troops, as, directly the force entered their country, it was fired on by day and also at night. The inhabitants had also deserted their villages, and set fire to them, although the Political Officer had told them that they would not be molested. None of these people showed themselves in the daytime to the troops, but they were heard shouting about the hills and ravines, and fired at

*Expedition
against the
Zakha Khel
Afridis in
1879.*

small parties. This sort of warfare was not formidable, and, though somewhat harassing to the troops, was more so to the enemy.

On the 27th, the Lieutenant-General determined the following day to reconnoitre in force the Bokar pass towards Bara. There seemed every chance of this step being resisted, and the country was quite unknown to any one with the column. A force of one thousand men with two mountain guns was therefore detailed, under the command of Brigadier-General Tytler, to accompany Lieutenant-General Maude whilst carrying out this reconnaissance.

On the arrival of the force opposite Halwai, two miles from camp, the enemy opened fire from a hill top opposite that village. The advance was contested by the enemy from that point till within 1,100 yards of the Bokar pass. The enemy was, however, forced to abandon each successive position owing to the skilful tactics of Brigadier-General Tytler, and the Lieutenant-General was enabled to get a good view of the pass and of the surrounding hills before returning. At a quarter-past one o'clock in the afternoon the order was given for the troops to fall back to camp, when the retirement was carried out by Brigadier-General Tytler in the same careful manner as the advance had been conducted. The rear guard reached camp just at dusk, the enemy not venturing beyond the high ground near Halwai. The casualties on this occasion were, one sepoy of the 4th Gurkhas killed, Lieutenant H. R. L. Holmes, 45th Sikhs, one sergeant, 11-9th Royal Artillery, and two *kahars* wounded. The loss of the enemy was admitted to be fifteen killed. On the same day, the 28th, Captain W. Atkins, 6th Native Infantry, was despatched to Ali Musjid with the camels of the column unladen to bring a further supply of provisions. This party, with the escort accompanying it, was attacked below the Prang Dara heights, but, owing to Captain Atkins' judicious arrangements, not a man or camel was touched, while four of the enemy were seen to fall.

The following day, 29th of January, a detachment of 450 bayonets, under Colonel G. H. Thompson, commanding 6th Native Infantry, was detached to blow up the towers of Halwai, where fire had been first opened on the troops the day before. The enemy showed in greater numbers than on the previous day. The towers were, however, demolished, but, on the return march of this detachment through the low hills to the south of the camp, the whole country at once became alive with the enemy. The detachment threw out skirmishers as it fell back, and inflicted a loss, estimated at twenty men, on the enemy, while the casualties on our side were one killed and five wounded.

A squadron of the 13th Bengal Lancers, under Lieutenant-Colonel R. C. Low, commanding that regiment, was also sent out on the same day to reconnoitre, and to discover, if possible, a site for the camp with water near the Bara passes. This party got as far as a point north of where the troops had arrived the previous day, without being able to fix upon a suitable site. Lieut.-Colonel Low found the hills beyond occupied on either flank by strong parties of the enemy, and, as the ground was unsuitable for the action of cavalry, he very properly, in accordance with instructions he had received, withdrew the party to camp, having lost one horse, killed. On this occasion, Lieutenant A. R. Murray, 13th Bengal Lancers, behaved with great gallantry in going to the rescue of the sowar whose horse was killed.

It was now becoming apparent that the commencement of an Afridi war might develop itself if the troops forced their way into Bara. Should this further complication arise, a grave responsibility would be incurred by the Lieut-

from Government, notwithstanding the assurance of the Political Officer that any combination of other tribes with the Zakha Khels was altogether improbable.

*Expedition
against the
Zakha Khel
Afridis in
1879.*

Those officers with the column, such as Brigadier-General J. A. Tytler and Colonel C. M. MacGregor, who had had experience of the hill tribes, fully concurred in the opinion that an Afridi war would be commenced should the troops make any further advance. Lieut.-General Maude felt, therefore, that in what appeared to him a question of great delicacy, he required, before he pushed on into Bara, the opinion of a political officer of higher standing than Captain Tucker, although nothing could exceed the energy displayed by that officer in endeavouring to get the best information, and to settle matters satisfactorily.

The Political Officer on the Khaibar and Jalalabad line, Major P. L. N. Cavagnari, was therefore requested by telegraph to join the column if possible, the reason for this request being at the same time explained to him; but he was unable at that time to leave Jalalabad, where he then was with the 1st Division, Peshawar Valley Field Force.

On the evening of this day, the 29th of January, a circular was received from Army Head-Quarters addressed to officers commanding columns in Afghanistan, in which the Commander-in-Chief reminded them of the Viceroy's proclamation of the 21st of November 1878, and requested them to bear in mind that the British Government had declared war, not against the people of Afghanistan or adjoining tribes, but against the Amir, Sher Ali, and his troops. The letter further directed them individually to use their utmost endeavours to avoid provoking unnecessary collisions with the tribes and other inhabitants of the country, and to render its occupation as little burdensome to them as possible. As this communication, though in the form of a circular, was addressed to the General Officer Commanding by name, and was dated four days subsequent to the telegram according sanction to the expedition, while there was nothing to show that its contents were not applicable to the existing state of things with the expeditionary force, Lieut.-General Maude felt, upon its receipt, more than ever the responsibility attached to his position.

This position on the 30th of January was as follows:—A limit of ten days, of which that day was the fourth, had been fixed by Government for the expedition; conciliation, in accordance with the wishes of Government, as appeared from the above-mentioned circular, was to be adopted; the hostile attitude of the tribes rendered an advance impossible without encountering the resistance of a combination of tribes; the conviction of the General Officer Commanding that it was not the time when Government would wish to risk the commencement of an Afridi war.

Lieutenant-General Maude, therefore, determined to ask for more explicit orders, and he accordingly telegraphed to Army Head-Quarters on that day (the 30th), and, having explained the situation, asked for specific instructions as to his future proceedings, and whether he was to force his way into the Bara valley against such opposition as he might meet with.

On the evening of the 30th of January, Captain Tucker reported that although on the previous day he had informed the Lieutenant-General that sections of the Zakha Khels alone were assembled to dispute the advance of the troops, he had since learned that members of other tribes had assembled, some from a considerable distance, and were still assembling, to combine with the Zakha Khels to oppose the advance of the column.

Lieutenant-General Maude instructed the Political Officer to endeavour

*Expedition
against the
Zakha Khel
Afridis in
1879.*

to break up this combination, and, in reporting the circumstances by telegraph to Army Head-Quarters, he suggested that, if Major Cavagnari could not join the column, either he himself or Colonel C. M. MacGregor should be invested with full political power to settle the question as might appear best for the interests of Government in the existing juncture of affairs.

Lieutenant-General Maude, however, considered himself quite able to force his way with the troops at his disposal into Bara and out again, but he did not disguise from Government that such a step would undoubtedly lead to an Afridi war.

It subsequently transpired that detachments from the Kuki Khel, Aka Khel, Kambar Khel, Malikdin Khel, and Sipah Afridis, as well as from the Sangu Khel Shinwaris, and the Urakzais, were assembled in the Bara passes to hold them.

On the 31st of January a convoy of provisions arrived in camp. It was on this occasion that Lieutenant R. C. Hart, Royal Engineers, distinguished himself by an act of conspicuous gallantry. This officer took the initiative in running some 1,200 yards to the rescue of a sowar of the 13th Bengal Lancers, who had fallen wounded, and was about to be despatched by a party of Afridis. Lieutenant Hart ran along a river bed exposed to the fire of the enemy from both flanks, and also from a party in the river bed itself, and, having reached the wounded man, drove off the enemy, and, with the aid of some sepoy of the 24th Punjab Native Infantry and 45th Sikhs, who had followed him, brought him under cover. The sowar subsequently died, but for this act of gallantry Lieutenant Hart was awarded the Victoria Cross.

On the same day a telegram was received from Lieut.-General Sir S. J. Browne, commanding the 1st Division, urgently calling for the return of Brigadier-General Tytler's force, as he had received information that an attack on Jalalabad and Dakka by Mohmands and Bajouris might be expected on the 7th of February. This requisition Lieut.-General Maude felt bound to comply with. Just at this time it transpired that the enemy had suffered severely in the skirmishes of the past few days, and that, in consequence of the protracted occupation of their valley by the troops, the inhabitants of this district were well disposed to open negotiations. This was followed by the arrival in camp, on the 1st of February, of a deputation from all the sections of the Bara Zakha Khels. They expressed themselves desirous of opening friendly relations, attesting their sincerity on this point by bringing in with them some of the camels which had been stolen from the troops some time before in the Khaibar pass.

On the 2nd of February the Political Officer reported that he had come to terms with the *jirga*, which he considered to be satisfactory; and it then became possible for orders to be issued for the return of the three columns to their respective stations on the following day.

The same evening the Lieutenant-General received a telegram in reply to his of the 30th and 31st, informing him that the instructions of Government regarding avoiding unnecessary collisions with the people of Afghanistan were to be accepted as general, and applicable more particularly to tribes which had hitherto been directly under Afghan rule, and that there was nothing, in the instructions referred to, to prevent Lieut.-General Maude carrying out the expedition into the Bara valley. He was also informed that he was left free, in consultation with Mr. D. C. Maclellan, the Chief Commissioner of the

him at once, to act on his own judgment in carrying out the intention for which the expedition was planned. *Expedition against the Zakha Khel Afridis in 1879.*

On the receipt of these instructions the Lieutenant-General decided to adhere to the orders he had previously issued for the whole force to commence its return march on the following day. This decision was chiefly caused by the sudden recall of Brigadier-General Tytler's force, as it was necessary for it to march the following morning if it was to arrive in time at Jalalabad and Dakka to meet the expected attack upon these places. In addition to this, the Political Officer stated that he was satisfied with the terms that the Bara Zakha Khels had agreed to. He was also of opinion that a more lengthened occupation of the valley would cause much irritation, and lead to a risk of collision with other tribes with whom the Government had no quarrel. Lieutenant-General Maude was inclined to agree with this view, as there was no doubt that considerable detachments from various tribes were massed in the Bara passes. Nor could there be any two opinions on this head, that though the troops were perfectly able to force their way into the Bara valley, such a step would bring on a war in which all the tribes from the Bazar valley to Kuram would join; while to stay in the Bazar valley longer would be very likely to cause the representatives of these tribes to commit acts of hostility which would call for immediate retaliation by the troops.

For these reasons, therefore, the General Officer Commanding determined to adhere to the orders which had been previously given for the return of the whole force, and accordingly, on the 3rd of February, the different columns left the Bazar valley—Brigadier-General Tytler by the Sisobi pass for Dakka, the troops of the 2nd Division by Chura for Jamrud and Ali Musjid respectively, reaching their destinations on the 4th.

The Political Officer with the column was expressly informed that no settlement of the case would be considered satisfactory if the columns were fired at on their return march. He was directed to inform the Zakha Khels that if shots were fired, the troops would, sooner or later, to a certainty, return. That none of the columns, contrary to Afridi custom, were molested during their withdrawal, may be taken as a proof of the sincerity of their submission.

The return of casualties in the above operations in the Bazar valley is given in Appendix E.

Lieutenant-General Maude, in submitting his despatch, said that, although the operations did not afford the troops an opportunity for the display of much gallantry, they were by no means wanting in giving them chances of showing the possession, by both officers and men, of high military qualities. All ranks showed the greatest anxiety to meet the enemy on all occasions, and whenever they did, although the enemy had the advantage of cover, and an intimate knowledge of the country, our troops invariably drove them before them, and obliged them to relinquish position after position. In concluding his despatch, Lieutenant-General Maude specially brought to notice the names of the following officers: Brigadiers-General J. A. Tytler, V.C., C.B., F. S. Blyth, F. E. Appleyard, C.B., and J. E. Michell, C.B.; Colonels C. M. MacGregor, C.S.I., C.I.E., Deputy Quarter-Master General, J. A. Ruddell, 1-25th Foot, G. H. Thompson, 6th Native Infantry, the Honourable D. M. Fraser, C.B., R.A., and W. C. R. Mylne, Principal Commissariat Officer; Lieutenant-Colonels F. B. Norman, 24th Punjab Native Infantry, R. C. Low, 13th Bengal Lancers, and M. H. Heathcote, Assistant Quarter-

*Conduct of
Khaibar Afri-
dis subsequent
to the Expedi-
tion of 1879.*

G. Hatchell, Assistant Adjutant-General; Captain M. G. Gerard, Acting Deputy-Assistant Quarter-Master General; Lieutenant B. E. Spragge, 51st Foot, in charge of the signalling operations; and Surgeon-Major J. A. Hanbury, Principal Medical Officer. In addition to the above, the Lieutenant-General mentioned the services of Subadar Alam Khan, and Jemadar Yassin Khan, 24th Punjab Native Infantry, who materially assisted in bringing the negotiations with the Zakha Khels to a satisfactory issue.

After this expedition the Zakha Khel Afridis showed a disposition for a time to remain friendly, but at the end of March they again began to give trouble, and continued to do so until the termination of the first phase of the operations in Afghanistan by the Treaty of Gandamak in May. On the 22nd of March the Afridis from the Bazar valley plundered and burnt the post station between Landi Kotal and Dakka, and on the same night the telegraph wire was cut, a large quantity of it being carried away. On the 5th of April a grazing guard was attacked near Ali Musjid by Afridis, and two sepoys of the 6th Native Infantry were killed. On the 9th a convoy proceeding from Dakka to Landi Kotal was attacked by 500 men of the Zakha Khel clan. Two followers only were wounded, and the enemy were driven off with a loss of fifteen killed and three prisoners. On the 23rd of the same month it was reported that the pass between Jamrud and Ali Musjid was closed by 300 men of the Zakha Khel and Kuki Khel clans, but communications were speedily restored by the joint advance of small forces from both the stations named.

On the withdrawal of the British army in June, the Afridis of the Khaibar pass did not attempt to molest the troops, except in one instance, in which they made an attack on the baggage of the 9th Lancers on the 6th of June, when two cartmen were killed, and some property of the officers stolen.

After the termination of the first campaign in June 1879, arrangements for the safety of the Khaibar were made with the Afridis. The leading representatives of the tribes were summoned to Peshawar from Tirah, and, after long negotiations, consented to serve under the British Government for the same allowances which they had been wont to receive, though somewhat irregularly, from the Kabul *Durbar*. A large force of *Jazailchis*, under a selected officer, was appointed to patrol the road, escort convoys, and relieve the military of the onerous duties of watch and ward. These arrangements worked very satisfactorily, and from the beginning of the second campaign to April 1880 the security and quiet of the Khaibar pass were almost unbroken. Two raids attempted by Zakha Khel Afridis, in October 1879, were punished by the Afridis themselves; the Khusrogis, the offending section, were compelled to pay a fine of Rs. 800, and to surrender hostages for good behaviour.

In April 1880 the misconduct of the Nasr-ud-din Khel and Anai sections of the Zakha Khels gave some trouble, and the hostages who had been taken as security for the good behaviour of these, the most turbulent sections of the Khaibar Afridis, absconded. Shortly after, a *Syad*, named Mir Bashir, of Tirah, with the countenance of Mulla Wali Khan, a devotee of great influence among all the Afridis, took advantage of the discontent which existed among certain sections of the Zakha Khels, and proclaimed himself *Badshah* of Tirah. He found followers principally among the Malikdin Khels and Kambar Khels.

levied money and grain contributions as tribute, and for the supplies of the army which he endeavoured to raise and drill in his support.

Under his influence, and at the instigation of an ex-*malik* of the Sipah clan, several raids were committed in the month of June, and an expedition to Tirah was proposed; but the emergency was not considered to be sufficiently grave to call for so important a movement, and shortly after this the influence of Mir Bashir died away.

*Conduct of
Khaibar Afri-
dis subsequent
to the Expedi-
tion of 1879.*

The Afridis were never seriously inclined to exchange their democratic freedom for the rule of a priest who demanded revenue and took tithe of their crops and herds, and this, combined with doubts of the sincerity of his religious pretensions, caused his popularity to wane as fast as it had risen.

The British army which had been in occupation of Northern Afghanistan returned through the Khaibar at the end of August and beginning of September 1880. The pass remained quiet, and there were no attempts, even on the part of isolated fanatics or bad characters, to plunder stores or molest the camps at night. The positions at Ali Musjid and Landi Kotal continued to be held by our troops, but in the month of September the Government of India announced its determination to withdraw the regular forces stationed in the Khaibar, if satisfactory arrangements could be made to keep the pass open under the independent and exclusive charge of the tribes. No time was accordingly lost in summoning the representative headmen of the Khaibar clans, of whom more than 300 assembled in Peshawar towards the end of that month. It was found necessary to give the headmen time to discuss matters among themselves, and to secure the consent of sections still absent in Tirah and Bara to the arrangements which were proposed. They had also, before any agreement could be made, to undertake the coercion of the Khusrogi and Painsai Zakha Khels. In this they succeeded, and in January 1881 a complete *jirga* of all the Khaibar tribes was collected at Peshawar, where their headmen affixed their seals to a final agreement with the British Government on the 17th February 1881.

The terms of this agreement were as follows:—

- (1) Independence of Afridis to be recognised, but no interference by any other power than Great Britain to be allowed.
- (2) In consideration of certain allowances, the Afridis to undertake to maintain order throughout the Khaibar.
- (3) All matters concerning pass arrangements to be submitted to a general meeting of representatives from all the tribes.
- (4) No traveller to enter the pass without an order.
- (5) The tribes not to require military aid from India.
- (6) The tribes to furnish such a number of *Jazailchis* as the Government might direct, with head-quarters at Jamrud; to be subject to political inspection, and to be paid by the British Government, but not to constitute a Government force.
- (7) All tolls, etc., to belong to the Government.
- (8) Offences on the road to be dealt with by a general *jirga* reporting to the Government.
- (9) The tribes to abstain from committing outrages in British territory.
- (10-15) Minor arrangements with reference to the custody of Ali Musjid and other Government buildings in the pass; to undertakings to forward posts and expresses at any time; and to the territorial limits of tribal responsibility, viz., Landi Khana on the west,

Arrangements
made with
Khaibar Afri-
dis in 1881.

The British Government engaged to continue the subsidies which had hitherto been paid on the following scale :—

					Rs.	
<i>Afridis</i> ...	{	Kuki Khel	1,300	per mensem.
		Malikdin Khel	1,300	" "
		Kambar Khel	500	" "
		Kamar Khel	250	" "
		Zakha Khel	1,700	" "
		Sipah	1,300	" "
<i>*Shinwaris of Loargai</i>		805	" "
Total				...	7,155	" "
					or 85,860	per annum.

Besides the above, there were small special allowances to minor headmen, who rendered service in the first campaign, but had to give place to the old tribal chiefs when they made submission after the peace of Gandamak. These allowances raised the annual subsidies to a total of Rs. 87,540.

The position of the *Jazailchis* was entirely changed in the new arrangement. The British Government now merely paid the cost of their maintenance, a sum amounting to about Rs. 87,160 per annum; but they were to be appointed and dismissed by the chiefs of the tribes concerned, who were solely responsible for their management, reporting their arrangements to the Political Officer at Jamrud. The strength of this body was about 550 men, with the usual complement of subadars, jemadars, and subordinate officers.

When these arrangements were complete and in working order, the British troops were withdrawn, on the 21st of March 1881, from the positions they had held at Ali Musjid and Landi Kotal.

The pass has since been protected by *Jazailchis*, and the arrangements made with the Khaibar Afridis have been found to work satisfactorily, and long trains of travellers and pack animals, convoys of treasure, and stores of ammunition for Kabul have come and gone through the pass with safety. Tolls on caravans commenced to be levied on the 15th September 1881, and the income from this source is estimated at about 60,000 rupees per

* The *Shinwaris* are a powerful tribe, numbering between 11,000 and 12,000 fighting men, who inhabit a portion of the Khaibar valley and some of the eastern valleys of the Safed Koh; they are also found on the borders of Bajour. With the exception of one small section, they have in ordinary times no dealings with the British, and therefore do not come within the scope of the present work. The only occasions on which we have come into contact with them were during the first Afghan war, and during the late operations in 1878-80. In November 1841 this tribe attacked the British post at Pesh Bolak, and in the following year an expedition was sent into their country to inflict punishment. In the late campaign in Afghanistan they caused considerable annoyance on our line of communications, and several punitive expeditions were sent against them. The *Shinwaris* are divided into four clans—I. Manduzai; II. Sangu Khel; III. Alisherzai; and IV. Sipah. Members of the Alisherzai clan inhabit the Loargai valley about Landi Kotal in the Khaibar, and are known as the Loargai *Shinwaris*. This is the only portion of the tribe with whom we have any dealings.

The Loargai *Shinwaris* number between 500 and 600 fighting men, and, as a rule, every man has a matchlock, but they do not possess many rifles. They are great traders, and carry on a large carrying trade with Peshawar, Jalalabad, and Kabul. This circumstance makes them very dependent on the British Government for their livelihood. They are a quiet, well-behaved set as a rule, and are well aware how much their prosperity depends on their good conduct; and they have hitherto cheerfully accepted their position and worked well with all the Government officials with whom they have come in contact. They are not likely to give aid to either of their powerful

annum.* The first occasion on which the traffic in the Khaibar was molested was on the 21st of February 1882, when, as a demonstration, a body of Zakha Khels, chiefly belonging to the Anai section, attempted an unsuccessful raid on a caravan about three miles from Ali Musjid. Due warning of their intention had been previously received, and the two Zakha Khel companies of the *Tazailchis*, with half of the Malikdin Khel company, repulsed the marauders with a loss of four men killed and ten wounded, before they could attack the travellers on the road. Shortly afterwards the offending section of the Zakha Khels submitted. It seems that they had reason to be discontented with the conduct of the Zakha Khel *maliks* in the distribution of the tribal subsidy, and their action is to be attributed more to this cause than to a desire to break the treaty which provided for the management of the pass by the Afridis. Measures were taken to remove their causes for discontent by a re-allotment of the Zakha Khel subsidy. At the same time the opportunity was taken to bring the distant section of the Zia-ud-din, which inhabits a tract in the Bara valley, detached from the main settlements of the Zakha Khels, into closer connection with the responsibility of the tribe for all its sub-divisions. Events subsequent to 1881

Unconnected with the affairs of the Khaibar and our general relations with the Afridis were the two night attacks by Kamal, Malikdin Khel, and his gang, on picquets of native cavalry at Peshawar and Kohat. In the first, which occurred on the night of the 19th of July 1881, Kamal, with eight associates, surprised a post on the road leading from the Peshawar cantonment to Jamrud. Of the duffadar and six men who formed the picquet, three were killed and three badly wounded, and four of their carbines were carried off. The raiders escaped unpunished, owing to the darkness of the night, the rugged and broken nature of the ground they traversed, and the precaution they took of cutting the telegraph wire to Jamrud. On the night of the 20th of September 1881 a similar carefully planned and boldly executed attack was delivered on the quarter-guard of the 3rd Punjab Cavalry at Kohat, by Kamal and eight or nine companions belonging to the Malikdin Khel clan. On this occasion three sowars were killed and four wounded, and two carbines were taken. Of the raiders, two were wounded, of whom one was abandoned by his comrades, and was captured near the *kotal* of the Kohat pass the next morning. He subsequently died of his wounds.

The audacity of these raids brought them into conspicuous notice, but it was clear that they were not the outcome of collective tribal ill-feeling against the British, nor prompted by any expectation of plunder, but were the acts of individual border ruffians who were actuated by personal motives of revenge. Kamal himself, who had served in our army, where he acquired a knowledge of military routine which materially facilitated the execution of his plans, lost a brother, and two near relatives of his associates were killed, in a raid which they attempted, in February 1881, on cattle of Peshawar villages grazing on the Aka Khel border. Not the less, these raids constituted a breach of the engagement by which the Khaibar tribes had bound themselves to prevent such outrages. It was therefore required of them either to surrender the raiders to justice, or to pay a fine of Rs. 7,000, and to exclude Kamal from the Afridi country. Both the demands involved in the second alternative were obeyed

* The principal imports into British India by this trade route consist of the skins and furs of Central Asia, the silks of Bokhara, gold in bullion and dust, clove, fresh and dried fruits from

Events subsequent to 1881.

without hesitation, and a heavy reward was offered for the capture of Kamal. Fines were also levied from the tribes who permitted him to pass through their limits to Kohat.

On the 6th of January 1883, the outlaw Kamal, with the assistance of some men of his own tribe and of the Bassi Khel section of the Aka Khels, having returned to Bassi Khel territory, made a raid on British territory, and carried off four horses and a mule belonging to a British officer marching from Peshawar towards Matanni, and the stolen animals were given a passage through the Aka Khel limits to the Urakzai country. The horses were, however, brought back in the following March by the Aka Khels. The Malikdin Khels were also to some extent implicated in this offence, as, contrary to the express agreement with Government into which they had entered, they had permitted Kamal to return to the tribal settlement in Maidan, whence he had started to commit this raid. The Malikdin Khels were accordingly fined Rs. 780, and the Bassi Khels Rs. 750.

The Aka Khels, since the punishment they had received in 1855, had been generally well-behaved; and the most important offence committed by them of late years had been the destruction of a police post in course of construction on their border in October 1880. For this offence a fine of Rs. 1,000, with Rs. 1,200 compensation, was recovered from the tribe.

No other offence of any importance has been committed up to the present time by the Khaibar Afridis, or by the Aka Khels. The Bassi Khel section of the latter have, however, refused to pay the fine of Rs. 750 imposed upon them for giving a passage to the outlaw Kamal, and this will have to be taken from their allowances. The Aka Khels have, moreover, committed themselves to claim from the Sipah Afridis a share in the Khaibar allowances, and this is a never-ending source of conflict on this border; in prosecution of their claim, they or their party are believed to have interfered at the beginning of the present year with the telegraph communication between Peshawar and Jamrud. The quarrel is still unsettled. The Aka Khels are now under the management of Nawab Sarfaraz Khan, chief of the southern Mohmands.

The arrangements for sending travellers and caravans through the Khaibar continue to work satisfactorily; on fixed days they proceed under an escort of *Jazailchis* from Jamrud to Landi Khana, where they are made over to the representatives of the Amir of Kabul, the *Jazailchis* in turn receiving charge of the caravans coming to Peshawar.

APPENDIX A.

Return of Killed and Wounded in the force under **LIEUTENANT-COLONEL J. H. CRAIGIE, C.B.,** *on the 27th March 1855.*

Corps.	Killed.					Wounded.					Remarks.
	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	
4th Native Infantry	6	6	*1	1	1	7	10	*Major C. Patten- son, slightly.
9th Native Infantry	3	3	7	7	
20th Native Infantry	1	7	8	
Total	9	9	1	1	2	21	25	

ABSTRACT.

Killed	9
Wounded	25
Total	34

APPENDIX B.

Return of Ammunition expended by the troops under the command of **LIEUTENANT-COLONEL J. H. CRAIGIE, C.B.,** *on the 27th March 1855.*

Corps.	Mountain Guns. Number of rounds.		Infantry and Cavalry. Number of rounds.	
	Shells.	Round shot.	Cartridges balled, musket rifle, carbine.	Caps.
Peshawar Mountain Train Battery ...	18	55
16th Irregular Cavalry	70	70
4th Native Infantry	7,634	11,451
9th Native Infantry	9,364	9,504
20th Native Infantry...	24,388	27,571
Total ...	18	55	41,456	48,596

APPENDIX C.

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing in the first expedition into the Bazar valley, from the 19th to the 22nd December 1878.

Corps	Killed.					Wounded.					Missing.	Remarks.			
	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Followers.	Total.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Followers.		Total.	Followers.	Total.
1-17th Regiment	1	...	1	*2	...	2	*One of these died subsequently. †Died subsequently.
8th Company, Sappers and Miners	1	...	1	
2nd Gurkha Regiment	†1	...	1	
27th Punjab Native Infantry	4	...	4	
45th (Rattray's) Sikhs	1	...	1	1	1	
Total	1	...	1	9	...	9	1	1	

ABSTRACT.

Killed	1
Wounded	9
Missing	1
Total	11

APPENDIX D.

Return of Ammunition expended by the Dalka Column operating in the Bazar valley, on the 20th, 21st, and 22nd December 1878.

Corps.	Number of rounds.	Remarks.
1-17th Foot	507	
8th Company, Sappers and Miners	90	
27th Punjab Native Infantry	272	
45th (Rattray's) Sikhs ...	159	
Total	1,028	

APPENDIX E.

Return of Killed and Wounded in the second expedition into the Bazar valley, from the 24th January to the 4th February 1879.

Corps.				Killed.						Wounded.						Remarks.
				British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Followers.	Total.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Followers.	Total.	
D-A. Royal Horse Artillery	1	1	
11-9th Royal Artillery	1	...	1	
1-25th Regiment	1	...	1	3	...	3	
13th Bengal Lancers	1	...	1	
2nd Gurkha Regiment	1	...	1	3	...	3	
4th Gurkha Regiment	1	...	1	
24th Punjab Native Infantry	1	...	1	1	1	2	
45th (Rattray's) Sikhs	*1	1	...	2	*Lieut. H. R. L. Holmes.
Mhairwarra Battalion	†1	1	1	†Died subsequently.
Total	5	...	5	1	...	1	8	3	13	

ABSTRACT.

Killed	5
Wounded	13
Total	18

CHAPTER X.

PESHAWAR AND KOHAT BORDERS.

AFRIDI TRIBE (*Continued*).

Adam Khel Afridis.

*Adam Khel
Afridis.*

IN the previous chapter it was stated that the Afridi tribe was divided into eight clans, and these, with one exception, formed the subject of that chapter. It is now proposed to consider the remaining clan, the Adam Khel, which, though a branch of the Afridi tribe, cannot, as already stated, be regarded as a part of it in any other than an ethnological point of view.

The Adam Khel Afridis inhabit the hills between the districts of Peshawar and Kohat, but, unlike the other Afridi clans, do not migrate to any great extent in the summer. A small portion of the tribe* proceed to Maidan during the hot weather, but the greater number remain in their own hills adjoining the Kohat and Peshawar districts all the year round. Their villages are substantial, strengthened by towers, and situated for the most part in defensible positions. They have considerable tracts of cultivation about them, but their chief agricultural labour is expended on the unirrigated waste-lands in British territory belonging to our villages adjoining their border. These villages were assigned by the Sikhs to the *arbabs* of the Mohmand division, in order to avoid coming into immediate contact with the hill-men, whose payment of revenue was uncertain and precarious, and with whom the *jagirdars* were forced to maintain a good understanding.

The Adam Khels have always been a very independent tribe, and have never acknowledged any authority. In former days the villages of Bori and Janakhwar maintained bands of robbers to plunder the Attock road, and it was owing to their depredations and the difficulty of managing them that the Sikhs were induced to assign the district of Kohat to the Barakzai chiefs.

The Adam Khels trade extensively with British territory, and are dependent on us. A blockade would do them much injury, and, if protracted, would be almost intolerable. The difficulty, however, in the case of a blockade is to prevent any one section from getting aid from neighbouring sections.

* The bulk of the Kalla Khel division of the Ashu Khel section migrate annually to Tirah. Two or three hundred families of Jowakis also reside in Tirah. The portion of Maidan, in Tirah, which is occupied by the Jowakis and Kalla Khels, is known as the Adam Khel Dara. These are the only sections of the tribe which live in Tirah.

The Kohat pass runs through the Adam Khel country, and is the most direct route from Kohat to Peshawar. As this pass has been the cause, directly or indirectly, of nearly all our complications with the Adam Khel Afridis, a brief description of it will not here be out of place. From the north side the defile commences at four and a half miles south-west of Fort Mackeson. From Aimal Chabutra to the south foot

Kohat pass.
Gallai Afridis.

kotal is about twelve or thirteen miles. The actual entrance is a mile and a half from Aimal Chabutra, thence at three hundred yards, and three-quarters of a mile to the right of the road, is the village of Akhor, and in less than two hundred yards further, the road goes between the main ridge and a low detached hill which completely commands the entrance to the pass. Beyond this point the hills open out, and, at a distance of three hundred and fifty yards from the detached hill, there is a space between them of a thousand yards. In the next half-mile the valley opens out to one mile and a quarter in width, again closing in to half a mile in the next fourteen hundred yards. This increases a little further on, but within three hundred and fifty yards again becomes about the same breadth. For the next three miles the road goes through the valley in a south-east direction, the hills being from a thousand to twelve hundred yards apart. A little further on the hills come as close as four hundred yards, but again recede to fifteen hundred in the next three furlongs. In less than half a mile more the hills again approach to within nine hundred yards, and about two and a half furlongs further the narrowest part of the pass, namely, three hundred yards, is reached. Before reaching this point, the Zargun Khel villages are passed; these are scattered along both sides of the road. The village of Khui lies about two miles distant on the left of the road, but is not visible from it. After passing through this narrow defile, the road runs in a south-westerly direction, and in three miles the foot of the Kohat *kotal* is reached. The valley here opens out to a breadth varying from a mile to a mile and a quarter, and the villages of Sheraki are scattered along the road on the right. One mile and a quarter from the foot of the *kotal* are the villages of Bosti Khel. The summit of the pass is 600 to 700 feet above the plain. In the open spaces all along the pass are strips of cultivation, sometimes of considerable width, and the hills on either side, although steep, are accessible. Water, however, is scarce; there are no springs of any description at Akhor; there are a few wells, but the supply of water is scanty, and at a great depth; there are also one or two wells at the back of Zargun Khel, between it and the hills. With these exceptions, the only dependence for water is to be placed on tanks, of which there are many in the pass, but they are liable to become dry in the hot weather.

The Adam Khel Afridis are divided into four branches—(1) Gallai, (2) Hassan Khel, (3) Jowaki, and (4) Ashu Khel.

The *Gallai Afridis* are divided into the following sections—Sheraki, Bosti Khel, Zargun Khel, and Torsappar. They live in the Kohat pass and its tributary glens, with the exception of the Torsappar section, which inhabits the valley of that name to the east of the pass, and between the Ashu Khel and the Jowaki territory. The Gallai number about 1,400 fighting men. Their principal dependence is on trade. Their lands yield sufficient for a year's consumption, but there is no surplus. Their principal occupation is carrying salt on camels to Peshawar, and their revenue is assisted by a subsidy from the British Government for the safety of the road leading from Peshawar through the Kohat pass.

Hassan Khel
Afridis.
Jowaki Afridis.
Ashu Khel
Afridis.

The *Hassan Khel Afridis* are divided into two principal sections, the Akhorwal, or Western,* and the Janakhwari, or Eastern, Hassan Khel; and the former is again sub-divided into (a) Bolaki Khel, (b) Gaddia Khel, and (c) Pirwal Khel. There is a dispute of long standing between the Bolaki Khel and Gaddia Khel relating to Kalamsada, a tract of land extending from the mouth of the Kohat pass northwards to Aimal Chabutra and the limits of Jana Garhi.

The principal villages of the Hassan Khels are Akhor, Janakhwar, Khui, Musadara, Taruni and Spargai. Their fighting strength is 1,900, the eastern section supplying 1,600 and the western 300 fighting men.

Their means of livelihood are bringing in wood and charcoal to Peshawar, and in cultivating some *lalni* land belonging to Mohmands of Sham Shattu and of Azakhel. They would become very hopeless if blockaded.

The *Jowaki Afridis* live to the east of the Kohat pass, and for the most part inhabit the valleys forming the southern portion of the Adam Khel country. They also occupy the northern valley of Bori and the country around Pastaoni which connects Bori with the southern Jowaki territory. They are divided into two sections, the Haibat Khel, and the Kimat Khel.

The principal villages of the Jowakis are, Paiah, Kakhto, Jamu, Shindih, Pastaoni, Ghariba, Turkai, Shindand, and Bori. The first six of these belong to the Haibat Khel, Turkai and Shindand are Kimat Khel, and in Bori the two sections are mixed. The above names cover, not single villages, but clumps of small hamlets. There are no large villages in the Jowaki country. The Jowakis are the principal carriers of wood to the Kohat cantonment, and also have a large carrying trade in salt. They possess a number of camels, which are constantly employed in carrying wood, grass, or salt, and the trade they derive in this way is very large. Their fighting strength is estimated at about 1,200 men.

The *Ashu Khel Afridis* are located to the south of Fort Mackeson, on the first range of hills, and in the Uchalgadda valley. Their villages are Kandao, Kandar, Kalla Khel, Pridi, and Mahmudi. With regard to their fighting strength, Kandao could turn out 400, and Kandar 100 men; the Kalla Khels have 700, and other sections could supply 200 more, making a total of 1,400 fighting men. The Kalla Khels migrate to Tirah, and many of them remain there the whole year round. In 1853 it had been intended to punish the Ashu Khels of Kandao for their share in the depredations on the Peshawar border, for which Bori was destroyed; but they gave in a timely submission, and so avoided punishment. They are an unimportant section, and are hardly recognised in the Adam Khel *jirga*.

The fighting strength of the Adam Khel tribe is thus—

Gallai	1,400
Hassan Khel	1,900
Jowaki	1,200
Ashu Khel	1,400
Total				5,900

Our dealings with this tribe are carried on through the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat.

* The Akhorwal, or Western, Hassan Khel is one of the pass sections, and is very closely associated with the Gallai. They are often included with the latter under the general head of Kohat Pass Afridis. The term Hassan Khel is generally restricted to the Eastern Hassan Khels.

Expedition against the Kohat Pass Afridis, by a force under Brigadier Sir Colin Campbell, K.C.B., in February 1850.

The British connection with the Adam Khel Afridis commenced immediately after the annexation of the Peshawar and Kohat districts. Following the example of all former governors of Peshawar, the British, in April 1849, entered into an agreement with the Kohat Pass Afridis to pay them Rs. 5,700 per annum, for which they were to protect the road through the pass. On the 2nd February 1850 a party of sappers employed in constructing a road from Kohat to the crest of the *kotal*, in British territory, were surprised by a body of Afridis. The assailed had not even time to arm themselves, before twelve were killed and six wounded, the assailants numbering, it was said, about one thousand men.

*Expedition
against the
Kohat Pass
Afridis in
1850.*

Lieutenant-Colonel G. St.P. Lawrence, the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar, at first supposed the outrage was no indication of any hostile combination of the hill tribes, but merely an effort of the sections through whose territory the road was to pass to prevent our labours, and thus purchase forbearance.

Lieut.-Colonel
Lawrence's report.

Subsequent information, however, pointed to a coalition between the Gallai Afridis and the men of Akhor in particular. The instigator and leader was reported to have been a proscribed freebooter, named Daria Khan; and the avowed object of the aggression was to compel reversion to the rates at which salt was formerly sold at the Kohat mines. In Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence's opinion, however, the chief cause was the making of the Kohat road, which would throw open the fastnesses of the neighbouring tribes, and make them accessible to regular troops.

In the opinion of Mr. Temple, at that time Secretary to the Punjab Government, the chief causes of this outrage were the innate ferocity of the Afridis, their distrust of a civilised Government, and the machinations of a noted freebooter who had, previously to annexation, forfeited for his crimes a *jagir* in the Peshawar district, and who hoped, by disturbing the passage of the defile, to induce the British to conclude terms with him. With regard to the other causes which were attributed, namely, the increased taxation of salt, the construction of a road through the pass, and the non-receipt of the stipulated allowances by the Afridis, these may have been circumstances of provocation, but each of them admitted of explanation. In the first place, the British tax on trans-Indus salt did not injuriously affect the Afridis. The duty leviable at the mines was, indeed, higher than the former taxes, but this was the only duty; while town and transit market duties, to which the salt had been previously liable, were remitted. The aggregate of the three kinds of previous taxes exceeded the single duty of the British at least two-fold in all cases, and even four-fold in some cases. But the rate of duty, while it might affect the western tribes or the consumers of the plains, in Peshawar or elsewhere, would not injure the Afridis, who are great carriers and not great consumers. If the price of salt were high, the consumer might suffer, but the carrier would realise his full dues. Moreover, experience shows that when the price of trans-Indus salt is increased, the profits of the carrier rise to a still greater degree. This fact has been repeatedly admitted by the Afridis themselves at conferences, so that some thought that if the duties were to be enhanced, the Afridis at least would be actual gainers. But the duties had not been

*Expedition
against the
Kohat Pass
Afridis in
1850.*

raised from the rate originally fixed (two, three, and four annas per maund); while in the Punjab the duty amounted to Rs. 2 per maund, and had always been cheerfully paid. Furthermore, if the duties had been vexatious to the Afridis, which they were not, still they had not come into operation when the party of sappers were massacred. The temporary closing of the mines pending inquiry might, perhaps, have created some mistrust; but they had been re-opened just before the outrage took place. As for the road, no ~~work~~ was being carried on within Afridi limits, nor through any part of the pass. The unfortunate sappers were working within our own territory, near Kohat, at a place where a regular road has since been constructed. As for the allowances being paid, not to the Afridis, but to another party who failed to pass it on to the proper recipients, the British officer at Kohat deposed that the money was disbursed to the Afridi *maliks* in his own presence.

Two regiments of the Punjab Irregular Force, the 1st Punjab Infantry and the 1st Punjab Cavalry, were at the time of the outrage under orders for Kohat, and their departure was therefore stopped.

About this time the Commander-in-Chief, General Sir Charles J. Napier, G.C.B., had arrived at Peshawar, and on the 7th of February 1850, orders were issued for an advance through the Kohat pass.

The force which was detailed for this duty was under the immediate command of Brigadier Sir Colin Campbell, K.C.B., but the Commander-in-Chief was to accompany it in person.

Fourteen days' provisions were to accompany the troops, and four officers taken from regiments that did not form part of the force were to accompany it as baggage masters. Any man found plundering would be hanged or flogged. Officers were to march in the lightest order, and no reprisals by the troops were to be allowed without distinct orders.

The object of the expedition was two-fold: first, to strengthen Kohat by the 1st Punjab Cavalry and 1st Punjab Infantry; and, secondly, to punish the offending sections.

2nd Troop, 2nd Brigade, Horse Artillery,
with separate elephant transport.
Two 5½-inch mortars, carried on one
elephant.
Two companies, 60th Rifles.
Two companies, 61st Foot.
Two companies, 98th Foot.

15th Irregular Cavalry.
1st Punjab Cavalry.
23rd Native Infantry (Com-
mander-in-Chief's escort).
31st Native Infantry.
1st Punjab Infantry.

The force,
as per margin,
marched on the
9th to Matanni,
entering the Ko-
hat pass on the

10th (*see* accompanying Map).

The advance was covered by the 1st Punjab Infantry. As the column entered the pass, it was met by a deputation from the village of Akhor, who endeavoured to exculpate themselves; but Lieutenant-Colonel G. St. P. Lawrence, the Deputy Commissioner, being assured that this was one of the villages which had taken part in the massacre of the sappers, an answer was returned to the deputation that the villagers must within an hour surrender themselves and their arms. At the end of the hour the *maliks* returned, stating that their companions would not listen to the terms, whereupon the Commander-in-Chief ordered Sir Colin Campbell to crown the heights round the village.

The enemy were posted chiefly on the heights, only a few occupying the village. Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence had assembled about 1,600 levies under their *arbabs*, or chiefs. These were, by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, ordered to

Lieut.-Colonel Law-
rence's report.


A PORTION OF THE AFRIDI COUNTRY

to illustrate the
MILITARY OPERATIONS
against the
AKA KHEL AFRIDIS IN 1855,
and against the
ADAM KHEL AFRIDIS
in 1850 & 1853

Scale 1 Inch = 4 Miles.

REFERENCES.

PLACES NAMED IN	{	Sir Colin Campbell, 1850.....
OPERATIONS OF		Col. Boileau, 1853.....
ROUTE TAKEN BY	{	Sir Colin Campbell's force.....
		Col. Boileau's.....
ACTIONS	{	Col. Boileau, 29th November 1853.....
		Col. Craigie, 27th March 1855.....



ascend the heights; those on the right in support of a detachment of the 60th Rifles and the 1st Punjab Infantry, under Captain J. Coke, and those on the left in support of detachments of the Guides and 1st Punjab Infantry, under Lieutenant H. B. Lumsden, of the former corps. *Expedition against the Kohat Pass Afridis in 1850.*

Regimental History,
Guide Corps.

The brunt of the skirmishing fell on the 1st Punjab Infantry. Strong opposition was offered by the enemy, who were behind breastworks; but, covered by the fire of two Horse Artillery guns, these breastworks were speedily carried.

Regimental History,
1st Punjab Infantry.

The levies had gone up boldly enough; but, once there, nothing could induce them to come down until the village had been taken, and it was quickly evident that little assistance was to be expected from them.

The village of Akhor was then partially destroyed, under the direction of the civil authorities.

The obstruction to the entrance of the defile being thus removed, the column moved forward towards the village of Zargun Khel, leaving at the head of the pass a large number of the levies and the 15th Irregular Cavalry, under Major S. Fisher.

On nearing Zargun Khel, the enemy were again found posted on the heights above the village, whence they were driven by detachments of the 60th and 98th Regiments, assisted by the Horse Artillery, when this village was also burnt.

On encamping for the night in the valley, which in this part is commanded from the heights on either side, the enemy crowned the hills, and kept up a desultory fire on the camp immediately below them, killing and wounding several of the force. Two companies of the 31st Native Infantry, under Captain W. P. Hampton, and a company of the 1st Punjab Infantry accordingly cleared the heights on both sides, and held them for the night. The enemy continued to annoy these picquets throughout the night.

Previous to the column moving forward on the morning of the 11th, a detachment, consisting of two guns on elephants, one company, 61st Regiment, five companies, 1st Punjab Infantry, two troops, 1st Punjab Cavalry, and 600 levies, the whole under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel J. Fordyce, and accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence, proceeded to the village of Khui. The advance was covered by the 1st Punjab Infantry, which had one man wounded. Resistance similar to that previously experienced was met at Khui, which was also burnt.

Regimental History,
1st Punjab Infantry.

On the return of this detachment, the column resumed its march through the pass, which, after leaving Zargun Khel, becomes extremely narrow and difficult, being commanded by the heights which immediately overlook it, and which were held by the enemy. These heights were taken by three companies of the 1st Punjab Infantry on the left, whilst a detachment of the 60th Rifles, supported by one of the 98th Foot, crowned the heights on the right.

Meanwhile the rear guard, composed of the 23rd Native Infantry and two Horse Artillery guns, under Major J. Platt, met with considerable annoyance from large bodies of the enemy, who pressed heavily on its rear and flanks, and occupied each height as soon as it was vacated by our troops, until the village of Sheraki was reached.

Sheraki was found deserted, and destroyed, and the march of the force was continued to the foot of the Kohat *kotal*, where the force encamped.

*Expedition
against the
Kohat Pass
Afridis in
1850.*

under Lieutenant F. R. Pollock, Assistant Commissioner, and the force was joined at the foot of the *kotal* by two guns and these irregulars.

Lieut.-Colonel Lawrence's report. In the afternoon the 1st Punjab Cavalry continued its march to Kohat.

The heights overlooking the front of the camp were occupied by a company of the 23rd Native Infantry, which, immediately after dark, was attacked by a party of the enemy, who were, however, driven off by the arrival of the in-lying picquet, which had been sent up when the firing was first heard.

About eight o'clock on the following morning, two companies of the 31st Native Infantry, which, under Captain W. R. Dunmore, of that regiment, had held the heights overlooking the rear of the camp, and which had remained unmolested during the night, were ordered down, as no enemy were in sight, to enable the men to procure water and regular food, it being the third day they had not cooked. As this order was being conveyed to Captain Dunmore, a party of twenty men of the 31st Native Infantry was detached under a native officer, with particular instructions to ascend the heights in a direction pointed out to him as more easy of access, and to hold the position during the temporary absence of the two companies.

This native officer, instead of obeying his orders, proceeded direct upon Captain Dunmore's detachment, at this time in the act of descending the steepest part of the hill by alternate companies, when the rearmost company, under Ensign W. H. Sitwell, still some distance up the hill, as well as the native officer's party, which had just reached him, were suddenly attacked by a body of the enemy, who opened a very severe fire, and rolled down huge stones. Ensign Sitwell and several of his men were struck down by the first discharge; and so sudden and impetuous was the attack of the mountaineers, that it was with the greatest difficulty that certain men of his regiment succeeded in rescuing that officer's body.

The retreat of the party was covered by one of the Horse Artillery guns, which prevented the enemy following up their first attack.

At the same time the other picquet of the 23rd Native Infantry was attacked; to reinforce which a company of the same regiment was immediately sent forward, under Lieutenant T. H. Hilliard. The enemy was driven off, but Lieutenant Hilliard was severely wounded in carrying out this operation.

Lieut.-Colonel Lawrence's report. The Commander-in-Chief, Sir Charles Napier, then rode over to inspect Kohat, accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence, and during the day two companies of the 98th Regiment, two companies, 31st Native Infantry, two companies, 1st Punjab Infantry, with the Horse Artillery, the whole under the command of Major E. Haythorne, 98th Foot, were detached to cover a party employed in burning the three villages of Bosti Khel. The enemy offered resistance, as on the previous occasions, but the duty was effected without a single casualty.

On the morning of the 13th, the force was put in motion to return to Peshawar, the baggage being in the centre of the column, and every precaution taken for its protection, as in the advance.

The 1st Punjab Infantry remained on the ground for some time after the force had started, and then proceeded to Kohat without molestation, although a large number of Bizotis (Urakzais) were on the hills around.

Sir Colin Campbell's column had commenced its march about 7 A.M.; on the advanced guard nearing Sheraki, the enemy opened fire from the neigh-

bouring heights, and from this point until the rear guard reached the immediate vicinity of Akhor, nearly the whole length of the defile, the Afridis contested the ground, opposing the force in front, and hanging incessantly on its flanks and rear, with greater perseverance even than they had manifested in our advance; but not a single beast of burden, or article of baggage, was lost throughout these operations.

*Expedition
against the
Kohat Pass
Afridis in
1850.*

On the return march another attempt was made to induce the levies to attack, but without success. There was, however, a detachment which was a brilliant exception to the general rule; for Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence said there was a small band of Khaibaris of the Malikdin Khel clan, under Fateh Khan (who had done such good service in the defence of Fort Attock under Lieutenant Herbert), which was ever foremost, Fateh Khan and his standard-bearer leading the van. In recognition of this conduct, the Commander-in-Chief directed that Fateh Khan and his standard-bearer should be mounted on an elephant, and precede the column into Peshawar.

The loss in these operations was nineteen killed, seventy-four wounded, and one missing (*see* Appendix A), of which thirty were in the 1st Punjab Infantry.

The force encamped outside the pass on the evening of the 13th, and returned to Peshawar the following day.

In forwarding his despatch on the above operations, Sir Colin Campbell alluded to the admirable steadiness and conduct of the force engaged in this service, and to the zeal and ability displayed by Lieutenant-Colonel J. Bradshaw, C.B., 60th Rifles, in charge of the advanced guard, both in the advance to, and return from, Kohat; by Lieutenant-Colonel J. Fordyce, commanding the artillery, as well as by Lieutenant-Colonel W. R. Corfield, 31st Native Infantry, who commanded the rear guard on the return of the column, and Major J. Platt, 23rd Native Infantry, who commanded it during its advance.

The Brigadier said that the conduct of Captain J. Coke and the regiment under his command (1st Punjab Infantry) could not be too highly spoken of, eliciting, as it did, the admiration of the whole force. He also brought to notice the services of:—Captain R. S. Simpson, Assistant Commissary-General; Lieutenant H. W. Norman, Brigade Major, (especially for his exertions in carrying away the wounded of Ensign Sitwell's party); Lieutenant J. S. Paton, Deputy-Assistant Quarter-Master General; Lieutenant F. Peyton, 98th Regiment, Aide-de-Camp; Captain J. Staples, 7th Light Cavalry; Lieutenant W. Young, 7th Light Cavalry; Ensign C. Murray, 70th Native Infantry, and Lieutenant J. Perkins, 71st Native Infantry, Baggage Masters. He added, he had had the greatest pleasure in being associated with Lieut.-Colonel Lawrence, the Deputy Commissioner, to whom was due his warmest acknowledgments for the cordial and obliging readiness which he evinced at all times to render assistance to himself and the troops whenever in his power to do so.

The Commander-in-Chief then issued a General Order, in which he reviewed the objects and the successful accomplishment of the expedition, and also paid a tribute to the memory of Ensign W. H. Sitwell, of the 31st Native Infantry, and of the men who sacrificed their lives in trying to save the wounded officer.

The thanks of the Supreme Government were subsequently ordered to be conveyed to the officers concerned.

The Governor-General in Council recorded that he had always anticipated

*Expedition
against the
Kohat Pass
Afridis in
1850.*

the occurrence of such forays and outrages on the part of the border tribes for some time to come, and that he conceived that their own lawless and predatory character was sufficient to account for attacks similar to that made on the sappers whenever they might occur.

The Indian medal, with a clasp for the "North-West Frontier", was G. G. O. No. 812 of 1869. granted in 1869 to all survivors of the troops ~~engaged in~~ the above operations against the Kohat Pass Afridis.

Soon after the expedition above related, hostilities commenced afresh.

On the 28th of February 1850 a *jirga* assembled among the hill-men, and it was decided to attack the police tower on the summit of the Kohat *kotal*. The next day the Afridis of the pass, with the Bizoti and Utman Khel sections of the Urakzais, surrounded the tower and took possession of the road, driving back the detachment of Multani police which had gone to the aid of the men in the tower.

The ammunition of the police was all but expended when Captain J. Coke arrived at the foot of the *kotal* with 450 bayonets of the 1st Punjab Infantry, a squadron of the 1st Punjab Cavalry, and two guns.

There were from 1,500 to 2,000 Urakzais and Afridis on the hill, the road up which was commanded on all sides.

Captain Coke immediately attacked the hill with the 1st Punjab Infantry, leaving the guns at the foot protected by the cavalry. The enemy were driven back, and a company of the 1st Punjab Infantry put into the tower with a supply of ammunition and food. Our loss had been eleven killed and fourteen wounded, which was severe, considering the number of men engaged.

The thanks of the Government were conveyed to Captain Coke for his gallant conduct, and also to Lieutenant H. Daly, who commanded the 1st Punjab Cavalry, and to the officers and men of the 1st Punjab Infantry and 1st Punjab Cavalry.

On the 2nd of March, Daria Khan arrived in the pass with the Hassan Khel Afridis and a number of the Khaibar Afridis, and, being joined by the Bizotis and Utman Khels (Urakzais), and by the men of the pass, he attacked the tower in the evening, but was beaten off. During the night the enemy pushed on close up to the tower, under cover of the rocks, cutting off the water, which was in a small tank about 150 yards down the hill; they then erected breastworks across the road up the hill. The attacking force consisted of some 2,000 men, but the native officer in command of the tower, Subadar Muhammad Khan, defended the place with great spirit.

It was now imperative that a movement should be made for the relief of the tower, and Captain Coke moved out with 450 bayonets and some 500 Bangash levies. After a conference between the Bangash men and the Afridis and Urakzais, the enemy retired from the hill, when Captain Coke withdrew his men and the police from the tower. The enemy soon returned and destroyed the deserted post, and the same evening dispersed to their homes.

On the 22nd of March, Apothecary M. Healy, proceeding *via* Khushalgarh to join the 1st Punjab Infantry at Kohat, was attacked by a party of hill-men, believed to have been Gallai Afridis. He had gone on in advance of his escort, and was cut down when within about six miles of Kohat, near the village of Togh, dying shortly afterwards from the effects of the wounds.

At the beginning of April several of the headmen of the Gallai Afridis came in to the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar, denying that the above murder had been committed by their sections, and suing for terms. And on the 24th of April the head-quarters and two squadrons, 1st Punjab Cavalry, marched through the Kohat pass to Peshawar, meeting with no opposition, but, on the contrary, finding the headmen and others offering every facility for their progress.

Lieut.-Colonel Lawrence's report.

Lieutenant H. Daly's report.

Conduct of the Kohat Pass Afridis from 1850 to 1853.

At the end of April the chief *maliks* of the offending sections came in to Lieut.-Colonel Lawrence of their own accord, and sued for peace. The terms offered by the Government were as follows, and the whole of the tribe in British territory were to be ejected in the event of their not being acceded to :—

1st. The tribe to engage to keep the pass open at all times, safe and free.

2nd. The tribe to receive the same allowances as in 1849, and to be admitted to the same terms in respect to salt as other tribes.

3rd. For the fulfilment of these conditions hostages to be given.

On the 6th of June 1850 all the assembled *maliks* of Akhor, Zargun Khel, and Sheraki accepted the conditions, and promised hostages.

But it soon became evident that the body of the tribe represented by these *maliks* was not prepared for submission. On the 9th of June, a native officer returning from Kohat was plundered, the *dak* papers were torn up and the carrier beaten, and an intended attack on the Assistant Commissioner of Kohat was reported.

Captain J. Coke's report.

Orders were therefore issued both at Peshawar and Kohat for shutting out the offending sections and seizing such as happened to be in British territory. This was followed by numerous seizures,—some of women,—which gave particular anxiety to the tribe.

As regards the renewal of hostilities, Government prohibited any extensive aggressive movement till after the rains, considering it safer to await the result of the blockade already established.

The infraction of the agreement was followed by an incursion into British territory, and the plunder of the village of Jana Garhi on the night of the 26th of July. The assailants belonged to the villages of Zargun Khel, Sheraki, and Bosti Khel, and numbered about 400.

On the 18th of September the Commissioner of Peshawar brought to the notice of the Board of Administration that the Afridis of the Kohat pass had again sued for terms, offering the headmen of the pass as their security. He pointed out the advisability of entering into a treaty, as there was every reason to believe the present submission was sincere. He also drew attention to the great importance of maintaining permanent possession of the Kohat salt mines, and to the advantages to be gained by having strong outposts at these points ; because an exclusion for six months of any tribe habitually frequenting the mines must reduce them to submission or starvation.

The Board, in soliciting the orders of Government, recommended a treaty with the Kohat Pass Afridis, and, though concurring in the necessity for posts at the salt mines, deferred sanctioning them until the sites had been inspected and reported on by some officer of mature experience. The Government of India, willing to treat the tribe considerately, consented to renew their old allowances on con-

Punjab Government despatch.

*Conduct of the
Kohat Pass
Afridis from
1850 to 1853.*

dition of their being responsible for the security of the pass. In order to strengthen the arrangement, Rahmat Khan, a chief of the neighbouring Urakzais, was admitted to a share of the responsibility, and was granted a personal allowance of Rs. 2,000 per annum, and Rs. 6,000 as the pay of a mounted guard, to be maintained on the crest of the *kotal* near Kohat. These payments, as then (November 1850) revised, aggregated Rs. 13,700 per annum.

From this time till 1853, the pass remained open, occasional robberies only being committed; but the Afridis regarded the share which Rahmat Khan had in the pass arrangements with extreme jealousy, and the ill-feeling thus raised culminated in October of that year, when they attacked and seized Rahmat Khan's post on the *kotal*, in which there were only twenty (instead of the stipulated one hundred) men. The pass was then closed, postal communication stopped, and British officers were fired upon by the Afridis.

The Chief Commissioner soon after this (November 1853) arrived at Peshawar, and directed Captain H. R. James, the Deputy Commissioner, to arrange for the attendance of the *maliks* of the Kohat pass. These men accordingly came in, and had a long conference with the Chief Commissioner, during which Major H. B. Edwardes, the Commissioner, and Captain H. R. James, the Deputy Commissioner, of Peshawar, and Captain J. Coke, the officer in charge of Kohat, were present.

There were four modes of arranging for the re-opening of the Kohat pass which appeared feasible—1st, to restore matters to the *status quo*, viz., to give Rahmat Khan (Urakzai) Rs. 13,700 per annum for himself and the Afridis, making them responsible, as formerly, for the security of the pass; 2nd, to give the Afridis for the pass (but only as their own share of the old allowances) Rs. 5,700; 3rd, to divide the pass into sections, making separate arrangements with the heads of those tribes who held each portion; and 4th, to hold the *kotal*, or summit of the pass, ourselves, and make an arrangement with the Afridis for the remainder.

To the first plan all our officers were opposed. They felt that the Afridis were opposed to further connection with Rahmat Khan, who had proved his incapacity to conciliate and control them. The second plan was that to which Captain James inclined as most acceptable to the Afridis themselves; the third was the proposition of Captain Coke; and the last, that of Lieut.-Colonel F. Mackeson, the late Commissioner of Peshawar, to which the Chief Commissioner himself inclined. This last was eventually given up, not simply because it entailed considerable expense, but because it did not appear probable that any reasonable number of the undisciplined irregulars, unconnected with the tribes in the vicinity of the pass, could hold the *kotal*.

The discussion was therefore narrowed to the second and third plans, and though Captain James still inclined to his former views, it was agreed that the one of making separate arrangements promised the best security and the greatest permanence. Our officers were unanimously of opinion that it was out of the question giving the Afridis a rupee in excess of their former emoluments. Rahmat Khan was their own selection. He may have treated them ill, but it was not right to allow them to benefit by their own wrongful acts. They had repeatedly broken their engagements and shut the pass. They had even, when enjoying our allowances, permitted travellers to be murdered and robbed close to their villages, which offered a refuge to the

The Afridis had finally crowned a series of misdeeds by attacking the posts of their chosen leader, and expelling his men.

The following, therefore, were the propositions which it was decided should be offered to the Afridis:—1st, that the whole crest of the *kotal* and the side of the hill towards Kohat down to Captain Coke's first post at the Kohat entrance of the pass should be made over to the Bangash tribe,* who, their allowances, should satisfy and be responsible for the good conduct of the Bizoti, Utman Khel, Feroz Khel, and other minor tribes, and that the allowance for this duty should be Rs. 7,700 per annum; 2nd, that from below the *kotal* (on the Peshawar side), down to the Akhor and the Bassi Khel boundary, should be made over to the Afridis on Rs. 5,400 per annum; 3rd, with the Bassi Khel Afridis an arrangement should be made for the rest of the road (being the broken ground outside the pass on the Peshawar side) for Rs. 600.

*Conduct of the
Kohat Pass
Afridis from
1850 to 1853.*

A conference accordingly took place on the 5th of November with the Gallai and Hassan Khel Afridis, who, with Rahmat Khan (Urakzai), had hitherto engaged for the whole pass. The Chief Commissioner on this occasion carefully recapitulated the past history of our engagements, showing how great had been their perfidy, ingratitude, and inconstancy. They replied that they were prepared to be faithful to their promises for the future; that, in fact, they had never broken them, but that Rahmat Khan had defrauded them; and that for the future they wished to have no chief over them.

The Chief Commissioner then told them the arrangements which he proposed, by which they would be responsible only for that portion of the pass which was within the lands of their own tribes. This they refused, saying they would alone engage for the whole pass and take all the allowances; and added, that rather than not have the whole pass to themselves, they would accept the responsibility on their former share of the allowances, *viz.*, Rs. 5,700.

The Afridis positively refusing our terms, the Chief Commissioner broke up the conference, and desired them to withdraw and consider the matter over quietly among themselves, and return in the space of two hours with their final resolve. Half an hour afterwards he was told that they had left Peshawar for their homes. On hearing this, though the Chief Commissioner felt that no faith could be placed on these Afridis, though he did not believe that they would accept the engagement, or that, if they did, they would adhere to it, still he was sorry that the *maliks* had left Peshawar while a prospect of an arrangement existed. He therefore sent after them, on the plea that their final answer should be formally given. On their return, Captain James was empowered to offer them the engagement they had desired, *viz.*, the responsibility of the whole pass on the allowance of Rs. 5,700 per annum. This might be thought so far a concession, that it gave up to the charge of the Afridis the *kotal* which we had hitherto held at our own disposal, and which they had never occupied. But, on the other hand, it was a punishment, inasmuch as it doubled their responsibility without increasing their allowance.

But the Afridis refused Captain James's offer, saying that nothing but the full allowance would satisfy them, thus proving that their first offer was not sincere. On this they received their dismissal, and set off for the pass. They had not, however, reached the pass before they again desired to negotiate, and sent in a message by one of our police sowars, who had followed them to see them safe out of the valley, proposing to return next day and endeavour

*Conduct of the
Kohat Pass
Afridis from
1850 to 1853.*

to effect an arrangement. This the Chief Commissioner refused. The fact was, that had the Afridis accepted the terms, there was not the slightest security that they would fulfil them. No tribe or party would go bail for them, and they could give no pledges of any real value for their sincerity. The system among hill tribes of giving hostages is little check on them when dealing with us, for they know that we shall not oppress their people. Under native rule, the hostages of a tribe who grossly infringed ~~the~~ ^{their} would have been put to death, or at least mutilated.

It may, perhaps, be asked why the Afridis of the pass were anxious to enter into engagements which they would not maintain. The reply is, that since the closing of the pass, a number of their tribe had been arrested at Kohat, whom they were anxious to see released; and, moreover, this was the height of the salt season, and the closing of the pass at this time to them was a great blow, for it stopped their carrying trade. If, therefore, we had to force the Afridis of the Kohat pass into terms which, however distasteful to them, they would have great difficulty in breaking, this was the best time for effecting our object.

By the old arrangement, Rahmat Khan (Urakzai) received Rs. 8,000 per annum, Rs. 2,000 as his personal allowance, and Rs. 6,000 for the pay of 100 men to hold the *kotal*. He appears to have kept up twenty men in two small posts below the summit on the Kohat side of the hill, spent a few rupees among the *maliks* of the tribes, and appropriated the rest. The Gallai and Hassan Khel Afridis received Rs. 5,700, out of which they had to satisfy the Bassi Khels. The latter were at feud with the Afridis of the pass, and, from their position outside on the left of the road leading to Peshawar, possessed great facilities for plundering, of which they never failed to avail themselves. It was useless, therefore, including them in any arrangement with the Gallai and Hassan Khel Afridis. The very smallest sum which the Kohat Pass Afridis could pay the Bassi Khel was Rs. 300 per annum, and this sum was accordingly deducted from the allowances of the former, and added to an equal sum out of that which Rahmat Khan formerly enjoyed. Thus, Rs. 7,700 remained for the Bangash tribe.

It has been remarked that it was the wish of Lieutenant-Colonel F. Mackeson, the late Commissioner of Peshawar, not to make over the *kotal* to any tribe, whether Afridis or Bangash; and the Chief Commissioner inclined to the same view. He did not wish, however, as Lieutenant-Colonel Mackeson proposed, to place there a body of undisciplined irregulars collected from distant places, as he believed that, with no cover and no water, they could not have held their position. But the Chief Commissioner wished Captain Coke to select men from the Bangash, the Bizoti, and Utman Khel Urakzais, and other tribes in the vicinity of the pass, and place them in charge; Captain Coke, however, assured him that the men of these tribes would not enlist for such employment.

The Chief Commissioner then sent Captain Coke back to Kohat, and empowered him to make an arrangement with the Bangash tribe, and to repair the two old towers, and to build three new ones on the *kotal*. If successful, of which that officer entertained no doubt, it must place the Afridis entirely at our mercy. Their hills did not afford them sufficient subsistence; they existed mainly by carrying salt from the Kohat mines into the Peshawar valley, and thus it would be impossible for them to do anything against our consent in the face of the Bangash tribe, backed by our troops. Shut out from Kohat, and blockaded by our forces in front of the pass on the Peshawar

side, they might emerge from their defile as individuals, to steal and to plunder, as they formerly did when enjoying the bounty of Government, but they could do nothing more than this.

*Conduct of the
Kohat Pass
Afridis from
1850 to 1853.*

It had long been contemplated to build a fort on the Peshawar side of the pass, near its mouth; accordingly a force was now moved out to that point, and the work on the post, known as Fort Mackeson, was commenced.

On his return to Kohat, Captain Coke assembled all the Bangash *maliks*, and asked them if they were ready to undertake the holding of the *kotal* against the Afridis on the allowances granted by Government; and as they almost all agreed to do so,

Captain J. Coke's
report.

Captain Coke ordered them to furnish their separate quota of men, and on the 11th he moved out with them to the *kotal*, taking a wing of the 1st Punjab Infantry and of the 3rd Punjab Infantry with two guns, to be kept in reserve at the foot of the pass.

The top of the *kotal* was gained without an Afridi being seen or a shot being fired. There being no water of any kind, it became necessary to make immediate arrangements for its supply, not only for the use of the men, but also for building the towers. These arrangements being completed, on the morning of the 12th the party commenced building the towers, repairing the walls, etc. These works were all in progress when, about ten o'clock, the alarm was given that the Afridis were coming down. They pushed boldly up the *kotal* from the glen on their own side, and got above the Bangash men on the left, where they had entrenched themselves with loose stones on the summit of a hill. The picquet of the Bangash on this hill now gave way and ran in on the others. Captain Coke was on the hill with ten or twelve men of the 1st Punjab Infantry, by one of whom the leading Afridi was cut down; but there was a general panic among the Bangash, who made a rush down the hill, evacuating all the strong positions before the force from below could support them. Having covered their retreat, and brought them out into the plain, Captain Coke found they were too disheartened to attempt anything again that day, and he therefore strengthened the camp at the foot of the *kotal* with another regiment of infantry and two more guns, and sent Khwaja Muhammad Khan to bring up his Khataks, hoping, with the aid of the Bizotis and Jowaki Afridis, to carry out the work.

Captain Coke and three of his men were wounded in this skirmish, and three of the Bangash *maliks* were killed, as well as other casualties.

An arrangement was subsequently entered into by which the Bizotis and Sipah Urakzais and the Jowaki Afridis agreed to aid the Bangash tribe in the defence of the *kotal*; and to receive as follows, *viz.*, Bangash, Rs. 3,200; Jowakis, Rs. 2,000; Bizotis, Rs. 2,000; and Sipahs, Rs. 500.

In the meanwhile the Afridis of the pass were suffering from the blockade. The British authorities had acted on the principle that if the Afridis would not keep the pass open, the doors of the pass must be shut upon the Afridis; so, at length, the Gallai and Hassan Khel Afridis tendered their submission, and offered to reopen the pass. This offer was accepted, except that they were to receive only Rs. 5,400 instead of the Rs. 5,700 formerly given, the remaining Rs. 300 being given from the allowances of the Akhor Hassan Khel to the Bassi Khel, Aka Khel Afridis. This last sum was afterwards increased to Rs. 600. This arrangement was concluded before the end of 1853.

Arrangement
made with the
Kohat Pass
Afridis in
1853.

The aggregate allowances of the pass were thus divided as follows:—

	Rs.
Bangash tribe	3,200
Urakzai tribe	2,500
Jowaki Afridis	2,000
Kohat Pass Afridis	5,400
Bassi Khel Afridis	600
Total ...	13,700

This total was subsequently increased to Rs. 14,600; the Bangash allowance being increased to Rs. 4,400 (Rs. 2,400 to Bahadur Sher Khan, for charge of the pass, and Rs. 2,000 to the Bangash tribe), and the allowance to the Pass Afridis being reduced to Rs. 5,100. This last amount was distributed as follows:—For guards furnished by the Akhor Hassan Khels, Rs. 1,200; for the *muliks* of this section, Rs. 1,050—total, Rs. 2,250; to the villages of Sheraki and Bosti Khel, Rs. 950; to Torsappar, Rs. 950; and to Zargun Khel, Rs. 950—total, Rs. 2,850.

Expedition against the Bori villages of the Jowaki Afridis, by a force under Colonel S. B. Boileau, in November 1853.

When the Afridis of the Kohat pass misbehaved in 1850, the Jowaki tribe offered to engage for that pass, or to conduct communications through their own, the Jamu and Bori passes, and to carry the *dak* regularly. The Jowaki route was actually used for a short time, but the Jowaki Afridis soon proved themselves to be worse even than their neighbours. They committed numerous raids and murders in the Kohat and Peshawar districts, robbed boats on the Indus, and were also concerned in the murder of Apothecary Healy.

In 1851, Lieutenant H. B. Lumsden reported that several serious raids had been committed on Kohat and Khushalgarh by the Jowakis of Paiah and Ghariba, who had also attacked one of the Khatak villages; and he recommended that these villages should be destroyed by Khwaja Muhammad Khan, the Khatak chief, whilst Captain J. Coke, with a force, prevented any co-operation from the villages of Turkai and Shindh. Nothing, however, seems to have come of these proposals.

The conduct of the Jowakis continued during the next two years to be bad, more especially that of the men of the Bori villages. These villages had, during the first years of our rule, given an immense deal of trouble to the authorities; and on the 8th of June 1853, Captain H. R. James, the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar, reported that the boldness and frequency with which the Bori Afridis committed raids in the Peshawar district called for serious notice, as their villages had become an asylum for every noted robber; whilst the Deputy Commissioner of Rawal Pindi represented that men who robbed and murdered in his district found refuge with the Boriwals; among others, Fateh Khan of Nara, a noted criminal, charged with murder.

The amount of plunder taken by the men of Bori in 1852-53 was said to have surpassed that of any former period, and Captain Coke reported that there were in every house half a dozen stolen cattle.

The Commissioner, Lieutenant-Colonel F. Mackeson, C.B., stated that in

than thirty in number, and had not averaged more than twelve, and he considered that these disorders were of a nature that could be put down by police arrangements; he accordingly urged the establishment of police posts along the Afridi and Khatak borders, but at the same time advised that at a convenient season a severe example should be made of the Bori men.

*Expedition
against the
Bori villages
of the Jowaki
Afridis in
1853.*

In September 1853, Lieutenant-Colonel Mackeson was assassinated, and was succeeded by Major H. B. Edwardes, C.B.; and in November 1853, Mr. John Lawrence, the Chief Commissioner, having proceeded to Peshawar, held a conference on the 15th of that month with the *maliks* of the villages connected with the Jowaki pass. Desiring, if possible, to avoid hostilities, the Chief Commissioner arranged with all the villages of the Jowaki pass, except Bori, that the interdict to their resort to the salt mines and to the markets of Kohat and Peshawar should be withdrawn on the following conditions:—

Chief Commis-
sioner's report.

- 1st. That neither they, nor any person living in their villages, should commit crimes for the future in British territory, in return for which they should have full permission to trade and to cultivate within our boundaries.
- 2nd. That they should not give a passage through their lands to depredators coming into British territory, or to criminals passing therefrom.
- 3rd. That they should on no account afford an asylum to criminals and outlaws flying from justice.

The Chief Commissioner was most anxious to get these Afridis to agree to seize and surrender such criminals as had taken refuge in their villages; but this they stoutly refused, simply stipulating that they would send them away. To the third condition they also evinced great repugnance, and it was only on their seeing that a refusal on this point would lead to a continuance of the blockade that they gave a reluctant consent.

These Afridis stated, with truth, that it was the immemorial custom of their clans never to refuse an asylum to anyone demanding it, and that to surrender an individual who had obtained refuge with them, or even to deny him their hospitality, was a great disgrace. Afridis will be found in any number who, for reward, will murder a refugee in cold blood and produce his head, but none will consent to surrender a fugitive who demands an asylum. The Chief Commissioner was impressed with the belief, from the conduct and bearing of these Afridis, that they were sincerely desirous as a body for peace. The way in which they discussed each question, and the resolution with which they refused to accede to those points to which they objected, gave some assurance that they were in earnest. The fact, however, that it was for their interest to be on good terms with us, was doubtless the strongest lien on their good faith.

The Chief Commissioner was even willing to make terms with the Bori men. The desire of Government to avoid a recourse to hostilities, the unsatisfactory state of affairs with the Afridis of the Kohat pass, and the extraordinary sickness among the troops at Peshawar,—all pointed to the advantage of this course.

But the Bori Afridis would make no atonement for the past, and give no security for the future: their arrogance went so far as to ask that a number of their youth should be admitted to service. To the different queries put to

*Expedition
against the
Bori villages
of the Jowaki
Afridis in
1853.*

murders, we have robbed, we have now a Hindu prisoner, and when his ransom is paid he shall be released; but give us service, make us an allowance, and we will be your servants."

The terms which were offered to them were—

- 1st. That they should make restitution for all property proved to have been stolen or plundered during the past year; on their pleading their poverty, this point was modified to the surrender of the horses of the mounted robbers, but this was also refused.
- 2nd. That they should release any prisoners detained for ransom.
- 3rd. That they should surrender certain outlaws of the cis-Indus districts who had found refuge with them. But each and all these propositions they rejected.

Nothing, therefore, remained but to send a force against them, and advantage was taken of the presence of the troops at Bazid Khel covering the erection of Fort Mackeson.

The Bori valley is about twelve miles long, and has an entrance at each extremity; but as they are both narrow and very defensible defiles, it was determined to cross the outer range at the most favourable point. It had been ascertained that a practicable path ascended through the village of Kandao, and a second was known to exist to the south of that village; but general information represented the Sarghasha pass, which crosses the outer range between Kandao and Taruni, to be the most practicable road, and it was therefore chosen. It had also been decided to avoid the Kandao pass in entering the Bori valley, so as not to alarm the Ashu Khel Afridis of Kandao, who were then at peace with us. But Lieutenant-Colonel R. Napier, Bengal Engineers, having reconnoitred the ground on the day preceding the advance of the force, had advised that the heights should be occupied from this point, so as to turn the flank of all opposition at the Sarghasha pass.

Advanced Guard.
Corps of Guides.
Mountain Train Battery.

Main Body.
66th Gurkhas.
22nd Foot.
20th Native Infantry.
2 9-pounder guns.
Sappers and Miners.

Rear Guard.
66th Gurkhas (200 men).
7th Irregular Cavalry (1 squadron).

At 4 A.M. on the 29th November the force, under the command of Colonel S. B. Boileau, and accompanied by Captain H. R. James, the Deputy Commissioner, marched from the camp at Bazid Khel (*see* Map, p. 320), in the order noted in the margin.

The first part of the road, which was some five or six miles in all, was over a good hard plain, but the approach to the Sarghasha pass, for the distance of about a mile, lay through ravines and low hills.

The Guide Infantry, under Lieutenant W. S. R. Hodson, was detached to ascend the path leading through Kandao, and to crown the outer range of hills to prevent the enemy defending the Sarghasha pass. Captain James had taken the precaution of having the *maliks* of all the friendly Afridi villages in attendance on him, and a *malik* of Kandao was now sent on to his own people to assure them of our peaceable intentions; nevertheless, though they abstained from hostilities, they could not rely on our good faith, and numbers fled up the hill with such property as they could hastily carry off.

Although the road had been good, and there had been a faint moon

Sarghasha pass was reached. Here a reserve of two companies of infantry and the cavalry were left, the main body reaching the summit of the pass at 10.30 A.M., where the Guide Corps had already arrived, having found a good and easy road from Kandao leading to Bori, the existence of which was not previously known to us.

*Expedition
against the
Bori villages of
the Jowaki
Afridis in
1853.*

The Sarghasha is the proper pass of the men of Bori. It was found to be steep, winding, narrow, and long, and though quite practicable for horses and any beasts of burden, it only admitted of troops ascending in single file. If, therefore, it had been disputed by the Afridis, Lieut.-Colonel Napier's manoeuvre would have been essential to the success of the main column; but there was no indication of any opposition having been contemplated here.

The smouldering ashes of the Bori watch-fires were alone found on the crest of the Sarghasha ridge, with the half-washed heads of maize which their picquets had abandoned at our approach.

Colonel Boileau had ordered that the 9-pounders should remain at the foot of the hill with the reserve, until he could ascertain from the summit of the range the nature of the ground on which the operations were to be carried out. The villages of Bori were now in sight on the further side of a small valley, occupying a considerable extent of ground, and lying between spurs of the opposite range, of the most abrupt and precipitous character. From the difficulties of the Sarghasha road, and the extent of work to be done in destroying the villages, it was apparent that the elephants with the 9-pounders could not be taken on with advantage, and orders were therefore given for them to remain at the foot of the hill with the reserve.

The sappers and the materials for blowing up the towers of the Bori villages had been placed with the 9-pounders; as, in case the force had met with opposition, the mules with the sapper park would have encumbered the advance up the Sarghasha pass. By some mistake, the order for detaining the 9-pounders and their elephants had not been delivered until they had accomplished part of the ascent, and their return down the pass so obstructed the road that Ensign A. U. F.

Colonel Boileau's
despatch.

Ruxton, commanding the Sappers and Miners, in spite of every exertion, was unable to come up in time.

The sappers were awaited until eleven o'clock, when, as there was no time to lose, it was determined to go on without them, and to abandon the idea of blowing up the towers. Leaving a picquet of a company of Her Majesty's 22nd Regiment, under Captain W. H. Poulett, and a company of the Guides, under Ensign J. H. Tyler, 20th Native Infantry, on the crest of the outer range (from which point the operations were viewed by Mr. John Lawrence, the Chief Commissioner), the force descended into the valley of Bori and advanced across the plain, covered by the light company of Her Majesty's 22nd Regiment. As the extreme parts of the Bori village, or rather cluster of villages, lay near the Taruni entrance of the valley; and as Colonel Boileau was assured by the Commissioner, Major H. B. Edwardes, and the Deputy Commissioner, Captain H. R. James, of the neutrality of the men of Taruni, whose village is built in the gorge of that defile, it was determined to withdraw from the valley by that route, and the plan of operations was made accordingly. In arriving at this decision, the most valuable assistance was afforded by Rissaldar Fateh Khan, late of the Guides, who was in personal attendance on the Chief Commissioner, and who had lived in these strongholds for some years.

*Expedition
against the
Bori villages
of the Jowaki
Afridis in
1853.*

crowned in the most brilliant manner by Lieutenant W. S. R. Hodson with three companies of the Guides, and by Lieutenant F. McC. Turner, his second in command, with two companies of that regiment and twenty-five men of the 66th Gurkhas, who drove the Afridis before them up to the highest peaks with a rapidity, steadiness, and intelligence which was watched by the whole force with admiration.

Lieutenant Turner's party had carried the first village *en route*, and swept fifteen or twenty of the Afridis before them up the hill; and when the mountain guns, coming up, played upon the towers, the last lingering defenders abandoned the village to its fate. The enemy being thus removed to a distance, the first village was entered, and its fort set on fire by Lieutenant J. T. Walker, Bombay Engineers, ably seconded by Fateh Khan (Khaibari) and his levies.

In the meantime the 22nd Regiment, under Colonel S. J. Cotton, and two detachments of the Gurkhas, under Captain C. C. G. Ross and Lieutenant J. A. Law, had, covered by the artillery fire, driven the enemy from the other two villages and fired them successively, the Afridis making no stand in the plain, but taking to the hills, from whence they poured down a matchlock fire till driven to a distance by our skirmishers. By twelve o'clock heavy columns of flame and smoke were rising from every Bori village.

While the work of demolition was being thus leisurely carried on below, the contest on the heights above grew warmer every hour, as
 Major Edwardes's report. friends and allies from Pastaoni, Torsappar, and Jamu came down the higher ranges to assist their clansmen of Bori.

The struggle of the day was for the peak of the centre hill, where the Afridis had, by erecting a breastwork on an isolated point, made an almost impregnable position. Here Lieutenant F. McC. Turner, with about twenty men, was brought to bay; and such showers of stones and bullets were rained upon them that an advance was impossible, while to retire would have been fatal.

The Afridis in the breastwork were seen from the opposite height to draw their knives, and watch intently for the first movement in retreat, as the signal to leap down upon the Guides. But no wavering was to be found in that little band. They at once sounded the bugle for help, and stood their ground, returning the fire of the Afridis. On seeing Lieutenant Turner's position, Lieutenant Hodson had sent a company of Guides from his own party; but they were unable to reach Lieutenant Turner. A company of the 66th Gurkhas, under Subadar Tala Gorrang, was then sent up, and shortly afterwards a second company, under Ensign W. F. Sweny; the former arrived first, and gallantly carried the enemy's stronghold, led by Assistant Surgeon R. Lyell, of the Guide Corps.

It was now nearly three o'clock, the work of the day was done, and the declining sun and the mustering Afridis both gave warning to retire while there was yet light; the troops were therefore recalled, the main body being drawn up in the centre of the valley. The Guides and Gurkhas were most skilfully withdrawn from the heights by Lieutenant Hodson; a party of Gurkhas, under Captain C. C. G. Ross, and two mountain guns, under Lieutenant T. Pulman, covering the retirement; this detachment of Gurkhas with the Corps of Guides then formed the rear guard.

There had undoubtedly been the severest trial to the discipline of

meets, but always follows, his assailant, and, after being driven doggedly from height to height during a long day's fighting, takes fresh breath and heart when the wearied enemy retires, and, with knife and gun, comes leaping down his native hills more like a demon than a man; and none but first-rate soldiers could have performed the retirement that was effected that afternoon.

*Expedition
against the
Bori villages
of the Jowaki
Afridis in
1853.*

After 3 P.M. the column was set in motion towards the Taruni pass—the 20th Native Infantry and Mountain Train Battery in advance, followed by the 66th Gurkhas and the 22nd Foot.

The Bori mouth of the Taruni defile is split into two roads by an isolated hill. The main column defiled down the lower one, while two companies of Her Majesty's 22nd, under Captain D. Anderson, skirmished with great steadiness along the upper.

The enemy, in considerable force, attempted to press the rear guard, but were checked by Lieutenant Hodson, who charged them with a small party of the Guide Cavalry, which had made its way through the Taruni pass during the day; every subsequent attempt was met by so hot a fire from the rear guard (in which the steadiness and coolness of Captain Anderson's skirmishers were conspicuous) that not the slightest impression was made, and shortly after passing Taruni all molestation ceased.

Captain Poulett's detachment, which had been left on the crest of the Sarghasha ridge, had, in the meanwhile, conformed to the movements of the main column, and had moved along the crest of the ridge parallel to the march of the force, checking an attempt of the enemy to intercept the line of march, and covering the left flank as far as the Taruni defile, where it joined the main column.

During the attack on Bori, the outer range of hills above Janakhwar, Khui, and Taruni was covered with armed Afridis, quietly watching the progress of events; and as the head of the column neared Taruni, considerable anxiety was felt as to the part which our new Afridi allies in that and the other villages would play on the occasion. Certainly they had been admitted to treaties with us, and allowed to trade when the salt mines were closed to the other tribes; but it was a great temptation. The "infidels" were in the pass, harassed by a long day's work, and still engaged with an enemy in the rear. The Afridis sat in hundreds on the hill, and saw that they had only to descend it in front to place the column between two fires; yet they refrained, and kept their faith, and even sent deputies to the men of Bori to warn them not to come beyond their border; whilst the Taruni men actually brought water at the Chief Commissioner's request up to the top of the ridge for the Europeans who held the pass.

Chief Commis-
sioner's report.

Thus the force moved out on to the plain, through friends, and by an easy, level road, instead of having to fight its way in darkness over the steep passes of Sarghasha or Kandao.

Night closed upon the column as it emerged from the defile, and the foremost did not reach camp till 8 P.M., the main body not till ten or eleven, after being more than eighteen hours under arms, marching, climbing, or fighting the whole time. The European soldiers had food in their haversacks, but the majority of the force had none; and all were without water, as the springs at Bori, being far up a ravine, were in the hands of the enemy.

The strength of the force actually engaged in the attack on the Bori

*Expedition
against the
Bori villages
of the Jowaki
Afridis in
1853.*

and twenty-nine wounded (*see* Appendix C), and that of the Afridis somewhat less.

The expenditure of ammunition is given in Appendix D.

Of the results, Major H. B. Edwardes said, the real loss of the Bori Afridis was not to be found in killed and wounded, or even in the destruction of their homes and stocks of winter fodder for the cattle, but in the loss of prestige, in the violation of their hills as a refuge for proclaimed criminals, in seeing that even our heavy regular army contains, and can produce when need requires, some troops who can take to the hill-side as lightly as themselves, and drive them off their roughest crags with weapons of superior range.

Colonel Boileau in his despatch said, it was for him to do justice to the troops for their conduct throughout the day. The duty to be done called for the utmost exertions of every officer and man of the force; and well, indeed, had the call been answered. The most arduous achievement, that of taking the heights of Bori by Lieutenants W. S. R. Hodson and F. McC. Turner with the Guide and Gurkha detachments, had been effected with a dashing gallantry which nothing could surpass; the Gurkhas and Guides fighting step by step, it was hard to say which was foremost. First in the advance, and last in the retirement, the exertions of Lieutenant Hodson had never ceased throughout the day.

Colonel Boileau said his warmest thanks were due to Colonel S. J. Cotton, commanding the 22nd Regiment, his second in command; Major J. H. Craigie, C.B., commanding 20th Native Infantry; Captain T. Brougham, commanding the Mountain Train Battery; and Captain T. Garstin, commanding 66th Gurkhas.

He added he was much indebted to the following officers, who volunteered their services as staff officers:—

Major J. D. McPherson, Military Secretary to the Chief Commissioner.

Lieutenant H. W. Norman, Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General.

Captain J. H. Graham, Brigade Major.

Captain D. Macdonald, 20th Native Infantry.

Lieutenant G. S. Macbean, Sub-Assistant Commissary-General.

Lieutenant H. J. Hawes, 1st Native Infantry, Assistant Commissioner.

He also alluded to the excellent service and assistance rendered by Lieutenant J. T. Walker, Bombay Engineers, who superintended the destruction of the villages, and Ensign P. S. Lumsden, Deputy-Assistant Quarter-Master General; and expressed his great obligations for the advice afforded him by Major H. B. Edwardes, C.B., Commissioner, Captain H. R. James, Deputy Commissioner, and Lieut.-Colonel R. Napier, Bengal Engineers, adding that his special thanks were due to the last-named officer, from whom he had received the greatest assistance throughout the day, especially in the retirement of the troops through the Taruni pass.

The satisfaction of the Government was subsequently expressed at the success of the above operations, and special allusion was made to the services rendered by Lieutenant-Colonel R. Napier and Major H. B. Edwardes, and the admirable conduct of the troops employed, especially the Guide Corps.

The Indian medal, with a clasp for the "North-West Frontier", was granted in 1869 to all survivors of the troops engaged in the above operations against the Bori Afridis under Colonel S. B. Boileau.

A few days after, the men of Bori made overtures of submission to Major H. B. Edwardes through a holy man named Syad Gul Mian, who, however, broke off the negotiations when told that no terms would be made till the refugee criminals were expelled from Bori. This, he said, was hopeless, because it was contrary to the customs of Pathan hospitality. *Submission of the Boriwals after the Expedition of 1853.*

Early in December 1853 the Boriwals applied to Captain J. Coke, Deputy Commissioner of Kohat, for terms of peace. That officer was authorised to receive their submission and admit them to friendly intercourse on the one condition that they expelled all refugee criminals with them, and promised to receive no more.

On the 11th of January 1854 Captain Coke wrote to Major Edwardes to say that the *maliks* of Bori had come in to him and agreed to everything, except the expulsion of refugees; and as they were willing to admit no more in the future, they hoped this point would be waived. This, however, Major Edwardes refused, because the principle at stake was worth more than peace with Bori.

On the 17th of January Captain Coke reported that the Bori deputies had at last agreed to expel the refugees if two months' grace were given them; but they wished to be allowed free intercourse with British territory at once, and on this understanding they had signed a treaty of submission, which Captain Coke sent for sanction. In reply, Major Edwardes said he regretted to be hard on them, but the treaty of friendship and friendly intercourse could only begin from the date of our enemies being expelled from Bori.

On the 8th of February Captain Coke reported the unconditional submission of the Boriwals to all our terms, and the actual expulsion of the refugee criminals. Accordingly, the following agreement was signed by them on the 24th February 1854:—

- 1st. We will abstain hereafter from committing raids, highway robberies, thefts, or other crimes within British territory.
- 2nd. If any criminal comes to our settlements from British territory we will promptly eject him; and if we ascertain that he is in possession of stolen property, we will make restitution of the same to Government.
- 3rd. If any resident of our settlements is apprehended for crime in British territory, we will not intercede for him; and if such person comes with stolen property to our settlements, we will make restitution of the same, and punish the thief according to our Afghan usage, and not permit him to return to British territory for the perpetration of crime.
- 4th. In regard to certain criminals who have taken refuge with us from the other side of the Indus, we agree, within two months, to eject them from our settlement.
- 5th. We will associate ourselves with the rest of our tribe in any service which the district officer may call upon them to perform.
- 6th. Whereas the Pakhi* Afridis have always been associated with us in our former evil deeds, we agree to be responsible for them also.

*Agreement
made with the
Boriwals in
1854.*

- 7th. We give as our securities Mir Mubarak Shah, Naib Muhammad Syad Khan, and Bahadur Sher Khan; if we commit any breach of the above engagements, the Government is free to call them to account.
- 8th. In consideration of the above agreements, we shall be allowed to come and go in British territory.
- 9th. In consideration of the same, the Government will be asked to release seven men of our tribe now in imprisonment.
- 10th. We will bring no evil-disposed person with us into British territory.

After the settlement with the Kohat Pass Afridis in 1853, the pass remained open till 1866, with the exception of one brief interval of twenty-six days. This interregnum was occasioned by a feud among the Afridis of the pass, during which some robberies were committed. The heads of the confederacy traced the perpetrators to the Bosti Khel villages, and the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat sent the Bangash men down, and compelled the inhabitants of these villages to make good the value of the plundered property, and to pay a fine besides.

As has been related in the previous chapter, the Bassi Khel Afridis, in consequence of their misconduct, had forfeited, in 1855, their share in the pass allowances. This section was again concerned in the complications in the Kohat pass in 1866.

The reason of the Bassi Khels having been originally admitted to a share in the pass allowances was in consequence of their claiming a portion of land called Kalamsada, extending from Kotkai to Aimal Chabutra, and it was in consequence of the constant fighting on this piece of land between the Bassi Khels and Akhorwals that Captain J. Coke made the arrangement that the former should receive Rs. 300 out of the allowances of the latter. This amount was afterwards increased, as already mentioned, to Rs. 600, but was forfeited in 1855 by their misconduct.

In 1859 the Bassi Khels again came forward with their claims to the Kalamsada, and consequent share of the allowances. In February 1859 an agreement was made, by which both parties bound themselves to refrain from fighting on the road near the disputed ground for five years. This was afterwards extended for one year more, to February 1865.

Disputes had also been going on for some time between the Bolaki and Gaddia Khel sections of the Akhorwals as to the relative proportion in which the share of each should be paid. These and the Bassi Khel dispute had caused fighting in the pass about Akhor, and, the Commissioner being unable to induce them to come to some agreement, the pass was closed and the allowances stopped; and it was not until October 1866 that these differences could be adjusted.

The Bassi Khels and Hassan Khels, however, still continued to give trouble, and the former demanded a right of interference in the management of the pass, unwarranted by former usage. For their contumacy they were debarred from access to British territory, when, after a brief interval, they submitted on the 8th of April 1867; and, on consideration of their renouncing their claim to the disputed tract of Kalamsada, an allowance of Rs. 1,000 per annum was granted to them.

The Hassan Khels were also subjected to a strict blockade, but after the institution of the blockade more outrages were perpetrated: a policeman on

freebooter ; a party of police were fired at while patrolling ; shots were fired at our posts ; and lastly, the Government mail, *en route* from the Indus to Kohat, was plundered on the high road by men of the Hassan Khel section.

The *jirga* of the tribe were then summoned to Peshawar, but at the end of ten days they firmly declined, by letter, to give way on the points at issue.

Commissioner's
report.

*Proposed
Expedition
against the
Hassan Khel
Afridis in
1867.*

Orders were accordingly issued for the assembling of a force to carry out coercive measures against this section.

The force was to consist of 5,091 men of all arms, with 14 guns (*see* Appendix E), and was to be divided into two columns, under the command of Colonel R. O. Bright, 1-19th Regiment, and Colonel S. J. Browne, V.C., C.B., Corps of Guides, respectively. The force was to be ready to march on the 12th or 13th of April.

Colonel Bright's column was to advance from Azakhel on Khui and Janakhwar, while Colonel Browne, having bivouacked on the Charat hill on the previous night, was to move along the ridge over the Jalala Sar, descending on Janakhwar, and closing the retreat of the enemy towards the Jalala Sar.

These preparations, however, soon changed the aspect of affairs. The Hassan Khel Afridis, who had hitherto mistaken forbearance for weakness or indifference, on perceiving the preparations for their chastisement, at once submitted unconditionally to the terms imposed upon them, and gave hostages for their future good conduct.

The happy result of this affair, which at one time appeared could not be brought to a termination without extreme measures, was, in the opinion of the Government of India, attributable to the firm, yet temperate, measures adopted throughout.

After the agreement come to in 1866, the Kohat pass remained open till 1876, with the exception of a period of ten days in 1870. In that year Lord Mayo rode through it on his way to Kohat, and a few days after, on the night of the 15th of April 1870, two muleteers and a servant of an officer were murdered in the most cowardly and brutal manner, in cold blood, and all the property they had with them was plundered. The murderers belonged to the Zargun Khel and Bosti Khel villages. Captain C. E. Macaulay, Deputy Commissioner of Kohat, at once seized all the men and property of the Afridis of the pass, and by the evening of the same day had Rs. 10,000 worth of property in his possession, consisting principally of camels laden with salt. The surrender of the criminals was then demanded by the Deputy Commissioner, but not acquiesced in by the Afridis, when in lieu they were offered the following terms: 1st, the destruction of Malik Bashu's village; 2nd, the destruction of Sherdil's (one of the murderers) house in Zargun Khel; 3rd, the destruction of Yasin's (another of the murderers) house in Bosti Khel; 4th, the prohibition against ever again building these without the permission of Government; 5th, the expulsion of the three criminals from the pass for one year; 6th, the payment of Rs. 1,000 by each of the murderers as compensation for the blood of the murdered men. These terms were agreed to after some demur, and carried out under the superintendence of Ata Muhammad Khan, brother of Bahadur Sher Khan. Security having been taken for the future good behaviour of the criminals, the pass was declared open again, after having been closed for ten days. One of the murderers, however, Nazr Ali, a Zakha Khel Afridi,

*Rupture with
the Gallai
Afridis in
1876.*

year he was captured by the villagers of Akhor, brought in, and hanged on the 19th on the crest of the Kohat *kotal*.

The cause of the rupture which led to the closing of the pass in 1876 was due to the re-opening of a question which had for many years been discussed, *viz.*, the construction of a road practicable for wheeled traffic through the pass. The Afridis, jealous of their independence, had always opposed the construction of this road, but in 1873 the question was again raised by the Commissioner of Peshawar, and all the frontier authorities considered that our relations with the Gallai Afridis were now on so friendly a footing that the time had arrived when we might open negotiations for the construction of the road with a fair prospect of success; the Bangash chief, Bahadur Sher Khan, who had for many years been in charge of the pass arrangements, being also of opinion that no active opposition would be made to its construction, the assent of the sections concerned was requested.

The Afridis of the pass generally were willing to agree to the proposals of the Government; and the question would have been amicably settled but for the opposition of one contumacious village—Sheraki—which absolutely refused to agree to the proposals; and by insults offered to the British Government, by obstructing the road by placing large stones on it, and by maltreating travellers using the pass, refusing, moreover, to send in their *jirga* for explanations, endeavoured to embroil the whole tribe. The closing of the pass was therefore forced upon the Government. Afridi trade was not prohibited until the 7th of February 1876, in consequence of distinct insults offered by the Sheraki men to the Government messenger sent to summon the *jirga* to listen to the Government demands.

Hostilities on the part of the Afridis at once commenced in the usual manner; night attacks and *dakaitis* were made on British territory; cattle and goats carried off; and the towers on the crest of the pass, which were in charge of the Jowaki and Urakzai levies, were burnt on the 16th of February.

Blockade arrangements were instituted in the Peshawar and Kohat districts, and, in the first named, the Afridi crops grown within British territory were, in the spring, ordered to be cut and confiscated.

In order to do this, on the 15th April large numbers of men were collected from different villages and assembled at Aimal Chabutra. To protect the men employed in cutting the crops, troops were ordered out from Peshawar.

At 3 A.M. on the 17th April a force, as per margin, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel R. G. Rogers, commanding 20th Punjab Native Infantry, marched from Peshawar towards Aimal Chabutra. After a short halt there, it moved on towards the Kotkai tower at the mouth of the pass, and the villagers then commenced to cut the crops. The troops were advanced to within 1,000 yards of Kotkai, near which the enemy could be seen, and while they remained in this position, the enemy kept up a dropping fire, which was replied to by B-F Royal Horse Artillery and the 20th Punjab Native Infantry, who were thrown out in skirmishing order on either flank of the position occupied by the troops.

Lieut.-Colonel
Rogers's report.

—
B-F Royal Horse
Artillery.
Detachment, 11th
Bengal Lancers.
17th Bengal Cavalry.
One company, Sap-
pers and Miners.
20th Punjab Native
Infantry.

Several casualties occurred in the 20th Punjab Native Infantry before

and three sepoy and one *kahar* severely, wounded. In addition to these, Surgeon J. A. Smith, Royal Horse Artillery, was slightly wounded. The casualties on the enemy's side could not be ascertained. *Submission of Gallai and other sections in 1877.*

The following day the same force was again moved out, but having been kept at a greater distance from the hills, no further casualties occurred, and the crops in the neighbourhood of the pass were successfully gathered.

At the commencement of the rupture, the Gallai Afridis alone were implicated. The Jowakis, who had badly defended the tower entrusted to them, and who had been remiss in allowing thieves to pass through their territory, were punished by a heavy fine, which they paid, and then remained neutral until the termination of the quarrel.

The Hassan Khel and Ashu Khel, the other sections of the Adam Khel tribe, were included in the blockade early in August; but no outrage of importance was committed by the former until the 10th of January, when a number of outlaws, sheltered in Hassan Khel territory, committed a very serious *dakaiti* in the military station of Nowshera, killing a police constable and a havildar, and carrying off arms from the police station, as well as robbing shops in the immediate neighbourhood. This daring outrage was performed under the leadership of Naim Shah, a noted robber, who was, some months later, when sleeping in a ravine, surprised and killed by the inhabitants of a village which he had presumably come to plunder.

The Hassan Khels were soon weary of the hostile attitude they had assumed, and signified their readiness to come to terms. The Government was quite willing to receive their submission, but only on their acceptance of the original demands which had been made, *viz.*, to consent to the construction of a road through the Hassan Khel section of the pass, and compensation for all offences committed since the commencement of the blockade, a suitable fine, and hostages to ensure compliance with these terms. In February 1877 the Hassan Khels agreed to the conditions, accepting the responsibility for future offences; and their submission was then accepted.

The collapse of the Gallai Afridis soon followed, and towards the termination of March they sent in their leaders to Kohat and made formal submission, accepting the Government terms, which were the improvement of the rocky portion of the road north of the *kotal* under Government supervision, the surrender of all property belonging to British subjects, and a fine of Rs. 3,000.

These terms were imposed by the Lieutenant-Governor in a public *darbar* held at Kohat on the 24th of March, and were accepted by the *jirga*. Bahadur Sher Khan, Bangash, received the title of *Nawab* and a *khillat*, and others who had done good service were also rewarded. The pass was then declared open, and, on the 26th, the Lieutenant-Governor passed through it on his way to Peshawar.

After the reopening of the pass, the unsatisfactory attitude of the Gaddia Khel section of the Akhorwals threatened to raise fresh complications, and accordingly Captain P. L. N. Cavagnari, the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar, obtained sanction to coerce them to submit to the Government demands by a prompt display of military force.

It was therefore decided to attempt to capture the Gaddia Khel hamlet on the Kalamsada tract, and close to the Aimal Chabutra post, by a night surprise, before the residents could effect their escape to the hills.

In communication with Colonel J. E. Cordner, R.A., commanding at Peshawar, it was arranged to move out a small force, consisting of two guns

*Surprise of
Gaddia Khel
hamlet in
1877.*

Royal Horse Artillery, a troop of cavalry, and fifty bayonets, on the night of the 14th August 1877. The detachment was to leave cantonments so as to reach Aimal Chabutra a little before daybreak. The distance to be traversed being about twenty miles, *ekkas* were to be provided for the infantry, so that the men should arrive at their destination fresh for whatever work they might have to perform.

At about half-past nine o'clock Captain Cavagnari, accompanied by Mr. Christie, District Superintendent of Police, went on ahead of the troops to make arrangements along the road for cutting off all communications with the southern border, and also to provide for the attendance of some village levies. Captain E. R. Conolly, Assistant Commissioner, was told off to accompany the troops, and to conduct them to the rendezvous decided upon.

The troops arrived punctually at the hour fixed, and halted at the place agreed upon till it was light enough to move against the village. It was then about half-past three o'clock in the morning, the distance having been accomplished in something over four hours, which, considering the time of year, the extreme darkness of the night (rain had fallen and heavy clouds were about), and the fact of the road being intersected in many places with steep ravines, was most creditable, and the whole success of the enterprise depended on the rapidity with which the troops could reach the village it was intended to surprise.

By the time scouts and picquets of the levies had been posted on the low hills which command the plain in rear of the village, day had commenced to dawn, and the troops were moved into position. On reaching Aimal Chabutra, Lieutenant-Colonel G. C. Rowcroft, who commanded the detachment, divided the cavalry into two portions, sending them at a smart gallop to the right and left rear of the village, directing them to be posted beyond rifle range of the village, and prevent any of the residents effecting their retreat to the hills. The guns were posted at a suitable distance to the north of the village.

All the arrangements were completed without disturbing the residents of the hamlet, and at first it almost appeared that the village had been deserted. Simultaneously with the movement of troops into position, an agent was deputed to the villagers, warning them of the folly of resistance, and assuring them that under no circumstances would their women or children be harmed. After some delay, and after reconnoitring and satisfying themselves that there was no way of escape, a deputation of the leading men, accompanied, as is usual under such circumstances, by a number of women and a *mulla* with the *Koran*, came forward and tendered their submission.

Captain Cavagnari then demanded the surrender of all the adult men in the village with their arms, and this was very reluctantly and slowly complied with. The whole of the village cattle were next ordered to be given up as security for whatever fine had to be levied, and as the Afridis were rather slow about this, a feint was made of moving the infantry close up to the village, with the object of sending them in to search the houses. This hastened their movements, and by seven o'clock the troops were marched away, twenty-seven prisoners and a hundred head of oxen having been taken as guarantees for their prompt compliance with the demands of Government.

The village was not entered by the troops or levies, nor any of the houses searched. For all practical purposes of procuring obedience to orders, sufficient had been done, and the case was not one in which additional severity was necessary.

The acknowledgments of the Lieutenant Governor were conveyed to

Captain P. L. N. Cavagnari for the tact and energy shown by him in bringing this small expedition to so speedy and satisfactory a conclusion, and the thanks of the Punjab Government were also conveyed to the troops employed in this operation. *Expedition against the Jowaki Afridis in August 1877.*

Expedition against the Jowaki Afridis by a force under Colonel D. Mocatta, in August 1877.

In 1853, as has been seen above, the Jowaki Afridis were admitted to a share in the allowances of the Kohat pass. They then agreed to furnish an outpost on the *kotal* with twelve armed men, to be present in a tower erected there, and to share with the Bangash tribe the responsibility for any injury or loss sustained thereon. For this service a share in the pass allowances of Rs. 2,000 was guaranteed to them, and this they had enjoyed up to the year 1877. For many years past the Jowakis had behaved well. Being the principal carriers of wood to the Kohat cantonments, and also having a large carrying trade in salt, they had amassed considerable wealth, and, their own country being barren, and their very existence depending on a free intercourse with British territory, they had shown far less inclination than other sections to embroil themselves with the Government.

During the disturbances of 1876-77, and the blockade of the Gallai Afridis, the Jowakis showed, as indeed might have been expected, a certain sympathy with their kinsmen who were engaged in hostilities with the British Government, but they themselves took no active part in the matter. They, however, abandoned their tower on the *kotal*, which was destroyed, as already stated, by the Gallai Afridis in February 1876, and they failed to keep their portion of the border free from the attacks of thieves belonging to the blockaded sections of the Adam Khel tribe. They were therefore proceeded against by seizure of their men and property found in the Kohat district, upon which they at once gave in their submission, adjusted claims to the extent of Rs. 2,000, and gave selected hostages to maintain strict neutrality.

This engagement the Jowakis observed until the close of the Kohat pass difficulties in 1877. At that time the consideration of the re-allotment of the pass allowances was rendered necessary, as it was felt that, as distributed, they were open to objection, as in some cases being paid to sections who performed no appreciable service. It was known that it was under consideration to reduce the Jowaki allowance of Rs. 2,000, which was not fairly earned, seeing that no Jowaki villages abutted on the pass, and that during the complications of 1876-77 the tribe had shown that they were not able to render the service, in defence of the road, which was expected from them. In the event, however, of this allowance being withdrawn from the Jowakis, the Government were prepared to allow them an equivalent for the performance of real duties in guarding the Khushalgarh road and telegraph line, which, running close to the independent hills, were always liable to attack.

The Jowakis, however, did not wait for the decision of the Government, but began to show a spirit of hostility in the month of July 1877, when, on the 15th of that month, they cut the telegraph wire between Kohat and Khushalgarh in several places. The Jowaki *jirga*, who were responsible for

*Expedition
against the
Jowaki Afridis
in August 1877.*

its safety, were at once summoned, but refused to come to Kohat, sending an insolent message that the Bangash *jirga* should be sent to discuss the matter with them in their own territory. A *baramta* of those Jowakis and their property found in British territory was at once ordered, which was fairly successful, and ninety-three men and a large number of cattle were seized.

On the 24th of July a considerable number of the tribe, who had hidden themselves in ambush on the Kohat road, rescued two of their men who had been seized and were being escorted by the police to Kohat, three of the guard, together with the prisoners, being carried off into the Jowaki hills. The *jirga* was at once ordered to release the prisoners and to return their arms, but, under the pretence of fearing arrest, the *jirga* declined to come in to Kohat, though the captives were released on the 27th of July. The next night the telegraph wire was cut a second time, and the Deputy Commissioner threatened to forfeit the pension and property of the principal Jowaki *malik* (Babri) in British territory, and to eject the members of the tribe from their hamlets in the Kohat district. The *jirga*, on the 30th, obeyed the summons of the Deputy Commissioner, and came to Kohat, where, the case being completely proved against them, they made submission, returned the arms of the police, and paid a fine of Rs. 300.

The matter being thus settled, the *jirga* were ordered to return to their villages. In spite, however, of their submission and the payment of the fine, the Jowakis almost immediately began to show signs of an inclination to give further trouble, and on the 8th of August commenced to remove their property and grain from their hamlets on the Khushalgarh road. The leading *malik* of the hamlets in British territory was, therefore, summoned, who explained that the reason for this action was the fear of the residents of being again arrested. He promised that the removal of the property should cease.

On the 13th of August the *malik* returned with two other headmen, preferring six requests; the Government, however, refused to discuss these, the tribal *jirga* alone being entitled to be heard on such questions.

Before the whole *jirga* could be summoned, news was received of a raid on the 17th of August, on commissariat mules grazing near the Khushalgarh road, in which thirty-six mules were carried off. The same night, on the Khushalgarh road, eleven miles from Kohat, a small party of sepoy, proceeding on leave, were attacked by Jowaki raiders. Three were killed, and a traveller with them, and the telegraph wire was again cut. For the safety of this important line of communication, cavalry and infantry patrols were ordered to be furnished, during daylight, by the garrison of Kohat.

Khatak levies, horse and foot, were also ordered to attend for service, and the police posts were strengthened. Brunswick rifles and ammunition from the Kohat stores were at the same time served out to villages on the Jowaki frontier.

On the 19th a portion of the Gandiali village was burnt by the Jowakis, and one man wounded, the raiders being driven into the hills by the troops, who held Gandiali till the afternoon, the only casualty being one horse wounded.

The agents of Nawab Bahadur Sher Khan, Bangash, who had now the entire management of the whole Adam Khel tribe, were sent into the hills to summon the *jirga*; but they returned, stating that both the sections of the Jowakis, viz., the Haibat Khel and the Kimat Khel, were engaged in the raids, and that the tribes demanded that their six requests should be granted, otherwise they would not come in to Kohat.

This insolent message was equivalent to the absolute refusal of the *jirga* to submit. *Expedition against the Jowaki Afridis in August 1877.*

On the night of the 20th a convoy of mules, under the escort of infantry and cavalry, under Captain C. C. Brownlow, was attacked by a Jowaki force estimated at 500 men, who retired on the infantry firing upon them, and the following night the telegraph wire was again cut at the ninth milestone from Kohat.

Nightly attacks on British villages and British subjects were now committed by the Jowakis, and on the 27th of August a bridge on the Khushalgarh road was burnt, and two days later an unsuccessful attempt was made to burn a second bridge. It was therefore decided that the immediate punishment of the tribe was absolutely necessary, but it was considered that the season was unfavourable for prolonged operations. It was accordingly determined to see if a sudden dash into their country, with the object of inflicting as much injury as possible on the tribe, would bring them to their senses and cause them to submit.

The causes of this outbreak on the part of the Jowakis, as far as can be gathered, appear to have been—

- 1st. The conviction of the Jowakis, founded on information, not officially conveyed to them, but irregularly obtained, and possibly communicated to them by persons interested in their misbehaviour, that the allowances hitherto given to them for their jointly holding the *kotal* of the Kohat pass were to be withdrawn.
- 2nd. The enforcement of the responsibility of the tribe for damage committed to the road and telegraph without any remuneration for such responsibility.
- 3rd. Transfer of the management of the tribe, which had lately been ordered by the Government, to Nawab Bahadur Sher Khan, who was notoriously hostile to some of its principal members.

At this time the two leading *maliks* among the Jowakis were Babri and Mushki, both belonging to the Kimat Khel Jowakis; of the Haibat Khel, the leading *malik* was Zal Beg of Paiah. All these men were at this time hostile to the British Government, and had done their utmost to incite the tribe to a rupture with us.

At the end of August secret orders were issued to Brigadier-General C. P. Keyes, C.B., commanding the Punjab Frontier Force, to penetrate the Jowaki country in three columns, with the object of cutting off the retreat of a body of raiders, who were lurking about the Khushalgarh road, obstructing traffic and harassing patrol parties.

On the night of the 29th of August, the troops told off for the expedition were all in position, ready for an advance. Brigadier-General Keyes, however, owing to a sudden illness, was unable to accompany the force, and the command devolved on Colonel D. Mocatta, commanding the 3rd Sikh Infantry.

The following was the plan of operations. The first column, composed of

Colonel Mocatta's despatch.		the troops as per margin, and accompanied by Colonel Mocatta, and also by Colonel Sir F. R. Pollock, K.C.S.I., the Commissioner, was to enter the Jowaki country by the Tortang defile (<i>see</i> Map, p. 372), and to push forward as rapidly as possible until it arrived at a central point, at the northern end of the
No. 1 Mountain Battery.		
2nd Punjab Cavalry ...	45 sabres.	
1st Sikh Infantry ...	103 bayonets.	
3rd Sikh Infantry ...	278 "	
4th Sikh Infantry ...	245 "	

*Expedition
against the
Jowaki Afridis
in August 1877.*

Gandiali ravine, with a view to cutting off the retreat in that direction of the main body of the enemy, which, it was anticipated, would be opposed to the second column in the Gandiali defile.

The second column, composed of the troops as per margin, was to advance up the Gandiali pass at daylight, but was to play with the enemy, rather than press them seriously, until time had been given for the arrival of the first column at the other end of the defile.

2nd Punjab Cavalry...	104 sabres.
1st Sikh Infantry ...	220 bayonets.
6th Punjab Infantry...	297 "

The third column, composed of troops as per margin, was to advance from Shadipur on the Indus, *via* Shekh Aladad Ziarat, with orders to cut off the enemy's retreat along the Tambal hills, and to continue its march until it effected a junction with the other two columns, when the entire force would retire to British territory by the Gandiali pass.

Corps of Guides,	
201 bayonets.	

In accordance with the above plan, the first column reached the entrance of the Tortang defile shortly before daylight on the 30th, and as soon as dawn appeared, the levies of Nawab Bahadur Sher Khan were directed to crown the heights on the right, whilst those on the left were secured by three companies of the 3rd Sikhs, under Lieutenant C. H. M. Smith. The column then advanced up the defile. The enemy opened fire from a strong position on the left, but a few rounds from the mountain guns soon cleared the advance. On emerging from the pass the column had to traverse a valley studded with hamlets, which, with the approval of the Commissioner, were burnt by the levies.

At 8.15 A.M. a junction was effected with the second column. This column had commenced its march through the Gandiali defile shortly after daybreak, but, although it expected to meet with determined opposition, no resistance had been offered to its advance. On emerging from the pass a few of the enemy were seen near the village of Turkai; they were immediately dispersed by the 2nd Punjab Cavalry, under Major F. Lance, with the loss to them of one killed and two taken prisoners.

The first and second columns having now united, it was necessary to effect a junction with the third column. Leaving therefore the 6th Punjab Infantry, under Major S. J. Browne, with the Khatak levies to hold the Gandiali pass, Colonel Mocatta advanced with the rest of the troops along the base of the Tambal hills, the left flank being protected by two companies of the 4th Punjab Infantry, the 2nd Punjab Cavalry forming the rear guard.

The enemy (among whom, it was said, was Malik Babri), according to their custom, now began to press the rear guard, and it was therefore necessary to strengthen it by a company of the 1st Sikhs, and subsequently by the 4th Punjab Infantry. As it was now evident that the original plan of retiring by the Gandiali pass would have to be effected with much difficulty, and probably with considerable loss, Colonel Mocatta decided to return to British territory by some other route, and accordingly he sent orders to Major Browne to retire to Gumbat through the Gandiali defile.

At the village of Lashkari Banda, which had been just set on fire by the Guides, Colonel Mocatta effected a junction with the third column. Here a short halt was made to allow the rear to close up, and to afford the men a little rest, as they had been under arms for twelve hours. The whole force then retired by the Kukachana pass to British territory. Major R. B. P. P. Campbell, commanding the third column, had, in anticipation of this, posted a portion

of his troops on the crest of this pass to protect the retirement to the border village of Talanj. The pass was difficult, but practicable; small parties of the enemy followed closely, and three of our men were wounded. The hamlet of Talanj, at the foot of the hills, was reached about 6.30 P.M., and the force then marched across the plain to Gumbat, which was reached at 9.30 P.M., many of the men having been under arms for twenty hours, and having marched nearly thirty miles.

*Expedition
against the
Jowaki Afridis
in August 1877.*

The conduct and spirit of the troops, throughout this long and trying day, had been excellent, and Colonel Mocatta, in his despatch, especially brought to notice the conduct of the cavalry, under Major F. Lance, who, in many instances, had dismounted and voluntarily given up their horses to those of the infantry who were exhausted by want of water and by the heat of a burning sun. Colonel Mocatta said that his thanks were due to the following officers:—

Captain J. A. Kelso, commanding	No. 1 Mountain Battery.
Major F. Lance,	2nd Punjab Cavalry.
Major R. B. P. P. Campbell,	Corps of Guides.
Captain A. G. Ross,	1st Sikh Infantry.
Captain W. B. Aislabe,	3rd Sikh Infantry.
Captain A. Gaselee,	4th Punjab Infantry.
Major S. J. Browne,	6th Punjab Infantry.

Also to the officers of the Staff—

Major W. C. Mackinnon, Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General,
Musketry.

Captain E. Harvey, R.E.

Captain J. M. Sym, 5th Gurkhas, Assistant Adjutant-General.

Surgeon-Major J. W. Johnston.

Colonel Mocatta acknowledged the services of Subadar-Major Habib Khan, 1st Punjab Infantry, whose knowledge of the country and the habits of the tribe was of great value; and he also acknowledged his indebtedness to Colonel Sir F. R. Pollock, K.C.S.I., the Commissioner, Captain T. J. C. Plowden, Deputy Commissioner, Mr. A. Christie, Assistant Commissioner, and to the native chiefs who had supplied levies and assisted in the day's operations.

Although measures had been taken to ensure the utmost secrecy with regard to the movement of the troops preparatory to this expedition, yet it was subsequently discovered that the Jowakis had information on the 29th which led them to expect that an attack was intended, and this would explain the small amount of opposition met with by the second column.

The expenditure of ammunition in the infantry had been an average of 6.8 rounds per man, and No. 1 Mountain Battery had fired 142 rounds—68 of shrapnel and 74 of common shell.

The detail of casualties is given in Appendix F.

Expedition against the Jowaki Afridis by a combined force under Brigadiers-General C. P. Keyes, C.B., and C. C. G. Ross, C.B., November to January 1877-78.

*Expedition
against the
Jowaki Afridis
in 1877-78.*

Although at first an opinion prevailed that a good effect had been obtained by the expedition into the Jowaki country on the 30th of August, yet the main object of the expedition, in inflicting personal loss on the enemy in killed, wounded, and prisoners, was not attained, and the number of casualties on the side of the enemy was exceedingly small. Property of considerable value was certainly destroyed, but the effect of this does not seem to have been of much importance, and it must also be remembered that all the loss of property had fallen on the Kimat Khel alone, and that the Haibat Khel section had not suffered at all.

Meanwhile the hostile attitude of the Jowakis remained unchanged, and aggressions on British territory did not cease. On the 9th of September a number of camels were carried off from British territory, and two days later the telegraph wire was again cut. A few days after this the police station at Shadipur on the Indus was fired upon, and on the 17th a large band of Jowakis attacked the village of Koteri, and killed and wounded some of the villagers, carrying off much plunder. The same day another band made a successful raid on the village of Kheri Shekh Khan. On the 24th of September the Deputy Commissioner, and Major F. Lance, commanding the 2nd Punjab Cavalry, were fired upon while inspecting sites near the Gandiali ravine, and the latter was severely wounded. The same day an outlying picquet near Gumbat was attacked, and four Khataks killed.

On the night of the 20th of October an attack was made on the village of Ghorizai, situated some four miles from Gumbat. This village was held by Khatak levies, of which there were no less than forty in charge. The Afridis, some 200 or 300 in number, attacked the village with great courage, and carried off a large number of cattle, leaving three of the villagers killed and two severely wounded.

On the night of the 23rd the village of Kamar on the Indus, nine miles north of Khushalgarh, was attacked, five men were killed and five wounded, and some cattle were carried off. Another audacious attack was made on the village of Garhi Ghandu, situated in the Peshawar district, and within half a mile of the police outpost of Sham Shattu. Here, on the 24th of October, the Jowakis, sixty in number, entered the village under cover of the ravines, plundered it, and escaped with their booty before assistance could be received. Several of the villagers were wounded in this raid.

On the night of the 25th an attack was made on a party of the 22nd Punjab Native Infantry at Shahkot near the foot of the Charat hill, who, in gross disregard of all rules for ensuring the safety of troops on the march and in the immediate neighbourhood of an enemy's country, had encamped on the edge of a ravine immediately on the Afridi border. Fourteen of their number were killed and wounded, and eight rifles were carried off.

These continued outrages of the tribe at last rendered further punitive measures against them absolutely necessary, and it was determined that a joint occupation of the country should be made by Brigadier-General C. P. Keyes, C.B., with a force composed of troops belonging to the Punjab Frontier Force, and supported by the 29th Punjab Native Infantry in

reserve at Khushalgarh, while Brigadier-General C. C. G. Ross, C.B., commanding the Peshawar district, should advance with a column from that direction. The blockade, which had for some time been of a purely military character, was to be made more active, and to be extended by Brigadier-General Keyes's occupation of the villages of Paiah and Turkai, cutting a line of country through the Jowaki territory.

*Expedition
against the
Jowaki Afridis
in 1877-78.*

Before these operations were undertaken the *jirgas* of the non-committed sections of the Adam Khel tribe, viz., the Gallai, Ashu Khel, and Hassan Khel, were summoned to Peshawar, and were received by the Commissioner on the 28th of October. They were informed of the intention of Government, and they were assured that, in the event of their remaining neutral, no injury whatever would be caused to them. The leading men of the *jirgas*, without hesitation, agreed to remain neutral, and selected hostages from the families of each section were given as a guarantee of their good faith. At the same time a proclamation was prepared by the Government of India, which was to be made public after Brigadier-General Keyes had entered the Jowaki country and taken up his position.

It had been ascertained that, after the expedition into their country on the 30th of August, the Jowakis had made overtures for help to the *Akhund* of Swat and to the Amir of Kabul.

Both applications were unsuccessful, the *Akhund* strongly condemning the tribes as thieves and rascals, who were only murdering and plundering their unarmed co-religionists (referring to raids on Kohat villages), and the Amir informing them that they were mistaken in supposing that he countenanced or approved of their proceedings.

Brigadier-General
Keyes's despatch.

On the 6th of November orders were issued by Brigadier-General C. P. Keyes, for the formation of three columns, as per margin, for offensive operations against the Jowakis. The troops were to carry with them cooked food for two days. At 5 A.M. on the morning of the 9th, the first column marched through the Tortang pass without meeting any opposition, and joined the second column, which had advanced unopposed by the Gandiali defile, near Turkai, at 10 A.M. (see Map, p. 372). The baggage of both columns having been formed in column of route, a continued movement on Paiah was made, and at 1 P.M. the force arrived within 2,000 yards of the highest point commanding the approach to Paiah from the west. This was immediately assaulted

*No. I Column at Kohat, under command of
Colonel D. Mocatta, 3rd Sikh Infantry.*

No. 1 Mountain Battery	
2nd Punjab Cavalry ...	25 sabros.
Corps of Guides ...	380 bayonets.
1st Sikh Infantry ...	225 „
3rd Sikh Infantry ...	225 „

*No. II Column at Gumbat, under command of
Major B. Williams, 2nd Punjab Cavalry.*

2nd Punjab Cavalry	25 sabres.
4th Punjab Infantry ...	350 bayonets.
6th Punjab Infantry ...	300 „

*No. III Column at Luka Talao, under com-
mand of Colonel P. F. Gardiner, 5th Gurkhas.*

No. 2 Mountain Battery	2 guns.
5th Punjab Infantry ..	280 bayonets.
5th Gurkha Regiment	280 „

by the Guides in front, and by the 4th Punjab Infantry in flank, the enemy, after a few shots, taking to flight. It has since been ascertained that Malik Babri was leading the defence, and, being unable to retire quick enough, hid in the ravines below, and thus escaped the Guides, whose skirmishers passed over him. At 3 P.M. the force descended on Paiah, and occupied the principal villages.

In the meantime the third column had pushed forward from Shadipur through the Namung pass, and met with no opposition until emerging from

*Expedition
against the
Jowaki Afridis
in 1877-78.*

were soon driven off by two companies of the 5th Punjab Infantry, and the advance was continued till the village of Kahkto was reached, where the troops received orders to entrench themselves.

On the following day the 4th and 6th Punjab Infantry were sent to the rear from Paiah, to reconnoitre and secure the best line for convoys, and on the 11th of November the first convoy arrived at 10 A.M., unmolested. Heavy and continuous rain prevented further operations that day.

On the 12th, the enemy having occupied the hills to the south of Colonel Gardiner's position, a company of the 5th Punjab Infantry was sent to dislodge them. Having gained the heights and driven them off, the company began to retire, when they were suddenly attacked by superior numbers of the enemy, who had remained concealed in the ravines on the other side of the crest. A gallant stand was made by Major C. E. Stewart and Lieutenant G. Gaisford and their men, who, from the nature of the ground, were broken up into small parties, and the heights were eventually regained, the enemy being driven off in great confusion, with a loss on our side of three men wounded. The enemy's loss could not be ascertained.

On the 13th Colonel Gardiner's column joined the head-quarters at Paiah, but, before doing so, seven towers were blown up and nine burnt, and the village of Zal Beg was completely destroyed.

On the 14th, No. 4 (Hazara) Mountain Battery was added to the strength of Brigadier-General Keyes's force.

On the 15th, after blowing up the principal towers in the Paiah valley, the main body retired to Shindih and Turkai, with the loss of only one man, wounded. The position occupied by the camp at Shindih was on the lower Jamu lands in front (to the south) of Bagh. Heavy rain fell on the 16th, 17th, and 18th, and again from the 22nd to the 25th. During this period reconnaissances and surveys were actively pushed on, and Brigadier-General Keyes returned to Kohat on the 17th, for the purpose of carrying out a reconnaissance in the direction of the Bazid Khel *kotal*, with the first column, which moved to Kohat on the 18th. On the 20th the Brigadier-General returned to the head-quarters' camp, leaving the troops of the first column to proceed on the 21st and 22nd to Turkai.

Owing to the state of the country after the heavy rain, military operations were rendered impossible, and nothing of importance occurred till the 1st of December, when it had been decided to advance on Jamu, one of the principal fastnesses of the Jowaki country. As it appeared difficult to retire a force from Jamu without heavy loss, after advancing and capturing that place, Brigadier-General Keyes suggested that the operations should be simultaneous with an advance by the Peshawar force on Bori. It will, how-

*Right column, under Major J. W. McQueen,
5th Punjab Infantry.*

5th and 6th Punjab Infantry, reinforced by
half No. 2 Mountain Battery, and the
Corps of Guides.

*Centre column, under Colonel P. F. Gardiner,
5th Gurkhas.*

No. 4 (Hazara) Mountain Battery, 4th
Punjab Infantry, and 5th Gurkhas.

*Left column, under Colonel D. Mocatta, 3rd
Sikh Infantry.*

ever, be seen hereafter that, owing to the rain and the breaking of the bridge at Attock, the Peshawar force was not able to occupy the Sarghasha ridge until the 4th December, and the value, therefore, of this operation in aid of Brigadier-General Keyes's movement on Jamu was therefore in a great measure lost.

On the morning of the 1st December the troops paraded noiselessly some time

At 4 A.M. the right column moved to the plateau to the north-east of the camp in the direction of Paiah. The left column moved by a high ridge to a point to the north-west of the camp. The centre column advanced in the direction of Bagh and Sapparai. The right and left columns having arrived at their respective positions at 6.30 A.M., the general advance commenced at that hour and, notwithstanding the enemy's breastworks and other preparations, the attack was a complete surprise, and as their flanks were threatened at the same time that the front attack was made, they did not in any place attempt to make a stand. The ground was much more difficult than had been anticipated, and would have been a formidable position if well held. The enemy was driven into and beyond the two villages of Shahi Khel, close to the Nara Khula defile, where the Jamu valley is very narrow. The gallant conduct of Captain A. J. D. Hawes, 4th Punjab Infantry, during this advance, was subsequently brought to notice by the Brigadier-General. These villages were occupied for an hour and then fired. In one of them was found the prayer-books and the pulpit cushion which had been stolen out of the Kohat church on the previous 5th of November.

*Expedition
against the
Jowaki Afridis
in 1877-78.*

The troops then fell back on the village of Sapparai in the Jamu valley, which was occupied by the head-quarters and the troops marginally noted, the remainder of the force retiring to the camp in front of Bagh. Our loss had been slight, one killed and eight wounded, and the enemy's was estimated at about thirty killed and wounded.

No. 4 (Hazara) Mountain Battery.
Corps of Guides.
1st Sikh Infantry.
4th Punjab Infantry.

As soon as the village of Sapparai had been occupied, the proclamation of Government (*see* Appendix G) was distributed in all directions, and the enemy allowed to remove and bury their dead.

On the following day a reconnoitring party ascended the Mandaher Sar, to survey the Jamu valley and the Bazid Khel *kotal*. On the morning of the 3rd, Brigadier-General Keyes, with a party of the 3rd Sikhs, proceeded to reconnoitre the Bazid Khel *kotal*, which was found to be much less difficult than it had been represented to be, and capable of being turned from the heights on the Kohat side. It would, however, be a formidable obstacle to troops hampered by baggage, if defended by an active enemy. On the 4th, after blowing up the towers, the whole force was withdrawn to the camp in front of Bagh, without casualty, the village of Bagh itself being fired as the troops retired.

It is now necessary to turn to the Peshawar side. On the 12th of November the garrison of Fort Mackeson had a skirmish with raiders between that place and Sham Shattu. On the 16th November Brigadier-General C. C. G. Ross, commanding at Peshawar, reported the occupation of the Sarghasha ridge in considerable strength by Jowakis, who came across from the Kohat side under the impression that an invasion of their country from the direction of Peshawar was intended; these men descended nightly on the Sham Shattu road. On the 21st of November the garrison of Fort Mackeson moved out to oppose an intended raid. On this occasion, Captain H. B. Swiney, 17th Bengal Cavalry, was killed.

In the meanwhile the concentration of troops at Fort Mackeson was being

*Expedition
against the
Jowaki Afridis
in 1877-78.*

fall of rain, quite exceptional at that time of the year, caused a flood on the Indus, which destroyed the bridge of boats at Attock, and caused a block on the line of communications with Rawal Pindi, so that it was not until the 3rd of December that the whole force was concentrated and ready to move into the Jowaki country.

1st Brigade, under Colonel J. Doran, C.B.
Half I-C Royal Horse Artillery.
51st Regiment.
Two companies, Sappers and Miners.
22nd Punjab Native Infantry.
27th Punjab Native Infantry.

2nd Brigade, under Colonel H. J. Buchanan.
Half I-C Royal Horse Artillery.
13-9th Royal Artillery (40-pounders).
9th Regiment.
4th Battalion, Rifle Brigade.
14th Native Infantry.
20th Punjab Native Infantry.

The force, under the command of Brigadier-General C. C. G. Ross, C.B., consisted of 3,959 of all arms (*see* Appendix H), and was divided into two brigades, as per margin, one under the command of Colonel J. Doran, C.B., and the other under Colonel H. J. Buchanan, 9th Regiment.

The Bori valley is separated from the plain to the south of the Mackeson-Sham Shattu road by a rocky range of hills, as already described in the account

of the operations against the Boriwals in 1853. This range is crossed by a comparatively low pass at Kandao, and by a second more direct pass, known as the Sarghasha pass, over a higher part of the ridge (*see* Map, page 372). The plan of operations was to occupy the crest of the ridge with artillery and infantry, and from this position, which entirely commanded the Bori valley, to take such measures as should be found most suitable for attacking the villages and destroying their towers and other defences.

The road *viâ* Kandao was selected for the advance of the 1st Brigade, under Colonel Doran, which was to make its way to the top of the ridge, and turn the Sarghasha pass at the same time as the latter was forced by direct attack by the 2nd Brigade, under Colonel Buchanan. Arrangements had previously been made with the Ashu Khel Afridis for the troops to use the road by Kandao, which lay within their territory.

At dawn on the morning of the 4th of December Colonel Doran's column, the 27th Punjab Native Infantry leading, left camp, and marched towards Kandao, followed by the 2nd Brigade. On arriving in front of Kandao, the latter turned off the road by a track leading to the Sarghasha pass, at the foot of which it arrived about 11 A.M. Colonel Buchanan had received instructions not to advance until he saw the skirmishers of the 27th Punjab Native Infantry on the hill above Kandao. He was then to make his way to the crest of the ridge, and, having dislodged the enemy, to move along the crest to meet his baggage and water, which were to join him *viâ* Kandao.

The advance of Colonel Doran's column was completely successful, and the skirmishers of the 27th Punjab Native Infantry, supported in their advance by the Royal Horse Artillery guns, were soon on the top of the Kandao pass, the small body of the enemy opposed to them being speedily dispersed. The turning movement of this column rendered the crest of the Sarghasha pass untenable by the enemy, who now abandoned their position and retired, partly towards the Bori valley and partly along the Sarghasha ridge towards Khui, keeping up a desultory fire on the advancing troops as they retired. In the meanwhile Colonel Buchanan's column, covered by the fire of the heavy guns, had gained the top of the pass, notwithstanding the

difficult nature of the ground, and the ridge was in our hands. It had been intended that the troops under Colonel Doran should return to the plain before Kandao for the night, but it was found necessary to alter this arrangement, and orders were issued for the whole force to bivouac on the ridge. *Expedition against the Jowaki Afridis in 1877-78.*

On the following morning, the 51st Regiment and 22nd Punjab Native Infantry were ordered to return to Kandao, and march thence by the road along the foot of the hills to the ground near the foot of the Sarghasha pass. During the day the road by this pass was improved by the Sappers and Miners, aided by infantry working parties, and the line of communications with the plains was transferred to this route, that by Kandao being abandoned to prevent any chance of complications with the Ashu Khel Afridis.

Arrangements had been made by Colonel Buchanan for an early attack on a small ridge in the Bori valley which the enemy had occupied the previous evening, and from which they had caused annoyance to our troops. Three companies of the 14th Native Infantry and two companies of the 9th Foot, under the command of Captain J. G. Maclean, of the former regiment, were therefore ordered to attack the position. The ridge proved to be more precipitous than it appeared from above, but Captain Maclean's party were soon on the top, with the loss of only two sepoy wounded and one *kahar* killed; a post was then established on this hill.

It has been mentioned that some of the enemy who had held the pass on the previous day had retreated to the end of the ridge towards Khui and Taruni. It was therefore necessary to clear this hill before the pass road could be considered safe for baggage and water mules, and for this duty four companies of the 20th Punjab Native Infantry were accordingly detailed. The enemy attempted to make a stand, but they were soon driven off and dispersed.

On this day (the 5th) steps were taken to ascertain, with accuracy, the ranges of most of the hamlets of Bori, and also of some of the more conspicuous points in the valley; and the knowledge thus gained proved of great value in the subsequent days' operations.

On the 6th, 7th, and 8th of December the troops were employed in the destruction of the villages and towers in the Bori valley.

The destruction of the villages was carried out by the sappers, under the superintendence of the Commanding Royal Engineer, covered by infantry and by the fire of the artillery on the ridge. On the first two days the rocky heights above the villages attacked were held by considerable bodies of the enemy, who maintained a brisk, though generally ineffective, fire, supplemented on several occasions by showers of stones, until dislodged by the steady advance of the infantry skirmishers, and by the admirably directed shells of the Royal Horse Artillery guns from the top of the Sarghasha ridge. On each occasion, the enemy, as is usually the case, reappeared as soon as we began to retire, but the fire of the guns and the steadiness of our skirmishers, effectually prevented them from pressing on our retirement. On the last day of our operations in the valley two of the strongest villages were occupied without resistance. The Afridis appear to have found that their traditional tactics were useless against the arms and disciplined troops opposed to them, and, with the exception of a few individuals, none of them on this occasion attempted to hold their ground or to fire upon the troops when retiring. During these three days' operations our loss was small, namely, one *kahar* killed, two men of the 9th Regiment, one sepoy of the 20th and 27th Punjab

*Expedition
against the
Jowaki Afridis
in 1877-78.*

Native Infantry, respectively, and six sepoy of the 14th Native Infantry, wounded. The small number of casualties was in great part due to the accurate shooting of the Royal Horse Artillery guns.

The Jowakis of the Bori valley had now taken refuge in the neighbouring villages of the "uncommitted sections", or had retreated by the Bori Chena pass into the heart of the Jowaki country.

The weather on the 7th, and on the morning of the 8th, had been cloudy and threatening, and on the afternoon of the latter day, before the troops had left the Bori valley, rain began to fall heavily, and continued without intermission, accompanied by intense cold and occasional violent gusts of wind, for forty hours. Orders were at once sent to the Commissariat to bring all available tents from Fort Mackeson to the camp at the foot of the pass occupied by the 51st Regiment and 22nd Punjab Native Infantry. The force on the ridge remained during the night of the 8th without shelter of any sort, but did not suffer materially or in spirits from the exposure they were subjected to. The following morning the main body of the force was withdrawn from the ridge, leaving only six companies of infantry and two guns on the crest, the remainder being in support in the main camp at the foot of the pass.

While the operations in the Bori valley were in progress, Brigadier-General Keyes, on the 7th of December, successfully attacked and destroyed the village and towers of Ghariba, a place which had long been considered the "Alsatia" of Jowaki thieves, and, from the difficult nature of its approaches, secure from attack. Malik Mushki was also known to be residing at Ghariba. It was therefore considered advisable that the valley should be visited and the place destroyed. Accordingly on the 6th of December orders were issued for an attack to be made on Ghariba on the following day.

The troops detailed for the attack were divided into two columns. The right column, under Major J. W. McQueen, 5th Punjab Infantry, was ordered to move along the convoy route leading from the right-rear of the camp into the Paiah valley, so as to reach the high plateau overlooking the villages of Paiah by daylight. Should the alarm be given by the enemy before this point was reached, the column was at once to push on, seize and hold the heights, and advance as far as practicable in the direction of Ghariba.

The left column, under Major R. B. P. P. Campbell, Corps of Guides, was ordered to start from camp at 5 A.M., and to move in the same direction as that taken by the right attack on Jamu on the 1st of December, and on reaching the direct road leading from Ghariba, to advance and seize the hill overlooking the village.

A third column, under Colonel P. F. Gardiner, 5th Gurkhas, was to form the reserve, and to start at 6 A.M., and follow the route taken by the left column.

At 4.30 A.M. on the morning of the 7th of December, the right column, consisting of the troops as per margin, started from camp, and proceeded towards the plateau in front of the villages of Paiah. The advance of the column was not seen by the enemy until it reached the slopes of the plateau. The enemy's picquet then retired, after giving the alarm, and the 5th and 6th Punjab Infantry, pushing rapidly over the plateau, came on the village of Ghariba, which the enemy evacuated, about fifty or sixty men holding the heights above and to the right, from which, however, the advanced

Brigadier-General
Keyes's despatch.

5th Punjab Infantry... 253 bayonets.
6th Punjab Infantry... 264 "

skirmishers soon drove them; picquets were left on these heights, and the remainder of the troops were employed in preparing the village for destruction. *Expedition against the Jowaki Afridis in 1877-78.*

In the meanwhile, the left column, consisting of the troops as per margin, had left camp at 5 A.M., and had reached the further end of the high plateau north-east of the camp by daybreak. From here the column continued its advance, without opposition, over extremely difficult ground, and, on approaching Ghariba, met the skirmishers of the right attack, with whom they crowned the heights to the north of the village.

Corps of Guides	...	340 bayonets.
4th Punjab Infantry	...	300 "
No. 1 Mountain Battery	...	2 guns.
No. 2 Mountain Battery	...	2 "
No. 4 (Hazara) Mountain Battery	...	2 "
1st Sikh Infantry	...	200 bayonets.
3rd Sikh Infantry	...	200 "
29th Punjab Native Infantry	...	200 "
5th Gurkha Regiment	...	200 "

The reserve column, as per margin, left camp at 6 A.M., accompanied by the Brigadier-General, and followed the route taken by the left column.

On reaching the end of the high plateau to the north-east of the camp, the 5th Gurkhas and the guns of Nos. 1 and 2 Mountain Batteries were detached to hold the Paiah-Jamu road, the rest of the reserve advancing to the crest of the hills to the west of Ghariba, where they arrived at 8 A.M., by which time the two columns of attack had united, and were occupying the village. At 11 A.M. the troops were ordered to retire, after destroying the hamlets and towers of Ghariba. This was effected without any loss on our side, and the whole of the troops returned to camp the same afternoon. During the day's operations there had been no casualties on our side. The enemy's loss was estimated at five killed and ten wounded, in addition to several prisoners captured. Malik Mushki, with his principal followers, escaped in the direction of Jamu. The Brigadier-General considered the success of the operations due to the rapid and combined movement of the two columns of attack, which gave the enemy no time to make a stand.

Although the chief places of the Jowakis had now been occupied and destroyed, and the blockade satisfactorily maintained by our forces, yet the enemy showed no signs of surrender. Had it been possible to ensure the friendliness of the other sections, the maintenance of the blockade, though a tedious proceeding, would certainly have brought the people to terms without the risk of any further advance into their country; but this friendliness did not appear to be assured, and a further advance, by both forces in combination, into the Pastaoni valley was decided upon. For many years past the strategic value of the Pastaoni valley, to a force operating against the Adam Khel tribe, had been recognised, and it was known that this portion of the Jowaki country was considered impregnable by them. It was also hoped that, by making a sudden combined movement in this direction, a surprise might be effected, and property and cattle seized, which would materially aid the settlement of affairs. Another consideration, though of minor importance, was that a survey of this part of the Jowaki country was very desirable. Brigadier-General Keyes, however, considered that the advantage of a movement into the Pastaoni valley was doubtful, and he argued not only that the physical difficulties were great, but that the chance of any property or cattle falling into our hands was small, owing to the facilities of removing them to Torsappar immediately our intention of attacking Pastaoni became known to the Jowakis. These objections, however, were overruled, and orders were

*Expedition
against the
Jowaki Afridis
in 1877-78.*

issued for a combined advance of the forces of Brigadiers-General Keyes and Ross.

On the Peshawar side the road from the Bori valley to Pastaoni leads through the Bori Chena pass, which was believed by many good authorities to present insurmountable difficulties to the advance of troops accompanied by baggage and stores, and accordingly orders were issued, on the night of the 23rd December, by Brigadier-General Ross, for a reconnaissance of the pass, and of the crest of the hills overlooking the Pastaoni valley. Between the 9th and 21st of December the Peshawar force had not been idle: new roads had been constructed by the sappers, and the communications generally had been improved between the ridge and the main camp at the foot of the Sarghasha pass. In addition to this, information had been collected by the Quarter-Master General's Department in view of an advance on Pastaoni. On the 24th orders were issued for the guidance of the officers selected to command

Brigadier-General
Ross's despatch.

1st Brigade, under Colonel J. Doran, C.B.

I-C Royal Horse Artillery (2 guns).

9th Regiment, 150 bayonets.

One company, Sappers and Miners.

27th Punjab Native Infantry.

2nd Brigade, under Colonel H. J. Buchanan.

* No. 4 (Hazara) Mountain Battery.

9th Regiment ... 120 bayonets.

14th Native Infantry 300 "

20th Punjab Native Infantry, 300 "

the reconnaissance. The force was divided into two brigades, as per margin, under the command of Colonels Doran and Buchanan respectively. Colonel Buchanan was ordered to move towards the top of the Dand Sar, but not to attack the village of Pastaoni, nor to proceed further than the crest of the ridge, unless he was attacked in force. In this case he was directed to advance on the

village if he found he had time to do so, and in any case to drive the enemy off before he began his retirement.

The villages of Bori were found deserted on the morning of the 25th, and the ascent of the Dand Sar was commenced shortly after daylight. The road was difficult, and severely tried the climbing powers of the battery. From the top of the peak a view was obtained of a portion of the Pastaoni valley and of the *kotal* of the Bori Chena pass. From here a party advanced to the crest of the ridge above Pastaoni, from whence the whole valley was visible, and having halted for an hour while the plane table survey was being completed, they then made their way to the *kotal*, and returned by the Bori Chena pass. In the meantime, the 1st Brigade, under Colonel Doran had furnished a crowning party on the heights on the east of the pass, which were found easily accessible by a steep path from the Bori valley. Only a few shots were fired during the day, and the troops got back to camp shortly after dark, having had twelve hours' hard work. The pass was found to be nothing but the bed of a mountain torrent, and would be almost impassable after much rain. The road was rough and bad, and in many places very narrow, but the result of the reconnaissance was to show that although difficult, the pass was practicable for laden mules. A noted

Captain Cavag-
nari's report.

thief, a Kuki Khel Afridi, a resident of Janakhwar, was found asleep in the pass, with five camels grazing close by him. He was made a prisoner, and enquiry showed that the camels had been stolen the previous day from a village in the Peshawar district.

* No. 4 (Hazara) Mountain Battery had joined the Peshawar column on the 21st of December, having been transferred from Brigadier-General Keyes's force.

It was accordingly proposed by Brigadier-General Ross that his force should bivouac in the Bori valley on the 26th, and advance to Pastaoni on the 27th, in co-operation with Brigadier-General Keyes, but heavy rain rendered all movements impossible, owing to danger of floods in the pass, and the advance had therefore to be postponed until the 31st of December, and it was expected that Brigadier-General Keyes's force from the Kohat side would arrive in the Pastaoni valley on the same day.

*Expedition
against the
Jowaki Afridis
in 1877-78.*

Four days' rations were taken by the Peshawar column, of which two days' supply were carried by the regiments, the remainder by the Commissariat. The force employed consisted of I-C Royal Horse Artillery, with infantry detachments on the Sarghasha ridge, and two brigades, under Colonels

1st Brigade, under Colonel J. Doran, C.B.

9th Regiment ... 100 bayonets.

4th Battalion, Rifle Brigade 130 „

17th Bengal Cavalry ... 20 sabres.

Two companies, Sappers
and Miners... 160 bayonets.

27th Punjab Native Infantry 484 „

2nd Brigade, under Colonel H. J. Buchanan.

9th Regiment ... 300 bayonets.

14th Native Infantry ... 489 „

20th Punjab Native Infantry 369 „

Doran and Buchanan, which were composed of the troops as per margin (*see Appendix I*). No. 4 (Hazara) Mountain Battery, with an escort of 50 bayonets of the 22nd Punjab Native Infantry, was attached to the 2nd Brigade until the crowning of the *kotal* and both sides of the pass was completed, when it was ordered to join Colonel Doran's column, in case it should be required to cover his

advance on Pastaoni. Colonel Doran was directed to detach two companies to the crest of the hills on the left of the pass, and to furnish a strong party as a rear guard, the remainder of his column being pushed on to the head of the pass, with instructions to await further orders regarding the attack on Pastaoni.

On the morning of the 31st of December the troops advanced, and the 1st Brigade, under Colonel Buchanan, having crowned the hills to the right, moved along towards the *kotal* over the same ground as on the 25th of December. The advance up the pass, as had been anticipated, proved a difficult one, and much delay occurred in the passage of the baggage, which was principally due to the fact that, the road being very narrow in parts, the loads were knocked off by the projecting rocks on either side. On arrival at the top of the pass, a party* under Major H. W. Gordon, 20th Punjab

Native Infantry, which had been previously detailed, took up a position on the *kotal*, with orders to hold the crest on both sides of the road during the stay of the force in the valley.

* 9th Regiment, 1 company.

20th Punjab Native Infantry, 1 company.

22nd Punjab Native Infantry, $\frac{1}{2}$ company.

27th Punjab Native Infantry, 2 companies.

The advance of the troops to the right and left of the pass was almost entirely unopposed, a few stray shots only being fired at the 27th Punjab Native Infantry, and some small parties who opened fire on the advanced skirmishers of the right column were at once dispersed by a few well-aimed shells from the Hazara Mountain Battery.

On the arrival of Colonel Doran's brigade at the top of the pass, he received orders to move down the opposite slope, and attack the village of Pastaoni. His attack was led by some skirmishers of the 9th Foot and 27th Punjab Native Infantry, with the detachment of the Rifle Brigade and other troops in support. The village of Pastaoni consisted of four principal hamlets, with two towers concealed from the foot of the pass by a low rocky hill

*Expedition
against the
Jowaki Afridis
in 1877-78.*

approaching to within five or six hundred yards of it, were received with a rapid, but ill-directed, fire from a small party of about thirty of the enemy.

The rocky hill above the village was quickly occupied by the skirmishers, but not before the enemy had time to gain the hills on the southern side of the valley, where they disappeared after firing a few shots.

The Brigadier-General then pushed on towards Walai with a portion of the 20th and 27th Punjab Native Infantry, and detachments of the 9th Foot and Rifle Brigade, and met Brigadier-General Keyes, escorted by a few mounted orderlies, about a mile above Pastaoni. After consulting as to future operations, Brigadier-General Ross returned to Pastaoni, and Brigadier-General Keyes was escorted back to his picquets on the Dargai Sar by a party of the 20th Punjab Native Infantry, under Lieut.-Colonel R. G. Rogers; this party was fired on by the enemy when returning to camp.

In the meantime, ground had been selected for the bivouacs of the different corps in and near Pastaoni, and the greater part of the baggage reached camp during the afternoon; but a portion of it, owing to delays in the pass, was still on the northern side of the *kotal* when the sun went down. They were, therefore, ordered to remain on a plateau near the crest, under the protection of Major Gordon's party, until the morning. The night was an exceptionally severe one, with hard frost and a bitterly cold wind; and the officers and men on the *kotal* had no food except what was in their haversacks, and very many of them had neither great-coats nor blankets. The night passed quietly, and no attack was attempted by the Afridis, although large numbers of them had been seen in the direction of Torsappar.

Brigadier-General Keyes had informed Brigadier-General Ross that he intended to withdraw from the positions occupied by his troops on the Dargai Sar towards Kohat, on the morning of the 1st of January. The latter, however, decided to remain in the Pastaoni valley another day, in order to send a survey party to the hills above Walai, as well as towards Garai, a Hassan Khel village below Pastaoni. On the evening of the 1st of January all preparations were made for the return of the force at daybreak next morning to the Sarghasha ridge and camp, and a portion of Colonel Buchanan's brigade was marched to the head of the pass.

The following morning at daylight the heights on both sides of the pass were crowned by the same troops as had been employed for this duty on the 31st of December, and, when the road was reported clear, the baggage, preceded by an advanced guard of native infantry, left camp and traversed the pass without a check, the road having been much improved by the sappers since the force marched through two days before. Colonel Doran's brigade left Pastaoni two hours later, after destroying the towers and setting fire to the villages, and followed the baggage through the pass. The opposition met with was very slight, and the whole of the troops regained the Bori valley early in the afternoon, and reached the Sarghasha camp without any casualties.

On emerging from the Bori Chena pass, the troops came upon the mutilated corpses of three Hindu traders, who had attempted to follow the force after the rear guard had passed through the defile. They had been barbarously murdered by the enemy, although unarmed and unable to offer any resistance.

It is now necessary to turn to the operations of Brigadier-General Keyes's force. After the capture of Ghariba, the force was withdrawn to the camp in front of Bagh, as already

Captain Cavag-
nari's report.

Brigadier-General
Keyes's despatch

flying visit to Peshawar, to see the Lieutenant-Governor, who was then at that place, and, having received his instructions with regard to further movements, he proceeded to the camp of Brigadier-General Ross, to consult with him as to the combined operations to be undertaken against Pastaoni. It was agreed that nothing definite could be settled until the reconnaissance already narrated had been carried out. Brigadier-General Keyes returned to Kohat on the 21st of December, and the following day accompanied the Lieutenant-Governor, who had also arrived there, to the camp in front of Bagh.

*Expedition
against the
Jowaki Afridis
in 1877-78.*

Brigadier-General Ross having carried out his reconnaissance on the 25th of December, it was arranged that a combined attack on Pastaoni should be made on the 27th, but heavy rain, as already mentioned, delayed the operations until the 31st of December, the date finally fixed for the advance.

The troops to take part in these operations were divided into three columns, as per margin. The advanced

Advanced Column.
Corps of Guides ... 200 bayonets.
5th Punjab Infantry ... 200 "

Centre Column.
No. 2 Mountain Battery (2 guns).
4th Punjab Infantry ... 200 bayonets.
6th Punjab Infantry ... 200 "
5th Gurkha Regiment ... 200 "

Rear Column.
No. 1 Mountain Battery (2 guns).
1st Sikh Infantry ... 200 bayonets.
3rd Sikh Infantry ... 200 "
29th Punjab Native Infantry 200 "

column was under the command of Major J. W. McQueen, 5th Punjab Infantry; the centre column, composed of troops from Shindih, was under the command of Colonel P. F. Gardiner, 5th Gurkhas; and the rear column, composed of troops from Turkai, was under the command of Colonel D. Mocatta, 3rd Sikh Infantry.

At 5.30 A.M. on the morning of the 31st of December the advanced column marched from camp, and, proceeding

along the convoy route, debouched on the Paiah plain, and from there advanced on Ghariba. A few of the enemy were seen retiring as the troops advanced, but not a shot was fired. On gaining the village of Ghariba, the column turned to the left up the spur of the Dargai Sar. The ground was exceedingly difficult, and, had it been defended, even by a few men, the troops could not have advanced without considerable loss. On reaching the summit of the Dargai Sar, two companies of the Guides, under Lieutenant F. D. Battye, were sent to hold the hill overlooking Jamu, and a small party of the Guides was also sent down to the ridge at the head of the pass to await the arrival of the main column.

In the meanwhile, the other two columns left camp at 6.30 A.M., and followed the advanced column to Ghariba. On arriving there, the Brigadier-General, with the 4th Punjab Infantry, 5th Gurkhas, and the guns of No. 2 Mountain Battery, moved on at once to the Dargai pass, leaving the baggage and the 6th Punjab Infantry with the rear column at Ghariba. On reaching the mouth of the pass, a few shots were fired at long distances, and one sepoy of the 5th Gurkhas was wounded. A considerable quantity of grain was found in the ravines, and it was evident that the advance of the troops in this direction was unexpected. A large number of camels were observed being driven off in the direction of Torsappar, and near the summit of the pass fifteen loads of grain were found on the road, which had apparently been thrown down in haste, and the unladen camels driven off to escape capture.

As soon as the leading regiment reached the crest of the pass, the Brigadier-General sent a company of the 4th Punjab Infantry to occupy Walai, and a survey party was sent in the direction of Jamu up Spin Takki, the highest point of the range. The Brigadier-General himself accompanied by his staff

*Expedition
against the
Jowaki Afridis
in 1877-78.*

found to be much longer, steeper, and more difficult than had been expected. On arriving at Walai, it was found to be an unsuitable position for the force to bivouac, as had been intended, and orders were accordingly sent back for the troops to remain for the night as nearly as possible in the positions they then held. Leaving the company of infantry to hold the village, Brigadier-General Keyes, with a few mounted orderlies, reconnoitred towards Pastaoni, which was now occupied by the Peshawar troops, and met Brigadier-General Ross, as already narrated. It was agreed that nothing was to be gained by further operations, or a prolonged occupation of the Pastaoni valley. Moreover, owing to the unsettled state of the weather, it was possible the force might be detained by rain beyond the time for which it had provisions, when the movement of supplies from the rear would be very difficult. Brigadier-General Keyes having informed Brigadier-General Ross that he would withdraw his force the next day, as a continued occupation of the Dargai heights was not necessary when further operations were not contemplated, then returned to his position on the Dargai Sar, escorted by a party of the 20th Punjab Native Infantry, the company of the 4th Punjab Infantry being withdrawn from Walai as he passed.

On the morning of the 1st of January the 4th Punjab Infantry was ordered to escort a survey party up the highest points of the range to the east, and to descend by a spur over Ghariba. The retirement of the whole force was commenced at 11 A.M. Major McQueen was directed to retire his column through the pass by which the main body had ascended the previous day, and to cover the retirement of the whole force. The road from the position occupied by the Guides and 5th Punjab Infantry to the head of the pass was steep and difficult, and caused considerable delay to the baggage mules of these two regiments. This delay enabled the enemy to collect and follow up the retirement. On arriving at the head of the pass, Major McQueen selected the Pathan company of the 5th Punjab Infantry to cover the retirement. This very difficult duty was admirably carried out, and they held the ridge against rapidly increasing numbers for over three-quarters of an hour, while the column was slowly filing down the pass, greatly impeded by its baggage. It was due to the skilful manner in which the retirement was effected that the enemy did not succeed in inflicting any loss upon our troops. The 4th Punjab Infantry, covering the survey party, were also followed up by a small party of the enemy, but succeeded in effecting their retirement without any casualty. From Paiah the troops marched back to camp unmolested. It was, however, quite dark before the regiments reached their respective positions.

On the following day, the 2nd of January, Brigadier-General Keyes visited the Lieutenant-Governor at Kohat, and it was decided that further operations should be undertaken against Jamu for the purpose of exploring the Nara Khula defile, which was the only remaining stronghold of the Jowakis. The operations were delayed, for political reasons, in consequence of the uncertainty as to the attitude of the neutral sections of the Adam Khel tribe, but it was finally arranged that a simultaneous advance should be made from the Peshawar and Kohat sides on the morning of the 15th of January, and that both columns should, on the evening of that day, occupy the same positions as they held on the 31st of December, and that on the 16th a consultation should be held at Walai as to the measures required for the passage of the Kohat force through the Nara Khula pass, and such further movements as Brigadier-General Keyes might think necessary to complete the occupation of the Jowaki

Since their return from Pastaoni on the 2nd of January, the Peshawar troops had not been idle. Advantage had been taken of the cessation of active hostilities to employ the troops in making such reconnaissances as were required to complete our knowledge of the country immediately beyond our border. On the 4th of January a reconnaissance was made of the Uchbori valley, and subsequently reconnaissances were made of the western portion of the Sarghasha ridge.

Expedition against the Jowaki Afridis in 1877-78.

On the morning of the 15th of January Brigadier-General Ross's force, composed of the same corps as on the first expedition to Pastaoni, and divided into two columns, as on that occasion, under the command of Colonels Doran and Buchanan respectively, moved into the Pastaoni valley by the Bori Chena pass. The force occupied Pastaoni without resistance at about 11 A.M., and the baggage arrived in camp early in the afternoon. The *kotal* was occupied by the same party, under Major H. W. Gordon, 20th Punjab Native Infantry, as on the former occasion. A halt was made at Pastaoni, and heliographic communication was established with Brigadier-General Keyes, who had again occupied the Dargai ridge, as on the 31st of December. At about 1 P.M. a small force, consisting of No. 4 (Hazara) Mountain Battery, the 9th Foot, and the 14th Native Infantry, under Colonel Buchanan, was despatched to reconnoitre in the direction of Walai and towards the Nara Khula defile; the column was fired on during its advance, but a few shells from the Hazara Mountain Battery soon dispersed the enemy. Having effected their object, the force returned to camp. As a result of this reconnaissance, it was decided to evacuate Pastaoni, and to move the whole force to Walai on the following day.

The troops were under arms at daybreak on the morning of the 16th, and marched shortly afterwards towards Walai, the hills on the left being crowned by the 27th Punjab Native Infantry, Colonel Buchanan's brigade at the same time moving along the spur forming the northern boundary of the valley, by which the reconnoitring party had advanced on the previous day. The village of Walai was occupied without opposition by Colonel Doran's troops, and the 20th Punjab Native Infantry, which formed the advanced guard of the other brigade, was pushed on to the crest of the spur from the main range overlooking the Gulu Tangai.

At 9 A.M. Brigadier-General Ross was joined at Walai by Brigadier-General Keyes, and was requested by the latter to co-operate with him by sending troops to the crest of the Torsappar range, which forms the boundary between the Jowaki and Gallai Afridis. Orders were at once sent to Colonel Buchanan to move his brigade towards the Torsappar watershed, and the 20th Punjab Native Infantry, which formed the advanced guard, began at once to move up the spur. The ascent was long and steep, and, when near the top, the advance was delayed for a short time by a small party of the enemy, who were strongly posted near the crest of the hill; they were, however, soon dislodged, and were pursued by the leading skirmishers across the Gallai Afridi frontier. The remainder of Colonel Buchanan's brigade shortly afterwards joined the 20th Punjab Native Infantry on the watershed, and Mr. G. B. Scott, of the Survey Department, was enabled from this point to add a large extent of hitherto unknown country to his map. The troops returned by the same spur by which they had ascended, and then turned to the right and descended into the Gulu Tangai, where it had been arranged that they should bivouac. Captain J. M. Trotter, Deputy-Assistant Quarter-Master General, Captain Cavagnari, the Deputy Commissioner, with some of

*Expedition
against the
Jowaki Afridis
in 1877-78.*

distance along the crest of the main range, and then descended to Colonel Buchanan's bivouac by the road which leads down the Gulu Tangai. The road was found to be rough and narrow in places, but capable of being made a fair baggage road in a few hours.

A portion of Colonel Doran's brigade had been employed during the day in examining the lower part of the Gulu Tangai, and had captured a few prisoners and a large number of cattle.

The 2nd Brigade, which bivouacked in the Gulu Tangai, passed the night quietly; but Colonel Doran's troops, which occupied Walai, were a good deal disturbed during the early part of the night.

On the following day it was determined, in consultation with Brigadier-General Keyes, that the Peshawar column should abandon its communications by the Sarghasha pass, and should join Brigadier-General Keyes's force on the 18th, and retire to the camp below the Sarghasha pass, *via* Kohat. Orders were accordingly sent for Major Gordon's party on the *kotal* above Pastaoni to fall back to the camp, with the exception of one company of the 27th, which was directed to join the head-quarters of the regiment at Walai, bringing the heliograph party with them.

On the 17th, Brigadier-General Ross employed his troops in adding to our knowledge of the country towards Torsappar. The 14th Native Infantry, the 20th Punjab Native Infantry, and No. 4 (Hazara) Mountain Battery were again sent to the watershed above the Torsappar valley, and it was arranged by Captain Cavagnari that Mr. Scott should be escorted by the Gallai *jirga* to the Zersappar peak, a short distance in advance of the force, to complete the survey of the valley below. From Colonel Buchanan's position a large body of the enemy was observed attempting to oppose Brigadier-General Keyes's troops, who were advancing to the crest of the hills to the north of the Nara Khula; the Hazara Mountain Battery was therefore directed to open fire on them, and succeeded in dropping several well-aimed shells among them.

On the same day (the 17th), Colonel Doran's brigade had been despatched at 9 A.M. towards Pastaoni, with orders to visit the gorge to the south of the village, where it was believed that some of the enemy had taken refuge with their cattle. On arriving at this gorge, there were signs of the place having been recently used as a large encamping-ground, but only a few cows were found, which were driven off by the troops.

Brigadier-General Ross's force bivouacked in the same positions as on the previous night, and early the next morning, the 18th, the whole of the Peshawar column marched towards the Nara Khula, to join Brigadier-General Keyes's force. On arriving at the entrance of the defile, the leading brigade (Colonel Buchanan's) was halted, and Colonel Doran was ordered to move through the pass and occupy Jamu. The command of the whole force then devolved on Brigadier-General Keyes; and it is necessary now to turn to the movements of the Kohat column since the morning of the 15th of January.

Early on the morning of the 15th, the 4th and 5th Punjab Infantry (200 bayonets each), under the command of Major J. W. McQueen, moved in advance of the main column with orders to march direct on Ghariba, and push on at once, as rapidly as possible, up the spur of the Dargai range by which the survey party descended on the 1st of January.

The Corps of Guides (200 bayonets) advanced at the same time by the spur by which Major McQueen's column had ascended on the 31st of

heights on the right were gained by the 4th and 5th Punjab Infantry. The baggage and main* column advanced direct by the Dargai pass, halting near the entrance until the skirmishers of the right and left attacks were seen advancing along the heights towards the *kotal*. The baggage was then sent on, and it took three hours in reaching the crest of the pass. The 4th Punjab Infantry, which led the right advance, met with some slight opposition near the foot of the spur by which it ascended, evidently from men who had retreated from Ghariba on the approach of the troops, or who had taken up their abode in temporary habitations in the neighbouring ravines. One sepoy was wounded, but opposition ceased before the difficult ground near the top was reached.

Expedition against the Jowaki Afridis in 1877-78.

*No. 2 Mountain Battery ... 2 guns.
6th Punjab Infantry ... 200 bayonets.
5th Gurkha Regiment ... 200 "

A few of the enemy occupied a commanding position on the left, and appeared determined to oppose the advance of the Guides; but, finding themselves liable to be outflanked and their retreat possibly cut off, they abandoned their position after firing a few shots, and the Guides made good their advance without further opposition.

In conjunction with the movement to the crest of the Dargai Sar, above described, a second column had been ordered to occupy the Jamu valley, with the object of forcing the Nara Khula defile.

This column, consisting of the troops as per margin, under the command of Colonel D. Mocatta, marched from Turkai at 6 A.M. on the 15th, and occupied the Jamu villages by 9 A.M., without opposition. Here Colonel Mocatt received orders from Brigadier-General Keyes, by heliograph, to make the necessary arrangements for forcing the Nara Khula on the following day. He accordingly, after selecting positions for the bivouac of the troops and for the picquets, reconnoitred the approaches to the defile, and made dispositions for carrying out these orders on the following morning. In the meanwhile, the regiments on the Dargai Sar range had been told off to the posts they were to hold along the heights, and preparations had been made to bivouac for the night.

On the following morning, Brigadier-General Keyes, accompanied by the Commissioner of Peshawar (Colonel Sir F. R. Pollock), the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat (Captain Plowden), and his staff, proceeded to Walai to meet Brigadier-General Ross, to consult with him as to the further movements of the troops. After leaving Walai, Brigadier-General Keyes joined a portion of his force (about 800 bayonets), which had been previously ordered to descend into the gorge at the foot of the Dargai Sar, and an advance was made up the spurs of the Sandalai Sar, with a view to reconnoitre the Torsappar valley.

Brigadier-General Keyes, with the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner, proceeded to the crest of the main range, whence a good view of the valley was obtained. From here, a body of the enemy, with some women and a large number of cattle, were visible, and the capture of these would have been easy, but, for political reasons, this was considered unadvisable, as it would have taken the troops into Gallai Afridi territory. The object of the reconnaissance having been obtained, the order was given for the troops to retire. It had been Brigadier-General Keyes's intention, after

*Expedition
against the
Jowaki Afridis
in 1877-78.*

troops again reached the gorge, to carry out this object, and they were, therefore, ordered to return to their bivouac on the Dargai Sar.

During the 16th, Colonel Mocatta, according to the orders he had received, advanced into the Nara Khula defile. At 6 A.M. a party of 100 bayonets, 1st Sikh Infantry, was sent forward to seize the ridge which connects the Mandaher Sar with the Zira hill on the west side of the Nara Khula. The party encountered considerable opposition, but, owing to the excellent arrangements made by Major A. G. Ross, who was in command, they succeeded in their object (with the loss of only one man), and picquets were placed which commanded the Nara Khula from the left. An hour later, another party, consisting of 50 bayonets of the 3rd Sikh Infantry, under Lieutenant C. H. M. Smith, was sent to seize a conical hill which overlooked the defile throughout almost its entire length. In the meanwhile, the guns of No. 2 Mountain Battery on the Dargai Sar had taken up a position overlooking the Nara Khula on the east side. The right and left flanks being thus secured, Colonel Mocatta, at 10 A.M., gave orders for an advance to be made through the defile. On reaching the further end of the pass, a smart fire was opened on the advanced party, and one man of the 1st Sikh Infantry was wounded. A few of the enemy were occupying a ridge about 500 or 600 yards in advance of the gorge, and it was necessary to dislodge them. This duty was performed by Major H. C. P. Rice with 30 bayonets of the 1st Sikh Infantry, and the heights on the right and left having been secured by parties from the 29th Punjab Native Infantry and 3rd Sikh Infantry respectively, the remainder of the troops were ordered to halt under cover, pending further orders. The guns, however, continued to shell the enemy, who appeared in considerable numbers on the higher ridge facing the gorge, at a distance of about 1,600 yards.

At noon, not having received any orders from Brigadier-General Keyes, and not wishing to delay too long in retiring, as previously directed, to Jamu, Colonel Mocatta ordered the advanced picquets to be withdrawn, and the force to commence its retirement. A small party of the 3rd Sikh Infantry was left in the gorge to keep down the fire of the enemy, who had occupied, in considerable numbers, the hill in front of the gorge directly the picquet of the 1st Sikh Infantry was withdrawn, and were keeping up a smart fire upon the gorge and the road leading down the ravine. This party of the 3rd Sikh Infantry kept up a heavy fire on the hill occupied by the enemy, until it was seen that the picquets on the right and left, as well as that of the 1st Sikh Infantry, which had been withdrawn from the hill in advance, had had time to get down from the heights occupied by them. The delay, which was unavoidable, had, however, given time for the more adventurous amongst the enemy to sneak down the hill under cover of the thick jungle in front of the gorge, and almost as soon as the the 3rd Sikh Infantry was withdrawn, they occupied the gorge, and kept up a heavy fire upon the road. By this fire a havildar was killed, and Major Rice, commanding the 1st Sikh Infantry, who, with a company of his regiment, had taken up a position about half a mile in rear of the mouth of the gorge to cover the retirement of the 3rd Sikh Infantry, was dangerously wounded. After this, the enemy, coming under the fire of Major Ross's party on the Zira hill, and of Lieutenant Smith's party on the conical hill, ceased to follow, but kept on firing down the ravine until all the covering parties were ultimately withdrawn, without further loss. Leaving a native

remainder of his men from that hill, and the whole force returned to their quarters in the Jamu villages. *Expedition against the Jowaki Afridis in 1877-78.*

On the morning of the 17th of January, Brigadier-General Keyes again visited Brigadier-General Ross at Walai, and it was then decided that the former should abandon his position on the Dargai Sar and take up a new one in the Nara Khula defile; it was also determined, as already mentioned, that the Pesnawar column should give up its communications with the Sarghasha camp and join Brigadier-General Keyes in the Nara Khula on the morning of the 18th. The combined forces were then to be employed in visiting the valley to the west of the Nara Khula defile, which was the only part of the Jowaki country which was still occupied by the fighting men of the tribe.

On the morning of the 17th, Colonel Mocatta, in obedience to orders received from Brigadier-General Keyes, again advanced through the Nara Khula defile. No opposition was experienced in the advance, but, on reconnoitring the hills in front of the gorge, they were found to be occupied by a few of the enemy. A company of the 29th Punjab Native Infantry was therefore directed to occupy these hills. This duty was successfully performed by Lieutenant R. W. MacLeod, with the loss of one man, wounded. At about 11 A.M. Brigadier-General Keyes arrived from Walai, and, the picquets on the hills in front of the gorge having been relieved, Colonel Mocatta was directed to withdraw his column to Jamu, leaving a picquet of the 3rd Sikh Infantry (one native officer and twenty bayonets) on the Zira hill to the west of the gorge. On the following day, this column, with the exception of the 1st Sikh Infantry, who remained at Jamu and furnished picquets on the Zira and Dargai hills, returned to Turkai.

In the meanwhile, the picquets which had replaced those of Colonel Mocatta's column in front of the Nara defile began to suffer annoyance from a small party of the enemy who, under cover of the rocks and jungle, had crept down to within a short distance of our advanced posts. Brigadier-General Keyes, therefore, ordered an officer of the Guides to be sent to select proper sites for the construction of breastworks for the protection of the picquets during the night. This duty devolved on Captain A. G. Hammond, who, finding his men annoyed by the fire of the small party of the enemy referred to, conceived the idea, after examining the ground, that it was possible to get above them without his movements being seen or suspected. Taking with him only four of his men, he succeeded in ascending the hill and getting above the enemy, and, with his own hand, shot three of them and captured their arms, the others flying before his party. This gallant exploit was a useful service to the regiment, and saved the men from further annoyance. The baggage of Brigadier-General Keyes's force arrived at 3 P.M., and arrangements were then made for the troops to bivouac in the defile for the night.

During the day parties of the enemy had been observed on the heights in front overlooking the Torsappar valley, and in the evening it was reported that Babri and other leading men were there. Brigadier-General Keyes, therefore, ordered the advanced picquets of the Guides and 5th Punjab Infantry to be pushed forward under cover of the night, and to seize the crest at daybreak. These regiments were supported by the 6th and 4th Punjab Infantry respectively. Unfortunately, the enemy had retreated after dark, and the Guides and 5th Punjab Infantry accordingly occupied the crest without opposition at daybreak on the 18th. Major McQueen was then instructed to make arrangements for holding the crest with strong picquets from these two regiments during the time the troops remained in the Nara Khula defile.

*Expedition
against the
Jowaki Afridis
in 1877-78.*

ordered the 6th Punjab Infantry and the 5th Gurkhas to return to their camp at Shindih, Brigadier-General Keyes then proceeded in the direction of Walai to meet Brigadier-General Ross, who was advancing with the whole of his force towards the Nara Khula. On meeting, it was arranged that Colonel Doran's brigade should march through the Nara Khula to Jamu, Colonel Buchanan's brigade remaining in the defile. During the day, Brigadier-General Keyes visited Major McQueen's position on the crest of the main range overlooking the Torsappar valley. From here, Peshawar, Matanni, and Abazai were clearly visible, and the following day direct heliographic communication was opened from here with the first of these stations.

On the 19th of January, at 9 A.M., Colonel Buchanan's brigade, the Guides, and 4th and 5th Punjab Infantry, under the command of Brigadier-General Keyes, advanced towards Khui for the purpose of reconnoitring the valley in that direction. The troops advanced along the heights south of the valley, whilst the picquets of the Guides and 5th Punjab Infantry advanced along the main range, the ravines running down from the heights being searched by the skirmishers of Colonel Buchanan's brigade. On reaching the limits of the Jowaki territory the troops were halted, and, the survey of the country having been completed, the order was given for the force to retire. Very little opposition had been met with during the day, a few stray shots only having been fired, and the retirement, which commenced at 3 P.M., was made without any molestation whatever.

The column returned to the Nara Khula on the evening of the 19th, and orders were issued by Brigadier-General Keyes for the march of the whole force to Jamu and Turkai on the following morning. On the 20th the troops moved off at daylight, and reached Jamu without a shot having been fired. A survey party was sent with the 20th Punjab Native Infantry over the spurs leading up to the Mandaher Sar, to complete the survey of that line of hills. Colonel Buchanan's brigade was directed to hold Jamu during the 20th and 21st, relieving Colonel Doran's troops, which were ordered to march to Kohat. This place they reached on the 21st, and on the 22nd proceeded through the Kohat pass without meeting with any interruption. The 1st Sikh Infantry and the 5th Punjab Infantry were attached to Colonel Buchanan's brigade for the purpose of holding Bagh and the heights towards Paiah and Ghariba. On the 21st, Colonel Buchanan received orders to retire to Turkai on the following day. Accordingly, on the morning of the 22nd, after blowing up the towers in Jamu and Sultan Khel, he retired his troops through Shindih to Turkai, the towers in the village of Bagh being destroyed *en route*. The 1st Sikhs brought up the rear, and accompanied the brigade to their position at Turkai, while the 5th Punjab Infantry returned to their camp at Shindih.

On the 23rd, Colonel Buchanan's brigade moved to Kohat. A party of 200 bayonets of the 14th Native Infantry and the 20th Punjab Native Infantry respectively, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel R. G. Rogers, was detached to escort a survey party from Bazid Khel by Shekh Khan to Kohat, and arrived at the last-named place at dusk. On the following morning, the 24th, Colonel Buchanan's troops moved back to the Peshawar valley, through the Kohat pass, whence, as already stated, Colonel

No. 4 (Hazara) Mountain Battery
17th Bengal Cavalry.
200 bayonets, Rifle Brigade.
14th Native Infantry.

Doran's brigade had preceded them on the 22nd. The troops, as per margin, were then ordered to occupy the Sarghasha ridge as a force of observation, and the remainder of Brigadier-General Ross's

Almost immediately after the retirement of our troops, the Jowakis had begun to show signs of a desire to submit, if only the terms were such as, consistently with Afghan honour, they could accept; and on the afternoon of the 23rd of January, their *jirga*, consisting of some sixty of all sections, except that of Malik Mushki, came into Brigadier-General Keyes's camp at Shindih, and subsequently to Kohat, to hear the terms which the Government offered. These terms had been thus stated in directions issued to the Commissioner of Peshawar at the commencement of the operations—

*Expedition
against the
Jowaki Afridis
in 1877-78.*

- (1) Restitution of stolen property.
- (2) Fine of Rs. 10,000.
- (3) Surrender of all Government arms, and arms of European manufacture. A number of native matchlocks proportional to the number of English arms surrendered to be taken. With reference to these last a proportionate reduction might be made in the fine.
- (4) Occupation of Jamu by British troops. (This had already been carried out.)
- (5) Construction of a road through Jowaki country, to be left to the decision of Brigadier-General Keyes as to the possibility of its execution. During the military occupation the communications to be improved as much as possible.
- (6) Survey of the Jowaki country to be made. (This had already been carried out.)
- (7) Surrender to be demanded of the persons chiefly concerned in leading or instigating the treacherous attack upon unarmed sepoy on the Khushalgarh road on the 17th of August, and in the Shahkot raid on the 25th of October. If surrendered, a reduction to be made in the amount of the fine and in the number of arms to be demanded. (These persons were four in number, *viz.*, *Khaishtu*, brother of Malik Mushki of Turkai, and *Hassan*, brother of Malik Zal Beg of Paiah, who were the leaders in the attack on the unarmed sepoy; *Malik Rambazai*, in whose hamlet the raid on Shahkot had been planned; and *Sheru*, the leader in that raid. The last, however, was reported to have been killed in the attack.)
- (8) Hostages for future good behaviour.
- (9) Jowaki pass allowances to be finally withdrawn.

The *jirga* was informed of these terms in the order 7, 3, 1, 2, and 8, no reference being made to the others, as it was considered undesirable to allude to them. After consulting together, they expressed their readiness to pay the fine and restore stolen property. They, however, demurred to the surrender of arms as an impossible condition, and absolutely refused to give up the ringleaders. Their reverses had not yet broken their spirit, and they made the preposterous demand that in estimating the amount of fine the Government should take into account as compensation the losses sustained by them during the expedition! It being impossible to discuss such demands as these, the *jirga* was dismissed.

The principal Jowakis had now taken refuge with the neutral Afridis in the Kohat pass, and pressure was brought to bear upon the latter to induce submission. The Jowakis had expressed themselves ready to abandon their lands and become subordinate holders of land under their pass kinsmen; and,

*Expedition
against the
Jowaki Afridis
in 1877-78.*

Tirah hills, where an asylum had been offered to them. Either of these alternatives would have been most undesirable, since it would have left the Government with no one against whom their claims, still unsatisfied, could be enforced; the Gallai Afridis were, therefore, informed that they would be held responsible for all outrages committed by any members of the Jowaki tribe in British territory. The Government of India, at length finding that the insistence of the unconditional surrender of the persons demanded would merely maintain the troops in the field, and necessitate the occupation of the Jowaki country for an indefinite period without much hope of a final settlement, and with the danger of the embroilment of the neighbouring tribes, so far modified the demand as to accept, in lieu of the surrender of the leaders, their perpetual exclusion from Jowaki territory if the tribe were absolutely unable to give them up. The compensation to be demanded was, moreover, reduced to any amount which the Lieutenant-Governor might see fit to demand, or might be abandoned altogether if the Jowakis were unable to pay. The progress of the negotiations need not be noted in detail; but, on the basis of the last-mentioned concessions, a settlement with the tribe was effected. The conditions finally accepted by the Jowakis were the following:—

- (1) Complete submission of the tribe to the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, in public *darbar* at Peshawar.
- (2) Payment of a fine of Rs. 5,000.
- (3) Permanent expulsion from the Jowaki territory of the four ring-leaders in raids, whose surrender had been at first demanded.
- (4) Surrender of twenty-five English rifles and twenty-five native matchlocks.
- (5) The giving of hostages for the good behaviour of the tribe in future.

These conditions were ratified at a *darbar* held at Peshawar on the 4th of March 1878. This was attended by the officers of the garrison, as well as the civil officers, and by the native chiefs and officials. The submission of the Jowaki deputation was received, the fine of Rs. 5,000 was paid in cash, and the stipulated number of arms given up. Deputations from those sections of the Adam Khel Afridis who had remained neutral were also present, and to these suitable presents were made, and the services of those chiefs who had given help during the operations were acknowledged and rewarded.

After this the British troops were withdrawn from Jowaki territory, the prisoners of war and the hostages held by us were released, and the garrisons of the British posts on the Adam Khel frontier were reduced to their normal strength.

The British losses during the above operations against the Jowakis, from the 9th of November 1877 to the 19th of January 1878, are given in Appendices J and K.

In his final despatch, Brigadier-General Keyes brought to the notice of Government the admirable conduct of the troops under his command during these operations, and especially their cheerfulness and endurance under the hardships occasioned by the unseasonable and unusually heavy rain.

He stated that his special thanks were due to the following officers:—

Captain J. Davidson, Assistant Adjutant-General, Punjab Frontier Force.

Major W. C. Mackinnon, Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General for Musketry.

Captains J. A. Kelso, G. Swinley, E. J. deLautour, and H. R. L. Morgan, Royal Artillery. *Expedition against the Jowaki Afridis in 1877-78.*
 Captain E. Harvey, R. E., Field Engineer.
 Majors F. Lance and R. C. R. Clifford, 2nd Punjab Cavalry.
 Major B. Williams and Captain F. S. Carr, 5th Punjab Cavalry.
 Majors R. B. P. P. Campbell and G. Stewart, and Captain A. G. Hammond, Corps of Guides (Queen's Own).
 Majors H. C. P. Rice and A. G. Ross, 1st Sikh Infantry.
 Colonel D. Mocatta, Majors G. N. Money and C. J. Griffiths, Captain W. B. Aislabe, and Lieutenants C. H. M. Smith and O. C. Radford, 3rd Sikh Infantry.
 Major A. FitzHugh, and Captain A. Gaselee, 4th Punjab Infantry.
 Majors J. W. McQueen and C. E. Stewart, and Lieutenant G. Gaisford, 5th Punjab Infantry.
 Lieutenant-Colonel B. R. Chambers, Major S. J. Browne, and Lieutenant H. B. Urmston, 6th Punjab Infantry.
 Colonel P. F. Gardiner and Major W. H. Unwin, 5th Gurkhas.
 Colonel J. J. H. Gordon, 29th Punjab Native Infantry.
 Major N. R. Burlton, Principal Commissariat Officer.
 Surgeons-Major G. Farrell, J. R. Johnson, T. Wright, and A. P. Holmes, Indian Medical Service.
 Mr. Gibson, Revenue Survey Department.
 Mr. Nigel Jones, Telegraph Department.

In addition to the above, Brigadier-General Keyes acknowledged the great advantage he had derived in all difficulties from the ready advice and assistance which he had received from Colonel Sir F. R. Pollock, K.C.S.I., Commissioner of Peshawar, throughout the operations; and he thanked Captain T. J. C. Plowden, Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, for his hearty co-operation at all times, and for the valuable aid which he had afforded.

Brigadier-General Keyes also brought to notice the gallant conduct of the following officers on the occasions already mentioned, *viz.*, Major C. E. Stewart and Lieutenant G. Gaisford of the 5th Punjab Infantry, on the 15th of November; Captain A. J. D. Hawes, 4th Punjab Infantry, on the 1st of December; and Captain A. G. Hammond, Corps of Guides, on the 17th of January.

Brigadier-General Ross, in forwarding the report of the operations of the Peshawar force, considered the services of the following officers to be particularly deserving of notice:—

Colonels J. Doran, C.B., and H. J. Buchanan, 9th Regiment, commanding brigades.

Colonel W. J. Williams, C.B., Commanding Royal Artillery.

Lieutenant G. W. Bartram, Commanding Royal Engineer.

Captain J. M. Trotter, Deputy-Assistant Quarter-Master General.

Captain W. J. Boyes, Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General.

Captain R. Eardley-Wilmot, 14th Bengal Lancers, Aide-de-Camp.

Captain H. S. Brownrigg, Rifle Brigade, and Lieutenant H. H. R. Heath, 11th Bengal Lancers, both attached to the Quarter-Master General's Department.

Major R. A. Wauchope, Captain J. G. Maclean, and Lieutenant C. J. Jamieson, 14th Native Infantry.

*Expedition
against the
Jowaki Afridis
in 1877-78.*

Lieutenant-Colonel R. G. Rogers, and Captains W. H. Meiklejohn and L. B. Irwin, 20th Punjab Native Infantry.

Surgeons-Major T. Walsh and W. S. Caldwell.

Captain C. S. Morrison, 14th Bengal Lancers, Provost Marshal.

Captain W. I. Bax, 11th Bengal Lancers, Baggage Master.

Captain J. R. Burlton-Bennet, Commissariat Department.

Captain A. S. Wynne, 51st Regiment, in charge of the signalling operations.

Mr. G. B. Scott, Survey Department.

In addition to the above, Brigadier-General Ross acknowledged the assistance he had received from Captain P. L. N. Cavagnari, Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar, and Captain L. H. E. Tucker, Assistant Political Officer with the force.

In directing the publication in Government General Orders of the despatches relating to the above operations, the Governor-General in Council desired to record the Government of India's high appreciation of the good services of Brigadiers-General C. P. Keyes, C.B., and C. C. G. Ross, C.B., and of the manner in which the operations entrusted to them were conducted and brought to a successful issue.

His Excellency in Council also desired to convey the acknowledgments of the Government of India to officers commanding corps, batteries, and detachments; to the several staff officers, and to those of the Medical, Commissariat, and other Departments whose services had been brought to notice; as well as to the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of the force, whose admirable behaviour and endurance during a protracted and trying service merited the highest commendation.

The Indian medal, with a clasp for "Jowaki", was granted in 1879 G. G. Os. No. 143 to all who took part in the above active operations against of 1879, and No. 285 of 1880. the Jowaki Afridis between the 9th of November 1877 and the 19th of January 1878, inclusive.

During the operations against the Jowakis, the other sections of the Adam Khel tribe fairly acted up to the promises of neutrality they had made, thus showing that the cohesion between the several branches of the Adam Khel tribe was less complete than had hitherto been supposed to be the case. Individual members no doubt joined their kinsmen in opposing the advance of the British force, and several of the uncommitted sections were among the killed and wounded in the first skirmishes with our troops. But this was to be anticipated, and indeed it was hopeless to expect that the main body of the tribe could altogether influence the more excitable members when fighting was going on in their immediate neighbourhood. The other Afridi clans, however, although solicited for assistance by the Jowakis in the most urgent manner, never came to the support of their kinsmen in any large numbers. A body of Zakha Khels, some 300 or 400 in number, came as far as the Kohat pass, and there threatened to create additional complications by firing on a party of English officers proceeding

along the road ; but they did not proceed further, and pressure was brought to bear upon the Gallai Afridis to compel their return to their own country.

*Conduct of the
Adam Khel
Afridis subsequent
to 1878*

After the conclusion of the Jowaki campaign in March 1878, the Adam Khel tribe continued to behave well, but sent their *jirgas* to Kabul to visit the Amir in the autumn. The malcontent Jowakis, *viz.*, the friends and kinsmen, some fifty in number, of those who had been outlawed, were the first to go ; and, on their returning with fifty-two Kabul-made Enfield rifles and Rs. 2,000 in cash, the greed of the Hassan Khel and Gallai sections was excited, and they also sent their deputations. The former received Rs. 2,500 in cash, whilst the pass men were given some hundred Kabul-made Enfield rifles, Rs. 2,400 in cash, as well as bayonets, caps, and flints.

After the outbreak of the Afghan war, reports were circulated of the intention of the Pass Afridis to close the road ; and of emissaries and written messages having been sent to the various sections of the Adam Khel tribe by the Amir of Kabul to either do so or furnish him with armed contingents. The *mullas* also threatened to burn the houses of any persons who should frequent British territory for purposes of trade by which our troops might benefit. But neither the Amir's messages, nor the threatenings of *mullas*, were of any avail, and though a few men may have joined the other Afridi clans in the Khaibar, the conduct of the Adam Khels, as a whole, remained satisfactory. The pass was not closed for a single hour ; treasure, ordnance stores, troops, and English travellers passed through it without molestation, and it continued to be, throughout the campaign, a valuable military line of communication between Kohat and Peshawar. The Adam Khels also did good service by offering their camels for carrying supplies and stores, and no less than 2,000 of these were employed for this purpose.

After the agreement made with them in 1878, the Jowakis committed several offences on the Khushalgarh road, but a settlement was effected with them in February 1880, and fines amounting to Rs. 3,598 were realised from them.

In August 1880, Nawab Bahadur Sher Khan, Bangash, died, and, as a temporary measure, the charge of our relations with the Adam Khel Afridis was entrusted to his brother, Ata Muhammad Khan. In June 1882, however, the old system of managing the Adam Khels through a middleman was abolished, and on that date the task of dealing with the tribe was transferred to the Deputy Commissioner in person. The *jirgas* of all the sections were summoned to Kohat, and the object of Government in directing the change of management was fully explained to them. It was effected without any hindrance, the tribesmen showing little concern in the matter. There is no doubt that an additional element of strength in transactions with the Kohat Pass Afridis has been gained by the adoption of direct personal relations with the tribe. The allowance of Rs. 2,400 a year formerly paid to Bahadur Sher Khan for the management of the Kohat pass, was placed at the disposal of the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat, to meet unforeseen and contingent charges arising from the control of the pass.

In February 1883 a violent dispute arose between the Gaddia Khel and Bolaki Khel sections of the Akhorwals, regarding a *mela* which the latter proposed to build in the Kalamsada. As this quarrel threatened to disturb the peace of the road and to render it necessary to close the pass, as in 1864, the *jirgas* of the contending sections were summoned to Peshawar, and the dispute was peaceably arranged, the Bolaki Khel being admitted to the

*Conduct of the
Adam Khel
Afridis subse-
quent to 1878.*

Kalamsada. The *mela* was accordingly built, but on the 5th August, taking advantage of the fact that the hamlet was almost deserted by the usual guards, who had gone in to Akhor to keep the *Id*, the Gaddia Khels attacked and destroyed it. The Gallai and Hassan Khel *jirgas* at once repaired to Akhor, and insisted on the quarrel being settled without fighting; but it was some time before this was effected. The parties are now, however, on good terms.

In May 1883 an agitation was commenced in the Kohat pass on account of the proposed enhancement of the duty on salt. The price of salt at the five mines open in the Kohat district at that time varied from two to four *annas* a *maund* (the rates which had been fixed with the sanction of the Government of India in 1850), but for reasons into which it is not necessary here to enter, the Government had decided to raise the duty to eight *annas* a *maund* at all the mines. The enhancement of this duty had been under consideration for some years, but it was not until 1883 that steps were taken to carry the measure into effect. When it became known that the rates were to be raised from the 1st of July, the Afridis of the Kohat pass decided to offer resistance. The grounds of their objections appear to have been that such a measure would interfere with their profits as carriers; that they had a right to the monopoly of the carrying trade; and that the rates fixed in 1850 were fixed in perpetuity, and the Government had no right to raise them. These grounds were shown to be quite untenable, and the Lieutenant-Governor, in reviewing the question, expressed his opinion that the Pass Afridis could not be permitted for a moment to dictate to the British Government what course it should pursue in a purely domestic matter such as the increase of the salt duty. Of the different sections of the Kohat Pass Afridis, the Bosti Khel and Sheraki were most eager in their opposition; the Zargun Khel and Akhor sections, though siding with the opposition, were comparatively lukewarm; while the men of Torsappar, who had been opposed to the agitation from the beginning, held entirely aloof. At the end of June the *jirga* of the Pass Afridis came into Kohat, but, after much useless discussion, they refused to give in or to allow the passage of salt which had paid the enhanced duty through the pass. They were accordingly informed that their allowances would cease from the 1st of July, and the pass would be closed so far as Government was concerned, but that traders and travellers could continue to use the road at their own risk. The *jirga* then took leave, after protesting that they did not wish for a cessation of friendly relations. On the 7th of September, seeing the uselessness of resistance, and fearing to lose their allowances altogether, the representatives of the Pass Afridis, with the exception of the Misri Khels, an unimportant section of the Bosti Khels, again came into Kohat, and said that they had agreed no longer to oppose the passage of salt. On the 10th the Misri Khels also came in, and the same day a proclamation was issued in Kohat notifying that the pass was open to salt traders as before.


Since then the Kohat pass has remained open, and the Afridis continue to enjoy their allowances. At the present time the total pass and *kotal* allowances amount to Rs. 12,356, as shown in Appendix L.

With regard to the behaviour of the other sections of the Adam Khel Afridis up to the present time, few important offences have been committed, though numerous thefts and burglaries have been recorded against them. In November 1883 six rifles were stolen from a detachment of the 1st Battalion, West Riding Regiment, at Pabbi (a small village between Peshawar and

M A P
OF THE
ADAM KHEL COUNTRY
to illustrate
THE MILITARY OPERATIONS
against
THE JOWAKI AFRIDIS
1877-78.

Scale 1 Inch = 2 Miles.

ROUTE OF Col. Mocatta's column, 30th August 1877.....
" " Peshawar and Kohat columns, November 1877
to January 1878.....



Khels, which, although it has not yet led to the recovery of the rifles, had a good effect in causing the section to pay up a number of the old outstanding claims against it. The behaviour of the Jowakis continues good, and the Deputy Commissioner reports that they are now the best disposed of all the tribes on the Kohat border. The Ashu Khels during the past year have required considerable pressure and the threatening of reprisals to make them pay up fines outstanding against them; but a satisfactory settlement has at length been effected.

*Conduct of the
Adam Khel
Afridis subse-
quent to 1878.*

APPENDIX A.

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing in the operations against the Kohat Pass Afridis under BRIGADIER SIR COLIN CAMPBELL, K.C.B., in February 1850.

Corps.	Killed.					Wounded.					Missing.		Remarks.
	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	Rank and file.	Total.	
2nd Troop, 2nd Brigade, Horse Artillery	1	1	Three horses killed and three wounded. *Lieut. T. H. Hilliard, dangerously. †Ensign W. H. Sitwell.
Her Majesty's 60th Rifles	1	1	
Her Majesty's 61st Regiment	1	1	
Her Majesty's 98th Regiment	3	3	
15th Irregular Cavalry	1	1	
23rd Native Infantry	1	3	4	*1	...	1	10	12	1	1	
31st Native Infantry	...	†1	1	1	7	10	...	1	29	30	
1st Punjab Infantry	5	5	...	1	2	22	25	
Total	1	1	2	15	19	1	1	4	68	74	1	1	

ABSTRACT.

Killed	19
Wounded	74
Missing	1
Total	94

APPENDIX B.

Strength of the force under the command of COLONEL S. B. BOILEAU, engaged in the attack on the Bori villages on the 29th of November 1853.

Corps.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Remarks.
Mountain Train Battery	4	1	12	91	
Her Majesty's 22nd Regiment	13	...	25	400	
20th Native Infantry	11	4	8	146	
66th Gurkha Regiment	11	12	24	467	
Guide Corps	3	20	49	428	
Total	42	37	118	1,532	

APPENDIX C.

Return of Killed and Wounded in the force under the command of COLONEL S. B. BOULEAU, in the attack on the Bori villages, on the 29th of November 1853.

Corps.	Killed.					Wounded.					Remarks.
	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	
Mountain Train Battery	1	1	Two <i>syces</i> wounded.
Her Majesty's 22nd Regiment	*6	6	*One mortally.
20th Native Infantry	
66th Gurkha Regiment	1	3	4	...	1	...	9	10	
Guide Corps	4	4	12	12	One horse wounded.
Total	1	7	8	...	1	...	28	29	

ABSTRACT.

Killed	8
Wounded	31
Total	39

APPENDIX D.

Return of Ammunition expended during the attack on the Bori villages, on the 29th of November 1853.

Corps.	Number of rounds.	Remarks.
Mountain Train Battery ...	86	
Her Majesty's 22nd Regiment	4,729	
20th Native Infantry ...	154	
66th Gurkha Regiment ...	14,465	
Guide Corps ...	10,887	
Total ...	30,321	

APPENDIX E.

Composition of force assembled to coerce the Hassan Khel Afridis in 1867.

				Men.	Guns.	
Royal Horse Artillery	84	4	Under the command of Colonel R. O. Bright, 1-19th Regiment.
Peshawar Mountain Battery	143	4	
5½-inch Mortars	21	2	
1-19th Regiment	400		
42nd Royal Highlanders	104		
19th Bengal Cavalry	300		
Sappers and Miners	88		
23rd Punjab Native Infantry (Pioneers)	617		
24th Punjab Native Infantry	577		
28th Punjab Native Infantry	561		
45th (Rattray's) Sikhs	85		
Hazara Mountain Battery	148	4	Under the command of Colonel S. J. Browne, V.C., C.B., Guide Corps.
3rd Bengal Cavalry	148		
Guide Infantry	601		
20th Punjab Native Infantry	590		
5th Gurkha Regiment	624		
Total	5,091	14	

APPENDIX F.

Return of Killed and Wounded in the force under COLONEL D. MOCATTA, in the operations against the Jowaki Afridis, on the 30th of August 1877.

Corps.	Killed.					Wounded.					Remarks.
	British Officers.	Native Officers.	Non-Commissioned Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	Non-Commissioned Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	
No. 1 Mountain Battery	1	1	*Surgeon-Major A. P. Holmes.
Corps of Guides	1	1	2	
1st Sikh Infantry	*1	3	4	
3rd Sikh Infantry	1	1	2	2	One horse was killed and two mules wounded.
4th Punjab Infantry	1	1	
Total	1	1	1	...	1	8	10	

ABSTRACT.

Killed	1
Wounded	10

APPENDIX G.

Proclamation issued by the Commissioner of Peshawar on the 1st of December 1877.

1. The Jowaki Afridis, a section of the Adam Khel Afridis, inhabit a small strip of independent territory, which runs south from the Jowaki pass into the Kohat district, nearly touching the main military road half-way between Khushalgarh and Kohat.

2. Within the last few months this tribe has assumed an attitude of hostility, defied the authority of the British Government, and perpetrated numerous unprovoked outrages and treacherous murders within British territory.

3. On the night of the 15th of July they cut the telegraph wire between Kohat and Khushalgarh in several places ; and, when reparation according to tribal usage was required, they sent an insolent reply. On the 24th of July a party of Jowakis rescued two of their tribe from a guard of British police, and carried off three of the latter into the Jowaki hills. On the 27th of July the guard was released, but on the next night the telegraph wire was cut again. On the 30th of July the tribe submitted, came into Kohat, and gave satisfaction for its offences. Scarcely, however, had this quarrel been settled, when, without any assignable cause, the Jowakis again exhibited hostile designs, and began to remove their property and grain from the villages on the plains to their fastnesses in the hills. This movement was accompanied with the most insolent demands for remission of the fines recently imposed on them ; for an indemnity on account of cattle seized during the Kohat pass difficulties ; for the restoration of their pass allowances ; and for exemption from responsibility both for the good behaviour of their clansmen and for the safety of the telegraph wire skirting their hills, which they had engaged to protect.

4. The answer of the local authorities to these demands was still under consideration of the tribe when, in defiance of Pathan usage, and with a treachery unexampled among the tribes of the frontier, the Jowakis recommenced hostilities. On the 17th of August they carried off thirty-six commissariat mules from the Khushalgarh road, and killed one of the muleteers. The same night a small party of sepoys of the 3rd Sikh Infantry, proceeding on leave, was attacked on the Khushalgarh road. Three were killed, and a traveller with them ; and the telegraph wire was cut again. On the 19th of August a portion of Gandiali, a village in British territory, was burnt, and one man wounded. On the 20th of August a convoy of mules escorted by troops was attacked by 500 Jowakis. The following night the telegraph wire was again cut. A bridge on the Khushalgarh road was burnt on the 27th of August, and two days later an unsuccessful attempt was made to burn a second bridge.

5. The British Government was still unwilling to proceed to extremities with this petty tribe. On the 30th, a small force of British troops entered the Jowaki country for the purpose only of intercepting the persons concerned in the perpetration of the above-mentioned outrages.

6. Meanwhile, aggressions on British territory did not cease. On the 9th of September a number of camels were carried off from the Saramela plain. On the 11th the telegraph wire was cut again. A few days later the British police station at Shadipur on the Indus was fired upon. On the 17th of September a large band of Jowakis attacked the village of Koteri. They killed and wounded some of the villagers, and carried off much plunder. The same day another band made a successful raid upon the village of Kheri Shekh Khan. On the 24th the Deputy Commissioner and Major Laras, commanding the 2nd Punjab Cavalry, were fired

upon while inspecting sites near the Gandiali ravine. The latter officer was badly wounded. The same day an outlying picquet near Gumbat was attacked, and four Khataks killed. On the 11th of October an attempt to carry off cattle was frustrated; but on the 20th of October the Jowakis attacked in force the Khatak village of Ghorizai. Three villagers were killed, two were severely wounded, and much plunder was carried off. The village of Kamar on the Indus, nine miles north of Khushalgarh, was attacked on the night of the 23rd. Five men were killed, five were wounded, and some cattle were carried off. On the night of the 25th a havildar's party of the 22nd Punjab Native Infantry was surprised at the Shahkot encamping-ground, near the foot of the Charat hill. The havildar, five sepoy, and one policeman were killed, seven sepoy were wounded, and eight rifles carried off. Shahkot was again attacked on the night of the 27th of October, but no casualties occurred. These last raids were perpetrated by the Bori Jowakis in violation of the treaty of 1854. Besides the above, many other outrages have been perpetrated by the whole tribe of the Jowakis, to detail which would be tedious.

7. The forbearance of the British Government having thus been misunderstood, and every effort to bring this petty border tribe to reason by peaceful means having failed, the Governor-General in Council finds himself reluctantly compelled to have recourse to severe measures in order to exact reparation for past misdeeds, to render the Jowakis powerless to commit such outrages in the future, and to maintain peace and security of life and property on this portion of the Punjab frontier.

8. His Excellency in Council has, therefore, resolved to occupy the villages of Turkai and Paiah, and a portion of Jowaki country, maintaining a tight blockade upon the rest. The two villages named will be held, and the blockade maintained, until such time as the Jowakis shall tender their absolute submission.

9. The Governor-General in Council desires that the object of these measures—viz., the righteous punishment of a series of unprovoked outrages committed by the petty tribe of Jowakis on British territory, and the prevention of future aggressions by that tribe—should be explained to the neighbouring tribes. Those tribes will be expected not to afford shelter or evasion to the Jowakis. It is a matter of satisfaction to His Excellency in Council that the Jowakis at present stand alone in the hostile attitude they have assumed, and that the elders of the Adam Khel section of the Afridi tribe, as yet unimplicated in the misconduct of their neighbours, have furnished hostages as pledges for their neutrality, and have engaged to allow the Jowakis no passage through their hills, and to afford them no shelter when retreating before the British troops. The neighbouring tribes may be assured that no harm will be done to them as long as they hold aloof, and that the chastisement of the Jowakis is a measure of a purely local and domestic character.

By order of the Governor-General in Council,

SIMLA,
The 5th November 1877. }

(Signed) C. U. AITCHISON
Secretary to the Government of India.

APPENDIX H.

Strength of the force under the command of BRIGADIER-GENERAL C. C. G. ROSS, C.B., on the 3rd of December 1877.

Corps.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	Non-Commissioned Officers and rank and file.	Remarks.
I-C Royal Horse Artillery	3	...	50	Infantry regiments were each directed to leave one non-commissioned officer and 20 men in camp when the force advanced to the Sarghasha ridge.
13-9th Royal Artillery	5	...	85	
2-9th Regiment	15	...	559	
51st (King's Own) Light Infantry ...	19	...	514	
4th Battalion, Rifle Brigade... ..	5	...	186	
17th Bengal Cavalry	8	10	326	
Sappers and Miners	3	4	194	
14th Native Infantry	5	13	485	
20th Punjab Native Infantry	8	12	466	
22nd Punjab Native Infantry	8	13	419	
27th Punjab Native Infantry	8	10	506	
Staff	20	
Total	107	62	3,790	

APPENDIX I.

Strength of the force under BRIGADIER-GENERAL C. C. G. ROSS, C.B., ordered to march on Pastaoni on the 31st of December 1877.

1ST BRIGADE, under COLONEL J. DORAN, C.B.

Corps.	British.	Native soldiers and public establishment.	Followers.	Horses.
No. 4 (Hazara) Mountain Battery	3	266	8	3
2-9th Regiment	104	56
4th Battalion, Rifle Brigade	138	43	19	1
17th Bengal Cavalry	20
Sappers and Miners	10	160	15	...
27th Punjab Native Infantry	9	484	38	7
Strength of brigade	264	1,029	80	11

2ND BRIGADE, under COLONEL H. J. BUCHANAN.

Corps.	British.	Native soldiers and public establishment.	Followers.	Horses.
2-9th Regiment	318	139
14th Native Infantry	5	489	9	1
20th Punjab Native Infantry	8	369	24	1
22nd Punjab Native Infantry	1	50
Staff	17	...	30	17
Strength of brigade	349	1,047	63	19

APPENDIX J.

Return of Killed and Wounded in the force under BRIGADIER-GENERAL C. P. KEYES, C.B., from the 9th of November 1877 to the 19th of January 1878.

Corps.	Killed.					Wounded.					Remarks.
	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	
Corps of Guides	1	1	1	2	3	*Major H. C. P. Rice, dangerously. Four of the wounded subsequently died.
1st Sikh Infantry	2	2	*1	...	1	4	6	
3rd Sikh Infantry	1	1	2	6	6	
4th Punjab Infantry	1	1	
5th Punjab Infantry	1	1	3	3	
6th Punjab Infantry	1	1	
29th Punjab Native Infantry	1	1	1	4	5	
5th Gurkha Regiment	1	...	3	4	
Total	1	6	7	1	1	3	24	29	

ABSTRACT.

Killed	7
Wounded	29
Total	36

APPENDIX K.

Return of Killed and Wounded in the force under BRIGADIER-GENERAL C. C. G. Ross, C.B., from the 9th of November 1877 to the 19th of January 1878.

Corps.	Killed.	Wounded.	Remarks.
Royal Artillery	1	
2-9th Regiment	2	
14th Native Infantry ...	1	10	
20th Punjab Native Infantry...	2	7	
27th Punjab Native Infantry...	...	1	
Total ...	3	21	
Camp followers ...	1	1	
Total ...	4	22	

ABSTRACT.

Killed	4
Wounded	22

APPENDIX L.

Present distribution of Kohat pass and kotal allowances.

								Rs.
Torsappar	950
Zargun Khel	950
Sheraki	715
Bosti Khel	715
Shpilkai	60
Akhori	{	Bolaki Khel	860
		Gaddia Khel	860
		Pirwal Khel	430
Janakhwar	400
Total pass allowances								5,940
Feroz Khel	1,000
Utman Khel	500
Bizoti	500
Sipah	500
Total allowances to Urakzai tribe								*2,500
Pay of Bangash <i>chaukidars</i> , etc., at the <i>kotal</i> and other road towers								1,516
Allowances for contingencies at disposal of the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat								2,400
Total Kohat pass and <i>kotal</i> allowances								12,356

* Of this amount, Rs. 672 is deducted on account of pay of *chaukidars* kept up at the *kotal*.

CHAPTER XI.

KOHAT BORDER.

URAKZAI TRIBE.

Urakzais.

THE Urakzais are a tribe of Pathans who inhabit the mountains to the north-west of the Kohat district. They are bounded on the north and east by the country of the Afridis, on the south by the Miranzai valley, and on the west by the Zaimukht country and the Safed Koh mountains.

Their origin is buried in obscurity; and though they resemble the Afghans in language, features, and many of their customs, they are rejected by them as brethren, and assigned a separate origin. They call themselves Pathans.

The Urakzais are wiry-looking mountaineers, but they are not by any means fine men. There seems to be a difference of opinion about their martial qualities, and MacGregor says he is not inclined to place them very high, but that they are probably not worse than their neighbours in respect to the usual deceit, avarice, and cruelty of their race. He says that no one would doubt that an Urakzai, as much as any Pathan, would not shrink from any falsehood, however atrocious, to gain his end. Money would buy his services for the foulest deed; cruelty of the most revolting kind would mark his actions to a wounded or a helpless foe, as much as cowardice would stamp him against determined resistance.

The Urakzais, like the Khaibar Afridis, migrate to their higher settlements during the summer months. The whole of the Urakzai country is sometimes spoken of as *Tirah*, but the name is more properly restricted to

Scott.

the valleys lying round the sources of both branches of the Bara river, and of the Khanki and Kurmana streams, comprising an area, as already stated, of six to seven hundred square miles. Generally speaking, *Tirah* includes the Bara valley proper above Torabela, the Urakzai Bara valley above Hissar, the Khanki valley above Sidurra, and the Kurmana valley above Khazina (*see* Map, page 408). The first of these, including the valleys of Rajgal and Maidan, as stated in Chapter IX, is occupied by Afridis, the other three chiefly by Urakzais.

The Urakzais are divided into six main divisions, which are sub-divided

Tucker.

as follows :—

				<i>Fighting men.</i>
1.	<i>Daulatzai</i>	...	{ Bizoti	500
			{ Utman Khel	600
			{ Feroz Khel	800

			<i>Fighting men.</i>	<i>Urakzais.</i>
2. <i>Muhammad Khel</i>	...	{ Bar Muhammad Khel	...	1,000
		{ Abdul Aziz Khel	...	400
		{ Mani Khel	...	800
		{ Sipah	...	300
3. <i>Ismailzai</i>	...	{ Rubia Khel	...	600
		{ Akhel	...	750
		{ Mamazai	...	300
		{ Khadizai	...	250
		{ Sadda Khel	...	80
4. * <i>Alizai</i>	...	{ Sturi Khel	...	400
		{ And Khel, Tazi Khel, etc.	...	300
5. <i>Lashkarzai</i>	...	{ Mamozaï	...	2,800
		{ Alisherzai	...	2,700
		{ Massozai	...	3,000
6. † <i>Hamsaya</i>	...	{ Ali Khel	...	2,300
		{ Malla Khel	...	1,000
		{ Shaikhan	...	3,000
		{ Mishti	...	3,000
Total			...	24,880

From two-thirds to three-quarters of the fighting men are armed with matchlocks and swords, the others having knives or pistols.

The Ali Khels, Alisherzais, and Malla Khels are generally considered the bravest of the tribe. All the sections are dependent on British territory for salt, and some of them are dependent on us for cloth, *gur*, and for pasture for their cattle in the winter. In the Urakzai hills water and firewood are generally abundant, but supplies would have to accompany any force advancing into the country.

With regard to reprisals against this tribe, the facility of effecting these would vary with each division; thus, in the case of the Daulatzai clan, seizures would be practicable to a certain extent in the case of the Feroz Khels and Bizotis, but would be difficult in the case of the Utman Khels, owing to the paucity of members of the section who frequent British territory. In the case of the Muhammad Khels, reprisals would be easy; and this remark also applies to the Ismailzais, with the exception of the Mamazai section, against whom they would be difficult; but the section is inoffensive as a rule, and cut off from much intercourse with British territory. Reprisals against the Mamozaï section of the Lashkarzais would be easy in winter, but against the Massozais and Alisherzais they would be difficult. In the case of the different sections of the Hamsaya clan, reprisals could be easily effected during the winter, as all these sections (as well as the Rubia Khel and Akhel sections of the Ismailzais) cultivate a good deal in the Miranzai valley, where they live sometimes in the

* Although the Alizais are one of the main divisions of the Urakzai tribe, yet the name is, for practical purposes, nearly obsolete, and members of this branch are spoken of under the heading of their sub-divisions, as Sturi Khels, And Khels, etc.

† The grouping of the Rubia Khel, Akhel, etc., and the Ali Khel, Malla Khel, etc., into Ismailzais and Hamsayas respectively, is inconvenient in many ways, though ethnologically correct. Of the more important of these sections, the Akhel and the Ali Khel, who are Gar in politics, form one party, and the Rubia Khel, Mamazai, Malla Khel, Shaikhan, and Mishti, who are Samil, form another party. These latter are much attached to the Khan of Hangu, and look up to him as their natural chief.

Urakzais.

old Bangash villages, but more often in small hamlets of their own. The Bizoti, Utman Khel, Feroz Khel, and Sipah sections also receive allowances, as mentioned in the previous chapter, for the Kohat pass, and, in the event of their misbehaving, these could be stopped.

The Urakzais are all *Suni* Muhammadans, with the exception of the Muhammad Khel division, the And Khel and Tazi Khel sections of the Alizai division, and a portion of the Ali Khels, who are *Shias*.

About half the tribe belong to the Gar faction in politics, and the other half to the Samil.

The Urakzais use bullocks chiefly for their trade; but mules and donkeys are also bred in their hills. They have no horses, and camels are not used by them. They have large herds of cattle and goats which they bring to graze in British territory.

There are a certain number of Hindus living among the Urakzais, and there is generally a Hindu's shop in each village. The Hindus of both sexes wear the same clothes as the Musalmans, and cannot easily be distinguished from them by a stranger.* The men of the tribe dress in loose trousers confined at the bottom, and in long shirts reaching to the knee, and sometimes to the ankle; dark blue *lungis* are their usual head-dress. The women wear rows of silver coins as buttons on their vests.

The Urakzais live in houses built of stone and mud. The villages are not generally walled, but all the houses face inwards, and the entrances from outside are through small openings; they are often in excellent positions, with well-placed towers protecting them.

Although the Urakzais are regarded as one tribe, they can only be considered such ethnographically. To regard them as one politically would only mislead; and so to give a description of our relations with the Urakzais as one body would be impossible. Yet it must not be forgotten that, though swayed by many different feelings and interests, the lust of plunder, or hatred of the infidel, would unite much more heterogeneous elements than these.

In order to understand the location of the different divisions of the tribe, some description of the Urakzai country will not be out of place. This country is divided into three main valleys, watered respectively by the Urakzai Bara,† the Khanki, and the Kurmana streams.

The southern, or, as it has for convenience been called, the Urakzai, branch of the Bara river rises in the hills south of Maidan; the valley is here broad and open, resembling Rajgal in climate and features, but is not so large; its elevation is probably between five and six thousand feet. It is at its western extremity occupied by the Ali Khel section of the Hamsaya division of the tribe, who are numerous and powerful, and possess several large hamlets and towers. The lands of this section cross the Sandwakhe range, which bounds the valley on the south, into the Khanki valley; they occupy a small strip of this valley, extend over the next range, the Sammanoghar, and down to the boundary of the Kohat district, within which lie their villages of Zargarai and Shinawarai in the Miranzai valley. They are thus independent of their neighbours in their biennial migrations to and from Masturai in Tirah.

Below the Ali Khels in the Urakzai Bara valley come, in succession, the Malla Khel, Mishti, and Shaikhan sections of the Hamsaya division.

* This is probably a mistake. Hindus generally wear clothes with a red stripe running through them, which is distinctive of their religion. A Hindu is recognisable at once.

† See note, page 278.

The valley is here narrower than in Masturai, and possesses fewer homesteads. The mountains to the north dividing this valley from Maidan are said to have gentle slopes, but the Sandwakhe range to the south is steeper, and is covered with dense pine forests. Below the Hamsayas come the settlements of the several sections of the Muhammad Khel clan. Their portion of the valley is warm, but more open and well cultivated; their villages also are larger, and they possess at least one good-sized fort known as Pakka Killa. The Muhammad Khel settlements descend the Kuriez Dara till that stream enters the Samilzai portion of the Kohat district near Marai. There is a fair road from Pakka Killa to British territory by the Landuki pass, and this road and the friendly disposition of the Muhammad Khels, like most other *Shias*, towards the British authorities, would be of much assistance in the event of an invasion of Tirah.

Urakzai country.
Urakzai Bara valley.
Khanki valley.

Near Pakka Killa a small stream enters the Urakzai Bara. Its valley is occupied by the Daulatzai clan, consisting of the Bizoti, Utman Khel, and Feroz Khel sections. Lower down, this branch of the Bara receives a larger stream, which drains the Waran valley. This valley, as already stated, is occupied by the Aka Khel Afridis. After receiving this tributary, the main stream continues its course eastward, alternately hemmed closely in between the rocky spurs of the mountains on each side, and again opening out into small fertile basins terraced into rice-fields, and dotted with hamlets and towers, chiefly of the Sturi Khel and Sipah sections. Some forty miles below its source, where it washes the base of Mulloghar, and where the Ublan route from Kohat meets it, the stream takes a rectangular bend northward, and, passing between high mountains which close in to its banks, it at length joins the Bara proper, eight or ten miles below the bend just where that river enters Kajurai. The Daulatzai clan are located here again, and occupy its banks and the eastern slopes of Mulloghar.

The next large valley is the Khanki, the upper part of which is occupied by the Mamozai and Alisherzai sections of the Lashkarzai clan, and the lower part by the different sections of the Ismailzai division; and during the winter the Hamsayas also come down from their settlements in Tirah to the lower portions of the Khanki valley. This valley has the Sandwakhe or Mazzeoghar range on the north, and the Zawaghar and Sammanoghar mountains on the south. The crest of the Mazzeoghar is over five thousand feet above the Khanki, and stands up a huge wall of rock surmounted by a fringe of magnificent pines. The spurs falling from it to the Khanki are bold, rugged, and wooded; the intermediate watercourses wild and precipitous. On the passes between stand the watch towers of the Shaikhan and Ali Khel Urakzais, guarding the approaches to Tirah. The crest of the Zawaghar is over nine thousand feet; of the Sammanoghar, the continuation of the former, six to seven thousand feet. When the elevation exceeds seven thousand, the range is covered with pine and oak forests. The crest of the Sammanoghar is fairly broad and flat, and in places stand the hamlets and towers of the Akhel and Rubia Khel sections of the Ismailzai clan, amongst patches of wheat and barley fields. The chief crop along the banks of the Khanki is rice of good quality. Owing to the manner in which the spurs of the opposite mountains close inward at intervals till only narrow defiles lie between, the valley is a difficult one for the passage of troops, but traders drive laden mules from one end to the other. The Khanki valley above the Khadizai village of Sidarra is a small

*Urakzai
country.
Kurmana
valley.*

summer. It is sometimes called the Kashai Dara between Sidurra and the British boundary.

The Kurmana valley is a basin of about two hundred square miles in area enclosed by lofty hills, of which the upper slopes are covered with magnificent forests of pine and oak where the spurs are high and bold. It is drained by several streams, which converge, and at length unite, near the deserted village of Khazina. The mountain slopes for several miles round Khazina are broad, open plateaux, divided by numerous ravines. The valley to the west of Khazina is covered with stunted oak and scrub, which appear to have spread over land once under cultivation but now deserted. The eastern portion of the valley is still well cultivated, and studded with many villages situated in strong positions. These are inhabited by the Massozai and Alisherzai sections of the Lashkarzai Urakzais. The Massozai section claim proprietary right over the entire Kurmana valley, but this claim seems to have little foundation, for the Shaonkauri, a pastoral race who inhabit the northern parts of the valley, have no dealings with them, and the Chamkanis, who now inhabit the western portion of the valley, are a distinct race. It is probable that the Massozai Urakzais formerly encroached on the lands of the Chamkanis, and pressed them back from their original habitations in the more fertile to the wilder and colder portions of the valley. In addition to their settlements in the Khanki and Kurmana valleys, the Alisherzai section of the Urakzais occupy several villages in the Zaimukht hills on the southern slopes of the Zawaghar range.

In the following list, which is taken principally from Scott's Report on Tirah, the summer and (in cases where the sections migrate in the cold weather) the winter quarters of the different divisions of the Urakzai tribe are given, and also the names of their principal villages:—

1. DAULATZAI—

- | | | |
|-----------------------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| | | { Summer.—Small valley between Pakka Killa and Maidan. |
| | | { Villages.—Hamlets. |
| <i>Bizoti</i> ... | ... | { Winter. —Crest and eastern slopes of, and both sides of the Urakzai Bara |
| <i>Utman Khel</i> ... | ... | { valley under, Mulloghar. |
| <i>Feroz Khel</i> ... | ... | { Villages.—Gara, Dana Khula, and Janimela (Bizoti), Zirandmela, Pitaomela, |
| | | { Spedara, and Balandra (Utman Khel), Sapri, Katta Kani, and |
| | | { Murga China (Feroz Khel). |

2. MUHAMMAD KHEL—

- | | | |
|----------------------------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <i>Bar Muhammad</i> ... | ... | { Summer.—Portion of Urakzai Bara valley. |
| <i>Khel</i> ... | ... | { Villages.—Pakka Killa, Hissar, Tanda, Sultanzai,* Ahmad Khel, Fatch |
| <i>Abdul Aziz Khel</i> ... | ... | { Jang Garhi, Ainposh, and other hamlets. |
| <i>Mani Khel</i> ... | ... | { Winter. —Kuriez and Kachai valleys. |
| <i>Sipah</i> ... | ... | { Villages.—Hamlets. |

3. ISMAILZAI—


- | | | |
|-----------------------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------|
| <i>Rubia Khel</i> ... | ... | { Summer and winter.—Khanki valley and Sammanoghar range. |
| | | { Villages.—Katsah, Guada, and other hamlets. |
| <i>Akbel</i> ... | ... | { Summer and winter.—Khanki valley and Sammanoghar range. |
| | | { Villages.—Krappa, Sapparai, etc. |
| <i>Mamazai</i> ... | ... | { Summer and winter.—Khanki valley. |
| | | { Villages.—Daradar, Karbogha, etc. |
| <i>Khadizai</i> ... | ... | { Summer and winter.—Khanki valley. |
| | | { Villages.—Sidurra and hamlets. |
| <i>Sadda Khel</i> ... | ... | { Summer and winter.—Khanki valley. |
| | | { Villages.—Hamlets. |

4. ALIZAI—

- | | | |
|---------------------------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------|
| <i>Sturi Khel</i> ... | ... | { Summer and winter.—Bara valley and Urakzai Bara valley. |
| | | { Villages.—Barkai, Ghundai, Barwan; Anjanni, etc. |
| <i>And Khel, Tazi</i> ... | ... | { Summer and winter.—Urakzai Bara valley. |
| <i>Khel, etc.</i> ... | ... | { Villages.—And Khel, Tazi Khel, etc. |

* Most of the inhabitants of this village are Abdul Aziz Khels. Usman Khan, the hereditary

S K E T C H
TO ILLUSTRATE
THE OPERATIONS
against
THE BIZOTI URAIZAIS
on the 11th March 1868.



5. LASHKARZAI—

<i>Mamozai</i>	...	{ Summer and winter.—Upper Khanki valley.
<i>Alisherzai</i> —		{ Villages.—Kahu and other hamlets.
(a) <i>Pitao</i>	{ Summer and winter.—Zaimukht hills.
		{ Villages.—Murghan, Tatang, Shimaki, Krumb, Tindoh, and Sariobe.
(b) <i>Sweri</i>	{ Summer and winter.—Khanki and Kurmana valleys.
		{ Villages.—Stir Killa, Kafirdap, etc.
<i>Massozai</i>	...	{ Summer and winter.—Kurmana valley.
		{ Villages.—Terri, Sapparai, etc.

*Summer and
winter settle-
ments of the
Urakzai tribe.*

6. HAMSAYAS—

* <i>Ali Khel</i>	{ Summer.—Urakzai Bara valley.
		{ Villages.—Gulomela, Zakhtan, etc.
		{ Winter.—Khanki and Miranzai valleys.
		{ Villages.—Kot, Ramadan; Shinawarai, and Zargarai.
<i>Malla Khel</i>	...	{ Summer.—Urakzai Bara valley.
		{ Villages.—Hamlets.
		{ Winter.—Miranzai valley.
		{ Villages.—Darband and two or three other villages.
<i>Shaikhani</i>	...	{ Summer.—Urakzai Bara valley.
		{ Villages.—Kangurai and other hamlets.
		{ Winter.—Drund, Khanki and Miranzai valleys.
		{ Villages.—Drund and other hamlets.
<i>Mishti</i>	{ Summer.—Urakzai Bara valley.
		{ Villages.—Hamlets.
		{ Winter.—Khanki and Miranzai valleys.
		{ Villages.—Hamlets.

With regard to the routes from British territory into the Urakzai country, one of these, passing up the Bara valley proper and crossing the Maturighar range by the Uchpal pass, has already been mentioned. This was the route followed by Captain L. H. E. Tucker in 1872, who descended from the Uchpal pass by the ruined fort of Kharshah to Sultanzai, in the Urakzai Bara valley. As, however, this route passes through Afridi territory, further consideration of it is not necessary.

From Kohat four routes are used by the Urakzais in their journeys to their principal valley. One, leaving the Ublan police post three miles north-west of Kohat, winds up a narrow water-course to the Ublan *kotal*, about four thousand feet in elevation, then descends by the village of Gara to the river bed near the Bizoti hamlet of Dana Khula. There is another more direct pass over the Ublan *kotal*, known as the Wucha Ghakha, which is more difficult, and is too steep for laden oxen. This was the pass used by Lieutenant-Colonel Keyes's column in 1869. The second route crosses the range above Alizai, nine miles from Kohat, by the Alizai or Dablai pass, and descends to the river, where it is occupied by the Sipah section. A third leaves Marai, seventeen miles north-west of Kohat, crosses the Marai pass, and descends into the Sturi Khel section of the valley. These are all practicable for laden animals, but, except for the punishment of the particular clans to whose hamlets they lead, they would be of little use in an advance on Tirah, as the greater portion of the main Urakzai valley would still have to be traversed. The fourth and principal route follows the course of the Kuriez Dara, past the villages of Alizai, Marai, and the Kuriez hamlets, which last lie among the low hills at the base of the range from which the ascent begins

* The settlements of the Ali Khels are a good deal mixed up with those of the Akhels. For a long time past there has been a feud going on among the Ali Khels, in which half the tribe, aided by the Akhels and the Hangu Samil tribes (Rubia Khels, Mamazais, Malla Khels, Shaikhans, and Mishtis) have been fighting the other half of the tribe, assisted by the Lashkarzai

*Routes in the
Urakzai
country.*

to the Landuki pass, elevation about six thousand feet. It then descends the opposite spurs of the range, and touches on the river at Pakka Killa. The ascent to the pass, and the descent from it, are not very steep, and the Muhammad Khel *maliks* ride the whole way from Pakka Killa to Kohat. But the route is commanded beyond Kuriez, first by a succession of low hills, and then by the spurs of the mountain, all of which densely covered with stunted trees and brushwood, affording excellent cover to skirmishers.

After reaching Pakka Killa, a rough road might be traversed to the summer quarters of the Daulatzais, or a broader and better route might be followed up the main valley through the Hamsaya sections—the Shaikhan, Mishti, Malla Khel, and Ali Khel. Though the valley is, in parts, two or three miles broad and well cultivated, it is in others a defile hemmed in by the mountains on either side; and the Hamsayas have the reputation of being the best fighting men of the Urakzai tribe, and the most inimical to the British, especially the Ali Khels, who occupy the westernmost portion, known as the Masturai valley. From Masturai an easy ascent of about half a mile in length crosses the northern watershed into Maidan by the Arhanga pass, probably seven thousand feet in elevation, and there is a path by the Sandwakhe pass to the Khanki valley, which is used by the Ali Khels and others in their migrations. The ascent to this is easy, but the descent to Sidurra is long, steep, and winding. From Sidurra, down the Khanki valley to the Kohat boundary, the route, as already stated, is practicable for laden mules, and is largely used by traders. Several pathways cross the Sammanoghar range from the Khanki valley to Miranzai and the Zaimukht country, but these are all difficult.

There is no government in Tirah, but, among the Urakzais, religion supplies its place to a certain extent; these men are as superstitious as they are impatient of control, and, consequently, we find the *Syads* exerting a good deal of influence among them. There is a religious feud between the *Shias* and *Sunis*, in pursuit of which hardly a year passes in which lives are not lost on both sides. The leaders of the former party are the *Shia Syads* of Tirah, and of the latter the well-known Mulla Wali Khan of Sapparai, an Akhel hamlet in British territory. At the time of the annexation of the Punjab, one Madat Shah was the leading *Syad* of Tirah. He, on his death-bed, ordered that his sons should succeed in turn, to the exclusion of his grandsons, and he was accordingly succeeded by his eldest surviving son, Syad Mahmud. The power of the *Syads* soon increased, and by degrees their oppressive rule became almost intolerable, and in 1860 a coalition of the *Sunis* of Tirah took place against Syad Mahmud and his *Shia* followers, and he was forced to flee to British territory, but was shortly afterwards reinstated in Tirah. In 1868 Syad Mahmud died, and was, in accordance with his father's will, succeeded by his brother, Syad Muhammad Hassan. In August 1874, the Tirah *mullas*, headed by Wali Khan of Sapparai, having collected about 8,000 men, proceeded against Syad Muhammad Hassan, who, with his followers, left Tirah and took refuge in British territory, but was recalled in the following November.

After this the *Shia* and *Suni* feud continued with varying fortunes, and in 1877 Syad Muhammad Hassan died, and was succeeded by his brother, Syad Husain Shah, who, in his turn, died in February 1879. As he had no brother living, his nephew, Syad Mir Akbar, the son of Syad Mahmud, became chief of the Tirah *Syads*.

Latterly the quarrel has been allowed to drop, but at the present time

**Expedition against the Rubia Khel Urakzais by a force under Brigadier
N. B. Chamberlain, in September 1855.**

Up to 1855 the Urakzais, though occasionally committing petty depredations on the border, and known to be capable of mischief if so inclined, gave no positive trouble to the British authorities, but in the spring of that year many of the tribe were concerned in the demonstrations and attacks on the Miranzai Field Force (*see* Chapter XIII). *Expedition against the Rubia Khel Urakzais in 1855.*

During the time the force was halted at the village of Kai, the Akhel section of the Urakzais attacked the British village of Balamini, and drove off 156 head of cattle. On the force proceeding to Nariab, the Ali Khel and Akhel sections assembled their men to attack the camp, and had come down as far as the village of Zargarai for this purpose; but the troops having marched the same morning for Darsamand, their attempt was frustrated.

On the force encamping at Darsamand, the Urakzai tribes, with the Afridis and the Zaimukhts, collected from 1,500 to 2,000 men to attack the camp, but were driven off with loss on the 30th of April 1855.

On the return of the Miranzai Field Force in the following month, Major J. Coke reported that the conduct of the Urakzais, bordering on Hangu and the Miranzai valley, had been so hostile to the Government, and their aggressions had been so insulting and unprovoked, that some punishment was necessary to repress the spirit of hostility evinced by them since the force under the command of Brigadier N. B. Chamberlain entered the Miranzai valley.

After the return of the troops the Urakzais continued to commit depredations upon the Bangash people of the Kohat district, committing no less than fifteen raids, in which several hundred head of cattle were carried off, and some British subjects killed. In these the Shaikhan and the Mishti sections were concerned, but the Rubia Khels were conspicuous. A feud at this time commenced between the Urakzais and the Hangu people. The chief of Hangu was murdered by one of his own relations, and the murderer fled to the Urakzais. On the 15th of July 1855, Major J. Coke, commanding the 1st Punjab Infantry, who was also Deputy Commissioner of Kohat, reported that, on the night of the 12th, the Urakzais had carried off 660 head of cattle from the village of Shahu Khel, near Hangu, and that he had at once proceeded there with a troop of the 4th Punjab Cavalry. He added that a hostile movement was apparently going on among the tribe, or a portion of it, and that as he felt apprehensions for the safety of the village of Hangu, 250 men of the 1st Punjab Infantry had been sent out to protect it.

The raids of the Rubia section of the tribe still continuing, Major Coke reinforced Hangu by the troops, as per margin. With this force Major Coke reported that he proposed to attack the Rubia Khel village of Nasin, and with the aid of our Bangash subjects of Togh, and of Khwaja Muhammad Khan, the Khatak chief, he hoped to be able to check the hostile movement of the Urakzai tribe in general, and the Rubia Khel section in particular, with whom the hostilities first arose.

No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery
(2 guns).

2nd Punjab Infantry, 150 bayonets.

3rd Punjab Infantry, 150 "

*Expedition
against the
Rubia Khel
Urakzais in
1855.*

no hostile movement should be undertaken beyond the British boundary without his orders, but adding, that if the tribe could be attacked to advantage within our territory, there would be no objection to it being done.

Brigadier Chamberlain, commanding the Punjab Irregular Force, was also averse to the employment of troops against the Urakzais at that time of the year (July), unless political reasons absolutely required it. His reasons for suggesting delay were—that operations against the Urakzais would probably involve complications with other tribes; and at that season the difficulty of moving troops would be great, with the certainty that regiments would suffer much from sickness. Instructions were accordingly sent to Major Coke that defensive measures only were to be adopted.

If the border villages could not be protected from Kohat, a small portion of the Kohat garrison was to be moved to Hangu.

On the 13th of August news was received that at a *jirga* of the Rubia Khel, Mamozai, and Ali Khel sections, it was agreed that if the Ali Khel and Akhel would join, the combined clans should make an attack on British territory, either before or after the *Eed* (the 25th of August).

By the 20th of the month matters amongst the tribes had progressed considerably, and Major Coke reported to Brigadier Chamberlain that an attack would probably be made by the united clans of the Urakzais after the *Eed*, on some point between Balamin and Samilzai, a distance of twenty miles; that the rest of the hill tribes were in a most excited state, and that they were all trying to foment a *Jahad*; and Major Coke asked that at least two more regiments might be sent into the district.

Brigadier Chamberlain had by this time arrived at Kohat, and the following arrangements were made. Reinforcements were called for from Peshawar, consisting of 800 infantry and six mountain guns; the detachments garrisoning the outposts of Nari, Latamar, and Bahadur Khel were recalled, and their duties taken up by similar detachments from Bannu, from which station a troop of the 3rd Punjab Cavalry was moved up to Kohat.

An engineer officer was ordered to put the border villages threatened in a state of defence, and to open out the roads most likely to be used for the protection of the frontier.

The different chiefs, amongst whom were Khwaja Muhammad Khan, the chief of the Khataks, and Bahadur Sher Khan, Bangash, were directed to collect armed retainers, horse and foot.

Every endeavour was at the same time made to collect commissariat supplies and carriage.

Peshawar Mountain Train Battery (4 guns).
No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery (5 guns).
4th Punjab Cavalry.
1st Punjab Infantry.
2nd Punjab Infantry.
3rd Punjab Infantry.

On the 25th of August the force, as per margin (the details of which are given in Appendix A), was assembled at Hangu (*see* Map, page 408), under the command of Brigadier N. B. Chamberlain.

The cantonment of Kohat was occupied by one troop, 3rd Punjab Cavalry, from Bannu, and the 1st Native Infantry from Peshawar.

On the 29th of the month the Deputy Commissioner wrote to the Brigadier recommending the destruction of the villages of Nasin* and Sangar, in the Sammanoghar range, both belonging to the Rubia Khel Urakzais. He represented that the conduct of that tribe had been so atrocious and insulting,

* The position of this village has been shown on the map, but it appears that the village itself

and the injuries they had inflicted on the Government so great, that the necessity for inflicting on them some punishment was apparent. He feared that the inactivity of the troops would only increase their presumption, and have a bad effect on the other tribes, who then appeared to be wavering in their intentions. He thought that a blow struck at the Rubia Khel tribe would be productive of the best effects in deterring the others from attacking British villages. He then proceeded to detail the various offences committed by the tribe since April 1855. Besides an attack on Balamin, they had killed ten men and wounded three, and carried off three women and no less than seven hundred and ninety-two head of cattle—all the men and women being British subjects, and the cattle the property of the same.

*Expedition
against the
Rubia Khel
Urakzais in
1855.*

Major Coke also proposed that the village of Katsah, on the banks of the Khanki stream, should be destroyed, with its rice cultivation.

In reporting his determination to carry out these punitive measures, Brigadier Chamberlain, in writing to the Chief Commissioner, after stating that he was not unmindful of the great responsibility he was taking on himself in adopting such a course, went on to say: "As the officer in command of the troops on the frontier, and more especially of the field force in this camp, I conceive that occasion may arise when it becomes my bounden duty to exercise a very great discretionary power; and I trust in the present instance it will not be deemed that I have exceeded or abused the authority I suppose to be vested in my office, and for the judicious exercise of which I hold myself to be just as much accountable to Government as for the discipline and efficiency of the troops." He added that he quite concurred with the Deputy Commissioner in the necessity of adopting aggressive measures, that he looked upon an attack on the Rubia Khel Urakzais as unavoidable, and that the urgency of the case rendered immediate steps compulsory.

On the 1st of September, therefore, arrangements were made to attack early on the following morning the villages of Nasin, Sangar, and Katsah.

The plan of operations was to make simultaneous attacks on the different points, the main object being the destruction of the villages and defences of Nasin and Sangar; for the *maliks* of those villages were notorious freebooters, and the inhabitants had been those who had been most active in making raids into British territory, as they believed, from the natural defences of their strongholds, they were impregnable.

The village of Sangar was situated on the very crest of the Sammanoghar range. It was well built, the dead walls of the houses being faced outwards for strength, and the whole was perfectly commanded by a high loop-holed tower of two storeys. Water was not procurable on the top of the hill, the inhabitants of the place supplying themselves either from the spring just below Nasin or from the Khanki stream, which flows at the northern base of the range.

Nasin was situated in the centre of a sloping plateau about three-quarters of a mile below Sangar, and from this amphitheatre two spurs ran down from the Sammanoghar range parallel to and close to each other, terminating in the Miranzai valley below.

The mural cliffs, which the inward faces of these spurs presented to one another, formed the gorge up which one of the only two paths led to Nasin, the other path being along the ridge of the eastern spur, and which, though difficult and precipitous at the bottom from the circumstance of the spur descending abruptly into the plain, was nevertheless practicable for mules. The

*Expedition
against the
Rubia Khel
Urakzais in
1855.*

two villages were connected with each other by a winding path. The ascent was, however, everywhere practicable for infantry.

The village of Nasin was defended by a *garhi* or fort, which was a square building, the walls being about nine feet high, and commanded by a loop-holed tower of two storeys. Its position was such as to completely command and close the paths leading up the gorge. Just below it, and within range of its fire, was the spring which supplied its defenders and the inhabitants of the village with water. The houses of the village were scattered in rows of five and six each, the ground being terraced for the sake of cultivation.

The difficulties the troops had to contend with were thus great, and the loss of life, if the ascent had been undertaken by daylight and the tribe prepared to meet our troops, would probably have been large. Success depended almost entirely upon both villages being surprised, and, if possible, at the same time; and, as any forward movement of the camp would have tended to create suspicion, it was absolutely necessary to make Hangu the starting-point.

This involved a march of fourteen miles before the commencement of the ascent; or, if the range were ascended opposite camp, there was still about the same distance to be accomplished along its ridge before Sangar could be reached. It was determined, therefore, that these villages should be attacked both from above and below, and the following dispositions were accordingly ordered.

The force was divided into three columns of attack. The first was under the command of Major J. Coke, and consisted of the 1st Punjab Infantry and three companies of the 2nd Punjab Infantry. To this force was entrusted the attack on the village of Sangar. The column was provided with small shells, to be used as hand grenades, bags of powder, crowbars, etc., and was accompanied by Lieutenant J. H. Bryce, Bengal Artillery, as engineer officer. It was to leave camp at 10 P.M. (the night was moonlight), and to ascend the Sammanoghar range near the camp, which was pitched about a mile to the south-west of Hangu, and move along the ridge until the village was reached, which, it was hoped, would be before daybreak. The village was then to be immediately attacked and destroyed. If, on arrival at Sangar, Major Coke found that the second column had not established itself at Nasin, or was hard pressed, he was to detach a party to its assistance; this party, acting from above, had everything in its favour, and as soon as the village of Sangar had been taken and destroyed, the remainder of the first column was to move down to aid in the attack on Nasin.

The second column, which was under the command of Captain B. Henderson, 3rd Punjab Infantry, consisted of three companies of that regiment, and was to move at 9 P.M. on the village of Nasin. On reaching a hill on the right of the gorge, Captain Henderson was to take up such a position above and near the village as would give him the command of it, as well as of the path by which the mountain guns were to ascend; his subsequent action was to be guided generally by the movement of the first column and main body.

The third column was composed of levies under Khwaja Muhammad Khan, and to it was allotted the destruction of the village of Katsah, with its rice crops and mills. This village was situated on the northern side of the Sammanoghar range on the banks of the Khanki stream, and was reported almost undefended. All prisoners taken were to be spared and

brought into camp, and the levies were on no account to attack any other tribe except in self-defence, nor to go down the stream. This column was to follow Major Coke's, and was to leave a body of footmen on the top of the range when the column descended, to cover its return.

Expedition against the Rubia Khel Urakzais in 1855.

The main body, consisting of the troops as per margin, under the immediate command of the Brigadier, was to leave camp shortly after the march of the first column, and, ascending the same spur as the second column, was to move on Nasin, ready to support either of the other parties.

Peshawar Mountain Train Battery (4 guns).
No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery (2 guns).
2nd Punjab Infantry, three companies.
3rd Punjab Infantry, four companies.

A reserve with the field guns was to follow this column, so as to reach the foot of the spur by dawn, ready to cover the retirement.

The guard for the camp, under Captain G. O. Jacob, 4th Punjab Cavalry, consisted of that regiment and one company from each of the infantry regiments.

The troops were only to be warned an hour before starting, and great care was to be taken that no sickly or weakly men accompanied the columns. Plundering was to be strictly prohibited.

The first column gained the crest of the Sammanoghar range by three o'clock on the following morning, when the troops, having rested an hour, continued their march, and as they reached the foot of the last crest, having traversed some most difficult ground, they descried the second column below them at Nasin. Major Coke then pushed on, as fast as the nature of the ground would admit, against Sangar, which he came in sight of at break of day. He described it as a village strongly situated on a knoll, the ground sloping away on either side, surrounded by a low wall and defended by a tower of great height, which, from its lofty position in the centre, commanded the ground on all sides. A rush with a cheer was made on the village, and, before ten shots had been fired, many of the sepoys, gallantly headed by Lieutenant E. J. Travers and Ensign W. H. Lumsden, of the 1st Punjab Infantry, had got beyond it, thus enabling the troops to capture nearly the whole of the cattle, which had by this time got half a mile away under the main range. About two hundred head of cattle and buffaloes, with a large number of goats and sheep, were thus seized and sent into camp. The villagers did not attempt to make a stand, but fled, leaving a number of women and children in the village; none of whom, however, were in any way injured. Sangar was found to contain about sixty houses, which, with the tower and the *jowar* crops on the plateau below, were entirely destroyed. The first column then joined the main body.

Major Coke's report.

The second column, after marching fourteen miles, and carefully avoiding the only village met with *en route*, commenced the ascent of the crest at 2.30 A.M., and, getting as quickly and silently as possible over the ridge, gained its position over Nasin at 4 A.M. Shortly before it reached this point the enemy began beating their war drums, but the column continued its movement in perfect silence and unseen. As soon as the position was gained, the men were collected and ordered to lie down under cover, waiting for dawn. The drums continued sounding, and the enemy endeavoured to ascertain the exact position of the column by firing a few random shots from the ridge and tower, which did

Captain Henderson's report.

*Expedition
against the
Rubia Khel
Urukzais in
1855.*

made a rush on the village, and the enemy, taking instantly to flight, were driven along and over the highest crest (the one commanding the village of Sangar) without any loss to us. The leading men of the column, led by Subadar Faiz Muhammad Khan, pushing on over the crest, captured some hundreds of cattle, sheep, goats, ponies, and donkeys, which the enemy were driving off.

The main column having left camp at 11 P.M., proceeded by the road to the small village of Pul Darband, situated at the base of the spur previously referred to, from which ran the paths leading up the mountain. This small village was situated about two miles and a half to the west of Darband.

The column reached Pul Darband at about 3 A.M., when some half an hour's delay took place owing to the difficulty of ascertaining the practicable route for the mountain guns, for the *malik* of the village (although one of our own subjects) declared that no laden animal could possibly ascend; but when he found his arms pinioned, and became aware of the penalty of treachery, he promised to show the way, and the column continued its advance. The first part of the ascent was so steep, and the path so narrow, from the rocks on each side, that the guns were got up with considerable difficulty; but higher up the path improved, and just at daybreak the main body came in sight of Captain Henderson's troops. It was at first difficult to determine whether they were friend or foe, but this was soon cleared up by the advance of that column on the village.

Before the guns could be brought into position, the enemy, finding themselves threatened from above by the first column, and from below by the other two, were in full flight up the Sammanoghar range; the body of only one man, killed by a shell, being found in the village.

The troops were now actively employed, covered by picquets, till 10 A.M., blowing up the towers and destroying the villages and crops.

The signal for our retirement had been anxiously looked for by the mountaineers, and no sooner had it been given, than they commenced following up, beating their drums, and shouting their war cry. As the skirmishers of the 2nd Punjab Infantry, under Captain G. W. G. Green, were abandoning one of the commanding points, they were attacked and driven back by a sudden rush of the enemy, sword in hand, when a native doctor and seven men were hacked to pieces, their rifles and accoutrements falling into the enemy's hands; but Captain Green, of whose conduct the Brigadier spoke very highly, rallied his men under cover of the fire of two mountain guns, under Lieutenant J. R. Sladen, and retook the position.

The retirement was then continued in good order. Before the troops had reached the foot of the hill the enemy had ceased to follow up, and the whole force reached camp by sunset.

In the meantime, Khwaja Muhammad Khan, with 300 footmen and 60 horse, had moved down into the Khanki valley, and destroyed the village of Katsah and several of the neighbouring hamlets. As this column had been ordered not to descend into the valley until firing was heard from Major Coke's troops, many of the villagers had moved off to assist Sangar before Khwaja Muhammad Khan arrived, and the cattle had almost all been driven off; what remained, however, were captured.

The men of Togh and Kai also aided in the operations against the Rubia Khels; and the former had four men killed, but reported the loss of the enemy to be more than their own. Brigadier Chamberlain stated that

in consenting to the employment of our Miranzai subjects against the Rubia Khels, he was guided by the consideration that, for the subjugation of both parties, the feuds between the independent hill tribes and our Bangash subjects of Miranzai could not be made too wide; for in that part of the country a blood feud once well established was a difficulty almost beyond the bounds of amicable settlement.

The casualties on our side were small (*see* Appendix B).

The loss of the Rubia Khel tribe was estimated by Major Coke at twenty-four killed and wounded, amongst the former being four *maliks*.

Brigadier Chamberlain spoke highly of the conduct of the troops, who were on foot seventeen hours, marching twenty-eight miles, ascending and descending a rugged mountain of nearly 4,000 feet in height; and he alluded to the able manner in which the duties assigned to them were carried out by Major J. Coke and Captain B. Henderson, and his staff officer, Captain R. R. Adams; and to the excellent zeal and energy of Lieutenant J. R. Sladen, of the Artillery. The services of Khwaja Muhammad Khan were also warmly acknowledged.

A few days after this punishment the Mishti section came to terms, and gave hostages; this was shortly followed by the submission of the Rubia Khels, who brought back a great number of the plundered cattle, agreeing to pay for the remainder, which they had eaten. The tribe were also willing to pay a grazing tax for the pasturage ground near our frontier, but Government declined to receive any revenue from them. The Shaikhan section also came to terms, and the force returned to Kohat on the 7th of October, when it was broken up.

The satisfaction of the Governor-General in Council was expressed to Brigadier N. B. Chamberlain and the troops employed in the above operations, and the most cordial acknowledgments and thanks of Government were ordered to be conveyed to Major J. Coke and Captain B. Henderson, who had led the several attacks, and for their admirable execution of the combined movements against the villages of Nasin and Sangar.

Affair with the Bizoti Urakzais at the Ublan pass in March 1868.

After 1855 the Urakzais did not trouble our border again until 1868, when complications arose with a portion of the Daulatzai clan, and more especially the Bizoti section. As already stated, the Daulatzais live in the cold weather on the crest and eastern slopes of, and in the small valley under, Mulloghar. They have two main settlements, Dana Khula and Gara. In the hot weather they go to Tirah, and occupy the small valley between Pakka Killa and Maidan.

The Bizotis sow their wheat crop in Tirah before they come down, and their rice crop in their lower settlements before they return to Tirah, leaving only a few families in the valley to look after it in the hot weather; but the whole tribe can be down from Tirah, in case of an attack, in from twenty-four to thirty hours. The Bizotis have little or no trade to lose by misbehaviour, and their main strength lies in their insignificance; and as their chief settlements were in Tirah, they had, previous to 1868, escaped punishment for their misdeeds.

At the commencement of British rule trans-Indus, the Bizotis were constantly cattle-lifting on our border, and they attacked and plundered

Expedition against the Rubia Khel Urakzais in 1855.

*Affair with the
Bizoti Urak-
zais at the
Ublan pass in
1868.*

in consequence of the misbehaviour of the Afridis, they were admitted, amongst others, to a share of the allowances paid for the peace of the Kohat pass. Besides the Bizotis, who touch our border, the other two sections of the Daulatzai clan, namely, the Feroz Khel and the Utman Khel, are generally one with them in all their political moves, and the allowance given to the Bizotis on this occasion was shared by them also.

The Sipah section of the Muhammad Khels adjoins the winter settlements of the Daulatzais, and are associated with them in the protection of the Kohat *kotal*. Though a small tribe, they are notorious as plucky men and great thieves. They have not more than three hundred fighting men, but they are well armed, and they have the character of being the best marksmen with the rifle amongst the tribes. They are armed with long rifles of Kohat manufacture, fitted with old, English-marked flint locks. They do not migrate in summer to Tirah, as do the Bizotis.

In 1865 a Sipah and two Bizotis were convicted of robbery in British territory and sentenced to imprisonment; the Bizotis, Utman Khels, and Sipahs interceded for the release of the robbers, and, on their petition not being granted by the Deputy Commissioner, took to making raids in British territory; they killed two of our subjects, and captured some cattle. Colonel J. R. Becher, C.B., then Commissioner of Peshawar, settled the case by releasing the prisoners, and exacting a small fine as compensation for the loss of the cattle, and the lives of our subjects who had been killed.

At the beginning of 1867, one Fateh Khan, a British subject of the village of Alizai, in the Kohat district, bordering on the Sipah hills, petitioned the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat that a civil suit which had been decided against him in 1854 by Captain J. Coke, then Deputy Commissioner of Kohat (whose decision had been confirmed on appeal in 1855 by Major H. B. Edwardes, the Commissioner), should be reopened. The Deputy Commissioner declined to reopen a case which had been finally decided twelve years before; but, as Fateh Khan appeared in difficulties, he was promised a situation as a mounted orderly when a vacancy should occur.

At the close of 1867 Fateh Khan went over to his independent neighbours, the Daulatzais, and induced them to take up his cause. On learning this, the Deputy Commissioner notified to the adjoining tribes that any intercession for Fateh Khan could not be attended to, as the matter was one which exclusively concerned British subjects. Notwithstanding this warning, on the 23rd of December 1867 a deputation from the Daulatzais, including representatives of the Bizoti, Utman Khel, and Feroz Khel sections, and also from the Sipah section of the Muhammad Khel division, came into Kohat (without, as usual, asking permission to enter British territory) to make intercession for Fateh Khan.


They were received in *darbar* by the Deputy Commissioner, and informed that their request could not be granted; and they were at the same time reminded that they had been duly warned of this.

After this interview, all the tribes, except a section of the Bizotis under the leadership of one Syad Raza, intimated their intention of abandoning the cause of Fateh Khan.

On the 15th of January news was received that Syad Raza was collecting his followers for a raid into British territory, and preparations were made accordingly, the Bizotis being warned that if they did not prevent the

ROUGH SKETCH
OF
THE UBLAN PASS
TO ILLUSTRATE
THE OPERATIONS
against
THE BIZOTI URAKZAIS

On the 11th March 1868.



EXPLANATIONS

- Bizotis ■
- 3rd P. C. ■
- 3rd P. I. ■
- 6th P. I. ■
- Artillery ■

demonstration was made against the police posts located in the towers at the foot of the Ublan pass, a defile through which ran the direct road from Kohat to the Bizoti villages (*see* Map, p. 408); but the Bizotis dispersed on the neighbouring villagers turning out.

Affair with the Bizoti Urakzais at the Ublan pass in 1868.

The same night, as an attack in force was threatened, the 3rd Punjab Cavalry, two field guns, and the 6th Punjab Infantry moved out, when the Bizotis dispersed.

These demonstrations were followed by gatherings of some of the tribes, who fired on our villages; and by an attack on the village of Alizai, when one villager was killed and two wounded in the pursuit of the marauders.

Meanwhile the representatives of the recusant sections had been summoned to Kohat, and, after some delay, the *jirgas* of the Bizotis, the Utman Khels, and the Sipahs appeared; a proclamation was then read out to them, pointing out the various acts of hostility which had been committed, and calling upon them to exact from the actual perpetrators compensation for injury done, and restoration of the plundered cattle, and (according to tribal usage) the destruction by fire of two houses in each of the implicated tribes, in token of submission. The *jirgas* expressed their inability to coerce the ill-disposed members of their respective tribes, and the tribes were then debarred from trade with British territory, and the Bizotis further deprived of the office of guarding the Kohat *kotal*, and of their allowances on that account.

On the 10th of March a party of men, chiefly Sipahs, made a demonstration against the towers at the Ublan pass, and did everything they could to bring on an engagement; but, acting on the orders of the Deputy Commissioner, the police remained on the defensive. Failing in this attempt, it was reported that the following morning the Bizotis, some four hundred in number, would attack the towers or the village of Muhammadzai, and during the night Lieutenant P. L. N. Cavagnari, the Deputy Commissioner, went out with 60 police and 180 levies.

Lieut. Cavagnari's report.

After the affair of the 16th of January, Major L. B. Jones, commandant, 3rd Punjab Cavalry, who was commanding at Kohat, had, in company with the Deputy Commissioner and the officer commanding the artillery, examined the ground at the Ublan pass. The pass itself, which is about six miles from Kohat, was found to be open, its width in some places being half a mile, and its length to the commencement of the ascent about a mile. Major Jones considered that if the Bizotis occupied a small hill in advance of the towers, as they had previously done, they could be easily driven off by the troops, when considerable punishment could be inflicted on them in their retreat, without the necessity for our advancing on to the main range. This hill was not under fire from the crest of the high ridge in rear, which, although British territory, was ground so very difficult that it was determined no advance on it should be made.

Lieutenant Cavagnari, accordingly, on the morning of the 11th of March, occupied the hills on the left of the gorge, leaving the right open for the raiders to occupy if they came down. (*See* accompanying sketch of the Ublan pass.)

About 9 A.M. the news received showed that a raid was intended, and, on the call from the Deputy Commissioner, 100 bayonets, 3rd Punjab Infantry, under Captain P. C. Rynd, were sent out from Kohat to the

*Affair with the
Bizoti Urak-
zais at the
Ublan pass in
1868.*

further instructions from the Deputy Commissioner, but on no account to move against the enemy until support arrived from cantonments.

Shortly after this, some men came down from the direction of the Sipah hills, and occupied a position in front of the levies on the left side of the pass.

About 11.30 A.M., the enemy, who had collected on the Ublan *kotal*, commenced beating drums and began to descend and occupy the hills on the right, some thirty or forty men occupying the small hill already mentioned. There were probably about two hundred in various other positions.

No. 2 Punjab Light Field Battery (2 guns).

3rd Punjab Cavalry, 80 sabres

3rd Punjab Infantry, 280 bayonets.

6th Punjab Infantry, 200 "

On this, Lieutenant Cavagnari again reported to Major Jones, and that officer moved out from cantonments with the troops as per margin, and he himself rode on ahead to consult with the Deputy Commissioner.

Major Jones found Lieutenant Cavagnari with his levies holding the Bizotis in check. The enemy had, as already mentioned, taken up the position it was expected they would on the low hill to the east of the pass, which was supposed to be detached from the main range by some two or three hundred yards of open ground, and from which it was expected that their retreat to the *kotal* could be cut off either by the cavalry or infantry.

Major Jones immediately ordered the detachment of the 3rd Punjab Infantry, under Captain Rynd, which had remained at the towers, to advance towards the *kotal*, halt out of fire, and cut off the retreat of the Bizotis, should they make for the *kotal* after having been driven off the low hill. A small body of police was posted by the Deputy Commissioner in support. Major W. D. Hoste, commanding the 6th Punjab Infantry, was posted with his men on the *kotal* side of the small hill, with directions to take a knoll about half-way up, from which a few of the enemy were firing, and to halt there until further orders. The 3rd Punjab Infantry, under Captain A. U. F. Ruxton, were posted to the right of the hill, with orders "to advance to the summit, take the position, and halt until further orders." The artillery, under Captain R. J. Abbott, supported by a body of cavalry, were placed in such a position as to cover the advance of the two columns. The gorge to the right was watched by 40 sabres, 3rd Punjab Cavalry (*see* accompanying sketch).

These arrangements were completed by about 1.30 P.M., and the troops advanced to take the small hill on the guns opening fire. The hill was gained without any loss on our side, and two of the enemy were believed to have been killed by the column under Major Hoste.

The enemy retired up the spur, which was now found to connect the small hill with the Ublan ridge, to a higher peak, where they had erected a breastwork. This peak was exceedingly steep to the south. Through a misunderstanding of orders, or ignorance of the ground, Captain Ruxton, commanding the 3rd Punjab Infantry, considered that he was to take this hill also, and he accordingly advanced against it. This, it is reported, he did in the most gallant style, but at the foot of the breastwork he fell, and soon after Lieutenant C. K. Mackinnon, his adjutant, was wounded, while his best native officer, Ram Singh, was killed; many casualties having occurred, the regiment retreated to the hill they had first taken.

On seeing this unexpected movement of the 3rd Punjab Infantry, Major

advancing. The 6th Punjab Infantry were at the same time brought down from the low hill, in view to their being available to support the 3rd Punjab Infantry in case of necessity, and they were subsequently ordered to move up the gorge to the left. They advanced to the support, and the two regiments attempted a rush on the position; but it was found impossible to enter it, though a heavy fire was kept up by the guns to support the advance. Finding the position was not likely to be taken, both regiments placed themselves under cover to rally.

No. 2 Punjab Light
Field Battery (2 guns).
1st Sikh Infantry.
Wing, 6th Punjab Infantry.

Major Jones now ordered out the reinforcements, as per margin, under Major J. P. W. Campbell, from Kohat.

The enemy, encouraged by their success, and by the reinforcements they were receiving from all sides, again moved forward. Consequent on this, a further advance of the British troops was ordered under fire of the guns, and reinforced by the detachment under Captain P. C. Rynd. The bugle was sounded, and a third attempt was made to take the position, but this also failed.

It was now 4.30 P.M., and darkness was approaching; and as it was reported that the position was impregnable from a natural barrier wall, the troops were ordered to retire under cover of the artillery fire, and they reached the plain without further loss at 5.15 P.M. Soon after, Major Campbell arrived with reinforcements, but as the sun was setting, it was deemed inadvisable to attempt any further operations, and the troops returned to cantonments. The total loss in the day's operations was eleven killed and forty-four wounded (*see* Appendix C). It was afterwards ascertained that Captain Ruxton had not been killed at the time of his fall, but was eventually cut up by the enemy, and his head carried off. The enemy were believed to have suffered considerably, to which Major Jones attributed the fact that the retirement was in no way pressed by them.

The loss of Captain A. U. F. Ruxton was sincerely deplored by the Governor-General in Council, and the Viceroy much regretted the death of Subadar Ram Singh, of the 3rd Punjab Infantry, said to be one of the bravest native officers of the Frontier Force, and of the other men who fell on the occasion. At the same time, the thanks of the Governor-General in Council were to be conveyed to Major W. D. Hoste and Captain T. Quin, of the 6th Punjab Infantry, and to Captain P. C. Rynd and Lieutenant C. K. Mackinnon, 3rd Punjab Infantry, for their conduct on this occasion.

Expedition against the Bizoti Urakzais by a force under Lieutenant-Colonel C. P. Keyes, C.B., in February 1869.

After the affair at the Ublan pass above narrated, the blockade against the offending sections was made more stringent, but, although it was worked as strictly as was possible, its good effects were considerably lessened owing to the insignificance of the tribe and their independence of British territory for their actual wants.

An attempt was then made to induce the other sections of the Urakzais to coerce or punish the Bizotis for a pecuniary consideration of Rs. 6,000; but they could not agree, and the scheme fell to the ground, and the Bizotis

Affair with the Bizoti Urakzais at the Ublan pass in 1868.

*Expedition
against the
Bizoti Urak-
zais in 1869.*

As the time approached for them to return to their winter settlements, it became necessary to consider what further measures of coercion should be adopted against them; and it was determined, as the blockade in its then limited extent had proved ineffectual, and as the Urakzais had failed to coerce the offending sections, that, after due warning, the blockade should be extended so as to affect not only the offending sections of the Daulatzais, but the Urakzai clans collectively. There was every hope of this measure soon causing the other sections to bring such pressure on the Daulatzais as would induce them to tender their submission, and give full satisfaction for their misconduct; but, on the night of the 13th of February, a fresh outrage was committed, a small party of the Utman Khel section surprising our police post at the foot of the Kohat *kotal*, killing one policeman, who resisted, and carrying off three others.

Although a large part of the Urakzai tribe desired to remain at peace and cultivate friendly relations with us, and with whom it was a matter of concern that outrages of this kind should be perpetrated by lawless members of portions of their clans, it was now evident that owing to the feelings of Afghan pride, and the complicated relations existing among the different divisions and sub-divisions of the tribe, it was hopeless to expect the well-disposed sections to coerce the offending clans, unless aided in their endeavour by an exhibition of the power of the British Government, and of its determination not to be trifled with, with impunity. There, too, was every probability that delay in noticing this outrage would cause matters to assume a still more serious aspect; and, on the strong recommendation of Lieutenant P. L. N. Cavagnari, the Deputy Commissioner, and Lieutenant-Colonel C. P. Keyes, C.B., commandant, 1st Punjab Infantry, who was commanding at Kohat, sanction was accorded by the Lieutenant-Governor for a sudden raid to be made into the territory of the offending tribes, as it was hoped that chastisement inflicted on them at their homes (hitherto vaunted as inaccessible) would show such a determination on our part not to be further trifled with, as well as our ability, if necessary, to penetrate their most inaccessible fastnesses, that the prestige of the offending sections would be destroyed, and the action of the friendly clans in coercing their fellow tribesmen to come to terms would be greatly stimulated.

As soon as the outrage on the tower at the Kohat *kotal* was reported, the mountain battery had been ordered to move from Abbottabad, but it arrived too late to take part in the proceedings about to be related.

The plan of operations was to cross the Ublan pass, and, if not opposed at the village of Gara, to pass on to that of Dana Khula, the head-quarters of Syad Raza, which was to be destroyed, as well as the settlements of the Utman Khels; but if any opposition was met with at Gara, no attempt to surprise Dana Khula and the Utman Khels was to be made, as the delay would afford ample time to the enemy to make preparations, in which case the troops were to return from Gara.

A demonstration was to be made on the Peshawar side, with the view of checking the Aka Khel tribe, especially the Bassi Khel section, and also to attract the attention of the Utman Khels.

The Deputy Commissioner had no fear about the Kohat Pass Afridis joining, as they had no sympathy with the Daulatzais; but,

Lieut.-Colonel
Keyes's despatch.

Lieut. Cavagnari's

at Kohat, were to be detained there whilst the force was out; and as the troops moved out of cantonments, Rustam Khan, son of Bahadur Sher Khan (who had the management of the pass arrangements), was to proceed to the village of Bosti Khel. *Expedition against the Bizoti Urakzais in 1869.*

Lieutenant
Cavagnari's
report.

Information regarding the nature of the country beyond the Ublan showed that it was impracticable to carry out the proposed plan of operations except by seizing the *kotal* by a sudden surprise. Everything therefore depended on secrecy regarding our movements; so much so, that it was determined that, if the *kotal* could not be seized without any alarm to the enemy in the valley below, it would be useless to push on with any reasonable hope of success, in which case the troop were to be withdrawn, and the expedition was to be abandoned.

But still it was necessary to get the opinions of natives experienced in hill campaigning who could be trusted, and with whom could be discussed the chances in our favour, and the difficulties in the way; and Lieutenant-Colonel Keyes accordingly took into his confidence Subadar-Major Habib Khan and Subadar Pyab (Afridi), 1st Punjab Infantry, and Lieutenant Cavagnari consulted with Shahzada Zamhur, Extra Assistant Commissioner, and Badshah, the *Kotwal* of Kohat.

On the 24th of February the following instructions were issued confidentially to commanding officers, but no warning was to be given, nor preparations made before the appointed time.

At midnight, Captain F. E. Lewes, commanding No. 1 Punjab Light Field Battery, was to proceed to the fort and get ready the mountain guns for service; half an hour later, the men of the battery were to be warned, and detachments for the mountain guns with mules sent down to the fort; at the same time the 1st and 4th Punjab Infantry were to be turned out, and at 1 A.M. the 2nd Punjab Infantry was to be paraded; all without bugle sound.

Ten mule-loads of ammunition were to accompany the force. Food might be cooked and sent up afterwards to the reserve.

At midnight a complete cordon was formed by the 4th Punjab Cavalry round the town of Kohat, to stop anyone attempting to enter or leave it, and police picquets were placed at all the likely places by which a footman might attempt to enter the hills.

At 1 A.M. on the 25th, the force, as per margin, moved from Kohat under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel C. P. Keyes, C.B. (see accompanying sketches, p. 402, and Map, p. 408). This force was followed by a reserve, consisting of the 2nd Punjab Infantry and two 24-pounder howitzers, under Captain H. Tyndall.

On reaching the foot of the Ublan pass, Lieutenant-Colonel Keyes and Lieutenant Cavagnari, with a few picked men from the police, headed by four *maliks* of the friendly portion of the village of Gara, ascended the pass as quickly as possible, leaving the column to follow slowly after them. A small picquet of the enemy had generally been posted at the top of the pass, and arrangements were made to seize this by stratagem. When challenged, the four *maliks* were to reply, assuring their people that, provided they kept quiet and did not raise the alarm, no harm would come to them; the police were at the same time to rush forward and seize them. This was the point at which to decide whether the enterprise was to be carried out or not: for

*Expedition
against the
Bizoti Urak-
zais in 1869.*

had the enemy been found on the alert, the troops would have at once been ordered to retire, and the expedition abandoned. Fortunately, however, the enemy, never dreaming that such an attempt would be made, and confident in the boasted strength of their position, had on this night neglected their usual precautions; no watch had been set, and quiet possession of the *kotal* was taken, and the troops awaited on the crest.

The four *maliks* of the Bizoti and Feroz Khel sections who were with Lieutenant Cavagnari, and who had, since the commencement of hostilities with the Daulatzais, professed friendship, were now sent on to assure the friendly portion of the village of Gara that we only intended destroying Syad Raza's quarter of the village, and that, if unopposed, the troops would pass on to Dana Khula and the Utman Khel country; but that, if any resistance was offered, Gara would be destroyed. The Feroz Khel *maliks* were to warn their tribe of the penalties which would be incurred by their hostages if they assisted the Utman Khels.

The 4th Punjab Infantry and a wing of the 1st Punjab Infantry then moved quietly down the pass with Lieutenant-Colonel Keyes.

The *maliks*, when permitted to start, lost no time on the road; and whether unable to restrain their men, or whether their professed neutrality was only with the view of obtaining a settlement distinct from Syad Raza's section, it is impossible to say; for they simply, on arrival at the village, passed the word that the troops were coming, and proceeded at once to remove their families and property to a place of safety,—their example being immediately followed by the rest of the village, the men and women setting to work at once to drive their flocks and herds up to the higher ranges. Consequently, when the troops arrived in front of Gara, not a quarter of an hour after the *maliks*, all, except a portion of the fighting men, had cleared out of the village, and a fire was opened on the column from the so-called friendly quarter. The design of saving Gara in the hope of surprising Dana Khula was thus frustrated.

The troops immediately opened out, and took the village with a rush, the left assault being made by the 4th Punjab Infantry, and the right by the wing of the 1st Punjab Infantry, led respectively by Lieutenant-Colonel J. Cockburn-Hood and Lieutenant H. W. Pitcher, V.C., with great spirit and determination,—their gallant example not being lost on the men, who fought as if the quarrel was their own, and as if they had a personal injury to avenge. In carrying the village our loss had been—in the 1st Punjab Infantry one man killed and eight wounded, and in the 4th Punjab Infantry eleven wounded.

Some cattle and live stock were seized, and the village was completely destroyed, with the exception of the mosque, which was left uninjured,—the enemy taking up a position on the spurs which commanded the village.

Although the greatest care was taken by the troops not to fire on the women retreating up the hill with their cattle, one was, unfortunately, killed by a stray shot.

Pir Syad Raza was himself in Gara when the troops came up, having come over from Dana Khula, and was one of the first to fall.


The surprise of Dana Khula was now no longer practicable, for the troops would have had to fight their way for two miles, and everything would have been cleared out of the village long before it could be reached. The

S K E T C H E S
ILLUSTRATING
THE OPERATIONS
OF A FORCE UNDER
COLONEL C. P. KEYES, C.B.,
against
THE BIZOTIS

25th February 1869.

REFERENCE.

- F.F.F.—Advancing Force engaged—1st Punjab Infy., 4th Punjab Infy., and 2 Guns.
C.C.—Reserve—2nd Punjab Infantry and 2 Guns.
K K K.—Enemy when driven from GARA.
O.—Second Position of right of Reserve.
X.—Point where Captain Ruxton was killed on 11th March 1868.
H.H.—Ublan Towers.
D.—Ublan Kotal.
M.—High Hill held by friendly levies to protect our left when retiring.
P.P.P.—Towers held by Police and Levies.
R.R.R.—Peshawur Kotal Towers.
N.N.N.—Cordon of 4th Punjab Cavalry to prevent communication between KOHAT and the Hills.
Advance left A. at 1-45 A.M. 25th February 1869; halted at B. at 2-55 A.M. to form order of attack; reached KOTAL at 5-30 A.M., and commenced northern descent at 6-5 A.M. GARA evacuated by 7 A.M.; returned to KOTAL at 8-45 A.M., joined Reserve at 10 A.M., and returned to KOHAT at 1 P.M. Time occupied about 12 hours.



troops would also have had to fight their way back against increasing numbers, and no advantage that could have been gained by the destruction of the empty village would have warranted the risk that would have attended the operations, and the heavy loss of life that must have occurred; in addition to this, the Deputy Commissioner was of opinion that the punishment which had overtaken the tribe, by the destruction of Gara, fully satisfied the political requirements of the case; and, moreover, it had never been proposed to go on if detained by a fight at Gara.

*Expedition
against the
Bizoti Urak-
zais in 1869.*

The mountain guns were, therefore, brought into action on the crest of the *kotal*, and made some admirable practice on the advancing bodies of the enemy, and thus materially assisted the retirement, which was conducted with great care and skill by Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn-Hood and Lieutenant Pitcher.

On reaching the top of the *kotal*, the 4th Punjab Infantry and the wing of the 1st Punjab Infantry were sent down, and the mountain guns moved to a position lower down the pass; whilst the crest of the *kotal* was held by the left wing of the 1st Punjab Infantry, under Captain T. Higginson, supported by picquets of the 4th Punjab Infantry on the right and left spurs, under Lieutenants A. Gaselee and A. McC. Bruce respectively. These picquets were necessary, as the crest of the pass was bare of cover, and without them the ground held by the 1st Punjab Infantry would have been altogether untenable; but when the crest had to be evacuated, their withdrawal was a matter of some difficulty. The descent from the spurs to the crest was steep and difficult, and the retirement of the picquets was necessarily slow—much slower than the enemy's movements; the latter had pressed the retirement from the village closely to gain these points, and these light-footed skirmishers were not long in seizing the vantage ground, and opening a smart fire on the retiring picquets, which the 1st Punjab Infantry had to keep down in the best way it could from the crest.

The great difficulty in moving off the hill was the impossibility (from the nature of the ground) of affording flanking protection, or of extending the movement beyond the narrow limits of the gorge itself, while every turn of the road was open to the fire of an enemy in possession of the crest; however, covered by the fire of the mountain guns, and by that of the howitzers in reserve, which opened on the enemy as soon as they occupied the crest, the men were withdrawn by Captain Higginson and Lieutenants Gaselee and Bruce with great coolness and steadiness; and the whole force reached Kohat at 1 A.M., having been twelve hours absent. Our loss was three killed and thirty-three wounded (*see* Appendix E).

The enemy, who numbered about 200, and who had fought with great bravery and determination, lost ten killed and seven wounded, four of these dangerously.

Lieutenant-Colonel Keyes, in submitting his despatch on this affair, brought to notice the names of Lieutenant-Colonel J. Cockburn-Hood and of Lieutenants A. Gaselee and A. McC. Bruce, of the 4th Punjab Infantry; of Captain T. Higginson and Lieutenant H. W. Pitcher, V.C., 1st Punjab Infantry; and of Captain H. Tyndall, 2nd Punjab Infantry. In addition to these, Lieutenant-Colonel Keyes mentioned the names of Captain F. E. Lewes, commanding the artillery, Lieutenant R. P. Blake, 4th Punjab Cavalry, Orderly Officer, and of Lieutenant C. A. Sim, Royal Engineers. He also brought to notice the gallant conduct of Lieutenant A. P. Broome, 1st Punjab

*Expedition
against the
Bizoti Urak-
zais in 1869.*

Infantry, in having, at considerable personal risk, carried out of fire a wounded soldier of the 4th Punjab Infantry.

Lieutenant-Colonel Keyes stated that not a whisper had got abroad of the intended movements, and that the four native officers and officials already mentioned had afforded valuable aid and exercised great discretion. He specially commented on the appreciation he felt of Lieutenant P. L. N. Cagnani's thorough knowledge of the hills and accuracy of information, and of the great ability he had shown in his management of the various tribes, in diverting their attention, and in reducing all possible resistance to a minimum. He also remarked that not only had the late outrage on the police post and the death of Captain Ruxton been fully avenged, but the minds of our subjects, visibly affected by the repeated acts of defiance of the hostile tribes, had been reassured by the action taken.

Royal Horse Artillery, 2 guns.
Two companies, 36th Foot.
Three troops, 19th Bengal Cavalry.
One company, Sappers and Miners.
Five companies, 3rd Native Infantry.
19th Punjab Native Infantry.

Whilst these operations were being carried on from the Kohat side, a column, consisting of the troops as per margin, had moved out from Peshawar, under Brigadier-General D. M. Stewart, C.B., for the purpose of distracting the attention of the Utman

Khel Urakzais and Bassi Khel Afridis.

Early on the morning of the day that Lieut.-Colonel Keyes crossed the

Commissioner's
report.

Ublan, an official was sent to the village of Akhor, in the Kohat pass, to say that the troops were close behind, and *must* be allowed temporarily to hold the village.

At the same time, detachments of cavalry and infantry were placed in front of Jana Garhi and Fort Bara, in view to keeping the Bassi Khels at home, and a leading man was sent to warn them. They began making off on seeing the troops, but afterwards, on being reassured by our emissary, they waited on the officer commanding the detachments.

The main body of the troops, under Brigadier-General Stewart, accompanied by the Commissioner, moved into the Kohat pass about daybreak. The Akhor people were averse to our going into their country, but they were not in a position to oppose us, and professed to acquiesce in our demands without hesitation.

Brigadier-General
Stewart's despatch.

The troops moved on about two miles beyond Akhor, along the dry bed of a torrent, towards the *kotal* leading into the Daulatzai country, when a party was sent on ahead to reconnoitre.

Commissioner's
report.

The pass leading to the *kotal* was at least six miles in length; very strong, and edged with precipitous, isolated hills. It was found to be a most difficult country to operate in, because a force could not move in it in presence of an enemy without crowning the commanding heights on each side, and this would necessarily be a very slow and harassing process. The distance to be traversed was greater than was supposed, and the country was far more difficult than represented.

The *kotal* was reported low and easy, beyond which the nearest Utman Khel settlement was distant three or four miles. The force halted at Akhor until 1 P.M., and then fell back upon Fort Mackeson, returning to Peshawar the following day.

These movements excited much attention, and they probably proved indirectly beneficial to the Kohat column.

Governor-General in Council considered that they were admirably planned, and bravely and skilfully carried out. He desired that the special thanks of the Government of India should be conveyed to Lieutenant-Colonel C. P. Keyes, C.B., for his able conduct of the expedition. *Expedition against the Bizoti Urakzais in 1869.*

The thanks of the Government were also to be communicated to the whole of the officers and troops employed, who, His Excellency thought, appeared to have displayed much spirit, and to have well sustained the credit of the Frontier Force, and special acknowledgments were to be conveyed to the officers mentioned by Lieutenant-Colonel Keyes, and also to Subadar-Major Habib Khan, Sirdar Bahadur, and to Subadar Pyab, of the 1st Punjab Infantry.

His Excellency observed with much pleasure the report of the marked gallantry of Lieutenant A. P. Broome, 1st Punjab Infantry, and stated that the recommendation that his name should be submitted to Her Majesty for the decoration of the Victoria Cross would be referred for the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief. His Excellency further desired to acknowledge, in a very special manner, the valuable aid and service rendered to Lieutenant-Colonel Keyes by Lieutenant P. L. N. Cavagnari on this occasion; and also to acknowledge the promptitude and secrecy with which a force under Brigadier-General D. M. Stewart, C.B., moved out from Peshawar to make a demonstration in favour of the expedition, and of the satisfactory manner in which that demonstration was carried out.

After the destruction of the village of Gara, the Bizotis began to evince signs of submission, as they now felt that their security from aggression had been snatched from them, in spite of tradition, and the obstacles of their boasted *kotal*, and on the 4th of April following, the *jirgas* of the Bizoti, Utman Khel, and Sipah sections came into Kohat, and tendered their submission to the Deputy Commissioner, laying their swords at his feet. They agreed to pay a fine of Rs. 1,200, and to give nine of their principal headmen as hostages for their future good behaviour. After an appropriate warning, their submission was accepted, and the blockade was removed.

In the following year a large caravan of the Alisherzai section of the Urakzais was seized near Kohat. This section, on account of various acts of petty theft, had been excluded from British territory, but they now sent in their *jirga*, begging for a settlement. On the 23rd of March 1870 the representatives of both Pitao and Sweri Alisherzais arrived at Kohat, and agreed to pay Rs. 1,100 for past offences, and to behave well in future, the headmen of Torawari being their sureties.

In 1873 reprisals were made on the Sipah section for petty offences committed on the Kohat border; but in January 1874 they submitted, paid full indemnity for losses incurred by British subjects, and gave security for future good behaviour.

In April 1874 an attack was made on a hamlet belonging to the Akhels, situated on the Miranzai border, by a party of six or eight men of that section, in pursuance of a blood feud, and the individual against whom the attack was made was murdered, and his property plundered. The Akhels were called upon to deliver up the murderers, or to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000, and they chose the latter alternative.

the Muhammed Khel clan of the Urakzais

Conduct of the
Urakzais in
1878-79.

who are *Shias*, and are followers of the *Tirah Syads*, were attacked by a large coalition of the *Suni* tribes of *Tirah*, and some of their principal villages were destroyed, and the *Syads*, as already stated, were driven to seek refuge in British territory. Great excitement was created along the *Miranzai* and *Hangu* borders, and it was with difficulty that British subjects were restrained from taking part in the affair.

In 1878 the *Alisherzai* and the *Massozai* sections of the *Lashkärzai* clan began to assume a hostile attitude toward us; this was due partly to the fancied inaccessibility of their hills, and partly to their association with *Mulla Wali Khan*, who was bitterly hostile to the British. This found vent in petty offences on the upper *Miranzai* border, as well as in *Kuram*.

On the outbreak of the Afghan war in November 1878, there was much agitation amongst all the *Suni* *Urakzai* clans, caused by emissaries from the Amir of *Kabul*, and the preachings of the *mullas*, and the effect of this for evil was chiefly shown amongst the *Ali Khel* and the *Akhel* sections; but on the 1st January 1879 a settlement was effected with them by the Deputy Commissioner.

On the 3rd of March the *Alisherzai* section of the *Urakzais* aided the *Zaimukhts* in an attack on the *Gandiawar sarai*, a commissariat station a few miles east of *Thal*, in which our loss was six killed and five wounded, and twenty-eight mules were carried off. In this outrage, however, the *Alisherzais* played a subordinate part, only five out of the twenty-five raiders belonging to their tribe. The party, moreover, passed through the *Zaimukht* limits on their way to British territory.

The *Alisherzais* aided the *Zaimukhts* again in an attack on a party of sepoy of the 5th Punjab Infantry going on furlough, which will be referred to again in the next chapter. In addition to these, the *Alisherzai* section had been guilty of several minor offences, such as cutting the telegraph wire, thefts of cattle, and on the 23rd of May, in conjunction with the *Akhels*, they lifted forty-seven head of cattle from near *Kai*, of which sixteen were subsequently recovered.

The conduct of the *Mamozais* had also been hostile, and they were guilty of several offences on the British border. The most important of these was the murder of two *munshis* and a servant, between *Kai* and *Nariab*, on the 27th of June 1879, and the robbery of property valued at Rs. 200. In this outrage they were joined by the *Akhels*. Again, on the 19th of July, a party of *Mamozais*, about one hundred and fifty in number, made a raid on the cattle belonging to the village of *Kai*, and carried off animals to the value of Rs. 2,750, one man being killed on each side. They were aided in their retreat by the *Akhel* section.

On account of these repeated outrages, the Government of India sanctioned the adoption of punitive measures against the *Alisherzai* and *Mamozai* sections of the *Lashkärzai* *Urakzais*, to be undertaken, if possible, in conjunction with the expedition against the *Zaimukhts* (to be described in the next chapter). The rapid success, however, of the British force employed against the last-named tribe so alarmed the *Alisherzais*, that their *jirga* attended and accepted the terms proposed, viz., payment of Rs. 4,000 fine and the surrender of twenty-eight hostages. The *Mamozais* also agreed to pay a fine of the same amount and to furnish hostages; but subsequently a claim was raised by one party in the tribe that the fine agreed to should include all payments on account of a raid by the entirely distinct section—the *Ali Khel*—on a *sarai*

could not, of course, be entertained, and the Mamozais were accordingly blockaded. *Conduct of the
Urakzais in
1879-80.*

The raid above mentioned upon Mazam Talao, between Togh and Surizai on the Kohat-Thal road, was of a very serious nature; the raiders, belonging chiefly to the Ali Khel Urakzais, were under the leadership of one Malik Hawas of that section. The party consisted of thirty-seven men, and, owing to the gross cowardice of the guard of road police stationed in the *sarai*, no resistance was offered. The casualties were thirteen killed and sixteen wounded, chiefly unarmed *coolies* and travellers. One woman and two children were included among the killed in this cruel massacre. The garrison of the road post was subsequently severely punished. Four of the neighbouring British villages, which enjoyed a remission of revenue in consideration of the duties of frontier watch and ward, had failed either to oppose or to follow up the retreating raiders, and their revenue demands were accordingly raised to the full amount for a term of five years. For this raid a fine of Rs. 4,500 was imposed on the Ali Khels.

On the night of the 5th of August 1880 another serious raid was committed on the Bagatukh *sarai*, two miles south-west of Hangu. The marauders were about forty in number, and were chiefly men of the Mamozai and Ali Khel sections, and were led by Malik Hawas, Ali Khel, and Muhammad Shah, Mamozai. The raiders, having found the sentry asleep, entered the enclosure by scaling the walls. There were at that time in the *sarai* twenty-two *coolies*, protected by a garrison of nine road police, recruited from the neighbouring villages. Of the former, two were killed and three wounded, and of the police six were killed and one wounded. The raiders then set fire to one side of the *sarai* and carried off four rifles, some matchlocks, some pickaxes, and about Rs. 150 in cash. The party approached Bagatukh through the lands of the Rubia Khel and Malla Khel Urakzais, and retired unmolested with their plunder into the territory of the Akhels. As a punishment to the villagers of Bagatukh for their apathy in not turning out to repel this raid, the assessment of the village was raised from Rs. 300 to Rs. 500 for a period of three years. To punish the sections who had given a passage to the raiders, a fine of Rs. 1,000 was imposed on the Akhels, of Rs. 750 on the Rubia Khels, and Rs. 750 on the Malla Khels; and, in addition to these, Rs. 1,000 was to be added to the amount already due from the Mamozais, the sum previously standing against the Ali Khels being held to be sufficient.

The fines now imposed upon the Urakzai tribe amounted to no less than Rs. 15,200,* and proposals were made for the payment of this amount being enforced by a military expedition; but punitive measures had to be deferred in consequence of the operations against the Mahsud Waziris (*see* Chapter XV). Since then the Ali Khels have given security for the payment of their share of the fine, and this is being gradually paid, about Rs. 2,000 only remaining to be realised. A settlement was also effected with the Rubia

	Rs.
* Mamozai, imposed after Zaimukht expedition (Rs. 4,000), and for Bagatukh raid (Rs. 1,000)	5,000
Ali Khel, for raid on Mazam Talao	4,500
Rubia Khel and Malla Khel, in equal shares, for passage given in Bagatukh raid... ..	1,500
Akhel, for passage given in Kai cattle raid (Rs. 500), in Mazam Talao raid (Rs. 1,000), in Bagatukh raid (Rs. 1,000)	2,500
Rubia Khel, Mishti, etc., for minor offences committed in British territory ...	1,700

*Relations of the
Urakzai tribe
with the British
Government at
the present
time.*

Khels, Mamazais, Malla Khels, Shaikhans, and Mishtis (known collectively as the Hangu Samil clans) in March 1883, but there are still unsettled claims against these sections (the largest being about Rs. 2,000 against the Mishtis), and reprisals will probably be necessary, as the tribes ignore the demands made upon them. The Akhels have hitherto given no sign of any intention of paying the fine of Rs. 2,500 due from them, and it will be necessary to consider their case after accounts with the Ali Khels have been settled. They have lately been behaving badly, and claims for cattle and other property are due from them in addition to the amount named above. The blockade of the Mamozais still continues; of the total fine of Rs. 5,000 due from them, Rs. 3,700 still remains to be realised, but they have lately shown a disposition to pay up this balance, in order to have the blockade removed. The Alisherzais and Massozais have given little cause for complaint since 1879.

The Daulatzai division, which, as we have seen, gave a good deal of trouble in 1868, have of late years been well-behaved. The Bizoti section was fined Rs. 1,000 for permitting the outlaw Kamal to pass through their limits on his way to commit the night attack at Kohat in September 1881 (*see* page 311); and this they have since paid. Fines, aggregating Rs. 447, are due from the Sturi Khels, which they refuse to pay, and it is now under consideration to blockade them in order to hasten a settlement.

M A P
to illustrate
THE MOVEMENTS
OF THE
MIRANZAI FIELD FORCE,
1861, 1865, & 1866,
AND
THE OPERATIONS
against the
URAKZAI TRIBE
in 1865, 1868, & 1869
and against the
ZAIMUKHT AFGHANS
in 1879

REFERENCES.


Route of Rubia Khel Expeditionary Force, 1855.....
Do. Zaimukht Do. Do. 1879.....
Do. Miranzai Field Force, 1866.....

ACTIONS { Brigr.-General N. Chamberlain, C.B., 30th April 1855
Major Jones, 11th March 1868
Lieutenant-Colonel Keyes, C.B., 25th February 1869
Brigr.-Genl. Tytler, C.B., V.C., 14th December 1879

Villages destroyed by Rubia Khel Expeditionary Force, 1855.

Scale 1 Inch = 4 Miles.

0 1 2 3 4 Miles



APPENDIX A.

Composition of the force employed in the operations against the Rubia Khel Urakzais in September 1855.

Brigadier N. B. Chamberlain, commanding.

Staff.

Captain R. R. Adams, Staff Officer.

Lieutenant A. W. Garnett, Bengal Engineers, Field Engineer.

Artillery.

Detachment, Peshawar Mountain Train Battery, Lieutenant T. Pulman, commanding.

No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery, Lieutenant J. R. Sladen, commanding.

Cavalry.

4th Punjab Cavalry, Captain G. O. Jacob, commanding.

Infantry.

1st Punjab Infantry, Major J. Coke, commanding.

2nd Punjab Infantry, Captain G. W. G. Green, commanding.

3rd Punjab Infantry, Captain B. Henderson, commanding.

Corps.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N.C. Officers and rank and file.	Remarks.
Brigade Staff	3	* Peshawar Mountain Train Battery.
* Peshawar Mountain Train Battery ...	3	3	93	Two 3-pounder guns.
† No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery ...	3	2	89	Two 12-pounder howitzers.
4th Punjab Cavalry	3	13	387	† No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery.
1st Punjab Infantry	4	10	620	Two 3-pounder guns.
2nd Punjab Infantry	2	10	567	One 9-pounder gun.
3rd Punjab Infantry	2	9	634	One 12-pounder howitzer.
Total	20	47	2,390	One 24-pounder howitzer. 6 Elephants.

APPENDIX B.

Return of Killed and Wounded in the operations against the Rubia Khel Urakzai villages of Nasin and Sangar, on the 2nd September 1855.

Corps.	Killed.					Wounded.					Remarks.
	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	
1st Punjab Infantry...	1	...	1	2	* Native doctor.
2nd Punjab Infantry	*1	7	8	1	...	1	
3rd Punjab Infantry	3	3	1	1	
Total	1	10	11	...	1	1	2	4	

ABSTRACT.

Killed	11
Wounded	4
Total	15

APPENDIX C.

Return of Killed and Wounded among the troops employed against the Bizoti Urakzais in the affair at the Ublan pass, on the 11th March 1868.

Corps.	Killed.					Wounded.					Remarks.
	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	
3rd Punjab Infantry	1*	1	2	5	9	1†	1	4	13	19	*Capt. A. U. F. Ruxton. † Lient. C. K. Mackinnon. ‡ Major W.D. Hoste.
6th Punjab Infantry	2	2	1‡	1	...	23	25	
Total ...	1	1	2	7	11	2	2	4	36	44	

ABSTRACT.

Killed	11
Wounded	44

APPENDIX D.

Composition of force employed in the operations against the Bizoti Urakzais under
 LIEUTENANT-COLONEL C. P. KEYES, C.B., in 1869.

Lieutenant-Colonel C. P. Keyes, C.B., commanding.

Staff.

Lieutenant C. A. Sim, Royal Engineers, Field Engineer.

Lieutenant R. P. Blake, 4th Punjab Cavalry, Orderly Officer.

Artillery.

No. 1 Punjab Light Field Battery, Captain F. E. Lewes, commanding.

Infantry.

1st Punjab Infantry, Captain T. Higginson, commanding.

2nd Punjab Infantry, Captain H. Tyndall, commanding.

4th Punjab Infantry, Lieut.-Col. J. Cockburn-Hood, commanding.

Political Officer.

Lieutenant P. L. N. Cavagnari, Deputy Commissioner of Kohat.

Corps.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	Non-Commissioned Officers.	Rank and file.	Ordnance.		Remarks.
					24-pounder howitzers.	Mountain guns.	
No. 1 Punjab Light Field Battery...	2	2	10	66	2	2	
Detachment, 4th Punjab Cavalry ...	2	1	5	31	
1st Punjab Infantry... ..	6	11	46	413	
2nd Punjab Infantry	6	12	56	445	
4th Punjab Infantry... ..	8	13	54	469	
Police and levies	2	3	4	410	
Total	26	42	175	1,834	2	2	

APPENDIX E.

Return of Killed and Wounded in the force under LIEUTENANT-COLONEL C. P. KEYES, C.B., in the operations against the Bizoti Urakzais on the 25th February 1869.

Corps.	Killed.					Wounded.					Remarks.
	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	
No. 1 Punjab Light Field Battery	1	1	
1st Punjab Infantry	2	2	11	11	
4th Punjab Infantry	1	1	...	2	2	14	18	
Police	3	3	
Total	3	3	...	2	2	29	33	

ABSTRACT.

Killed	3
Wounded	33
Total	36

CHAPTER XII.

KOHAT BORDER.

ZAIMUKHT TRIBE.

THE Zaimukhts are a tribe of Pathans inhabiting the hills to the south of the Urakzais, between the Miranzai and Kuram valleys. *Zaimukhts.*

They are divided into two main branches—(I) Mammazai, or Western Zaimukhts; and (II) Khoidad Khel, or Eastern Zaimukhts.

Plowden. The Mammazais number 1,830 fighting men, and are sub-divided into—

Manatuwal	900
Mandani	260
Wattizai	510
Daudzai	160

The Khoidad Khels number 1,747 fighting men, and are sub-divided into—

Hassan Khel	296
Babakar Khel	766
Tapai	165
Khadu Khel	520

The total fighting strength of the Zaimukhts is thus about 3,500 men. Of these, the Eastern Zaimukhts are principally armed with swords, while the Western are armed with knives. Only about one-fourth of the tribe possess matchlocks, and about the same number have pistols, but the firearms are all of a very inferior description. The Zaimukhts are *Sunis* in religion and *Samil* in politics. They are physically a fine-looking, powerful race, forming in this respect a striking contrast to their Turi neighbours. They do not move about so much as other tribes, but remain in their villages all the year round. The Khoidad Khel branch of the tribe are brought more into contact with our officers than the Mammazai, and have the reputation of being more enterprising and daring than their fellow-tribesmen to the west.

Scott. The country of the Zaimukhts (*see* Map, page 408) may be described as a triangle, with the range of hills known as the Zawaghar or Sammanoghar as its base, and the village of Thal, on the Kuram, as its apex. This includes a tract of country on its western side (as mentioned in the previous chapter) occupied by the Alisherzai Urakzais. The total area is about four hundred square miles, of which the Alisherzai occupy one-fourth.

The hills are at a height of over 9,000 feet above

*Zaimukht
country.*

Zawo, and from 7,000 to 8,000 feet elsewhere. The crest is in some parts covered with pine forests, in others it is bare of trees. From this main range several streams run southward between precipitous and rocky spurs whose sides are quite inaccessible; from the crests, here and there rise steep, craggy peaks, which render the ridges also very difficult, if not impracticable.

Among these glens lie many hamlets of small size, the village of Zawo being composed of several hamlets. This village was considered the chief stronghold of the Zaimukhts, and impregnable from its position, nestling close under the mountain range, and from the south only approachable up a ravine seven miles in length hemmed in by precipitous spurs rising to 8,000 feet in elevation. It was, however, reached, as will be seen hereafter, by Brigadier-General Tytler's force in 1879.

The spurs of the Zawaghar range are steep and rugged for about six to seven miles; as they run southward they fall away, and form a succession of small plateaux intersected by ravines 4,000 to 5,000 feet in elevation. Across these runs the route from Torawari to Balesh Khel, formerly used by *kafilas*. The drainage divides into three parts—one running westward into the Kurmana and Kuram, near Balesh Khel and Sadda; a second, collecting below Chinarak, forms the Sangroba or Sangrab, which falls into the Kuram near Thal; and the remainder runs eastward into the Ishkali Toi in Miranzai, which drains into the Kuram river. Dividing these are two passes at the villages of Manatu, elevation 5,200 feet, and Urmegi, elevation 4,300 feet, which also form the connecting links between the Zawaghar hills and a second series of hills that rise abruptly from 4,000 to 8,000 feet in two groups—one round the peak of Dingsar, 8,100 feet in elevation, west of the Sangroba, the other round Dandoghar, elevation 7,000 feet, east of that stream. The crests and spurs of these two groups are rugged, rocky, and almost treeless. Amongst them lie several difficult glens, in which are other hamlets of the Zaimukhts, very difficult of access, but which were, nevertheless, visited by British troops in 1879.

The principal villages are, on the western drainage toward Balesh Khel, Tindoh, Krumb, Murghan, Sariobe, and Tatang, all inhabited by Alisherzai Urakzais, and possessing from forty to one hundred huts each, and two or three towers. Tatang and Murghan lie at the exit of two glens resembling the Zawo defile; the former exceedingly difficult, the latter less so. Through Murghan a mule track, used by traders, runs from Kuram to the Khanki valley, in the Urakzai country. On the pass dividing the western from the central drainage lies Manatu; near it are Khorshah and Shimaki. In the central valley succeeding Manatu lie the Mandan hamlets, then Chinarak and Darani; Urmegi, further east on the pass dividing the central and eastern drainage, is a small hamlet. Under the Dandoghar lies Dumbuki, a few miles from Torawari, where the main route enters the Kohat district. Along the base of the northern range of hills lie the large villages of Yasta, Tarai, and Sparkhwait, and in the glens above these villages are the hamlets of Ragha, Bagh, etc., in the Zawo defile, Surmai, Gurgarai, Mandzaki, Tarbatta, and several lesser ones. Along the course of the Sangroba, between the defile below Chinarak and Thal, lie the villages of Sangroba, Thana, Admela, and Dolragha. Along the banks of the Kuram river, on the road from Thal to Balesh Khel, lie the hamlets and posts of Chapri, Manduri, Alizai, and Shinak, at elevations ranging from 3,000 to 4,000 feet,

None of the Zaimukht villages are very large, the largest perhaps containing two to three hundred huts, and several towers. The principal villages are all accessible, and were visited by General Tytler's column in 1879. The hamlets in the defiles and glens are strongly protected by the surrounding rocky precipitous hills. Zaimukht country.

The country is, as a rule, barren and devoid of timber trees. The hill-sides are often clothed with stunted oaks and wild olives; in the valleys water is plentiful. Each of the large villages is surrounded by a few hundred acres of wheat and barley cultivation; those in the glens have patches of Indian-corn. The reason that the cultivation is only to be seen in the immediate vicinity of the villages is chiefly owing to the number of internal blood feuds in this tribe, which preclude the possibility of agricultural operations being carried on at any distance from support.

Tytler says that the fertility of the country is unquestionable, Indian-corn, wheat, barley, and other cereals being grown in large quantities. There are also great numbers of cattle, sheep, goats, and poultry, sufficient for the requirements of the inhabitants, but if a force entering the country were quartered for any time in any particular place, the supplies would very soon fail. Camel pasturage and grass abound, and firewood also is plentiful.

With regard to the routes in the Zaimukht country, the most important one is that already mentioned, which was formerly used as a *kafila* route. Starting from Torawari in Miranzai, this road runs across open country three miles to Dumbuki, then follows the course of a stream under the northern base of Dandoghar, hemmed in by wooded hills on both sides to Urmegi; or another stream might be followed to Nawakila, and thence between low-wooded hills to Urmegi. From Urmegi the road descends slightly, about two miles through wooded hills, then over open cultivated country to Chinarak. It there crosses a succession of ravines and small plateaux to the Mandan hamlets, lying in open country, and continues up the bed of a fairly easy watercourse running between steep banks to Manatu. From the Manatu pass a descent through wooded hills is made to Gawakhi, in a glen with high rocky spurs to the south and a low ridge of hills to the north. From here the road leads along the bed of the stream, which is fairly open and easy, to Sadda on the Kuram river. From Chinarak another road follows the Sangroba stream to Thal. For the first few miles below Chinarak the road runs through a narrow defile hemmed in between high mountains. On reaching Sangroba the country is more open, and it becomes still more so after it has passed Admela, above which is a short, narrow defile about one mile in length. From Admela to Thal the road is easy.

Rough pathways run east and west from these main routes. Those over the Sammanoghar range are said to be extremely difficult. Troops could cross the hills between Admela and Alizai, as there is a pathway running through the intricate mass of hills which fill up this bit of country.

The following list shows the principal villages belonging to the different sections of the Zaimukht tribe:—

Division.	Section.	Villages.
MAMMAZAI	Manatwal	... Manatu, Gawakhi, Nirarai, Lowarimela, Jalamoi and Durani.
	Mandani	.. Mandan hamlets, Zuitunak.
	Wattizai	... Sangroba, Manduri, Zakhai, Katakumela, Kandali, Shagai, Darani.

*Zaimukht
villages.*

<i>Division.</i>	<i>Section.</i>	<i>Villages.</i>
KHOIDAD KHEL... ..	<i>Hassan Khel</i> ...	Sparkhwait, Mandzaki, Tarbatta, and hamlets above Mandzaki.
	<i>Babakar Khel</i> ...	Yasta, Surmai, Gurgarai, Urmegi, Chingai.
	<i>Tapai</i> ...	Tarai.
	<i>Khadu Khel</i> ...	Zawo, Bagh, and intermediate hamlets.

In addition to the above, the village of Dumbuki is occupied jointly by Hassan Khels and the Babakar Khels, and similarly the latter share with the other sections of the Khoidad Khel the villages of Torawari (in Miranzai), Dolragha, Thana, and Admela.

The village of Torawari is the only village in British territory belonging to the Zaimukhts. It pays revenue to the Government, and the responsibility of its headmen for the independent Khoidad Khel can always be enforced. The Western Zaimukhts have no settlements in the Kohat district, but they have extensive lands in Kuram, and by confiscating these, or the crops on them, these sections could be punished if necessary.

When Miranzai was first occupied by the British Government, the villages of Dolragha and Admela were considered independent territory in the settlement made by Captain J. Coke; but in 1856 the Khoidad Khel petitioned Captain B. Henderson, then Deputy Commissioner of the district, stating that their enemies, by laying siege to, and forcibly occupying, these villages, prevented the tribe from being able to act up to their responsibilities, as their position commanded the roadway along the Sangroba stream. Captain Henderson, in order to afford them protection, declared Dolragha and Admela to be within the British border, and assessed them with a nominal revenue, or *nazrana*, of Rs. 100 per annum, which up to the present time has been regularly paid.

The Zaimukhts only depend upon us for salt, but they would feel a blockade very much. They can generally reckon on aid from the Alisherzai Urakzais in their external quarrels, and they are sometimes joined by the other two sections of the Lashkarzai division, *viz.*, the Mamozai and the Massozai.

There is a bitter blood feud between the eastern and western divisions of the Zaimukhts. The quarrel arose forty years ago from their joining opposite sides in a dispute between the Kabul Khel Waziris and the Turis.

Another cause of contention has been the possession of the village of Thana, which, from its position on an eminence, not only commands the Sangroba stream, but also one of the principal passages into Kuram. For many years this village was constantly changing hands, for being entirely dependent for water on the Sangroba stream, which flows some 200 or 300 feet below the village, a besieging party encamping in the low hills on the banks of the river could easily prevent the villagers from going down to draw water. In 1867 this difficulty was provided for by the Khoidad Khels, who, having regained possession of the village by the aid of the neighbouring Waziris, constructed a subterraneous passage from the village to the bed of the stream. Thana has since then remained in the undisturbed possession of the Khoidad Khel branch, for without guns it would be very difficult to oust the defenders by assault. On account of this feud, owing to both parties having supporters in Miranzai, it has occasionally been a matter of some difficulty to prevent British subjects mixing themselves up in the quarrel.

In the early years of the annexation the Zaimukhts gave little trouble,

but in 1855 they assumed a hostile attitude, and, among other acts of hostility, they took part in the affair near Darsamand on the 30th of April (to be described in the next chapter). After the expedition to the Miranzai valley in 1856, however, their behaviour became good.

*Relations of
the Zaimukht
tribe with the
British Gov-
ernment pre-
vious to 1878.*

During that expedition Brigadier Chamberlain examined the ground in the neighbourhood of the villages of Dolragha and Admela, and rode through the gorge leading to the villages of Thana and Sangroba, which he found to be more accessible than reports had made out. On the march from Ibrahimzai to Hazar Pir Ziarat, the western entrance to the Zaimukht country was also explored. Sketches were taken and the fact established that the Zaimukht country was more accessible than had been supposed. From 1856 to 1878 the Zaimukhts gave little trouble on our border.

Expedition against the Zaimukhts by a force under Brigadier-General J. A. Tytler, V.C., C.B., in December 1879.

Soon after the outbreak of the Afghan war in November 1878, the Zaimukhts began to give trouble on the line of communications of the Kuram Valley Field Force, both on the Kohat-Thal road in British territory and also in Kuram. On the 27th of December 1878 twenty-four camels were carried off while grazing at some distance from the military camp at Thal, by Zaimukhts of the Babakar section. Eighteen of the camels were recovered, and a fine of Rs. 500 was imposed on the Khoidad Khels for this offence. On the night of the 2nd-3rd of March 1879 a much more serious raid was committed on the *sarai* at Gandiawar, in Miranzai. The raiders were twenty-five in number, twenty being Khoidad Khel Zaimukhts and five Alisherzai Urakzais (see p. 406). They moreover came into British territory through the Khoidad Khel limits. The raiders entered the *sarai* about 11 P.M., and succeeded in killing five mule drivers and wounding three, besides killing one sepoy of the road police and wounding two others, and then escaped, carrying off with them twenty-eight mules, of which seventeen were subsequently recovered through the men of Torawari. On the 9th of March two Hindu postal carriers were murdered in Wattizai limits, between Chapri and Manduri. The raiding party consisted of eighteen Zaimukhts and three Alisherzai Urakzais.

On the 6th of May a havildar and three sepoy of the Patiala Contingent were attacked by Khadu Khel Zaimukhts of Zawo, on the road between Thal and Chapri. The havildar and one sepoy, after a short resistance, were killed, but the other two sepoy, one of whom was wounded, succeeded in making their escape. The raiders carried off property to the value of Rs. 78, including a pair of shoes. These last were sent as a thank-offering to the well-known Mulla Wali Khan, who had incited the Gandiawar raid mentioned above, and had, until very recently, lived in Zaimukht limits.

The next offence was on the 12th of May, when a shepherd was kidnapped, but subsequently released, and sixteen head of cattle lifted near Nariab, in Miranzai. On the 25th of June Surgeon W. B. Smyth was murdered at Chapri, seven miles from Thal; the murderers belonged to the Wattizai section. On the 7th of the following month the mails were robbed on the Manduri road by Zaimukhts of the Daudzai section.

On the night of the 27th of July an attack which has been mentioned

*Expedition
against the
Zaimukhts
in 1879.*

in the previous chapter, was made near Gandiawar on a party of seventy-two armed sepoy of the 5th Punjab Infantry, who were proceeding on furlough. These men were travelling at night, in disregard of orders forbidding them to do so, and were attacked by marauders numbering sixty-nine, sixty of whom were Zaimukhts and nine Alisherzais. The raiders were eventually driven off by two volleys, leaving two men killed on the ground, carrying off two others killed and several wounded. Of the furlough men three were killed and ten wounded, including the subadar; also two cartmen and seven bullocks.

On the 25th of August a grass-cutter was murdered within Khoidad Khel limits whilst cutting wood, and on the 29th of September the Zaimukhts crowned their long list of evil deeds by the cruel and dastardly murder of Lieutenant F. B. Kinloch, 5th Bengal Cavalry, between Chapri and Manduri. This officer, accompanied by one sowar, was riding along, when some forty men, lying in ambush near the road, fired a volley at him. He fell, and the men then rushed on him and murdered him. The sowar who was with him escaped to Chapri, and, having procured assistance, brought the body back to Thal. The murder was committed within Wattizai limits, but the marauders belonged to the Khoidad Khel division of the Zaimukhts. In the above list of offences committed by this tribe, minor offences, such as petty thefts, cutting the telegraph wire, etc., of which several occurred, have been omitted.

The hostile attitude which the Zaimukht tribe had assumed was generally attributed to the residence of Mulla Wali Khan for some months in their village of Sparkhwait, and to their having been guided by his ill advice. The total claim against the Zaimukhts on account of these outrages and raids amounted to no less than Rs. 25,000.

The cup of their iniquities being full, sanction was given by the Government of India for punishment to be inflicted on the tribe, and orders were accordingly issued for the assembling of a force to enter the Zaimukht country in the middle of October 1879. The command of the expedition was entrusted to Brigadier-General J. A. Tytler, V.C., C.B.

The main objects of the expedition were four in number. Firstly, to punish the Zaimukht tribe for their raids and outrages on the Kuram road and the Miranzai border; secondly, to extend the operations, should it be found convenient and desirable to do so, to the Mamozai and Alisherzai sections of the Lashkarzai Urakzais, in consequence of their recent misbehaviour, or in the event of their joining the Zaimukhts in attacking or withstanding the British forces; thirdly, it was required by the Adjutant-General of the Army that a right of way should be admitted by the Zaimukhts through their territory between Torawari, in British territory, and Balesh Khel, in Kuram, and that they should give hostages for the security, and undertake the responsibility, of this road; and fourthly, it was intended generally to secure the safety of communications on the Thal-Kuram road.

Previous to active operations being commenced, a proclamation (*see Appendix A*) was issued to the independent tribes on the Kohat border, in which the causes and the objects of the proposed expedition were set forth, and in which they were warned against affording aid to the offending tribes.

Owing to renewed active operations in Afghanistan, consequent on the murder of the British envoy at Kabul, the expedition against the Zaimukhts had to be postponed for a time, chiefly on account of want of transport. At

Punjab Govern-
ment despatch.

the end of October some 3,000 Lashkarzais had assembled in the neighbourhood of Balesh Khel, and on the 29th of that month Lieut.-Colonel R. G. Rogers, 20th Punjab Native Infantry, with a flying column, consisting of detachments of the 85th Foot and the 20th Punjab Native Infantry, with two mountain guns, made a demonstration against this gathering, and dispersed the enemy with a few shells at long ranges. There were no casualties on our side.

*Expedition
against the
Zaimukhts
in 1879.*

On the 21st of November, a raid was made on the independent Zaimukht hamlet of Dand, about five miles from Torawari. The object was to capture some relatives of Malik Hawas, Ali Khel, the leader of the attack on Mazam Talao on the night of the 14th of November, in which a large number of *coolies* had been killed and wounded (see page 407). These men were known then to be living at Dand. The party consisted of 80 sabres of the 18th Bengal Cavalry, under Major T. R. Davidson of that regiment, and was accompanied by Major E. R. Conolly, Assistant Commissioner of Kohat. The distance turned out to be greater, and the road rougher, than had been expected, but the surprise was successful, and it was not until the party arrived within a quarter of a mile of the hamlet that any move was observed among the villagers. They then attempted to fly, but were stopped, and, seeing resistance to be hopeless, they stated their readiness to give in. The party then returned to Torawari, taking with them twelve prisoners, six of whom were Ali Khels, and related to Malik Hawas, and five were Zaimukhts, the remaining man being an Alisherzai.

Major Conolly's
report.

On the 22nd of November about one thousand Zaimukhts, Mamozaïs, and Alisherzais had assembled one mile and a half from the Chapri post, in the Kuram valley, but they were driven off by the little garrison of the 18th Bengal Cavalry (36 sabres), under Ressaldar Nadar Ali Khan. The enemy lost thirteen killed and many wounded, and we had three sowars wounded.

Preparations were, in the meanwhile, rapidly pushed on for the expedition into the Zaimukht country, and on the 28th of November Brigadier-General Tytler reached Balesh Khel, from which place the expedition was to start.

On the 30th a preliminary reconnaissance was made, seven miles south-east of the camp, to some hills overlooking Gawakhi. Brigadier-General Tytler accompanied this party, and although but a limited view of the Zaimukht valley could be obtained from this point, yet sufficient of the nature of the country was seen to show that it would be one difficult to operate in, should any determined resistance be offered.

Brigadier-General
Tytler's despatch.

On the 1st of December two reconnaissances were made into Zaimukht territory, in a more northerly direction; one party, consisting of 500 infantry and two mountain guns, under Colonel J. J. H. Gordon, C.B., 29th Punjab Native Infantry, accompanied by Major T. J. C. Plowden as Political Officer, ascended the Drabzai mountain, 7,300 feet high, seven miles from Balesh Khel, which commands the whole southern Alisherzai valley, with the passes leading to the northern Alisherzai and Massozai country.

A second force of 400 infantry, 100 cavalry, and two mountain guns, under Lieutenant-Colonel R. C. Low, 13th Bengal Lancers, accompanied by Captain A. Conolly as Political Officer, passed round the foot of the Drabzai mountain, through Tindoh, as far as the entrance to the Krumb defile. Both columns returned to camp that evening without having met with any opposition.

On the 3rd of December a reconnoitring party, under Lieutenant-Colonel R. G. Rogers, C.B., 20th Punjab Native Infantry, consisting of 400 infantry,

*Expedition
against the
Zaimukhts
in 1879.*

Abasikor pass, the latter distant about thirteen miles from camp, and 7,700 feet in height. Passing by the villages of Tindoh and Adu, the force halted at the village of Tatang. Here the inhabitants appeared anxious to show their friendly intentions, producing honey, bread, and eggs, and readily offering their services as guides. After passing this village, the road entered the Tatang defile, distant about a mile from the village, very narrow, about forty or fifty yards long, and with precipitous rocky sides overhanging the roadway. After this the pass widened considerably till within about a mile from the crest, when the ground rose abruptly to the summit. The road throughout was rough, and the latter part especially would have been found difficult for any but lightly-laden baggage animals. From here a good view was obtained of the Massozai valley; a few shots were fired at the troops, but these were not returned, and the force reached camp the same evening, without any casualties.

On the same day a small body of the 13th Bengal Lancers, under Major C. R. Pennington, reconnoitred the country in the direction of the old *kafila* road from Durani to Gawakhi. The road was found to be fairly good, and it was determined to follow this route. Advantage was taken of the reconnaissances, on the 1st and 3rd, by Mr. Scott, of the Survey Department, to add largely to the existing surveys.

On the 8th of December Brigadier-General Tytler moved into the Zaimukht country (see Map, page 408), with the force noted in the margin (see Appendix B). Major T. J. C. Plowden, Captain A. Conolly, and Mr. G. C. Walker, B.C.S., were attached to the column as Political Officers; and Mr. G. B. Scott, of the Survey Department, also accompanied the force.

Eleven days' supplies were taken with the troops, and provisions for ten days were collected at Doaba, from which place a convoy was to meet the troops at Tarai. The force reached Gawakhi on the 8th. The main body marched by Durani; the cavalry, with the exception of one troop, which preceded the column, was sent by the direct route, in order to diminish the length of the column as much as possible, and also to intercept any fugitives in case of the enemy showing fight. No opposition was made, although, on the reconnaissance of the 3rd, *sangars* commanding the road from the right and left were observed to be occupied. The village was found deserted, the inhabitants having fled on the approach of our troops, taking with them their property and cattle.

On the following day the march was continued to Manatu, nineteen miles from Balesh Khel; several portions of the road had to be improved by the sappers, the baggage animals experiencing much difficulty. This village was not deserted (although it was afterwards discovered that large quantities of their grain had been sent into the Wattizai valley), and the inhabitants were apparently anxious to come to a friendly understanding. The Manatuwal section, to which this village belonged, had accepted the terms offered to them before the force started.

On the 10th, three columns, as per margin, were detached to burn certain

Right Column, under Col. J. J. H. Gordon, C.B.
2 guns, No. 1 (Kohat) Mountain Battery.
600 Infantry.

Centre Column, under Colonel R. G. Rogers, C.B.
600 Infantry.

Left Column, under Lieut.-Colonel R. C. Low.
2 guns, 1-8th Royal Artillery.
200 Cavalry.
150 Infantry.

of Kandali and Katakumela, about five miles from camp. The enemy was soon dislodged by the fire of the screw guns, upon which the infantry advanced, and carried the villages, together with others in the neighbourhood. These villages were found stored with large quantities of grain, the whole of which, together with the houses, was destroyed by fire on the morning of the 11th. Over four hundred and fifty head of cattle were taken, together with thirty prisoners.

Major Plowden's
report.

No casualties occurred among the troops.

The Wattizai valley was found to be about six miles long, well cultivated and watered. The inhabitants were evidently taken by surprise, as few cattle or little property had been removed. The damage inflicted by the burning of the villages must consequently have been considerable, and was estimated by the Political Officer at Rs. 60,000.

Simultaneous with the advance of the troops into the Wattizai valley, the villages of Sereverge, Pastaoni and Imamdara, also belonging to this section, were attacked from Kuram by a body of Turi levies (horse and foot) under their chief, Muhammad Nur Khan, and were completely destroyed.

On the 11th the troops returned to camp, and the force, after destroying one tower at Manatu, pushed on to Zaitunak, a village about five miles and a half distant, and situated on the southern slopes of the main watershed, on the summit of which was the village of Manatu. At Zaitunak the representatives of the Mandani section came in and made their submission, and accepted the terms offered to them.

On the 12th the column marched five miles to Chinarak, distant about eight miles from the stronghold of Zawo, the objective point of the expedition. Chinarak was situated on a fairly open and level plateau, surrounded by terraced fields, through which ran numerous water channels, and was almost at the foot of the defile leading to Zawo. In the afternoon the Brigadier-General reconnoitred the fastness, which was deemed impregnable by the enemy. On Chinarak the three main routes into the Zaimukht country converge, viz., from Balesh Khel, from Torawari, and from Thal by the Sangroba defile, and it may therefore be looked upon as the most important strategical point of the whole valley. The inhabitants had not deserted the village, and appeared willing to be friendly, readily furnishing supplies of food and fodder. A sepoy of the 29th Punjab Native Infantry was, however, shot dead on picquet duty during the night. From the hills above Chinarak, as previously arranged, heliographic communication was opened with a station on the lower slopes of the Dandoghar hill, and thence to Thal.

1-8th Royal Artillery, 2 guns.
No. 1 (Kohat) Mountain Battery, 2 guns.
85th Regiment, 400 bayonets.
13th Bengal Lancers, 50 sabres.
Half 8th Company, Sappers and Miners.
13th Native Infantry ... 100 bayonets.
4th Punjab Infantry ... 350

cated in several offences on the Thal-Kuram road, and more especially in the murder of Surgeon Smyth at Chapri. The first two columns, under Colonels J. J. H. Gordon and R. G. Rogers, met with no opposition; the last, however, under Lieut.-Colonel R. C. Low, was checked at the villages

*Expedition
against the
Zaimukhts
in 1879.*

On the following morning (the 13th) the camp was left in charge of Colonel R. G. Rogers, C.B., with a small force, and the remainder of the troops, as

*Expedition
against the
Zaimukhts
in 1879.*

There are three approaches to this fastness—one by a difficult ravine about seven miles long and ten feet wide; one to the left, over a steep spur on the west of the ravine; one to the right, over high hills west of the valley of Surmai.

The plan decided on was that the commanding ground on the right should be held, while the main advance should be by the ravine.

The advanced guard, consisting of the troops as per margin, under Colonel

No. 1 (Kohat) Mountain Battery (2 guns).

Four companies, 85th Regiment.

Four „ 29th Punjab Native Infantry.

J. J. H. Gordon, C.B., reached the village of Ragha at 8 A.M., and occupied the plateau (A) (*see sketch, page*

424) close under the ridge on the eastern side of the entrance to the defile leading to Zawo. Meanwhile, the Brigadier-General with the main body (which had now become the left column, Colonel Gordon's detachment forming the right column) followed the same route as far as the plateau of Ragha, from whence the enemy could be seen occupying the ridge in front. He was soon, however, dislodged by the fire of the screw guns, while the right column carried the lower spurs without opposition; but Colonel Gordon's guns, being unable to ascend the ridge, were sent back to join the main body.

It was now 10.30 A.M., and the Brigadier-General, entering the defile to the west of the ridge, pushed on to the village of Bagh, his left being secured by a flanking party of three companies of the 4th Punjab Infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel H. P. Close, which occupied the high ground on the west of the ravine (G). The bed of the defile was excessively difficult, and on arrival at 2.30 P.M. at Bagh, distant about three miles and a half from Chinarak and four and a half from Zawo, the Brigadier-General decided to postpone any further advance till the following day, and to bivouac at Bagh for the night.

Colonel Gordon, meanwhile, with the right column, having cleared the ridge on the east of Ragha, had opened fire on the village of Bagh lying on the opposite side of the valley (which is here about 1,000 yards wide), while the enemy took up a very strong position on a rocky hill and ridge (B to D), from which all attempts by the 85th Regiment to dislodge him by a direct attack failed. A flanking movement (C) by two companies of the 29th Punjab Native Infantry, under Lieutenant R. W. Macleod, followed by the two remaining companies of the same regiment in support, under Major C. E. D. Branson, resulted by 2.30 P.M. in the capture of the point (B), from which the enemy's line could be enfiladed. The enemy advanced in great force from the low ground north of the ridge, and a hand to hand fight ensued on the crest, in which they were repulsed, and the four companies firmly established themselves in their new position. During this encounter, Jemadar Fazl Ahmad, 29th Punjab Native Infantry, who had distinguished himself by his gallantry, was wounded.

About this time the two guns of the Kohat Mountain Battery had worked round by Bagh, and were brought up from the westward to within 700 yards (K) of the enemy's main position, on which they opened fire soon after three o'clock, while it was attacked simultaneously by the 85th in two columns from the south and south-east, and by the 29th from the west, aided by a small detachment from the left column (*see accompanying sketch*). At 4 P.M. Colonel Gordon was in possession of the whole ridge, and there bivouacked for the night, the enemy retreating to a fresh position behind a rocky and well-


S K E T C H

TO ILLUSTRATE

ATTACK ON ZAWO HEIGHTS

ADVANCE GUARD OPERATIONS

13th December 1879.



Lithographed at the Survey of India Offices, Calcutta, November 1863.

won, the 29th holding the rear ridge and protecting the communications, while the two guns were posted on the crest of the Bagh-Surmai pass. *Expedition against the Zaimukhts in 1879.*

At 7.30 A.M. on the 14th, Colonel Gordon, leaving one company of the 85th at the bivouac, sent three companies of that regiment to drive the enemy out of the position he had taken up on the previous night, and to occupy the high ground to the north, flanking the approach to Zawo from Bagh, while the two guns, with three companies of the 29th Punjab Native Infantry, reached the same ridge at 10 A.M. by a detour round the head of the Surmai valley, the remaining company of that regiment holding the ridge (near *K*) and the communications between the 85th hill picquet (between *B* and *D*) and Bagh. A little later two companies of the 85th were sent down to burn the three villages of Surmai.

At 11 A.M. the enemy endeavoured to reinforce Zawo from the eastward (*E*), but dispersed on being fired on by the mountain guns. The right column now completely commanded the approaches to Zawo from the east, while two companies of the 85th, on the left of Colonel Gordon's position, were pushed forward to aid the left column while debouching from the Bagh defile. Colonel Gordon remained in the position he then occupied during the rest of the operations against Zawo.

In the meanwhile, leaving Bagh in charge of Major C. R. Pennington, 13th Bengal Lancers (the road in front being impracticable for cavalry), Brigadier-General Tytler, with the left column, continued his advance up the gorge, over increasing difficulties for about a mile, when large bodies of the enemy appeared on the hills on both sides of the gorge. The screw guns were brought into action, and, under their cover, the infantry were pushed on, the hills on the left being crowned by parties of the 4th Punjab Infantry and of the 20th Punjab Native Infantry (*I* and *II*), and at the same time the guns of No. 1 (Kohat) Mountain Battery (from Colonel Gordon's force) opened fire on the right (from *D*). The columns now pushed on to the foot of the pass leading to Zawo itself, the men moving in single file under a heavy fire and shower of rocks from the heights. Here Lieutenant T. J. O'D. Renny, the Adjutant of the 4th Punjab Infantry, fell mortally wounded, and a havildar of the same regiment was dangerously wounded. Upon gaining the summit of the pass, the villages of Zawo appeared below in a horse-shoe shaped valley.

The village was most pleasantly situated amongst terraced fields, built in eight or ten separate hamlets. The slopes of the surrounding hills were in parts thickly wooded with fir. The fields were large and well tilled, and the view as seen from above was both pleasant and surprising, considering the narrow and tortuous nature of the approach. Most of the property had been removed before the arrival of our troops.

After a short rest on the summit of the pass, covering parties of the 4th Punjab Infantry were detached to the heights on the right, and detachments were sent down to burn the villages and to destroy the forage, etc., in and near them. This having been done, the column commenced to retire, and arrived at Bagh at 5 P.M., entirely unmolested, several hamlets having been burnt on the way, and two towers in the village of Bagh having been blown up.

The troops bivouacked that night at Bagh, and on the 15th returned to Chinarak, being joined *en route* by the right column, which, after the Brigadier-General had returned through the Zawo pass on the 14th, had with-

*Expedition
against the
Zaimukhts
in 1879.*

The enemy had four standards with him, and his losses were estimated at over forty killed and one hundred wounded. The British casualties were one officer and one sepoy killed, one native officer and one non-commissioned officer wounded (*see* Appendix C).

The amount of ammunition expended on the 13th and 14th was seventy-one rounds of 7-pounder shrapnel and thirty rounds of common shell, and 5,861 rounds of small-bore ammunition.

The result of the operations against Zawo was the complete destruction of the settlements of the Khadu Khel section. The Zaimukhts were aided by a strong force of from 2,000 to 3,000 men from the Alisherzai and Mamozai Urakzais. So confident were they of the natural strength of Zawo, that they hardly commenced to desert the village until the ridge above Zawo had been taken by our troops. In the flight of the enemy from the village the greater part of their losses occurred, and it is probable that it was owing to the severe loss then sustained that no attempt was made to molest the troops when they retired.

In his despatch, describing the attack on Zawo, Brigadier-General Tytler said that the endurance and discipline displayed by the troops working over most difficult ground was admirable.

On the 16th of December the column marched from Chinarak to Nawakila (nine miles), passing the village of Urmegi about half way. The road was fairly level, but in other respects much resembled the previous marches, that is to say, through low hills intersected by dry, rocky *nullahs*.

On the following day the force arrived at Sparkhwait (seven miles), and found it half deserted and all the grain removed, but fodder and grass in abundance. On the same day all available carriage was sent to Torawari to bring up supplies, and returned to camp on the following day.

Sparkhwait was situated in a small open valley at the foot of the Mandatti pass, leading into the Alisherzai country.

On the 18th a detachment of four mountain guns, 50 cavalry, 30 sappers, and 700 infantry was moved out to burn the village of Yasta, about seven miles from camp. This village belonged to the Babakar Khel section, which had been mainly implicated in the raid on Gandiawar on the 2nd of March, in the attack on the 5th Punjab Infantry furlough men on the 27th of July, and in the murder of Lieutenant Kinloch on the 29th of September. No real opposition was met with, although the enemy showed themselves on the neighbouring heights, and fired a few shots, but without effect. The force returned to camp the same day, having destroyed the village, demolished two towers, and seized a large quantity of forage. On their return to camp, information was received that a large number of the enemy, consisting of Alisherzai and Mamozai Urakzais, with sixteen standards, were assembled in the higher range in front of the camp to dispute our passage of the Mandatti pass.

On the 19th, orders were received from Brigadier-General J. Watson, V.C., C.B., commanding the force in the Kuram valley, to at once conclude operations against the Zaimukhts, with a view to releasing the column for a demonstration in the direction of the Shutargardan, so as to assist Lieutenant-General Sir F. S. Roberts, who was reported to be hard pressed at Kabul. Accordingly, on that day, the 13th Native Infantry, accompanied by the head-quarters and one squadron of the 13th Bengal Lancers, marched for Thal *viâ* Torawari. The rest of the force, however, remained halted at

S K E T C H
to illustrate
ATTACK ON ZAWO
ZAIMUSHT COUNTRY
under
BRIGADIER-GENERAL TYTLER, C.B., V.C.,
13th & 14th December, 1879.

Surveyed by G. B. SCOTT, Survey of India.

Scale 2 Inches = $1\frac{1}{2}$ Mile.



R E F E R E N C E S.

- A to B. Advance 85th Foot on 13th December.
- B. Col. Gordon's Bivouac, 13th & 14th. Point contested by enemy.
- C. Flank attack on B, by 29th Native Infantry on 13th.
- D. No. 1, Kohat Mountain $\frac{1}{2}$ Battery, 14th December.
- E. Enemy's reinforcements shelled from D, 14th December.
- F. General Tytler's Bivouac, 13th & 14th December.
- G. Advance 4th Punjab Infantry on 13th.
- H. Flank advance 20th Native Infantry on 14th.
- I. Flank advance 4th Punjab Infantry on 14th.
- J. Defile entering Zawo.
- F to K. Route No. 1, Kohat Mountain Battery on 13th.
- K. Kohat Mountain $\frac{1}{2}$ Battery, shelling B on 13th.
- L. Crest of Surmai-Bagh Pass.

To have retired hastily without attacking the enemy or bringing him to terms would have nullified the good effect which our late operations had had upon the Zaimukhts and their neighbours. Advantage was therefore taken of this effect, and of the fact that no Kabul news had as yet reached the enemy, to consent to listen to the overtures that the Alisherzai and Mamozai Urakzais had that day made with a view to saving their country from attack and their villages from destruction. *Expedition against the Zaimukhts in 1879.*

Accordingly, the next day, the 20th, the force halted at Sparkhwait, and negotiations were entered into with these sections, which resulted in their agreeing to pay a fine of Rs. 4,000 each, and to furnish hostages—the Mamozai twenty, and the Alisherzai twenty-eight. The *jirgas* came into camp in the afternoon, and on these terms their submission was accepted.

On the same day the Hassan Khel section of the Zaimukhts, in whose limits the force was then encamped, also surrendered in full to the terms offered them.

Their villages of Sparkhwait and Mandzaki were very strongly fortified with towers and walls, and their *jirga* was informed that two of these towers would be blown up, so as to mark the passage of a British force through their valley, and that the remainder were spared solely with a view to enable them to effectually bar in future the passage of Alisherzai and other Urakzai raiders through the Mandatti pass (of which they held the mouth) to British territory. Failure to do so would, they were further informed, inevitably lead to the complete destruction of both villages.

A small force was also detailed from the camp this day to bring in a large amount of fodder from the neighbouring village of Tarai (Tapai section) for the use of our transport cattle.

On the 21st the column marched to Chinarak through Tarai, Chingai, and Urmegi; several houses in the first village were burnt, and a tower at Urmegi was destroyed. On the 21st the column marched to Chinarak, where the Tapai *jirga* came into camp, and accepted the terms imposed on them. The Daudzai *jirga* also this day paid in full their fine, and surrendered the arms demanded of them.

On the 22nd of December the column marched to the village of Sangroba, through the difficult and narrow defile of the same name. This village is situated at the head of the Sangroba valley, in which are also the villages of Thana, Admela, and Dolragha. These four villages, together with Manduri on the Thal-Kuram road, had been subsidised for the protection of that road; but for their breach of faith in not acting up to their engagements and responsibilities, a fine of Rs. 7,000 had been imposed upon them. To realise this fine, the advanced guard, under Colonel J. J. H. Gordon, C.B., on the 22nd moved down the valley, and surrounded the villages of Admela and Dolragha, and made them pay their share of the fine, whilst similar proceedings were taken by the main body at Sangroba and Thana. In Dolragha two men implicated in the murder of a *syce* of the 1st Bengal Cavalry, on the high road near Gandiawar on the 9th August 1879, were captured; and in Sangroba, one Gul Nur, who was implicated in Lieutenant Kinloch's murder (being the guide to the raiders, who came from the northern Zaimukht country), was seized.

Of this total sum of Rs. 7,000, Rs. 3,100 were at once recovered in cash, and hostages taken for the punctual payment of the balance in five days' time.

On the 23rd the expeditionary force marched to Thal. Just before the

*Expedition
against the
Zaimukhts
in 1879.*

presence of the whole force, and the other two men were shot at Dolragha (their native village), where the usual half-way halt was made. The *jirgas* of the Zaimukht and Urakzai sections witnessed these executions, and appeared to be impressed by the fact that punishment for killing a camp follower was inflicted at the same time as that for the murder of a British officer.

On the 23rd the whole of the force, having reached Thal, was broken up.

In forwarding his despatch on the attack on Zawo on the 13th and 14th of December, Brigadier-General Tytler brought to notice the names of the following officers:—

Colonel J. J. H. Gordon, C.B., 29th Punjab Native Infantry, who commanded the right attack, and who most ably and efficiently carried out all his orders and instructions.

Lieutenant-Colonel H. P. Close, commanding 4th Punjab Infantry, who led the advanced guard of the left column into the Zawo valley.

Lieutenant-Colonel J. Bartleman, commanding detachment 20th Punjab Native Infantry; Major J. Haughton, Royal Artillery; Major C. R. Pennington, commanding detachment 13th Bengal Lancers; Major G. B. Stevens, commanding detachment 13th Native Infantry; Captain D. A. Grant, commanding 85th Regiment; and Lieutenaut H. P. Leach, R.E., commanding Sappers and Miners.

The Brigadier-General said that his acknowledgments were due to the following officers of the Staff:—Major H. T. Jones, 81st Foot, Brigade Major; Lieutenant E. Burrell, 85th Regiment, Deputy-Assistant Quarter-Master General; Lieutenant J. E. Nixon, 18th Bengal Cavalry, Orderly Officer; Lieutenants C. Herbert and W. S. Burrell, Extra Orderly Officers.

He also mentioned the names of Lieutenant H. Mansfield and Major F. S. Terry, in charge of the Commissariat and Transport arrangements respectively; of Surgeon-Major W. C. Boyd, Principal Medical Officer; of Major J. Creagh, in charge of the signalling, and his assistant, Lieutenant E. J. Stuart-Wortley, 60th Rifles; of Lieutenant H. B. Urmston, 6th Punjab Infantry, and Lieutenant J. W. M. Newton, R.A.; and of Mr. G. B. Scott and Mr. Ogle, of the Survey of India. Brigadier-General Tytler also stated that he had received most valuable information and assistance from the Political Officers with the column, Major T. J. C. Plowden, Captain A. Conolly, and Mr. G. C. Walker, B.C.S.

In a supplementary despatch, describing the operations of the force throughout the whole expedition, Brigadier-General Tytler, in addition to the names already mentioned, brought to notice the services of Colonel R. G. Rogers, C.B., commanding 20th Punjab Native Infantry; of Lieutenant-Colonel R. C. Low, 13th Bengal Lancers; of Major T. R. Davidson and Major R. Wheeler, 18th Bengal Cavalry; and of Mr. Sparling, of the Postal Department. He also mentioned the services of Muhammad Amin Khan, and his son, Usman Khan, attached for duty with the political staff, and of Ressaldar Jaggat Singh, 18th Bengal Cavalry. This native officer, while with his regiment at Torawari, had volunteered to traverse from end to end the Zaimukht valley, at a considerable risk to his life. Disguising himself as a Khatak *baniah*, he travelled on foot with two attendants, performing the journey in five days. On his arrival at Balesh Khel, he reported himself to Brigadier-General Tytler, and gave him much useful information.

Punjab Govern-
ment despatch.

have been satisfactory. The four objects, as stated above, for which punitive measures against this tribe had been undertaken had been fulfilled. The Zaimukhts had been severely

*Expedition
against the
Zaimukhts
in 1879.*

punished, their country had been traversed from end to end, the villages of the notorious Wattizai section had been visited and destroyed, and several important and difficult places, such as Zawo and Yasta, which had been considered impregnable, were taken. The total claim against the Zaimukht tribe, as already stated, amounted to Rs. 25,000, but to this was added a further sum of Rs. 1,100, subsequently due from the subsidised villages of the Sangroba valley, making the total fine demanded Rs. 26,100. This amount the tribe agreed to pay, and Rs. 21,100 (*see Appendix D*) was realised from the different sections in addition to the sum of Rs. 5,000 demanded from the tribe as a whole. They had also agreed to the surrender of 500 matchlocks and 500 swords, and had given forty-eight hostages for the fulfilment of these terms. With regard to the second object, the Alisherzai and Mamozai Urakzais had made their submission, and had agreed to pay a fine of Rs. 4,000 each, and to give hostages for the payment of the amount.* With reference to the proposed road from Torawari to Balesh Khel, which was the third object of the expedition, it was found that the country over which the road would lie was extremely difficult, and that while the distance saved by following this line, as compared with the road by Thal, was no more than seven miles, it would be even more exposed to raiders than the latter route. Hostages had been, however, taken for its construction, if it should be considered necessary. The fourth and last object of the expedition had been fully obtained, and the Thal-Kuram road subsequent to these operations enjoyed an immunity from outrages which it had not previously known since the commencement of the operations in Afghanistan.

In acknowledging the receipt of the reports of the expedition, the high commendation of the Government of India was conveyed of the manner in which its objects had been carried out, and the Secretary of State for India, in his despatch, concurred in this approval, and considered that the objects of the expedition had been attained under circumstances of some difficulty, in a manner which reflected much credit on all concerned.

Since the above operations the Zaimukht tribe have given no trouble on our border.

* The Alisherzai fulfilled these terms, but the Mamozai, as stated in the last chapter, subsequently refused to do so, and were accordingly placed under blockade, and have, up to the present time, been excluded from British territory.

APPENDIX A.

Proclamation issued to the independent tribes—Afridi, Urakzai, and Waziri—on the Kohat border, previous to the expeditionary force entering the Zaimukht country in 1879.

At the commencement of hostilities with His Highness the Amir of Kabul, in November 1878, the causes which had led to such hostilities, and the policy which the Government of Her Imperial Majesty the Queen-Empress of India had decided to pursue towards the people of Afghanistan and the independent tribes, were publicly announced to all the tribes on the Kohat border, agreeably to instructions received from His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

In this announcement they were distinctly warned that Her Majesty's Government particularly desired to maintain friendly dealings with them, to avail itself of and reciprocate their good offices, and abstain from all interference with their internal affairs or their possessions; also that, so long as they continued friendly, and in good faith held aloof from any collusion with those opposed to the British Government, they need be under no sort of apprehension regarding the advance of British troops into Afghanistan.

The warning was also added that grave consequences would speedily follow any act or attitude, on the part of any tribe or tribes, that might denote opposition to the movements of such troops or imply a breach of neutrality.

The various tribes, Afridi, Urakzai, and Waziri, on the Kohat border, have, for the most part, wisely, hitherto appreciated the above warning, and maintained a strictly neutral attitude during the present war.

The only exception has been in the case of the Lashkarzai section of the Urakzais and the Zaimukhts, who have committed repeated and very serious outrages for some months past, both in the Kohat and Kuram valleys, and recently aggravated their misdeeds and exhausted the patience of the Government on the 29th of September 1879, by cruelly murdering, near Chapri, Lieutenant Kinloch, of the 5th Bengal Cavalry.

Certain sections of the Zaimukhts have, moreover, broken the engagements into which they had voluntarily entered with the British Government, and to which they had pledged themselves in writing. Although they were in the receipt of allowances for the protection of the tract of territory which they inhabit, they have nevertheless themselves treacherously raided, or permitted raids to be made, upon the very parts which they were subsidised to guard.

Under these circumstances His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General has determined to despatch an expeditionary force against the offending tribes, to punish them for their misconduct; but at the same time an assurance is hereby publicly conveyed to all the neighbouring tribes, Waziris, Urakzais, and Afridis, that so long as they adhere to their present attitude of neutrality, and abstain from affording aid to, or otherwise co-operating with, the offending sections, they need be under no apprehension for themselves or their possessions.

They are, moreover, in conclusion, specially exhorted in their own interests to pay no heed whatsoever to any report or rumour to a contrary effect which designing and malevolent persons may strive to disseminate and spread abroad.

APPENDIX B.

Strength of the force under BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. A. TYTLER, V.C., C.B., on entering the Zaimukht country on the 8th of December 1879.

Corps.	British Officers.	British N. C. Os. and men.	Native Officers, N. C. Os. and men.	Officers commanding corps.
1-8th Royal Artillery (4 guns) ...	4	48	143	Major J. Haughton, R.A.
No. 1 (Kohat) Mountain Battery } (2 guns) }	1	...	77	Lieutenant H. N. Jervois, R.A.
2-8th Regiment	1	40	...	Captain D. A. Grant, 85th Light Infantry.
85th Regiment	20	713	...	Lieutenant-Colonel R. C. Low, 13th Bengal Lancers.
1st Bengal Cavalry	2	..	55	Lieutenant H. P. Leach, R.E.
13th Bengal Lancers	5	...	150	Lieutenant-Colonel W. Playfair.
18th Bengal Cavalry	1	...	54	Lieutenant-Colonel H. P. Close.
8th Company, Sappers and Miners .	1	...	56	Colonel R. G. Rogers, C.B.
13th Native Infantry	6	...	317	Colonel J. J. H. Gordon, C.B.
4th Punjab Infantry	7	...	550	
20th Punjab Native Infantry ...	6	...	393	
29th Punjab Native Infantry ...	8	...	560	
Medical Officers	8	

Total combatant officers, 62; British non-commissioned officers and men, 801; native officers, non-commissioned officers, and men, 2,355; 6 guns.

APPENDIX C.

Return of Killed and Wounded in the force under BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. A. TYTLER, V.C., C.B., in the attack on Zawo on the 13th & 14th of December 1879.

Corps.	Killed.					Wounded.					Remarks.
	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	
29th Punjab Native Infantry	1	1	* Lieutenant and Adjutant T. J. O'D. Renny.
4th Punjab Infantry	*1	1	2	1	...	1	
Total	1	1	2	...	1	1	...	2	

ABSTRACT.

Killed	2
Wounded	2

APPENDIX D.

Table showing the amount of fine, arms, and hostages demanded from the different sections of the Zaimukht tribe.

Division.	Section.	Fines.							Arms.		Hostages.		Remarks.
		For general offences.	For mail robbery.	Gandiawar raid.	Raid on 5th Punjab Infantry furlough men.	Raid on 2nd November 1879.	Two murders in British territory traced to villages.	Total.	Matchlocks.	Swords.	Proposed.	Taken.	
Mammazai (or Western)	Manatuwal ...	Rs. 2,700	Rs. ...	Rs. ...	Rs. ...	Rs. ...	Rs. ...	Rs. 2,700	60	60	4	4	*Seven additional taken to further enforce protection of mouth of Mandatti pass leading to the Alisherzai country.
	Mandani ...	2,000	2,000	60	60	4	4	
	Wattizai ...	4,000	4,000	100	100	10	10	
	Daudzai ...	1,000	1,000	30	30	2	2	
	Total ...	9,700	9,700	250	250	20	20	
Khoidad Khel (or Eastern)	Hassan Khel ...	650	...	250	100	1,000	40	40	3	*10	
	Babakar Khel ...	1,000	...	500	200	1,700	100	100	10	10	
	Tapai ...	700	...	250	100	1,050	30	30	2	3	
	Khadu Khel ...	650	650	80	80	5	5	
	Total ...	3,000	...	1,000	400	4,400	250	250	20	28	
Subsidised villages of the Sangroba valley	Sangroba ...	1,200	300	200	...	1,700	
	Manduri ...	800	800	
	Thana ...	1,000	200	200	...	1,400	
	Admela ...	1,000	200	50	300	1,550	
	Dolragha ...	1,000	200	50	300	1,550	
	Total ...	5,000	900	500	600	7,000	

CHAPTER XIII.

KOHAT BORDER.

TURI AND BANGASH TRIBES.

THE *Turis* are a tribe inhabiting the Kuram valley, which adjoins British *Turis*.
Plowden. territory at the western end of the Miranzai valley. Little is known of their origin, but all authorities are agreed that they are not Afghans of pure descent, if Afghans at all. Muhammad Hyat Khan says they are Karlanrai Afghans; Lumsden says that they are of Moghal descent, whilst Edwardes and others—and this is probably the true account—say they are a Hindki race, some sixty families of whom, about four or five hundred years ago, because of drought, migrated from their native country in the Punjab (opposite Nilab on the Indus, in the Kohat district), to the Kuram valley, or, as it was then called, the Bangash valley, and became *hamsayas* of its inhabitants. When the Baizai Bangash, at present residing in the Kohat district, crossed the Kuram river into Miranzai, their settlements in upper Kuram fell to the Turis.

By the Bangash accounts it was about four centuries back when the Turis first took root in Kuram. The Bangash had rebelled against their Kabul sovereign, who sent a force and reduced them, and imposed on them a tax, to pay which they sold the village of Barakar, near Paiwar, to the Turis. After that the Turis got Paiwar by another bargain, by which they were bound to supply Asad Khan, a Bangash chief of Shalozan, with wood. Thus, little by little, the Turis availed themselves of Bangash dissensions to seize new villages until the Bangash say they have now only the villages of Shalozan and Zeran under the hills, and Azakhel in the plains, which are free. The rest of Kuram is in the hands of the Turis, who have reduced the Bangash to the condition of *hamsayas*.

There is war between the Turis and the Bangash of Shalozan and Zeran, but the latter are strong, from numbers and situation, and hold their own. They cannot, however, travel about the rest of Kuram without taking a *Turi badraga*, or safe-conduct.

As the Bangash were *Shias*, the Turis, from living amongst them, became so also.

The Turis are divided into two main branches—(I) Sargalli, (II) Chardai. These are again divided into five clans, *viz.*—

Turis.

*Sargalli	{ Hamza Khel.
			{ Mastu Khel.
Chardai	{ Duparzai.
			{ Ghundi Khel.
			{ Alizai.

The Chardai can turn out the most fighting men, but the Hamza Khel^f clan of the Sargalli is the most influential of the whole tribe.

The Hamza Khels have settlements in both upper and lower Kuram; they number over 700 families, and can turn out some 1,500 fighting men (including horsemen). The Mastu Khels number 500 families, and can furnish 1,000 fighting men. They, as also the Hamza Khels, are partly nomadic. The Duparzai clan is divided into two main sections, which are again subdivided into twelve smaller ones; they number 800 families, and can turn out 1,600 fighting men. The Ghundi Khels have 500 families and 1,000 fighting men, and the Alizais are estimated at about the same numbers. The Turis thus number 6,100 fighting men.

In addition to the Bangash there are several other races, who are *ham-sayas*, or are otherwise dependent on the Turis. The most important of these are the *Syads* of Kuram and the Mangals. The former are related to the *Shia Syads* of Tirah, mentioned in Chapter XI. In all important matters the Turis are guided by the counsellings and advice of these *Syads*, associated with the leading *malik* of each of the five sections into which the tribe is divided. The Mangals are related to the independent tribe of that name[†] inhabiting the southern part of the upper end of the Kuram valley.

The five clans into which the Turis are divided are sometimes spoken of collectively as Panjplara (literally five fathers, *i.e.*, divided into five clans). When the Turis first acquired possession of the upper part of the Kuram valley they parcelled it out into five equal shares—to each clan a share; a custom which they have strictly followed with every fresh acquisition in the valley, without any reference to the comparative numbers of the five branches; and possession continues in this manner at the present day, except in individual cases of sale and other voluntary transfer.

Those Turis who chose, took to building houses on their lands, but there are still a large number who remain *kuchis*, living in tents throughout the year, in the winter in the lower Kuram valley, and in the summer on the slopes of the Safed Koh.

Edwardes says of the Turis, that they are not in general large men, and their dark complexions mark their eastern origin; but they are strong, hardy, and courageous. The dress of the common people consists simply of

* The names Sargalli and Chardai are not in every day use. A Turi, if asked what division he belongs to, always gives the clan name, Hamza Khel, Mastu Khel, etc.

† This is a large tribe, and is said to possess 250 forts, 500 black tents, and to be able to muster 8,000 fighting men. They are divided into five sections, of which the Miral Khel is the most powerful, and the chief of this is also chief of the whole tribe. The Mangals are said to be very thievish in their propensities; they hold a tower on the Palwar *kotal*, whence they levy a tax on all travellers frequenting this route, robbing the unprotected, and skulking from the strong. This tribe caused a good deal of anxiety on the Kuram line during the late Afghan war, and from time to time annoyed the posts and attacked convoys. On the 13th of December 1878 the rear guard of a column, under Major-General F. S. Roberts, V.C., C.B., exploring the country towards Kuram from Ali Khel *via* the Sapri pass, was attacked and suffered some loss, including two British officers mortally wounded; but the Mangals were soon driven off, and lost many men. We have no deal-

a blanket shirt. As horsemen they are as superior to their neighbours as *Turis*. the Waziris are as footmen. A mounted Turi is a perfect model of a moss trooper; his horse is small, but active and enduring, and carries his own clothing under the saddle; while at the saddle bow, in leathern wallets, hang food for man and horse, spare shoes, nails and a hammer in case of accident, and an iron peg and rope to picket the horse anywhere in a moment. The object of horsemanship with them is to commit distant and daring raids, rather than for defence; and any distinguished highwayman earns the honourable title of a *khlak*, or hard man.

A profusion of arms covers every horseman—one or two short brass-bound carbines at his back, two or three pistols, knives of sizes and sorts all round his waist-belt, and a sword by his side. The introduction of revolvers would save them a good deal of weight.

Masson mentions a curious custom which is said to be prevalent among them. When they see a stranger, they ask him if he is straight or crooked, putting at the same time their forefinger to their forehead and holding it first in a perpendicular position, and then in a contorted one. If desirous of being civilly received, the stranger had better reply that he is straight, by which they understand that he is a *Shia*.

They have a peculiar custom of firing numerous shots with matchlocks over the head of a newly-born male child, as an introduction to the ordinary scenes of this life, and to accustom him to the sound, so that he may not shrink from the fire of his enemies in after-life.

The *Turis* have a great reputation for hospitality, and their courtesy towards their guests is said to extend to allowing the women of the household to wait upon them. The fidelity of a *Turi badraga* has passed into a proverb.

They are at feud with the Waziris, Zaimukhts, Mangals, and Jagis,* but are friendly with the Bangash. The Bangash join the *Turis* in all wars, but not often in raids. If they are summoned and fail to join, they are fined when the expedition is over.

The feud with the Jagis is very bitter, and each is ever on the watch to pounce on some unfortunate or unguarded member of the opposite tribe; consequently no member of either tribe dare transgress the limits of the other by crossing the intervening hill, except at the risk of his life.

The *Turis* are divided into two great factions—the party of the Kuram *Syads*, headed by Badshah Gul, and that of the Tirah *Syads*, the leader of which is Nur Muhammad. The former is known as the *Sust Gundi*, and the latter as the *Ting Gundi*.

The *Sust Gundi* (loose faction) are so called because, owing to the fact that they serve four masters (the four *Syads* of Kuram), they are divided in their councils, and wanting in energy of action, whereas the *Ting Gundi* (firm faction) are so called because its members are united, and under the control of the single reigning *Syad* of Tirah.

* This tribe occupies the country to the west of the *Turis*, and extends from the Paiwar pass to near that of Shutargardan. The tribe is estimated at from 700 to 800 families, and is divided into numerous small sections. They are described as a fine, hardy race, but are very poor, and depend entirely for support on the produce of their cattle and crops. They are *Shias* in religion. During the occupation of Afghanistan they were friendly. We have no dealings with them, but many of the tribe are to be found doing work as day labourers along the British frontier stations during the

Turis.
Bangash.

The Turis have a good trade with British territory, and would suffer much inconvenience by being subjected to a blockade.

Cavagnari.

The Turi nomads and the Turis of Paiwar are the principal traders.

Plowden.

Every family possesses one or more pack-mules, and they bring down fruits, rice, and *dal* to British territory, and either hire their mules out to Hindus of Kohat and Baunu to take merchandise to Paiwar or Kabul, or return home with Kohat salt.

Formerly the Kuram valley was under the Government of Kabul, and every five or six years a military expedition was made to collect the revenue, the soldiers living meanwhile at free quarters on the people; and it was not until about 1848 that the Turis were brought directly under the control of Kabul, when a Governor was appointed, who established himself in Kuram. The Turis never, however, liked the Barakzai rule. In recognition of their good service to us in the late Afghan war, their independence was granted to them by the British Government in 1880.

The *Bangash* tribe of Pathans inhabit the Miranzai valley, as well as the valley of Kohat, in British territory, and the valley of Kuram, in Afghanistan.

They are said to be descended from one Ismail, who had two sons, Gar and Samil, who, on account of the bitter enmity that existed between them, were nicknamed *Bankash*,* or root

Ibbetson.

destroyers. These sons have given their name to the two great political factions into which not only the Bangash themselves, but their Afridi, Urakzai, Khatak, Turi, Zaimukht, and other neighbours are divided. The Gari are divided into the Miranzai and Baizai clans. The latter hold the valley of Kohat proper; the Miranzais lie to the west of them, in the valley to which they have given their name; while the Samilzais, the third main division of the tribe, occupy the valley of that name to the north-west and west of Kohat, and hold Shalozan and Zeran, in upper Kuram, where they are independent; and they also live in the Kuram valley, under the protection of the Turis. The number of the Bangash in Kuram is, according to MacGregor, 5,620, and according to the census of 1881 their number in British territory was 17,565. The Bangash, as already stated, formerly owned the whole of Kuram, but, owing to the encroachments of the Turis, they moved eastward, and, with the aid of the Khataks, dispossessed the Urakzais of Kohat, drove them north, and took their territory in the Kohat district, which they now occupy.

The Bangash of the Kohat district are mostly *Sunis*. The Baizai and Miranzai Bangash above Hangu are exclusively *Suni*.

Tucker.

The villages of the Hangu *tehsil*, east of Hangu, are mixed *Suni* and *Shia*. Samilzai is nearly entirely *Shia*, as also are the Kuram Bangash. With regard to politics, the greater portion of the tribe are Gar. Baizai is nominally so, but there is no strong feeling on the subject. Upper Miranzai is strongly Gar, while Samilzai and Lower Miranzai are mixed, some villages being Gar and some Samil.

Agha Abbas, a Persian, mentions that he had often met Bangash men

performing the pilgrimage to Mashad. Their great saint (*Pir*) is Madat Shah (the ancestor of the Tirah *Syads* already mentioned), whom they appear to hold in extraordinary reverence. If they are seated, and his name is mentioned, they immediately rise and press the four fingers of their right hand, half closed, first to their lips, and then to their foreheads. *Bangash. Miranzai valley.*

Muhammad Hyat Khan says they are a brave and warlike race; but this opinion differs from that of most English officers, who have but little opinion of their courage. Their arms are those usually carried by Pathans, *viz.*, matchlocks and *churas*.

As far as physique is concerned, they are quite as good men as the Pathans around them, except perhaps the Afridis. The western Bangash are said to be known from the eastern by their long beards, the latter clipping them short. After the Kohat pass difficulties in 1853, already narrated (*see* Chapter X), the Bangash undertook the responsibility of that portion of the pass from the Kohat side to the *kotal*, and they still retain their share of the pass emoluments. For many years Bahadur Sher Khan, the chief of the Baizai Bangash, was in charge of the Kohat pass arrangements, but he died in 1880, and in 1882 the management of the pass was transferred to the hands of the Deputy Commissioner direct. The chief of the Miranzai section is the Khan of Hangu, Muzaffar Khan, who has charge of our dealings with the Urakzais on the Hangu border.

As the Miranzai section in the earlier years of British rule gave some trouble and necessitated punitive measures being undertaken against them, some description of their country will not be out of place. Miranzai comprises the valleys of the Hangu and Ishkali rivers. It is divided into upper and lower Miranzai, and extends from Thal to Raisan, and from the Zaimukht and Urakzai hills to those of the Khataks. Its length is about forty miles, and its breadth varies from three to seven miles.

The portion of Miranzai east of Hangu consists of numerous small, circumscribed, and well-cultivated valleys, in which the plane, poplar, willow, fig, and mulberry, together with the apple, apricot, and other orchard trees, flourish abundantly. To the west of Hangu, including the whole of Upper Miranzai, the country is a broad, open, breezy valley. The plain is bare of trees, but the hills are generally covered with scrub. The country is ravinous towards Thal, but the valley generally is not much cut up.

The dwarf palm abounds all over Miranzai, and is applied to a variety of useful purposes by the inhabitants. The wealth of the inhabitants consists principally in cattle, goats, and sheep; of these, the cows are of a lean and dwarf breed, and give but little milk. A good number of horses are bred in different parts of Miranzai. The soil, which is for the most part gravelly, with only a scanty deposit of alluvium, was not much cultivated before British rule, owing to the constant feuds among the inhabitants, as well as to the scarcity of water.

A considerable portion of the cultivation is dependent on the rains for irrigation. That which is regularly irrigated by artificial means is watered by streams issuing from springs, or from tanks of rain-water in the neighbourhood. Wheat, barley, and pulse are gathered in the spring harvest, and millet, pulse, and cotton, in the autumn harvest. The principal villages of Miranzai are Thal, Darsamand, Torawari, Nariab, Surizai, Kai, Muhammad Khoja, Togh, Hangu, and Ibrahimzai. Hangu and Darsamand are the largest, and could each turn out nearly 800 fighting men. Nariab and Kai are

*Expedition to
Miranzai in
1851.*

The best season for operations in Miranzai is from the end of March to the end of May, which gives two full months. The climate of Miranzai is colder than that of Kohat, its elevation being greater. The spring crops are not ripe till the middle of May, and as this is the most important one in Miranzai, the people at that season have most to lose.

Expedition to Miranzai, by a force under Captain J. Coke, in 1851.

During the time of the Sikh rule, Miranzai remained under the Governor of Kohat, but much interference was not attempted.

On the annexation of the Punjab, being an outlying territory, it was overlooked when the rest of Kohat was taken possession of. The Kabul Government accordingly made arrangements to occupy Miranzai, and in 1851 the Amir's son, Sirdar Muhammad Azim, who was then Governor of Kuram, sent some cavalry to occupy the villages of Biland Khel, Thal, and Torawari. The people of Miranzai thereupon appealed to the British Government, and made a petition that their country might be included in British territory, offering to pay Rs. 7,500 to the Government as revenue.

Their request was acceded to, and in August 1851 a proclamation was issued declaring Miranzai to be a portion of the Kohat district, and at the same time orders were sent to each village that, in case of attack, they were to aid each other with all their disposable men, as they were quite able to protect themselves from any Waziri or Urakzai inroads,—the village of Kai having, in 1848, successfully resisted for three months the attacks of 8,000 Waziris.

The proclamation also stated that anyone exercising authority, except by order of the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat, would be punished, and that all foreign troops must at once be withdrawn, or they would be ejected.

At the same time Captain Coke, commanding the 1st Punjab Infantry and also Deputy Commissioner of Kohat, addressed a letter to Sirdar Muhammad Azim, requesting him to withdraw his troopers from the Miranzai villages. The *Sirdar* replied with scant courtesy and scarcely veiled threats, advising Captain Coke that the occupation of Miranzai was not worth the while of his Government; the revenue was small, and the difficulties great; that complications with the hill people would arise, and that they would make a religious war on us, which he would not be able to stop. At the same time there is no doubt that Muhammad Azim did all in his power to bring about the very complications he warned Government against. On receipt of this communication, Captain Coke earnestly begged for permission to move a force into Upper Miranzai before the *Sirdar's* intrigues had brought down the Waziris and Zaimukhts on the Bangash villages. This was all the more necessary as the Waziris were reported at the end of September to have collected near Biland Khel for the purpose of attacking Darsamand; and although their advance had been checked by Khwaja Muhammad Khan, the Khatak chief, who had assembled his people for the purpose, it became advisable to move troops into the valley, not only for the dispersion of the Waziris, but to enable the Deputy Commissioner to make a circuit of this part of his district, to settle the revenue, and to arrange a system of defence amongst

Permission having been granted, Captain J. Coke, with the force as per margin, marched from Kohat to Hangu (*see* Map, page 408) on the 14th of October 1851. The 1st Punjab Cavalry was commanded by Lieutenant H. Daly; the Artillery was under Lieutenant J. R. Sladen, and Captain Coke himself commanded the 1st Punjab Infantry.

No. 1 Punjab Light Field
Battery (3 guns).
1st Punjab Cavalry.
Half company, Sappers and
Miners.
1st Punjab Infantry.

*Expedition to
Miranzai in
1851.*

From Hangu the force proceeded to Kai, Nariab, Torawari, and Darsamand, having been joined by a body of levies (145 horse and 510 foot) under Khwaja Muhammad Khan. Up to the last place the troops had been well received, and not a shot had been fired. From there the column proceeded to Thal. On arriving at this place there was some firing at the picquets; and at Biland Khel, where the column was halted from the 26th to the 30th, both inclusive, this increased considerably, and was continued nightly. On the night of the 30th intelligence was brought in of the Waziris being assembled in force, and during that night there was a sharp attack on the picquets, especially on that held by Khwaja Muhammad Khan's Khataks; but as the picquets were placed at a great distance from camp, and were protected by a breastwork, the attacks were repulsed without loss. During the day no attempts were made on the camp, but one of Khwaja Muhammad Khan's horsemen on guard with the grass-cutters was killed, and two camp followers cut up. In these night attacks there was no doubt the villagers of Biland Khel took part with the enemy, but Captain Coke did not attach much importance to this, as he considered the village to be entirely in the hands of the Waziris, who from time to time, during a space of fifty years, by purchase or mortgage, had possessed themselves of a greater portion of their lands.

On the return of the column to Thal on the 31st, attacks were again made on the picquets at night, but with more spirit than before, and it was found necessary to aid one of the picquets on a hill near camp with some shells from the battery.

There was no doubt that the villagers here also were implicated in these attacks, and Captain Coke therefore told the headmen, and especially Hazrat Nur, a *Syad* of much influence in this village, that if these attacks were repeated, he would burn the village; after which intimation the attacks ceased.

On the 2nd of November the force returned to Darsamand. Captain Coke then assembled all the headmen of Miranzai, and explained to them the Government intentions, and called on the three most powerful villages to give two hostages each for their good behaviour. He had also a paper drawn up and signed by the whole of the villages, with the exception of Thal and Biland Khel, which he did not think it desirable to include in this arrangement, because, till something definite was settled about Biland Khel, it would have been useless to call on them to attempt to throw off the Waziri yoke, and Thal was able, with the aid of the Turis, to defend itself against any attack of the Waziris.

Two hostages were, therefore, taken from Nariab, Darsamand, and Torawari.

The force returned to Kohat on the 12th of November, after much hard work and unpleasant night duty.

The casualties during these operations were one sepoy killed, and one sepoy severely wounded, both belonging to the 1st Punjab Infantry. In addition to

Expedition to Miranzai, by a force under Brigadier N. B. Chamberlain, in 1855.

*Expedition to
Miranzai in
1855.*

But although the people of Miranzai had petitioned to be included in the Kohat district, they were, in their hearts, hostile to the British Government, as, indeed, they were to any Government whatever. Thus, after the return of the force under Captain Coke in 1851, Miranzai was as unsettled as ever, no revenue was paid, and the frontier continued in a most unsatisfactory state.

Darsamand was constantly being threatened by Waziris, and the Turis committed several serious raids against the Khatak villages on the Miranzai border. This state of affairs induced Captain Coke to recommend that he should be permitted, in the cold weather of 1852, to proceed with a force to Miranzai, and erect a post in some suitable position, so as to check these raids; but the Commissioner, for various reasons, was averse to the measure, and matters were allowed to continue in this state.

During March 1855 it was arranged that the village of Biland Khel should be made over to the Kabul Government, and the Kuram river should in future be the British boundary. Major J. Coke was much opposed to this transfer, and protested against it, on the ground that it would not fall to the Kuram authorities but to the Kabul Khel Waziris, who would thus gain for themselves a secure basis for carrying on further depredations amongst the Miranzai and Khatak villages.

Meanwhile, it was reported that no revenue had been paid by certain villages for three years; that two of the largest of the Hangu villages on the Miranzai border had betaken themselves to arms for the settlement of a dispute arising out of some ordinary judicial proceedings of the criminal court at Kohat; and that the *maliks*, when summoned to answer for the affray, had refused to obey the order of the Deputy Commissioner, going off instead to Miranzai and Kuram. The Deputy Commissioner said that the valley was fast becoming the asylum of all the robbers and murderers of the Kohat and adjoining districts, who looked upon it as a place the Government were either afraid or unable to control; that the Waziri, Turi, Zaimukht, and Urakzai tribes, joined with the villages of Miranzai, had made that valley a rendezvous, from which they could assemble to plunder all the well-disposed villages on the Hangu and Khatak frontier; and that, owing to the distance of Kohat from the Turis and others, pursuit was unavailing.

At the same time, the moment the people of Miranzai were threatened from without, they were loud in their call for aid, urging absurd reasons for their past misconduct.

It was, therefore, decided by the Government of India that an expedition should be sent to enforce the submission of the Miranzai villages.

To subjugate such a people two courses were open—either to march in and punish them by force of arms, without asking any questions, or first to offer them the alternative of giving full and reasonable satisfaction. The Commissioner, Major H. B. Edwardes, C.B., did not think the former would be just, because these people had been less accustomed to the requisitions of a regular Government than almost any other tribe on the frontier. It had never been their habit to pay tribute annually. They used to be left entirely alone for several years, and then a Barakzai

by violence and plunder. It therefore seemed unreasonable to expect them all at once to pay regularly and behave well; and, as a matter of policy, it was unwise to weaken our own subjects. Already had the rich plain of Upper Miranzai been encroached on by hungry mountain tribes; and to level a village, or decimate its fighting men, would be only to let in a new stream of enemies from the hills. We desired to interfere in Miranzai as little as possible, and to keep it as a barrier on our frontier. Our policy, therefore, was not to weaken it, but to keep it strong. For these reasons it was determined to give the people every opportunity of satisfying the demands of Government without using force.

*Expedition to
Miranzai in
1855.*

The force, as per margin (details of which are given in Appendix A), under the command of Brigadier N. B. Chamberlain, and accompanied by Major H. B. Edwardes, C.B., the Commissioner, marched from Kohat on the 4th, and arrived at Togh on the 7th of April 1855 (*see* Map, page 408). The headmen of all the villages were formally summoned to come in to Togh, which is a few miles only from the border of Upper Miranzai. In the course of two days they all presented themselves, except the *maliks* of Torawari, which was supposed to indicate that the Zaimukht interlopers, who

No. 1 Punjab Light Field
Battery (3 guns).
No. 3 Punjab Light Field
Battery (6 guns).
4th Punjab Cavalry.
Detachment, Sappers and
Miners.
Wing, 66th Gurkhas.
1st Punjab Infantry.
3rd Punjab Infantry.
Sind Rifle Corps.*

had settled in that village, were the least inclined to be dictated to. On the 11th the troops moved to Kai, where a halt of five days was made. Immediately on arrival at Kai the Brigadier reconnoitred the village.

The men turned out and stood on their houses during the reconnaissance, and conversed in a very independent tone when spoken to; but no collision took place. In the evening the missing *maliks* of Torawari also came in, and in full *darbar* all the chiefs of the valley were informed of the respective quotas of revenue which every village would have to pay, that the arrears of the last three years would be rigidly exacted, and that fines would also be levied for every criminal offence that stood against them.

The revenue of Upper Miranzai was fixed at Rs. 6,300, of which Rs. 4,860 was to be expended in maintaining a body of horse, consisting of one jemadar and fifteen sowars, and in good service money to the leading men of the valley. These terms were submitted to with the air of men who would have resisted if they could, and they then dispersed to their several villages to make arrangements.

It appeared that the Torawari men had sent emissaries to the camp at Togh to see the strength of the force, and that the report being "just a little too much," the *maliks* had come in. One of the *maliks* of Kai, in a friendly chat with Brigadier Chamberlain, went further, and said to him—"We could manage this force, but we don't know what is behind."

The strictest discipline was enforced in camp. No plundering of any kind was allowed. Everything required was fairly bought and paid for, and the people, seeing themselves protected, instead of robbed (as they had always been by the Barakzais), soon took confidence, and old men, women, and children might be seen bringing wood into the camp to sell, and fearlessly

* This regiment was transferred from the Bombay to the Bengal Presidency in 1849, and was originally known as the Sind Camel Corps, but its designation was changed at the end of 1853 to the Sind Rifle Corps. The strength of the corps was the same as the regiments of Punjab Infantry. Subsequent to this, on the 4th of August 1856, its designation was again changed, and it then

*Expedition to
Miranzai in
1855.*

bargaining with the soldiers. On two successive nights a few shots were fired at the advanced cavalry picquets; the villagers were suspected, and on being warned by the Deputy Commissioner that the village would be fired if the practice was continued, it at once ceased.

Arriving at Nariab on the 17th, the troops were halted there till the 27th. On the night of the arrival at Nariab, a camel man, who had left camp contrary to the strictest orders, was killed within 300 yards of the village. It was at first proposed to surround the village and demand the surrender of the murderer; but as it was satisfactorily shown that it had been the work of a Zaimukht, to which tribe the destruction of Nariab would have been the greatest triumph, it was spared.

The picquets were here fired on nightly, but with a worse result to the enemy than to the troops, as the latter were protected by breastworks, while of the former, the son of a Zaimukht *malik* was mortally wounded, besides other losses.

On the 28th the troops marched to Darsamand *via* Torawari, that the defences of that place might be examined. Lieutenant P. S. Lumsden, the Deputy-Assistant Quarter-Master General, who had gone on to mark out the ground near Darsamand, was fired on from the hills near the village by Zaimukhts. The camp was pitched as far from the hills and broken ground as possible; and, being well protected by picquets in *sangars*, it was not annoyed here at night. On the evening of the 29th April some 4,000 *ghazis*, belonging chiefly to the Zaimukht, Urakzai, and Afridi tribes, assembled on the hills in rear of Darsamand and to the front of the camp, and there passed the night over their watch-fires, having previously given out that it was their intention to make a night attack on the camp.

At 10 A.M. on the 30th they descended from the main range, and, to the number of about 1,500, occupied a small ridge of hills which Brigadier Chamberlain's despatch. rose immediately behind Darsamand, and which was only separated from the high range in its rear by a very narrow glen; there they remained for some time, firing their guns, beating drums, and shouting their hill war cry.

Finding that the troops remained inactive, they became bolder, and some few of them began to descend into the more open ground, and advance towards the cavalry picquet. This being seen, Captain G. O. Jacob was instructed to have a party of cavalry in readiness to cut them off whenever they should advance sufficiently far from the hill; and between one and two o'clock the opportunity was afforded.

A portion of the enemy were seen approaching the front cavalry picquet through the jungle, and Captain C. R. Fraser, 4th Punjab Cavalry, advanced with 35 sabres to cut them off. As the enemy opened fire on the picquet, Captain Fraser, whose detachment was reinforced by the 15 sabres of which the picquet consisted, charged them in a very gallant manner, under a heavy fire from the hills. He was immediately joined by a few Pathan horse, belonging to the Khatak chief, led by Major J. Coke, these being shortly followed by 30 sabres, 4th Punjab Cavalry, under Captain G. O. Jacob.

The enemy attempted to regain the hill, whilst their brethren, who were in large numbers on the hillside, opened fire to protect their retreat.

In the meanwhile, Lieutenant E. J. Travers, of the 1st Punjab Infantry, who was on picquet duty with a company of his regiment, advanced to the support of the cavalry, and immediately

Major Coke's
report.

of 50 dismounted men of the 4th Punjab Cavalry, from a breastwork, and 250 of the 1st Punjab Infantry from the camp, were advancing to the assistance of the other parties, and, on their being united, they soon drove the enemy from every point, with the loss of twelve or fifteen bodies left on the ground, in addition to any killed or wounded who were carried away. Our loss was small, consisting of fourteen wounded (*see* Appendix B), besides which there were five horses killed and eleven wounded.

*Expedition to
Miranzai in
1855.*

The enemy were so completely routed and panic-stricken that, on reaching the foot of the high range of mountains, they appeared only to think of ascending to its summit, and at dark not a flag, or man, or watch-fire was visible.

The Brigadier considered that the conduct of those engaged was most soldierly, and merited the approbation of Government.

Up to this time it had been the boast of these hill tribes that, were it not for our guns, we could never oppose them; and therefore not the least advantage of this engagement was their having been made to experience the falsity of this assertion. Other hill tribes were assembling and sending their quotas, but the ignominious defeat of the first body at once put a stop to any further exhibitions of fanaticism.

There was a grave feature in this affair. The *ghazi* movement was purely a Muhammadan one against the Christians and all those who, by bearing arms in their service, placed themselves in the category of "infidels". A very large proportion of the troops in camp happened to be Pathans, all of whose homes were on the trans-Indus border; many among the very tribes who had then assembled. This was especially the case in the 1st Punjab Infantry and 3rd Punjab Infantry. The first corps had already distinguished itself on many occasions, the latter had not then had the good fortune to find an opportunity; both were picked specimens as regarded material and spirit; yet it was decidedly felt that the purely religious appeal made by the *ghazis* on the hill was so powerful as to be a great pain to the men, and a great anxiety to their officers. It was mentioned by a native officer of the 1st Punjab Infantry—himself a Pathan—that the father of one of the best non-commissioned officers was on the hill, and that there were many similar cases. Emissaries could not possibly be excluded, but the good spirit in the corps was shown by the fact being at once reported to Major Coke. In the same way, an Afghan native officer of the 3rd Punjab Infantry earnestly urged his commanding officer "to get blood spilt between the troops and the *ghazis* before nightfall if possible", so as to stop the sympathy between them.

However, then, as subsequently, the conduct of these men, when acting even against their own brethren, was all that could possibly be desired.

Whilst touching on this subject, the Commissioner, Major Edwardes, alluded in terms (which the events of 1857 made truly prophetic) to the danger of not having mixed races in the native army.

On the 6th of May the troops were moved to Thal, where a halt was made till the 17th, to enable a settlement to be made with the Turis and the Waziris.

The settlement with these tribes having been satisfactorily accomplished, on the 17th the force commenced its return to Kohat, where it arrived on the 21st, and was then broken up.

Many indications proved that the Zaimukhts viewed with great dislike the settlement with these tribes, and at the time unable to prevent

*Expedition to
Miranzai in
1855.*

or resist it; so *en route* the heads of the tribe were called in, and they were warned of the penalties of future misconduct, and told what was known against them.

Brigadier Chamberlain said that the conduct of the troops had been exceptionally good. There had been no plundering or misconduct of any kind, nor a single complaint against any soldier of the force.

Although the weather was getting hot, for the last fortnight of the time the force was out, the health of the troops was good, and supplies were abundant.

The expression of the Governor-General's high satisfaction at the dispersion, on the 30th of April, at Darsamand, of the large body of *ghazis*, as well as the results generally of the expedition, was subsequently conveyed to Brigadier Chamberlain and the officers concerned.

The Indian medal, with a clasp for the "North-West Frontier", was granted in 1869 to all survivors of the troops engaged in the above operations in the Miranzai valley under Brigadier N. B. Chamberlain.

G.G.O. No. 812 of
1869.

**Expedition to Miranzai and Kuram, by a force under Brigadier
N. B. Chamberlain, in 1856.**

The expedition into the Miranzai valley in 1855 had been attended by the best effects; but, subsequently, Darsamand, one of the most distant and largest of the villages, withheld the land-revenue due from it. Numerous raids were also committed on our Khatak, Bangash, and Waziri subjects, resident in the valley, by the Turis, whom the Kabul Government were unable to control, and these incursions were abetted by the Zaimukht tribe.

The Turis, on the first annexation of the Kohat district, had given much trouble. They had repeatedly leagued with other tribes to harass the Miranzai valley, harbouring fugitives, encouraging all to resist, and frequently attacking Bangash and Khatak villages in the Kohat district.

In August 1853, Captain J. Coke moved from Bahadur Khel with 100 bayonets, 1st Punjab Infantry, and 45 sabres, 1st Punjab Cavalry, to seize a large armed Turi caravan. Pushing on with the cavalry, after a march of forty miles, the convoy was sighted, and, after some resistance, in which one of them was killed and one wounded, thirty-seven Turis with all their property were captured, their goods being taken as security for the repayment of the value of the plundered property, and the men as hostages for their tribe. This measure was soon followed by an embassy from the tribe, whose petition, after compliments, ran thus—

"Our caravan, cattle, and many of our tribe have been seized. This is the just punishment of evil-doers. Before the British Government came to this country, we had evil intent against Khatak and Bangash, and carried off their cattle. Since the arrival of the British Government, we have, through evil counsels, done the same. But since we find there is a British officer who protects his subjects, both Bangash and Khatak, and has retaliated on us, we beg that our caravan may be released, and we bind ourselves to abstain in future from raids on British territory, and the Turis will trade with the Khatak and Bangash."

mencement of 1854. The value of plundered property was made good, the prisoners were released, and five Turis were made over to the British as hostages; but within one month the tribe again gave way to "evil counsels", and in the following March (1854) a serious attack was made by the Turis with 2,000 men (horse and foot) on a Miranzai village; lives were lost on both sides, and the Turi hostages were then incarcerated in the Lahore jail.

*Expedition to
Miranzai and
Kuram in
1856.*

This instance of misconduct was followed by other raids. In the autumn of 1854, when the expedition against the refractory British villages of Miranzai was proposed, it was under consideration whether the opportunity should not be taken of punishing the Turis; but as they were subjects of Kabul, and negotiations with the Amir were shortly expected, the Government decided on first arranging with His Highness on the subject.

During the negotiations for the treaty at Peshawar in March 1854, it was explained to the Afghan representative that either the Kabul Government must restrain the Turis from incursions into British territory, or else the British Government itself would undertake to chastise them; but it was resolved that another trial should be given to the tribe before further measures were taken, as the Kabul Government promised to control them. During the expedition to Miranzai in 1855, the Turis, having seen that display of force, desired to make peace with us, and, as already stated, a settlement was effected with them at Thal, and their men were then released from confinement.

These measures, however, had not the desired effect, and the Turis continued their raids. In June 1856 no less than thirteen were recorded against them, in which one Khatak, four Waziris, and two Bangash were killed, four Khataks and two Bangash wounded, and nearly 500 head of cattle carried off. These were followed by another raid, marked by the unusual atrocity of the murder of a young girl.

With regard to the Zaimukhts, their object had long been to encroach on the valley of Miranzai, in which they had already acquired the village of Torawari; and it was therefore determined to send a force to punish the Turis and to compel an understanding with the Zaimukhts, and to make an example of the refractory village of Darsamand. But, previous to the advance of the force, the recusant village paid up its revenue, together with the fine of Rs. 1,000 imposed.

As regards the time of year for the operations, the Deputy Commissioner, Captain B. Henderson, remarked that it would then (in the autumn) be fine and settled weather; that forage would be abundant, water plentiful, and the Kuram river at its lowest; and that, moreover, it was very advisable that the Miranzai valley should be visited at as early a date as possible.

Accordingly, the force, as per margin, under the command of Brigadier

Detachment, Peshawar Mountain Train Battery.

Detachment, No. 1 Punjab Light Field Battery.

No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery.

Detachment, 1st Punjab Cavalry.

4th Punjab Cavalry.

2nd Company, Sappers and Miners.

66th Gurkha Regiment.

1st Punjab Infantry.

2nd Punjab Infantry.

3rd Punjab Infantry.

5th Punjab Infantry.

6th Punjab Infantry.

Khatak levies.

N. B. Chamberlain, consisting of 4,896 men of all ranks, with fourteen guns (see Appendix C), was ordered to assemble at Kohat. The troops were to be provided with warm clothing, and the camp followers to be warned of the certainty of great cold. The Deputy Commissioner of Kohat was to be informed of the daily requirements of each regiment or corps, and he was directed to collect supplies for the force,

*Expedition to
Miranzai and
Kuram in
1856.*

the line of route; and if firewood was scarce in any parts of the country, to have supplies of it stacked at the nearest possible places.

On the 21st of October 1856 the force marched from Kohat towards Hangu, where it arrived on the following day. On the 23rd the march was continued to Togh, and on the 24th the column arrived at Kai, the border village of Upper and Lower Miranzai (*see* Map, page 408).

Brigadier Chamberlain's despatch.

A great difference was perceptible in the feeling of the people. In 1855 the walls and houses had been covered with armed men; now all was quiet; no notice was taken of the arrival of the troops, and the men and women of the villages pursued their usual avocations. They had already paid their revenue, and, having defied no orders, seemed perfectly to understand that they were safe, though 5,000 soldiers were encamped under their walls. Nothing had tended more to create this confidence than the strict discipline maintained by Brigadier Chamberlain.

At Kai the Deputy Commissioner, Captain B. Henderson, had received intelligence that a large number of Miranzai criminals had taken refuge in Torawari, which was inhabited by Zaimukht settlers from the hills north-west of Miranzai. In the expedition of 1855 greater consideration had been shown to Torawari than to any of the other villages, through the good offices of Khwaja Muhammad Khan, the chief of the Khataks, who, to gain the friendship of the Zaimukht clan, went so far as to pay himself most of the Torawari revenue. In consequence of this prompt payment, the force had then no occasion to encamp at Torawari, even for a single day. But, as usual, mild treatment was attributed to weakness, and not only the Zaimukhts, but their Bangash neighbours, came to regard Torawari as an impregnable fortress; hence, every run-away scoundrel in the valley, as our force again approached, sought and received asylum in this redoubtable Zaimukht village.

It was therefore decided to surprise the village. Orders were issued for the usual march to Nariab on the following morning.

The Nariab road was reconnoitred by the engineer officers, and improved by the sappers, and the ground at Nariab was selected for the camp. The criminals from this place no doubt congratulated themselves that they were snug in Torawari.

An hour before the appointed time the morning bugle sounded. From Kai to Torawari is about nine miles, and for half the distance the road is the same as that to Nariab. Up to this point the whole force proceeded leisurely, and none but commanding officers knew what was going to happen. At length, however, the troops broke into two columns, one keeping the road to Nariab, and the other striking off to Torawari. The friends of the Zaimukhts then became uneasy, but no man was allowed to go ahead. When within four miles of the place, and as day was fast breaking, the cavalry pushed on in two bodies, one led by Captain Henderson, the Deputy Commissioner, the other under the Brigadier himself, accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel H. B. Edwardes, the Commissioner; the broken nature of the ground prevented any rapid movements, but, by keeping a tolerably wide circle, the cavalry succeeded in surrounding the place before the inhabitants had any warning, and the Zaimukhts and their guests awoke to find themselves caught in a net.

So entirely helpless were these boasters now, that not a sign of resistance was made. The headmen were summoned from the village to hear the terms dictated to them, but, after two hours' negotiations, nothing could

either surrender the criminals known to be harboured by them, pay a fine for previous misconduct, and give security for future good behaviour, or stand the consequences. *Expedition to Miranzai and Kuram in 1856.*

In the meanwhile the Peshawar Mountain Train Battery and the 6th Punjab Infantry came up, shortly followed by the mountain guns of No. 1 Punjab Light Field Battery, and the 1st and 2nd Punjab Infantry; these were all placed in position, ready to act if required.

Half an hour had been allowed to the *maliks* for the surrender of the criminals, and this time expired without any sign of compliance on their part being shown. A further quarter of an hour was granted, to enable them to send out their women and children; and during this period every endeavour was made to induce them to place their families in security, but with no effect; and the time having expired, the guns were opened with blank cartridge, in the hope of intimidating the inhabitants, but without success.

At length shells were thrown into the village, and, after about thirty rounds, the women were seen rushing out of the village and running towards our position, waving clothes and holding up the *Koran*.

The fire of the guns was instantly stopped, and the women were sent back to tell the men that they must now come out and lay down their arms, or the batteries would re-open. Slowly and angrily they came out and threw their swords, daggers, pistols, and muskets down upon the plain, but only by twos and threes; and still there was no sign of giving up the criminals. The 1st and 2nd Punjab Infantry were therefore ordered into the village to search for arms and refugees. One sepoy was wounded in a house, and the Zaimukht assailant was killed upon the spot. Still the criminals were concealed. At length the stacks of winter fodder for the cattle were fired, and the wind carried the flames from house to house, setting off loaded muskets that had been hidden in the straw. Then, one by one, the criminals were brought out, each with protestations that he was the last. But Captain Henderson had the list of them in his hand, and patiently demanded the remainder.

The troops were then recalled from the village, and the inhabitants allowed to extinguish the flames, which had destroyed about one-third of their houses.

The arms* that had been surrendered, and the thirteen criminals who had been captured, were all sent off to our camp at Nariab; and one hundred hostages, with two hundred or three hundred head of cattle, were also carried away as security till a fine of Rs. 2,000 should be paid for the long-standing scores of Torawari.

Two or three lives only had been lost on the side of the villagers, and on our side two sepoys had been wounded in the village.

The troops reached camp about two o'clock, no one attempting to molest them during their retirement.

The force halted at Nariab from the 25th of October to the 4th of November, when it marched to Darsamand, and on the 5th to Thal.

As Ghulam Jan, the Deputy Governor of Kuram, had, notwithstanding orders received from Kabul, failed in securing the attendance of the headmen of the Turis, orders were issued for the force to advance from Thal.

On the 6th and 7th the troops were employed in entrenching a position at the head of the Kuram, and about 600 men were left to hold this

*Expedition to
Miranzai and
Kuram in
1856.*

and to protect the sick and all superfluous baggage and non-combatants which were not absolutely necessary to accompany the force on its onward march. There had been a good deal of sickness in the force since it left Kohat, due principally to the excessive alternations of heat and cold, there being a difference of nearly 40° Fahr. between the day and night.

On the 8th of November the force crossed the Kuram, and marched up its banks for ten miles, where it encamped for the night ; neither a village nor a man was seen throughout the march, and for the whole distance the hills bounded the river on both sides.

The following day the march was continued to Hazar Pir Ziarat, fifteen miles (*see* Map, page 408), a rather difficult and tedious one for the guns and baggage, and it was nearly sunset before the rear guard reached camp. The road was either on the banks or along the bed of the river. The Kuram valley and the Turi lands were entered immediately on leaving the encamping ground, when the valley increased in breadth, villages were numerous, and the whole country bore signs of careful cultivation. During the march a low *kotal* was crossed by the cavalry and infantry, but was impracticable for artillery, though easily capable of improvement, and the artillery had to follow the bed of the stream. The narrowness of the path, which for a time ran along the face of a hill, delayed the baggage greatly. The artillery generally proceeded along the bed of the Kuram ; the river was low at this season, and its bed found easier for guns than along its banks. No resistance had been offered to the advance of the force, and this day the column was met by a representative of the Kabul authorities, and also by the principal Turi and Bangash *maliks*.

As it was desirable that the settlement with the Turis should take place near the fort (occupied by the Kabul *Sirdar* when in the valley, and at that time by his deputy), and as the opportunity for seeing and surveying the country was a favourable one, it was decided that the advance should be continued.

From Hazar Pir to the *Sirdar's* fort there are two roads, one being up the bed of the river and past numerous villages, the other by the Darwaza pass ; the latter was said to be the more practicable, and was adopted. The troops, therefore, continued their march on the 10th, passing through narrow valleys covered with high grass, but destitute of any signs of man ; although later in the year these lands are occupied by migratory tribes, who return to their hills on the approach of summer. The camp was pitched at the mouth of the Darwaza defile, about eleven miles from Hazar Pir Ziarat.

The following day the column proceeded through the Darwaza, and the camp was pitched, after a march of twelve miles, on the right bank of the Kuram, about one mile and a quarter from the fort, on the opposite side of the river. The defile was about eight miles in length, and, although large working parties were employed to improve the road, and a regiment of infantry was detailed to assist the guns of No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery, the axles of two of the four pieces gave way, and it was sunset before the battery was in camp.

For the first six miles the pass was so narrow that it was commanded by hills at matchlock range from both sides. The chief difficulties of the road were found in the first three miles. The *nullah* draining the pass had frequently to be crossed, the ascents and descents being occasionally steep and rocky. In one place the path had been cut away by torrents, and there was a perpendicular drop of twenty feet into the *nullah*. The hill above was very

difficult to work in—rocky, covered with stunted palm bushes, and of a steep slope, and it was found necessary to build a road for the passage of the artillery. *Expedition to Miranzai and Kuram in 1856.*

The Kuram fort was found to be situated in the widest part of the valley, which was there about twelve miles broad; the cultivated portion extending for about ½ mile on either side of the river. The villages were thickly clustered, and situated on these cultivated strips of land, with the exception of a few built at the gorges in the hills where there were springs.

Up to this time not a single shot had been fired into the camp. At Hazar Pir the headmen had been warned by the Brigadier that he would not submit to the indignity of being annoyed at night, and that if his picquets were fired into, every village in the neighbourhood of the camp would be destroyed.

The force was halted near the Kuram fort from the 11th to the 23rd of November. There was some difficulty about grazing for the camels, the nearest ground being in the Darwaza, six or seven miles from the camp. As supplies were running short, little having been brought in by the people of the country, foraging parties had to be sent out with cattle and money, and a compulsory sale enforced in the neighbouring villages; but, although the operation was a tedious one, going from house to house to fill up the bags, no difficulty was experienced by the troops employed, and after a day or two the people of the country began to bring grain into the camp. A strong detachment of Khwaja Muhammad's horsemen was also sent back to Thal to bring up supplies, this detachment taking only two marches in reaching the camp from Thal.

The Turis, who at first intended to refuse compliance with our demands, hoping they would induce the surrounding tribes to unite against us, very soon changed their language and policy; and our claims against them* having been amicably arranged, the 21st was spent by the Brigadier and the Commissioner, and other officers, in visiting the Paiwar pass. On the first arrival of the force in the valley, the Commissioner had mentioned to the Deputy Governor and headmen his intention of doing this; but as further notice might have led to difficulties, the determination was only made known to the Paiwar *maliks*, who were in camp, late on the night of the 20th, when they were warned to accompany the party. The escort consisted of 200 cavalry. The party left camp shortly after 3 A.M., on the morning of the 21st, and reached the village of Paiwar about 7.30 A.M. To the foot of the pass took another hour and twenty minutes, and its actual ascent a quarter of an hour more; the party then descended on the Kabul side, and after a ride of half an hour a halt was made, to enable Lieutenants A. W. Garnett and P. S. Lumsden to make a sketch of the country; and some of the villagers coming up to the Commissioner, much useful information was obtained from them.

On regaining the summit of the pass, some time was spent in making additional observations, and it was sunset before the party reached the camp, the distance from the crest of the pass being twenty-four miles. The

				Rs.	A.	P.
* Losses proved	17,010	6	0
Reprisals, etc.	4,430	8	0
Balance				12,579	14	0

Of this, Rs. 4,219-0-0 was realised in Kuram, and Rs. 8,630-14-0 guaranteed by the Deputy

*Expedition to
Miranzai and
Kuram in
1856.*

people were civil, ready to afford any information, and appeared quite to have made up their minds that they were shortly to expect a British occupation.

In camp the cold was now very trying at night, the thermometer falling 10° Fahr. below freezing-point, and the sick-list was again on the increase; chest and bowel complaints being most common.

On the 23rd the force commenced its return towards Thal, and it was determined, instead of returning by the Darwaza pass, to follow the river route to where it joins the other at Hazar Pir Ziarat.

The first day's march, twelve miles, was to Ibrahimzai; the cavalry and artillery had to follow the bed of the river, the infantry marching by a narrow path on its right bank leading along the foot of a low range of hills. The second day's march was to Hazar Pir Ziarat, eleven miles,—the road again following the bed of the river. This route was found to be much better than had been stated.

A halt of three days was made here, to enable the Kabul authorities to collect the remaining stolen cattle which were in the neighbouring Turi villages; and advantage was taken of this halt for the Brigadier, the Commissioner, and others, to explore, under the escort of a strong party of cavalry, and accompanied by the Zaimukht *maliks* (who, however, were most unwilling to show the road), the western entrance into the Zaimukht valley. This object was attained, although after a short time, the heights being crowned by some of the tribe, it became unsafe to proceed any distance up the valley.

On the 26th the 2nd Punjab Infantry and a wing, 4th Punjab Cavalry, marched towards Hangu, and were employed afterwards in bringing out treasure for the camp.

On the 27th the camp moved from Hazar Pir Ziarat, reaching Thal on the 28th. A troop of cavalry had, on the requisition of the Commissioner, been placed at the disposal of the Deputy Governor of Kuram for the day, to aid him in recovering from certain villages the value of the cattle stolen from British subjects, which was duly paid.

On the afternoon of the day on which the force returned to Thal, four grass-cutters were killed, and one mortally wounded, whilst out cutting grass.

Their ponies, carried off by the murderers, were recovered by the cavalry guard with them; but, from the nature of the ground, the cavalry could not succeed in coming up with the murderers.

Brigadier N.B. Chamberlain's
despatch, and Captain B.
Henderson's report.

The troops remained at Thal till the 5th of December, when, the murder of the grass-cutters having been clearly brought home to the Miami branch of the Kabul Khel Waziris, and their *maliks* having declined either to wait upon the Deputy Commissioner or to afford any reparation, no alternative was left but to obtain redress by force of arms.

Although their conduct did not call for any consideration at our hands, both the Deputy Commissioner and the Brigadier were of opinion that the future peace of the frontier, and the interests of Government, would best be secured could punishment be inflicted upon the guilty only; and as the names of those actually implicated in the murder, and their precise location, had been made known to Captain Henderson, the operations were to be restricted, as far as it was possible, to their apprehension.

But to have required the surrender of criminals without being in a

as an idle menace, and would have been treated with contempt; and, therefore, before any call of the kind could be made, it was necessary to bring the whole section of the tribe under our control. It was only possible to effect this by a surprise, and arrangements were made accordingly. *Expedition to Miranzai and Kuram in 1856.*

After the murder of the grass-cutters, such of the Miamis as had previously been encamped on the right bank of the Kuram crossed the river, and the whole of the section pitched their tents at the foot of a range of mountains which they had been accustomed to consider inaccessible, and where they supposed themselves secure from any attack except in front, and consequently cared not for the proximity of our camp.

For the surprise to be successful, two conditions were indispensable, *viz.*, the possession of the mountains in rear of their encampments, and the cutting off of their retreat down the left bank of the river.

To the force as per margin, under Major J. Coke, commanding 1st Punjab Infantry, was assigned the first of these operations. At midnight these troops fell in without noise, and then, led by guides provided by the Deputy Commissioner, they commenced their march for the summit of the mountains by a circuitous and difficult path.

Two hours after the departure of Major Coke's column the remainder of the troops fell in, crossed the Kuram opposite camp, and marched down its right bank, under Brigadier Chamberlain.

On their reaching the village of Biland Khel the day began to dawn, so, leaving the infantry and guns to follow, the Brigadier pushed on with the cavalry; the Deputy Commissioner accompanied Khwaja Muhammad Khan's horsemen, for the double purpose of cutting off retreat by the river bank, and of reconnoitring the river down-stream for a place practicable for infantry. On crossing the river and entering the broken ground, the cavalry came suddenly on an encampment of the Miamis, who, warned of their approach, were carrying their families and cattle up the steep mountain path in their rear. Here a few shots were exchanged, we having one sowar wounded and two horses killed, the Waziris losing one man.

About this time intimation was brought that Major Coke's column had been seen on the summit of the mountain, so there was no longer any doubt as to his success. The Gurkhas and the Peshawar Mountain Train Battery having meanwhile come up with the cavalry, turned the southernmost point of the Miami encampments, and ascended the mountains, thereby completing the chain. Major Coke's column was above them, and entirely closed the few paths which led up the mountain. The 3rd Punjab Infantry and the guns of No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery threatened their front from below; and lower down again the Gurkhas and mountain guns had the command of the hills; whilst the cavalry cut off all retreat by the plain.

Major Coke's despatch. Major Coke's column, however, had not reached its position without great difficulty; the force was accompanied by three guides and a man of the Miami section, who was to prevent firing on the troops from any Waziri *kiris* the column might pass. Passing the village of Muhammadzai, where a guard of fourteen men with a guide was placed to prevent any men leaving the village to give the alarm, the detachment ascended the hills by a gorge to the south. The ground was very difficult, only one man could pass at a time: and when, at half-past 5 A.M., the head of the column was

*Expedition to
Miranzai and
Kuram in
1856.*

halted to allow the rear to close up, it was found that the 6th Punjab Infantry and the guns had lost their way,—misled, it afterwards appeared, by the man of the Miami section who was with the guns, and who had then effected his escape. As it was nearly daylight, Major Coke determined to push on with the 1st Punjab Infantry, and, after some three miles, came upon a Miami encampment; and as this could not be passed without the inhabitants giving the alarm, two companies, under Lieutenant W. H. Lumsden, were sent to surprise it, when 1,000 sheep and some cattle were captured, and the Waziris driven over the hills, away from the villages against which the column was proceeding. Major Coke was here joined by the guns of No. 1 Punjab Light Field Battery, and the 6th Punjab Infantry, led by a guide, who had been sent back under escort to them when their absence was first discovered. Continuing its march, the column arrived at the crest of the hills overlooking the encampments, and which were then, as stated above, completely surrounded.

As soon as all the troops were in position, the precise object of the visit was explained to the enemy, and they were assured that they would not be injured unless they resisted. Seeing that any attempt at escape or opposition would be useless, they at once gave up all who were present and called for. The troops then retired, and several hundred head of cattle and sheep were brought away, to be restored when terms were definitely settled with the tribe. The troops reached camp at 4 P.M., after a very hard day's work, and after being for nearly twenty-four hours without food, as any measures for its preparation and carriage by the men would have at once destroyed the secrecy absolutely necessary. There were no other casualties besides those already mentioned.

As it was found that it would be impossible to convict the suspected men if tried in a criminal court, a fine of Rs. 1,200 was levied on the tribe.

Before the operations, the precaution had been taken of sending messages to the other branches of the Kabul Khel Waziris not to interfere in support of the Miamis, and no aid was given them.

In concluding his report of this affair, Brigadier Chamberlain attributed the success mainly to the way in which Major J. Coke had carried out his instructions, and to the very correct information, as well as to the good guides, furnished by Captain B. Henderson, the Deputy Commissioner.

After two days spent in a settlement with the Miamis, the force moved to Gandiawar, where it was encamped till the 21st of December, pending the adjustment of certain difficulties with the Zaimukhts, as a party of that tribe, having no quarrel with the people of Darsamand, and solely with the object of outraging the British Government, had on the 14th of December seized three men belonging to that village, one of whom afterwards died of his wounds.

The Zaimukhts in the plains were not participators in this crime, and were powerless to procure the surrender of the culprits; but the demands of the Deputy Commissioner, backed as they were by the presence of such a large body of troops, had the desired effect, and a deputation was sent in and a fine of Rs. 1,000 paid.

The ground in the neighbourhood of Dolragha, Admela, and the gorge which leads to the villages of Thana and Sangroba, were, as mentioned in the previous chapter, reconnoitred by Brigadier Chamberlain, and found more accessible than native reports had stated them to be.

The payment of the fine imposed on the Zaimukhts leaving nothing

December, where it halted for four days, was, on arrival at Kohat, broken up. *Expedition to Miranzai and Kuram in 1856.*

The conduct of the troops had been most exemplary; not one single act of violence had been committed, either against property or person, during the whole period. No stronger indications of the increase of our power and influence in these valleys could have been afforded than the fact that not a single shot had been fired at the camp at night; that with the exception of the murder of the grass-cutters by the Kabul Khel Waziris, no camp follower had been injured, nor had a single animal been carried off.

The operations against the Miamis for the murder of the grass-cutters were considered by the Supreme Government highly creditable to the officers and men. The excellent arrangements made by Brigadier N. B. Chamberlain, commanding, and by Captain B. Henderson, the Deputy Commissioner, as well as the excellent conduct of the troops, were appreciated by the Government; and an expression of approbation was to be conveyed to all who were engaged during the whole expedition, and to the Commissioner, Lieutenant-Colonel H. B. Edwardes, C.B.

At the end of 1859, Brigadier-General N. B. Chamberlain, C.B., again passed through the Miranzai valley at the head of a force, with which he was about to punish the Kabul Khel Waziris (to be related in the next chapter), and Captain James, Commissioner of Peshawar, who accompanied the force as Political Officer, then took the opportunity of inspecting the valley, and thus spoke of the good fruits which the expeditions in 1855 and 1856, and the wise policy at that time inaugurated, had brought forth. He said, one who had known the valley in past years would scarcely recognise it in its altered state. There were still, of course, as amongst all Pathans, feuds and factions; but the former rarely led to bloodshed, and the latter were not based upon men's favour or hostility to a Government which all had been taught either to fear or to respect. Protected from foreign enemies, the whole country had been brought under cultivation, and at certain seasons it would have been impossible in many places to encamp the force without injuring the crops. The migratory herdsmen were not only restrained from trespassing, but paid a tax for the use of the pasture lands, and, under threat of expulsion, were as amenable as the resident tribes. Several abandoned villages had been re-established, and were now thriving settlements; whilst towers and walls, formerly so indispensable, were in many places suffered to crumble away.

The Commissioner, on entering their villages, was met by no sullen band of men paying their revenue in order to save their houses, but by a civil troop of greybeards proffering hospitality, and by crowds of merry children. The cases which came before the Deputy Commissioner were no longer of raids, of plundered harvests, and whole families murdered, but inequality of assessment, of assistance required to dig water-courses, construct dams, or the request of some youth clamorous for service.

The Commissioner did not wish it to be believed that their nature had changed, or that, if left to themselves, they would not return to their former habits and predilections; but their passions were restrained, their children were not nurtured in scenes of blood, and it might be hoped that the first and

Conduct of the Miranzai villages subsequent to the Expedition of 1856.

Since then the villages of Miranzai have given very little trouble. In 1869, a force, under the command of Colonel C. P. Keyes, C.B., marched to Thal; again, in 1872, a detachment, under Major F. R. DeBude, visited that place, and in April 1874 the greater portion of the Kohat garrison, under the command of Colonel P. F. Gardiner, proceeded to the same place; but in each of these cases the movement of troops through the Miranzai valley was in consequence of complications with the Waziris on the Kohat border.

During the Afghan war of 1878-80, the Miranzai valley was a good deal disturbed by the neighbouring hill tribes, who committed numerous raids on the Kohat-Thal road,—the main line of communication of the Kuram Field Force. In some of these cases the villages of Miranzai failed to act up to their responsibilities, and were in consequence fined, or had their revenue increased for a period of years; but, on the whole, their behaviour was satisfactory.

The people of Miranzai themselves are now quite friendly and reconciled to our rule, and this part of our frontier may be considered as safe as any other part of the border from Agror to Gumal.

Since the expedition of 1856, the Turis, who had formerly been so turbulent, have given little trouble. In the Kabul Khel expedition of 1859 they joined most heartily against the Waziris. Well acquainted with the Waziri paths and ravines, they acted as guides and spies to the force, and as plunderers on their own account. Following the troops on donkeys and bullocks, they did not leave an article behind which could be turned to any use, and they carried off immense stores of grain and flocks of sheep from the Waziri hills.

During the disturbances in Tirah in 1875 some members of the tribe attempted a passage through the Miranzai valley to assist the *Syads*, but were forced to retrace their steps to Kuram. In May and June 1876 there were disturbances between the Bangash of Kuram and our frontier village of Thal. These were owing to disputes about land near Biland Khel.

In August 1877 the Amir of Kabul called on the Turis to pay Rs. 50,000 into his treasury, as well as to supply 6,000 recruits for his army, to wage war with England. The result was a general flight of the Turis into their most inaccessible hills. A force was sent from Kabul to coerce them, but did not advance beyond Kushki. The Turi *jirga* was subsequently induced to proceed to Kabul, where, by the Amir foregoing his demand for recruits altogether, and consenting to be satisfied with a money payment of Rs. 25,000, a settlement was effected.

On the outbreak of the Kabul war in 1878, the tribe assumed a friendly attitude towards us, and during Major-General Roberts's advance through the Kuram valley, the behaviour of the tribe was good, the headmen making protestations of friendship, and readily bringing supplies into camp. Turi levies were subsequently employed in escorting convoys and in assisting generally the operations of the troops, and their behaviour throughout the campaign continued satisfactory.

In the Zaimukht expedition in December 1879, described in the last chapter, they joined with us against that tribe, and co-operated with our troops by burning some of the villages belonging to the Wattizai section. On the 25th of March 1880 a Turi convoy was plundered about one mile and a half from Thal, and ten men were killed and seven wounded, and property

and Dawaris. Before the evacuation of the Kuram valley in 1880, a proclamation was read out to them in a public *darbar* held by Major-General J. Watson, V.C., C.B., on the 7th of October 1880, granting them their independence. The proclamation, which explains the present relations of this tribe to the British and Kabul Governments, was as follows:—

Conduct of the Turis subsequent to the Expedition of 1856.

“I, Major-General Watson, commanding the British troops in the Kuram valley, am instructed to announce to the *maliks* and people of the Turi tribe that the British Government intends to withdraw its forces very shortly across the border.

“Under these circumstances it has become necessary to make some arrangement for the future administration of the district, and the matter has been considered with an earnest desire to meet, as far as possible, the wishes of the people.

“The British Government understands that the Turi tribe desire their country to be made independent. Consequently, I have now to announce that the British Government recognises their independence, and so long as the Turis desire it, will regard their country as having no connection with the Amir of Kabul.

“Regarding the internal administration of the district and its protection against neighbouring tribes, the British Government does not wish to interfere, and the Turis will be left free to make their own arrangements. In this matter, also, the British Government believes that it is consulting the interests of the tribe.

“In return for its recognition and support, the British Government requires that the Turi tribe shall conform in all respects to any advice which may be given them at any time on behalf of that Government.”

It was accordingly arranged that the executive government of Kuram should be carried on by two delegates chosen by the tribe, namely, Badshah Gul and Nur Muhammad, the heads of the two factions (*Sust Gundi* and *Ting Gundi*) into which the tribe was divided, under the control of the Turi *jirga*. These were to be supported by an armed force, to be furnished by the different sections of the Turi tribe, and by the Bangash of the Kuram valley, and, in order to meet the pay of the force, a tax of one rupee a *bigha* was to be put on all the cultivated lands of the tribe.

These arrangements, however, soon broke down. For a few months the land-tax was paid and the proposed levies were kept up. The tribe then began to think it was waste of money to keep up so many footmen, and arranged to furnish a small quota of sowars. These again dropped off by degrees. Internal feuds broke out with great violence, and soon all rule and government were at an end. In December 1881 the two delegates reported that, owing to the internecine feuds of the Turis, they could no longer carry on the administration of the valley. In June 1882 Nur Muhammad and some of the leading men of his party visited Kabul, and half expressed a desire to be brought under the rule of the Amir. Badshah Gul was opposed to this, and the tribe generally were of his opinion; so nothing came of the visit. During the greater part of 1882-83 the Turis were constantly fighting among themselves. Towards the beginning of 1883, both parties, being tired out, desisted from any active prosecution of their feuds. In April and May 1883, however, quarrels again broke out. There was fighting also between the Turis and the Jagis. In April the Jagis raided in force on the Turis. In May the Turis retaliated. Up to September there was fighting going on, sometimes with the Zaimukhts,

*Relations of
the Turis with
the British
Government at
the present
time.*

ment of India that the Turis were constantly misbehaving, and that he had threatened to punish them. The Turis, on the other hand, represented that they raided on the Amir's subjects because the latter raided on them. Up to the present time the Government have refused to interfere, but if matters continue as they now are, it is probable that the Government will, before long, have seriously to face the alternative of either annexing the valley or of allowing the Amir to establish his authority there again.

APPENDIX A.

Strength of the Miranzai Field Force, under BRIGADIER N. B. CHAMBERLAIN, in 1855.

Corps.	British Officers.	British Non-Commissioned Officers.	Native Officers.	Native Non-Commissioned Officers, and rank and file.	Elephants.	Horses.	Mules.	Howitzers.	Guns.
Detachment, No. 1 Punjab Light Field Battery	1	1	1	36	...	2	39	2	1
No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery	2	2	2	135	6	133	36	1	5
4th Punjab Cavalry	4	...	10	483	...	501
Detachment, Sappers and Miners	3	33
Wing, 66th Gurkha Regiment	7	1	10	564
1st Punjab Infantry	4	1	15	852
3rd Punjab Infantry	3	2	13	793
Sind Rifle Corps	3	...	11	770
Total	24	7	65	3,666	6	636	75	3	6

APPENDIX B.

Return of Killed and Wounded in the affair near Darsamand on the 30th of April 1855.

Corps.	Killed.					Wounded.					Remarks.
	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	
4th Punjab Cavalry	1	6	7	Five horses were killed and eleven wounded.
1st Punjab Infantry	1	1	
Khatak levies	6	6	
Total	1	13	14	

ABSTRACT.

Killed	0
Wounded	14

APPENDIX C.

Composition of Miranzai Field Force, under BRIGADIER N. B. CHAMBERLAIN, *in* 1856.

Brigadier N. B. Chamberlain, commanding.

Staff.

Captain R. R. Adams, Staff Officer.

Lieutenant A. W. Garnett, Bengal Engineers, Field Engineer.

„ P. S. Lumsden, Deputy-Assistant Quarter-Master General

„ C. J. Nicholson, Orderly Officer.

Cavalry.

One troop, 1st Punjab Cavalry, Lieutenant W. Fane, commanding.

4th Punjab Cavalry, Major G. O. Jacob, commanding.

Artillery.

Detachment, Peshawar Mountain Train Battery, Captain T. Brougham, commanding.

Detachment, No. 1 Punjab Light Field Battery, Lieutenant J. R. Sladen, commanding.

No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery, Lieutenant R. Mecham, commanding.

Engineers.

2nd Company, Sappers and Miners, Lieutenant A. W. Garnett, commanding.

Infantry.

Wing, 66th Gurkha Regiment.

1st Punjab Infantry, Major J. Coke, commanding.

2nd Punjab Infantry, Captain G. W. G. Green, commanding.

3rd Punjab Infantry, Captain B. Henderson, Deputy Commissioner, commanding.

Detachment, 5th Punjab Infantry.

6th Punjab Infantry, Lieutenant C. P. Keyes, commanding.

Political Officers.

Lieutenant-Colonel H. B. Edwardes, C.B., Commissioner of Peshawar.

Captain B. Henderson, Deputy Commissioner of Kohat.

Levies.

Khatak horsemen, under Khwaja Muhammad Khan.

Detail of troops.

Corps.	British Officers.	British Non-Commissioned Officers.	Native Officers.	Native Non-Commissioned Officers, and rank and file.	Elephants.	Horses.	Yabus and mules.	Guns.				Remarks.
								Field.		Mountain		
								24-pounder howitzers.	9-pounders.	12-pounder howitzers.	3-pounders.	
Staff	4	
Detachment, Peshawar Mountain Train Battery ...	3	1	2	56	81	2	2	
Detachment, No. 1 Punjab Light Field Battery ...	2	1	1	59	...	3	52	2	2	
No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery	2	2	3	114	6	132	36	2	4	
Detachment, 1st Punjab Cavalry	1	...	3	97	...	98	
4th Punjab Cavalry... ..	4	...	12	407	...	418	
2nd Company, Sappers and Miners	2	40	
66th Gurkhas	6	1	12	680	
1st Punjab Infantry	3	...	12	778	
2nd Punjab Infantry	5	...	10	769	
3rd Punjab Infantry	5	...	10	747	
5th Punjab Infantry	1	...	4	188	
6th Punjab Infantry	5	...	6	688	
Levies, under Khwaja Muhammad Khan	150	
Total	41	5	77	4,773	6	651	169	2	4	4	4	

CHAPTER XIV.

KOHAT AND BANNU BORDERS.

WAZIRI TRIBE.

Darwesh Khel Waziris.

Waziris.

THE Waziris are a large tribe of Pathans who inhabit the hill country beyond our border, from Thal, in Miranzai, to the Gumal pass.

The Waziris are descended from Wazir, son of one Suliman. Wazir had two sons—(1) Khizri, (2) Lali. The latter, by reason of a blood-feud, had to fly, and settled in Ningrahar, on the northern slopes of the Safed Koh, where his descendants are still located. Khizri had three sons—(1) Musa, (2) Mahmud, (3) Mubarak. Musa Darwesh had two sons—(1) Utman, (2) Ahmad—from whom are descended the Utmanzais and Ahmadzais, unitedly called Darwesh Khel Waziris. Mahmud had a son called Mahsud, from whom are descended the Mahsuds. Mubarak had a son, Gurbaz, from whom are descended the Gurbaz Waziris.

The Waziris, therefore, are divided into five main branches, and their fighting strength is estimated as follows :—

Utmanzai	15,700
Ahmadzai	9,230
Mahsud	13,600
Gurbaz	1,500
Lali	1,500
				41,530

Physically, the Waziris are tall, muscular, and courageous ; they generally go on foot, and are most active in the mountains. A few of the great men of the tribe have horses, but are bad riders. They neither own, nor, by their own account, have they ever owned, any allegiance to any of the rulers of Kabul. If you ask them where their country is, they point to the far-off horizon, where the azure sky is pierced by the snowy peaks of the Safed Koh, which they call Spinghar.

But that great range is only their citadel, at the head of a long line of fastnesses extending from a little beyond the frontier of Dera Ismail Khan to within fifty miles of Jalalabad.

They are at war with all their neighbours, and on every side, except

Ghilzais they have taken Barmul. The Jadrans are confined to one ridge; *Waziris.* the whole country of Zhob trembles at their name. They were till lately almost entirely nomad and pastoral, but of late years they have encroached upon the plain country of the Marwat, Bannuchi, and Khatak, and now hold cultivated land in British territory. In the census of 1881 the number of Waziris in British territory was 20,741, and of these 19,262 were in the Bannu district.

The whole tribe are thieves, and are proud of their prowess as such; and, unless paid black-mail, systematically make raids upon their
Chamberlain. neighbours.

They generally attack caravans by night, but sometimes by day. Their successful forays have given them a great stock of camels, sheep, and cows; and whilst no road in their vicinity is safe, except to armed bodies, no stranger can enter the country save through the intervention of some holy or well-known man.

A Waziri is never spared when caught by any one of the surrounding tribes, their enemies.

The Waziris never injure females nor take their jewels, but all males they invariably kill. Even by their enemies they are allowed to be truthful, courageous, and hospitable. These statements, however, must be taken *cum grano*, or in a comparative sense. They show the opinion which is held of them comparatively with their neighbours; for, as Lumsden says of the Afghans, Waziri honour and Waziri hospitality, when judged by a civilised standard, would surely seem infinitesimal in quantity and indifferent in quality.

Coke thus remarks on a custom of the Waziris: "These tribes", he says, "return, as the hot season approaches, to the Suliman range. If any of the tribes have suffered in the countries in which they have been during the winter, or consider their freedom of pasturage likely to be infringed, they have a grand meeting of all the tribes, and if it is decided to attack the parties who have injured them, they form what they call a *sangar*, that is, all the available fighting-men of their tribes. A portion of men, with the women and herds, are sent to the pasture grounds, where they will be safe; the rest of the men, each tribe furnishing its quota, unite for the attack of the common enemy. A chief is selected from amongst them, without any reference to rank or power—some man whom they consider a lucky or a fighting-man; a bodyguard of 100 Waziris is given him, and his power is unlimited till the *sangar* breaks up. This *sangar* cannot be formed when once the tribes have departed for the cold season; therefore, when any matter occurs which calls on them to unite for their common interests, their attacks are seldom or never made the same season as the event which has caused their assembly, but in the following."

Among their peculiar customs in which they differ from other Afghans is in cases of adultery, when, instead of killing both parties, they kill the woman, but only cut the nose off the man. Marriages are arranged in Waziristan by parents of the contracting parties, and no engagements are entered into until the contracting parties have reached the age of puberty, as is the custom with the majority of Pathan tribes. The dower is given by the bridegroom to the bride's father; in other words, the women are sold to their husbands. The ceremony is simple, and is not attended with extravagant display of any sort. Polygamy, although recognised according to the tenets of the Muhammedan religion, is but rarely practised, owing to the poverty of

Waziris.

the people. Widows re-marry; but it is the custom for the relation of the husband to marry a childless widow, in order to raise up seed for the family. In the event of no relation of the husband offering to do so, the woman is at liberty to re-marry whom she pleases.

The Waziris eat wheat, maize, barley, and bread made of these, and also mutton; meat is much used, also porridge of roughly-pounded maize.

Their clothing generally consists of a turban, usually of a dark-blue or red colour; a large, loose garment, called *angarka*, made of coarse sheep's wool, either of its natural colour or of white; loose, white cotton *paijamas* or trousers, and sandals. They also wear a *chadar*, which is usually white and of a coarse texture; some few *maliks* wear a blue *lungi*, and the richer people wear *angarkas* made of white cotton cloth instead of sheep's wool.

The Waziris are, without any exception, Muhammadans of the *Suni* sect; but, like many of the Pathan tribes, they are very slack in the performance of their religious duties. The *mullas* have influence only as far as the observances of religion go, and are powerless in political matters. Kaniguram is the seat of religion, being the dwelling place of some families of *Syads*, who have been settled there for many centuries.

Unlike most other independent border tribes, the Waziris have had the wisdom to avoid, to a large extent, internal feuds, and their unity is proverbial.

This marked characteristic of the tribe is fostered by peculiar customs and laws. It is well known that amongst Pathans the avenger of blood is not only privileged, but bound to slay any relative of the man who has committed the deed for which vengeance is sought. But Waziri greybeards of ancient times ruled otherwise; with them the actual murderer must be the only victim. The effect of this wise law was to cement the tribe by avoiding those ramified feuds, which in other places arose out of indiscriminate vengeance, where an account current of blood was handed down from father to son, and balanced at convenience, and where the friend of yesterday became the victim of to-day. Again, the sums of money which, under certain circumstances, were accepted by relatives of the slain, locally denominated "make-up-money", was fixed at much higher rates than against other tribes. Waziri life, therefore, was habitually regarded as something valuable. The sums were so large, indeed, as to be seldom forthcoming, when articles of property were reckoned in at fancy prices; but still the nominal mulct was a restraining influence on those passions which would lead to strife and disruption. This rude law had sufficient weight to control them in their intercourse with each other, and they worked for a common end; thus, as their numbers increased, they had gradually overcome their neighbours, and extended their limits until they had become the most powerful and the most dreaded tribe along the whole western border.

Yet, as will be seen in the different expeditions we have made into their country, we have found that they will not support each other; in each case the division which had come under our displeasure was left to fight it out by themselves. And Maclean says there is no pretence of union between the Darwesh Khels and Mahsuds. The former call themselves Waziris and the latter Mahsuds, and there is a bitter feud between the two.

The Waziris on the Kohat border are Samil in politics.

The Waziris boast that they have no poor man amongst them; whenever a family is brought low by deaths, accidents, or raids from without, the

and so on; thus there is no incentive to the Waziri to leave his home to seek *Waziris*. a subsistence or to enter foreign service, and this accounts for the fact that they do not take service in the ranks of our army.

The climate of Waziristan is reported good; the country is hilly, well wooded, and well watered; the people lead an active, healthy life, and are not subject to the low fever so prevalent in the lower and more marshy districts on the frontier. Their *hakims*, or native doctors, seem to have a certain knowledge of their duties. Inoculation is practised for small-pox; splints are used for broken limbs; cold water for gun-shot wounds; but for fever the patient is enveloped in the skin of a newly-killed animal and dosed with turmeric. It is not then to be wondered at that the Waziris complain that their doctors do not understand fevers, or that they should have such faith in the quinine of the British.

The Waziris have a fine breed of horses, which are exceedingly hardy and active, though small, and often impetuous and vicious animals. They are difficult to procure in any great numbers, as the demand for them is great, and they are numerically scarce. It is said that they have Arab blood in them, derived from horses in Nadar Shah's army, which were either given by, or stolen from, that conqueror. They have herds of small, black cattle and also sheep in abundance, the sweet-scented grass of the Waziri hills seeming to suit them.

The outer spurs of the Waziri hills are quite bare of verdure, and almost of soil; but, as they recede from the plains, they become covered with wild olive, oak, and, lastly, pine. In some parts, as at Maidani and Razmak, the hills lose their steep character, and assume the appearance of downs covered with trees and wild flowers.

The country in the vicinity of the numerous mountain streams is well cultivated, although the extent of ground is not sufficient to produce enough grain for the whole population. Wheat, barley, rice, and Indian corn are the chief crops.

Such is a general outline of the tribe who, upon annexation, became our neighbours, from the north-western border of the Kohat district to the Gumal pass in front of Dera Ismail Khan, the measured distance along the boundary line being one hundred and forty miles. On their becoming so, every effort was made to conciliate them; but, as will be shown, from the very commencement some clans of the Ahmadzais and Utmanzais, and the whole Mahsud branch, exhibited the most hostile spirit, and committed constant aggressions. No travellers or caravans were safe within miles of the border, except under strong escort. The salt mines in the neighbourhood of Bahadur Khel had to be protected by a fort and strong garrison. The pass, through which runs the main road between Kohat and Bannu, could not be traversed with safety until the heights were crowned. A line of posts had to be erected along the Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan borders to check inroads, and every road within reach of the hills had to be guarded and patrolled.

The punitive measures which the aggressions of these people forced upon the Government will be detailed hereafter.

It has already been mentioned that the Waziris are divided into five main branches—the Utmanzai, Ahmadzai, Mahsud, Gurbaz, and Lali. Of these, the last are the most northerly, and reside on the slopes of the Safed Koh. The Gurbaz live on the borders of Khost, to the Afghan Governor of which district they pay a small tribute. A few members of this tribe live in the Tachikasa, and form escorts for *kafilas* to Dawar and Khost. The British

Darwesh Khel Waziris. Government has never come into contact with either of these branches, and has no dealings with them. No further notice of them, therefore, is necessary.

With regard to the remaining branches, the present chapter will deal only with the Utmanzai and Ahmadzai branches, known as the Darwesh Khels, leaving the consideration of the powerful Mahsud clan for a separate chapter.

The Darwesh Khel Waziris have very few regular villages, and these are on the banks of rivers, protected by walls of loose stones and towers. Within the hills they reside in *kiris*, or encampments, constructed of stout woollen blankets spread over curved sticks, with sides of coarse matting. These blankets are worth Rs. 20 to Rs. 30 each, and are exceedingly durable, impervious to rain, and not easily destroyed by fire. The cattle, sheep, and camels are all kept in the encampment, which is guarded by dogs of a large breed and of singular ferocity. The only permanent traces of these Waziris are found in the graveyards of the tribe, which are scattered over the hills at convenient spots. The tombs are of loose stones put together with much care and neatness. These resting-places of their dead appear to be the sole objects of their veneration, and in them are deposited their household stuffs when absent from their camps, the boldest thief not venturing to lay sacrilegious hands upon them.

Of the Darwesh Khels, not more than one-third are armed with guns, the remainder carrying a sword and a shield, to which many add a pistol and dagger.

On both banks of the Kuram, and also on the banks of the Kaitu, which rises in Khost and falls into the Kuram, near Zirwan, there are broad tracts of rich soil. The produce of these lands is a great source of wealth to the Waziris. Beyond these streams they have no cultivation, but the hills afford abundance of rich pasture for their flocks, and the ravines are mostly lined with excellent grazing for their numerous camels. The general character of the hills on the right bank of the Kuram is not so difficult as their jagged outline would indicate. These are the rough walls which support extensive tracts of table-land, or conceal the grassy slopes within. On the right bank of the Kuram there are few places impracticable for horsemen.

The proper settlements of these tribes are amongst the higher spurs of the Suliman range, where they pass the summer months. In October the greater portion descend to the lower hills bordering on the Kohat and Bannu districts. Some of the clans who are located on the lower slopes remain there throughout the year.

The Utmanzai branch of the Darwesh Khels are principally located on the right bank of the Kuram river, and occupy the hills between that river and the valleys of Khost and Dawar.

The tribe is divided into three principal divisions, the sub-divisions and fighting strength of which are as follows:—

				<i>Fighting men.</i>
	(Hassan Khel	1,100
<i>Mahmit Khel</i>	...	{ Wuzi Khel	...	800
		{ Bara Khel	...	2,000
	(Manzar Khel	700
				2,000

				<i>Fighting men.</i>	<i>Darwesh Khel</i>
					<i>Waziris.</i>
					<i>Utmanzais.</i>
<i>Wali Khel</i>	...	{	Kabul Khel *2,000	
			Malik Shahi 400	
			Baka Khel 1,200	
			Jani Khel 1,000	
			Total 15,700	

It is difficult to fix the limits of these divisions, but it may be said generally that they inhabit the hills to the north of Dawar between the Kuram river and Khost.

The Mahmit Khel and the Ibrahim Khel divisions are responsible for no passes, and do not hold lands in British territory, but they come in to trade. Their settlements are much scattered, and in addition to the country they occupy to the north of Dawar, the Mahmit Khel and the Tori Khel sections of the Ibrahim Khels occupy the Khasora valley to the south of that country. The Wali Khels have the most dealings with us, and the sections of this division, more especially the Kabul Khels, have at different times given much trouble on our border. The Kabul Khels are divided into—(1) Miami, (2) Saifali, and (3) Pipali. During the winter they occupy the lands on the right bank of the Kuram river, and they also come down to the Khatak lands on the east of the Kuram. The Bangash of Biland Khel are *hamsayas* of the Kabul Khels. They are at feud with the Turis, and also with the village of Thal, in British territory.

The Malik Shahis, like the Kabul Khels, come down to the lands on both sides of the Kuram in the winter. They also cultivate land in British territory.

The Baka Khels own land between the Baran and Khasora passes, and are responsible for the Tochi pass, and partly for the Khasora, as well as for all the intervening paths. During the winter they reside in British territory.

To their south live the Jani Khels, who share with them the responsibility of the Khasora pass. This section cultivates land on all sides of the Jani Khel post.

All these sections of the Wali Khel Waziris have lands in Shawal, and migrate thither during the summer months.

The Ahmadzai branch of the Darwesh Khel are situated principally on the left bank of the Kuram river to the north of Bannu, and in British territory. They are also located in the Wano, Shakai, Badar, and neighbouring valleys to the south-west of the Mahsud country. They are divided into two main branches, the Shin Khel and the Kalu Khel, which are again divided into five sections, Hati Khel, Sirki Khel, Umarzai, Maclean. Nasri Khel, and Spirkai. The first three belong to the Shin Khel, and the last two to the Kalu Khel, branch. The sub-divisions and the fighting strength of these sections are as follows:—

*Darwesh Khel
Waziris.
Ahmadzais.*

The Zalli Khels are located in the summer months in the Wano valley, a large district to the west of the Mahsud country and to the north of the Gumal river. In the winter they come down to the Gumal valley in British territory, and also into the Bannu district. Besides the Zalli Khels, the Wano valley is also occupied by families of the Sirki Khel, Tazi Khel, Gangi Khel, and Khojal Khel Ahmadzai Waziris, and also by the small *Pawindah* tribe of Dotanis.

The Gangi Khels are also scattered about the Kafirkot range. Taylor says they are engaged in the salt trade, but are always ready to join in any mischief that is going forward with the Kabul Khel and the Hassan Khel Utmanzais.

The Alikhanis are all far beyond the British border.

The Khojal Khels, like the Gangi Khels, are engaged in the salt trade, and are ready to join with the Kabul Khels and Hassan Khels. In the winter they come into the Kohat district among the Khataks.

The Khunia Khels are all beyond the British boundary, and live about sixteen or twenty miles from our frontier. The small section of the Bodin Khels, on the other hand, live within British territory, their land being on the *Thal*.

The Bizand Khels are a well-behaved section. They cultivate some land in a valley in the hills called Ping, which lies to the north of the Gumati pass, between that and Barganattu. They have generally been friendly to the British Government.

The Painsa Khels have lands in British territory on the *Thal*, and this section, with the Bizand Khels and the Bodin Khels, are always ready to stand together.

The Muhammad Khel, Sudan Khel, and Sada Khel sections are known collectively as Spirkai. They all own land in British territory. The Spirkais had generally been well-behaved until the defection of the Muhammad Khel section in 1870, which will be related in its proper place.

The number of the Ahmadzai Waziris now residing in British territory is, roughly speaking, equal to the number living beyond the border. This clan was in possession of land in the Bannu district before the Sikhs arrived in that country, and Edwardes, in 1849, thus describes how the immigration of the Ahmadzais to the plains of Bannu took place: "A multiplying people, increasing flocks, and insufficient grazing grounds, first brought these nomads into Bannu, about thirty years ago. The *Thal*, too dreary and barren for the softer Bannuchis, was to them a tempting space; they drove down their herds into it, and pitched their black blanket tents; the flocks fattened, and the winter which raged in their native hills passed luxuriously away in these new plains. The spring sun rekindled the love of home, and made the goat-skin cloak hang heavy on the shoulders of the mountaineer, and the sheep to bleat under its fleece. The tribe turned their faces towards Spinghar, and the Bannuchi thieves, hanging on the rear of their march to the very borders of the valley, were afraid to venture within the range of the *jazails* of the Ahmadzais, and the strangers went away unchallenged. Again and again the winter brought them back, and, in occasional collisions between the savage of the plain and the savage of the mountain, the Waziri proved ever the more savage, and became a name of fear and hatred in Bannu. At length the Waziri cast his eyes on the Bannuchi fields and harvests, and became possessed with the lust of land; so he proceeded in his rough way to occupy what he wanted, which, for the convenience of being within reach of his own people, he chose nearest to the *Thal*; and when the Bannuchi owner came to look after his crops he was 'warned off' with a bullet, as a trespasser. A sad era was this in Bannuchi annals. Hushed

*Immigration of
the Ahmadzai
Waziris to the
plains of Bannu.*

were all private feuds now, for the lion had come among the wolves. *Malik* after *malik* was being robbed.

“At length the two great *gundis* (factions) laid aside their differences, and met in high council on the national dilemma. Then had been the time to fight, and fight desperately, ere the intruders had taken root; and some voices did cry out for war; but the chiefs of the two *gundis* knew their strength, and that the whole valley could not muster 20,000 men. On one side their neighbours of Dawar were afraid to assist them, for their little valley was nearer than Bannu to the Waziri hills. The brave men of Marwat on the other side were scarcely less hostile than the Waziris. The Waziris themselves could summon 40,000 warriors. The ‘council of war’, as usual, resolved on peace, ‘tempered’, as Talleyrand said of the Russian despotism, ‘by assassination’. They would not fight the Waziri tribe, but they would harass individuals with matchlock, knife, and ambuscade; and make occupation or cultivation impracticable. They little knew the Waziri temper. The first act of treacherous hostility drew down a fearful and bloody retaliation. Where at first only a field was gone, now a home was desolate; and so both sides continued—the Waziri encroaching, the Bannuchi resisting; the Waziri revenging, the beaten Bannuchi retiring in despair. At length even this found its limit. Both sides grew weary. Only a few Waziris cared for the new toy of cultivation, and many came to a compromise with the owners for small sums of money, inadequate, but better than nothing. The Waziri intruders built forts like those of the Bannuchis on the plundered lands, and, with the usual facility of revolutions in the East, soon passed into undisputed proprietors of some of the best tracts on the left bank of the Kuram. But they never mixed with the Bannuchis, either in marriage, religious ceremonies, or the more ordinary affairs of life. Had the Bannuchis been less wronged, the Waziri would have been still too proud to mingle blood, pure as the snow on the Safed Koh, with the mongrel lowland tribes of Bannu.”

After the annexation of the Punjab, the Waziris were encouraged not only to retain the lands they had conquered, but to settle on them, and to cease to be graziers and to cultivate the soil. This policy has proved most successful in the case of the Ahmadzai branch of the tribe, nearly all the sections of which have now settled down into good cultivators, and pay their revenue with praiseworthy regularity. They have become eager to possess themselves of as much land as possible, and are not unfrequently to be seen in the British courts litigating for their rights with as much enthusiasm and not less noise than a Bannuchi; for this *Thal*, though sandy, is very favourable for the *rabi*, and in some places produces also good *kharif* crops.

Expedition against the Umarzai Waziris, by a force under Major J. Nicholson, in 1852.

On the annexation of the Punjab in 1849, the Umarzai section of the Ahmadzai Waziris gave much trouble on our border. This section cultivated land in British territory which had been wrested from the Bannuchis of the neighbourhood. The head of these Bannuchis was a local chief, named Bazid Khan. The Umarzais paid their revenue through this man, who was responsible for the collection. Some of the Umarzais, however, used to reap

the harvest, go off to the hills, and leave Bazid Khan to pay instead of them. Bazid Khan would then pay the revenue and occupy the lands of the defaulters. These defaults being repeated, some of the Umarzais were seized, as a last resource. Shortly afterwards, two of the hostages were sent to ask the Umarzais to come into Bannu and settle accounts. The day they came in there happened to be no European officer at Bannu, the district officer and the assistant being in the interior of the district; so that the Umarzais met Bazid Khan: some conversation ensued about the accounts with him, at which the Umarzais were dissatisfied. Forgetting that there were British officers near, who were anxious to settle everything, the Umarzais resolved to wreak their hatred upon the Bannuchis; so that very night they attacked Bazid Khan's villages, in force 3,000 strong, killed several people, among whom was Bazid Khan's son, and sacked fourteen villages, and then escaped, without loss, by the Gumati pass. The estimated damage was nearly Rs. 12,000. This happened on the 3rd of December 1849.

*Expedition
against the
Umarzai
Waziris in
1852.*

Soon after, on the 2nd of January 1850, another party, 1,500 strong, consisting of the Umarzai, Muhammad Khel, and Hati Khel sections, and some Bara Khels, Kabul Khels, and Mahsuds, attacked the post of Gumati, but were gallantly repulsed by a party of 350 footmen, under Mr. MacMahon, Extra Assistant Commissioner, with a loss of four killed and twelve wounded.

Again, in February 1850, the Gumati post was attacked, but without success.

In November 1850 the Umarzais, having induced the Mahsud Waziris to join them, made a formidable demonstration with several thousand men. They intended to attack the town of Bannu itself, had they not found a strong force ready for them. They therefore assailed some border villages, but were repulsed. In December of the same year they carried off a convoy of supplies on its way to Latamar.

In 1851 they induced the Kabul Khels to join them, and appeared with 2,000 men, but retreated before our troops. In March they made a night attack on an outpost, but were driven back with loss by the garrison, consisting of detachments of the 2nd Punjab Cavalry and the 2nd Punjab Infantry, a sowar of the former being wounded. During the same year they were guilty of an attack on a police guard, and also on a baggage party.

Deputy Commis-
sioner's report.

From 1851 to 1852 the outposts of Bannu were constantly engaged in skirmishes with the Waziris, who came down almost daily, and occupied the low hills in front of the Gumati post, firing long shots at the men holding it; but the enemy never could be drawn into close quarters in the plain, and following them even into the low range of hills was strictly forbidden.

Regimental His-
tory, 2nd Punjab
Infantry.

Captain Walsh's report.

No. 2 Punjab Light Field Battery.
2nd Punjab Cavalry.
2nd Punjab Infantry.

On one occasion, 13th March 1851, a body of some 500 or 600 Waziris entered the plains near the Gumati pass and were driven back to the hills by the outposts; when Captain T. P. Walsh, with the troops marginally noted, moved out from Bannu, and after a skirmish drove the enemy with some loss from the breastworks they had erected across the pass. The casualties on our side were two men of the Artillery and one man of the 2nd Punjab Infantry wounded.

Efforts had been twice made to settle some terms with the Umarzais, but

*Expedition
against the
Umarzai
Waziris in
1852.*

by stealth. Thus, ever since the Umarzais had left their lands, they had been in open rebellion against us, and, at the end of 1852, permission was accorded to Major John Nicholson, the Deputy Commissioner, to arrange for their chastisement. At the time this permission was received, it was believed that a portion of the tribe would make submission, and operations were deferred while the result of their councils was at all doubtful.

But, very shortly afterwards, the southern Umarzais, who were thinly scattered in the low hill between the Tochi river and Gabar mountain, incited by a holy man, suddenly marched down towards the Kuram, in the hope of surprising one of our villages. In this they were frustrated by the arrangements made by Major Nicholson; and the time had now arrived for showing them that it was not fear which had induced us to offer to listen to any offers of submission, and that we were not to be annoyed any longer with impunity.

As the greatest secrecy was absolutely necessary, the 4th Punjab Infantry was ordered to march from Bahadur Khel, as if in course of relief, and two companies of the 1st Punjab Infantry were ordered from Kohat, with the same reason assigned, while the 6th Punjab Police Battalion were ordered up from Dera Ismail Khan.

The plan of operations was as follows:—One column was to march from Bannu at 10 P.M. on the 20th December, through the Gumati pass on Derabina and Garang (the former distant about fourteen, and the latter about seventeen or eighteen, miles), so that, if possible, a simultaneous attack might be made on both places at daybreak. The latter village was at the foot of a narrow, precipitous chasm in the Kafirkot range, through which ran the road to Sapari, which is not far from the summit of the ridge. If the surprise proved complete, and this pass was undefended, the force was to advance by it to Sapari, otherwise it was to await until Sapari had been taken by the second column in reverse.

A second column was to move from Latamar at 9 P.M. on Sapari by the Barganattu pass (distance about twenty miles). This column consisted of the troops coming from Bahadur Khel and Kohat, which were to reach Latamar that day.

Both these columns were to bivouac the next night in the neighbourhood of Garang or Derabina.

A third column was to move from Bannu at 11 P.M. on the Umarzai encampments, thinly scattered among the low hills near the mouth of the Khasora and Sein passes; it was to be accompanied by the *maliks* of the Jani Khel and Baka Khel sections, who would be useful as guides, as well as to prevent any members of their sections from making common cause with the Umarzais. The *kiris* were so few and thinly scattered that it was not expected this column would be able to effect much, but it was considered its operations would show the Umarzais that they were no longer secure in that part of the country, and that they would have to seek other and inferior pasturage.

Major Nicholson added that the Umarzais were so weak he should not have thought of taking so large a force against them, were it not that the presence of a small force might, and probably would, induce the neighbouring sections to coalesce against us.

Mounted videttes from the levies were to be posted early on the night of

Latamar posts, to prevent any spies from Bannu or the *Thal* preceding the columns with intelligence.

The heights on each side of the Gumati pass were to be occupied by parties of foot levies as soon as the force had entered the hills.

The next day the *Thal* was to be patrolled from an early hour by cavalry, to prevent any Waziris entering the hills.

On the night of the 20th December 1852 the three columns, as per margin,

<i>1st Column.</i>				under the command of Captain J. C. Johnston, Captain T. P. Walsh, and Lieut. J. W. Younghusband, respectively, moved off accordingly to the plans already detailed, Major Nicholson accompanying the second column.
2nd Punjab Infantry.				
<i>2nd Column.</i>				
Two companies, 1st Punjab Infantry	...	140 bayonets.		
4th Punjab Infantry	350 "		
<i>3rd Column.</i>				
2nd Punjab Cavalry	40 sabres.		
Mounted Police	50 "		
6th Punjab Police Battalion	400 bayonets.		

The first column entered the Gumati pass at midnight, and, after a very difficult and fatiguing march of six hours, reached the friendly village of Gumati (*see* Map, p. 494). After crossing the valley in which Gumati is situated, and a low range of hills, the village of Derabina was reached by the column, when all the flocks were captured and the village was destroyed. Captain Johnston then advanced, and with two companies crowned the hills above the Garang ravine, the remainder of his regiment holding the hills which commanded the entrance to it; and so correctly had the combination been arranged and executed, that, as this column arrived on the top of the hills, the head of the second column, under Captain Walsh, which had marched from Latamar, was seen emerging from the village of Garang.

The second column entered the Barganattu pass (nine miles from Latamar) at midnight, and following the course of the *nullah* for about twelve miles, the crest of the Kafirkot range was reached, after a gradual ascent, a little before daybreak. After a short halt, the troops descended into a *nullah* leading towards the Kuram river; and after about a mile, some Waziri encampments were seen.

The first village, Sapari, was taken completely by surprise, and destroyed, and a considerable number of sheep and five camels fell into our hands; the enemy, it was said, had eight men killed. Three other encampments in the very formidable Garang pass were destroyed, but they had been abandoned before the troops could get up. This column was joined by the first column at about 9 A.M. at the mouth of the Garang defile, when the troops proceeded to the village of Gumati, where they bivouacked for the night; the 1st Punjab Infantry and 4th Punjab Infantry having marched over some twenty-eight miles of ground very difficult in many places.

The combined movements of the first and second columns had been so well executed, and the surprise was so complete, that the enemy had been able to offer little resistance; the Umarzais had been defeated (with only two casualties on our side during the operations) in their own hills, which Major Nicholson considered more difficult than any he had seen in Afghanistan.

But, however successful these operations had been, they had been dearly purchased, for, on the 4th Punjab Infantry reaching their bivouac, twenty-three of the regiment were reported missing. It was ascertained afterwards

*Expedition
against the
Umarzai
Waziris in
1852.*

*Expedition
against the
Umarzai
Waziris in
1852.*

that these men had either fallen out, overcome by sleep and fatigue, or straggling behind had missed the road, when they were killed by the Waziris in detail after the corps had descended from the heights.

The troops were not molested at their bivouac, nor on their return to Bannu by the Kuram pass the following morning. Before the column marched for Bannu, a wing of the 2nd Punjab Infantry, under Major Nicholson, destroyed some more encampments, without any resistance on the part of the enemy.

The third column, after passing through low hills, reached open ground at daybreak, when the cavalry were pushed on against the nearest village, the cattle of which were captured and the village burnt. Two other villages were then destroyed by the infantry; but as the highest range had now been reached, and as the troops were within three miles of Dawar, no further advance, according to instructions, was made.

Lieutenant Young-
husband's despatch.

As the column retired with the captured flocks and herds, the Waziris endeavoured to annoy the skirmishers holding the heights on the sides of the passes, but with little effect, and the 6th Punjab Police Battalion had only one non-commissioned officer killed and two men wounded; the loss of the enemy was believed to have been pretty severe, and two of their number were taken prisoners.

The men of the 6th Punjab Police Battalion had marched one hundred miles in four days to take part in the operations, and twelve hours after their arrival at Bannu they had entered the hills, marching not less than thirty miles before they returned to their camp in British territory.

The approbation of Government was subsequently conveyed to Major Nicholson and the other officers for the way in which the operations had been conducted.

In the month of September 1853 Major Nicholson reported that the tribe were thoroughly humbled, and had several times sent in suing for peace; but he recommended that terms should not be accorded to them for a time. Their request was, however, subsequently granted, and they were re-admitted to their lands in Bannu; and since then, with the exception of the occasion of the Muhammad Khel complications in 1870, they have given little trouble.

Expedition against the Kabul Khel Waziris, by a force under Brigadier-General N. B. Chamberlain, C.B., in 1859-60.

Next to the Umarzai, the section of the Darwesh Khel Waziris which gave most trouble on our border after the annexation was the Kabul Khel section of the Utmanzai branch.

In the autumn of 1850 they signalled themselves by an audacious attack on Bahadur Khel and its salt mines. For this purpose they assembled in considerable force, and induced many Khatak villages round Bahadur Khel to league with them.

Troops* were, however, promptly brought up from Nari to the scene of action, and the Waziris dispersed without effecting much mischief. The cavalry pushed on ahead of the infantry, and on their approach the enemy fled, pursued by the cavalry, by whom eleven of their number were killed, amongst them being a *malik* and his son. The villagers had six wounded.

* Detachment 1st
Punjab Cavalry.
Five companies,
Police Battalion.

*Expedition
against the
Kabul Khel
Waziris in
1859-60.*

This attempt does not appear to have been prompted by any particular motive. There was no grievance with regard to salt. Any doubts which the Waziris might have felt as to the intentions of the British Government had been long since removed, when the salt mines were opened at the beginning of 1850, and a very low rate demanded. Being, like the Afridis, largely engaged in the salt-carrying trade, they doubtless had perceived the political importance of the mines, and the great influence which accrued to the British Government from the possession of them. For the same reasons, the Khataks envied their masters the command of these valuable resources, and would have been glad if, in co-operation with the Waziris, they could have secured their possession. It is probable, however, that no fixed idea existed in the minds of these savages on this occasion, and there certainly had been no provocation whatever given.

After this attack it was determined to hold Bahadur Khel in force, and to construct a fort. During the construction of this work, on which the 4th Punjab Infantry and the men of the Police Battalion were employed, the Waziris gave all the opposition in their power, and constantly harassed the working parties.

On one occasion a party of some 50 or 60 marauders were attacked by 11 sabres of the 1st Punjab Cavalry, when two were killed and some seven wounded, the cavalry having two men wounded.

Regimental History,
1st Punjab Cavalry.

In 1851 they joined, as already shown, with the Umarzais in their misconduct, and on the 11th of March, in conjunction with them and others, they assembled and threatened the post of Gumati, but were driven back by the 2nd Punjab Infantry with some loss. On the following days they also threatened the Kuram post, and on the 17th attacked it in force; but it being garrisoned by 20 sabres of the 2nd Punjab Cavalry and 50 bayonets of the 2nd Punjab Infantry, they were driven back with considerable loss. They then dispersed, but did not desist from their misconduct.

During Captain J. Coke's expedition to Miranzai in October 1851, already narrated, they annoyed the picquets while the column was halted at Thal, and also at Biland Khel. From 1852 to April 1854 no less than nineteen raids were committed by them, in which thirty-two camels, twenty-seven bullocks, three horses, forty donkeys, and two hundred and thirty sheep were carried off. As the practice was on the increase, Captain J. Coke, the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat, took decisive steps. The Kabul Khels were interdicted from trading at the salt mines. Two parties of these people, together with their cattle, were seized; and by the medium of one of their men a message was sent to the head-quarters of the section, to the effect that unless satisfaction was given the cattle would be sold, the proceeds being applied to the reimbursement of the sufferers by the raids, and the men would be detained as hostages. The tribe then lost no time in making terms; the value of the stolen property was realised, and the chief of another section of the tribe came forward as security for the future good conduct of the Kabul Khels. Their prisoners were then released; and for a time the tribe

*Expedition
against the
Kabul Khel
Waziris in
1859-60.*

In 1855, as mentioned in the previous chapter (*see* page 441), the Miranzai Field Force, under Brigadier N. B. Chamberlain, moved to Thal, to effect a settlement with the Kabul Khels on account of sundry questions and differences with the *maliks* of the British village of Thal. The force arrived at Thal on the 6th of May, and was halted there until the 17th, and the mere exhibition of our strength was sufficient to bring them to terms, without resort to punitive measures. The settlement with the Kabul Khels is thus graphically described by Major H. B. Edwardes, C.B., the Commissioner.

The Kabul Khel *maliks* had been summoned, but they declined to come in; they said they were afraid, knowing they had opposed Captain Coke in 1851. The Commissioner then wrote to assure them that they would be honourably treated if they would come in and hear what he had to say; when, if they did not agree to his terms, they should be free to return. He even told them to keep his messenger as a hostage; but nothing could move their distrust, and their only answer was to retire to the adjacent hills. So two regiments of infantry and one of cavalry, with some guns, were moved across the Kuram.

On arriving at Biland Khel, the infantry and guns were left before that village, whilst the Brigadier and the Commissioner pushed on with the cavalry a few miles down the high bank of the river. There the Waziri harvest was spread out beneath them in a waving sheet of ripening corn as far as the eye could reach, dotted here and there with *shisham* trees, and profusely watered by the Kuram river. A more peaceful or beautiful landscape could scarcely be imagined, and it was resolved to exhaust all measures of conciliation rather than disturb it. As none of the Waziris were to be seen, a last message was sent to them in the hills, that there was no wish to injure them or their crops, and an hour was given them to come in.

The stillness of the scene was disturbed occasionally by the angry drums of the men of Thal, who, with sword and sickle, and beasts of burden, had come across, under cover of the force, to wreak vengeance on their Waziri enemies. One of them, a decrepit old man, gathered up all his strength for the occasion, and, unobserved by the British officers, swam across the Kuram to a narrow strip of Waziri land at the foot of the hills on the left bank. Presently he was seen plunging into the stream on his way back, pursued by screaming women and shouting men, while a dense volume of smoke, rising from a threshing-floor on the opposite bank, proclaimed that he had fired the corn stacks of his own particular enemy. Arriving safely on our side, the old man seemed beside himself with joy. First, he threw himself at the feet of Captain B. Henderson, the Deputy Commissioner, as if worshipping the Nemesis who had brought such righteous things to pass; and then he performed a war dance in front of the troops, relating between whiles the injury he had sustained, the years he had watched for revenge, and how comfortable he now felt that the account was cleared. This was the only act of violence that day.

At last the patience of the Commissioner was rewarded by the arrival of a Waziri *malik*, named Mazulla, as a hostage for whose safety our own messenger had been detained upon the hill. The bitterness of the feud with Thal here showed itself, one of the headmen of Thal calling out, "That is not a *malik*; I know him; he is only a common fellow." It afterwards turned out that Mazulla was the leading man of all the Waziris then in the plains, but he had closed with the Thal man's sister. A few days later

versation sufficed to convince him that all those English officers, and all those soldiers, had not been standing for hours in the sun with any hostile feelings towards his tribe, and that it only required a word to be spoken to let loose the whole force, including the men of Thal, into the crops. He struck his big hand upon his chest, and swore that if the force was drawn off, he would bring in all the Waziri *maliks* to camp by sunset. This was agreed to. He was warned that, if he did not keep his word, the troops would be back there again by sunrise next day, and the crops cut without further parley.

*Expedition
against the
Kabul Khel
Waziris in
1859-60.*

True to his word, Mazulla arrived at sunset with thirty or forty Waziri *maliks*, and from that moment no difficulty arose. In the presence of the Thal and Waziri chiefs the Commissioner took the accounts of the losses of men and cattle suffered (during British rule) on both sides, and they proved to be about equal.

The Commissioner then advised them to cry quits and make friends, as Government could not permit this state of things to continue. Both parties seemed to feel this proposition a relief, and the Waziris especially entered into the details of an agreement with a heartiness which showed that they were sincere. The negotiations lasted three days, and closed with both sides swearing on the *Koran* to abstain from further feuds.

This characteristic agreement entered into between the Kabul Khel tribe and the village of Thal was as follows :—

“We, the Kabul Khel Waziris and *maliks* of Thal, hereby agree—

“1st. That whatever bloodshed, or plunder, or any other kind of loss, has been between us up to this date, is hereby forgiven. Let bygones be bygones.

“2nd. In future we will be friends, and cease from hostilities.

“3rd. If any man of Thal or any Bangash of Miranzai in future injure a Kabul Khel Waziri, the Waziris shall not take the law into their own hands, but send a petition about it to the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat through Hazrat Nur, or anyone else they can trust, who shall take it to the *Tehsildar* of Hangu, and the Government will then be responsible to see justice done.

“4th. If any Kabul Khel Waziri shall injure a Government subject, we, the *maliks* of the tribe, are responsible as follows :—

“If a man is killed or wounded, we will give up the criminal or pay the ‘make-up money’.*

“If robbery takes place, restitutions to be made, on proof on solemn oath.

“5th. The Thal men agree not to assist the Turis in any way to injure the Kabul Khels in future.”

* It was explained that the “make-up money” was as follows :—

	Rs.
1. For killing a Pathan	1,200
2. For killing an inferior man	360
3. For laming a Pathan in hand or foot (for which giving a daughter counts as Rs. 80)	500
4. For laming an inferior man; give a daughter and do penance at the injured man's door.	
5. <i>Scale for fingers</i> —	
A Pathan's thumb or forefinger	60
The other three fingers	60
An inferior man's finger	
Only necessary to take a goat or sheep to his house; kill	

*Expedition
against the
Kabul Khel
Waziris in
1859-60.*

This agreement, which was dated the 15th of May, was in the name of the whole Kabul Khel tribe, and they also undertook to be responsible for the Malik Shahi section, and not to allow a passage through their territory to other sections who were hostile.

In the following year (1856), when the force under Brigadier N. B. Chamberlain was returning from the Kuram valley, five of the cavalry grass-cutters were murdered at Thal by a party of the Miami section of the Kabul Khels; the Miami settlements were accordingly surprised, as already narrated (*see p. 449*), and, as there was not sufficient evidence to prove the murder against any individuals, a fine of Rs. 1,200 was taken from the section.

The Kabul Khels did not again misbehave until 1859. On the night of the 5th of November of that year, Captain R. Mecham, Bengal Artillery, commanding No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery, was proceeding from Bannu towards Kohat, when, about two miles from the outpost and village of Latamar, he was set upon and murdered by a gang of marauders. Captain Mecham was at the time very ill, and was travelling in a *doolie*; his escort consisted of two sowars of the Bannu mounted police, he having sent on two men of his battery to Latamar to increase his escort from there. It does not appear that the murderers had any previous knowledge of an officer being likely to pass that way; they were simply prowling about on a marauding expedition, and seeing the approaching light of the torches, they had hidden themselves in some bushes to waylay the travellers. The moment the attack was made, the mounted police basely deserted Captain Mecham, and the *doolie* bearers took to flight. Captain Mecham attempted to keep off his assailants with his revolver, but he was overpowered and cut down. The party consisted chiefly of Hati Khel Ahmadzais, who fled for refuge to the Kabul Khels.

Captain B. Henderson, the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat, at once proceeded to our frontier village of Thal, and summoned the chiefs of the different Waziri sections; but although it was known the act was greatly disapproved by other portions of the tribe, the Kabul Khels refused to render any satisfaction for the murder, or to give up the men implicated, from the strong prejudice amongst the border tribes against the surrender of any person seeking an asylum with them. Our sole object was then explained to the other Waziri sections; and they were warned of the penalties they would incur by siding with the Kabul Khels, from whom it now became necessary to exact retribution by force of arms.

Although the Kabul Khel section numbered only 3,000* men, it remained to be seen whether the rapid advance of the troops would give sufficient weight to our warnings and threats to deter others from openly siding with them. The proverbial unity of the Waziris was against such a supposition (the peculiar customs and laws by which this unity was fostered have been already mentioned); nevertheless, Captain H. R. James, the Commissioner, did not anticipate opposition on the part of the other branches, as we had a great hold on many of them from the fact of their bringing their cattle to graze within our territory, and much could be done in the way of reducing opposition, and in preventing other tribes joining the Kabul Khels by timely warning and advice. It was calculated that 6,000 men might be brought against us, but probably not more than half that number would be collected.

It has been already stated that in the winter months the Utmanzais are

* This was Captain James's estimate at that time. MacGregor puts their fighting strength at 2,500, but this is a very low estimate.

mainly located on the right bank of the Kuram river, and at this time the several sub-divisions of the Kabul Khels were thus located, below the Afghan frontier village of Biland Khel, cultivating for their spring crops.

*Expedition
against the
Kabul Khel
Waziris in
1859-60.*

Regarding the best time for operations, the Commissioner said that there were two seasons when the tribe would be peculiarly open to punishment, *viz.*, at the beginning of winter and in the spring; more real injury could be inflicted in the winter, more apparent in the spring. A force proceeding against them at the former season could carry off their winter stores, and compel them to retreat to their higher hills. In the spring the crops could be destroyed upon which the tribe is dependent in the summer. He therefore advocated immediate action, not only for the above reasons, but because a blow delivered at the time strikes greater terror into the mountain tribes than at a subsequent period.

With regard to the punishment of the Hati Khel section, the Commissioner considered no advance of troops would be required, but it would be necessary to bring strong pressure on the members of the tribe within our border, and to imprison such of their leaders as would not act vigorously in the matter.

The line of operations led through a portion of the territories of the Amir of Kabul, and communications had therefore to be addressed to His Highness on the subject.

As the refusal of the Kabul Khels to make restitution had all along been anticipated, orders had been early given for a force to be assembled at Kohat. It was impossible, as already stated, to say what numbers would be opposed to us, or how far it might be necessary to follow the Waziris into the heart of their mountains, when every additional mile would increase the difficulty of keeping open the communications with the rear; or lastly, what was the nature of the difficulties to be overcome, the country being then totally unknown. It was therefore necessary to employ a force sufficiently large to meet all contingencies.

The force consisted of the troops as per margin, numbering 3,916 of all ranks, and 13 guns (*see* Appendix A), and was under the command of Brigadier-General N. B. Chamberlain, C.B. On the 15th of December 1859 it marched from Kohat, and reached Thal on the 19th. Here the column was joined by a body of Bangash and Khatak levies and police, numbering 240 horse and 1,216 foot, raising the total of the force to 5,372 men.

On the 20th of December the force crossed the Kuram river (*see* Map, p. 494), encamping at the village of Biland Khel, in the territory of the Amir of Kabul; instructions had been sent by His Highness to render every assistance to the expedition, but the troops were only in Kabul territory whilst encamped there, as all the country to the south of that village forms the possessions of the independent Waziris.

Brigadier-General
Chamberlain's
despatch.

Detachment, No 1 Punjab Light Field Battery, 2 guns.
 „ No. 2 Punjab Light Field Battery, 4 „
 „ Peshawar Mountain Train Battery, 4 „
 „ Hazara Mountain Train Battery, 3 „
 „ Guide Cavalry.
 2nd Punjab Cavalry.
 Detachment, Sappers and Miners.
 „ Guide Infantry.
 4th Sikh Infantry.
 1st Punjab Infantry.
 3rd Punjab Infantry.
 4th Punjab Infantry.
 6th Punjab Infantry.
 *24th Punjab Infantry (Pioneers).

*Expedition
against the
Kabul Khel
Waziris in
1859-60.*

Previous to the arrival of the force at Biland Khel, it had been reported to the Deputy Commissioner that Zangi, the leader of the gang to which the murderers of Captain Meham belonged, was at his encampment on the left bank of the Kuram, with about one hundred followers. Brigadier-General Chamberlain awaited only the return of spies verifying this intelligence to send a detachment across the low hills to surprise the party, whilst the cavalry proceeded down the right bank of the river to cut off their retreat in that direction. But by some accident the spies experienced difficulty in gaining the Deputy Commissioner's tent, and when they did arrive it was too late to undertake the enterprise.

The main body of the Kabul Khels had determined to make their stand on a high range of hills called Maidani (highest point 5,000 feet, and about 3,500 above Biland Khel), and to this place they had, previous to crossing the Kuram, removed all their encampments, including their families, flocks, and herds, and had prepared for its defence by storing grain and raising breastworks.

Maidani was about eight miles west of Biland Khel, and its general features might be described as two parallel ranges contiguous to each other, terminating at either end in a gorge, and enclosing a long, narrow valley; the inward slopes of both mountains were tolerably easy, and covered with grass and bushes, but the outward sides or faces were rugged and precipitous.

The two gorges, which were the water channels, were the means of entrance to the valley,—the one facing the east being termed Gandiob, and the other to the south, Zaka.

The watch-fires of the enemy on the surrounding peaks were nightly visible from our camp. The enemy were variously stated at from 2,000 to 3,000 men, and it was known that no other clan had yet joined them; some offers of arms and ammunition had been made, but proudly rejected in their self-confidence, and it was reported on all sides that they considered their position too strong to be attacked. On the 21st, however, there were rumours that the Waziris were planning to remove as soon as the force should break ground, and it was agreed that night, between the Brigadier-General and the Commissioner, that an attack should be made as soon as possible.

Although it had been reported that the easiest and nearest approach was from the Gandiob side, for many reasons it was desirable that the Zaka entrance should be seen before the plan of attack was decided on, and on the 21st a reconnaissance was made by the Brigadier-General with a strong body of cavalry. The distance to the Zaka entrance was found to be about sixteen miles from camp, and the gorge a difficult one. The Gandiob ravine was also examined, and the advantage of that route over the Zaka one verified.

At six o'clock the following morning the troops noted in the margin (the cavalry and field guns being ordered to follow at day-break) marched upon Gandiob, to which place the camp was to be moved. Each corps of the main column was to carry fifty rounds of ammunition per man, and to be accompanied by two mule loads of ammunition. The horses of native officers of infantry were to be left at the camp. All men were to carry cooked food with them.

Peshawar Mountain Train Battery (4 guns), Captain F. R. DeBude, commanding.

Hazara Mountain Train Battery (3 guns), Captain F. R. Butt, commanding.

Guide Infantry, Lieutenant T. G. Kennedy, commanding.

4th Sikh Infantry, Major O. E. Rothney, commanding.

1st Punjab Infantry, Major F. W. Lambert, commanding.

3rd Punjab Infantry, Lieutenant A. U. F. Ruxton, commanding.

4th Punjab Infantry, Lieutenant F. H. Jenkins, commanding.

more confined, with abrupt hills on either side, impracticable for field artillery, which, with the cavalry, remained at the new camp. *Expedition against the Kabul Khel Waziris in 1859-60.*

As Maidani was approached, parties of the enemy were observed on the hill tops, and the Guide Infantry, supported by the Peshawar Mountain Train Battery and the 4th Sikh Infantry, at once ascended the range of hills to the left, whilst the 1st Punjab Infantry, supported by the Hazara Mountain Train Battery and the 3rd Punjab Infantry, crowned the range to the right.

The left column was under the immediate orders of the Brigadier-General, who was accompanied by the Commissioner, while the command of the right column devolved upon Major F. W. Lambert, with whom was the Deputy Commissioner. The orders for both columns were for each to advance along the ridge, and to drive off the enemy.

The 4th Punjab Infantry, in reserve, moved up the bed of the ravine (which runs between and separates the two ranges), so as to close that passage and be ready to assist either column.

Major Lambert's force was the first in action, it having the easiest hill to ascend, and the constant training of the Hazara Mountain Train Battery over the hills of Hazara telling much in its favour; whereas the Peshawar Mountain Train Battery had not had the advantages of such practice on the hillside.

It afterwards appeared that the enemy expected an attack by the Zaka gorge, from the reconnaissance having been made in that direction, and from the pioneers having been employed in making a gun road below Biland Khel, and the main body of the Kabul Khels had therefore posted themselves at that entrance. Breastworks on the right side of the gorge had not been thrown up, and little or no resistance was offered to the column. This enabled Major Lambert from his side to outflank with the mountain guns the breastwork held on the opposite range, and to this circumstance was attributed the little loss sustained by the left column.

On the left range breastworks had been raised at several points, and at first they were bravely defended by the enemy, who numbered about 1,500 men. Indeed, the charge by a small body of Waziri footmen, with some ten or twelve horsemen, upon the skirmishers of the Guide Infantry, whilst ascending to the attack of the first breastwork, was most gallant, and elicited the admiration of our officers and men. It was wonderful how the horsemen, mounted on small, but wiry, mares, managed to charge down over the rocks and declivities.

But it soon became apparent that the enemy were deficient in fire-arms, and, opposed to our arms and discipline, sword and shield and pistol had no chance, and the Waziris were speedily repulsed, and the breastwork carried. Another party of a dozen footmen, behind a low breastwork on the summit of a hill, endeavoured to keep their ground against a company of rifles. Having exhausted their ammunition they took to stones, which in Waziri hands are formidable missiles, and, coming out in front, kept up an incessant discharge, wounding several sepoys. At last, finding that their foes were closing in upon them, several came down sword in hand to die.

The enemy, threatened in flank and pressed in front, were driven from their successive positions at a trifling loss to the troops, and, after two hours' rough climbing, our men were in possession of the heights above the Waziri encampments.

As it was now past noon, and as there was no knowledge of the hills in advance or of the enemy's line of retreat, and as moreover the troops had then

*Expedition
against the
Kabul Khel
Waziris in
1859-60.*

been six hours on foot, and had still to return some miles to camp, possibly followed the whole way, the halt was sounded, and the reserve ordered to destroy the three large encampments. In this work they were zealously assisted by bodies of Turi foot levies, who had followed in rear (*see* p. 452), and in the course of two hours everything was either destroyed or carried off.

Very little grain had been taken away by the Waziris, consequently all their winter stores fell into our hands, together with a large number of sheep and goats.

Rain began to fall in the afternoon, and the troops reached the camp at Gandiob at dusk. No attempt was made to molest the column during its retirement. The casualties were small, being only one killed and sixteen wounded, besides two of the levies wounded (*see* Appendix B).

The enemy left some twenty bodies on the ground, three of their principal leaders being amongst this number; and they must have had about fifty casualties in all.

The rain having cleared during the night, it was determined to follow up the advantage of the previous day; so, after the men had cooked an early meal, and the tents had dried sufficiently, all the infantry (except the Guides) and the two mountain batteries returned to Maidani; whilst the camp, escorted by the Guide Infantry, field guns, and cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel H. B. Lumsden, C.B., changed ground to Shiwa on the Kuram, ten miles below Biland Khel. The same orders were issued to the troops as on the previous day, except that the men were to carry forty instead of fifty rounds, and that there were to be four mule-loads of ammunition instead of two.

Lieutenant-Colonel Lumsden was instructed to detach all his cavalry and two companies of infantry towards the Zaka gorge, as soon as he considered that they could be spared from the protection of the baggage. If they reached that point before Brigadier-General Chamberlain's column arrived there, they were to harass the enemy without committing themselves to serious loss, and the two companies were to be posted on the hills commanding the gorge leading into the Zaka water-course, to keep a retreat open for the cavalry, should they be pressed.

The main body, after leaving Gandiob, passed the smouldering remains of the enemy's encampments, and were approaching the Zaka exit from the valley, when the Deputy Commissioner obtained information which made it appear probable that, by crossing over the range to the right and descending into a small valley named Durnani (which was occupied by the Hassan Khel Waziris, who had declined to assist the Kabul Khels), the troops might be able to come up with some of the flocks and herds which had been driven off by that route; but as the Hassan Khels had hitherto held aloof, warning was sent to them that they would not be injured, but that they must give up any property of the fugitives which might be with them.

Captain B. Henderson, the Deputy Commissioner, then pushed on with some of his levies, followed by the Brigadier-General with a body of infantry, and the Hazara Mountain Train Battery in support; the remainder of the infantry and the other battery moving straight to the camp through the Zaka gorge, destroying *en route* one of the Kabul Khel encampments, which had escaped destruction the previous day, but which the Kabul Khels had not had time to remove.

Captain Henderson's foray proved most successful, and, although none of

the Kabul Khels could be come up with, the levies, supported by the troops, managed to capture 5,000 sheep, 300 bullocks, and 60 camels, the Turis and others carrying off a quantity of property besides, and but for night coming on, many more flocks and herds would have fallen into our hands. Throughout the day no opposition was attempted, the few of the enemy seen confining themselves to flourishing their swords from the summits of the hills. *Expedition against the Kabul Khel Waziris in 1859-60.*

The levies rejoined the troops about dusk at Durnani, and as the camp at Shiwa was some eighteen miles off, the column bivouacked in the dry bed of the *nullah* for the night. The Hassan Khels were required to post picquets on the hills around, and not a shot was fired during the night. It was a strange duty for the Waziris to find themselves called on to perform, and their readiness to comply with all our requisitions indicated how powerless they felt themselves.

At daylight the next morning the column commenced its march towards the camp, and some more flocks and herds fell into our hands. Some high ranges which intervened between Durnani and Shiwa rendered it necessary to make a long detour *via* the Kaitu stream, and it was three o'clock in the afternoon before the troops reached their tents. Rain fell throughout the day, accompanied by a cutting wind; and though many of the men had at last to walk bare-footed, from their shoes having become worn out by their two days' marching over the hills, nothing could have been more cheerful than their manner.

Representatives from the Kabul Khel, Tori Khel and Hassan Khel sections having come in, the force halted four days at Shiwa, when strong escorts were placed at the disposal of the engineer officers to enable them to map the country in the neighbourhood of the camp.

With the Kabul Khels it was determined to hold no immediate communications, but the other two sections were informed that if the Utmanzais would unite and deliver up Zangi, or two of the murderers, we would be satisfied. To this they agreed, giving hostages, and, in token of their sincerity, sent in the next day one Ghulam, a notorious robber suspected of murder. But as in case of laxity in carrying out the agreement coercive measures might become necessary, it was determined to move a force into their country, and as their lands lay to the south of the Kaitu river, a place on that stream called Spinwam was selected for the camp.

Before making this move, however, it was deemed advisable to surprise a small party of the Kabul Khels, who had separated from the rest of their tribe, and had secreted themselves in some very steep hills, a few miles to the south-west of the camp.

Hazara Mountain Train Battery.
Detachment, 2nd Punjab Cavalry.
4th Sikh Infantry.
3rd Punjab Infantry.
One company, 24th Punjab Infantry
(Pioneers).

Accordingly, some hours before daybreak on the 28th, a column, consisting of the troops as per margin, moved out under the command of Major O. E. Rothney, with the Deputy Commissioner, to beat up this party.

Following the downward course of the stream for about seven miles, the column at dawn ascended a range of hills stretching down to the river, below the crest of which, in a small valley, the Waziri encampment was situated. The 3rd Punjab Infantry was then detached, under Lieutenant A. U. F. Ruxton, to take up a position beyond the village; but, on the main column reaching the *kiri*, it was found to be abandoned; what was left of it, however, was destroyed.

The refugees could not have selected a more favourable hiding-place than

*Expedition
against the
Kabul Khel
Waziris in
1859-60.*

that against which Major Rothney had moved, as the precipitous nature of the crags and ravines rendered it a very difficult task to approach it; these difficulties of the route had caused more delay than had been anticipated, and the Waziris, becoming aware of the movement, had at once driven off their cattle.

The direction taken by the enemy was unknown, and the column was halted whilst scouts were searching the country and the surveyors were taking observations. The enemy having been sighted, the column pursued them for some six miles, but without success, for they had too long a start with their cattle; however, a small encampment was destroyed and a few cattle captured.

Lieutenant Ruxton, who had been instructed to pursue independently if opportunity offered, hearing there was another encampment in his front, pushed on for some four miles in a direction at right angles to the main column, and crossed the Kaitu, but found the encampment deserted, which he destroyed; following the tracks of the enemy, some 200 sheep were captured, and a few shots were exchanged. On his return, Lieutenant Ruxton destroyed another small encampment which he had passed on the way, but which he had not then fired for fear of giving the alarm. During the pursuit, hearing there was a village about one mile and a half to the right, Lieutenant Ruxton detached two companies, under Lieutenant H. W. Pitcher, to destroy it; this was done, and, after a pursuit of another two miles, fifty-six sheep and eighty-six head of cattle were taken; there was a slight skirmish with between 200 and 300 of the enemy, who had six men killed, only one non-commissioned officer being wounded on our side.

The 3rd Punjab Infantry rejoined the main column about 2.30 P.M., the whole reaching camp at dusk, having been on foot almost the whole period of its absence.

Early on the morning of the 29th the main body moved to Spinwam, distant ten miles, under the command of the Brigadier-General; and the remainder of the force, under Lieutenant-Colonel Lumsden, moved up the river towards Biland Khel, partly for the purpose of securing our communications with the rear and for the sake of supplies, etc., and also because there was little grass for horses or forage for camels on the Kaitu.

The next day the Davesta Sar, 5,114 feet high, was visited. It was considered by the Waziris as one of their most unassailable strongholds, and several of their encampments, snugly situated amongst the spurs of the mountain, were passed. From the top of the Davesta Sar a most extensive view was obtained, including parts of the Kohat and Bannu districts, and the valleys of Dawar and Khost.

It was known that the murderers of Captain Meham had on their way back been hospitably entertained by one Umber Shah, at whose house they had been seen displaying that officer's property. The camp at Spinwam was in the neighbourhood of the settlements of the section to which this man belonged, and the headmen were therefore summoned; they arrived on the 31st in a great state of alarm, when they were called on to give up Umber Shah, or to take the consequences. They were then allowed to leave the camp on the promise that they would give him up, hostages being taken from them for the fulfilment of this promise. The following day they kept their word, for Umber Shah was brought in a prisoner, to stand his trial. This was a great triumph over Waziri prejudice, and gave promise of success in regard to the murderers.

The force remained at Spinwam on the 1st of January, as the Commissioner was anxious to ascertain the real views of the Utmanzais before moving, and the day was occupied by the survey officers in another long excursion over the Shir-i-Talla plain (the head-quarters of the Tori Khels), close up to the confines of Dawar. *Expedition against the Kabul Khel Waziris in 1859-60.*

In the afternoon a group of twenty-eight captives, male and female, were brought into camp by a party of the Utmanzais, with a piteous story of Zangi's escape.

There being nothing more to detain the troops at Spinwam, the next day the camp moved back to the Kuram, to a spot called Karera, a little below Shiwa, where it was joined by Lieut.-Colonel R. G. Taylor, the Commissioner of Leiah, from Bannu, who had come up the bed of the Kuram with a mounted escort.

Brigadier-General Chamberlain had now settled with the Waziris located on the right bank of the Kuram, but there remained the Gangi Khel and the Umarzai and Hati Khel sections inhabiting the rugged spurs of the Kafirkot range on the left bank of the Kuram.

Early on the 4th of January the troops, as per margin, under the Brigadier-General marched for Sapari, leaving the Peshawar Mountain Train Battery and the 1st and 4th Punjab Infantry, under Major F. W. Lambert, encamped on the right bank of the Kuram, to keep open the communications. After a march of fully twenty miles through defiles, and up the bed of a large ravine called Zangara, the troops reached the village of Sapari, and pitched their camp near the only spring of water.

Lieutenant-Colonel R. G. Taylor had informed the tribes of our intention of visiting their country, and had called upon the chiefs to meet him at Sapari, promising that life and property would be respected if no opposition was offered. With the example of the Kabul Khels before them, resistance was considered by them as hopeless, and fully trusting to our word, their encampments remained as usual, and the women and children drove their cattle and flocks to water in the pool in front of the camp.

On the 5th and 6th, whilst the chiefs of the tribes were assembling, the Kafirkot range and other places, from which the surveyors could complete their map, were visited.

The entire country east of the Kuram is much more difficult than that on the west; the hills are more massed together, huge cliffs meet the eye in every direction, and the inaccessible peaks of the higher mountains assume the appearance of gigantic castles. This similitude strikingly applies to the Kafirkot mountain, which rises above the neighbouring hills grimly pre-eminent. Kafirkot is the name given to a series of peaks, so called from their striking resemblance to the ruins of a gigantic castle. The sides are so precipitous that it proved very difficult to ascend to the top of one of the gigantic pinnacles; a party of five officers, however, succeeded in doing so, and obtained a grand view from the top over Bannu on one side, and away into Miranzai, Dawar, and Khost on the other.

On the afternoon of the 6th the Ahmadzai *maliks* were assembled, and they were told that they must assist in the capture and surrender of the actual murderers of Captain Mecham, as some of these belonged to their branch of the tribe: they were reminded of the immunity and comfort they enjoyed in

Hazara Mountain Train Battery.
Detachment, Sappers and Miners.
3rd Punjab Infantry.
6th Punjab Infantry.
One company, 24th Punjab Infantry (Pioneers).

*Expedition
against the
Kabul Khel
Waziris in
1859-60.*

they must take the consequences. Several claims against the tribe were then satisfactorily disposed of.

The object for which the expedition had been undertaken was now, as far as possible, accomplished, and the troops were free to return to cantonments.

When the main body struck camp on the 7th of January, the 3rd and 6th Punjab Infantry, which were under orders for Dera Ghazi Khan and Dera Ismail Khan, accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel R. G. Taylor, the Commissioner of Leiah, and Captain H. C. Johnstone, of the Survey Department, marched by the Barganattu ravine towards Bannu; whilst the remainder of the force, under Brigadier-General Chamberlain, retraced its steps towards Kohat by the same route as that by which it had advanced, being joined by the detachments under Major Lambert and Lieutenant-Colonel Lumsden, respectively, which had preceded them to Thal.

On the return march a halt of one day was made at Gandiawar, in Upper Miranzai, to enable the Deputy Commissioner to settle some outstanding cases with the Zaimukht tribe, and Kohat was reached on the 14th of January, a month from the date of starting, when the force was immediately broken up.

The spirit and conduct of the troops had been most excellent, and the force returned without the loss of a single follower, or animal carried away. That there had been so little opposition, the Brigadier-General attributed to three causes,—firstly, the strength and efficiency of the force; secondly, the conviction that it had entered the hills to exact reparation, and not to bring the tribes under subjection; and thirdly, to the fact that the appeals made to the neighbouring tribes by the Kabul Khels for assistance had not been responded to, owing in a great measure to the arrangements adopted by the Deputy Commissioner to keep them aloof.

The weather had proved favourable. From an unusually good fall of rain during the previous summer, there was more grass and forage than could be always expected in the winter season.

The furnishing of the necessary carriage for the force and the supply of provisions in the field had rested entirely with the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat; and, although all supplies had to be drawn from a distance of from fifty to eighty miles, the Brigadier-General said everything had been most efficient. He also acknowledged the assistance he had received in regard to intelligence from the Deputy Commissioner, and he alluded to the zeal and good spirit of the native chiefs who accompanied the force.

Captain C. Pollard, Bengal Engineers, in a report of the country through which the force had passed, said that the general character of the hills was that of a sandstone formation; the higher ranges covered with a long, coarse grass, but the lower hills almost destitute of vegetation. Conglomerate, consisting of small boulders or water-worn pebbles cemented by a stiff clay, was met with on the left bank of the Kuram, but nowhere on the right bank was this formation observed. Whenever sandstone formation obtained, the heights were invariably accessible, and even mules and horses found little difficulty in ascending paths which at first sight appeared to be too steep to be practicable; this was due to the hold which the animals had on the soft stone, and which prevented them slipping. The conglomerate, on the contrary, was generally precipitous, which, joined to the treacherous nature of its footing, made it nearly, if not quite, impracticable for troops. Throughout the whole of the country traversed, water was generally procurable in small quantities, by

This was more particularly the case where the bed of the *nullahs* was composed of small boulders, or of boulders and silt and sand, but it was doubtful if this supply would be forthcoming in the summer months.

*Expedition
against the
Kabul Khel
Waziris in
1859-60.*

The Governor-General in Council directed that his thanks should be conveyed to Brigadier-General Chamberlain, and to the force under his command, for the promptitude and success with which these important operations had been conducted, observing that in the short period of one month Brigadier-General Chamberlain had exacted reparation from the Kabul Khel Waziris, for the support and shelter given by them to the murderers of Captain Meham; and while effecting that object, that he had exhibited to the tribes of the districts through which he marched, not only the power of the Government to reach and punish those amongst them who are guilty of offences, but its careful forbearance towards all others.

The Indian medal, with a clasp for the "North-west Frontier", was granted G.G.O. No. 812 of 1869. in 1869 to all survivors of the troops engaged in the above operations against the Kabul Khel Waziris.

After the termination of the expedition it was no easy task to get the Ahmadzais to take any steps towards the capture of the murderers. The winter rains and snow on the hills had set in; nevertheless, Lieut.-Colonel R. G. Taylor, the Commissioner, made them assemble a regular little army and enter the hills, and at length, having seized one of the murderers, by name Mohabat, at a place far in the interior, beyond Dawar, they brought him gagged and bound on a *charpoy* to the Deputy Commissioner of Bannu. This man had been one of the party that had committed the murder, and he had, by his own confession, not only encouraged the others to attack the travellers, but he it was who had first struck Captain Meham when getting out of his *doolie*, and had cut him down from behind when he was, though wounded, bravely trying to defend himself with a pistol. On the very spot where the murder had been committed a gallows was erected, and this miscreant was hanged.

Lieut.-Colonel R. G. Taylor believed that the statement made by the Ahmadzais, that the other murderers had dispersed to different places away in the snows, was true; the Ahmadzais thought they had done a great deal in capturing Mohabat, and in doing violence to their strongest prejudices against giving up offenders, and nothing but the re-assembling of the force would have made them do more.

There are no records of what ultimately became of the others of the gang; but some of them found shelter with Adam Khan, a powerful Waziri *malik* in Upper Dawar; and Zangi, the leader of the gang, found refuge with the Mahsuds. The pressure on the Ahmadzais was apparently subsequently relaxed; time, probably the general results of the expedition, and the execution of the principal murderer, may all have operated as causes for this relaxation. In June 1862, when an agreement was entered into with the Mahsud Waziris, one of the stipulations was, that those of the party which assassinated Captain Meham, and who were still at large in independent territory, should receive no shelter from the contracting Mahsuds. But from what we know of Pathan character generally, and that of the ruder hill tribes

*Demonstration
against the
Kabul Khel
Waziris in
1869.*

strictly acted up to, except under the certainty of immediate pressure in the event of its infringement.

The next occasion on which we came into contact with the Darwesh Khel Waziris was in 1869. On the 5th of March of that year, the Tazi Khels were preparing to return to their summer quarters, when they were drawn into an ambuscade by their enemies, the Turis, near the village of Thal. The Waziris were overpowered, and lost twelve killed, and six wounded; after stripping the bodies of their arms and clothes, the Turis retreated to their own country before the Waziris could assemble. The Waziris believed that the inhabitants of Thal, who are Gar in politics, and friends of the Turis, brought down the latter on them. Accordingly, on the 2nd of April 1869 a body of Waziris, principally of the Kabul Khel and Tazi Khel sections, retaliated by attacking the village of Thal, and succeeded in carrying off about 700 head of cattle.

Lieutenant P. L. N. Cavagnari, the Deputy Commissioner, at once demanded restitution of the stolen property; this the Waziris flatly refused; and Lieutenant-Colonel C. P. Keyes, commanding the troops of the Kohat district, was called upon to move such a body of troops into Miranzai as would enable him to destroy the crops of the Kabul Khels in the vicinity of the border, if the demand on them for reparation was not complied with.

No. 1 Punjab Light Field Battery, 2 guns.	under Lieutenant-Colonel C. P. Keyes, C.B.,
Peshawar Mountain Battery, 2 guns.	accompanied by 1,000 Khatak and 1,500
4th Punjab Cavalry ... 250 sabres.	Bangash levies, and 120 police, with the
1st Punjab Infantry ... 390 bayonets.	Deputy Commissioner, marched from Kohat
2nd Punjab Infantry ... 390 „	on the 17th, and reached Thal on the 22nd
4th Punjab Infantry ... 380 „	of April.

On the day the force arrived at Thal, the chief men of the Kabul Khel section, with two exceptions, tendered their submission. The two other headmen came in two days afterwards; their absence had been caused by the Thal men having led them to believe that a surprise was intended, and that their crops would be destroyed without further parley, and they had consequently retired with their followers to a considerable distance. The *maliks* acknowledged they could not justify themselves for committing such an outrage in British territory, but pleaded it was only a just reprisal for the wanton attack which they said the men of Thal had committed; at the same time they declared themselves ready to comply with the Deputy Commissioner's demands. These were, to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000 to Government, to restore the plundered cattle that remained in their hands, and to pay up on the part of the whole tribe a further sum of 8,000 Kabuli rupees, which was sworn by the men of Thal to be the value of the remaining plunder; and further, to give hostages for their future good behaviour, and also as security for the payment of the fines. The troops then returned to Kohat. The fines were paid in March 1870.

The Government considered that this successful result was mainly attributable to the alacrity and promptitude displayed by all concerned; and it directed this opinion to be conveyed to Lieutenant-Colonel Keyes and those employed under his orders.

In the following year, 1870, the Muhammad Khel section began to give considerable trouble on the Bannu border. This is a small section of the Ahmadzai Waziris, numbering only about 250 fighting men, which, as already

in the Bannu district, where they held the lands on either bank of the Kuram river where it issues from the hills.

They had, previous to this, been looked on as a well-behaved section, and with the exception of a slight *émeute* in 1848, at the beginning of the British connection with Bannu, had given little trouble.

At the beginning of 1870, or at the end of 1869, a *baniah* was carried off in the Kuram pass, for which pass the Muhammad Khels were responsible, and they were therefore heavily, but according to their ideas unjustly, fined. Shortly afterwards the water in the Kuram fell very low, when they were ordered by the *Tehsildar* to repair a *band*, which diverted the little water that remained on to the Bannuchi lands. They did this grumblingly, because their own lands were dry, but they shortly afterwards cut the *band* and seized the water for themselves, for which they were again heavily fined; and they now made up their minds to commit some outrage against the Government. They sold their property, abandoned their lands in our territory, and retired into the hills without attracting in any special manner the attention of the local authorities, who considered the matter to be unimportant, and failed to impress on the military authorities the necessity for any exceptional precautions.

Muhammad
Khel compli-
cations in
1870-71.

At daylight on the morning of the 13th of June 1870, as a detachment of 10 bayonets of the 4th Sikh Infantry, marching from Bannu for the relief of the Kuram outpost, was passing through the old (abandoned) Kuram post, it was fired on by a party of the Muhammad Khels, who lay concealed behind the walls and in the neighbouring *nullah*, when six of the detachment were killed and one wounded; a syce and a pony of the 1st Punjab Cavalry, which were with the detachment, being also killed.

About half-a-mile behind the infantry were 11 sabres of the 1st Punjab Cavalry, also proceeding as a relief to the Kuram post; this detachment, on hearing the shots, immediately galloped up, and were joined by a similar detachment from the post. The Muhammad Khels numbered about 140 men; but the ground they were in was so broken, and they clung so obstinately to the ravines and the banks of the Kuram, that the cavalry could not charge; they, however, made use of their carbines with some effect, and the Waziris retreated, leaving two men dead on the ground. The casualties in the 1st Punjab Cavalry were two non-commissioned officers and one sowar wounded, and two horses killed.

Whilst the attack was going on, the 1st Punjab Cavalry was route marching along the Kuram road, and as soon as the intelligence was received, Captain C. S. Maclean pushed the regiment forward rapidly to the Kuram, and proceeded for about three miles up the pass. He did not, however, meet any of the enemy.

The Muhammad Khels were at once proclaimed outlaws; all members of the tribe found in British territory were arrested, and their lands were sequestered till such time as the whole tribe should submit unconditionally, and should give up to justice the men who had joined in the attack on the British detachment.

To those terms the Muhammad Khels refused to submit. From June 1870 to September 1871 they wandered among the hills bordering British territory, supported by the charity of other tribes, who sympathized with them and aided them as much as they dared. They constantly threatened raids in force and they committed numerous petty robberies.

*Muhammad
Khel compli-
cations in
1870-71.*

On the 4th of July 1870, as they were threatening British territory, Lieut.-Colonel P. F. Gardiner, who was commanding at Edwardesabad, moved out with the 2nd Sikh Infantry and the artillery and cavalry of the Edwardesabad garrison, but the enemy retreated as the troops came up. The 2nd Sikh Infantry had thirteen men struck down by heat apoplexy, of whom three died.

On the 12th of February 1871 a party of 80 or 100 raiders made a night attack on the village of Sukhi, situated only 800 or 900 yards from the Gumati post. Although the picquet on duty, on hearing the alarm, instantly galloped towards the place, and soon afterwards actually came upon the Waziris, who were retreating through the ravines which lay between the village and the hills, yet the ground was so unsuited for cavalry that they were not able to inflict any loss on the enemy, who escaped in the darkness, leaving, however, their booty behind them.

The Muhammad Khels then endeavoured to prevent the erection of the new tower on the Kuram *band*. They had for some days constantly shown themselves on the hills near the Kuram, and fired, though without effect, on the body of troops who protected the building of the new tower. On the 31st of March a party of fifty or sixty of them coming down into the *nullah* near the tower, were driven back by a party of the 2nd Punjab Infantry, headed by Lieutenant H. De la M. Hervey, 1st Punjab Cavalry, when three of their number were wounded. Lieutenant Hervey's conduct on this occasion received the expression of the Lieutenant-Governor's satisfaction.

On the 24th of April another attempt was made on the Kuram *band* tower. This attack, however, was gallantly and successfully repulsed by the garrison of the Kuram outpost, consisting of 35 bayonets, 4th Sikh Infantry, and 11 sabres, 1st Punjab Cavalry, under Jemadar Kalandar Bakhsh, 4th Sikh Infantry, who was himself severely wounded. A sepoy of the 4th Sikhs and a sowar of the 1st Punjab Cavalry were also slightly wounded. The Waziris retreated to the low hills, whence they kept up a desultory fire with the garrison, but well out of rifle range. Captain W. J. Forlong and Lieutenant H. De la M. Hervey, 1st Punjab Cavalry, with 25 sabres from Edwardesabad, reached the scene soon afterwards, when the enemy retreated to the crest of the hills, and eventually disappeared. The Muhammad Khels were known to have had one man killed in this affair.

The tribe at length, weary of being hunted from place to place, dependent for the means of subsistence on the charity of others, were now anxious to come to terms, and would gladly have accepted any punishment short of surrendering the original offenders. This was the one condition to which their Afghan pride would not submit, and which long delayed the settlement of the case. But the Lieutenant-Governor was convinced that nothing less than unconditional surrender should be accepted, and pressure was put on the neighbouring tribes to expel the offenders from their limits.

They were at length driven to extremities, and on the 20th of September 1871 they surrendered unconditionally to the Commissioner of the Derajat. The whole tribe, with their women, children, and cattle, came into the cantonment of Edwardesabad, where, with their heads bare and turbans bound round their necks, they threw their arms, matchlocks, swords, pistols, and shields in a heap at the feet of the Commissioner, and implored forgiveness for their offences.

Complete pardon for offences of such enormity it was impossible to accord; but, on the other hand, the Government could not but be satisfied with the result.

inflicted should bear in the eyes of border tribes no appearance of revenge. The humiliation of the Muhammad Khels had been so unprecedented, and the assertion of the authority of the British Government so complete, that there was no fear of mercy being mistaken for weakness. The six headmen of the section were accordingly sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment in the Lahore jail, and heavy fines were imposed on the tribe, on payment of which they were permitted to return to their lands in British territory. *Muhammad Khel compli- cations in 1870-71.*

To render this lesson more impressive, it was determined to call to account the several sections which, during the outlawry of the Muhammad Khels, had afforded them assistance or shelter. First were the Umarzais. They had not only passively, but actively, assisted them. Some were engaged in the attack on the village of Sukhi on the 12th of February, others were present at the skirmish in the Kuram pass on the 24th of April, and others were guilty of separate acts of hostility. They were accordingly ordered to produce all the men concerned in these outrages. These, with three exceptions, were given up, when fines proportionate to their offences were levied.

The Bizand Khels were next called to account, and paid without demur the fine imposed on them.

Lastly, the village of Gumati, inhabited by Sudan Khel Waziris, who had harboured the Muhammad Khels, aided their raids, and covered their retreat from the plains with stolen property, was utterly destroyed. It was decided that the burning of this village would be the punishment having the most lasting effect, while at the same time it would not seriously impoverish the tribe. The order for the burning of the village was carried into effect by the inhabitants themselves, in presence of Mani Khan, chief of the Sudan Khel Waziris, and Muhammad Hyat Khan, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Bannu.

The villages of Lower Dawar, however, who had also given shelter to the Muhammad Khels, did not submit, and refused to pay the fine imposed, and in consequence, Brigadier-General Keyes, commanding the Punjab Frontier Force, visited that valley with a force, the operations of which are described in Chapter XVI.

At the end of 1872 His Excellency Lord Northbrook saw the Muhammad Khel prisoners in the Lahore jail, and, considering that they had been sufficiently punished, he was pleased to direct their release.

In January 1874 reprisals were made on the Miami section of the Kabul Khel Waziris for plundering a caravan of Ghilzai traders proceeding from British territory to Kuram, and in the following March troops were moved to Thal for the purpose of settling claims against the different Waziri tribes on the Kohat border.

The force,* consisting of 1,000 men of all ranks, under the command of

	Of all ranks.	Colonel P. F. Gardiner, commanding at Kohat, and accompanied by Captain P. L. N. Cavagnari, the Deputy Commissioner, left Kohat on the 26th of March, and arrived at Thal on the 1st of April.
* Peshawar Mountain Battery ...	152	
1st Punjab Cavalry ...	82	
2nd Sikh Infantry ...	383	
3rd Punjab Infantry...	383	

A satisfactory settlement was then effected with the Kabul Khel, Malik Shahi, Khojal Khel, and Tazi Khel sections, and the force returned to Kohat on the 22nd of April.

During the next few years the Darwesh Khel Waziris gave but little trouble on our border. They were engaged in carrying on a tedious war in the independent hills, beyond the frontier, with the other great branch of the

*Misconduct of
Zalli Khel
Waziris in
1879.*

Waziris—the Mahsuds. This feud had no injurious effect on our border administration, but rather the contrary; the occupation of these predatory tribes in internecine strife tending to withdraw their attention from plundering in British territory. In this feud, owing to the dissensions amongst the different sections of the Darwesh Khel branch, the Mahsuds had the advantage in almost every instance of hostile collision. In September 1878 a truce was agreed to by the two tribes, and the feud which had lasted for so long was patched up.

At the commencement of the war in Afghanistan, the Waziris, and more especially the Mahsud clan, as will be seen in the next chapter, were incited from Kabul to commit depredations on the British border. The Darwesh Khels as a body do not appear to have given way to this excitement, but one section of the Ahmadzai clan was guilty of a serious outrage on our territory. This was the Zalli Khel section, who, as already stated, live in the neighbourhood of the Gumal valley. In the hot weather they retire to the Wano valley to the east of the Mahsud country, and in the cold weather they come down and encamp on the Gumal border, between the mouth of the Gumal pass and the little Girni pass, and graze their flocks in the low hills and adjacent plains. They had undertaken for the last four years the responsibility of the passes in front of their *kiris*.

On the 2nd of January 1879 a body of Zalli Khels (some 300 or 400 strong) aided by Mianis,* who are British subjects dwelling in the Gumal valley, surrounded the Jatta post. The garrison, consisting of eighteen men of the police, behaved in a cowardly manner, and surrendered the post without a blow, when it was immediately plundered and burnt by the enemy, who then went on and plundered and looted the Gumal bazar, which is only about two miles distant from the Manjhi military post. The affair was not attended with bloodshed, and the Zalli Khels seem to have acted on the impulse of the moment on hearing of the raid on Tank on the previous day (see p. 533). This is borne out by the fact that they had not time to warn a large convoy of theirs coming from Bannu with grain, and the consequence was the convoy fell into our hands, and forty of their tribesmen were made prisoners as they neared the Gumal border. The convoy was confiscated, and realised Rs. 3,164; but the total damage caused to property in the above raid was estimated at over Rs. 12,000.

For their part in this outrage the Mianis were made to pay a fine of Rs. 3,000, and their ringleaders, brought to trial before the ordinary tribunals of law, were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment.

With regard to the Zalli Khels, all property belonging to their tribe found in British territory was seized, and in the following January Captain E. A. Money, commanding at Tank, in consultation with Major C. E. Macaulay, the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan, arranged to make a raid on a party of Zalli Khels, with the object of capturing their cattle, which were reported to be grazing close to the border. Small parties of infantry and a few cavalry were accordingly, during the evening of the 27th of January 1880, told off from the Kot Khirgi, Girni, Jatta, and Manjhi posts to act as covering parties to a body

Major Macaulay's
report.

* The *Mianis* are a small tribe inhabiting a portion of the Gumal valley in the Dera Ismail Khan district to the north of the Luni river. A great part of the tribe leave the plains in the hot weather, and go to the Waziri hills. A portion of the Mianis are independent *Pawindahs*, but are closely allied to those in British territory.

of levies composed of Batanis,* Mianis, and Ghorazais,† who were to be employed in driving off the cattle from the hills. The troops marched from their different posts during the night, and both they and the levies reached their allotted positions in the hills unobserved before the break of day, and commenced the descent on to the Zalli Khel flocks, in the direction of the plains, as soon as it was daylight. The surprise was complete, and the shepherds and watchmen fled in dismay. The number of cattle captured was four hundred sheep and nearly three thousand goats, and were valued at Rs. 9,000. The enemy followed up one party, but was kept at a distance by the fire of the infantry. There were no casualties on our side, those of the enemy being

Raid on a party of Zalli Khel Afridis in 1880, and their subsequent submission.

Captain Money's
report.

estimated at four. The troops performed their work exceedingly well, and were most keen and cheerful in doing all that was required of them.

After this the Zalli Khels offered to make good the damage caused to property in the raid in January 1879, and also to pay any fine the Government might think fit to impose upon them. This led to the recovery of the sum of Rs. 16,021,‡ at which the fine and compensation had been fixed, and the tribe was again admitted to intercourse with British territory.

Returning now to the Kohat and Bannu borders. At the commencement of the war in Afghanistan a convoy route was opened between Thal and Bannu. This route, which followed for the most part the line of the river Kuram, passed through the independent territory of the Utmanzai and Ahmadzai Waziris, and had not been traversed by British troops since the Kabul Khel expedition of 1859, above related. During the winter of 1878-79 several detachments of British cavalry and infantry, and the whole of the Jind and Kapurthala Contingents, marched by this route, and it was very extensively used for convoys of supplies and transport animals for the Kuram Valley Field Force, Waziri camels being employed largely in carrying commissariat stores. In spite of the efforts of the well-known Mulla Adkar of Khost to interfere with the arrangements entered into with the Darwesh Khel Waziris, the route remained open for troops and supplies

Umarzai.
Sudan Khel.
Muhammad Khel.
Khojal Khel.
Sada Khel.

until the 21st of March 1880. For the protection of convoys on the Bannu side, escorts or *badragas* were enlisted from the Ahmadzai sections named in the margin, and small personal allowances were made to some of the more important chiefs. On the Kohat side similar arrangements

were made with the Malik Shahi and Kabul Khel Utmanzai sections. The total allowances amounted to about Rs. 1,000 a month.

During the time the route was open one hundred and nineteen convoys passed through. In the first campaign only four offences of any importance were committed upon this road; and in the second, parties of robbers from Dawar made two successful raids, on the 29th of September 1879 and 31st of January 1880. In March 1880, chiefly in consequence of the excitement

* The *Batanis* are a tribe on the Tank border, and will be described in the next chapter.

† The *Ghorazais* are an insignificant tribe of Kakars, living in the Gumal valley in the Dera Ismail Khan district to the south of the Luni river.

					Rs.
‡ Compensation for loss caused by them	12,121
Fine imposed on tribe	3,000
" " on two leading <i>maliks</i>	900
				Total	16,021

*Misconduct of
different sec-
tions of the
Darwesh Khel
Waziris in
1880.*

among the surrounding clans produced by the preaching of the above-mentioned Mulla Adkar, it was deemed expedient to close this route.

This man, whose influence was felt throughout the whole of the Waziri hills, was a fanatical disciple of the late *Akhund* of Swat, and aspired to occupy his position; but, unfortunately, he was not such a respectable character. He had, for many years, established his head-quarters at Kadam, in Khost, but on the occupation of that valley by British troops in January 1879, he fled to Upper Dawar, and was untiring in his efforts to organise a general crusade among the hill tribes, and, when that failed, to incite and encourage smaller incursions for plunder and assassination.

Almost immediately after the closing of the Thal-Bannu route, a serious outrage was committed, which has been already mentioned (*see* p. 452), in which a Turi caravan was attacked near Thal, and suffered considerable loss. It is said that the raiders set out with the intention of

attacking a large body of Government camels coming from Bannu to Thal by the Kuram river route, but owing to this route having been closed on the 21st of March, the convoy was sent through British territory *via* Bahadur Khel and Dalan. The Turis, with their baggage animals, had, contrary to orders, encamped in an exposed spot on the side of the Thal-Kuram road, about one mile and a half from the former place. They had not a single weapon amongst them, and do not appear to have kept any watch. They were attacked about midnight on the 25th-26th of March, by a body of men armed with swords and knives. Of the Turis ten were killed and seven wounded, and their animals, with the exception of two or three mules, were then driven off. No shots were fired; the attack was begun without warning, and was the work of only a few minutes. The number of animals carried off was one hundred and seven mules, twenty-five donkeys, one pony, and eight bullocks, and were valued at over Rs. 15,000. The raiders were about sixty in number, and consisted of thirty Tori Khel Waziris, twenty-four Dawaris, and a few Mahsuds. The party passed through the territory of the Mahmit Khels on their way to and from the scene of the outrage.

This raid was the outcome of the evil influence and fanatical preaching of Mulla Adkar, and another outrage due to the same influence was committed a few days later in an attack by a party of raiders (about 150 strong), composed of Mahmit Khels (Hassan Khel section), Mahsuds, Dawaris and disciples (*talib-ul-ilms*) of Mulla Adkar, on a Khatak labour camp, three or four miles from Thal, on the Thal-Kuram road, on the 3rd of April. The route taken was the same as that in the raid on the Turi caravan. The camp was surrounded by a low wall, and accommodated about 250 Khataks, who had built thatched huts within the enclosure. It stood on a plateau overhanging the Kuram river. Most of the labourers were armed, about one-fourth of their number with matchlocks, the others with swords. The attack was made about 11 P.M. from the north end. The assailants were not seen until they were close to the camp. It appears that here they were repulsed, for the attack was renewed from the other end, where the raiders rushed on the *coolies* with their swords, fired the huts, and left after killing six of the labourers and wounding thirteen. Some shots were fired by the Khataks, but most of the latter fled instantly on being attacked. The blazing huts were distinctly seen by the levies in the Kapiang post, about a mile and-a-half down the river on the opposite side, but they did not turn out, and the enemy was allowed to escaped unmolested to the hills, but did not

Deputy Commis-
sioner's report.

succeed in carrying off any plunder. The raiders had two men killed and one wounded.

This outrage was followed, on the 11th of April, by an attack on some camel men returning with their camels from a grazing ground near Thal. Two of the drivers were killed and fifty-five camels looted. Reported gatherings of Waziris caused patrols, under Major T. R. Davidson, 18th Bengal Cavalry, to be sent along the Kuram river towards Chapri, and on the 13th it was ascertained that the enemy had collected, to the number of 800, near Maidani, eight or nine miles south-west of Thal. A cavalry reconnaissance was accordingly ordered from Thal in the direction of Maidani, on the 14th, to obtain reliable information. The party, consisting of a squadron of the 18th Bengal Cavalry, under Captain G. L. R. Richardson, crossed the Kuram river south of Thal, and, on approaching Biland Khel, struck off to the right towards Maidani. After proceeding a few miles they came upon the enemy, estimated at about 600 strong. Shots were exchanged, but the cavalry returned without any casualties, the enemy losing four killed and eight wounded.

After this, on the 24th of April, the Waziris were reported to be dispersing, but on the night of the 1st-2nd of May an attack was made on the military post of Chapri, which was garrisoned by 50 bayonets of the 5th Native Infantry and 30 sabres of the 1st Bengal Cavalry, under the command of Lieutenant W. H. Cazalet, of the latter regiment. The Chapri post consisted of

Assistant Commissioner's report. a walled enclosure some sixty yards square, standing close to the Thal-Kuram road, at a distance of eight miles from Thal. It stood on ground sloping slightly down towards the road, and was roughly divided into two parts—the upper occupied by the troops garrisoning the post, and the lower by the transport convoys. In the lower half also stood the officers' tents, the tent for the guard at the gate, and those occupied by shop-keepers, *kahars*, and officers' servants. This lower half was not fortified, and was only enclosed by a wall eight or nine feet high. It was into this half that the raiders gained access, after having pulled down a foot or two of the west wall at a corner where there was no sentry.

The party did not probably number more than two hundred men, and of these only some forty or fifty gained access, and it is supposed that they must have been inside some minutes before any one in the post was aware of their presence. During this time they were creeping about among the tents in search of plunder, and had, it is supposed, entered the tent of Lieutenant O. B. Wood, Transport Officer, as the whole of his property was found to have been turned over, cut open, and ransacked. When, however, they were observed and challenged, they rushed in among the *kahars* and camelmen, who were sleeping all round, slashing at and cutting down every one they met.

On hearing the noise the garrison turned out, but for a short time all was confusion, as the night was at that time without any moon, and no one seemed to know what had happened. Eventually, however, the raiders, finding they were likely to get the worst of it, turned, and escaped from the enclosure over the north and west walls. They retired in two bodies—one going straight towards the river, the other striking into the hills behind and above the post, probably with the intention of diverting attention in case a pursuit should be made. The troops in the post kept up a fire, as they retreated, from the walls of the enclosure, but no pursuit

Misconduct of different sections of the Darwesh Khel Waziris in 1880.

*Misconduct of
different sec-
tions of the
Darwesh Khel
Waziris in
1880.*

Our loss had been eleven men killed, including Lieutenant O. B. Wood, Transport Officer, and sixteen wounded.

Lieutenant Wood had been cut down when he jumped up on the first alarm. He had been sleeping outside the tent, and was found quite dead and covered with wounds. Two of the raiders were killed, and their bodies remained in the enclosure, and others were seen to have been badly hit, and were carried away by their companions.

From information subsequently received, it appears that the raiders started from the country of the Mahmit Khel Waziris, and were made up of members of that tribe and of Dawaris, with a few Mahsuds. The Dawaris and Mahsuds had probably remained in the Mahmit Khel country after the dispersal of the gathering reported on the 24th of April. The Tori Khels and Hassan Khels gave a passage to the offenders through their limits, although they were quite able to have denied this if they had wished.

In forwarding the report of this affair, the Commissioner of Peshawar recommended that, when occasion should offer in the autumn, an expedition should be organised against the Mahmit Khel and Tori Khel Waziris, to punish them for their repeated acts of hostility to the Government; but the day of reckoning never came.

Subsequently, gatherings of Waziris in the neighbourhood of the Thal-Kuram road and of Bannu were reported, but these led to nothing, and the gatherings dispersed. On the 16th of July information reached Thal that twenty-three camels, which had been sent to graze to the west of the river beyond Biland Khel, had been carried off on the previous day by raiders; all the available cavalry were at once sent in pursuit, under Captain G. L. R. Richardson, 18th Bengal Cavalry, and surrounded the village of Fateh Khel, near the Kaitu stream, by 4 A.M. On the 17th, eighteen camels belonging to the Waziris were captured, and twenty-five men were brought in as prisoners. The result of this was that the stolen camels were all returned in a few days, mostly in kind, with an equivalent for the remainder. The raiders in this case consisted of Waziris and Dawaris.

Expedition against the Malik Shahi Waziri settlements, by a force under Brigadier-General J. J. H. Gordon, C.B., in October 1880.

In October 1880 fines and penalties, aggregating Rs. 13,200, were due from the Kabul Khel and Malik Shahi Waziris, chiefly for minor offences, such as thefts of cattle and property, committed by them on the Kuram river route, and in the neighbourhood of Thal during the war; and in order to bring pressure to bear on these sections for the recovery of this amount, a force

Brigadier-General Gordon's despatch.		(as per margin) of two guns, 250
1-8th Royal Artillery	...	2 guns.
85th King's Own Light Infantry	...	250 of all ranks.
18th Bengal Cavalry	...	250 "
20th Punjab Native Infantry	...	250 "

by Major T. J. C. Plowden as Political Officer, entered the Kabul Khel hills on the evening of the 27th of October 1880.

The object of the expedition was to seize men and cattle of the Malik Shahi section as security for their share of the fine. This section is almost

tains and the winter in their lands on both banks of the Kuram river, extending from the 9th to the 16th mile on the Thal-Bannu road. They have few villages. Black blanket tents are their chief habitations. In order to reach them the whole Kabul Khel settlements had to be traversed, and they would thus have time to escape from the comparatively open country through which the Kuram river flows into the more intricate hill country to the west, in the direction of the Siah Koh. The Malik Shahis, conscious of the advantages of their position, and the facilities with which they could escape on our moving out against them, had been more reckless than the Kabul Khels in their conduct towards us. The difficulty, therefore, of the enterprise was for the column to move through the country of the latter without notice of its approach reaching the Malik Shahi section.

*Expedition
against the
Malik Shahi
Waziri settle-
ments in 1880.*

The force marched from Thal at 9.30 P.M. on the 27th of October (*see Map, p. 494*), and, by making a detour, avoided the large Bangash village of Biland Khel, and also the various Kabul Khel *melas* on the road. Once or twice, however, the watch dogs in the villages became alarmed, and began to bark, but the presence of the troops was fortunately not discovered, and they reached the positions which had been previously assigned them before daybreak.

The men's rations and 700 transport mules to take away fodder were ordered to follow from Thal at 3.30 A.M. on the 28th, escorted by a guard of 200 infantry and 30 cavalry.

The advanced party of the force, under the immediate command of the Brigadier-General, and accompanied by Major Plowden, surrounded the Malik Shahi encampment at the south-west end of the valley; another party had been detached to the left to surround the Malik Shahi settlements on the Charkhanai plateau; and a third small party had proceeded to the right, to try and capture some noted Waziri thieves. The supports remained at Drozanda, the first encamping ground from Thal on the Thal-Bannu road. The surprise was complete, and two thousand head of cattle, one hundred and nine prisoners, and a Khatak, outlawed for murder, were captured. No resistance was offered, except by three Waziris; two, while being made prisoners, were slightly wounded with the bayonet; and one, who rushed at the *Thanadar* of Thal, Khanzada Said Khan (Bangash), with a knife, was killed by him in self-defence.

The force returned to Thal by 6 P.M. on the 28th. The march had been arduous and trying, more especially for the guns and the infantry, as the Kuram had to be forded four times. The distance traversed by the troops was about thirty-two miles. Excellent order and discipline were maintained throughout, and all ranks did their duty well. On the return march the Kabul Khels expressed great astonishment that so large a force had marched through their country without their knowledge. The captured cattle and prisoners were handed over to the civil authorities at Thal. On the 30th the Kabul Khel *jirga* attended at Thal and made their submission, and by the 18th of December the whole fine of Rs. 13,200 was realised from the Kabul Khel and Malik Shahi sections; the prisoners were then released, and Rs. 6,000 taken as security for future good behaviour.

The expedition had thus proved a brilliant success, and had resulted in the complete submission of both the recusant sections, and the Deputy Commissioner had been enabled to realise all claims outstanding against these sections for offences during the past seven years.

The Government of India in acknowledging the report of the above

Conduct of the Kabul Khel and other sections subsequent to 1880. operations, considered that the expedition had been very successful, and that much credit was due to Major T. J. C. Plowden for the political management of the affair.

a

In spite, however, of the punishment that they had received, the conduct of the Kabul Khel Waziris continued to be unsatisfactory. With the Hati Khel and other sections residing on the Bannu border, and with the support of Khatak outlaws, they committed numerous raids during the following year (1881) into the heart of the Khatak country. In some of these they succeeded in carrying off large herds of *Pawindah* camels; in the majority they were unsuccessful, the stolen cattle being recovered in pursuit. The head-quarters of the raiders was in Hati Khel territory, but most of the stolen cattle found their way to the Saifali Kabul Khels. The *jirga* of the Kabul Khels was, therefore, summoned to Kohat by the Deputy Commissioner in February 1882, and fines were imposed in cases brought home to them, and the conduct of the tribe since then has been more satisfactory. Muhammad Zaffar Khan of Teri has recently been put in charge of this part of the border, and it is hoped that this will tend to render it still more settled. It may be noted, in conclusion, that the notorious Mulla Adkar, whose harangues had contributed so much to the agitation and excitement amongst the Waziris and Dawaris during the late war, died in May 1882.


M A P
to illustrate
THE OPERATIONS
against the
UMARZAI WAZIRIS
in 1852,
OF THE FIELD FORCE UNDER
BRIGADIER-GENERAL N. B. CHAMBERLAIN, C.B.,
against the
KABUL KHEL WAZIRIS
in 1859-60,
AND OF THE SURPRISE OF THE
MALIKSHAHI WINTER ENCAMPMENTS
By BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. J. H. GORDON, C.B.,
in 1880.

REFERENCES.

The dotted red line shows the Route of the Expedition in 1852.
The plain do. do. do. 1852-60
The chain-dotted line do. do. do. 1880
.....

Scale 1 Inch = 4 Miles.

0 1 2 3 4 Miles



APPENDIX A.

Composition of the force employed in the operations against the Kabul Khel Waziris, 1859-60.

Brigadier-General N. B. Chamberlain, C.B., commanding.

Staff.

Lieutenant J. Williamson, Staff Officer.
Captain J. H. Cooper, 7th Fusiliers, Assistant Quarter-Master General
Lieutenant-Colonel W. Olpherts, V.C., C.B., Royal Artillery, Orderly Officer.
Lieutenant J. W. Campbell, Multani Cavalry, Orderly Officer.
Captain H. C. Johnstone, Survey Department.

Artillery.

No. 1 Punjab Light Field Battery, Captain J. R. Sladen, commanding.
No. 2 Punjab Light Field Battery, Captain G. Maister, commanding.
Peshawar Mountain Train Battery, Captain F. R. DeBude, commanding.
Hazara Mountain Train Battery, Captain F. R. Butt, commanding.

Engineers.

Detachment of Sappers and Miners, Captain C. Pollard, Bengal Engineers, commanding.

Cavalry.

Detachment of Guide Cavalry.
2nd Punjab Cavalry, Lieutenant F. J. Craigie, commanding.

Infantry.

Detachment, Guide Infantry, Lieut.-Col. H. B. Lumsden, C.B., commanding.
4th Sikh Infantry, Major O. E. Rothney, commanding.
1st Punjab Infantry, Major F. W. Lambert, commanding.
3rd Punjab Infantry, Lieutenant A. U. F. Ruxton, commanding.
4th Punjab Infantry, Lieutenant F. H. Jenkins, commanding.
6th Punjab Infantry, Lieutenant W. P. Fisher, commanding.
Detachment, 24th Punjab Infantry (Pioneers), Lieutenant J. Chalmers, commanding.

Political Officers.

Captain H. R. James, Commissioner of Peshawar.
Captain B. Henderson, Deputy Commissioner of Kohat.
Lieutenant-Colonel R. G. Taylor, Commissioner of Leiah.

Detail of troops.

Corps.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	Non-Commissioned Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	Horses.	Mules.	Field Guns.		Mountain Train Guns.		Remarks.
								Guns.	Howitzers.	Guns.	Howitzers.	
Staff ...	5	5	6 elephants attached.
Detachment, No. 1 Punjab Light Field Battery ...	2	1	5	38	46	50	25	1	1	
Detachment, No. 2 Punjab Light Field Battery ...	2	2	12	65	81	87	36	3	1	
Detachment, Peshawar Mountain Train Battery...	2	2	9	72	85	...	85	1	3	
Detachment Hazara Mountain Train Battery...	2	1	8	48	59	...	48	1	2	
Detachment, Guide Cavalry...	1	4	12	86	103	101	
2nd Punjab Cavalry ...	4	11	37	276	328	343	
Detachment, Sappers and Miners	2	...	12	2	16	
Detachment, Guide Infantry	3	9	70	241	323	
4th Sikh Infantry	5	14	88	532	639	
1st Punjab "	5	16	88	408	517	
3rd " "	5	12	74	411	502	
4th " "	3	14	91	420	528	
6th " "	4	13	86	484	587	
Detachment, 24th Punjab Infantry (Pioneers). ...	1	2	15	79	97	
Total ...	46	101	607	3,162	3,916	581	194	4	2	2	5	.

APPENDIX B.

*Return of Killed and Wounded in the operations against the Kabul Khel Waziris
on the 22nd of December 1859.*

Corps.	Killed.					Wounded.					Remarks.
	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	
Corps of Guides	1	1	1*	...	1	9	11	<i>* Captain G. H. Gordon, 39th A. F.</i>
4th Sikh Infantry	5	5	
Levies	2	2	
Total	1	1	1	...	1	16	18	

ABSTRACT.

Killed	1
Wounded	18
Total	19

CHAPTER XV.

BANNU AND DERA ISMAIL KHAN BORDERS.

WAZIRI TRIBE (*continued*).

Mahsud Waziris and Batanis.

*Mahsud
Waziris.*

THE Mahsud Waziris inhabit the hills on the Tank and south Bannu frontier, and are all beyond the border. An attempt was made to get them to settle like the Darwesh Khels, but it has not yet been successful, although within the last few years this plan has been again attempted, and is at present on its trial. They are the most southern of the Waziri tribe, and their country is bounded on the north and west by that of the Darwesh Khel Waziris, on the south by the Gumal river, and on the east by the country of the Batanis.

The Mahsud Waziris are divided into three main branches, which are sub-divided as follows:—

				<i>Fighting men.</i>		
<i>I.—Bahlolzai</i>	...	{	Aimal Khel	2,110
			Shingi	700
			Nana Khel	1,920
			Band Khel	250
<i>II.—Alizai</i>	...	{	Shabi Khel	1,600
			Amanzai	3,960
<i>III.—Shaman Khel</i>		{	Chahar Khel	710
			Khali Khel	550
			Gallesahi	600
			Badinzai	400
						<hr/> 12,800

To this may be added the Urmurs, who, although in their origin a separate tribe, now form part of the Mahsuds. They can furnish 800 fighting men, making the total fighting strength of the tribe 13,600 men. Of this number it is probable that not more than 2,500 are armed with matchlocks, and none of them possess rifled arms.

There is a marked distinction observable between the Mahsuds and their neighbours in the hills, the Darwesh Khel Waziris. The former have never undergone, as the latter have, owing to their landed possessions in the Bannu district, the civilising and softening effects of constant residence in,

together in their hills, the contrast is very striking. The Mahsuds appear almost to be an inferior breed of men when compared with the Darwesh Khels, who all bear testimony in their dress, appearance, bearing, and conversation to the benefits derivable from close contact with British rule. The Mahsuds are themselves by no means blind to their inferiority in the above respects; and to place themselves on an equal footing of well-being with the Darwesh Khels has been the constant aim of many of them for the last ten years. But the struggle they are engaged in is a long one, and is by no means at an end yet; for it is the struggle of the more enlightened with the more bigoted of the tribe—of those who prefer a peaceful, honest, and improving life, with those who, from long habit, delight to live by violence and plunder.

The Mahsud country is intersected in all directions by ravines, generally flanked throughout their course by high hills, which occasionally recede sufficiently to give the spaces enclosed the appearance of small valleys. The width of these ravines is very variable, in some places being as much as a thousand yards, whilst at others they narrow to a hundred yards or less; but, as may be supposed, they are broadest at their mouths, and gradually narrow as they ascend. The narrowest parts are where the water has had to pierce its way through a range crossing its course at right-angles. Such gorges, called by the natives *tangis*, are the points usually occupied to oppose an enemy. On both sides, at intervals throughout their course, patches of land have been deposited, and are preserved by artificial means for the purpose of cultivation, and the largest of these afford some space for the encampment of troops. The beds of the ravines are paved throughout with boulders and stones. In fine weather a stream of water usually trickles down them, requiring to be crossed every few hundred yards; but after rain these beds suddenly fill, and often become dangerous torrents; such channels and their tributaries form the ordinary means of communication within the country.

From the rugged nature of the country, cultivation is confined to the plateaux at the base of the high mountains, the small valleys, and the stretches of alluvial land bordering the main ravines. These last are termed by the natives *kaches*, and they are a feature in all the principal defiles of the Suliman range. In the valleys and *kaches* the land is generally terraced and irrigated, and in many instances the water is led on to the fields by means of channels cut out of the hillside, exhibiting considerable engineering skill and great labour. The borders of the fields are commonly planted with mulberry and willow, which give to these spots a pleasing appearance compared with the rugged hills which encircle them. The Mahsuds live in houses which are ordinarily perched upon the hillside above their cultivation, not together in any order, but apparently only placed with reference to the convenience of families.

The dress worn by the men of this tribe is similar to that of other Waziris, which has already been described. The women do not cover their faces with veils, nor have they any *pardah*, but mix freely with the men when ministering to their wants.

The men and women are addicted to chewing tobacco mixed with ashes or lime. Very few smoke it, and none are given to intoxicating drinks. Their chief occupations are agriculture, plundering, and trading with British territory, to which they export a large quantity of dwarf palm, timber, and *ghi*. Their flocks of sheep and goats are not large.

*Mahsud
Waziris.*

Chamberlain.

Macaulay.

*Mahsud
Waziris.*

in their country. Most of them eat boiled *jowar*, or rice with butter-milk, and bread made from *jowar* and barley with *ghi*, and drink butter-milk or water. Hospitality is considered a prime virtue among them. In every village at dawn and at night when prayers are said, the guests are welcomed from afar by both men and women present, who greet them by "Harkalarashe" (may you come always), and ask them to sit down at the place appointed for the guests of the village. All the inhabitants of the village then come out to welcome them. If the guests are poor men, they are given any dry bread that may be forthcoming. The entertainment of men having a better position, consists of wheaten bread, or *jowar* and rice, eaten with *ghi*. If the guests are distinguished, or can pretend to be *syads* or *mullas*, they are given shelter, and a sheep is roasted for them. When the number of guests exceeds ten or twelve, they are accommodated in different houses, and sheep are slaughtered for them. The sheep prepared for the guests is eaten with bread or rice, and occasionally with *jowar* bread. Some of the best pieces are first roasted and given to the leading men, while the liver, etc., are at the same time fried and given to the others. When the *deg* or pot is ready, it is placed before the guests, who, before helping themselves from it, set apart a joint, which is called the *deg's* share, and is intended for the use of the women of the house. *Ghi* is also placed in a cup before the guests, who, when they have done eating, are given, in summer, a carpet or mat to lie down upon outside the house. In winter each house accommodates a guest, and furnishes him with a *charpoy* and a quilt to protect him from the cold. Early in the morning the women prepare hot water for the guests to wash themselves for morning prayers, after which, bread with *ghi* is presented to the guest, who then starts forward on his journey. The cost of hospitality is borne by the whole village, except when occasionally some one, either to acquire a reputation or make a display, defrays all the expenses himself, or more than his own share.

Their marriage customs are similar to those of other Waziris. The price of a woman ranges from Rs. 60 to Rs. 150. The marriage procession, which goes from the bridegroom's house to bring the bride, consists of 100 to 200 young men, and fifty to sixty women or young girls; they have two or three drums with them. The women sing songs, and the young men dance, waving in their hands their swords and shields, and others fire off their matchlocks. They also take with them two or three sheep, or a bullock, with a quantity of rice. One or two sheep are killed by the bride's father for the procession, who spend the whole night in noisy rejoicings. Next morning the procession return to their own village, taking in their midst the bride, who is mounted on a mare. The marriage service is read by the *mulla* after an interval of fifteen to twenty days, the bridegroom and the bride having no intercourse in the meanwhile. The bride is in this way brought to her husband's house before her marriage merely to become acquainted with his family.

The Mahsuds are an illiterate and ignorant people, having no desire for knowledge. Very few of them take to learning; and those who do, only read the *Koran* and a few religious books containing the Muhammadan law. The prayers, the fasts, and the alms enjoined by this law are rigorously observed, and the *mullas*, *akhunds*, *syads*, and *shekhs* are much respected.

The purchase and mortgage of land and other monetary contracts are made before two or three witnesses, but no written agreements or bonds are executed.

upon by the *mullas* and *syads*, who write charms, read incantations, and enjoin alms, sacrifices, and pilgrimages to shrines for the cure of diseases. The only treatment resorted to in the winter consists of enveloping the patient in a sheepskin for twelve hours till he perspires profusely. This treatment is repeated four or five days afterwards if the patient does not improve. Purgatives are sometimes given, and the patient directed to abstain from all food except dry bread. Mahsud Waziris.

When a man dies, his relatives and friends, male and female, wail and beat their chests, while the inhabitants of the surrounding villages come to condole with them. The body is washed and prepared for the coffin by the *mullas*, and consigned to the grave previously dug by the young men of the place. Prayers are then said, and the men return from the graveyard. The relatives and friends of the deceased are afterwards entertained by men of a different section of the tribe from their own.

The procedure observed in cases of murder is somewhat peculiar to this tribe. The pecuniary commutation is fixed at Rs. 1,200, half of which must be paid in cash and the other half in produce and commodities, including two girls valued at Rs. 100 each, and another Rs. 100 for the relatives of the deceased. If the heirs of the murdered man do not consent to this settlement, the *syads*, *mullas*, and *maliks* take a *Koran*, and, with one or two women and a few sheep, go to the houses of the complainants and ask them to forego their right of vengeance. When the heirs accept the composition, Rs. 1,300 in all, as above noted, is realised from the offender, of which Rs. 1,200 is given to the aggrieved party, and Rs. 100 is distributed among the friends of the deceased and the men of the *jirga*. Half this amount, *i.e.*, Rs. 650, is demanded on the murder of a woman, and a *lungi* of the value of Rs. 50. When a man is murdered and his heirs are unable to avenge his death, owing to the murderer being a powerful man of great influence in the tribe, they hire, for Rs. 60 to Rs. 150, other men called *baskars* to punish the offender. If the *baskars* murder the offender, his friends have no cause of retaliation against them. If any person other than the offender is killed by them, then the heirs of the wrongly killed man have a right to revenge his death on complainant. If any of the *baskars* be killed in the fight, the offender's son or brother is exposed to the danger of being killed, unless the matter is otherwise adjusted. The pecuniary compensation for a wound inflicted by a sword is apportioned according to size, Rs. 12-8 being fixed for one half an inch long (or equal to the breadth of a finger tip); but for the cutting off of a nose a special sum of Rs. 250 is fixed. The loss of a limb, when the man becomes lame or permanently incapacitated from doing manual labour, is recompensed by the payment of Rs. 500; a wound from a bullet or from the stab of a knife or dagger, below the neck and above the navel, there being fear of death, is compounded by the payment of Rs. 100. When the wound is below the navel or above the neck Rs. 50 are paid; for the cutting off of an ear, Rs. 100 is the pecuniary compensation; for the loss of an eye, Rs. 500. If an animal be killed, double its value must be paid. If a man steal anything from his fellow, he is not only to restore the stolen property, or if it be no longer within his power to do so, to pay four times its value, but must also slaughter a sheep as *nagha*, and pay Rs. 25 as *tappa*. If more than one are concerned in the commission of the theft, each must pay the *nagha* and the *tappa*. Until the amounts are paid the thieves are placed in confinement.

*Mahsud
Waziris.*

secured. All the *maliks* having assembled at a place appointed for the purpose, and having declared a tribe or people as their enemy, send out word to their own tribe for the collection of a force. This is done by the appointment of *chalwashtis*, or officers, who require each section to furnish a certain number of young men who have been previously named as constituting the fighting strength of the tribe.

No retaliation is allowed for any punishment inflicted on any member of the tribe by a *chalwashti*. Every family depute their young men for the fight, and send two or three sheep for the entertainment of guests, and a woman to cook the bread and fetch wood and water. When the Waziri force starts for an attack or for a fight, all the women with it wear their gowns inside-out, to insure victory to their side. While the fight is raging they sing war songs and carry water to the men in the trenches.

If a force is collected for any tribal punishment and the inhabitant of any village is killed in carrying it out, and the actual offender cannot be ascertained, the *malik* or head of the clan who may be present with the force is held responsible for the murder, and if the heirs of the deceased murder him in retaliation there is no redress. If the house of a villager is looted by men of the force, the property must be restored; but if it be lost, the owner of the house is made to swear on the *Koran* what articles of his are missing. The headman who was the cause of the collection of the force is held answerable for the value of the plundered property, in addition to the payment of Rs. 250 for violating the honour of the house.

Iron is found in abundance in the Mahsud hills, and swords, knives, and daggers are manufactured from it. A large quantity was formerly brought to Tank and sold there, but since 1879 little has been brought in. English imported iron has, during the last ten or twelve years, almost superseded Mahsud iron, and it now finds its way to Dawar and Khost.

The Mahsuds, unlike the Darwesh Khels, are not nomadic, but remain in their hills all the year round. In the spring, however, many of the tribe come down to British territory, and overrun Tank and Gumal during the reaping season.

The Mahsuds have numerous villages, the largest and most important being Kaniguram and Makin. The former contains five hundred houses, and is pleasantly situated, surrounded by orchards and fruit gardens and terraced fields of cultivation. Its inhabitants are chiefly Urmurs, regarding whose origin considerable doubt exists, which is increased by the fact that they speak a language of their own, which is neither Persian nor Pushtu, and which few but themselves in the hills understand. Moreover, their marriage ceremonies, funeral rites, and customary laws, which differ widely from the surrounding tribes, prove that they are not Afghans, and it is probable that they are Hindki in their origin. They are great traders, and number about 800 fighting men, and readily join the Mahsuds in any hostilities in which they are engaged. They fought against us at the Barari pass in 1860, and in January 1879 accompanied in some numbers the raiders on Tank.

Besides the Urmurs, there is a small colony of *Syads* located at Kaniguram, consisting of five families, who are well-to-do, and own some of the best gardens and lands there. They sink to a very great extent their religious character, and dip deeply into the politics of the Mahsuds. Some of them are great intriguers and schemers, and are constantly urging on the Mahsuds to mischief.

a small Mahsud settlement in the town composed of different sections. All tribal meetings are held at this place; and whilst the council is assembled, the inhabitants have to provide the members with board and lodging free of expense, each clan having its established billet. With the exception of a few artizans residing at Kaniguram, no others are to be found in the Mahsud country. Their workmanship is strong, though coarse, but the most valued arms are imported from India or Afghanistan. *Mahsud Waziris.*

The Mahsuds are by nature robbers, and have given much trouble on the British border. The Bahlolzais are the worst-behaved. The Alizais and Shaman Khels do a little cultivation and trading. They trade with Tank, Bannu, and Kalabagh, bringing timber, iron, ropes, and mats, and taking back cloth and corn.

The principal passes used by the Mahsuds in entering British territory are the Tank Zam, Gumal, Girni, and Shuza.

As already mentioned, there is an important feud between the Mahsuds and the other great branch of the Waziri tribe, the Darwesh Khels. The Mahsuds attributed much of the success of Brigadier-General Chamberlain's expedition in 1860 to the information given by the Ahmadzais to our officers. This feud, in which the Mahsuds generally have the best of it, was patched up, as already mentioned, in 1878.

Chamberlain says of the Mahsuds, that it was their boast that, while kingdoms and dynasties had passed away, they alone, of all the Afghan tribes, had remained free; that the armies of kings had never penetrated their strongholds; that in their intercourse with the rest of mankind they knew no law or will but their own; and lastly, that from generation to generation the *daman* (or the plain country), within a night's run of the hills, had been their hunting ground from which to enrich themselves.

Under the Sikh rule, this state of things was even worse; for, through misgovernment, the chief of Tank became a refugee in the Waziri mountains, and his country was farmed out to Multani or Tiwana mercenaries, according as either class was for the time being in favour at the Lahore court. The chief being expelled from his territory, his course was naturally to ally himself with the Mahsuds (which he did by marriage), and to keep the country in so distracted a state, that it became almost uninhabited; the town of Tank at last contained nothing but its garrison and a few *baniahs*. On one occasion it was attacked and plundered by the Mahsuds, when they retained possession of it for three days.

After the first Sikh war the rightful owner was restored, and things returned to pretty much their usual state, the Mahsuds not causing uneasiness as a tribe, but raids being of constant occurrence.

The country of the Mahsuds does not touch British territory, except near the mouth of the Gumal pass; and although many of the passes debouching on the plains have their origin in their hills, they have to pass through the territory of the Batanis before reaching British territory.

The Batanis hold the hills on the borders of Tank and Bannu from the Gabar mountain on the north to the Gumal valley on the south. They are descended from Baitan, the third son of Kais, the founder of the Afghan

Batanis.

Macaulay.

The tribe is divided into three main branches, *viz.*—

			<i>Fighting men.</i>	
Dhannas	1,310	
Tattas	1,275	
Uraspuns	430	
			<hr/>	
			3,015	

This number only includes the Batanis in the hills; the number of fighting men of the tribe within British territory is estimated at 1,454.

A small *Syad* clan, called Koti, is affiliated to the Batanis.

Till some fifty years ago, the Batanis lived wholly beyond our present border; but of late they have spread into the Tank plain, where they now form a large proportion of the Pathan population. They now hold 14,720 acres of land in British territory, on which a revenue of Rs. 8,700 has been assessed.

Besides those members of the tribe who are resident in British territory, more than one-half of those that dwell in the hills also possess lands within our border. Most of the hillmen are closely related to those in the plains.

The Uraspuns are, perhaps, the most completely in our power; for not only do they hold considerable lands in our territory, both ancestral and acquired, but the lands they occupy in the hills are, at the most, three miles from our border, stretching along behind the first low range of hills, opposite Nasran and Mullazai, from the Shuza to the Larzan passes. They dwell nowhere else in the hills. Their ancestral lands in the plains are situated in front of the Zam, and they have acquired lands on the Nasran and Mullazai border.

The Dhannas come next in position in the hills, living on the Tank border at two places, and on the Bannu border on the Gabar hill. The two places they occupy opposite the Tank border are behind the Uraspuns, as it were, *viz.*, at the head of the Shuza pass, and at Alikhel, in the Larzan pass. Their *kiris* and lands in British territory are mainly situated in one place, opposite the mouth of the Tank Zam. They have two *kiris* on the Mullazai border, one of which is connected with the Alikhel *kiri*, in the Larzan. All the Gabar Batanis own land in Haramtalah, in the Bannu district, and also some land on that border.

The Tatta *kiris* and lands in British territory are situated altogether in one place to the south front of the Tank Zam. In the hills the Tattas dwell in rear of the Dhannas at two points—Jandula, on the Tank Zam, and Saraghar, situated on a high tableland on the Mahsud border line between the Shuza and the Larzan streams. Though the Tattas at Jandula do not own much land in British territory, representatives of their section dwell within our border and own land. Similarly, the Saraghar Tattas are represented in British territory, and some of them own land within our border, and most of them also depend on their trade with British territory for their livelihood.

The Batanis are a rude people, just emerging from barbarism, but keen-witted. They are of medium height, wiry, and active, and inveterate thieves and abettors of thieves; and they have been called the jackals of the Waziris. They do not acknowledge any one chief. The proverbial wit of the country-side thus expresses their stupidity and thriftlessness—"The drum was beating in the plains, and the Batanis were dancing on the hills," and

The country of the Batanis has been likened to the Himalayan *Duns*. *Batanis*. It is bare, stony, and uncultivated; the streams which cross it rush down with what water there is in them, too low to be used for purposes of irrigation.

They dress much like the Waziris, and it is difficult to distinguish one tribe from the other.

The produce of their country consists of wheat and *bajra*, and they have flocks of sheep and herds of cattle.

They are very much at our mercy and control, owing to the accessible nature of the low ranges of hills they occupy on our border, and also on account of the number of villages they possess, the quantity of land they cultivate, and the numerous herds and flocks they graze in British territory; and it is indispensable to the general well-being of the tribe that they should have free intercourse and trade with British territory. On the Bannu frontier they cultivate a good deal near the border villages, and are dependent on them for necessaries. The Batanis carry on a trade with British territory by the different passes leading into their country. They bring wood, goats' wool, ropes, mats, grass, camels, bullocks, sheep, goats, hill rice, *ghi*, and honey, and take back grain of sorts, sugar, oil, salt, piece-goods, and sandals.

No raids can be carried on in British territory by the Mahsud Waziris without their having, as already stated, to pass through Batani territory. The latter used formerly to urge, and with some reason, that, owing to the paucity of their numbers, they were unable to deny the Waziris a passage through their limits, and it was not until about eight years ago that the tribe accepted the responsibility of the passes leading through their territory.

The Batanis, though insignificant, have always been a troublesome tribe, but they have generally been engaged as the spies and guides of their powerful neighbours rather than in any large plundering raids on their own account. In 1853, however, the Batanis, tired of their usual rôle of jackals, undertook the part of the lion, and attacked and plundered two villages within British territory, in retaliation for the death of a brother of one of their chiefs, killed by the police in a plundering excursion. A party of the tribe in British territory was at once seized, and they then made terms. Had they not done so, it was proposed to despatch an expedition to chastise them. After this they behaved better, and in the expedition against the Mahsud Waziris in 1860, about to be described, they gave the British force some little assistance by supplying information, and in other ways.

Expedition against the Mahsud Waziris, by a force under Brigadier-General N. B. Chamberlain, C.B., in 1860.

The Mahsuds were formerly celebrated as the earliest, the most inveterate, and the most incorrigible of all the robbers of the border.

From the earliest days of our rule they were guilty of a long list of raids on British territory, and they were in the habit of attacking the *Pawindah** caravans, as their country commands the Ghwadari pass, the main

* The tribes of warrior traders included under the term *Pawindah* (probably from the same root as the Pushtu word for "to graze") belong chiefly to the great tribe of Ghilzai Pathans.

They are almost wholly engaged in the carrying trade between India and Afghanistan and

*Expedition
against the
Mahsud
Waziris in
1860.*

avenue through which these traders enter British territory; but the merchants, themselves of the Pathan race, being invariably armed, were able to offer a stout resistance. However, as soon as they encamped in British territory, they often neglected the precautions which they adopted across the border, and the frontier was kept much disturbed, and the outposts were harassed, by the plundering attacks made on their *kiris* and herds by the Waziris.

In the spring of 1855 the Chief Commissioner (Mr. John Lawrence), being impressed with the injuries committed by the Mahsuds, recommended that a force should be sent against them that autumn, but the proposal was not carried out. In February 1857 Sir John Lawrence again found occasion to recommend "that retributive measures be no longer delayed", and Government sanctioned their being undertaken; but again circumstances arose to prevent their being carried into execution.

In 1859 Brigadier-General N. B. Chamberlain, C.B., then commanding the Punjab Irregular Force, thus wrote of the raids of the Mahsuds—

"In the course of my annual tour I see much of all classes of the people, and nowhere now do I hear the cry for justice until I come within reach of the Waziris. Then commences a train of injuries received and unredressed; and I know of no more pitiable sight than the tears and entreaties of a family who have lost their only means of enabling them to accompany the tribe (the *Pawindahs*) on its return back to summer quarters. Supposing that our backwardness arises from fear, several times have the men, and even women, counselled courage, saying we will assist you; they cannot stand before guns and percussion fire-arms."

herds, and long strings of camels laden with the goods of Bukhara and Kandahar; and forming enormous caravans, numbering many thousands, march in military order through the Kakar and Waziri countries by the Zhob and Gumal passes through the Suliman hills.

Entering the Dera Ismail Khan district, they leave their families, flocks, and some two-thirds of their fighting men in the great grazing grounds which lie on either side of the Indus, and while some wander off in search of employment, others pass on with their laden camels and merchandise to Multan, Rajputana, Lahore, Amritsar, Delhi, Cawnpore, Benares, and Patna.

In the spring they again assemble, and return by the same route to their homes in the hills about Ghazni and Kelat-i-Ghilzai. When the hot weather begins, the men, leaving their belongings behind them, move off to Kandahar, Herat, and Bukhara with the Indian and European merchandise which they have brought from Hindustan. In October they return, and prepare to start once more for India.

About 50,000 of these traders enter the Dera Ismail Khan district every year by the Gumal pass between the 20th of October and the 15th of December, and return between the 20th of March and the 10th of May.

They may be classified as follows:—

Nasir	15,000
Mian Khel	7,000
Dotani	1,000
Suliman Khel	12,000
Kharoti	6,500
Miscellaneous	8,500

The last are composed of different tribes, such as the Mitthi, Kundi, Miani, Andar, Tarakki, and others. Some come with their families, some without them; when going far trading they leave their families behind in the district.

For generations past the Waziris have carried on war to the knife with these merchant traders. To meet the opposition that awaits them at this part of the road, the *Pawindahs*, who are heavily armed, move in large bodies of from 5,000 to 10,000, and regular marches and encampments are observed, under an elected *Khan* or leader, exactly like an army moving through an enemy's country. They have more than once attempted to come to a compromise with their enemies and arrange for an unmolested passage on payment of a fixed blackmail, but the Waziris have invariably refused to

In the winter of 1860-61 Brigadier-General Chamberlain intended to resign the command of the Punjab Irregular Force, preparatory to proceeding to England, and as he did not wish to leave the Waziri question in the state it then was, and as he felt that sooner or later an expedition would have to be sent against the tribe, he proposed that punitive measures should then be adopted, as it was utterly hopeless to expect them to mend their ways till punished. Our forbearance had been mistaken for weakness; their conduct had been outrageous from the beginning; they had afforded open refuge to criminals from our territory; Zangi, the leader of the band by whom Captain Meham was murdered (*see* p. 474), had found an asylum with them. To go no further back than the five years previous to 1860, the police reports of the district officer recorded against them the commission of one hundred and eighty-four crimes of a serious nature. In addition to this list, in the month of March 1855 a native officer and 12 sowars of the mounted police, pursuing too far into the hills, were surrounded and (with the exception of one man) destroyed, and their horses carried off. In November of the same year some 3,000 of the tribe assembled in the pass in front of Tank, with the intention of plundering that town, and were only foiled in their object by troops arriving by a forced march of fifty miles from Dera Ismail Khan.

*Expedition
against the
Mahsud
Waziris in
1860.*

The matter was submitted to Government, and discussed with Lieutenant-Colonel R. G. Taylor, the Commissioner, and others at Sialkot, where Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor had gone to meet the Viceroy, accompanied by the Tank chief and others of the Derajat. But Lord Canning eventually decided against an expedition, on the ground that it was a cumulative case, and not actually pressing at the time, as the border was then quiet, as evinced by the fact that the Commissioner, Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, had been able to take away all the chiefs to Sialkot. But before Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor was half-way back to Dera Ismail Khan, news of great importance reached him.

Emboldened by years of immunity, and believing that they could successfully oppose any attempt to penetrate their mountains, and probably thinking, too, the absence of the Tank chief, Shah Nawaz Khan, was a favourable opportunity, the Waziris had, on the 13th of March 1860, without provocation or pretext of any kind, come out into the plains to the number of some 3,000, headed by their principal men, with the intention of sacking the town of Tank, which stands on the plains some five miles from the foot of the hills. The Nawab's agent having obtained previous notice of their gathering, on the 12th informed Saadat Khan, the native officer in command of the troop of the 5th Punjab Cavalry, then holding Tank. This officer at once summoned the sowars in the neighbouring regular outposts, besides collecting twenty of the Nawab's horsemen, and some other irregular horse; so that the force at his disposal was 158 sabres, 5th Punjab Cavalry, and 37 mounted levies.

On the morning of the 13th the whole party moved out towards the mouth of the Tank Zam, on arriving near the entrance of which they found the Waziris drawn up about half a mile on the plain side of the pass. The Waziris immediately opened fire upon the cavalry, on which Rissaldar Saadat Khan ordered his detachment to retire, with the intention of drawing the enemy further into the plains. The stratagem was successful, and the enemy followed with shouts of derision; but when they had come nearly a mile, the cavalry turned and, having first cut off their retreat to the hills, charged in

*Expedition
against the
Mahsud
Waziris in
1860.*

vigorous muscular frames, wanted the power of combination to resist effectually the charge of our cavalry. Cut down and ridden over, they fled in confusion, the men in front forcing back the men behind, till all became a helpless rabble, struggling, striving, straining to regain the safety of the mountain pass.

The result was that about 300 Mahsuds were killed, including six leading *maliks*, and many more wounded. Among the former was Jangi Khan, the leading chief of the whole tribe. Our loss was one jemadar of levies killed, two non-commissioned officers and eleven sowars of the 5th Punjab Cavalry, and three of the levies wounded. Besides which nine horses were killed and thirty wounded.

The conduct of this detachment met with the highest commendation from the Government of India. In addition to other rewards, a sword of honour was given to Rissaldar Saadat Khan for his gallant behaviour.

This outrage was considered as filling up the cup of their iniquities, and it was decided that their punishment could no longer be deferred.

Orders were accordingly issued to Brigadier-General Chamberlain for the assembling of a force to enter their hills, and there exact satisfaction for the past and security for the future. Brigadier-General Chamberlain had the option of advancing from either Bannu or Tank, and he chose the latter—first, because he thought it more appropriate to commence from the Tank side, as that was the route used by the Waziris when descending for the above raid; secondly, the most mischievous portion of the Mahsud tribe, with whom the quarrel especially was, inhabited the hills immediately above Tank, and it was more natural to attack them in the first instance; and thirdly, the line of road was better known, and, though it had difficulties, was known to be practicable, while nothing was known concerning the road from the Bannu side.

The Brigadier-General hoped, in the event of the tribe not coming to terms after the force had entered the Tank Zam pass, and if further ingress did not prove to be impracticable, to penetrate to Kaniguram and Makin, their two chief places, and then return to British territory by the Khasora defile in front of Bannu.

Lieut.-Colonel Taylor's report. Lieut.-Colonel R. G. Taylor, the Commissioner, anticipated the Waziris adopting one of the three following courses:—

The first and most probable was, that they would make their grand stand at Shingi Kot, their traditional strong point, like the Khan Band of the Bozdars. This was a fairly strong place, protecting the head of the country, and was decidedly the most likely place for them to defend with all their available strength and means.

Secondly, that they would come further forward to the Iinis Tangi. This is a much stiffer place than the Shingi position, and their holding it would make the first action in all probability a more serious matter than if they waited at Shingi, as they might inflict a good deal of loss before being driven off the heights. On the other hand, the Iinis Tangi was rather an advanced position for the Waziris to take up, as they would be further from support than at Shingi, and there they would not be sure of a safe retreat.

The third plan Lieut.-Colonel Taylor thought they might adopt was to avoid resisting the force in large bodies, and only harass it by day and night,

he thought, however, that they would most likely adopt one of the first two courses. *Expedition against the Mahsud Waziris in 1860.*

It was probable that, if once well defeated, they would break away, and not offer much further resistance (but no precedent could be counted on, as this was the first time these Waziris had been assailed in their homes); after defeating the enemy, the force could advance *via* Kaniguram and Makin, either into the Bannu or Dawar valley, concluding matters which were still pending with the Kabul Khels and Tori Khels; or, if the country was found stiffer than was expected, after taking full satisfaction from the Mahsuds at Shingi Kot, which is well in the Waziri country, the force could return from there.

Arrangements had been made for a large body of levies to take part in the expedition. These levies were drawn from the frontier classes, and were under their *Khans* and *Tumandars*. It was considered that they might be employed, perhaps, in the attack of minor places on the flanks of the main column (thus distracting the enemy, and affording a hope of seizing cattle), in holding points to keep open the communications, and on other duties; and it was thought by Lieut.-Colonel Taylor that advantage would be derived from the force being thus accompanied by the frontier classes and chiefs, all hereditary enemies of the Waziris, as the operations would thereby be more clearly shown to be in the cause of order, and in a great measure on behalf of our subjects.

The *Pawindah* merchants were also ordered to assemble in front of the Gumal valley, to act, if required, against their declared and bitter enemies; but there were some difficulties in the way of their employment. The *Pawindahs* had doubts how their joining in the expedition would be regarded by the authorities and tribes above the passes; and there was the likelihood that if, taking advantage of the advance of a Government force, the *Pawindahs* took severe revenge for former injuries, it might be re-visited on them and their caravans by the Waziris as a body when our quarrel had been settled.

On the 16th of April 1860 the force, as per margin (details of which are given in Appendix A),

No. 2 Punjab Light Field Battery	3 guns.
No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery	3 "
Peshawar Mountain Train Battery	4 "
Hazara Mountain Train Battery	3 "
Guide Cavalry	108 all ranks.
3rd Punjab Cavalry	131 " "
Multani Cavalry*	100 " "
1st Company, Sappers and Minors	60 " "
Guide Infantry	407 " "
4th Sikh Infantry	427 " "
1st Punjab Infantry	397 " "
2nd Punjab Infantry	684 " "
3rd Punjab Infantry	373 " "
4th Punjab Infantry	381 " "
6th Punjab Infantry	400 " "
14th Punjab Infantry†	207 " "
24th Punjab Infantry (Pioneers)‡	418 " "
Hazara Gurkha Battalion§	464 " "
6th Police Battalion	394 " "

consisting of 5,196 of all ranks, was assembled at Tank.

Lieut.-Colonel R. G. Taylor, the Commissioner, was to accompany the force as Political Officer. Before advancing, a proclamation was addressed to the Mahsud chiefs, to announce the object for which the Government forces were about to enter

* Now the 15th Bengal Cavalry. It was at this time (1860) attached to the Punjab Irregular Force.

† Subsequently disbanded.

‡ Now the 32nd Punjab Native Infantry (Pioneers)

*Expedition
against the
Mahsud
Waziris in
1860.*

their hills; to tell them that, within a fixed period, they were free to attend the camp for the purpose of hearing the demands of the British Government; and that, on their failing to appear, or not complying with the demands, they and their tribe would be treated as enemies, and punished, when their blood would be upon their own heads. (*See Appendix B.*)

No reply having been received to this proclamation, and reports having reached the camp that the Waziris were assembling within a few miles of the plains, further delay was considered inadvisable, and, on the morning of the 17th of April, Brigadier-General Chamberlain struck his camp, and with the whole of his force, which had been augmented by 1,600 levies, horse and foot, crossed the border by the Tank Zam (*see Map, p. 552*). This is a huge ravine, the bed of which is paved throughout with boulders and stones. In fine weather a clear stream from two to three feet deep winds down it, requiring to be crossed at every few hundred yards; after rain the whole bed suddenly fills, and is impassable even by an elephant.

After a march of eleven miles and a half, the camp was pitched on a stony plateau, the present site of the Kot Khirgi outpost. The pass as far as the Hinis Tangi was reconnoitred. It was reported that the enemy intended to make a stand at this point, and had barricaded the pass. The gorge, however, was found unoccupied, and the pioneers were sent to remove the breastwork which had been thrown across it.

The next day's march was to Palosin Kach, some nine miles; but as it was thought that the village of Shingi Kot might be occupied, it was determined to try and surprise it, and at midnight the whole of the cavalry, under the Brigadier-General, moved off, followed by the troops as per margin, under Lieutenant-Colonel H. B. Lumsden, C.B.; both columns being led by Batani guides. The remainder of the force and the baggage marched later, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel A. T. Wilde, C.B.

Shingi Kot was a walled village, some five miles beyond Palosin, perched on a high plateau at the junction of the Tank Zam with one of its main tributaries. On reaching the bifurcation of the defile, daylight was awaited, when, leaving a troop to watch the rear, the remainder of the cavalry pushed on to Shingi Kot. But there had been no intention of holding the place, and as the troops approached, the few men in it quitted the village. One was killed, a few taken prisoners, and some head of cattle and 200 sheep were seized on the hillside. On our side one sowar was killed.

After setting fire to every house in the place, the troops returned to the camp, which was being pitched at Palosin.

Throughout the day a few Waziris occupied the neighbouring heights, but our picquets forced them to remain passive spectators of the destruction of their crops. Occasionally the Waziri look-outs would taunt the Pathan soldiers with serving infidels and fighting against Muhammadans, and when told they did so as the servants of Government, the Waziris would abuse them as infidels, and challenge them to put aside their rifles and fight like men, with swords, when they would see how they would be served.

The village of Jandula, situated at the western mouth of the Hinis Tangi, belonged to the Batanis, and as the position commanded the passage to and from the plains, the greater portion of the levies were placed there for the convoy of supplies from Tank.

Peshawar Mountain Train Battery.
Hazara Mountain Train Battery.
Guide Infantry.
1st Punjab Infantry.
2nd Punjab Infantry.
3rd Punjab Infantry.
6th Punjab Infantry.

in case they were disposed to negotiate, the force was halted during the 19th of April. But as it was reported that, so far from being inclined to submit, the Waziris were assembling for hostilities, the destruction of their houses and property was ordered; and as their owners were notoriously the worst of the border robbers, living almost entirely upon the proceeds of plunder from the plains, there was the greater reason for not sparing them.

*Expedition
against the
Mahsud
Waziris in
1860.*

Before advancing on Kaniguram, it was deemed advisable to penetrate up the Shahur Zam towards the Kundighar mountain, to examine the country, and to destroy the crops and property of the Shingi and Nana Khel sections, who had been always foremost in plundering attacks on the Tank border.

On the 20th, therefore, the head-quarters and the troops, as per margin,

No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery.
Peshawar Mountain Train Battery.
Hazara Mountain Train Battery.
Detachment, Guide Cavalry.
Detachment, 3rd Punjab Cavalry.
Detachment, Multani Cavalry.
1st Company, Sappers and Miners.
Guide Infantry.
1st Punjab Infantry.
2nd Punjab Infantry.
3rd Punjab Infantry.
4th Punjab Infantry.
6th Punjab Infantry.
Detachment, 24th Punjab Infantry
(Pioneers).
6th Police Battalion.

moved with eight days' supplies to Haidari Kach, distant eight miles and three-quarters.

It was necessary to keep possession of Jandula, that supplies might be collected there for an immediate advance on Kaniguram on the return of the troops from the Shahur valley; and as the strength of the force admitted of a division, Lieutenant-Colonel H. B. Lumsden, C.B., was left at Palosin, with discretionary orders to fall back on Jandula if any gathering of the Waziris rendered it advisable. Captain H. W. H. Coxe, the Deputy Commissioner, remained with Lieutenant-Colonel Lumsden's camp.

The move upon the Shahur gorge was not expected by the enemy, and it was found unoccupied, save by a small party, who retired as the infantry ascended the heights, after firing a few shots, by which a horse of the levies was killed.

The defile was found to be narrow and difficult, and about three miles in length, the hills on either side closing in, in a manner to preclude artillery being turned to much account; and to command the sides, either a great circuit had to be made to reach the main range, or each spur had to be ascended in succession,—a most fatiguing operation, involving much exposure. The western end of the gorge opened into a small valley called Haidari Kach, where the troops encamped; but owing to the narrowness of the defile, and the difficult nature of the road, which was nothing more than the bed of a mountain torrent, it was late before the rear guard came up.

After emerging from the gorge, Lieutenant-Colonel R. G. Taylor, whilst reconnoitring the road in advance, came suddenly upon three Waziris in broken ground, who turned upon his party and wounded three men and five horses (his own amongst the number) before they were destroyed, one of the Waziris being cut down and another shot by Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor. The leader of the attacking party was a well-known *Akhundzada*, Khindad by name, and one of the other men was a *malik* or a *malik's* son. They had been of the party which had been firing on the troops in the pass, and being suddenly surprised by Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, Khindad proposed to his companions that they should die for the faith, and show what kind of men there were in the country we were going to invade.

The ground where this fight had taken place was very bad, a narrow hill road—rocks above and a deep dip below, and for a time all Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor and his party could do was to hold their own. Indeed in

*Expedition
against the
Mahsud
Waziris in
1860.*

the first onslaught, which was suddenly made from behind a rock, Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor and his men were forced back a few yards, with this advantage, however, that the ground was then more favourable. The Waziris could at any moment have saved their lives by just stepping up among the rocks above the road, where nothing could have been done to them, but they never showed the slightest intention to escape, fighting to the last.

Knowing the importance these tribes attach to carrying off their dead, and desiring to mitigate, as far as possible, the bitterness of hostilities, the Brigadier-General invited the enemy to remove the bodies which had been brought into camp; but they did not do so, probably not knowing and not trusting us, although they proffered thanks for the offer.

Lieut.-Colonel
Taylor's report.

On the 21st, after sending back the guns of No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery with their elephants and the Guide Infantry, the Brigadier-General advanced to Turan China, only four miles, as the stream he had been following suddenly ceased to flow above ground, and as the distance to the next water was uncertain.

On the march, Shahur Kot, a walled enclosure containing thatched houses, was passed and fired, and during the day other detached habitations which were come across by the party on duty with the survey officers were destroyed. Little or nothing was found in the houses; such articles of household furniture as could not be carried off having been generally dragged to the nearest shrine or burial-ground.

On the following day, the 22nd, the force marched to Barwani (six miles and a half), at the foot of the Kundighar mountain. On this and the previous march the country was found to be more open than any that was either before or subsequently passed through, but beyond the camp the hills again closed in, and the bed of the ravine was the only practicable road.

On the 23rd the march was continued up the bed of the ravine for four miles, when Jangi Khan's fort was reached, and the camp pitched. Jangi Khan, who had been the principal chief of the whole Mahsud tribe, had been killed, as already mentioned, with his son and nephew the previous month in the attack upon Tank.*

The fort was blown up, and the village, as well as the cultivation, of the Nana Khels destroyed. Close by was the residence of another chief, who was known not to have participated in the intended attack on Tank, and, purposely to mark the distinction between the conduct of the two men, no injury was done to his place or property. During the afternoon the escort on duty with the survey officers was attacked, but retired without loss, bringing with them a Mahsud spy captured near the camp.

By the defile by which the troops were moving, Kaniguram (then distant only fourteen miles as the crow flies) could be reached, and the Waziris, supposing this to be the real object of the movement, determined to defend the passage at a gorge leading into the Khaisora valley, three miles beyond the camp.

But as to reach Kaniguram by this route was no part of the general plan, to have forced the gorge would have been an expenditure of life without any object; and having now seen and surveyed the best part of the north-west

* In the Waziri war songs the cavalry affair at Tank is much dwelt on, and the little opposition offered generally to the expeditionary force is attributed in a great measure to the death of their former great leader, Jangi Khan.

portion of the district, and consumed half the supplies, it was time for the force to return.

The absence of men on the distant hills, or even the usual look-out on the heights in the neighbourhood of the camp, had been remarked during the last two days, and this was now explained by their having collected all their numbers to close the passage to Kaniguram; and also, as will be shown, to attack Lieutenant-Colonel Lumsden's camp; the news of which attack reached Brigadier-General Chamberlain by a Batani spy as the troops were falling in at daybreak on the 24th, preparatory to moving back to Palosin.

The force under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Lumsden consisted of the troops noted in the margin, with a body of levies, as well as the sick of those corps which had gone with Brigadier-General Chamberlain, with the spare carriage and establishment, supplies, and war material. It occupied a position (*see rough sketch, p. 514*) on the *kach* land on the left bank of the Tank Zam, its right resting on an old Waziri tower (distant some 800 yards) overlooking the stream; and the left protected by a picquet on the abrupt peak to the south-east, having the scarped bank of the stream in its front and the edge of the high table-land immediately in the rear.

On the night of the 22nd the outlying picquets were at their posts on the ridge behind the camp; a complete company occupied the tower, three other parties, each of one havildar and eight sepoys, were posted along the rear, and one of thirty men was on the high peak just mentioned,—each regiment furnishing a picquet also held a party of equal strength in readiness to support it if necessary.

The little information which could be obtained by Captain Coxe from scouts tended to the assurance that no bodies of the enemy had yet assembled, and that they would not do so till the force proceeded further into their country; but, owing to the unanimity among the Mahsud branch of the Waziris, it was almost impossible to obtain anything like reliable information of the movements of the tribe. Spies were stopped and turned back, or allowed to go and see as much as the Waziri *maliks* chose, and Captain Coxe had no means at his disposal that could be depended on; the Batanis, when sent, only went for a short distance, and returned with a made-up story, more dangerous than the simple truth that they were unable to go among the Mahsuds, and thus there was the danger of their reports having the effect of lulling suspicion.

During the night a few stray shots were fired by the sentries at intervals, but all appeared tranquil, till, just as the *reveille* sounded, the camp was alarmed by a volley fired by the rear picquet, and by the call to “fall in”.

A body of 3,000 Waziris, making a sudden rush, had overpowered and nearly destroyed the picquets, immediately in their line of attack, holding the high bank above the camp; here the greater mass stopped, while 500 of the bravest of them dashed into the camp sword in hand, the remainder beating their drums, cheering on their fellows, and keeping up a heavy fire from the ridge. As it happened, they were chiefly successful where the store godown

*Expedition
against the
Mahsud
Waziris in
1860.*

No. 2 Punjab Light Field Battery.
No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery.
3rd Punjab Cavalry.
Detachment, Guide Cavalry.
Guide Infantry.
4th Sikh Infantry
14th Punjab Infantry.
Detachment, 24th Punjab Infantry.
Hazara Gurkha Battalion.

Lieut.-Colonel
Taylor's report.

Lieut.-Col. Lums-
den's despatch.

*Expedition
against the
Mahsud
Waziris in
1860.*

Guide camp. Owing to the suddenness of the attack, considerable confusion at first prevailed, and the Waziris did great mischief among the surprised mounted levies, killing men, especially camp-followers, and a large number of horses at their picquets, and cutting and slashing among the godown camels.

The alarm became general, and an in-lying picquet, consisting of a company of the Corps of Guides, was quickly placed by Lieutenant-Colonel Lumsden in person on the ridge, to enfilade the slopes on the enemy's flank, and to check their advance; this had the effect of making them move off more to their right, but they still bore down on the levies and stores, where they did much mischief, as already stated. The confusion for a time was general, but Lieutenant E. E. B. Bond, of the Guides, and Lieutenant G. O. Lewis, 7th Fusiliers, attached to that corps, rallying a considerable body of men, drove back the Waziris in front of them at the point of the bayonet. No sooner had the alarm been given, than the artillery (supported by the 24th Punjab Infantry), under Captains G. Maister and T. E. Hughes, were in action, rendering the most valuable assistance in clearing the camp of the enemy.

In the meantime, Major O. E. Rothney had formed up the Hazara Gurkha Battalion on the ridge, supported by the 4th Sikhs, under Lieutenant F. H. Jenkins, the picquet of which regiment had not been driven in; when, after driving back the enemy, who were now pouring into that part of the camp, Major Rothney advanced on the enemy's flank, bearing down on the mass of Waziris on the tableland above with great steadiness. After these two regiments had got clear of the right of the camp, they were joined by the Guides, when the three corps, under Major Rothney, pursued the enemy for fully three miles over the hills, inflicting severe punishment on them till they broke and dispersed,—a part going in the direction of Shingi Kot, and the rest over the ridges more to the eastward. The Gurkhas were in front all the way, and, although quite a new regiment, their skirmishing over difficult ground won the admiration of all.

The 3rd Punjab Cavalry and the 14th Punjab Infantry, which were on the extreme left of the camp, and furthest from the scene of action, were brought up as a support to the guns on the advance of the infantry under Major Rothney.

Our casualties were heavy (*see* Appendix C), for the attack, in the true Afghan style—dashing, but ill-judged, and ultimately failing for want of support and assistance—had not only been sudden, but for a time conducted with determined gallantry by the enemy; indeed, it was a hand-to-hand conflict during the time the enemy were inside the camp, and the unarmed camp-followers suffered much. The picquets, too, had greatly suffered; in the Corps of Guides alone there were the following casualties: in one picquet—one native officer, two non-commissioned officers, and ten sepoy killed, and six non-commissioned officers and thirty-eight sepoy wounded; in a second—one non-commissioned officer killed and three sepoy wounded; and in a third, three sepoy wounded. Among the killed on our side was Hafiz Ahmad, the *Tehsildar* of Bannu, an excellent officer.


But the losses of the enemy were also very heavy; ninety-two of their bodies were found in and around the camp, and some forty more in a *nullah* on their line of retreat. Of their wounded nothing was known, but they were probably numerous, judging from the number killed.

In his report on this affair, the Brigadier-General specially brought to notice

ROUGH SKETCH
OF
CAMP PALOSIN
MAHSUD WAZIRI EXPEDITION

23rd April 1860.

Scale about 150 Yards to an Inch.



the good services rendered by Major O. E. Rothney, commanding the Hazara Gurkha Battalion. *Expedition against the Mahsud Waziris in 1860.*

To revert now to the movements of the main column, which was marching to rejoin Lieutenant-Colonel Lumsden.

On the 24th the force marched to Turan China, and the following day to the western entrance of the Shahur gorge.

When the force had advanced, only such crops had been destroyed as were known to belong to the worst offenders; but after the attack on Lieutenant-Colonel Lumsden's camp, and the evident intention of the Mahsuds to resist to the utmost, it would have been weakness to exercise such forbearance any longer, and all the crops the troops passed were now destroyed.

As soon as the Waziris found that Kaniguram was not our object, their first intention was to oppose the force as it returned through the Shahur gorge,

Lieut.-Colonel
Taylor's report.

and a chief sent a message to the Commissioner to this effect, saying he might take the intimation as friendly or not, as he liked; but the hearts of the Waziris failed at the last

moment, and as the column approached the pass they were seen retiring from it.

Early on the 26th a move through the gorge was commenced; some attempt was made to harass the rear guard, under Lieutenant-Colonel A. T. Wilde, C.B., but all the heights had been crowned, and the picquets were withdrawn without any casualty on our side, although the Waziris lost some men.

The camp was pitched at Mandana Kach, one mile and a half above Palosin, where the main body was joined by Lieutenant-Colonel Lumsden's force.

From the 27th of April to the 1st of May the force remained halted, to admit of the sick and wounded being sent back to Tank, and for the litters to rejoin preparatory to an advance upon Kaniguram. During this period the arrangements for carrying fifteen days' rations for man and beast were completed by Captain H. W. H. Coxe, the Deputy Commissioner; and a supply of 4,000 shoes for the soldiers, as well as horse shoes and nails, were brought up from the rear, the constant marching over boulders and through water having caused an inordinate expenditure of these necessities.

On the 1st of May, as it was reported that the Mahsuds had occupied the Ahnai Tangi, nine miles beyond camp, it had been intended to move the next day to within easy range of the gorge, so as to attack it in the early morning; but late in the afternoon eleven Mahsud *maliks* arrived in camp, deputed, they said, by the whole tribe to make terms. They were received by the Commissioner, Brigadier-General Chamberlain and Lieutenant-Colonel Lumsden being also present.

The reasons for the force entering the hills were fully explained to the chiefs; the Government proclamation was read to them in Pushtu, and they were told there was yet time for them to make terms. These were either immediate payment of the value of the cattle stolen during the past eight years, calculated at a low estimate at Rs. 43,000, or giving security for its payment within a reasonable time, and hostages for their future good conduct; and they were further told there was not the slightest wish to meddle with their country, far less to annex any portion of it; all that was desired being that they should keep their tribe in order, and prevent their plundering in British territory.

But the Waziris had evidently no fancy for paying a fine, and the alter-

*Expedition
against the
Mahsud
Waziris in
1860.*

native proposal, namely, that they should give a free passage to the force to Kaniguram, the capital of the country, was equally unpalatable. The *malik* who acted as spokesman, a well-known character, named Nabi, of the Shingi section of the tribe, made great protestations of their anxiety for peace; but it was evident that they hoped for it without paying for the past, and probably without giving security such as we should wish for the future; and further, that they were decidedly opposed to the march through their country. The question of security for the future never came actually under discussion, as the deliberation did not get beyond the first point.

The tone of the *maliks* throughout this meeting was quiet, and the reverse of disrespectful; but through the veil cast by professions of humility and desire for peace might still be discerned the unquelled pride of the men, in the strength of their tribe and country. Thus, when the march to Kaniguram was under discussion, they asked why it was wished to go there; the people were rough mountaineers, difficult to restrain; blood was fresh, and the bodies of their relations were still bleaching unburied in the sun; the country was mountainous and confined, and not fitted for our army at all—all which representations of course contained a good deal more of pride and warning than of humility and submission.

One passage in the conversation appeared to show a good feeling, and one that the Commissioner would gladly have worked on for good. Brigadier-General Chamberlain called attention to the bodies of Waziris lying near the camp, or hastily buried by our troops, and explained to the *maliks* his willingness to allow the relations to come and remove their dead on this and on future occasions, as it was wholly contrary to our customs and feelings to extend our hostility to an enemy when dead, and he said it gave him pain to see them lying about unburied and uncared for. In reply to this the *maliks* said, if it was pain to us, what must it be to them, whose brothers, and fathers, and cousins were thus lying ghastly in the sun, making food for the fowls of the air. Lieut.-Colonel Taylor tried to improve this opening, but without result. They no doubt feared that the burial parties would be subjected to an ambuscade, as they possibly would have been by native commanders, and only at night and by stealth did they attempt to recover the bodies of their friends.

Towards the end of this meeting there arose a point of difference as to whether the force should halt or move onward the next day. It was an object in every way to move on to Shingi; the ground occupied had become unhealthy, and supplies were getting scarcer every day. On the other hand, the *maliks* wished for a day's delay to consider the propositions; but after fully weighing the whole case, Brigadier-General Chamberlain decided in favour of moving on, feeling convinced that if the *maliks* were sincerely bent on peace, this would not interrupt or mar their plan, while it would save a day's supplies, and give the troops a healthy encampment.

One view of the case which the *maliks* put forth was very fairly turned against them, namely, that in our generosity, as representatives of a strong Government, we should allow them some *pardah* (or screen for their honour), meaning that we should spare them the disgrace of submission, or of having an army march through their country; but in answer to this it was fairly objected that we also required some *pardah*; an army had marched into the country to demand reparation for years of unprovoked injury, and trustworthy security for the time to come, and it was out of the question that it should, of its own free will, march back again without obtaining satisfaction on one point or the other, either by realising the fine demanded (in which

case all further operations would at once cease), or by marching through the country. *Expedition
against the
Mahsud
Waziris in
1860.*

When it was decided that the force should move on, Brigadier-General Chamberlain promised that it should only move to the better ground at Shingi, and not advance at all towards their position at Ahnai until the final decision of the council was received. On the other hand, the *maliks* undertook to go and consult their tribesmen, and to bring back an answer at Shingi on the evening of the following day.

As the force marched on the morning of the 2nd of May to Shingi Kot, the chiefs proceeded to rejoin their clansmen at the Ahnai Tangi; and as the advanced guard neared Shingi Kot, it was seen that the hills in its neighbourhood were occupied; but as their chiefs approached, the Waziris descended and moved off with them.

Not even a message was received during the afternoon of the 2nd. The march was, therefore, continued the following morning; the Ahnai gorge was found abandoned, the Waziris having fallen back to their next position, distant five miles, known as the Barari Tangi, which was said to be the more defensible of the two gorges.

As there was no suitable ground for a camp between the Ahnai and Barari defiles, the force encamped for the day at Zeriwam, at the southern entrance to the Ahnai gorge, when the destruction of houses and crops was again carried on. During the afternoon 400 of the foot levies were brought up from Jandula, to assist in guarding the convoy of grain. The remainder of that garrison was then ordered to return to Tank.

But before any further advance was made, it was thought right to make one last effort for a peaceful settlement with the Waziris, and the Ahmadzai Waziri chief, who had been the bearer of the proclamation, was despatched to the Mahsud leaders to ask for the promised answer. So determined, however, were the Mahsuds generally for war, and so confidently did they count upon their numbers and position, that our messenger, though a Waziri, was insulted and threatened, and one ruffian, a petty chief and notorious leader of freebooters, went the length of drawing his sword and hacking his horse to pieces. Thus disgraced, our messenger returned to camp, mounted on a horse given him by a Mahsud *malik*. Nothing was left, therefore, but to reply to their appeal to the sword.

The reason why the Waziris had not stood at the Ahnai Tangi was obvious enough, for it was found to be the easiest defile the troops had passed through; whilst the Barari gorge was unquestionably the most difficult of any that had been seen. Moreover, from the Ahnai upwards, the passage is considerably narrower than it is below the gorge, and the hills on either side are steeper and higher. In short, above the Ahnai, the whole road (with the exception of two *kaches*, one at the entrance to the Barari Tangi, and the other beyond it) is a defile until close to Kaniguram, where the hills become lower and rounder in form.

Soon after daylight on the 4th of May the force moved forward, and, after advancing four miles up the defile, entered a narrow, cultivated dell, at the further end of which, and distant about a mile, was the Barari gorge, which, it had been reported, the enemy were holding in strength. This was now confirmed by spies who met the column, as well as by the reports of the flanking parties; and as the force approached the position, the Mahsud picquets were seen retiring from their more advanced points.

*Expedition
against the
Mahsud
Waziris in
1860.*

The Barari Tangi is a narrow cleft cut by the Tank Zam through a chain of mountains crossing its course at right angles. Both sides of the passage are perpendicular cliffs of forty or fifty feet in height, from which the mountains slope upwards at a considerable incline.

The enemy had taken up a very strong position to defend the gorge (see accompanying sketch).

A thick grove of trees concealed the actual mouth of the pass from the column, but it was conjectured, from seeing low lines of *sangars* immediately over it, that something difficult had been prepared there.

It proved eventually to be a strong abatis, composed of large stones and felled poplar trees, forming a massive barrier, completely closing the pass. Guns would have had but little effect on this, and it took the sappers, after the heights had been taken, half an hour to make a gap in it sufficient for the force to pass through.

The right of the enemy's position was very formidable. On the true right of the mouth of the pass, and overhanging it, was a craggy, steep hill, surmounted by a tower; then came a short level interval, and then the commencement of a lofty ridge, which, from its precipitous nature, was wholly unassailable by an attacking force; while, from the great distance of its chief peaks from the scene of action, it was only necessary for the defending force to occupy the spurs above their position to enable them to lend good assistance by their fire.


From the tower to the spur of the main hill stretched a double row of *sangars*, and for some distance up the spur of the ridge *sangars* were terraced one above another, affording a flanking fire on a force attacking the main position. Above these again were the sharp-shooters, crouching in the rocky spurs of the ridge, whose fire would also tell on the ranks of a body advancing along the ledge between the main ridge and the ravine—the only line of approach by which an attack could be made on the *sangars* of the chief position. The precipitous ridge already described afforded also what most hillmen like—a safe line of retreat—enabling them to inflict injury on an attacking force up to the last moment, and then to retire without the fear of being cut off.

The ascent to the left of the enemy's position was steep, but some of its spurs were practicable for infantry and mules. The most difficult feature to deal with was the ravine which joins the Zam just at the mouth of the pass. For it appeared that even if the heights on the left bank of this ravine were taken, little advantage would be gained, as probably this position was cut off from the heights beyond, which were very stiff, and were strongly occupied. The advanced position on the enemy's left was also strongly held, and when the Waziri leaders saw that it was intended to seize it as the first step, they lost no time in greatly strengthening it.

Such was the position occupied by the enemy, who numbered from 4,000 to 7,000 men; naturally very strong, it had been taken advantage of to the utmost, and this was to be expected from their warlike character.

After a patient and thorough examination of the position, in which all the information that it was possible to obtain regarding the features of the ground was extracted from the spies on the spot, Brigadier-General Chamberlain rapidly formed his plan of attack, which was to gain possession at once of the heights on the enemy's left by a vigorous attack, and for a second column to ascend the hills on our left and threaten the right of the enemy's position, and await a favourable time to attack that also.

S K E T C H
TO ILLUSTRATE
THE ATTACK ON THE BARARI PASS
BY THE FORCE UNDER
BRIGADIER GENERAL N. CHAMBERLAIN, C.B.,
on the 4th May 1860.



Two columns of attack were formed, as per margin, the right being under the command of

LEFT COLUMN.
Advanced body.
6th Punjab Infantry, 300 bayonets—
Lieutenant W. P. Fisher.

• *Support.*
Guide Infantry, 250 bayonets—
Lieut.-Colonel H. B. Lumsden, C.B.
Peshawar Mountain Train Battery, 4
guns—Captain F. R. DeBude.

Reserve.
Wing, 6th Police Battalion, 300 bayonets—Lieutenant J. W. Orchard.

RIGHT COLUMN.
Advanced body.
3rd Punjab Infantry, 300 bayonets—
Lieutenant A. U. F. Ruxton.

Support.
2nd Punjab Infantry, 500 bayonets—
Lieut.-Col. G. W. G. Green, C.B.
Hazara Mountain Train Battery, 4
guns—Captain F. R. Butt.

Reserve.
1st Punjab Infantry, 300 bayonets—
Captain C. P. Keyes.

Expedition against the Mahsud Waziris in 1860.
Lieut. - Colonel G. W. G. Green, C.B., and the left under that of Lieut. - Colonel H. B. Lumsden, C.B. The guns of Nos. 2 and 3 Punjab Light Field Batteries

and the 4th and 24th Punjab Infantry formed the support in the centre, under Lieut.-Colonel A. T. Wilde, C.B., and were about 900 yards from the gorge, with the Hazara Gurkha Battalion and the cavalry a little in their rear as a reserve, the baggage being massed behind, guarded by the 14th Punjab Infantry and foot levies, with the 4th Sikh Infantry as rear guard.

When the troops were in position, the column on the right, under Lieut.-Colonel Green, advanced to the attack. A plateau, about 300 yards below the crest of the hill (on which the enemy had erected a strong line of breastworks), was reached without any loss. From this plateau three small spurs, with ravines between them, led to the crest of the hill, and the 3rd Punjab Infantry were ordered to advance, covered by the fire of the mountain guns, and the field guns with the centre column in the *nullah*.

Two companies were thrown into skirmishing order, the remainder being in support; but the fire from the breastworks being very heavy, the rear companies of the 3rd Punjab Infantry were pushed on to strengthen those in advance; at the same time the 2nd Punjab Infantry was ordered to move up in column of sections to the cover of the spur of a hill (about two-thirds of the way up), to keep down the flanking fire on the left of the 3rd Punjab Infantry, and as a support to it. The 1st Punjab Infantry was halted as a reserve, and as a support to the mountain battery.

After a difficult advance, during which there were some twenty casualties, the leading men of the 3rd Punjab Infantry, headed by Lieutenant A. U. F. Ruxton, rushed to within a short distance of the breastworks, situated on the crest of a rugged, steep ascent, the last twelve or fifteen feet of which were almost inaccessible.

The ground was much cut up by ravines, and the attacking party was consequently dispersed and broken up into knots of men, so that there was not a sufficient body collected in any one spot to make the final rush. The men, to avoid the enemy's fire and the stones hurled down upon them from above, now sought shelter behind the rocks, whence they could only keep up a desultory fire on the breastworks.

The Waziris, emboldened by the check, and at the moment receiving an accession of numbers from the rear, leaped their breastworks, and with a shout rushed down upon the 3rd Punjab Infantry sword in hand, causing a panic, which became general. The 3rd Punjab Infantry were driven back upon the support, which also gave way, and the enemy bravely continued their advance upon the mountain guns and the reserve.

The nature of the ground admitted of the attack being witnessed alike by friend and foe; and as the Waziris charged down the hill, their bright

*Expedition
against the
Mahsud
Waziris in
1860.*

swords glistening in the sun, the mountains resounded with the plaudits of their clansmen as they cheered them on to victory.

Although many of the 1st Punjab Infantry, who were in reserve, got mixed up with the two lines which had been driven back, those on the right, who were clear of the retreating bodies, escaped the panic, when Captain C. P. Keyes (who cut down the leader of a party which was advancing on the flank of the guns), putting himself at the head of this portion of the reserve, turned the tide which affairs had taken in favour of the Mahsuds. But the men of the mountain battery, under Captain F. R. Butt, had never wavered; they had gallantly stood to and fought their guns, and the enemy were now not only under the fire of the mountain guns, but also under that of the field guns below, and their triumph, brilliant as it had been for the moment, was over. Brave and dashing as are the hillmen in attack, when checked they are lost; and the Mahsuds retreated up the hill, hotly pursued by the 1st Punjab Infantry, who took the main breastwork; the other troops now rallying, breastwork after breastwork was carried, and the right of the position won.

In the meanwhile, the column under Lieutenant-Colonel H. B. Lumsden had advanced against the enemy's right, but the Waziris, disheartened by the loss of their position on their left, and exposed to the fire of our guns from the right column, offered only a feeble resistance. Lieutenant-Colonel Lumsden, after moving on the tower, ascended the eastern slope of the hill, when he cleared ridge after ridge with his mountain guns, with a loss of only two men. In the centre, as soon as the barricade at the mouth of the gorge had been removed, the 4th Punjab Infantry and the Gurkhas were sent up to clear the eastern ridges, as the hill ascended by Lieutenant-Colonel Green's column was separated from these hills by the tributary to the Zam, before alluded to.

No further opposition was then offered, and the camp was pitched on the Bangiwala Kach, three miles beyond the defile.

Our loss had been thirty killed, including Lieutenant J. M. Aytoun (94th Regiment, attached to the 2nd Punjab Infantry), shot through the head at the commencement of the ascent, and eighty-six wounded (*see* Appendix D).

Amongst the killed was a *doolie* bearer of the 2nd Punjab Infantry, shot whilst assisting, under a sharp fire, to tie up Lieutenant Aytoun's wound.

The enemy left thirty-five dead bodies on the ground, including some chiefs; the ruffian who had killed our messenger's horse, and the leader of the party who had killed the detachment of police in 1855, being of the number.

The crops in the neighbourhood of camp were given over to the cattle, and the houses set fire to.

In the evening a deputation was received from the Mahsud chiefs, expressing renewed wishes for peace. The chief of Makin also sent to intercede for that place, and another leader sent a special messenger to beg that his property might be spared. To all conciliatory answers were given, and they were assured that, if they would come in and make peace, there was no wish to injure them further.

Late in the evening, the body of Lieutenant Aytoun was committed to the grave. A spot was carefully selected, which would be almost certain to escape observation, and by the light of the moon he was laid in his last resting-place; and few soldiers sleep in a wilder spot. While his funeral was being conducted, the ground on the opposite side of the stream was one blaze of fire, in

which the mortal remains of the Sikhs and Hindus who had fallen were being gradually reduced to ashes. *Expedition against the Mahsud Waziris in 1860.*

In his despatch, Brigadier-General Chamberlain stated that the officers he desired to bring specially to notice for the attack on the Barari position were Captain C. P. Keyes, commanding 1st Punjab Infantry, Captain F. R. Butt, commanding Hazara Mountain Train Battery, and Lieutenant A. U. F. Ruxton, commanding 3rd Punjab Infantry.

On the 5th of May the force advanced, and, after a march of fifteen miles, halted near Kaniguram. As the force ascended, the defile became narrower and the ascent steeper. Hitherto only wild olives had been seen, but oaks were now found. The appearance of the houses improved as the troops advanced, and there was an air of comfort and solidity about them; many of the vistas where the stream rushed along its course, hemmed in on either side by strips of cultivation bordered by rows of willows and poplars, were exceedingly picturesque. Relying on the friendly professions of the *maliks*, injury to crops and property was stayed, with one exception, that of the Shingi village of Janjal, the residence of people notorious for their depredations upon the border.

At Maidan, about four miles from Kaniguram, the force was met by the *Syads* and the Urmur elders of the latter place, who were assured of protection, and who were told to return and recall the inhabitants, who had fled. On reaching Maidan, the country assumed quite a different aspect. The hills were generally low, and of easy slope, and in some places had the appearance of downs. The plateau is there reached, from which the lower ranges radiate, ending in the mountains of Pir Ghal and Shuidar.

The town of Kaniguram was built on the southern slope of a low hill, the houses rising in tiers. It contained at that time, it was said, 800 houses: these were of stone, and were flat roofed; some of them had a sort of balcony in front. The principal street was roofed over, to keep off the snow in winter and the rain in spring and summer.

A small stream ran in front of and below the town, on either side of which were the gardens of the townspeople, containing walnut and other fruit trees, and vines. Above the gardens were terraced fields, which then bore luxuriant crops of green corn. The gardens were fast going to decay. The people said they derived no benefit from them, as the Mahsuds plundered the fruit.

Hardly any Waziris resided in the town, but all the tribal meetings were held there. The inhabitants were then, as they are now, composed principally of *Syads* and Urmurs. As the latter had taken part in the defence of the Barari pass, and as they had furnished no supplies to the camp, it was thought proper that they should pay a fine of Rs. 2,000, in consideration of which the town was to be spared. This was immediately arranged for, and good security was given by the *Syads*, who were the head of the society, and who had considerable mercantile and other connections with Tank.

The force halted on the 6th. During the night a fire broke out in the town; it was in the house of a *Syad*, and had been caused by a Waziri in revenge for some supposed injury. The bodies of two camel drivers, who had, in opposition to orders, gone beyond the line of sentries, were found at daylight, hacked to pieces.

Some of the townspeople now returned to their homes, but they were in too great awe of the Mahsuds to assist us with supplies—a little tobacco and some grass sandals being the extent of the aid afforded.

*Expedition
against the
Mahsud
Waziris in
1860.*

The height of the camp was found to be 6,700 feet above the sea, and the range to the south (easily ascended) 8,300. Numbers of wild plants and flowers, such as forget-me-not, clover, and several other kinds common to England, were found.

The Pir Ghal mountain was too far from the camp, and too difficult of ascent, to be visited, much as the survey officers desired to do so, to lay down the range to the west.

No further communication having been received from the Mahsud chiefs, a halt was made on the 7th, and messengers were sent to ascertain the intentions of the enemy, when a most unsatisfactory reply was received, the only thing definite in it being that if the force would remain two or three days at Kaniguram, they would come in to arrange terms. They were aware of the unreasonableness of their request, knowing full well that the supplies were limited; and these once expended, there was nothing but starvation for the force until the plains were reached. The cavalry horses had already been put on half rations of grain. However, Brigadier-General Chamberlain determined to halt during the 8th, to give them no excuse for not coming in, when, in return for this forbearance, it was found the enemy were discussing where further opposition could best be made. To avoid injuring the crops, the camels had been starved for two days (for they would not browse on the oak trees); but the duplicity of the chiefs having thus relieved us from any necessity for self-sacrifice, the beasts were allowed to satisfy their hunger in the fields.

Although the force had come provided with blankets and great-coats, the great change in climate, and more especially the really cold nights, added to the rain which fell every afternoon, began to tell upon the troops, British officers as well as men; and fever and diarrhoea were sending numbers into hospital. To enable them to be transported, bedsteads were procured from the town, which were transformed into camel litters through the exertions of Captain C. Pollard, of the Engineers, and Lieutenant J. Chalmers, commanding the Pioneers, aided by regimental armourers.

During the halt of the force at Kaniguram, the soldiers were permitted to visit the town morning and evening in parties under officers; and on one occasion, one of the leading *Syads*, who was watching their orderly march through the place, loudly called out to the by-standers, "Well done! British justice." Brigadier-General Chamberlain observed that such a remark from such a source was more honourable to our arms and country than any military success.

As no communication was received from the chiefs, the force moved back on the 9th five miles and a half to Do Toi, setting fire to everything that had been spared and protected on its upward march. To this an exception was made in favour of a small property opposite the camp, known to belong to the son of the Ahmadzai chief, Swahn Khan, famous as having as far back as 1824 shown civility to the enterprising traveller Moorcroft, and as having subsequently rendered assistance to Lieutenant H. B. Edwardes, when that officer entered upon the settlement of the Bannu district in 1847.

On the march some attempt was made to annoy the rear guard, but only two men were wounded, whilst the enemy suffered from the fire of our long range rifles.

Do Toi is the point where the Tank Zam divides into two branches, one going south-west to Kaniguram, the other a little north-west to Makin. The

camp was pitched at the junction of the two streams. The hills close in here, and are high and rugged, and it is a difficult position to quit in presence of an enemy. *Expedition against the Mahsud Waziris in 1860.*

On the 10th the force marched five miles and three-quarters towards Makin; it was not known if the Mahsuds would oppose the force entering that valley, or if an attack would be made on the rear. The first part of the defile was difficult, but after about three miles the hills became lower, and opposite Makin the plateau was again reached. No attempt, however, was made to oppose the column; the picquets were skilfully withdrawn, and the rear guard, under Lieutenant-Colonel A. T. Wilde, reached camp with only two men and one horse wounded. All Mahsud property passed on the march was destroyed.

The force was now approaching the boundary line that separates the Mahsuds from the Darwesh Khel Waziris; and a settlement of the latter, located within the Mahsud border, was passed on the march. Relying on protection being afforded them, the inhabitants had remained in their homes, and safeguards had been placed over their property as the column passed; unfortunately, however, one of the rear-guard flanking parties, not being aware of the circumstances, and coming suddenly upon some Waziris, took them for Mahsuds; when, before any explanation could be entered into, the party fired and badly wounded two of the Darwesh Khels. These men were brought into camp and their wounds attended to; but being unwilling to accompany the force, they were sent back to their homes, each with a handsome present.

The town of Makin was situated at the point where the mountains of Shuidar and Pir Ghal close in upon each other, a spur from each mountain forming its northern and southern face. The houses were built upon the slopes of these spurs, the spaces between them being covered with groves of wild olives and apricot trees. Makin contained numerous smelting houses, and was the principal seat of the Mahsud iron trade. Next to Kaniguram, it was the most important and best built in the country, many of the houses measuring fifty feet, with solid stone walls, and roofs of excellent timber. The whole of the valley was cultivated, and considerable skill and labour had been exhibited in turning to account every bit of ground available for cultivation. A small stream, having its rise within the gorge formed by the meeting of the Shuidar and Pir Ghal mountains, flowed through the centre of the valley, which was filled with villages of considerable size.

Earnestly desiring to come to a settlement, and to avoid having to commit further destruction, a last effort was made to induce the tribe to listen to reason; and to this end a Mahsud, who was in camp, was despatched by the Commissioner to inform the tribe of our wish to spare the place. But, though they had suffered so much, and were perfectly aware of their inability to withstand our arms, their stubborn pride would not still allow of their yielding, and on this, as on previous occasions, nothing came of the proposal.

The force accordingly halted the following day, the 11th, when the work of destruction went on. The ridges on the northern and southern sides were crowned by infantry and mountain guns, whilst a column moved up the centre of the valley. In this manner the few men inclined to offer opposition were driven back to the main ranges, where they were kept until the force retired. By evening the whole of the town and villages were in flames, and the towers burnt or blown up, amidst shouts and yells of rage from the Waziris on the mountains. At dusk the troops returned to camp, with only two casualties.

*Expedition
against the
Mahsud
Waziris in
1860.*

The state of the supplies now rendered it absolutely necessary to bring the operations to a close; and, as was previously intended, Bannu was the point on which the troops commenced to move. As they marched away from Makin on the 12th, two high towers, which guarded the entrance to the valley, and which had been occupied by our picquets, were blown up, and Makin was left in ruins.

A march of eight miles and a quarter up the bed of the ravine was made to Razmak, when descended the defile leading to the Bannu valley. Shortly after leaving Makin, the Mahsud boundary was passed, and the lands of the Mahmit Khel and Tori Khel Utmanzais were entered; but before crossing the boundary, the Mahsud village of Toada Chini was given to the flames, and its crops destroyed.

After passing the Mahsud limits, small parties of the Mahsuds still endeavoured to annoy the line of march from the hill sides. Considering the relative position of the two branches—Mahsuds and Darwesh Khels—it was not to be expected that the latter could or would interfere to prevent the Mahsuds following the column, and the rear guard lost two men and one horse wounded.

The country about Razmak had much the appearance of English downs, and was covered with turf and wild flowers, the violet amongst the number. Razmak was found to be 7,000 feet above the level of the sea, and was the greatest altitude to which the camp attained. The crest of the Razmak pass is the water-shed between Bannu and Tank, the water on one side flowing into the Bannu valley, and on the other side into the Tank Zam.

As the camels would not browse upon the oak trees, fields of green corn were purchased for them to graze in, and from this day everything required was paid for most scrupulously.

During the 13th there was a halt, to admit of the road down the pass being made practicable for guns and laden animals; this, for about a mile and a half, was very steep, when the bed of the Khasora stream was reached, the fall of which was gradual from this point.

At 2 P.M. on the 14th, the road being ready, the tents were struck and the descent was commenced. During the 12th, 13th, and 14th heavy rain had fallen at intervals, and the wind was cold and cutting; the supplies were running short, and the camels were suffering from want of food; and as there was no certainty when the rain might cease, the Brigadier-General considered it undesirable to delay the onward march, even though a late move would prevent the rear guard reaching the new ground till very late. By night-fall the heights on either side of the pass were crowned, and everyone passed into camp, at Razani, in safety, though it was midnight before the rear guard came in. Some shots were exchanged without loss to us.

The stone from which the Waziris extract their iron seemed to be more abundant at the head of the Khasora valley than at any other place the troops passed through, and each collection of houses had its smelting furnaces.

From Razani the force marched, on the 15th, to Saroba, a Tori Khel village. The rear guard was fired upon as it quitted the camping ground at Razani, but after this the Mahsuds were left behind, and no further molestation was attempted.

A march of twelve miles on the 16th brought the column to Dwa Warkha. It was necessary to halt the following day on account of rain, the bed of the defile being a torrent, impassable even by an elephant. From the ridge behind the camp a portion of the Dawar valley was visible, and beyond it the

outline of the track Brigadier-General Chamberlain had passed over a few months previous, when operating against the Kabul Khel Waziris. *Expedition against the Mahsud Waziris in 1860.*

On the bleak heights of Razmak the stunted wheat had been struggling into ear, but, as the troops descended, every few miles brought its change in climate, until, at Dwa Warkha, the people were found treading out their corn, preparatory to moving up to their summer quarters. As the troops marched along, men, women, and children left their encampments to watch them pass, thus proving their confidence in our sense of justice. Almost every plateau of cultivation had its high, narrow tower of two or more storeys, built partly to afford refuge to the men who remained behind to attend to the rain crops, and partly for the defence of the defile.

On the 18th the force emerged from the hills and encamped at Spinwam, in the Bannu valley, and two more marches brought it to Bannu, where it was broken up.

Although the expedition did not result in the immediate submission of the Mahsuds, its success was great. A loss was inflicted on the tribe which it would take them years to recover. Whenever they had met our troops, although in difficult passes, they had been defeated. Their chief town, Kaniguram, had been occupied, and spared only on payment of a fine, whilst Makin, their next most important town, had been destroyed, and their hitherto unknown country surveyed and mapped.

The loss inflicted on the Mahsuds by this invasion was estimated by the Commissioner at not less than Rs. 1,40,000.

Information of the intentions and movements of the tribe proved for a long time during this campaign very difficult to obtain. At first it was only possible to work through the Batanis, but when the force entered the Mahsud lands, the Batani spies became nearly useless. A few Mahsud Waziris were attached to the train of Nawab Shah Nawaz Khan, the chief of Tank, who accompanied the force, but these were not considered fully trustworthy. After a time matters improved; money, and possibly the growing belief in our ultimate success, enabled Shah Nawaz Khan to make use of men of respectability among the Mahsuds, who gave information concerning the chief movements and counsels and intentions of the tribe; and thus, latterly, the information was of a better kind.

Brigadier-General Chamberlain, in his despatch on the above operations, thus describes the services which the troops had rendered. The shortest marches took hours to perform, the safety of the followers, supplies, and baggage requiring the heights on both sides to be crowned and held until the arrival of the rear guard. Though starting by sunrise, it was generally noon, and often later, before the new ground was reached; arriving there, day picquets had to be posted, and escorts for the surveyors, cattle, and foragers to be supplied. In the afternoon fatigue parties had to be turned out to construct breastworks for the night picquets. These had to be substantially built with stones collected from the hill sides, and to be palisaded, to prevent a sudden rush by overpowering numbers.* At sunset from 700 to 1,000 men occupied these works, their comparatively isolated position rendering support difficult; at dusk the tents were struck, and, in addition to in-lying picquets, half the men slept accoutred, and the whole in uniform.

* The style of defence was to build an interior *sangar*, or breastwork of stones, and to surround it at a distance of some twenty-five or thirty paces with an abatis. When trees were not procurable, small thorny brushwood pegged down, or weighted down by massive stones when pegs would not hold, made a good substitute.

*Expedition
against the
Mahsud
Waziris in
1860.*

But no one grudged the exertion, for all felt that success, and honour, and safety depended on unceasing vigilance. The result was, that in a march of one hundred and sixty miles through an unknown and difficult country, carrying sixteen days' supplies for 8,000 men, with an enemy ever on the watch to take advantage of remissness, the expeditionary force lost but three camp followers and as many camels,—the former through their own negligence and disobedience of orders, the latter by a bold thief, who feigned to be a camel driver, and who was not noticed till beyond reach. Every camel that fell from exhaustion had been immediately shot, that it might not be of any use to the enemy.

Brigadier-General Chamberlain added, the conduct of the troops had been excellent, and the officers had afforded him the most cheerful and hearty support. In addition to the officers already named as having distinguished themselves, he specially acknowledged the services rendered by Lieutenant-Colonel H. B. Lumsden, C.B., commanding Corps of Guides; Lieutenant-Colonel G. W. G. Green, C.B., commanding 2nd Punjab Infantry; Lieutenant-Colonel A. T. Wilde, C.B., commanding 4th Punjab Infantry; Captain C. Pollard, Field Engineer; Surgeon H. B. Buckle, Principal Medical Officer; and he testified to the unwearied zeal with which Major J. T. Walker and his assistants, Lieutenants J. P. Basevi and B. R. Branfill, of the Survey, accomplished their task of constructing a map of the country. The Punjab Government, when sending on the report of the operations, alluded to the services of Captain H. C. Johnstone, of the Survey Department, who had been attached to the expedition.

Brigadier-General Chamberlain, after stating that the Commissioner, Lieutenant-Colonel R. G. Taylor, and the Deputy Commissioner, Captain H. W. H. Coxe, had as military officers from the first taken part in everything, and cheerfully rendered every assistance in their power, added that he had to acknowledge how greatly the military operations were assisted by the hearty co-operation of those officers in their capacities of Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner.

It was stated by Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor that the Nawabs Foujdar Khan Bahadur and Shah Nawaz Khan of Tank, and the eldest son of the Nawab of Dera Ismail Khan, besides some other chiefs of border influence, accompanied the force, and that all were desirous of exhibiting their loyalty; and that the levies did the duty assigned to them cheerfully and well, and exhibited an excellent spirit.

In a despatch from the Secretary of State for India, it was recorded that His Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief agreed with the Secretary of State in highly appreciating the skill, energy, and judgment displayed by Brigadier-General Chamberlain, and the discipline, courage, and devotion exhibited by the troops, in carrying to a successful issue operations of such peculiar difficulty; that the service rendered to the State was of considerable political importance, and proved that, under proper guidance, a well-organised force can penetrate the rugged mountains which form the north-western frontier of India, and operate at will against the warlike tribes which inhabit them, without much loss, and independently of local supplies.

The cordial aid afforded by the political officers was considered by the Governor-General in Council to be deserving of the highest commendation; and the special thanks of His Excellency in Council were to be conveyed to

Lieutenant-Colonel R. G. Taylor, the Commissioner, whose valuable services *Expedition against the* had been prominently brought to notice by the Brigadier-General. *Mahsud Waziris in*

For his services in the conduct of these operations, Brigadier-General Chamberlain was nominated a Knight Commander of the order of the Bath. 1860.

The Indian medal, with a clasp for the "North-West Frontier", was granted in 1869 to all survivors of the troops who took part in the above expedition against the Mahsud Waziris.

As no settlement had been come to with the Mahsud Waziris before the force was withdrawn to British territory, the tribe was put under blockade, and as they traded largely with the plains, and lived in a great measure on the profits of their iron trade, their annual loss from exclusion was estimated at not less than Rs. 20,000.

More than a year passed away, but the Mahsuds would not submit. Being able to draw supplies from the valleys of Khost and Dawar, the Mahsuds were not pinched by famine, though they suffered by the exclusion of their own and other commodities from British markets. During the whole of 1861 the Mahsuds lost no opportunity of making plundering raids into British territory. In February 1862 they opened negotiations, but they came to nothing. In June 1862, however, they agreed to the terms offered to them, and were again admitted to trade in our territories. The basis of the new engagement was, that each main section—Bahlolzai, Alizai, and Shaman Khel—should be responsible for any outrages committed by members of their sections. It was, moreover, ruled that six approved hostages should be given, two from each clan, and that three of these should be lodged at Bannu and three at Tank, receiving subsistence from Government.

But the Mahsuds had hardly concluded this treaty before they broke it; several thefts were committed, and five grass-cutters of the 3rd Punjab Cavalry were murdered by men of the Alizai and Bahlolzai sections. In consequence of this, all men of these sections found in our territory were seized, and their property confiscated; the Shaman Khels not being implicated, came and went without interruption, except when they used Alizai camels, which were then confiscated. The headmen subsequently professed their readiness to make good the fines due from them under the treaty, amounting in all to Rs. 4,500.

Their camels, therefore, were sold, and the balance paid by a banker, who was to be repaid by the offending sections, with interest, by a toll on all their pack animals, till the debt should be liquidated.

Soon after, on the 17th of November 1862, a deputation of the principal men of each sub-division waited on the Commissioner at Dera Ismail Khan to ratify the treaty previously made. Lieut.-Colonel R. G. Taylor then advocated some of the Shingi and other sections being settled in the waste lands in the Dera Ismail Khan district, and employment in the militia being given to the tribe; but, although tried, this project failed.

Meanwhile they did not discontinue their raids. In 1862, on the Dera Ismail Khan border, there occurred thirty-one cases of cattle-lifting, four petty

*Conduct of
the Mahsud
Waziris from
1860 to 1878.*

thefts, and four highway robberies, by which 133 camels, 90 head of cattle, and 232 sheep and goats, besides some cash and clothing, were stolen.

In 1863 the Mahsuds in force attacked the Jatta outpost, which was then not quite finished, and did some damage, and, besides this, 905 head of cattle were carried off; but 714 of these were recaptured, and five of the raiders were killed, three wounded, and thirteen captured.

They seldom gave an opportunity for reprisals, so that at length it was found necessary to exclude them from trading in the Bannu or Dera Ismail Khan districts.

The instructions of the Commissioner, Colonel J. R. Becher, C.B., on this subject were issued in August 1863, from which date the Nana Khels and Shingis were prohibited from entering British territory. These sections continued to plunder whenever they found an opportunity, but at length, in April 1864, they sought for peace by sending deputations to the foot of the hills to ask permission for a *jirga* to come in and make terms.

The Nana Khel section having carried on their principal trade with Tank, their chief men sought and obtained an interview through the Nawab, who forwarded them on to Dera Ismail Khan, where they made terms, and promised to behave well in future.

The Shingi section would not, however, come to terms, either at Dera Ismail Khan or Bannu: a large *jirga*, indeed, who came in to see the Deputy Commissioner of Bannu, requested that their clan might be forgiven and allowed once more to trade. They were hospitably entertained for some days, but were told that they must make good all they had plundered, amounting to Rs. 2,272, and must besides pay a fine of Rs. 500, and give hostages for their good behaviour. They promised to do this, and went off in order to gain the consent of the rest of the tribe, who, however, refused.

Attempts were then made at reprisals, in order to obtain some compensation for our villages which had thus been robbed, and Rs. 1,359 were collected in this manner.

At last, in August 1865, Major S. F. Graham, then Deputy Commissioner of the Dera Ismail Khan district, despairing of doing anything with the tribe, recommended that service in the frontier militia should be given to twenty-five Mahsud horsemen, and that land should be granted to them within the border. The terms on which it was to be granted were a rent-free tenure for ten years, and then a demand of one-tenth of the produce, and an advance of Rs. 5,000 was to be granted by Government, to assist in bringing water to the land.

The preliminaries of this arrangement progressed but slowly. The Mahsuds were not modest in their ideas, "demanding nothing less than 100 sowars for each section, and lands from Dabra to Tator"; and they wished to make the release of some prisoners caught marauding the first condition of their assent to the proposal. Gradually, however, they gave in, and all sections agreed in February 1866, except part of the Shingis, who held out for more horsemen.

As soon as the terms were agreed to, the horsemen were enlisted, and in the cold weather of 1866-67 about twenty families of Mahsuds settled on the land, brought about sixty acres under cultivation, and reaped the produce—a sum of Rs. 2,000 out of the Government grant of Rs. 5,000 having been expended. The prisoners were detained pending the result of these measures.

During the year, from the 18th of February 1866 to the 18th of February 1867, the tribe was, on the whole, much better behaved, but towards the close of the year some heavy cases of plunder of camels, with one or two of kidnapping Hindus, occurred, which swelled the amount of compensation due from the tribe to about Rs. 8,000. As usual, the Shingi and Nana Khel sections of the Bahlolzai branch were the principal offenders, and, as usual, they were unable to pay up; the release of the prisoners, therefore, which was contingent on good behaviour, was held in abeyance, pending compensation.

*Conduct of
the Mahsud
Waziris from
1860 to 1878.*

But in order to show his scrupulous observance of the terms of the treaty, Lieut.-Colonel Graham caused the prisoners to be removed from the jail on the 18th of February 1867, and to be placed in a *sarai* under a guard, with permission to see their friends freely, to resume their own dress, and to receive presents of food; their fetters were also removed.

In the meanwhile, a *jirga* of the tribe was summoned to Tank for the settlement of accounts previous to the release of the prisoners; and when matters looked sufficiently promising to warrant such a step, the prisoners were conveyed, still under guard, to Tank.

It soon, however, became apparent that no settlement of such heavy accounts could be hoped for (a quit settlement, indeed, of Rs. 2,000 was offered and rejected), and when their inability to pay became clear, Lieut.-Colonel Graham determined to withdraw the prisoners from Tank to the jail as before, which was carried out without accident or outbreak of any kind.

In so acting, Lieut.-Colonel Graham felt that it was necessary, if he hoped for success, to deal strictly as well as justly with the tribe; at the same time he well knew that the retention of the prisoners was in reality his only tangible security for the future.

He now summoned a special *jirga* of the tribe, and receiving the representatives of the three main sections separately, explained to the Alizais and Shaman Khels that, according to our old-standing treaty with them, each main section would be dealt with separately; that they had only a small amount of compensation to make good, and had no prisoners to be released; and that they should act up to their agreement with us, square their own accounts, remain on good terms with the Government, and leave the Bahlolzais to settle their own affairs. To this the delegates unhesitatingly agreed, and they were then dismissed.

Lieutenant-Colonel Graham then received the Aimal Khel and Band Khel sections of the Bahlolzais, and suggested the same course to them, to which they also agreed.

Lastly, the Shingi and Nana Khel delegates presented themselves, and to them it was announced that their prisoners would be retained pending compensation for plunder during the year. The release of the prisoners was promised after another year on the same terms as before, *i.e.*, on the tribe refraining from plunder, or paying compensation for such plunder, etc., as might be committed, in which case their liabilities for the past year would be remitted as before.

At the same time they were given fully to understand that if they were determined to give trouble, their quota of horsemen (eight) would be discharged, that they would be ejected from their lands, and excluded from British territory, and from any further favours which might be extended to the rest of the tribe.

This occurred during April, and the delegates agreed to refer the matter

*Conduct of
the Mahsud
Waziris from
1860 to 1878.*

to a conference of the whole tribe at their capital of Kaniguram, the result of which was that the Alizais and Shaman Khels elected to remain on good terms with the Government, while the whole of the Bahlolzais elected for mischief.

Amongst the murders committed by the Mahsuds in 1866, that of the agent of the Nawab of Tank was conspicuous. This act was committed by a party of Waziris, numbering twenty-two, who came into the Gumal valley by the pass opposite the post of Murtaza.

In 1867 there were two murders, two cases of wounding, and forty of cattle-lifting.

In 1868 there were five cases of murder, five of wounding, and sixty-four of cattle-lifting, the most prominent of the raids being one on the 25th of February, when a party of Nana Khels, variously estimated at from twenty to sixty, made a dash into the plains near the Girni pass, and, falling on a party of Batanis, carried off ten bullocks. They were pursued by a guard of the 1st Punjab Cavalry, who rescued the bullocks and wounded one of the marauders.

Again in April a body of Shingis attacked the village of Dabra, some miles within our boundary. Taking advantage of a dark and stormy night, they succeeded in reaching the gateway of the village without being observed, when they killed one man and wounded three others.

The state of this frontier was deemed so unsatisfactory, that Brigadier-General Wilde, commanding the Punjab Frontier Force, in this year selected sites for new posts, near the Girni and Zam passes, the better to stop these raids.

In 1869 there were five cases of murder, fifteen of wounding, and forty-eight of cattle-lifting. In one of these, on the 10th of March 1869, the *Nawab's* agent at the Gumal *thana* was cut up at midnight in the courtyard of his *thana* by a party of Nana Khels, Shingis, and Shaman Khels, who had succeeded in breaking through the wall and concealing themselves within the enclosure, notwithstanding the presence of two sentries. After this occurrence the *thana* officials and villagers were so paralysed by fear, that they gave no alarm to the Jatta post till the morning, and the Waziris escaped.

Another outrage occurred on the 11th of April 1869 between 9 and 10 P.M. A body of hillmen, fifty in number, surrounded the village of Fatch Namiji. Four men, who were apparently on watch, though unarmed, on hearing the hillmen arrive, ran to their houses to obtain arms: an alarm was given, and intimation was immediately conveyed to the neighbouring outpost of Kot Nasran, and also to several *Pawindah* and Batani encampments, that they were near with a view to pursuit. Meanwhile the assailants, having despatched a woman of the village and wounded five men (one of whom lost an arm), and carried off property estimated at Rs. 400, retired to their hills with impunity before any of the pursuing parties could overtake them.

The Girni post was begun in 1869 at a site three miles from the pass, but was abandoned on account of the failure to reach water, and the site was changed to the mouth of the pass; and in 1870 this post was completed and that of Kot Khirgi begun. On this the Mahsuds signalled their displeasure by making a treacherous, and, unfortunately, a successful, attack on the 13th of April 1870, on a guard of five bayonets of the 1st Sikh Infantry, proceeding to Tank from Kot Khirgi. These men were joined in the Zam pass by a body of from twenty to forty Shingi Mahsuds, who represented themselves

as servants of the chief of Tank, and being allowed to mix with the guard, suddenly disarmed and attacked them, killing two and wounding the remainder. It was afterwards ascertained that these men had come down for the express purpose of waylaying stragglers between Tank and Kot Khirgi. *Conduct of the Mahsud Waziris from 1860 to 1878.*

The raids on the Mahsud border for 1870 included four cases of murder, five of wounding, and fifty-eight of cattle-lifting. On the 29th of October 1870, Lieutenant C. B. Norman, 1st Sikh Infantry, who had for some days been completing a survey of the Gumal valley on the Tank frontier, was attacked by a marauding party of some sixty Waziris in front of Girni. After placing his escort, consisting of a detachment of the 2nd Punjab Cavalry, 1st Sikh Infantry, and some Batani footmen, in positions to meet the attack, and seeing that the Waziris were determined to come on, Lieutenant Norman fired on them at long range with a Martini-Henry rifle. The fourth shot knocked over the leader, when the remainder of the party at once retired up the hill with his body. Lieutenant Norman's conduct on this occasion was censured by the civil authorities, but Sir Henry Durand, the Lieutenant-Governor, to whom the matter was referred, recorded that while there might have been a little unnecessary assumption of risk on Lieutenant Norman's part, still the way in which he extricated himself from the attempt of the Waziris was creditable to him and to those who were with him, and the indiscretion that was committed by unnecessarily exposing himself and his party under circumstances that might have been avoided without any disgrace, was redeemed by the steadiness displayed by himself and his party when attacked.

During 1871 and 1872 the conduct of the Mahsuds on the Tank border continued to be most unsatisfactory. In the former year one hundred and eight, and in the latter seventy-eight, offences were committed. The disorder, however, had rather a criminal than a political aspect, and the raids which were committed were few, and were not of a serious character.

In March 1873 the Shaman Khels, who had been guilty of numerous offences, made full submission to the terms offered by the British Government, *viz.*, that the tribe should pay a fine of Rs. 3,000, be held responsible for the misconduct of individual members, and give twenty hostages as a guarantee of future good behaviour.

Their example was followed by the Bahlolzais, and in February 1874 their representatives came in to Dera Ismail Khan, and agreed to the terms offered by the Government. These terms were, payment of a sum of Rs. 5,585 as compensation for losses caused by them in British territory; payment of a fine of Rs. 3,000 in addition to this, and the giving of hostages for their future good behaviour.

While negotiations were still pending, a small party of the tribe belonging to the Haibat Khel and Jalal Khel sections of the Nana Khels, aided by a few Batanis, made an attack, on the 31st of March 1874, on a party of travellers passing under escort through the Bain pass. The attacking party numbered forty or fifty men, and succeeded in plundering the travellers of their clothes and Rs. 40 in cash, and wounded three of them with swords. On the alarm being given, five separate parties started in pursuit. One of these, numbering some twenty men, was attacked by a larger body of hillmen when returning, and seven of their number were wounded, four seriously. The raiders succeeded in getting off without any casualties. The marauders in this affair were permitted to pass and re-pass through the territory of the Batanis.

In consequence of this outrage, the Bahlolzai *jirga* were informed that

*Conduct of
the Mahsud
Waziris from
1860 to 1878.*

the negotiations were at an end, unless they were prepared at once to prove their sincerity by bringing in the ringleaders of the offending party, and by making full reparation to the men who had been wounded on this occasion. The compensation money, according to Afghan custom, amounted to Rs. 1,500; and this sum the Bahlolzais agreed to pay in addition to the amount already imposed. They also produced the ringleaders as required. On the 26th of April 1874 a final settlement with them was effected.

They then paid into the Government treasury the sum of Rs. 7,085 as compensation money, and they arranged that the fine of Rs. 3,000 should be recovered from a toll levied on their convoys entering British territory, and for their future good conduct they gave thirty-three hostages, to be located at Dera Ismail Khan.

With regard to the Batanis who had taken part in the Bain pass raid, a satisfactory settlement was also made with them.

This tribe, as already stated, had afforded some assistance to the British force in 1860, when operating against the Mahsuds, but after that they had relapsed into their old habits, and had committed numerous thefts and robberies on our border. In 1865 a settlement was made with them, and a portion of the tribe was located in the Dera Ismail Khan district, a tract of land being given them on easy terms, in consideration of their being responsible for the passes. Since then their conduct had greatly improved.

The part taken by the tribe in the Bain pass outrage afforded a favourable opportunity for fixing the pass responsibility of the Batanis on the Bannu border, and in consideration of their accepting this responsibility, a small fine of Rs. 5,000 only was imposed on the tribe. In May 1874 the Batanis paid the fine, and entered into a formal agreement to be responsible for the border from the Kharoba pass to the Larzan inclusive. A militia force was enlisted from among them to hold selected posts, the higher appointments being in the nomination of the headmen.

In 1875, in order to prevent the Tank border from relapsing into its former unsatisfactory state, an entire reform in the administration of the Tank valley was introduced. This valley had hitherto been under the control of the Nawab of Tank, who, with the best intentions, had proved himself unable to keep in order the wild tribes on his immediate border; his circumstances were bad, and he was unable to provide a sufficiently large force, either military or police, to ensure order. The police administration was now taken over, and a new police organised. The *Nawab's* position was in many respects ameliorated, and the revenue management of the *parganna* left in his hands. This reform, together with the acceptance of pass responsibility by the Batanis on the Tank, as well as on the Bannu border, and by the Mianis and Ghorazais on the skirt of the Gumal valley, and the enforcement among the Mahsuds themselves of complete tribal responsibility for offences committed by any of their sections, led to a marked change in the character of this part of the frontier.

In August 1877, however, an offence was committed which led to the blockade for the first time of the tribe as a whole. On the night of the 12th of that month a Hindu child was carried off by a small party of malcontents, who refused to restore it except for a large ransom. Accordingly, on the 26th of August, tribal property to the value of Rs. 15,000 was seized, and the Batanis, acting up to their engagements, closed their passes, so that no Mahsud could venture through them; but it was not until the 18th of March 1878 that, driven by the pressure of the blockade, the boy was restored. On that date, Umar

Khan, the leading *malik* of the Alizais, with the kidnapped Hindu child in his arms, presented it to the police officer, who met him on the border, saying, "For God's sake take this curse away from us." He little thought then that he was himself destined to prove a far greater, and more lasting, curse to his tribe than ever the Hindu child had innocently been to them. This blockade demonstrated what a powerful engine of coercion such a measure was against the Mahsuds for the redress of all ordinary border crime.

Operations in the Gumal valley in 1879.

Operations in the Gumal valley against the Suliman Khel Pawindahs and others, in January 1879.

In 1878 it was reported that the Tank border had never before been in such a satisfactory condition, nor life and property within the valley so secure as they had been during the last three years.

This peace was rudely broken by the raid on the town of Tank on the 1st of January 1879, which for audacity has been rarely paralleled in the history of the frontier. It was directly due to instigation from Kabul; Umar Khan, Alizai, having in December 1878 returned from that place with instructions from the late Amir Sher Ali to collect the Mahsud tribe, and endeavour to incite them to hostilities. It was only on the 25th of December

Punjab Govern-
ment despatch.

that the district officer heard rumours of a probable raid, and he then took precautions against any attack which might be made on British territory. All the posts on the Tank border

were doubled; at the same time their relief was deferred, so that in the important posts of Girni and Zam there was treble the usual number of troops, and by the 28th of December nearly half of the available force in the district was in the Tank valley; 210 bayonets and 150 sabres being in the Manjhi, Girni, and Zam posts. The villagers were also put on the alert in the usual manner, and the police and the Batanis, who were in charge of the passes, were properly warned. On the 1st of January the Batani posts and levies, failing to resist the enemy, or making common cause with them, the Mahsuds descended in a body, estimated at 2,000 to 3,000 strong, passing down the Zam, and in front of the military post of that name, which had been reinforced as above stated. After feeble and ineffectual efforts of the garrison to stop the raiders, the Mahsuds advanced on Tank, which they reached without further opposition, burning the *bazar* and many of the houses, and carrying off such property as had been left behind by the Hindu population, who had taken refuge in an old fort adjoining the town. The Waziris, however, killed no one, except a woman of their own tribe who had eloped, and was living at Tank. They then retired with their women and children, some 400 in number, who had formed part of the families of the hostages removed from Dera Ismail Khan to Tank some time previously, and regained the hills without molestation before any troops could intercept them.

The raiding party was joined by large numbers of *Pawindahs*, who at this time were in the Dera Ismail Khan district, and who could not resist the temptation to plunder. The Batanis, with everything to lose and little to gain by joining the Mahsuds, beyond the satisfaction of their religious fanaticism, made common cause with the enemy, while many British subjects belonging to the small Miani and Ghorazai tribes were equally culpable. The

*Operations in
the Gumal
valley in 1879.*

the native officers commanding the Zam and Girni posts, who had at their disposal a sufficient number of cavalry and infantry to have made a conspicuous example of the Mahsuds had they not shrunk from the responsibility of attacking them. The leader of the raiding party was Umar Khan, Alizai, the son of Jangi Khan, who had been the leader in the former attempt to surprise Tank in 1860, when he had been killed. The Mahsuds belonged chiefly to the Alizai clan, although the Bahlolzais and Shaman Khels also joined in the raid.

On the 2nd of January the Extra Assistant Commissioner at Tank sent to request aid from the Zam post, and accordingly the whole of the cavalry detachment of the post proceeded to Tank and occupied the *tehsil* buildings.

On the same day, hearing that a marauding party of the Kharotis was in the neighbourhood, the native officer commanding the detachment, Muhammad Nasir Khan, turned out his guard, and coming up with them, called upon them to surrender. As they refused, and fired on his guard, he attacked them, killing ten and taking six prisoners, the only casualty on our side being one horse wounded.

The plunder and firing of Tank was the signal for general disorder; and lawless and predatory bands of Kharotis, Suliman Khels, and even British subjects, availed themselves of a time of confusion to plunder and destroy several border villages.

On the 2nd of January, as described in the last chapter, the Zalli Khel Waziris, an isolated section of the Ahmadzai Darwesh Khels, aided by Mianis and *Pawinduks*, burnt the Jatta police post and pillaged the Gumal bazar. The officer commanding at Manjhi, a subadar of the 4th Sikh Infantry, made no effort to drive the enemy off, and simply contented himself with defending his post.

On the receipt of the report of the impending attack upon Tank, which reached Dera Ismail Khan on the morning of the 2nd of January, Colonel H. F. M. Boisragon, commanding at that place, at once gave orders for the available troops, consisting of about 100 sabres of the 4th Punjab Cavalry and 180 bayonets of the 4th Sikh Infantry, to move out at once to Tank. At the same time he telegraphed to the officer commanding at Edwardesabad to push on as rapidly as he could all available troops of his district towards Tank. Colonel Boisragon arrived at Hatala, about fourteen miles from Tank, at 2 A.M. on the morning of the 3rd, and was there met by Major C. E. Macaulay, the Deputy Commissioner. At 7 A.M. the 4th Punjab Cavalry pushed on from Hatala to Tank, and the 4th Sikh Infantry followed soon after. About four miles from Tank, the force came upon a Kharoti *kiri* in a strong position. On being summoned to surrender, these men refused to give up their arms or plunder, and at the expiry of half an hour, which had been allowed them to do this, the infantry was ordered to advance in extended order, and the cavalry was sent round to their right flank. After a few shots had been fired, a *pagri* was waved as a token of submission, and the troops then entered the *kiri*, recovered the plunder, took about fifty arms of various sorts, one hundred camels, and fifty prisoners, and arrived at Tank at 8 P.M., having marched nearly fifty miles, and the cavalry more than this, as they visited the villages *en route*.

On the 4th, at 8 A.M., the troops, as per margin, under the command of Captain B. E. Gowan, 4th Sikh Infantry, and accompanied by Major C. E. Macaulay, proceeded from Tank towards the frontier posts

4th Punjab Infantry... 63 sabres.
4th Sikh Infantry ... 47 bayonets.

of Dabra, Jatta, and Girni. On arriving at Dabra, the Deputy Commissioner informed Captain Gowan that there was an encampment of Zalli Khel Waziris near the hills, who had been plundering in British territory, and it was determined, with the assistance of some troops from the Girni post, to try and surround it. *Operations in the Gumal valley in 1879.*

Captain Gowan accordingly, having sent orders to the troops at Girni to move out, proceeded to Jatta, and at 3 P.M. he left that post and made straight for the hills, meeting on the way the detachments of cavalry and infantry from the Girni post. On reaching the hills, the force moved along their base, but the encampments had in the meanwhile moved off across the frontier, and Captain Gowan, therefore, proceeded to Girni, which he reached after dark, and passed the night within the outpost. On the morning of the same day, the 4th of January, the cavalry garrison of Girni, under Jemadar Amir Singh, had attacked a party of Zalli Khel Waziris, who were making their way into the hills. Two Waziris were killed and one severely wounded. They then surrendered, and the rest of the party, forty in number, were made prisoners. A large number of bullocks laden with grain were also captured, and were brought in, together with the prisoners, to the Girni outpost.

On the morning of the 4th the Deputy Commissioner received information that a Suliman Khel *kiri*, which had been plundering in British territory, was about to leave our territory by the Gumal pass. Arrangements were accordingly made to try and intercept it on the following morning.

At daybreak on the morning of the 5th of January the cavalry and infantry detachments, as per margin, moved out from the Girni post, under the command of Captain B. E. Gowan. The cavalry was under the command of Captain T. Shepherd, 4th Punjab Cavalry, and the force was accompanied by the Deputy Commissioner. The troops came upon the encampment at 8 A.M., about four miles from Girni, to the left of the Girni-Jatta road. The infantry and cavalry having advanced to within four hundred yards of the *kiri*, the headmen were summoned by Major Macaulay to surrender. Parleying went on for about an hour, but the *Pawindahs* refused to submit; and as they were seen to be busy entrenching themselves inside the *kiri*, orders were given for a shot to be fired over the encampment, to show that we were in earnest. They, however, made no signal of submission, but took to their entrenchments, the few women that were in the encampment leaving it. The position of the enemy was naturally a strong one, in the midst of a succession of low sand hillocks, which they had strengthened by throwing up shelter round them. Captain Gowan ordered the infantry to advance, and they rapidly moved forward by rushes, firing steadily, and taking advantage of any cover there was. In the meanwhile half the cavalry, under Lieutenant W. Lambert, had moved round the enemy's right, to cut off the retreat of the *Pawindahs* towards some low hills close at hand, and to prevent any aid being received from the ridge in rear, where some few men were seen collected. The fire of the enemy was well sustained, and they fought steadily from behind their cover.

After the attack of the infantry had lasted about half an hour, the cavalry was ordered to charge in flank through the encampment, in order to shake the confidence and steadiness of the enemy. Captain Shepherd accordingly made a gallant charge at the head of the detachment, which was most successful. Many of the enemy, seeing the 4th Punjab Cavalry approach, threw down their matchlocks and took to their *talwars*. The party had several hand-to-

4th Punjab Cavalry ... 90 sabres.
4th Sikh Infantry ... 55 bayonets.

*Operations in
the Gumal
valley in 1879.*

hand encounters with the enemy, and cut down about fifteen of their number. Captain Shepherd received a sword cut in the neck, and Lieutenant R. H. Forrest had his horse shot under him. Simultaneously with this charge of the cavalry, Captain Gowan made a final rush with the infantry, and took the last position of the enemy, on the left flank of the *kiri*, which they had held with great tenacity. The encampment was then set on fire and completely destroyed.

The behaviour of the 4th Sikhs, encouraged by the coolness of their leader, Captain Gowan, was excellent throughout, though the fire of the enemy from their entrenched position was heavy and maintained to the last. Our casualties had been two killed and eleven wounded (*see* Appendix F). Of the enemy seventy dead were counted in and about the encampment. Their resistance had been most determined, and during the attack men were seen brandishing their shields and swords in front of the *kiri*, and encouraging all to fight hard.

Captain Gowan, in his report of this affair, acknowledged his indebtedness to Captain T. Shepherd and to Surgeon A. McGregor, 4th Punjab Cavalry. He also brought to notice the excellent behaviour of Jemadar Baisakha Singh, who was the only native officer with him, and of several sepoy, who he considered had specially distinguished themselves. Captain Shepherd said that Lieutenants R. H. Forrest and W. Lambert, 4th Punjab Cavalry, afforded him every assistance, and led their men in a gallant manner.

After the termination of this affair, the troops marched to Manjhi, where they passed the night. On the night of the 6th they marched to Jatta, where they joined Colonel Boisragon and the head-quarters of the 4th Sikh Infantry, which had come out from Tank that day. On the 7th Colonel Boisragon received orders from the Brigadier-General commanding the Punjab Frontier Force that the Bannu troops were to be sent back immediately to their district, and orders were issued accordingly. These

*3rd Punjab Cavalry...200 sabres.
3rd Sikh Infantry .. 250 bayonets.
4th Punjab Infantry...250 „

troops,* under the command of Major G. N. Money, 3rd Sikh Infantry, had moved out from Bannu on the requisition of Colonel Boisragon on the first news of the outbreak. Major Money reported that he found the district more or less in a state of panic, owing to the conduct of the *Pawindahs*, who were plundering the villages and giving out that the British rule was at an end. On the 4th instant the detachment arrived at Ama Khel, and on the following day marched to Mullazai, with the exception of 100 sabres of the 3rd Punjab Cavalry, which were sent at daybreak direct to Kot Nasran, with orders to reconnoitre the Shuza pass, where some Waziris were supposed to have collected, and the country between Kot Nasran and Mullazai. Major J. D. Macpherson, commanding this party, found traces of about two hundred men having passed the night in the pass, and a spy whom he sent up returned later in the day with information that an attack on Kot Nasran had been intended, but was abandoned on hearing of the arrival of troops at Ama Khel.

On the 6th the detachment returned to Ama Khel, and on the 7th, as already stated, they received orders to return to Bannu. During their stay at Ama Khel all the *Pawindah kiris* in the neighbourhood were visited by cavalry patrols, and six *Pawindahs*, who had been engaged in plundering, were arrested and made over to the civil authorities.

On the 7th Colonel Boisragon, leaving 50 cavalry and 50 infantry at Jatta, under the command of Lieutenant R. H. Forrest, 4th Punjab Cavalry, returned to Tank with the rest of the troops. *Operations in the Gumal valley in 1879.*

In forwarding his report on the above operations in the Gumal valley, Brigadier-General C. J. Godby, commanding the Punjab Frontier Force, considered that Colonel Boisragon's arrangements, after the outbreak, were good. The Brigadier-General said that his thanks were due to this officer and to Lieutenant-Colonel F. T. Bainbridge, 4th Sikh Infantry, and he brought to notice the conspicuous gallantry of Captains B. E. Gowan and T. Shepherd in the affair of the 5th of January, and favourably mentioned the names of Lieutenants R. H. Forrest and W. Lambert, and of Surgeon A. McGregor, all of the 4th Punjab Cavalry, and of Lieutenant V. C. Tonnochy, 4th Sikh Infantry. Brigadier-General Godby also acknowledged the great assistance which had been received from Major C. E. Macaulay, the Deputy Commissioner.

A Brigade Order was subsequently issued, publishing to the Punjab Frontier Force the opinion expressed by the Lieutenant-Governor, that the gallant action of the detachment under Captain Gowan, in the affair of the 5th of January, had restored order on the Tank border.

On the 15th of January 80 sabres, 4th Punjab Cavalry, and a detachment of the 4th Sikh Infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel F. T. Bainbridge, commanding at Tank, disarmed a Kharoti *kiri* near Ranwal, and recovered a quantity of stolen property.

On the evening of the 16th of January it was reported that 3,000 Mahsuds had collected at the mouth of the Zam pass. During the night they threw up stone breastworks round an old ruin called Aladad-ki-Kot on their left, and also round the base of the hill on their right, on the other side of the stream, and connected the two positions by a line of breastworks across the bed of the *nullah*. The troops at Tank had now been reinforced by the 3rd Punjab Infantry from Dera Ghazi Khan. Lieutenant-Colonel Bainbridge accordingly moved out from Tank early on the 17th with 245 bayonets and 95 sabres, and endeavoured to draw the enemy out of his position; but his efforts were of no avail, and, as it was getting late, the troops retired, not being strong enough to attack.

Lieutenant-Colonel Bainbridge having received information from the Deputy Commissioner that the Mahsuds intended a raid towards Shah Alam, Nasran, and Tajori, sent Lieutenant V. C. Tonnochy, 4th Sikh Infantry, with 50 bayonets, to Shah Alam. Lieutenant J. A. C. Wedderburn, 3rd Punjab Infantry, was at Nasran, with 75 bayonets. Nothing, however, was attempted on the night of the 17th, the enemy not knowing where the troops were bivouacked.

On the 18th cavalry patrols were sent to reconnoitre. In the evening intelligence was received that the Mahsuds were on their way down towards Nasran. At 9 P.M. news came that Shah Alam was attacked, but the enemy were not aware that Lieutenant Tonnochy was there, and when they were met by a volley, they retired from the place, leaving three killed. Major J. Finnis, 3rd Punjab Infantry, with 80 bayonets, had started from Tank on their track, and fortunately came across them as they were returning from Tajori with plunder. He attacked them, and the Mahsuds fled, leaving behind them their

*Affair in the
Zam pass in
January 1879.*

plunder, and some of their own arms and property. In this he was assisted by Lieutenant Wedderburn from the Nasran post. The enemy escaped by the Shuza pass; the number of killed is not known, but it was only the darkness of the night which prevented their being as utterly destroyed as the Suliman Khels had been by Captain Gowan, on the 5th of January.

In addition to Tajori, the villages of Ashpari and Kot Kat were also attacked by a band of marauders, consisting of Mahsuds and Batanis, and were partially looted, the damage done being estimated at Rs. 4,960. Early on the 19th Lieutenant-Colonel Bainbridge, having received a small increase of strength, moved out again from Tank with 350 bayonets and 94 sabres, belonging to the 4th Sikh Infantry, the 3rd Punjab Infantry, and the 4th

Punjab Cavalry. At 9 A.M. the troops arrived in front of the Zam pass, when it was seen that the enemy had left their position in the *sangars*, and were in great numbers on the low hills in rear. On perceiving the troops they began to descend to some of their positions again. Major P. C. Rynd, commanding the 3rd Punjab Infantry, was then ordered to take his regiment and 40 bayonets, 4th Sikh Infantry, and to turn the flank of the enemy by attacking the hill on the right of their position. At the same time the remainder of the 4th Sikh Infantry was extended to threaten a front attack.

The cavalry was placed in rear of the 4th Sikh Infantry, and in the bed of the *nullah*. Major Rynd's attack on the enemy's right was entirely successful, and, almost as soon as his skirmishers opened fire on the Waziris, they abandoned their *sangars*, and the whole of the enemy fled to the hills behind and up the Zam without waiting to be attacked. The 3rd Punjab Infantry then occupied the commanding position on the left and the 4th Sikh Infantry advanced and occupied the main position, and remained there till all signs of the enemy had disappeared from the surrounding hills. With the small force at his command, Lieutenant-Colonel Bainbridge did not consider it prudent to follow up the enemy, and at 1 P.M. he marched back to camp. There were no casualties on our side, but the enemy were said to have had seven men killed.

Brigadier-General Godby, in forwarding the report of this affair, considered that it had been well managed. The Government letter acknowledging the report said that, in the opinion of the Governor-General in Council, Lieutenant-Colonel Bainbridge might have attacked the enemy's position on the 17th, and have done what he did on the 19th without incurring any great risk.

On the evening of the 20th of February a report reached the Mullazai post that a flock of sheep belonging to a *Pawindah kiri* in the neighbourhood had been carried off from their grazing ground by Mahsud marauders, and that the *Pawindahs* had gone in pursuit of them towards the Larzan pass, as it was thought the marauders would drive them to the hills by that route.

At the Mullazai militia post, there was, at that time, a party of 50 bayonets, under a British officer, Lieutenant O. C. Radford, 4th Punjab Infantry, who, on hearing this news, proceeded with 30 bayonets and the militia of the post to the Larzan, with a view of cutting off the retreat of the raiders with their plunder.

About dawn on the 21st of February Lieutenant Radford and his party reached the entrance of the pass, where they overtook some of the *Pawindahs*. They now looked for the tracks of the raiders, but could not

discover any, whereupon Lieutenant Radford, accompanied by Ressaldar Abdul Samand and a few sowars, rode up the pass a short distance to see if they could find any traces higher up. They had not gone far when they sighted men on the hills to the north of the pass, and on seeing that they were evidently in some numbers and were working round to, if possible, cut off their retreat, Lieutenant Radford sent for his party, which had been halted at the entrance to the pass, and as soon as they came up, he drove the enemy off from the heights on the right, causing them, it was reported, the loss of six or eight men killed and wounded. One man on our side was mortally wounded, and one of the sowars' horses killed.

Affair in the Larzan pass in February 1879.

The enemy consisted of about 200 Mahsuds and Batanis, and it subsequently appeared that they were assembled with the object of carrying off from the plains some *Pawindah* camels grazing in that direction. The report of the sheep having been carried off turned out afterwards not to have been true, and to have been caused by the flock not having returned at the usual time; but, as it turned out, the false alarm was a fortunate occurrence, as it led to the dispersion of a strong body of marauders assembled for the purpose of raiding in British territory. The Lieutenant-Governor subsequently expressed his satisfaction at the results attained in this little affair.

On the night of the 16th of March, at 10 P.M., an attack was made by a body of about one hundred Mahsuds on the village of Gumal. Warning of an intended raid had been received, and consequently the post at Jatta had been strengthened by 55 sabres. The attack was, however, beaten off by the villagers themselves before the troops arrived from Jatta and Manjhi. There were only about thirty men in the village at the time, and the raiders succeeded, in the first assault, in breaking open one of the gates, but were driven back by a volley from the defenders, and the gate was again closed. The raiders twice attempted to force it again, but the villagers with their matchlocks defended the approach from the walls on both sides so determinedly, that they at last succeeded in beating off the attack; and the raiders, on hearing that the cavalry were coming, took to flight, leaving one of their wounded in front of the gate which the villagers had so well defended. Two more of the raiders were also wounded, one of whom subsequently died in the hills. The villagers suffered no loss of any kind or hurt except a few slight bruises from stones.

Order had now been restored on the Tank border; and the different tribes, with the exception of the Mahsuds, had received punishment for the part they had taken in the recent disturbances. Besides the punishment inflicted, as already shown, on the *Pawindahs*, a sum of nearly Rs. 60,000 was levied as fine and compensation from these wandering tribes, whose settlements the necessities of trade placed within our grasp. The conduct of the *Pawindahs* necessitated special precautions with regard to them for the future. All bands of these migratory tribes were to be disarmed on their entry into British territory; their arms were to be deposited in a military arsenal, and returned to their owners when they again crossed the border. No *Pawindah* encampment was to be allowed within the immediate neighbourhood of the hill passes, but all were required to settle within a ring drawn at some distance from the hills.

The Batanis were punished by the resumption of their lucrative service in the border militia, and by a fine of Rs. 10,000; the ringleaders of the Mianis and Ghorazais were captured and sentenced by the ordinary tribunals to long periods of imprisonment: from the former, too, a fine of

*Terms offered
to the Mahsud
Waziris.*

Rs. 3,000 was levied, and an allowance of Rs. 2,000 for service in the Murtaza post was withheld.

The Mahsuds alone, the principal offenders, remained unpunished. On them the Government had imposed the following terms:—

- 1st. The surrender of all property plundered on the 1st of January 1879, and subsequently up to the date of any settlement which might be made, or payment of compensation for the value of it.
- 2nd. The payment of a fine of Rs. 30,000.
- 3rd. The surrender of six headmen, ringleaders in the disturbances of January 1879, *viz.*, Umar Khan, Yarak and Matin (Alizais), Boyak Khan, Azmat, and Mashak (Bahlolzais).

In the event of their refusing to accept these terms, they were to be enforced by a punitive expedition into their country as soon as a favourable opportunity should occur. In the meanwhile, a strict blockade was to be enforced against the tribe.

In April 1879 a large party of Mahsuds was seized in the Bannu district and one hundred and sixty of their number—the men of better position and standing—were detained. On the 11th of the same month the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan reported that seventy leading families of the Shaman Khel and Alizai Mahsuds had surrendered themselves unconditionally to Government. As it was impolitic to deal with anything but a full *jirga* of the tribe, a few of the principal men only were detained, and the rest sent back to their hills to endeavour to effect such agreement as would lead to compliance with the conditions of punishment imposed.

Affair with the Batanis of Jandula at the Hinis Tangi, in April 1880.

In March 1880 the excitement produced by the preaching of the fanatical priest, Mulla Adkar of Khost, extended to the Mahsuds. This man, as already mentioned, had been driven out of Khost by our troops in January 1879, and had taken refuge in Upper Dawar. At the end of March 1880 he visited Kaniguram, in the hope of rousing the Mahsuds to active hostilities against the British Government; but his ardour was temporarily checked by a fall from the roof of his house, resulting in injuries so serious that he had to be carried back on a litter to his home in Dawar. His visit to the Mahsuds was thus cut short, and he was frustrated in his purpose of superintending the proposed attack in person. He left, however, some of his disciples behind him to see that the tribe carried out his designs, and it is said that he distributed certain sums of money to the hostile tribal leaders as an inducement to them to lead their tribe in the proposed attack on British territory.

On the 5th of April the Deputy Commissioner received information that the Waziris were gathering in small numbers at a place ten miles from our border up the Tank Zam, and that more would probably join them. He accordingly warned the officer commanding at Dera Ismail Khan (Lieut.

Colonel P. C. Rynd) that this border would probably require to be reinforced. *Affair with the Batanis of Jandula in 1880.* Lieut.-Colonel Rynd thereupon ordered the troops, as per margin, from Dera Ismail Khan to Tank. A detachment of fifty bayonets was also ordered from Kulachi to Jatta. On the 6th infor-

No. 3 (Peshawar) Mountain Battery	...	3 guns.
4th Punjab Cavalry	...	50 sabres.
4th Sikh Infantry	...	150 bayonets.
3rd Punjab Infantry	...	150 "

mation was received that the Waziri gatherings, which had largely increased in numbers, had collected near Jandula, and were debating whether to come down by the Tank Zam, or to go up the Shahur Zam and descend on the Gumal valley; Umar Khan, Yarak, and Mashak were with them, but some of the main sections had declined to join the force, and owing to differences of opinion among those collected as to the direction they should take, and to their supplies running short, some of them began to return to their homes. The rest, chiefly Alizais, under Umar Khan and Yarak, determined to try what they could do on the Gumal border, and in the afternoon it was reported that they had begun to move in that direction. The posts in the Gumal valley were accordingly placed on the alert, and warned to expect an attack during the night. The Jatta and Manjhi posts were expressly entrusted with the protection of the Gumal town. After night had set in, a party of the enemy, some two hundred or three hundred strong, passing down the bed of the Gumal stream, and concealed by the high bank, got down close to the town, and then leaving the *nullah*, made a rush at three of the gates. They managed to get into a deserted corner of the village, where there were a few *Pawindahs* and their families, with five camels and twenty donkeys, passing the night. The eighteen bayonets which had been placed in the town prevented their making any further progress, and the cavalry from the Manjhi post now coming up, compelled them to retire. They managed in the dark to drive off the camels and donkeys they had secured in the corner of the village, and they killed a little *Pawindah* girl who tried to save her father's camel while he himself was hiding behind a wall. The loss the raiders suffered while they were being driven off from the town and retiring to the hills was three killed and two wounded. The difficult nature of the country, the darkness of the night, and the blowing of a sand-storm, prevented any pursuit, and no doubt enabled them to gain the hill less punished than they would otherwise have been. After the failure of the attack on Gumal, the Waziris retired to their hills, and the gathering dispersed to their homes.

In this affair the Batanis of Jandula, who were nominally friendly to the British Government, had failed in supplying information as to the movements of the Waziris, and had given a passage to the enemy through their lands. Lieutenant-Colonel Rynd, therefore, in consultation with the civil authorities and with the sanction of the Punjab Government, determined to attack Jandula and punish the Batanis. Accordingly, the troops as per margin, con-

Lieutenant-Colonel Rynd's despatch.

		All ranks.
4th Punjab Cavalry	...	78
No. 3 (Peshawar) Mountain Battery	...	84
4th Sikh Infantry	...	262
3rd Punjab Infantry	...	297

sisting of 721 of all ranks, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Rynd, commanding the Dera Ismail Khan district, were ordered to concentrate during the night of the 11th and 12th of April at the post of Kot Khirgi, and at 3 A.M.

on the 12th the force marched from there towards Jandula (see Map, p. 552).

Nothing of any importance occurred on the line of march till the troops approached to within half a mile of the Hinis Tangi, a defile about a hundred

*Affair with
the Batanis
of Jandula
in 1880.*

yards wide which opens on to the Jandula plateau. Here it was reported that the enemy was holding the defile to dispute the passage. The force was, therefore, halted till daybreak.

At daybreak a company of the 4th Sikhs, under Lieutenant E. W. Cunliffe, was sent ahead of the column towards the mouth of the pass, and a company of the 3rd Punjab Infantry, under Captain J. E. P. Mosley, was ordered to crown the heights on the left. When Lieutenant Cunliffe arrived within view of the defile, he reported that it was held by the enemy in force. Lieutenant-Colonel Rynd then advanced, and found that the pass was barricaded across the mouth, and was commanded by a *sangar*, which was full of men, on the hill on the right of the enemy's position. Another company of the 3rd Punjab Infantry, under Lieutenant J. A. C. Wedderburn, was, therefore, ordered to reinforce Captain Mosley, and the attack commenced. The guns were at the same time brought into action, and they made excellent practice, dropping several shells into the *sangar*. After a sharp encounter, during which the 4th Sikhs were attacking on the right, the 3rd Punjab Infantry on the heights of the left, and the Peshawar Mountain Battery firing from the centre, the enemy began to retreat up the hill to the left, and the defile was carried, and the whole column moved through.

Seeing some of the enemy on the ridge and face of the hill to the left, Lieutenant-Colonel Rynd sent Lieutenant W. A. D. O'Mealy, with some more bayonets, to co-operate with Lieutenant Wedderburn, and to hold the heights while the column advanced on Jandula.

As it appeared that all the inhabitants of Jandula had taken part in the engagement, orders were given for the place to be destroyed.

Lieutenant-Colonel Rynd halted at Jandula to rest the troops for about an hour, and then returned to Kot Khirgi unmolested, which place was reached at 12 noon. The troops were all back in Tank by 9 P.M., having marched forty miles in the twenty-four hours over the stony bed of the Tank Zam.

Our casualties during the engagement were slight (*see* Appendix G). The loss of the enemy must have been severe, nine dead bodies having been left on the ground, besides those taken away.

Lieutenant-Colonel Rynd, in his report of this affair, said that the conduct of the troops was excellent. The brunt of the fighting fell to the share of Captain Mosley and Lieutenants Wedderburn and O'Mealy; and he particularly brought to notice the conduct of the last named officer. Lieutenant-Colonel Rynd also said that his best thanks were due to the officers commanding the several detachments, and he largely attributed the success of the expedition to the valuable information and assistance afforded to him by Major C. E. Macaulay, the Deputy Commissioner.

The Government of India, in acknowledging the report of this affair, considered that the conduct of the expedition reflected much credit on Lieutenant-Colonel Rynd and all concerned.

At the end of May following, the Batani headmen of Jandula came in and made their voluntary submission to the Deputy Commissioner. The three leading *maliks* were detained as hostages, and the rest were then allowed to return to Jandula.

Expedition against the Mahsud Waziris by a combined force under Brigadiers-General T. G. Kennedy, C.B., and J. J. H. Gordon, C.B., in 1881.

To return now to the Mahsud Waziris. As seen in the last chapter, this tribe was associated with the Darwesh Khel Waziris and with the Dawaris in 1880 in several serious outrages on the Thal-Kuram road. In the attack on the Turi cavarán on the night of the 25th-26th of March 1880, a few members of their tribe were present, and in the raid on the Khatak labour camp (3rd-4th of April) they were also represented. On the night of the 22nd-23rd of April they were guilty of a further outrage on British territory, when, in company with a body of other Waziris and Dawaris, they made an attack on the Baran post on the Bannu border. This affair will be more fully described in the next chapter. In the attack on the Chapri post on the night of the 1st-2nd of May, already narrated, and in the raid on Government camels near Thal on the 15th of July, the Mahsuds were also implicated.

*Expedition
against the
Mahsud
Waziris in
1881.*

On the termination of the operations in Afghanistan, the Government was able to take up the case of the Mahsud Waziris. Since the commencement of the blockade, the general attitude of the tribe had been one of outward show of humility and desire to make terms; and at various times petitions to be forgiven and received once more into favour had been presented by *jirgas* or bodies of the headmen of different sections, but the tribe as a whole had not displayed any inclination to take active steps towards making the reparation required by the British Government, and had, moreover, been guilty of numerous acts of hostility, as shown above. Sanction was therefore asked to the movement of troops against the Mahsuds as the only measure which seemed likely to bring about the submission of the tribe. The spring was considered the best time of the year for the expedition. The proposal was sanctioned by the Government of India in March 1881, and arrangements were at once made for coercing the tribe.

A proclamation (*see* Appendix H) was published and widely circulated, which, after reciting the engagements under which this clan had bound itself to abstain from raids and aggressions on British territory, offered to them a final opportunity for peaceable submission, and invited them to depute delegates to arrange for the terms of settlement and the payment of the fine. Meanwhile orders were issued for the assembling of a force at Tank under the command of Brigadier-General T. G. Kennedy, C.B., to whom was entrusted the command of the expedition. This force was to be composed of troops of the Punjab Frontier Force, to which were added a company of Sappers and Miners and the 32nd Punjab Native Infantry (Pioneers). At the same time a reserve brigade was to be formed at Bannu, under the command of Brigadier-General J. J. H. Gordon, C.B. Major C. E. Macaulay, who had been appointed Political Officer with the force, was told that the object of the expedition was to compel the Mahsuds to submit to the terms offered to them, which were the same as those originally imposed, *viz.*, compensation for property plundered, payment of a fine of Rs. 30,000, and the surrender of the six headmen already named (*see* p. 540).

*Expedition
against the
Mahsud
Waziris in
1881.*

On the 18th of April, the force, as per margin, consisting of 12 guns, 290				sabres, and 3,662 bayonets,
No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery	3 guns.	under the command of
No. 3 (Peshawar) Mountain Battery	6 "	Brigadier-General T. G.
No. 4 (Hazara) Mountain Battery	3 "	Kennedy, C.B., command-
1st Punjab Cavalry	100 sabres.	ing the Punjab Frontier
4th Punjab Cavalry	190 "	Force, marched from
8th Company, Sappers and Miners	70 bayonets.	Tank to near the Zam
1st Sikh Infantry	465 "	post (<i>see</i> Map, p. 552).
4th Sikh Infantry	466 "	The force was accom-
1st Punjab Infantry	423 "	panied by Major C. E.
2nd Punjab Infantry	460 "	Macaulay, the Political
3rd Punjab Infantry	461 "	Officer.
4th Punjab Infantry	464 "	
6th Punjab Infantry	475 "	
32nd Punjab Native Infantry (Pioneers)	378 "	

While arrangements for the assembling of troops were still in progress, several sections of the Mahsuds sent in their headmen, in the hope of making terms separately with the Government, and of thus avoiding punishment. Among these were the clans whose possessions were nearest to British territory, and whose headmen had for some time past been resident in Tank or Dera Ismail Khan. But many important sub-divisions of the tribe were still unrepresented, specially those whose homes were in the western and more inaccessible hills, and whose leaders had been most closely associated with Umar Khan, and the faction for many years past opposed to peace with the British Government.

Shortly after the distribution of the proclamation, the question of submission to our demands had been discussed at a great council held at Kaniguram, where the leading men of the Shabi Khel Alizais, the Aimal Khel Bahlolzais, and the Shaman Khels urged unconditional surrender as the only means of rescuing the tribe from protracted suffering. The proscribed headmen consequently found that they had to pay the usual penalty of ill success, and that the majority of their fellow clansmen were not disposed to join them in armed resistance. Accordingly, Azmat (Shingi) and Boyak Khan (Aimal Khel), both of the Bahlolzai branch, surrendered at the Tank Zam post on the 18th of April, and on the following day Umar Khan and Matin (Alizais) gave themselves up captive, with the son of Yarak, who was, or affected to be, prostrate with illness. The sixth ringleader whose surrender was demanded by Government, Mashak (Nana Khel), gave out that he would follow Umar Khan's example, and come down to Shingi Kot; but his resolution failing, he returned home. One of the three conditions, and seemingly the most stringent and hard of accomplishment, was thus nearly fulfilled at the outset; but the submission of the tribe was still incomplete. Several important sub-divisions, especially the Nana Khel section of the Bahlolzais, were still defiant, and while they remained unpunished, no negotiations for the payment of compensation and fine by the whole tribe were possible. Accordingly it was determined that the troops should advance into the Mahsud country with the object of coercing the Nana Khel section into submission.

Brigadier-General
Kennedy's des-
patch and Major
Macaulay's re-
port.

On the 21st the force advanced to Kot Khirgi, and the following day to Jandula, where it was halted on the 23rd. The instructions to the General Officer Commanding and to the Political Officer authorised them to destroy all fortified places visited by the troops, to seize the property of ringleaders and persons known to have been engaged in the raid on Tank, and to punish armed resistance by the seizure of cattle and of crops; while

any village submitting in a body was to be kindly and considerately treated, the houses spared, and all supplies paid for. *Expedition against the Mahsud Waziris in 1881.*

The Nana Khels who were to be coerced were divided into seven sections. The Abdul Rahman Khels lived chiefly in Aspalito; the Nekzan Khels in the Khaisora valley; the Gigai Khels in Badar; and the Jalal Khels and Kikrais in Shaktu. The Haibat Khels and Umar Khels dwelt on the Tank Zam at Suri Raghza and also at Makin, and were consequently more submissive than the other sections who resided in less exposed parts.

The Shahur valley was the first portion of the Mahsud country visited by the British force. Through it the raiders streamed from the higher hills and from the Khaisora valley, and the Abdul Rahman Khels, the section of the Nana Khels to which Mashak belonged, lived in Aspalito, a narrow and difficult ravine which trends towards the north-west at the very entrance of the valley as soon as the Shahur gorge leading from the east is cleared. The Shahur valley is inhabited by Shaman Khels at Haidari Kach and Turan China, by Nana Khels at Barwani, and by Alizais at Gurgarai and the west end of the valley generally.

On the 23rd a reconnaissance of the Shahur pass was made, and the road was repaired by the sappers and pioneers. No opposition was met with, the force returning to camp the same day. The following day the column advanced to Haidari Kach, and on the 25th and 26th continued its march up the Shahur Zam, encamping successively at Turan China and Barwani.

On leaving Haidari Kach the rear guard was fired on, and this was repeated more or less every day while the troops remained in the Waziri country.

Whilst the main body marched on the 26th from Turan China to Barwani, a strong force, under Lieutenant-Colonel B. R. Chambers, 6th Punjab Infantry, was detached to visit the residence of Mashak, on the banks of the Aspalito Algad, about nine miles distant. The crops belonging to their chief were destroyed, and an attempt was made to destroy his residence, a large domed cave, but with indifferent success. The force then rejoined the main column, at Barwani, passing on the way the fort of Umar Khan, but no injury was done to his property. A few stray shots had been fired at the column, but no casualties occurred, and no opposition was offered by the Abdul Rahman Khels, whose headman, Taj, had already submitted at Haidari Kach, and was present with the other Mahsud headman, who that day guided the column to Mashak's residence. Thus the object of visiting the Shahur valley had been fully attained. The Abdul Rahman Khels had submitted, their difficult defile had been overrun by our troops, and Mashak had been punished by the destruction of his crops at his hitherto supposed inaccessible home on the banks of the Aspalito torrent.

The force now moved on towards the Khaisora valley, and encamped at the mouth of the Tangi Raghza, a narrow and difficult gorge leading into it from the Shahur valley. The gorge was found impracticable for camels without the expenditure of more time and labour than could well be spared. So a mountain road was constructed over the hills to the north into the valley. For this purpose the force was halted the following day, and working parties were sent out to make the road practicable. Some small parties of the enemy were observed on the hills, and some firing took place, but they did not venture to close quarters. A havildar and two sepoy amongst the troops covering the working parties were wounded, and the enemy were said to have had one killed and four wounded.

*Expedition
against the
Mahsud
Waziris in
1881.*

It was probably hoped by the enemy that a demonstration on the hills might deter an advance into the Khaisora valley by so difficult a route. Gatherings and the brandishing of swords on the higher hills were observed. But Shah Salim, the principal Alizai headman of those parts, exercised his influence successfully as regards the people of his own clan, and prevented any of them joining the opposition. The Alizai headmen of the Khaisora valley also came into camp and submitted.

The opposition now exhibited chiefly proceeded from the Nana Khels of the Khaisora and Badar valleys, and other sections of the Bahlolzais who resided near Kaniguram. But it was quickly overcome, and the force advanced on the 29th by the newly made road to Narai Raghza without any casualty, although the enemy showed on the right front and flank. On the following day the advance was continued to Kundiwan over another pass, the road through which had been repaired beforehand by the sappers and the pioneers.


Brigadier-General Kennedy halted for two days at Kundiwan, and from there telegraphed to Brigadier-General Gordon to advance with the reserve brigade into the Waziri country, so as to reach Razmak by the 6th of May, as he expected to reach Kaniguram on the 5th. Advantage was taken of the halt at Kundiwan for a survey party to explore the Kundighar mountain (8,140 feet).

On the 3rd of May the force moved to Shah Alam, passing, on the way, the houses of three of the leading Nana Khel chiefs who had refused to submit. Their towers, and also a fort belonging to them, were destroyed, and their crops cut for the use of the troops.

On approaching Shah Alam, it was seen that the enemy was in force on the densely wooded hillsides to the right and right front. The 1st Sikhs were at once ordered to clear the front, which they did forthwith, and then, wheeling up half right, halted. The 3rd and 4th Punjab Infantry were, at the same time, moved out half right and halted. These three regiments, each covered by its skirmishers, then awaited further orders, while the Brigadier-General reconnoitred the enemy's position. Meanwhile, the guns had moved up, and had opened fire on bodies of the enemy moving in the open. The 6th Punjab Infantry was in reserve. The position of the troops is shown in the accompanying sketch. While thus halted, the enemy, with a shout, suddenly charged down on the 1st Sikhs. The skirmishers, having fixed bayonets, advanced to meet them. Seeing the state of affairs, the Brigadier-General at once ordered up a wing of the 6th Punjab Infantry to support the 1st Sikhs, but they were not required, as the enemy had broken before the skirmishers alone, who, being joined by their supports under Lieutenant-Colonel A. G. Ross, followed up the enemy, and cleared them out of their position on the crest of the hill. Here they halted until ordered to retire, which they did without any attempt being made by the enemy to molest them—a sure sign that they had been thoroughly beaten.

The casualties in the 1st Sikhs had been three killed and fourteen wounded, and the 3rd and 4th Punjab Infantry had each one man severely wounded. The enemy's loss could not be ascertained, but twenty bodies were counted over the line of advance of the 1st Sikhs, and it is known that there were some influential men among the killed and wounded. It was reported that the enemy numbered 3,000, but these numbers were not seen, and the party which attacked the Sikhs

SKETCH
OF
POSITION OCCUPIED BY THE WAZIRIS
IN THE AFFAIR OF
SHAH ALAM
on the 3rd of May 1881.



was not more than 50, with some 300 or 400 in second line. The gathering was headed by a chief named Madmir, who was killed while gallantly leading the charge against the 1st Sikhs, and by Mashak, and was composed chiefly of Bahlolzais, with a few bad characters from the other clans. They were also stimulated by the presence of Ali Muhammad, the nephew of Mulla Adkar, and some of his bigoted followers. In his despatch with reference to this affair, the Brigadier-General brought to notice the names of Lieutenant-Colonel H. C. P. Rice, commanding 1st Sikhs, and Lieutenant-Colonel A. G. Ross and Captain F. R. Begbie, of the same regiment. After the fight it appears that the enemy dispersed to their homes, and abandoned all idea of further resistance. *Expedition against the Mahsud Waziris in 1881.*

Mashak had not, like Madmir on the day of the battle, distinguished himself by forward gallantry, and had thus failed to inspire the further sympathy of his clan. His cause was deserted by all, and he crept back to his cave in the Aspalito ravine, and then on to Shingi Kot, where he intended to surrender as the force passed down the Tank Zam to the plains, had not new and unexpected prospects dawned on him during the last days of the expedition.

Although it was expected that the enemy would try to disturb the camp at Shah Alam, yet the night passed without a shot being fired, and it was reported the next day that the enemy had dispersed.

On the 4th Brigadier-General Kennedy marched five miles to Moghal Khel. The route lay through a dense forest of oak and pine. A few shots were fired, and one sepoy of the 4th Punjab Infantry was mortally wounded.

On the 5th of May the force reached Kaniguram, being the same day and the same month that Brigadier-General N. B. Chamberlain had arrived there in 1860, and it encamped on a plateau to the west of the town. During this day's march a force was detached to punish four of the Nana Khel *maliks*, who lived about five miles up the Badar valley, and who had been engaged against us on the 3rd. Their towers having been blown up, this detachment returned and joined the main body the same day at Kaniguram.

The column halted at Kaniguram during the 6th, but on the 7th the camp was moved to another site, about a mile to the east of the town, and was halted there during the 8th. A survey party, with a strong escort under Lieutenant-Colonel C. S. Maclean, C.B., started on the 7th for the famous Pir Ghal mountain (11,583 feet), and returned the following day without any casualty. At Kaniguram heliographic communication was opened with Brigadier-General Gordon's column. On the morning of the 9th of May the force moved towards Makin by the Tank Zam, as the direct road through Maidan was found to be impracticable for camels, and encamped at Do Toi, and the following day marched to Makin, where supplies were received from the Bannu column, which was only seven miles distant at Razmak. The same day Brigadier-General Kennedy rode over to Brigadier-General Gordon's camp.

It is now necessary to turn to the movements of the Bannu column, originally designated the reserve brigade, which had been ordered to assemble at Bannu. On the 16th of April Brigadier-General Gordon had moved from Edwardesabad and taken up a position on the right bank of the Tochi river, near the village of Mirian, commanding the entrances of the Khasora, Tochi, and Shaktu valleys.

On the 4th of May, in compliance with the instructions received from

*Expedition
against the
Mahsud
Waziris in
1881.*

Brigadier-General Kennedy, the Bannu column, consisting of eight guns, 326 sabres, and 3,380 bayonets, as per margin, marched for Razmak by the Khasora route, to co-operate with the Tank column, and to take up a week's supplies for that force. Mr. R. Udny, C.S., Deputy Commissioner of Bannu, accompanied the force as Political Officer. On the 4th the column marched to Spinwam (eleven miles), within the Khasora pass. On the following day the march was continued to Dwa Warkha (ten miles), and the next day Saroba (thirteen miles) was reached.

At this last place the ground on which Brigadier-General Chamberlain's force had encamped in 1860 was found to have been washed away by floods. During the march up the Khasora valley the force was accompanied by representatives of the Tori Khel and Mahmit Khel Waziris, who inhabit the valley.

On the 7th the force marched to Razani (ten miles); a few shots were fired at the rear guard on leaving Saroba. Brigadier-General Gordon halted the following day to allow the road up the Razmak pass to be improved. From the summit of this pass heliographic communication was opened on the 8th with the Tank column at Kaniguram. Taking advantage of the halt on the 8th, a survey party, with an escort of 250 men, was sent up the Vezhda Sar (7,000 feet), a hill about seven miles to the north of Razani. From here valuable observations of upper Dawar and the country beyond were taken. While halted at Razani, a private of the Rifle Brigade was shot dead whilst straying near the camp. For this offence, and for firing at the rear guard when leaving Saroba, the Mahmit Khels, within whose limits both cases occurred, were fined. The offenders were supposed to be prowling Mahsuds or *talibs* from Dawar, who had accompanied Ali Muhammad, and, after the affair at Shah Alam on the 3rd, were returning to Dawar. After this the Mahmit Khels took precautions to prevent any further violation of their territory.

On the 9th the column marched to Razmak (six miles), and encamped at a height of 7,500 feet, where it halted during the 10th and 11th. On the morning of the 10th a convoy of 970 camels and six days' supplies were sent to Makin for the Tank column. This convoy was escorted by the troops, as per margin, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel H. Wood, Rifle Brigade. They had a skirmish with some Mahsuds on the hills along the line of march, in which one man of the Rifle Brigade was slightly, and one man of the 18th Bengal Cavalry was severely, wounded. The enemy had three killed, one being an *Akhund* leader of some note from near Kaniguram.

On the same day a survey party, with an escort of 450 men under the command of Major C. McK. Hall, 5th Punjab Infantry, with Major T. H. Holdich, Royal Engineers, started for the Shuidar mountain (12,000 feet), and returned to camp the following day. They were attacked on the hillside by Mahsuds, and one sepoy of the 20th Punjab Native Infantry was killed. Six of the enemy were killed and their arms brought in.

No. 1 (Kohat) Mountain Battery,
2 guns.
4th Battalion, Rifle Brigade.
Detachment, 8th Bengal Cavalry.
Detachment, 30th Punjab Native
Infantry.

No. 1 Battery, 8th Brigade, R. A., 6 guns.
No. 1 (Kohat) Mountain Battery, 2 „
4th Battalion, Rifle Brigade, 480 bayonets.
18th Bengal Cavalry, 326 sabres.
6th Company, Sappers and Miners, 124 bayonets.
14th Native Infantry ... 503 „
5th Punjab Infantry ... 596 „
20th Punjab Native Infantry ... 641 „
21st Punjab Native Infantry ... 610 „
30th Punjab Native Infantry ... 426 „

During the halt of the two columns at Makin and Razmak, respectively, a slight alteration was made in the distribution of the troops, the two guns of No. 1 Mountain Battery being transferred to the Tank column, while the Bannu column was strengthened by the half batteries of Nos. 2 and 4 Mountain Batteries, the 4th Punjab Cavalry, the 8th Company, Sappers and Miners, and the 32nd Pioneers. *Expedition against the Mahsud Waziris in 1881.*

On the 11th of May Brigadier-General Gordon visited Brigadier-General Kennedy at Makin, and received instructions with regard to his return to Bannu by the Shaktu valley, hitherto unexplored, and inhabited by the Nana Khel section of the Mahsuds. Brigadier-General Kennedy himself decided to return to Tank by the open and known Tank Zam, by which the force had advanced in 1860.

On the 12th of May the Bannu column commenced to retire, and the following day Brigadier-General Kennedy broke up his camp at Makin and marched to Janjal. On the 14th Surimanja Kach was reached, and on the next day Kurghiband, one mile beyond Shingi Kot. The crops of the Nana Khel section along the route were used by the troops.

On the 16th the force marched to Jandula, the baggage keeping to the bed of the Zam, but the main body of the column taking a branch road to the east, crossing the open plain of Spin Raghza. On the 17th the march was continued to the mouth of the Tank Zam pass, and on the 18th to Tank, where the force was at once broken up.

The return march had been almost entirely unmolested; a few stray shots had been fired, and these were punished with a fine of Rs. 50 each. One incident is worthy of note as indicating the friendly feeling of the tribe towards the force on its departure from their hills. A sick camp follower, who had fallen out, was accidentally left behind at the last encamping ground in the Mahsud country. The Shingis took him in, fed him well, and as soon as he was sufficiently recovered, brought him on a pony to Tank.

In the meanwhile, Brigadier-General Gordon marched on the 12th to Razani by the Razmak pass, and the following day to Dosalli (seven miles), a large village of the Mahmit Khels on the Sura Mela Algad. On the 14th a short but difficult march of five miles brought the force out on to the open, grassy Sham plain, belonging to the Tori Khel Utmanzais. This plain is an elevated pasture ground about 6,200 feet in height, bordered by low hills. It is about two miles broad by two long, with water, wood, and forage at hand. One of the advanced guard picquets was here fired on from the hills, but the enemy was soon cleared off by a party of riflemen and a few rounds from the artillery. While the force was halted at this place, the principal *maliks* of the Nana Khels inhabiting the Shaktu valley came into camp with only one exception. One of the minor *maliks* also absented himself, probably because he was a notorious thief, and feared punishment for old offences.

On the 15th the force again entered Mahsud territory, and after a march of six miles, encamped at Waladin, a village on the Shaktu stream at the head of the valley of the same name. The village of the minor *malik* above mentioned, which was found deserted, was here destroyed.

The Shaktu valley is narrow, flanked by steep hills, well cultivated along the banks of the stream, and has many villages. The inhabitants of the valley had hitherto held aloof from all negotiations, thinking themselves secure on account of the difficulty of penetrating to their settlements, and because they were left untouched in 1860. They had now submitted without a struggle,

*Expedition
against the
Mahsuds
Waziris in
1881.*

and the presence of their *maliks* in the camp re-assured the people, most of whom had never before seen a European.

On the 16th the force marched down the course of the stream to Baramand (thirteen miles). On the road the only remaining *malik* above mentioned who had not submitted came out to meet the force. •

The route beyond Baramand was found to be impracticable, and a halt was therefore ordered to allow the road to be made, and on the 18th the troops advanced to Mandawam (seven miles), to the astonishment of the inhabitants of the valley, who thought this route would be quite impassable for our troops. On the 19th Brigadier-General Gordon marched to Karkanwam (twelve miles) at the mouth of the Shaktu pass and three miles from our border, and on the following day to the frontier post of Jani Khel (ten miles), entering British territory after an absence of sixteen days. During the return march there had been no opposition to speak of, and only one casualty had occurred, a sepoy of the 14th Sikhs being severely wounded. The column reached Edwardesabad on the 22nd, and was then broken up.

The total number of casualties among the troops employed in the above operations against the Mahsuds Waziris was 32 (*see Appendix I*).

Appendix J shows the number of followers and transport animals which accompanied the two columns.

In forwarding his despatch on these operations, Brigadier - General Kennedy stated that the Mahsuds generally were no better armed than they were in 1860, and that they were said to have only about a dozen long range rifles amongst the whole tribe. In concluding, Brigadier-General Kennedy acknowledged the excellent conduct of the troops, and the hearty co-operation of Brigadier-General Gordon in all his plans and arrangements. He also stated his obligations to Major Macaulay, the Political Officer, and mentioned the names of commanding officers and others whom he considered specially deserving of recognition. Brigadier-General Gordon, in his despatch, acknowledged the valuable services of Mr. R. Udny, C.S., the Political Officer with the Bannu column, and also mentioned the names of the officers whose services he thought worthy of special notice.

In forwarding these despatches, the Commander-in-Chief considered that the operations entrusted to Brigadier-General Kennedy had been carried out in a very satisfactory manner, and in this approbation the Government of India and the Secretary of State concurred.

Although the expedition had been so far successful, and the wildest and boldest of the Mahsuds from the glens and valleys most distant from our territory, and from all knowledge and experience of our power, had been taught that no natural difficulties of their country, pathless hills or steep defiles, could protect them from punishment for unprovoked aggression, and although the tribe, as a whole, were eager to conclude peace, and to be relieved of the oppressive blockade, under which they had been reduced to the verge of starvation, yet the demands of the Government had not been fully complied with, and the blockade was therefore ordered to be continued.

Even before the British troops had left their hills, some leading spirits among the party opposed to peace bethought themselves of making an appeal to Kabul and they sought the intercession of His Highness the Amir. It

was the news of this, as offering a loophole of escape, that deterred Mashak at the last moment from giving himself up, as he had determined to do.

Towards the end of May, Sirdar Mazulla Khan, the Amir's agent, appeared at Kaniguram, where his presence and promises of assistance and intercession tended considerably to thwart the efforts of the party in favour of peace with the British Government and submission to its demands.

*Conduct of the
Mahsud
Waziris
subsequent to
the Expedition
of 1881.*

Nevertheless, such was the pressure of the blockade and the fear inspired by the recent proofs of the power of the British arms, that the welcome accorded to the Amir's emissary was but a cold one, and he departed suddenly for Khost, and thence to Kabul, accompanied by Mashak, Yarak, and a few other Mahsuds. The absence of these two proscribed chiefs, and the reaction consequent on hopes raised by interference from Kabul, naturally retarded a final settlement with the tribe; but ere long the Mahsuds discovered that papers had been sent to the Amir, purporting to offer to His Highness the allegiance of their clan and the sovereignty of their country; and that he wished to enlist troops from their hills. This discovery irritated and alarmed a people both proud and jealous of their independence. They might not have been unwilling to attack the Amir's enemies in a time of war, or send a contingent to fight for him; but each recruit furnished for his regular army might become a hostage for their behaviour, and a token of their subjection. The feeling that their freedom was involved produced a reaction against the endeavour to profit by the Amir's interference, and in favour of concluding peace direct with the British Government by submission to all its demands, in preference to the purchase of the assistance of Kabul by acknowledgments which the Amir or his successors might hereafter use against them. Accordingly, on the 10th of June, the leading men of the Mahsuds at Kaniguram sent a letter to the Amir, in which they disclaimed all connection with any offers of allegiance or admission of Kabul sovereignty over their hills.

It would seem that it was not long before the Amir discovered that the deputation which accompanied Mazulla Khan to Kabul was one of small influence and importance, and the reception of Yarak and his companions was accordingly neither flattering nor satisfactory. In July they returned to their homes, dispirited and disappointed. On the 3rd of the same month four leading Nana Khel *maliks*, with the son of Mashak, were given up by the tribe as hostages and security for the surrender of Mashak himself, who had been detained in Kabul. In September he returned to the Mahsud country to find his fellow clansmen clamouring for his surrender. With this he refused to comply, trusting to the Afghan prejudice against delivering an offender up to punishment. Finally, it was necessary to resort to force. Mashak was seized by some leading men of the Balholsais at a council of the tribe, and delivered up, bound hand and foot, to the British authorities at Tank on the 7th of September. This was followed by the voluntary surrender of Yarak, the last of the six proscribed ringleaders in the outrages of 1879. The Mahsuds having thus, by accepting a humiliation as great as a Pathan clan can suffer, proved their honest desire and intention to submit, the blockade which had been maintained against them for nearly three years was removed, and once more they were at liberty to renew trade and intercourse with markets in British territory.

The other conditions of settlement, the payment of fine and compensation, however, still remain to be fulfilled. The value of property plundered and destroyed in the Tank valley and in the villages in the neighbourhood of Kot

*Conduct of the
Mahsud
Waziris
subsequent to
the Expedition
of 1881.*

Nasran, in January and February 1879, was at the time put down at Rs. 67,000, and the fine to be demanded was fixed by Government at Rs. 30,000. Subsequent offences by the Mahsuds during 1879 and 1880 raised the value of the compensation to be exacted to Rs. 74,948, making a total of Rs. 104,948. Against this had to be set off the value of such supplies, grain and green crops, as were appropriated without payment for the use of the troops during the expedition.

The amount was, however, still so large that it was quite beyond the power of a wild and semi-savage tribe to pay on the spot. Sanction was therefore obtained for the amount being liquidated by a tax imposed on all goods imported by the tribe into British territory. To this arrangement the Mahsuds agreed, and the amount is gradually being realised in this way.

In order to secure further guarantees for the future good behaviour of the Mahsuds, eighty selected hostages were taken from the tribe, and located at Dera Ismail Khan. Attempts are also being made again to induce certain families of the tribe to settle in British territory, by giving them grants of land free of revenue for five years, on the condition of the responsibility for the safety of the general route being accepted by the tribe. The experiment is at present, as already mentioned, on its trial.

With regard to the six ringleaders, one of them, Yarak, died at Lahore in September 1882, and the others were released by order of the Lieutenant-Governor in January 1884. This was in consideration of the Mahsuds having furnished an escort to a survey party into the Gumal pass last December, and also in consequence of the general good behaviour of the tribe since their submission in 1881. Mashak, however, was excepted, and he was sent to Dera Ismail Khan, under the surveillance of the Commissioner, till his release could be recommended. This has just been sanctioned, and he also has now been allowed to return to his own country.

During the past year the Amir of Kabul has been endeavouring to gain over the Mahsuds to surrendering their independence, permitting posts to be built in their hills, and agreeing to pay him a tithe of their crops. After much parleying he has sent two agents into their country, but it is very improbable that the tribe will consent to pay tithes, or to give up their independence.

The conduct of the Batanis since 1880 has given satisfaction, and their frontier service, as well as that of the Mianis and Ghorazais, which had been suspended since their misbehaviour in 1879, was restored to them on the 1st of February 1883, and the military garrison of Kot Khirgi was withdrawn, and replaced by their men. There is at present an open quarrel between the Batanis and their Mahsud neighbours, which is injurious to the trade of the latter, but this has not hitherto affected the peace of the border.

M A P
OF THE
MAHSUD WAZIRI COUNTRY


to illustrate the
OPERATIONS OF THE FORCE UNDER
BRIGADIER-GENERAL N. B. CHAMBERLAIN, C.B.,
in 1860,
AND OF THE COMBINED FORCE UNDER
BRIGADIERS-GENERAL T. G. KENNEDY, C.B., AND J. J. H. GORDON, C.B.,
in 1881.

Scale 4 Miles = 1 Inch.

6 4 3 2 1 0 5 10 15 Miles

REFERENCES.

Route of Brigadier-General Chamberlain's Column.....
,, Brigadiers-General Kennedy's and Gordon's Columns ---
Site of Actions shown thus



APPENDIX A.

Composition and strength of the Field Force assembled at Tank to act against the Mahsud Waziris, on the 16th of April 1860.

Brigadier-General N. B. Chamberlain, C.B., commanding.

Staff.

Captain W. Graydon, Staff Officer.

Captain H. Plummer, 7th Royal Fusiliers, Deputy-Assistant Quarter-Master General.

Major J. T. Walker,

Lieutenant J. P. Basevi,

Lieutenant B. R. Branfill,

Captain H. C. Johnstone, Topographical Survey.

Captain C. Pollard, Field Engineer.

Assistant Surgeon J. L. Stewart, on special duty.

Artillery.

No. 2 Punjab Light Field Battery, Captain G. Maister, commanding.

No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery, Captain T. E. Hughes, commanding.

Peshawar Mountain Train Battery, Captain F. R. DeBude, commanding.

Hazara Mountain Train Battery, Captain F. R. Butt, commanding.

Engineers.

Sappers and Miners, Lieutenant J. Browne, commanding.

Cavalry.

Guide Corps, Lieutenant-Colonel H. B. Lumsden, C.B., commanding.

3rd Punjab Cavalry, Major L. B. Jones, commanding.

Multani Cavalry, Lieutenant J. W. Campbell, commanding.

Infantry.

Guide Corps, Lieutenant-Colonel H. B. Lumsden, C.B., commanding.

4th Sikh Infantry, Lieutenant F. H. Jenkins, commanding.

1st Punjab Infantry, Captain C. P. Keyes, commanding.

2nd Punjab Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel G. W. G. Green, C.B., commanding.

3rd Punjab Infantry, Lieutenant A. U. F. Ruxton, commanding.

4th Punjab Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel A. T. Wilde, C.B., commanding.

6th Punjab Infantry, Lieutenant W. P. Fisher, commanding.

14th Punjab Infantry, Captain W. J. Ward, commanding.

24th Punjab Infantry, Lieutenant J. Chalmers, commanding.

Hazara Gurkha Battalion, Major O. E. Rothney, commanding.

6th Police Battalion, Lieutenant J. W. Orchard, commanding.

Political Officers.

Lieutenant-Colonel R. G. Taylor, Commissioner of the Derajat.

Captain H. W. H. Coxe, Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan.

Detail of troops.

Corps.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	Non-Commissioned Officers.	Rank and file.	Total number of fighting men.	Ordnance.					Remarks.
						Field.			Mountain.		
						9-pound guns.	24-pound howitzers.	4½-inch mortars.	3-pound guns.	12-pound howitzers.	
Staff	8	8	The mortars were carried on platform carts dragged by horses. No wagons accompanied the field pieces. All the ammunition was transported on mules and <i>yabus</i> . 1,600 levies were attached to the expedition, 400 of whom marched with the force to Kaniguram.
No. 2 Punjab Light Field Battery	1	1	6	45	53	1	1	1	
No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery	2	1	7	42	52	1	1	1	
Peshawar Mountain Train Battery	4	2	10	52	68	1	3	
Hazara Mountain Train Battery	2	1	9	52	64	1	2	
Guide Cavalry	5	4	12	87	108	
3rd Punjab Cavalry	2	6	16	107	131	
Multani Cavalry	1	3	12	84	100	
Sappers and Miners	1	...	8	51	60	
Guide Infantry	12	71	324	407	
4th Sikh Infantry	5	14	73	335	427	
1st Punjab Infantry	4	10	63	320	397	
2nd Punjab Infantry	5	16	85	578	684	
3rd Punjab Infantry	4	10	58	301	373	
4th Punjab Infantry	4	10	59	308	381	
6th Punjab Infantry	5	10	63	322	400	
14th Punjab Infantry	3	6	36	162	207	
24th Punjab Infantry (Pioneers)	3	12	67	336	418	
Hazara Gurkha Battalion	3	11	54	396	464	
6th Police Battalion	1	14	60	319	394	
Total	63	143	769	4,221	5,196	2	2	2	2	5	

APPENDIX B.

Proclamation to Umar Khan, Khan Zaman, Ahmad-ud-din, and other maliks of the Mahsud tribe, in 1860.

Ever since the *Daman* has become the British boundary, the Mahsud Waziris have never ceased to harass the border and to commit injuries upon the persons and property of British subjects, and likewise upon merchants and travellers.

Further, the evil intentions of the whole tribe have lately been manifest by their assembling to the number of 5,000 or 6,000 men in the Tank Zam, and coming out of the hills for the purpose of plundering the town of Tank.

How this army of Waziris was met and defeated by a small band of Government horsemen, and driven back in rapid flight to their hills, leaving their chief *malik* and 250 bodies on the plain, need not here be entered into; and had this been the only aggression committed by the Mahsuds, the punishment which they suffered might have been considered by Government sufficiently severe to obviate the necessity of further retaliation.

But the Mahsuds have, as before mentioned, for years past committed deeds of violence, and this last unprovoked attack, in which all sections of the tribe joined, convinces the Government that its previous policy of leniency and forbearance is misunderstood, and that consequently there is no hope of its territory being respected, or of future immunity from injury, until it shall have evinced to the tribe that it has resources and ability to redress the wrongs done to its subjects.

Wherefore the Viceroy and Governor-General has desired that a force shall enter the Mahsud country, and there obtain redress for the past and security for the future.

This proclamation, then, is to inform you that a force will enter your mountains in a few days, and to explain to you the reasons for its doing so, and the objects with which it comes.

If the tribe will comply with the just demands of Government, force will not be employed against them; but if the Mahsuds refuse to make restoration for the past and to give security for the future, and appeal to arms, then they will be met by the Government troops in the full hope that if our cause be just, God will help us, and the bloodshed on both sides will be on the heads of the Mahsuds themselves.

Lastly, and with the object of avoiding bloodshed if possible, the *maliks* of the tribe will be permitted to attend the camp to have any points in this proclamation, which may not appear clear to them, explained in *vivâ voce* communication, after which they will be permitted to return unmolested.

(Sd.) NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN,
Brigadier-General.

(Sd.) REYNELL G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner and Superintendent.

APPENDIX E.

General return of Killed and Wounded in the operations against the Mahsud Waziris in 1860.

Corps.	Killed.						Wounded.						Animals.						Remarks.
	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Camp followers.	Total.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Camp followers.	Total.	Killed.			Wounded.			
													Horses.	Ponies and mules.	Camels.	Horses.	Ponies and mules.	Camels.	
No. 2 Punjab Light Field Battery	1	...	3	2	6	1	2	1	...	*Lieut. J. M. Aytoun. †Lieut. A. U F. Ruxton.
No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery	1	5	6	10	1	1	...	
Hazara Mountain Train Bat- tery	1	...	1	
3rd Punjab Cavalry	1	...	1	2	...	2	
Multani Cavalry	2	...	2	
Sappers and Miners	1	...	1	
Corps of Guides	1	3	11	16	31	9	62	12	83	...	11	10	1	
4th Sikh Infantry	1	1	2	...	2	
1st Punjab Infantry...	1	...	1	...	2	1	4	...	7	
2nd Punjab Infantry	*1	2	4	11	...	18	5	29	...	34	
3rd Punjab Infantry	4	9	...	13	†1	2	14	24	...	41	
4th Punjab Infantry	2	...	2	
6th Punjab Infantry	1	1	2	1	...	1	
24th Punjab Infantry (Pio- neers)	2	...	2	3	8	4	15	20	
Hazara Gurkha Battalion	12	...	12	
6th Police Battalion	3	...	3	11	...	11	
Levies and police	26	...	26	37	...	37	4	
Total	1	3	12	67	17	100	1	5	32	200	23	261	1	11	40	8	2	...	

ABSTRACT.

Killed	100
Wounded	261
Total	361

APPENDIX F.

Return of Killed and Wounded in the attack on the Suliman Khel kiri near Girni on the 5th of January 1879.

Corps	Killed.					Wounded.					Horses.			Remarks.
	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	
4th Punjab Cavalry...	1	1	*1	1	...	4	6	2	2	2	* Captain T. Shepherd.
4th Sikh Infantry	1	...	1	5	5	1	
Total	1	1	2	1	1	...	9	11	3	2	2	

ABSTRACT.

Killed	2
Wounded	11
Total	13

APPENDIX G.

Return of Killed and Wounded in the force under LIEUT.-COLONEL P. C. RYND, in the affair at the Hinis Tangi, on the 12th of April 1880.

Corps.	Killed.					Wounded.					Remarks.
	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	
4th Sikh Infantry	2	2	* All severely.
3rd Punjab Infantry	*3	3	
Total	5	5	

ABSTRACT.

Killed	0
Wounded	5
Total	5

APPENDIX H.

Proclamation issued to the maliks of the Mahsud Waziris and others in 1881.

In the years 1873 and 1874 the Shaman Khel and Bahlolzai branches of the Mahsud Waziris entered into treaty engagements with the British Government, with which for a long time previously they had been at enmity. They then promised to maintain friendly relations with the British Government, and agreements were taken from them, of which the object was to secure the British border against predatory incursions and murderous assaults by members of the tribe. As a guarantee for their good faith and security for their good conduct, they gave several representative members of their clan as hostages.

Again, when, in November 1878, the British army advanced upon Afghanistan, the Mahsud Waziris, in common with other tribes on the border then at peace with the British Government, were warned of the consequences of preferring the hostility to the friendship of that Government.

The Mahsuds, however, on the 1st of January 1879, violated their engagements, and, disregarding the warning conveyed them, collected a body of 3,000 men of the tribe, who plundered the town of Tank and other villages, causing the loss of some lives and of much property in British territory. Since that time the Mahsuds have committed frequent offences within the British border, causing further injury to life and property, and disturbing the peace of British territory.

In order to punish this tribe for their misconduct, and to prevent a recurrence of it, the Government of India has offered the Mahsuds peace upon certain terms.

The British Government, desirous only of exacting justice, wishes that the Mahsuds should submit to these terms of their own accord, and without the compulsion of a military force. The terms have been announced publicly to the Mahsuds for some time past, but hitherto the tribe has not tendered its submission. Now again the British Government gives a final opportunity to the Mahsuds to comply with these terms, and to send in delegates from all branches of the tribe to make arrangements for paying the fine and compensation.

If this is not done, then it is the will of the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council that the British forces should enter the Mahsud country to enforce these terms and inflict such punishment on the tribe as may seem good.

APPENDIX I.

Return of Killed and Wounded in both columns employed against the Mahsud Waziris in 1881.

Corps.	Killed.						Wounded.						Remarks.
	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Camp followers.	Total.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Camp followers.	Total.	
4th Battalion, Rifle Brigade	1	...	1	1	...	1	
1st Punjab Cavalry	1	...	1	
4th Punjab Cavalry	1	...	1	
18th Bengal Cavalry	1	...	1	
14th Native Infantry	1	...	1	
1st Sikh Infantry	1	2	...	3	3	11	...	14	
4th Sikh Infantry	1	...	1	
2nd Punjab Infantry	1	...	1	
3rd Punjab Infantry	1	...	1	
4th Punjab Infantry	1	...	1	2	2	
6th Punjab Infantry	2	...	2	
20th Punjab Native Infantry...	1	...	1	
Total	1	6	1	8	5	19	...	24	

ABSTRACT.

Killed	8
Wounded	24
Total	32

APPENDIX J.

Return of followers and transport animals which accompanied both columns employed against the Mahsud Waziris in 1881.

Force.	Followers, public and private.	Mules.	Ponies.	Camels.
Tank column ...	4,676	2,790	658	2,668
Bannu column ...	4,281	1,499	678	3,654
Total ...	8,957	4,289	1,336	6,322

CHAPTER XVI.

BANNU BORDER.

DAWARI TRIBE.

DAWAR is the name given to the valley watered by the Tochi river lying *Dawar valley.* nearly due west of the point where the Tochi, breaking through the belt of the Suliman hills, enters the plains of Bannu. It is entirely surrounded by mountains, which are for the most part occupied by Ahmadzai and Utmanzai Waziris.

The valley is divided into two parts (*see* Map, p. 570), known as Upper and Lower Dawar, by a narrow *tangi* or pass known as the Taghrai *tangi*, a defile some three miles long. Between Dawar and British territory is the low range of uninhabited hills which skirt the Bannu district in that direction.

The lower valley commences at the Shinki *kotal*, a few miles distant from the British border, and extends westward for a distance of ten or twelve miles, with an average breadth of three or four miles, to the Taghrai *tangi*. Above the Taghrai pass, the receding hills open out and form the upper valley, which stretches away for some five and twenty or thirty miles.

The fighting population of Lower Dawar is estimated at 5,000, and, with the exception of the inhabitants of one village, these all belong to the race from which the valley takes its name, a spurious tribe of doubtful origin, who claim to be Karlanrai Afghans, but are very unlike their warlike Pathan neighbours, and are notoriously wanting in courage and manly qualities. In the upper valley the Dawaris are confined to the eastern tract between the Taghrai pass and Tindai. Above the last-named village the valley is held by various sections of the Utmanzai Waziris, Manzar Khels, Hassan Khels, Tori Khels, and finally, Mada Khels. The fighting population of Upper Dawar is estimated at—Dawaris proper, 4,000; Waziris, 3,000.

Lower Dawar is divided into two parts by the Tochi river. The country on both sides of the stream, and especially on the northern bank, is an open plain, well cultivated by irrigation from the Tochi itself, and studded with villages.*

* A very good idea of Lower Dawar is given by the sketch (*see* page 568), made in May 1878 by the late Lieutenant C. H. M. Smith, 3rd Sikh Infantry, from the hills near the Shinki *kotal* at the eastern extremity of the valley.

Dawar valley.
Villages.

The chief of these villages are—

Haidar Khel.	Idak.
Aipi.	Hakim Kilai.
Hassu Khel (or So Khel).	Borakshahi.
Musakai.	Tapiye.
Usuri.	Daulat Khel.
Irmuz.	Palali.
Zeraki.	Rasal Khel.
Khaddi.	Arghund.

All these villages, except the four last, lie on the north bank of the Tochi. The small village of Rasal Khel is inhabited by a sub-section of the Tori Khel Waziris, and about the Taghrai *tangi*, on the right bank of the Tochi, there are four or five small settlements of the Bara Khel section of the Mahmit Khel Utmanzais.

The valley of Upper Dawar is similar in character to that of Lower Dawar, with numerous villages and broad tracts of irrigated cultivation, but is of larger extent. As far as Tindai, as already stated, the inhabitants are Dawaris, their principal villages being—

Miram Shah.	
Darpa Khel.	
Amzani (not a single village, but a cluster of hamlets).	
Boya.	} known collectively as the Mallakh villages.
Land.	
Muhammad Khel.	
Dihgan.	
Idal Khel.	
Tindai.	

The upper valley, like the lower, is divided into two parts by the Tochi stream. On emerging from the *tangi*, the country in which the village of Miram Shah stands is open on both sides of the stream, but contracts at Darpa Khel, and still more a little further up; but even here the valley is not less than a mile in width, and after this it expands again to a breadth of two or three miles, the cultivation being principally along the southern bank, on which are situated the villages of Boya, Land, Muhammad Khel, and Dihgan. Above Dihgan most of the cultivation shifts to the northern bank, including the villages of Idal Khel and Tindai, while on the southern side the hills approach the stream. These hills, however, do not extend far back from the Tochi, and behind, *i.e.*, to the south and west of them, a broad, stony plain, known as the Tsirai, stretches away to the northern slopes of the Shuidar range. From Tindai upwards there seems to be but little cultivation north of the stream; but two or three miles north of Kanirogho there is a broad gap in the hills on the southern bank, through which a large *nullah*, called the Darrevasta, joins the Tochi, running down from the Shuidar range across the broad plain above mentioned.

Above the junction of the Darrevasta the Tochi appears to flow in a narrow bed for two or three miles through hills on either side, after which the hills cease on the right bank, and a wide belt of cultivation commences, which extends for about ten miles along the southern bank of the stream as far as the village of Sherania, and is bounded on the south and south-east by

the Tsirai plain. In this cultivation stand a number of villages and smaller hamlets, of which the principal in order from east to west are Chashmai, Dand Kilai, and Sherania. Immediately above the last named, the Tochi enters a labyrinth of hills, and for the remainder of its course becomes a difficult defile hemmed in by steep banks. *Dawar valley.*
Dawaris.

The Tochi stream, as has been seen, flows through the whole length of the Dawar valley, and debouches into the plains near the MacGregor. Tochi outpost. Numerous small streams flow into it from the hills on either side of the valley. The waters of the Tochi are sweet, and it may always be depended on for a plentiful supply. Nowhere does the stream present any military difficulties; the bottom is hard and stony, and, though liable to sudden rises, it never remains impassable for more than a few hours.

The valley of Dawar, although open, is much intersected by broad, deep water-courses, and the numerous marshes present great difficulties to the operations of cavalry, an arm for which, to judge from the first *coup d'œil* of the country, the ground might be supposed to be peculiarly adapted.

The climate of the valley is good, but fever is somewhat prevalent in Lower Dawar, owing to the swampy nature of the ground. Snow scarcely ever falls in the valley, but the surrounding hills are completely covered for three months in the year, and communication with the neighbouring tribes is very often entirely interrupted. During the hot months the nights are always cool, but the people suffer from swarms of mosquitoes; they own, however, that the valley of Upper Dawar is more pleasant than the lower valley, and that the latter is far preferable to Bannu.

The soil is a rich loam, and is cultivated to a high degree. Parts of it are left for grazing purposes, as the Dawaris possess large herds of cattle, goats, and sheep, with which they trade in British territory. Rice, wheat, barley, Indian-corn, and sugar-cane are the chief products of the valley. The value of the annual harvest is roughly estimated at Rs. 50,000.

The Dawaris export grain to the Mahsud Waziris in exchange for iron, with which they trade in Bannu, and, in return for the tobacco, *ghi*, and honey of Khost, exchange rough cloth of their own or British manufacture. The valley is capable of maintaining a large force for months. Forage, firewood, grain, meat, and water are abundant. The Dawaris are all Muhammadans of the *Suni* sect.

Their character stands very low, even in the estimation of Bannuchis, who are themselves vicious to a degree. Edwardes says that they resemble in character the Bannuchis, whose state twenty-five years ago is still existent among them; and the account of their revels given by Agha Abbas proves them to be addicted to the most unnatural of crimes. Munro says that they are unwarlike—opium and bhang eaters—fond of pleasure—of very indolent and filthy habits—thoroughly priest-ridden and fanatical. It is to be hoped that some have redeeming qualities, but the general estimate of the Dawaris, even by their own countrymen, is not high.

They are chiefly occupied in cultivating the soil; and their reluctance to leave their own country is proverbial. Their peregrinations are confined to Bannu and Khost, which are the limits of an outer world to them. Their mosques are infested by Muhammadan students of fanatical tendencies—*talib-ul-ilms*—who flock thither from all the neighbouring hills, food being easily obtainable, and prices cheap. It is notorious that to the dictation of these men and of the *mullas* the Dawaris are indebted for any exhibition of

Dawaris.

martial spirit which they may have ever shown, the offspring of a dark, unquestioning fanaticism, rather than of patriotic feeling.

The Dawaris are unfortunate in being surrounded by the Waziris. These, on their return from the plains at the commencement of the hot weather, generally plunder the Dawar villages and crops which lie near their line of march. The villages are all walled, but their flanking defences, which consist of towers at irregular intervals, are weak, and the hearts of the Dawaris who defend them are still weaker; the consequence is, that though they are well armed with matchlock, sword, and shield, they rarely attempt to make any stand when attacked, and, in spite of the exhortations of their own *mullas*, they never attempt to cope with the bodies of Waziri marauders who constantly harass them. If their villages are too far to reach on the approach of Waziri robbers, the Dawaris fly to the small towers erected in every field, and try to drive them off by the fire of their matchlocks. When the crops are ripe, these towers are manned night and day, as the Dawaris have found by long experience that the Waziris prefer having their corn grown for them, and their bullocks bred by their faint-hearted neighbours, rather than take the trouble of growing it themselves, or being put to the expense of buying it at their own rates.

One peculiar characteristic of the Dawaris is the custom of staining their faces, more especially the eyebrows and eyelids, red and blue; this is supposed to give them a fierce expression, and is intended to terrify their enemies; the majority of the killed and prisoners in the expedition of 1872 were hideously disfigured in this way.

In every village there are a few Hindu settlers, and over these the Dawaris, cowardly themselves, tyrannise to a cruel degree. The headman of each section in which Hindus have lands receives one-tenth of the produce, another tenth going to the *mullas* of the village. A tax of four annas is levied on every camel that comes into the valley consigned to a Hindu. Forty rupees is levied on the marriage of each Hindu girl, and three on that of each male. In spite of these drawbacks, it is an open question whether the Hindu has not the whiphand of his Muhammadan oppressor, who is generally very much in his debt.

Dawar is entered by three passes from British territory—the Tochi pass, the best known, the Baran pass, and the Khasora pass.

The Tochi pass, from the entrance of the hills to the Shinki *kotal* at its western end overlooking the Dawar valley, is about nine miles in length. The road is a mere track, and, though generally level, is very rough and stony, but is practicable for all arms. The Shinki *kotal* can be easily turned, especially on the northern side.

C. H. M. Smith.

The Baran pass commences just opposite the outpost of that name, and, after a circuitous course of about twenty miles, enters the Dawar valley to the north of the village of Usuri. The pass is not only twice as long as the Tochi, but is much more rocky, and would be impracticable for cavalry.

The third road enters the hills by the Khasora pass, about six miles south of the Tochi post, and follows a branch of the Khasora stream until, after a circuitous course of twenty-five miles, it enters the Dawar valley to the west of the village of Haidar Khel. It is an easier and a better road than the Tochi, and is at all times passable for all arms. It, however, has the disadvantage of being much longer.

The only pass in the valley is the Taghrai *tangi*, already mentioned, which divides Upper from Lower Dawar. The bed of the Tochi stream,

which runs through this defile, is perfectly practicable for all arms. The height of the flanking hills is from two hundred to three hundred feet, and they are said to be easy for skirmishers. *Roads in Dawar. History of Dawar previous to the annexation.*

The main road through the Dawar valley follows the course of the Tochi stream, which it crosses and recrosses many times. The only part where it leaves the stream is between the Darrevasta and Chashmai; and here, in order to avoid the contracted passage along the bed of the stream between these points, it makes a circuit round the southern base of the hills on the right bank of the Tochi.

From the Darrevasta there is another road which crosses the range of hills known as the Loargai Sar into the Khasora valley, which it was proposed to use in 1881 if a force had entered the Upper Dawar valley.

There is a road to Khost from the village of Darpa Khel, which is much used by traders. It is practicable for camels, and water is procurable.

There are other mountain tracks by which communications are carried on with the neighbouring tribes, but any further notice of these is unnecessary.

The ancient history of Dawar is somewhat obscure. The people are believed to have migrated from the westward some 500 years ago, at the same time that Bannu and other parts of this country became the permanent residence of detached parties from the great wandering hordes of Khorasan. Dawar was included in the Moghal Empire of Hindustan during the reign of Aurungzebe, whose son, Bahadur Shah, is said to have visited the valley and imposed a revenue of Rs. 12,000 per annum upon it. In the course of the waning fortunes of the house of Timur, Bannu and Dawar fell away early, and were for some time subject to the Durani yoke, being subjected to periodical visits, mainly with a view to extort revenue, by the lieutenants of the Saduzai rulers of Kabul. But discussions at home, and invasions from abroad, compelled the Duranis to neglect their new acquisition, and in 1825 the Sikhs ravaged the adjacent valley of Bannu. By the first article of the tripartite treaty of the 26th June 1838, Shah Shuja ceded it to Maharaja Ranjit Singh; but the jurisdiction of the Sikhs over this valley was at best but a shadowy one, and their authority merely nominal, their dealings with it being limited to one or two rapid forays with troops from Bannu. In 1847 the British Government relinquished any rights to Dawar which might have accrued to it as the successors of the Sikhs, and in 1855 the Government of India formally renounced, in favour of the Amir, Dost Muhammad Khan, all claim or title to sovereignty over Dawar. Nevertheless, the country remained, as before, practically independent of Kabul.

The central authority was unable to penetrate the fringe of independent tribes by which Dawar was hemmed in; and thus, owing rather to its situation than to the numbers or prowess of its inhabitants, no instance is on record of the Afghan Governor of Kuram having succeeded in levying revenue from Dawar, though in 1859 he desired, but was not allowed, to take advantage of the expedition against the Kabul Khel Waziris to enforce a demand for arrears against the people of the valley. The sovereignty of Kabul over Dawar has, therefore, been of the most nominal and imaginary kind, and the British Government has never held that the relations between the Amir and this valley are such as preclude it from direct dealings with the people of Dawar, or obviate the necessity of taking their punishment into its own hands. The people of Dawar have more than once expressed a wish to come under British jurisdiction, but their offer has never been entertained.

**Expedition against the Dawaris, by a force under Brigadier-General
C. P. Keyes, C.B., in March 1872.**

*Expedition
against the
Dawaris in
1872.*

After the annexation of the Punjab, the first occasion on which we came into contact with the Dawaris was in 1851, when, in April of that year, a party of their tribe, conjointly with the Umarzai Waziris, attacked a police guard in charge of some camels belonging to the Latamar outpost. They were driven off on this occasion with heavy loss, but not before they had killed two and wounded three of the small party who opposed them.

From this time to 1870 the Dawaris gave little trouble on our border. In 1858 they sent a deputation to ask the aid of the British Government against the Waziris, but it was refused.

In 1870, however, they made themselves conspicuous by giving shelter and assistance to the Muhammad Khel Waziris, who were then in open rebellion against the British Government (*see* Chapter XIV). It is now well known that the reculant tribe, on leaving British territory, proceeded to Dawar; that the council at which hostile measures were determined on was held at the village of Haidar Khel on the 10th of June 1870; and that the measures then adopted were strongly advocated by the Dawari *maliks*, some of whom indeed took part in the cowardly attack on the guard of the 4th Sikh Infantry on the 13th of June. Throughout the defection of the tribe the Dawaris behaved in an underhand way; for while, in order to stand fair with the British Government, they constantly brought intelligence of the movements of the reculant tribe to the civil authorities, yet, to remain in the good graces of their Waziri neighbours, they gave them shelter and even land, distributing the families of the Muhammad Khels amongst the various villages of the valley. When the Waziris submitted to the Government, on the 20th of September 1871, it was determined to fine all the tribes who had assisted them, and accordingly a fine of Rs. 3,000 was imposed on the two valleys of Upper and Lower Dawar. All the neighbouring tribes paid the fine demanded, and the men of Upper Dawar paid their share, *viz.*, Rs. 1,500, of the tribal fine; but the men of Lower Dawar refused to do so.

The secret of the men of Upper Dawar having been more tractable than those of the lower portion of the valley, lay in the fact that they were afraid of the Waziris who resided in their neighbourhood, and they knew that at a very slight instigation from us they would suffer considerable losses, if they were not completely driven from their lands, which the Waziris so much coveted; and the influence of the Waziri *maliks* had been brought to bear upon them from the beginning.

All efforts to obtain reparation from the men of Lower Dawar were, however, unsuccessful. A deputation sent to them to summon their *jirga* met with a most insulting reception. Our messengers were abused and expelled from their villages, and were pelted with stones and clods of earth; subsequently a written communication of the most insulting nature was addressed to the district officer and his assistant.

To submit tamely to such an insult would have been to endanger our prestige with all the tribes along the border; and orders were accordingly issued, on the evening of the 5th of March 1872, for the march on the following morning of all the available troops in garrison at Edwardesabad to the neighbourhood of the Tochi pass. Brigadier-General C. P. Keyes, C.B., command-

ing the Punjab Frontier Force, was then at Edwardesabad, and was to direct the operations, which were on no account to extend beyond the period of twenty-four hours. *Expedition against the Dawaris in 1872.*

Further delay, in the opinion of both the Commissioner and Brigadier-General Keyes, might have proved fatal to the accomplishment of the object in view within the time allowed for the operations, and with the force then at Edwardesabad. Circumstances might so change that, within a few days, it might become imprudent, from a military point of view, to enter the hills with that force alone. It was known that the Dawaris had sent messages into Khost and the neighbouring hills for aid, and that certain priests and *Syads* had been instigating them to resist. There were, too, rumours that the Ahmadzai Waziris began to think that, if they had shown a bolder front and had offered more resistance, they might have escaped more easily in the settlement that had been made with those implicated with the Muhammad Khels.

Accordingly, on the morning of the 6th of March, Brigadier-General Keyes's despatch. leaving a force of 600 bayonets and two guns for the protection of the Edwardesabad fort and cantonment, Brigadier-General Keyes marched with the troops, as per margin (*see Appendix A*),

No. 3 Punjab Light Field	towards the Tochi pass, and encamped about
Battery 2 howitzers	six miles from Edwardesabad, on ground
1st Punjab Cavalry ... 149 all ranks	where there was an abundant supply of
2nd Punjab Cavalry ... 206 " "	water. Major A. A. Munro, the Com-
1st Sikh Infantry ... 534 " "	missioner of the Derajat, accompanied the
4th Sikh Infantry ... 424 " "	force as Political Officer.
1st Punjab Infantry ... 448 " "	

Arrangements had been made for two mule-loads of blasting powder to accompany the force, and also for fifty *coolies*, to repair the road if necessary. Cooked food was ordered to be taken by the troops.

The day previous to the march of the troops it was arranged that Muhammad Hyat Khan, Extra Assistant Commissioner, should proceed with a thousand Waziri levies (supposed for the nonce to have been converted from bitter enemies into friendly allies) to seize the Tochi pass; but the number collected for this purpose were not as many as had been expected, and did not amount to more than four hundred, of which only one hundred had matchlocks. The plan had been consented to, as Muhammad Hyat Khan had expressed himself confident of being able to carry it out, and also in order to spare no effort to effect the proposed object peacefully, and without coming into actual collision with the inhabitants of Dawar.

On the night of the 5th of March Muhammad Hyat Khan proceeded with these levies, and occupied the *Shinki kotal* at the western end of the pass, without opposition, at daybreak on the 6th, and also a *tangi* or defile, which was the narrowest part of the pass, about a mile on this side of the *kotal*.

On reaching the camp near the mouth of the Tochi pass, the Brigadier-General, accompanied by Major A. A. Munro, the Commissioner, Lieutenant-Colonel T. G. Kennedy, 2nd Punjab Cavalry, Captain C. A. Sim, Royal Engineers, and Captain F. J. N. Mackenzie, Staff Officer, proceeded to reconnoitre the pass itself.

The road for the first few miles led along the left bank of the Tochi stream, westward, and, taking then a more northerly course, followed the channel of the stream to the *tangi*, and thence to the *kotal*, over which the road passed at a height of 190 feet above the bed of the stream. Major Munro's report.

*Expedition
against the
Dawaris in
1872.*

After the party had proceeded about four miles, reports were received from Muhammad Hyat Khan that the enemy had approached to within 300 yards; and that he required the assistance of a regiment. As it would have been quite dark long before a regiment could reach him, such support was utterly out of the question, and the Brigadier-General determined to push on and see matters for himself. It was about 4 P.M. when the party reached the *kotal*, and its occupants were found in a great state of excitement. There was a little firing, chiefly from the Waziri side, but it was manifest the men who occupied the *kotal* had no intention of holding the place against opposition; they had, indeed, already begun to retire.

The attacking force did not exceed 150 men, led by a Hassu Khel *malik* named Hussen, who was acting independently of the *jirgas* of the valley, and it had approached to within 200 yards in open ground of the Waziris. Captain Sim very spiritedly volunteered to remain the night with the levies, to give them confidence, but the Brigadier-General would not consent to a British officer being left in such a position.

The Waziris were assured that supports would be sent up as soon as possible; but Brigadier-General Keyes warned Muhammad Hyat Khan that he could not allow these supports to join him in the dark, and that therefore he need not expect them until the morning, as they could not be moved in the night. But it was obvious that the defence was a sham, and that the Waziris had no intention of making a stand. It was now necessary for the party to hasten back to camp; but before the Brigadier-General and the Commissioner had retired many yards, the Waziris abandoned their position, and fled down the pass. Two of the runaways were slightly wounded, and the body of a Bannuchi, with his throat cut, was found some way down the pass the next morning, but he was believed to have been murdered by Mahsud robbers.


This conduct of the levies made a peaceful settlement more difficult, and it became a question whether it would not now be advisable to make a forced march by the longer and more open route through the Khasora pass, in order to avoid loss of life, should the pass which had been abandoned by the Waziris be occupied by the Dawaris. After due consideration, this plan was given up, on account of the length of the route, and of the difficulty of finding any one sufficiently acquainted with the road to lead the column in certainty on a dark night. There was also the probability that the Waziri *kiris*, of which there were several in the pass, would take alarm at the approach of the troops; on the other hand, the road and its difficulties by the shorter route were fully known; and, as the effect of forcing our way into the valley by this route would be so much greater and more lasting after what had occurred, it was resolved to carry out the bolder course.

At 4 A.M. on the 7th of March the camp was left standing, under the charge of Captain F. A. Bertie, 1st Punjab Cavalry, with 150 sabres of that regiment and the outlying picquets of the infantry corps, consisting of 40 bayonets each, while the remainder of the force, consisting of some 1,200 bayonets, 200 sabres, and two howitzers, marched towards the Dawar valley.

One hundred rounds per gun, and the same number per man, a day's rations in haversacks, and a hospital establishment accompanied the column. The usual precautions were taken to clear the heights which commanded the bed of the Tochi, but it was soon ascertained that the crest of the pass was unoccupied, and at 9 A.M. the Shinki *kotal* was reached without opposition (*see* Map, p. 570).

It was said that the men of Dawar, knowing that the camp was at Tochi,

SKETCH
OF
LOWER DAWAR
TO ILLUSTRATE
THE OPERATIONS OF THE FORCE
UNDER
BRIGADIER-GENERAL C. P. KEYES, C.B.
in March 1872.



Lithographed at the Survey of India Offices, Calcutta, January 1885.

and that no movement had been made to support the Waziris, imagined that we would not attempt any further demonstration without endeavouring to negotiate, and consequently, instead of securing the pass, they had returned to their homes, to assemble their people and hold counsel. *Expedition against the Dawaris in 1872.*

At the *kotal* the column halted, and a road practicable for guns was made by the party of fifty *coolies* attached to the column for this purpose, who were assisted by a fatigue party of the 4th Sikhs, under the superintendence of Captain Sim, Royal Engineers. About 11 A.M. the road was reported ready, but it proved too steep for the horses to drag up the howitzers, and they had therefore to be dragged up the greater part of the ascent by the men of the battery and 4th Sikh Infantry. The descent on the Dawar side was comparatively easy.

The howitzers and ammunition wagons having been got over the *kotal* about noon, the Brigadier-General, accompanied by the Commissioner, pushed on with the cavalry, and, after an hour's ride over the rocky bed of the river, ascending a slight rise, found themselves at the end of a broad plateau with the three refractory villages of Haidar Khel, Hassu Khel, and Aipi in their front (*see accompanying sketch*). Here they were met by two Hassu Khel *maliks*, who expressed a willingness on the part of the people of Dawar to agree to any terms which might be imposed. They were then informed by the Commissioner that the fines originally proposed would be levied, with an additional Rs. 1,000 from Hassu Khel and Rs. 500 from Haidar Khel, as a mark of our further displeasure at their conduct. Blood-money at the usual rate would be demanded for the Bannuchi found dead in their pass that day; and two towers in each of the villages would be burnt for the previous day's misconduct of the Hassu Khel *malik*, as well as for the recusancy of the leading men of lower Dawar, which had necessitated the march of a British force into the valley.

The *maliks* acquiesced in these demands, but they begged for time. However, the afternoon was advancing, and if the force was to return to camp that night, no time was to be lost. A quarter of an hour's delay was, therefore, granted to the villagers in which to collect the fine money, the cavalry remaining halted on the plain. A large body of the enemy was, however, seen assembling in front of the village of Haidar Khel, defiantly waving their *talwars*, and apparently inciting to an attack.

On the arrival of the infantry and guns the assurances of obedience and submission were repeated, and the force advanced on the village of Haidar Khel, partly with the purpose of receiving the fine imposed, and partly to carry out the terms on which their submission was accepted, *viz.*, the burning of the village towers. In strange contrast with the submissive tone of the emissaries was the attitude of the great mass of the enemy, who, far from dispersing, still maintained their position in front of the village. The authorities were, however, so confident of the honesty of the Dawaris that the force, covered by the skirmishers of the 1st Sikh Infantry, advanced to within matchlock range of the enemy without firing a shot.

When the skirmishers had arrived within 200 yards of the Dawaris, a shot was fired, apparently as a signal, which was followed by a volley from the rest of the enemy, who at once took shelter behind the walls and in the ditches. The guns were promptly brought into action on the village, while the 1st Sikh Infantry made a spirited advance on the enemy. A wing of the 4th Sikh Infantry (the other wing having been left to hold the Shinki *kotal*) was, at the same time, sent round to the left flank of the village, and the cavalry

*Expedition
against the
Dawaris in
1872.*

to its right and rear, to cut off any attempt to escape. The 1st Sikh Infantry stormed the closed gates of the village and effected an entry, driving the inhabitants to the north corner, where for some time they made a stand behind some high-walled houses. The 1st and 4th Sikh Infantry having obtained entire possession of the left portion of the village, set it on fire. The 1st Punjab Infantry was then brought up and sent to the right flank of the village, to aid the cavalry in cutting off the retreat of the villagers. The fire and the determined bearing of the two Sikh regiments was soon too much for the defenders of the village, and, abandoning their position, they fled towards the plain, only to find themselves surrounded by the cavalry on the left, the dark coats of the 1st Punjab Infantry in their front, the guns on their right, and behind them the deadly Enfields of the two Sikh regiments. The cavalry were speedily down upon them, and sabred ten of their number, when the rest, seeing that all was lost, made a rush for the guns and head-quarters, and, throwing down their arms as they ran, surrendered as prisoners.

The cavalry and the 1st Punjab Infantry were then advanced to the adjacent village of Aipi, which was surrounded. Profiting by the severe lesson inflicted on Haidar Khel, the inhabitants at once gave security for the amount of the fine imposed, and the village was spared. It was now considered that sufficient retribution had been exacted, and that no further punishment was necessary. The more distant village of Hassu Khel was therefore spared, but, on the way back to the camp, the Commissioner received the representatives of that village also, who had followed to surrender, and who yielded unconditionally to all demands. At about 4 P.M. the force commenced its return march, the Shinki *kotal* was cleared before dusk, and the troops arrived in camp at 10 P.M., having been eighteen hours under arms. No opposition of any sort was encountered during the return march.

Our loss had been trifling (*see* Appendix B). The loss inflicted on the enemy, according to the most authentic accounts, was forty-three killed, wounded unknown, and thirty prisoners. The result of these operations was satisfactory in a political as well as in a military sense; for a hitherto independent tribe had been compelled to recognise that even their secluded valleys did not protect them from just punishment. The fines imposed were subsequently paid in full, and the prisoners were then released.

When our troops entered the village of Haidar Khel, the shops, between fifty and sixty in number, were found well stored with grain, *ghi*, etc.; and scarcely a house was entered which had not cattle tied up in the courtyard, showing how well-to-do were the inhabitants of Dawar.


In his despatch on these operations, Brigadier-General Keyes stated that the conduct of the troops had been admirable throughout a long and laborious day; during the operations the troops had marched over about twenty-five miles of ground, almost entirely covered with boulders, and had made a road practicable for guns over the *kotal*—a duty in which the infantry most cheerfully assisted, and which occupied them three hours. The artillery had much hard work, and the manner in which the guns had been dragged over nearly twenty-five miles of boulders (the horses were eighteen hours in harness) spoke much for the hardiness and endurance of the animals, and for the discipline of the battery.

The names of the officers he wished to mention were—

Lieutenant-Colonel J.P.W. Campbell, commanding 1st Sikh Infantry.

Captain A. FitzHugh, commanding 4th Sikh Infantry.

Scale 2 Miles = 1 Inch.



Lieutenant-Colonel T. G. Kennedy, commanding 2nd Punjab Cavalry. *Expedition against the Dawaris in 1872.*
 Captain F. J. Keen, commanding 1st Punjab Infantry.
 Captain J. Charles, commanding No. 3 Punjab Light Field
 • Battery.
 Captain C. A. Sim, Royal Engineers.
 Captain F. J. N. Mackenzie, Staff Officer.
 Surgeon G. Farrell, 2nd Punjab Cavalry.

And Brigadier-General Keyes also brought to notice the spirited way in which Captain C. A. Sim had volunteered to remain with Muhammad Hyat Khan and the Waziris when it was believed that they would not stand without the presence of some one to give them confidence.

Brigadier-General Keyes said his acknowledgments were also due to Major A. A. Munro, Commissioner of the Derajat, and to Captain J. W. H. Johnstone, Deputy Commissioner of Bannu, who accompanied the force, for their cordial co-operation.

The satisfaction of the Governor-General in Council was expressed at the success of the expedition, which, it was remarked, had been well conceived and carried out, and the hearty thanks of Government were to be conveyed to the officers engaged.

After the punishment of the Dawaris in 1872, their conduct continued to be satisfactory until 1876. In March of that year the Haidar Khel, Hassu Khel, and Idak *jirgas* were summoned to Bannu to answer for three burglaries which had been committed in the lines of the 5th Punjab Cavalry in January and February of that year, by a band of robbers (headed by a Khostwal named Gul Azim), who had taken up their head-quarters at Idak, but were also harboured and aided by the other villages. All three villages obeyed the summons, although it was the first time the representatives of Idak had attended as a body on any Deputy Commissioner, and a large portion of the stolen property was produced by the *jirgas*, who paid a fine of Rs. 300 in compensation for the remainder.

This, it was hoped, would serve as a warning to the Dawaris for some time to come, but Gul Azim had sworn vengeance for the death of a comrade named Mir Salam, who had been shot dead by a sentry in one of the burglaries in the cavalry lines early in 1876; and, on the night of the 11th-12th August 1877, Gul Azim himself, with Mir Salam's brother and six other followers, made a savage and treacherous attack on a guard of four policemen posted at the head of the Kuch-Kot bridge, on the road leading to the Kuram outpost within a quarter of a mile of cantonments.

The sentry on duty alone managed to escape, severely wounded, but the other three (who were asleep on *charpoy*s at the side of the road instead of in the tower provided for their safety) were all killed, and their arms and accoutrements carried off.

Although only one of the murderers, a man named Kasim Gul, of Usuri, was actually a Dawari, two of the others being Khostwals, like Gul Azim, and the remaining four bad characters belonging to different sections of the Darwesh Khel Waziris, their leader, Gul Azim, had always enjoyed an asylum in Idak and Musakai, and it was ascertained that the gang had not only

*Blockade of
Lower Dawar
in 1877-78.*

assembled at Idak before the outrage, but had returned there afterwards. It was impossible, too, that the raid could have been effected without the connivance of the intermediate villages of Hassu Khel and Haidar Khel.

The surrender of the criminals was accordingly demanded, and, in order to enforce this demand, orders were issued that the whole of Lower Dawar should be blockaded, and traffic of every kind stopped. At the same time a seizure of all men and property of Lower Dawar was ordered, which resulted in the arrest of seventy men, and the capture of some cattle, for the sale of which, after deducting expenses, a net balance of Rs. 275 was realised. Unfortunately the prisoners proved to be nearly all residents of Haidar Khel, and their detention had little influence directly on Idak, Musakai, and Usuri, which were chiefly implicated. The demand, too, for the surrender of the criminals was one which there was small chance that any tribe having pretensions to Afghan origin would comply with, except under more severe pressure than that of a blockade.

In the middle of November, the Dawaris having shown no signs of compliance with our demands for the surrender of the criminals, the Deputy Commissioner proposed that if it was inconvenient to move out troops, the case might be compromised by the infliction of a fine. This was approved by the Government, and the fine was fixed at Rs. 3,500.

In February 1878, as the Dawaris still held out, the Deputy Commissioner proposed that an attempt should be made to surprise, by the Baran pass, the village of Usuri, and to capture Kasim Gul, one of the raiders who was known to be residing there. The Government would not, however, sanction this plan, and ordered the blockade to be continued. In the meanwhile the whole valley was feeling the effects of the blockade, and their long-continued exclusion from the Bannu market; but the realisation of the fine was impeded by the want of unanimity which usually prevails in an independent border community, and by the absence of leading spirits to take the initiative.

The village of Haidar Khel went so far as to bring in Rs. 1,200; but they were sent back, as it was impossible to treat separately with a part of the tribe for a portion only of the fine imposed on the whole tribe. Moreover, the greater part of this fine had been subscribed by the relatives of the Haidar Khel prisoners in our hands, so that it could not be received even as an earnest of submission on the part of the other villages.

In the month of May a reconnaissance of the Tochi pass was made by Lieutenant F. Mardall, 3rd Punjab Cavalry, and Lieutenant C. H. M. Smith, 3rd Sikh Infantry. As it was then the harvest season, the idea spread rapidly through the valley that the patience of the Government had at last become exhausted, and that this was only a preliminary to the employment of troops for sharper measures, or at any rate for the destruction of the ripening crops. The result was a scare almost amounting to a panic; the Idak people, it was said, being so frightened as to beg a loan of camels from their Waziri neighbours for the removal of their property to a place of security; this was soon followed by signs of submission on the part of the recusant villages, and in the beginning of June their *jirgas* came into Bannu, and made their submission. The sum of Rs. 2,599 was realised from them in cash, and good security was furnished for the payment of the balance (Rs. 901) in three months. On the 11th of June the blockade was declared to be raised, and the *jirgas* were dismissed. At the same time orders were sent to Dera Ismail Khan for the Dawari prisoners detained in jail to be sent to Bannu, where they arrived a few days later, and were released.

The balance of Rs. 901 was subsequently paid, and the whole of the fine demanded by Government was thus realised. *Misconduct of the Dawaris in 1879.*

At the outbreak of the war in Afghanistan in 1878, the Dawaris did not at first show any open hostility to the Government, but when the British troops visited Khost in January 1879, the notorious Mulla Adkar fled from that valley, and took up his residence in the Mallakh villages of Upper Dawar, and in the following month a series of raids and outrages were commenced by the inhabitants of Dawar, aided by contingents from the different sections of the Waziri tribe, which were directly due to his instigation and encouragement.

The residents of Upper Dawar, from Miram Shah to Sherania, were, more or less, concerned in every raid that occurred, and seem to have thought that their distance from our border quite put them beyond the reach of retribution. Upper Dawar also furnished the men who made themselves most conspicuous as leaders, *viz.*, Manzamdin (a brother of Mulla Adkar), Ghulam Khan, son of Adam Khan, the Mada Khel *malik* of Sherania, and Gulab Pir, a noted fanatic and freebooter, who lived with the Manzar Khel Waziris, either at the village of Kanirogho itself, or in one of the neighbouring hamlets.

In Lower Dawar the villages lying westward of Zeraki, *viz.*, Khaddi, Idak, Hakim Kilai, Borakshahi, Tapiye, Palali, and Rasal Khel, were equally active in the raiding, and appear to have shared with their neighbours of Upper Dawar the idea that they were out of reach; but the rest of the population was less reckless. In a few cases, however, the eastern villages were implicated too; but it is worth remarking that Haidar Khel, which suffered so severely at the hands of Brigadier-General Keyes's expedition in 1872, refrained altogether from participation in these raids. The outrages consisted for the most part of raids committed on the Thal-Bannu and the Thal-Kuram roads. The opening of the former route especially afforded them opportunities of plunder, of which they availed themselves with great pertinacity. In February 1879 a band, led by Ghulam Khan, plundered a caravan *en route* from Edwardesabad to Thal. In June another raid was committed on the same road, in which one man was killed and twenty-one camels were lifted. In another raid in September two men were killed and some cattle carried off. In November marauders from Dawar took part in two plundering incursions, one led by the brother of Mulla Adkar, a few miles above Thal, another, in which twenty-six camels were lifted, from the Chapri post on the Kuram road. In December of the same year an armed gathering, estimated to have numbered three thousand, recruited from the Dawar valley by the inflammatory preachings of Mulla Adkar, set forth to assault Thal, but dispersed without striking a blow against that place, breaking up into bands, which for many weeks molested the direct road from Edwardesabad. On the 31st of January 1880 a party hailing from Dawar, led by Gulab Pir, pillaged a convoy on this road, carrying off 105 camels and Rs. 10,000 worth of stores; and on the 21st of March 1880 it was considered advisable by the local authorities to close the road against traffic.

A few days after this the Dawaris joined with Waziri marauders in the attack on the Turi caravan, already described (*see* p. 490), in which ten men were killed, and property to the value of more than Rs. 15,000 carried off. The leader in this raid was Gulab Pir, of Kanirogho. On the 3rd of April, in the raid on the Khatak labour camp (*see* p. 490), Dawar again played a principal part.

*Misconduct of
the Dawaris
in 1880.
Proposals for
punishment.*

Once more, in April 1880, a large body, some 800 strong, assembled, threatening Thal, but dispersed without accomplishing anything.

The same month, however, saw an unusually audacious attack, led by Ghulam Khan, who, with a band of some 200 Dawaris and Waziris, assaulted and occupied the Baran militia post in British territory, on the Bannu frontier about five miles from Edwardesabad.

This post was occupied on the night of the 22nd-23rd of April, when the raid was committed, by a party of eight men of the militia. About 10 or 11 P.M. some of the raiders, having placed roughly-made ladders against the wall of the post, effected an entrance, all the occupants, even the sentry, being asleep. On being awakened by the raiders, the militia begged for their lives, saying they were all Musalmans, and that they had been forced to take service, and garrison the post. They then showed the raiders where the ammunition and other things were, and they were allowed to go into the tower at the west angle of the post, where they remained the whole time the raiders were in the place. They managed to take two carbines and a little ammunition with them. The marauders broke open the gates with axes, and the rest of the raiders came in. They then looted the post, taking away five horses, three carbines, three matchlocks, three *talwars*, and other property. They were inside the post for two hours, when an alarm was suddenly raised that the cavalry were coming, upon which the raiders abandoned the post, and beat a hasty retreat, the men in the tower firing a few shots at them as they ran away, by which one man was killed and another wounded.

For their cowardly conduct in this affair the militiamen occupying the post were ordered to be dismissed.

The Dawaris were also implicated in the attack on the Chapri post on the 1st-2nd of May 1880, already described, in which Lieutenant O. B. Wood, of the Transport Department, was killed (*see* p. 491). The leader in this raid was a favourite *talib* of Mulla Adkar, named Wazir Khan.

In addition to the above, the people of Dawar were guilty of several minor raids, and the total value of the property plundered by them, excluding many items which, by common frontier custom, would be charged against them, amounted to no less than Rs. 45,000.

It was therefore proposed, in order to exact reparation from the inhabitants of Dawar for their many offences, to take advantage of the assembling of the force at Bannu in April 1881 to act as a reserve against the Mahsud Waziris (*see* Chapter XV), to visit the Dawar valley, and to realise a fine of Rs. 50,000 from its inhabitants. This fine it was proposed to allot as follow :—

				Rs.
Lower Dawar	15,000
Upper Dawar	{ Dawaris	25,000
	{ Manzar Khel and Hassan Khel Waziris			5,000
	{ Mada Khel Waziris of Sherania	...		5,000

The people of Dawar, conscious of their guilt, and alarmed at the preparations against the Mahsuds, had already begun to make overtures to avert the retribution which they dreaded; and Adam Khan himself, the Waziri *malik* of Sherania, was reported to have sent word of his readiness to purchase, by the payment of a fine, immunity from punishment for the inveterate hostility shown towards us since the days when he harboured the murderers of Captain Mecham, and for the part taken in these later offences

by his son, Ghulam Khan, who in person led several of the most serious raids. *Proposals for punishment of the Dawaris not sanctioned. Present attitude of the tribe.*

The plan of operations proposed was that Brigadier-General Gordon's force, after advancing to Makin by the Khasora pass to open communications with the main column from Tank, under Brigadier-General Kennedy, should, instead of returning to British territory by the same route, cross the Loargai Sar from the Khasora valley into the Upper Dawar valley by the Darrevasta. After visiting Sherania and the Waziri settlements at the western end of Upper Dawar, and exacting the fines demanded, the force was to march down the Tochi and realise the fines due from the Dawaris proper from Tindai eastward, which it was expected would be attended with little difficulty.

The Lieutenant-Governor advocated these measures, and he considered that, to ensure the permanent peace and tranquillity of the Bannu border, it was necessary to prove to Dawar, which for many years had been a hot-bed of disaffection and fanaticism, a rendezvous for all robbers to mature their preparations for raids into British territory, and an asylum for outlaws and refugees from our border, that British territory could be attacked, or British subjects murdered, with impunity.

The Government of India, however, refused to sanction the proposed expedition, on the ground that all the offences recorded against the Dawaris, with the exception of the attack on the Baran post, were committed beyond the frontiers of British India during the time the British forces were engaged in military operations beyond the border, and that the offences in question were more or less connected with these operations. The Governor-General in Council was of opinion that these offences did not afford ground for extending operations, which, for general reasons of policy, it was very desirable not to prolong.

In May 1882, as already mentioned, the notorious priest, Mulla Adkar, whose harangues had been chiefly instrumental in inciting the people of Dawar to acts of hostility, died. Since then the conduct of the Dawaris has been satisfactory, and has given little cause for complaint.

APPENDIX A.

*Composition of the force employed in the operations in the Dawar valley
in March 1872.*

Brigadier-General C. P. Keyes, C.B., commanding.

Staff.

Captain F. J. N. Mackenzie, Staff Officer.

Captain C. A. Sim, Royal Engineers, Field Engineer.

Artillery.

No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery, Captain J. Charles, commanding.

Cavalry.

1st Punjab Cavalry, Captain F. A. Bertie, commanding.

2nd Punjab Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel T. G. Kennedy, commanding.

Infantry.

1st Sikh Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel J. P. W. Campbell, commanding.

4th Sikh Infantry, Captain A. FitzHugh, commanding.

1st Punjab Infantry, Captain F. J. Keen, commanding.

Political Officers.

Major A. A. Munro, Commissioner, Derajat.

Captain J. W. H. Johnstone, Deputy Commissioner, Bannu.

Detail of troops.

Corps.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	Non-Com- missioned Officers.	Rank and file.	Remarks.
No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery	2	1	6	51	Two 24-pounder howitzers. * Includes one medical officer.
1st Punjab Cavalry...	1	5	16	127	
2nd Punjab Cavalry ...	*4	7	27	168	
1st Sikh Infantry ...	*6	13	49	466	
4th Sikh Infantry ...	4	12	50	358	
1st Punjab Infantry ...	*4	13	53	378	
Total ...	21	51	201	1,548	

APPENDIX B.

Return of Killed and Wounded in the operations in the Dawar valley on the 7th of March 1872.

Corps.	Killed.					Wounded.					Remarks.
	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	
1st Sikh Infantry	*6	6	*Three severely. Seven horses belonging to the 2nd Punjab Cavalry were also among the casualties.
Total	6	6	

ABSTRACT.

Killed	0
Wounded	6
Total	6

CHAPTER XVII.

DERA ISMAIL KHAN BORDER.

SHIRANI AND USTARANA TRIBES.

Shiranis.

THE Shiranis are a tribe of Pathans occupying the principal portion of the mountain known as the Takht-i-Suliman,* and the country thence eastward down to the border of the Dera Ismail Khan district. To the north, beyond the Gumal pass, their neighbours are the Mahsud Waziris; on the south they march with the Ustaranas and Zmarais; † and to the west they are bounded, beyond the water-shed of the Takht-i-Suliman, by the Haripals ‡ and by the powerful Kakars § and Mandu Khels. || Between the Takht and our border lie several insignificant

* The Takht-i-Suliman is held in great reverence, and is resorted to as a place of pilgrimage. The shrine is about two miles north of the true Takht or southernmost peak visible from the plains. The Takht itself does not contain any shrine. It is said by those who have seen it to be a mere cavity, some 30 feet square, cut out of the solid rock. To approach it the pilgrim has to ascend in one place by the aid of a rope. The legend goes that Solomon visited Hindustan to marry one Balkis, and that, as the happy pair were returning through the air, seated on a throne supported by genii, the weeping bride implored the bridegroom to give her a chance of looking back for a few moments on her beloved land. Solomon assented, and, as they had then very opportunely arrived just over the Takht-i-Suliman, he directed the genii to scoop out a stand for his throne. This was done, and the throne placed upon the stand, and Balkis obtained the loving glance at the sultry plains below which she so much loved.

It is probable, however, that we must look more to a Hindu origin for the sanctity of the place than to a Musalman one. It is noteworthy that, until it became too unsafe to visit, the Takht-i-Suliman was far more visited by Hindus than by Musalmans.

† The *Zmarais* are a small and insignificant tribe, of whom little is known. They occupy the whole crest of the Misri Koh (Zmaraighar) mountain and its western slopes. They are not extensive traders in British territory, but at the same time they are to a certain extent dependent on this trade for their prosperity.

‡ The *Haripals* are a small tribe of *fakirs* living from hand to mouth, and number about 800. They are under the protection of the Shiranis. Little is known of them. They sometimes come down with donkeys and oxen by the Shekh Haidar pass to Draband and Kulachi to get grain and barter produce.

§ The *Kakars* are a very numerous Afghan race, divided into many distinct tribes, who have no connection with each other beyond the common name of Kakar. Not only is there no chief of the Kakars, or general *jirga* of the whole tribe, but in most cases there are no recognised heads of the different tribes, the various sections of which go pretty much their own way, and, if not at actual feud with their neighbours, are at least perfectly indifferent to their welfare. During the late Afghan war, the Kakars caused some annoyance on the line of communications of the army in southern Afghanistan; but their misdeeds were generally confined to attacks on camp followers and solitary individuals, and no attempt at organised resistance was made. The Kakars inhabiting the Zhob valley have lately given some trouble, and last year were guilty of a serious raid, and it is probable that before long punitive measures against them will have to be adopted.

|| The *Mandu Khels* are an off-shoot of the Kakar tribe. They number about 3,000 in all, and are a peaceful and agricultural tribe. They do not come down to British territory to trade.

ridges, all running north and south, in the valleys between which the lowland Shiranis have their villages. Almost all these villages are easily accessible, and within a day's march from one or other of the three chief passes leading into the country, namely the Zarakni or Shekh Haidar, the Draband, and the Chaudwan. Adjoining each village is a *kach*, or stretch of alluvial soil, irrigated generally by perennial water and fairly well cultivated. Above the lowland Shiranis are the Bar Shiranis, who occupy the higher slopes of the Takht and the west slopes of the Suliman range, and lead a pastoral life.

The Shiranis are divided into three main sections, *viz.*, Hassan Khel or Sen Khel, Uba Khel, and Chuhar Khel, and occupy their country from north to south in this order. Of the three, the first is the quietest, most settled and friendly towards ourselves; the last the least so. Various estimates of the strength of the tribe have been given, but the most recent authorities do not think that the fighting men would number more than 3,500.

During the summer, the flocks and herds from all three sections are pastured more or less promiscuously on the higher slopes and plateau of the Takht-i-Suliman mountain.

The tribe is divided into those who occupy fixed homesteads and those who are unsettled or nomadic. The former, who largely outnumber the latter, may all be regarded as well disposed to the British Government—much more so than their nomadic brethren.

Tribal cohesion among the Shiranis is weak; the different sections have at times endeavoured to escape joint responsibility, and the result has been that the unruly individuals in the clan have, from time to time, indulged their predatory tastes at the expense of the tribe, and it has repeatedly been necessary to compel the Shiranis to control, as a body, their individual sections or clansmen.

The Shiranis are generally of middling stature, thin, but hardy and active. They have bold features, high cheek-bones, and their general appearance is wild and manly. The dress of a common Shirani consists of a coarse black blanket tied round his waist, and another thrown over his shoulders. They wear sandals, the soles of which are made of bullock's hide, rudely prepared by steeping it in the ashes of the tamarisk tree; and their dress is completed by a few yards of white cotton cloth loosely twisted round their heads. The dress of the richest is not much finer than this. The chief is thought magnificent because he dresses in Multan silk.

Their usual food is bread, made of Indian-corn, and butter. Wheaten bread is only produced at festivals. The flesh principally used is mutton. They eat wild olives fresh from the tree, and dried olives, which they are obliged to boil. They also eat wild pomegranates (though they are very sour and harsh), the seed of the *chalghozah* pine, and several sorts of berries which grow wild in their mountains.

The Shiranis marry late. They differ from the other Afghans in this respect, that the father of the bride gives a dowry, instead of receiving a price for his daughter. The women only work at domestic employments and at reaping the harvest. Money is very scarce among them, trade being principally carried on by barter.

They have no domestic servants or slaves, and no artificers. About a dozen Hindus keep shops, and sell grain, cloth, treacle, tobacco, clarified butter, and a few of the coarsest manufactures of the plains; and a small

Shiranis.

number of settlers from the *daman* practise the trades of smiths and weavers.

The principal employment of the Shiranis is agriculture, which is carried on in the valleys. Some places under the hills produce grain without watering, but all the rest of their lands are irrigated by means of dams thrown across the hill streams. There is no man in the tribe, except the chief (and the *mullas*), who does not labour.

They have two harvests, one of which consists of rice, Indian-corn, and tobacco. It is sown in summer and reaped in autumn. When it is off the ground, they sow wheat and barley, which is cut in the beginning of summer.

Their common stock consists of bullocks, but there are some shepherds who live scattered in small hamlets over the summits of the mountains, and some even in tents.

Their bullocks are very small, and always black. They have a few goats and some donkeys; but no mules, buffaloes, or camels. There are not twenty horses in the whole country.

There is a *mulla* in every village, who receives a tithe of the produce of its lands and flocks. The simplicity of the Shiranis is shown in a strong light by one of the functions of this priest, which is to sew the shrouds for the dead. A great many of the Shiranis learn to read the *Koran*, though none but *mullas* learn to read Pushtu, and none Persian. They are very punctual in their prayers, but apparently feel little real devotion. They are at war with all the tribes that pass through their country in the annual migrations.

The Shiranis inhabiting the higher slopes of the mountains live in villages of from twenty to forty houses. They cut out the sites of their houses in the slopes of the hills, so that on three sides the earth forms the lower part of the wall. Each cottage contains but one room, and has only one entrance, which is closed at night with a branch of a thorny tree. Even in winter they have nothing to shut out the cold, but sleep on black carpets round the fire, wrapped up in sheep-skin cloaks. Their forests furnish them with plenty of firewood, and their houses are lighted with branches of a particular sort of fir, which burns like a torch. In the valleys bordering on British territory the villages are larger, and Drazand contains a hundred and fifty houses, or more.

Although their chief occupation is agriculture, this tribe carries on an extensive trade in the autumn months in the Dera Ismail Khan district. The principal towns they trade with are Kulachi, Draband, Chaudwan, and Musazai, and important and effective seizures of this tribe could nearly always be made within our border. Moreover, numbers of the tribe cultivate land to a considerable extent within British territory, and at the present time more than three hundred families are located as cultivators at Musazai, Draband, and Chaudwan. They are dependent chiefly on their intercourse with British territory for their food supply and cloth goods, in exchange for the produce of their hills.

Elphinstone says that their faith is unblemished, and that a traveller who hires an escort of Shiranis may pass through their country in perfect security. But, in spite of this estimate, it would be as well for anyone not to try to do so without some other guarantee than the faith of a Shirani.

The Ustaranas are a tribe of Afghans who inhabit the outer hills

opposite the extreme south portion of the Dera Ismail Khan district. They *Ustaranas* are the descendants of one Ustarana, a *Syad* who settled among and married into the Shirani section of the Afghans. They are bounded on the north by the Shiranis, on the east by British territory, on the south by the Kasranis and Bozdars, and on the west by the Zmarais, Isots,* and Musa Khels.†

Until about a century ago, the Ustaranas were entirely a pastoral and *Pawindah* tribe. But a quarrel with their neighbours, the Musa Khels, put a stop to their annual westward migration, and they were forced to take to agriculture, and subsequently acquired a good deal of the plain country below the hills. They still own a large tract of hill country, in which indeed most of them live, cultivating land immediately under the hills, and pasturing their flocks beyond the border. Their territory only includes the eastern slopes of the Suliman mountains, the crest of the range being held by the Musa Khels, Isots, and Zmarais.

They are divided into two main clans, the Ahmadzai and Gagalzai; and these again into numerous sections. Each of these clans can furnish 450 men; so that the fighting strength of the tribe is 900. There is a blood-feud of long standing between the Ahmadzais and Gagalzais. The former wear the hair in long ringlets, like the Biluch tribes; the latter wear it short.

The lowland villages of the Ustaranas are still called *kiris* and *jhoks*, showing how recently they have passed from being a pastoral to an agricultural tribe. Nothing can be more miserable than the whole of the Ustarana country. Their land in the plains is very barren and sandy, and is entirely dependent for cultivation on rain water.

Their chief village is Kui Bhara, about three miles beyond the border up the Rammak pass. It is a fine, well-built village of about 360
Thorburn. houses, and has numerous *chauks* and a few Hindu shops.

The Ustaranas are venturesome traders, and take goods to Bengal and Kandahar. Macaulay says that they import camels, goats, sheep, donkeys, bullocks, wool, honey, and *ghi*, and export grain of all sorts, piece-goods, shoes, blankets, indigo, etc.

The members of the tribe living beyond British territory are largely engaged in trade, and those within British territory are both agriculturists and traders. Their trade is carried on chiefly with the towns of Chaudwan and Vihowa. This tribe is completely at our mercy, as they own a large tract of country within our territory, and their principal villages, though beyond the border, might be destroyed in a day.

The Ustaranas are a fine, manly race; they are quiet and well behaved, and many of them are in our army and police. A few of them are still

* The *Isots* are a small tribe of Pathans numbering about 300 fighting men, and are said to be of Kakar origin. They are essentially a nomadic race, possessing no towns or villages, but living in caves. They are a quiet, inoffensive people, and at certain times of the year come down to trade in British territory.

† The *Musa Khels* are also of Kakar origin, but are a much more powerful tribe than the Isots, and number 5,000 fighting men. They enter British territory by the Vihowa pass, and carry on an extensive trade, but are not dependent on us for the necessities of life. They are a peaceable and united race and are friendly to the British, but are at enmity with the Khetrans and the Biluch tribes, to the south of their country. They are of the *Suni* persuasion. This tribe, as also the Isots, are much engaged in the carrying trade between British territory and the hills, and seizures of either of these might be made, if necessary, within our border. In 1879 the Musa Khels, Isots, and other Pathan tribes, to the number of 5,000, made a demonstration against Vihowa, and their intention was to attack that place; but on it becoming known that the town had been reinforced, they dispersed without carrying out their intention.

Ustaranas.

Pawindahs. They are all *Suni* Muhammadans. They are constantly at war with their neighbours, the Bozdars, by whom they are much harassed.

On the outbreak of the Sikh rebellion in 1848, 200 infantry of these Ustaranas, under Fateh Khan, the chief of the Gagalzai clan, followed Lieutenant H. B. Edwardes to Multan. They have always been friendly to us, and have never given any serious trouble. At the present time they are the best armed of the tribes on the Dera Ismail Khan border.

Expedition against the Shiranis, by a force under Brigadier J. S. Hodgson, in 1853.

Previous to our annexation of the Punjab, the Shiranis had made themselves the terror of the border. They used to carry off not only cattle, but men and women, whom they never released except for a rich ransom. They once sacked the town of Draband, though defended by a small Sikh garrison. In 1848, the border was laid waste for miles by their depredations, or deserted through fear of their attacks.

The men of the plains would make reprisals and retaliation, and thus the feud would be inflamed. The Shiranis were so much feared, that the arable lands skirting the base of the hills were left untilled, and the neighbouring plain villages regularly paid them one-fourth of their produce, to buy off their depredations.

After the annexation, efforts were made by the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan to conciliate them to peace; but from the first they made war on our subjects. In 1849 they attacked a village on the Kulachi border, when one of their leaders was slain.

Again, in July 1851, Katal Khan, the Shirani chief (who was molesting British territory in the hope of being bought off with a fief), came down to rob near Draband. The Shiranis, who had entered the plains during the night, were cut off by a detachment of the 5th Punjab Cavalry and some mounted police, under Jemadar Ghulam Ali Khan. The Shirani chief and two of his sons and a nephew were slain, and the above-mentioned native officer also lost his life. The third remaining son of Katal Khan after this applied for service in the military police. The application was granted; but the man eventually preferred to remain with his tribe, and to plunder in British territory.

In 1852 a large body of Shiranis entered the plains near Draband,	when they were driven back by a detachment, consisting
5th Punjab Cavalry,	of the troops as per margin, under Captain R. Fitzgerald,
84 sabres.	5th Punjab Cavalry, who was in camp at Draband,
*Sind Camel Corps,	covering the building of the outposts and the con-
73 of all ranks.	struction of the frontier road. The ground was imprac-
Mounted police, a few	ticable for cavalry to act over. The enemy had seven killed and several
sabres.	wounded. Our loss was one non-commissioned officer
Captain Fitzgerald's	of the 5th Punjab Cavalry and one sowar of the mounted
despatch.	police killed.

* The Sind Camel Corps was transferred from the Bombay to the Bengal Presidency in 1849. It consisted at this time, in addition to the European officers attached to it, of 5 subadars, 5 jemadars, 5 colour havildars, 25 havildars, 30 naiks, 10 buglers, and 450 sepoyas. The camel establishment consisted of 1 jemadar-major, 22 jemadars, 42 duffadars, and 477 sowars. Its designation shortly after this was changed to the Sind Rifle Corps, and it is now the 6th Punjab Infantry.

Besides this attack, the Shiranis made several unsuccessful attempts on Draband, probably in revenge for the death of Katal Khan. Besides these more important cases, numerous minor raids were perpetrated.

*Expedition
against the
Shiranis in
1853.*

Major J. Nicholson, who was then Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan, and was cognisant of all their acts, testified in 1853 "that the Shiranis have regularly plundered and taken blackmail from this border since it came into our possession."

About the commencement of 1853 the Shiranis attacked and burnt a village of the Dera Ismail Khan district. In February 1853 they again plundered and burnt a village near Draband. These attacks becoming intolerable, troops were assembled. On the 10th of March a body of Shiranis, aided, it was believed, by the Nasirs (a *Pawindah* tribe), numbering 700 foot and 70 horse in all, having entered the plains, were driven back after a long skirmish by the Draband post, consisting of 35 sabres, 5th Punjab Cavalry, and 47 bayonets of the Sind Camel Corps, under a native officer of the 5th Punjab Cavalry, leaving one dead body in our hands, and having many wounded. Two men of the Sind Camel Corps and two horses belonging to the 5th Punjab Cavalry were wounded.

<p>Owing to the hostile attitude and conduct of the Shiranis, a small force</p> <p>Captain Bruce's despatch.</p> <p>had descended in</p> <p>5th Punjab Cavalry, 64 sabres.</p> <p>Sind Camel Corps (2 British officers, 2 native officers, and 123 bayonets, with their camel esta- blishment).</p> <p>Mounted police, 5 sabres.</p>	<p>was now encamped at Draband. On the morning of the 14th of March intelligence was received that the Shiranis force into the plains, and had advanced about two miles from their position in the Draband Zam, to attack a reconnoitring party from the Draband outpost. Captain F. F. Bruce, Sind Camel Corps, who was commanding at that place, at once gave orders for the troops, as per margin, to march towards the Draband pass, a distance of seven or eight miles. On seeing the approach of this detachment, the enemy retreated and took up a strong position some little distance up the pass.</p>
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This position was strengthened by a stone breastwork, behind which the greater part of the enemy were concealed. As the force advanced up the pass, a picquet on the left opened fire, but from too great a distance to do any harm. After placing a flanking party on the lower hills, Captain Bruce proceeded with his detachment against the enemy's position. On arriving at the foot of the hill held by the enemy, a party was ordered to storm the breastworks. This was done in gallant style by Ensign C. H. Palliser, Sind Camel Corps, who, with his men, dashed up in the most daring manner, carrying all before them, and killing and wounding numbers of the enemy. Among the killed were three chiefs and Mulla Gundah Khan, a man whose advice carried much weight among the Shiranis. The enemy was dislodged at the point of the bayonet, leaving five dead within their entrenchment, and fled in confusion over the hills. The exact strength of the enemy could not be ascertained, but, from the heavy matchlock fire kept up, their numbers must have been considerable. After the position had been taken, the detachment returned to Draband without molestation.

Our loss in this affair was heavy (*see* Appendix A), but, owing to the strength of the enemy's position, this was to be expected. The enemy's loss was subsequently ascertained to have been seventeen killed and thirty-nine wounded.

The gallant conduct of the troops engaged in this affair received the

*Expedition
against the
Shiranis in
1853.*

expression of the approbation both of the Governor-General in Council and of the Commander-in-Chief.

After this affair it was resolved to follow the Shiranis into their own hills, and punish them severely. Orders were accordingly issued, and a force, as per margin (*see Appendix B*), consisting of 2,795 of all ranks, under Brigadier J. S. Hodgson, commanding the Punjab Irregular Force, was assembled at Draband (*see Map, p. 592*), on the morning of the 30th of March, and no time was lost in arranging for an immediate advance. The 5th Punjab Cavalry had been sent out to the frontier previously, with orders to

No. 2 Punjab Light Field Battery.
Detachment, Garrison Artillery.
5th Punjab Cavalry.
Sind Camel Corps.
Wing, 1st Punjab Infantry.
Wing, 3rd Punjab Infantry.
2nd Police Battalion.
6th Police Battalion.

patrol day and night in front of the Shirani country, to prevent the enemy having any knowledge of our movements.

The orders for the troops were, that the cavalry and artillery should make their own arrangements for the carriage of grain for three days. The supplies for the men of the infantry regiments, etc., were to be carried under arrangements made by the civil officers, regimental *bazar* establishments being employed for issue. The men were to carry one day's provisions in their haversacks. No camp followers except those absolutely necessary were to be allowed to accompany the column. One camel and one servant were to be allowed to every two officers.

The fighting strength of the Shirani tribe was at this time believed to be from four to five thousand men, and it became a matter of serious importance to divide and distract it by threatening several passes at the same time, and occupying the attention of those collected to the southward, while arrangements were made to enter the Shirani country by the Shekh Haidar pass, some twelve miles to the north of the Draband Zam. This was successfully accomplished by encamping the whole force on the 30th opposite the Draband pass, and making the same evening demonstrations before it and the Chaudwan pass, twelve miles to the south, where a body of the enemy had collected to oppose our entrance.

At midnight on the 30th Brigadier Hodgson moved on the Shekh Haidar pass, leaving the camp standing, under Ensign W. H. Paget, 5th Punjab Cavalry, with a detachment of the 5th Punjab Cavalry, and of the 2nd Police Battalion, with guards from the different regiments. The column entered the pass a little after daybreak on the morning of the 31st of March. The heights on either side of the defile were at once crowned by the four companies of the 1st Punjab Infantry, without any opposition, and the column then advanced. Wherever the route of the column was commanded by heights, they were immediately crowned by infantry. Adopting these precautions, the force steadily progressed, and reached the village of Drazand, or Kotkai, unmolested, at 5 P.M. On making a reconnaissance, the village was found to be deserted, and was immediately taken possession of, and the troops bivouacked in its neighbourhood.

Shortly after leaving Draband heavy rain fell, continuing for five hours, and it was doubtful at one time if the troops could move up the pass on account of the torrent. Great difficulties of ground were encountered, and the whole march, a distance of twenty-five miles, took seventeen hours to accomplish; if the enemy had offered any opposition, much loss must have occurred. The absence of opposition can only be accounted for on the suppo-

sition that the enemy expected the force to enter by the Draband or by the Chaudwan pass, and were thus unprepared to oppose the entrance so much to the north. To conceal our intentions to the last, a demonstration in front of the Draband Zam had been made at daylight on the 31st, in order to distract the enemy's attention.

The village of Drazand was found to be very strong, surrounded by a breastwork, defended by eleven towers, and containing 300 houses substantially built, which gave shelter to 1,200 inhabitants.

The following day, the 1st of April, the 3rd Punjab Infantry were moved to the Draband pass to hold it, and to improve the road for the passage of artillery, as well as to open communications with Draband. At the same time the troops, as per margin, were employed in destroying the Shirani villages

*Expedition
against the
Shirani in
1853.*

within a circumference of eight miles of Drazand, strict injunctions being given to respect women and children, and all mosques and shrines.

1st Column.

5th Punjab Cavalry	...	20 sabres.
Sind Camel Corps	...	100 bayonets.
1st Punjab Infantry	...	100 "
6th Police Battalion	...	200 "

The first column, under Captain F. F. Bruce, Sind Camel Corps, effectually destroyed the villages of Wazir Kot, Murga, and the hamlets of Landai.

2nd Column.

6th Police Battalion	...	100 bayonets.
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3rd Column.

4th and 5th Punjab Cavalry,	20 sabres.
1st Punjab Infantry	...
6th Police Battalion	...

The second column, under the command of Lieutenant J. W. Younghusband, of the Police, secured the demolition of the village of Sharu.

The third column, under the immediate command of the Brigadier, effected the destruction of Dag, situated to the south of Drazand.

These several detachments rejoined the main column at Drazand before nightfall, when a report was received that the road over the Draband pass had been rendered practicable for guns. This, besides opening communications direct with the Draband post, ensured an easy and safe return for the force.

At 5 A.M. on the morning of the 2nd of April Brigadier Hodgson proceeded in command of the troops, as

5th Punjab Cavalry	...	100 sabres.
Sind Camel Corps	...	100 bayonets.
1st Punjab Infantry	...	300 "
6th Police Battalion	...	400 "

per margin, to destroy the villages to the extreme south of the Shirani country and situated to the westward of the Chaudwan pass.

The column arrived on the crest of the ridge facing Landi, the village and stronghold of Rahmat Khan, a Shirani chief, about 9 A.M. This was immediately taken possession of by a detachment of the Sind Camel Corps, and set on fire.

Detachments, under the command respectively of Lieutenants C. P. Keyes and E. J. Travers, 1st Punjab Infantry, and Akbar Shah, 6th Police Battalion, were directed upon the villages of Spina Tangi, China, and Shekhmela, all of which were taken with scarcely any opposition, and entirely destroyed. Small parties of the enemy hovered about and fired long shots. As the troops retired, the enemy attempted to harass the column, but were held in check by the rear guard, under Lieutenant Keyes, when they suffered some loss themselves without inflicting any on the troops. The column arrived at Drazand before nightfall, having marched two and twenty miles during the day.

Simultaneously with these operations, one hundred and fifty men, all

*Expedition
against the
Shirani in
1853.*

of the Babar* tribe, and British subjects, under their chiefs, Dado and Muhammad Gul, entered the Chaudwan pass, and, by direction of the Deputy Commissioner, co-operated by destroying the village of Saidal, situated about eight miles within the pass. They bivouacked that night within the Shirani country, and the next morning returned to Chaudwan.

During the 2nd the troops left at Drazand had mined and blown up the towers, and, with the exception of one solitary building (a mosque), had razed the village to the ground.

The following day the troops returned to Draband by the pass of that name, and, although a few of the enemy showed themselves, not a single shot was fired at the column.

Though the force had been in the enemy's country for three days, it returned after having accomplished, in a very unmistakable manner, the object of the expedition without the loss of a single soldier or camp follower. Although the Shiranis had had time to drive their herds into the interior before the approach of the troops, and no captures had consequently been made, the punishment of the tribe had been complete, their country had been overrun, and their principal villages had been destroyed. The extraordinary absence of all opposition was attributed by Major Nicholson to a jealousy between the northern and southern divisions of the tribe, which prevented them from combining.

In his despatch, the Brigadier spoke very highly of the conduct of the troops, and specially mentioned the following officers:—

Captain W. R. Prout, Brigade Major.

„ F. F. Bruce, Sind Camel Corps.

„ H. Hammond, Artillery.

Lieutenant S. W. Stokes, Artillery.

„ C. P. Keyes, 1st Punjab Infantry.

„ B. Henderson, 3rd Punjab Infantry.

„ J. W. Younghusband, Police.

„ H. Bruce, 5th Punjab Cavalry.

Ensign W. H. Paget, 5th Punjab Cavalry.

Brigadier Hodgson also alluded to the able, zealous, and energetic co-operation he had received from Major J. Nicholson, the Deputy Commissioner, and to the good arrangements for supplies made by Lieutenant A. L. Busk, Assistant Commissioner.

The satisfaction of the Governor-General in Council at the successful result of the expedition was subsequently conveyed to Brigadier Hodgson and the troops employed under him.

The Indian medal, with a clasp for the “North-West Frontier”, was granted, in 1869, to all survivors of the troops engaged in the above operations against the Shiranis under Brigadier J. S. Hodgson.

G.G.O No. 812 of
1869.

* The Babars are a tribe of Shirani stock, though now quite separate from the Shiranis proper. They are divided into two sections, one living wholly within our border, the other holding the hill country opposite, but on the other side of the Suliman range. The two have now little connection with each other. The Babars of the plain hold some 180 square miles in the Dera Ismail Khan district, Chaudwan being their chief town. They are a civilised tribe, and are much addicted to commerce, being one of the richest, quietest, and most honest tribes of the sub-Suliman plains.

After the expedition above related, the conduct of the Shiranis occasioned comparatively little trouble, and Katal Khan's son, Azim, became anxious to be considered a well-wisher of the Government. He undertook to prevent any small expeditions being organised in his portion of the tribe, and not to allow any marauders to pass through his country. On one occasion he joined in the pursuit of a party of raiders who had carried off cattle near Chaudwan, and assisted in recovering the booty.

*Conduct of the
Shiranis from
1853 to 1882.*

The Shirani tribe, however, continued systematically to give shelter to criminal refugees from British territory, and, though professing to be on friendly terms with the Government, steadily allowed these outlaws, together with bad characters of their own tribe, to commit depredations on British territory, and more especially on the Gandapur* border.

In the early part of 1873, the Gandapur chief, Muhammad Guldad Khan, was called upon by the Government to act up to his border responsibilities, and he was informed that the Government would look to him for their fulfilment in future. This chief succeeded in bringing such influence to bear on one of the branches of the Shiranis, viz., the Sen Khel, that they went in force and brought back from the Khidarzais, a small but troublesome section of the Uba Khel branch, three Hindus who had been kidnapped from British territory by outlaws and carried off to the Shirani hills, and restored them to the British Government.

Efforts were at the same time made to break up the band of outlaws, the leaders of which were principally Gandapurs. These efforts were successful, and the headman of this band came in and surrendered unconditionally to the Deputy Commissioner, and was fined Rs. 3,000.

The party opposed to the Gandapur chief were, however, making secret but strenuous efforts to keep up the old state of excitement on this border. In April 1874 a Hindu boy mysteriously disappeared from Kulachi, and was shortly afterwards heard of at Murga, in Sen Khel limits, where he was either put to death or died. In the following August an attempt was made by a party of three or four men of the Khidarzai section to carry off a Hindu child from Draband; they were, however, thwarted in their object by the parents of the child, and fled, but not before they mortally wounded both father and mother.

As members of both the Sen Khel and Uba Khel Shiranis had thus misbehaved and openly violated British territory, it became necessary to enforce the principle that it is by means of the majority of the tribe that visit the plains that the plundering minority in the hills is controlled by Government.

Accordingly, in September 1874, a large Sen Khel convoy was seized at Kulachi, and fifty-four members of this branch were taken prisoners and lodged in the jail at Dera Ismail Khan. The value of their convoy amounted to Rs. 3,000. At the same time seventeen Uba Khels with their property were seized at Draband, and lodged in the jail at Dera.

The *jirgas* of the two branches came in at once, and soon came to terms. A fine of Rs. 1,500 was imposed on the Sen Khels for the disappearance of the Hindu child from Kulachi, and a fine of Rs. 1,000 was imposed on the

* The Gandapurs are a *Syad* tribe of Ustarana stock settled in British territory. They hold the whole of the north-western part of trans-Indus Dera Ismail Khan, east and south of Tank, comprising an area of 460 square miles abutting on the Suliman range on the west. The town of Kulachi is their head-quarters. They were originally a poor *Pawindah* and pastoral tribe, but they now cultivate more extensively than any of the other Dera Ismail Khan tribes. They still engage in the *Pawindah* traffic.

*Conduct of
the Shiranis
from 1853
to 1882.*

Uba Khels for the Draband crime. Both branches were required to enter into engagements in which they acknowledged their responsibility in future for all crimes committed in British territory by members of their tribe, or by anyone dwelling in their hills. The Uba Khels specially undertook to be responsible for the future good conduct of the Khidarzai section of their branch. This agreement was ratified on the 11th of November 1874, in the presence of the *jirgas* of both branches of the tribe.

The hopeful objects of the friendly relations entered into with the Shirani tribe were, however, well-nigh frustrated in March 1875 by the misconduct of the Gandapur chief, Muhammad Guldad Khan, who, taking advantage of the confidence reposed in him in connection with these relations to prosecute schemes of his own within the Shirani hills, secretly committed himself by endeavouring to erect a fort in Shirani territory and by annexing lands. His misconduct brought down upon his dependents who were thus employed a grievous retaliation and the loss of fifteen lives—the Shiranis in a large body having attacked the Gandapur workmen at daybreak on the 22nd of March 1875, and effectively prevented any further prosecution of Muhammad Guldad Khan's unauthorised projects. A severe punishment followed in the deposition of the chief, in pecuniary reparation to the families of the slain from his allowances, and in the suspension of several native officials in Government employ who neglected to report, or who secretly connived at, the chief's reckless schemings. In consequence of the unfriendly attitude assumed by the Shiranis in this affair, and more especially for not having informed the Deputy Commissioner of the state of things before taking the law into their own hands, the tribe was prohibited from entering British territory. No attempt was made by them to molest the border in retaliation, and in December 1875 it was considered that the tribe, which had acted under grave provocation, had been sufficiently punished, and they were accordingly re-admitted to friendly relations with the British Government.

From 1875 to 1882 the behaviour of the Shiranis continued to be good, and they gave no trouble on our border. Throughout the year 1882, however, their conduct was not so satisfactory. During that year, men belonging to the tribe committed numerous offences against British subjects, which were principally acts of the normal character of border crime, such as thefts, and robberies of cattle. More serious misdeeds were the murder of a Hindu woman and the mischievous destruction of a water-mill and an irrigation dam. In October 1882 the account for compensation due from the tribe, after deducting the value of the property recovered, amounted to Rs. 2,265. A settlement of the account was demanded in that month; the Sen Khels and Uba Khels met the demand by professions of inability to coerce the offenders, while the Chuhar Khel section refused to send their representatives to confer with the British authorities. No other course was therefore open in order to obtain satisfaction from the Shiranis than to put pressure on the tribe.

Accordingly, a blockade was declared with effect from the 1st of January 1883. Simultaneously the military frontier post of Draband was slightly strengthened, and the post at Shah Alam, situated half-way between Draband and the large village of Chaudwan, and hitherto held by border police and militia, was for the time occupied by regular troops. Their exclusion from British territory, and deprivation of trade with the Dera Ismail Khan district, soon began to be felt by the Shiranis, who throughout the six months of the blockade, with a few exceptions, refrained from retaliatory incursions, and bore

their punishment quietly. The Commissioner had been authorised to accept the submission of the tribe on the basis of payment of the compensation due at the date of submission, and of unreserved acceptance of full and joint tribal responsibility; the compensation payable was to be composed of the sum due on the date of the imposition of the blockade, and such additional compensation as might have accrued for any offences committed during the time the tribe was excluded from British territory. As the main object of the coercive measures against the Shiranis was to enforce and signalise tribal responsibility, the Lieutenant-Governor considered that a fine, in addition to compensation for past offences, was unnecessary, provided the purpose of the blockade was attained. *Blockade of the Shiranis in 1883.*

On the 15th of July 1883 the Shirani *jirga* came into Dera Ismail Khan and made their submission. They agreed in writing to the following conditions :—

- 1st. To pay Rs. 2,530-3-0 due on account of compensation for offences committed by the tribe. Any stolen property that could be produced to be handed over in lieu of so much of this sum as represented its value.
- 2nd. To repair the Chaudwan dam and the water-mill which were burnt and destroyed by the tribe.
- 3rd. As regards future offences, to restore the property stolen, or to point out the offenders or the property when they came down to the plains, and make them over to the Government within three months from the date of the offence.
- 4th. To expel outlaws who, having committed offences in British territory, might seek refuge in the Shirani country.
- 5th. To accept the principle of joint responsibility in such matters.

The terms were considered fully to satisfy the requirements of the Government, and orders were accordingly given for the raising of the blockade, and the tribe was once again admitted into friendly relations.

Survey expedition to the Takht-i-Suliman mountain, in 1883.

The desirability of exploring and surveying the Takht-i-Suliman mountain had long been recognised by the British Government, and as far back as 1877 it was recorded that the Governor-General in Council was prepared to sanction the exploration of the Takht whenever the local authorities might consider that this could be effected without undue risk.

In 1882 the Surveyor-General of India represented to the Punjab Government the desirability of an officer of the Survey Department being permitted to visit this country for the purpose of taking observations, urging that the summit of the peaks of the Takht commanded a view of the country to the west for a very considerable distance up to the hill range in the vicinity of the road from Quetta to Kandahar, and stating that very little was known of the country, which was usually represented in the latest and best maps

Survey expedition to the Takht-i-Suliman in 1883.

of Afghanistan as a *terra incognita*. The Surveyor-General further pointed out that during fairly clear weather a very large number of points could be fixed, and observations taken in this region, which would be of much value for geographical purposes, and which would pair with as yet unpaired observations taken from the high peaks on the western frontier of the country of the Mahsud Waziris, which had been visited by Major T. H. Holdich, Royal Engineers, and other officers during the Expedition of 1881 (*see* Chap. XV).

The Government of the Punjab, in reply, intimated that if the expedition could be undertaken with reasonable safety, it would be sanctioned; and Major Holdich, in communication with the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan, submitted proposals, approved by the Commissioner of the Derajat, for a scheme which, it was thought, would satisfy the conditions imposed; but, owing to the Shirani tribe being then under blockade, as above related, it was considered desirable to postpone the expedition till matters were settled with the tribe.

After the submission of the Shiranis, and the final settlement had been made with the tribe, the question of the exploration of the Takht was again considered, and the Lieutenant-Governor strongly recommended that the expedition should be carried out on two conditions—

1st. That the tribe should give their consent.

2nd. That they should give hostages for maintaining a quiet attitude while the exploration was being carried out.

The Lieutenant-Governor considered that, in order to provide against possible contingencies, and also as a preventive measure, a strong body of troops should go with the expedition, an escort from which should accompany the surveyors, a considerable reserve being detained at the foot of the hills. The strength of this force, as proposed by Brigadier-General T. G. Kenendy, commanding the Punjab Frontier Force, was one mountain battery, 1,500 bayonets, and 100 sabres (if fodder was plentiful). The best time of the year for the expedition was considered to be from the 15th of October to the 15th of November, as there would be less fear of snow then than at a later date.

These recommendations and proposals were sanctioned by the Supreme Government, but it was not until the middle of November that the force was ready to enter the hills. It was decided to adopt the more circuitous route by the Shekh Haidar pass, in preference to the direct road by the Draband Zam, and to make the ascent of the Takht-i-Suliman mountain from its western base by a pathway up a spur known as the Pazai path. This route presented only one known difficulty, and this was at a point where the Zao pass was partially blocked by a great fallen rock. *Pawindah* camels surmounted this obstacle annually, and the route was said to be practicable for laden hill camels. The civil authorities had succeeded in making satisfactory arrangements with the Shiranis who had given hostages, as demanded, for the quiet behaviour of the tribe during the expedition. The only section which had failed to attend when summoned was the Khidarzai.

This troublesome section belongs properly to the Uba Khel branch of the tribe, but they are located among the Chuhar Khels, and are practically more connected with them than with the former.

Of the hostages given (one hundred in number), half were to remain at Draband, and the other half were to be with the expeditionary force.

On the 15th of November the troops to accompany the survey party

marched from Dera Ismail Khan, and reached Draband in three marches. On the 18th, the force, strength as per margin, under the command of Brigadier-General T. G. Kennedy, C.B., crossed the frontier and encamped at Kot Guldad (*see* Map, p. 592). Mr. S. S. Thorburn, C.S., the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan, accompanied the expedition as Political Officer, and Major T. H. Holdich, Royal Engineers, was in charge of the survey operations. An officer of the Geological Survey was also attached to the force.

Survey expedition to the Takht-i-Suliman in 1883.

No. 4 (Hazara) Mountain Battery.
1st Punjab Cavalry, 42 sabres.
1st Sikh Infantry, 500 bayonets.
4th Punjab Infantry, 500 "
5th Punjab Infantry, 496 "

The expedition was equipped with mule transport only, but fifteen days' supplies were carried from Draband on hill camels,* hired from *Pawindahs* of the Nasir tribe.

On the 19th the force marched to Gandera Kach, seventeen miles beyond our border at the eastern end of the Zao pass, in which was the obstruction already referred to. The following day was spent in making the road in advance through the pass, which was found to be more formidable than had been expected. The Dabarra rock appeared at first an almost insurmountable obstacle, but before nightfall the road had been made practicable for mules; but it took the whole of the following day to get the laden camels through, most of which had to be unloaded and reloaded on either side of the rock which blocked the road.† On the 22nd the force moved through the defile, which is four miles long, and encamped at its further or western end, and the following day marched fourteen miles to Kach Mazrai. Here it was reported that the force would probably be opposed at the Pazai *kotal*, and that a body of Shiranis, about 300 in number, composed chiefly of Khidarzais, was assembled to dispute the passage of the troops.

On the 24th the column moved to Wazdana, and the next day reached the Pazai springs, situated about midway between the plain to the west of the Takht and a *kotal* of the range, at the north end of which is the Kaisarghar, the highest peak of the Takht-i-Suliman range. This *kotal*, over which the road to the Takht lay, was found to be held as reported, and to be a formidable position. The following dispositions were accordingly made to dislodge the enemy. A flank attack under Colonel H. C. P. Rice, 1st Sikhs, with 540 bayonets,‡ was ordered to leave camp at 2.30 A.M. on the 26th, to turn the enemy's left; and a front attack, under Colonel C. S. Maclean, C.B., 1st Punjab Cavalry, with 4 guns and 540 bayonets,§ was to leave camp at 6 A.M. The reserve of both attacks, 416 bayonets, under Major C. K. Mackinnon, 5th Punjab Infantry, was to remain with the Brigadier-General in camp, from which both attacks would be to a great extent visible.

These operations were accordingly carried out on the 26th of November. The turning movement, extending over a circuit of about six miles, was

* These camels were mostly females, and proved well adapted for this kind of work. Mr. Thorburn says that they went over the bad ground like goats.

† The difficulty here experienced was due chiefly to the large space (nearly eight feet) required by the camels loaded with uncompressed *bhusa*. For a hill expedition where narrow defiles have to be passed, compressed *bhusa* only should be carried.

Survey expedition to the Takht-i-Suliman in 1883.

admirably executed by Colonel Rice. The front attack carried the advanced positions of the enemy after a slight opposition, and, as their last and almost inaccessible position was reached, Colonel Rice appeared on the heights above and on the left rear of it, when it was at once abandoned, and the front attack pushing through it, the *kotal* was taken. The enemy was followed up in different directions by both columns until nothing more could be seen of them, and then Colonel Maclean returned to hold and bivouac at the *kotal*, and Colonel Rice retired to the camp. The only casualties on our side in this little affair were two men of the 4th Punjab Infantry slightly wounded. The enemy were said to have numbered between 300 and 400, and their loss was estimated at about fifteen killed and wounded, among the former being two Khidarzai *maliks* of note.

From the *kotal* Colonel Maclean with his column was entrusted with the actual escort of the survey operations. The remainder of the troops were in reserve in camp at the Pazai springs, and a picquet for the protection of the road was placed half-way between the two positions, and was visible from both.

The height of the camp at Pazai was 5,750 feet, and of the bivouac on the *kotal*, which was three miles distant, 8,600 feet. The ascent was steep, and the last part of it very rough. The upper position was dependent on the camp for its water supply, which was sent up on mules.

The mountain known as the Takht-i-Suliman was found to consist of two parallel ridges, running roughly north and south, the southern end of the eastern ridge culminating in a point 11,070 feet high, which is the Takht proper, and the western ridge culminating at its northern end in a point 11,300 feet, known as Kaisarghar or Ubashta. Between these two ridges is the *maidan*, a level tableland about 9,000 feet, above the level of the sea. Both this *maidan* and the interior slopes of the ridge are, except in places where it is too precipitous, covered with pine forests. As the mountain is of hard limestone formation, the soil is not retentive of moisture, and owing to this, and to a long continued drought, no water could be discovered, which added very greatly to the difficulties of the survey, as all water had to be brought up from the camp at Pazai.

On the 27th a reconnaissance towards the northern peak (the Kaisarghar) was made, and proved the road to be impracticable for mules, so that all requirements for any advance beyond the *kotal* had to be carried by men.

Major Holdich decided that it would be sufficient for the survey party to ascend the northern peak only, as the fixed survey point on the Takht proper was inaccessible, and a good substitute for that point could be found without ascending that peak.

On the 28th of November, leaving 100 bayonets to hold the Pazai *kotal*, a detachment of 200 bayonets for the ascent of the northern peak, carrying one day's food and water, and a second party of 200 men, carrying another day's food and water for their comrades, moved out seven miles towards the northern peak and bivouacked there, the carriers returning to camp.


On the 29th the advanced party marched four miles, and then climbing 2,300 feet, crowned the northern peak, and—the survey therefrom completed—returned and bivouacked at its foot.

On the following day this party returned to the camp, Colonel Maclean himself remaining at the *kotal* to organise a further survey escort for the neighbouring heights from a fresh detachment of 200 bayonets of the 5th Punjab

MAP
OF PART OF THE
SHIRANI COUNTRY
to illustrate
THE OPERATIONS OF THE FORCE
under
BRIGADIER-GENERAL HOLGSON
in 1853;
and the route followed by the
SURVEY EXPEDITION
to the
TAKHT-I-SULIMAN
in 1883.

REFERENCES.

Route of Expedition 1853.....
" " " " 1883.....



Infantry, under Major C. K. Mackinnon, furnished from camp for the purpose. *Survey expedition to the Takht-i-Suliman in 1883.*

On the 1st of December, the whole of the survey requirements having been satisfied during the day, the troops returned to the camp at Pazai by sunset. During this day reports were received that reinforcements were being sent to the hostile Shiranis by the Kakar and Mandu Khel tribes, and accordingly the 4th Punjab Infantry, under Major A. J. D. Hawes, was detached to meet a convoy of four days' supplies which was then on its way to the force, with orders to remain at Kach Mazrai until the arrival of the rest of the troops on the following day; and by that time it was reported that the reinforcements had dispersed on hearing that the Shiranis themselves were no longer opposing us.

On the 2nd of December the return march was commenced, and on the 6th the frontier was re-crossed. It was necessary for the force to return by the same route as it advanced, in order to meet the additional supplies which had been sent out for its use, as, owing to the advance having been delayed at the Zao pass, the fifteen days' supplies taken with the force had been exhausted.

On the 8th the force arrived at Dera Ismail Khan, and was at once broken up, and thus ended a very successful, but extremely arduous, expedition.

In forwarding the report of the above survey expedition, the Lieutenant-Governor considered that it reflected great credit on Brigadier-General T. G. Kennedy, C.B., and the officers with the force; and he more especially brought to notice the names of Colonels C. S. Maclean, C.B., and H. C. P. Rice, and also that of Mr. S. S. Thorburn, the Political Officer with the troops, whose management of the Shirani tribe considerably lessened opposition, and whose good arrangements for supplies were prominently brought to notice by Brigadier-General Kennedy.

The Lieutenant-Governor also referred to the excellent conduct and soldier-like spirit with which all ranks endured unusual hardship, cold, and exposure, and overcame all difficulties, which was shown by the fact that the men willingly went without their bedding for some days in winter on a mountain 11,000 feet high, and carried supplies and water for long distances, sometimes upwards of seven miles, for themselves and their comrades, in order that the object of the expedition might be attained.

The conduct of the Shirani and Ustarana tribes at the present time continues to be satisfactory.

APPENDIX A.

Return of Killed and Wounded in the affair in the Draband pass, on the 14th of March 1853.

Corps.	Killed.					Wounded.					Remarks.
	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	
5th Punjab Cavalry	1	1	2	2	One horse was killed and seven wounded. *Capt. F. F. Bruce and Ensign C. H. Palliser.
Sind Camel Corps	4	4	*2	1	2	10	15	
Total	5	5	2	1	2	12	17	

ABSTRACT.

Killed	5
Wounded	17
Total	22

APPENDIX B.

Composition of the force employed in the operations against the Shiranis in 1853.

Brigadier J. S. Hodgson, commanding.

Staff.

Captain W. R. Prout, Staff Officer.

Artillery.

No. 2 Punjab Light Field Battery, Captain H. Hammond, commanding.
Detachment, Garrison Artillery, Lieutenant S. W. Stokes, commanding.

Cavalry.

5th Punjab Cavalry, Lieutenant H. Bruce, commanding.

Infantry.

Sind Camel Corps, Captain F. F. Bruce, commanding.
Wing, 1st Punjab Infantry, Lieutenant C. P. Keyes, commanding.
Wing, 3rd Punjab Infantry, Lieutenant B. Henderson, commanding.
2nd and 6th Police Battalion, Lieutenant J. W. Younghusband, commanding.

Political Officers.

Major J. Nicholson, Deputy Commissioner.
Lieutenant A. L. Busk, Assistant Commissioner.

Detail of troops.

Corps.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	Non-Commissioned Officers.	Rank and file.	Total number of fighting men.	Ordnance		Remarks
						9-pr. guns.	24-pr. howitzers.	
Staff	3	3	
No. 2 Punjab Light Field Battery...	1	2	5	48	56	2	1	
Detachment, Garrison Artillery	1	1	12	14	
5th Punjab Cavalry	1	8	14	98	121	
Sind Camel Corps	3	6	81	573	663	
Wing, 1st Punjab Infantry	2	8	47	374	431	
Wing, 3rd Punjab Infantry	2	7	48	386	443	
3rd Police Battalion	1	11	40	308	360	
6th Police Battalion	18	70	603	691	
Brigadier's escort, 4th Punjab Cavalry	...	1	2	10	13	
Total	13	62	308	2,412	2,795	2	1	

CHAPTER XVIII.

DERA GHAZI KHAN BORDER.

KASRANI, BOZDAR, KHOSA, LAGHARI, AND KHETRAN TRIBES.

Kasranis.
Bozdars.

THE *Kasranis* are a Biluch tribe who inhabit the extreme north of the Dera Ghazi Khan district, a portion of the south of the Dera Ismail Khan district, and the hills to the immediate west of these tracts. They are the most northern of the Biluch tribes. They are said to be descended from one Kasra, Rind Biluch. The tribe is a poor one, and is divided into seven clans, the *Lasharani*, *Khubdin*, *Budani*, *Vaswani*, *Laghari*, *Jarwar*, and *Rustamani*, none of which are important.

In the last census (1881) the number of Kasranis in British territory was 4,418. It is difficult to estimate the number of this tribe in the hills, but this is considerably less than those in the plains, and the total number of fighting men in the tribe is probably not more than 1,500.

The Kasranis have large herds of cattle grazing on the sandy plain between Kot Kasrani and Vihowa, which affords good pasturage; and a large portion of the tribe reside in small detached temporary villages along the foot of the hills, near the mouths of the passes, into which they take their cattle for water, being on good terms with their own fraternity in the hills. A portion of the tribe also cultivate land near the river irrigated by wells.

They were formerly described as a very predatory race; but of their feuds, etc., there is no information, and very little seems to be known of their history before annexation.

The *Bozdars* are a Biluch tribe situated beyond our frontier to the south of the Kasranis. They are bounded on the east by British territory, on the south by the country of the Khosas, Lagharis, and Khetrans, on the west by the Lunis* and the Musa Khel Pathans, and on the north by the Isots, Ustaranas, and Kasranis.

The Bozdars are of Rind extraction, and are said to be an offshoot of the Lagharis; they are divided into the *Dulani*, *Ladwani*, *Ghulamani*, *Chakrani*,

* The *Lunis* are a tribe of Pathans who were until quite lately entirely nomads; their tents were their homes; they had no fixed settlements; and their movements were entirely regulated by the state of the hills and plains as to forage and water. The Lunis are excellent soldiers and fine men. Formerly they are stated to have numbered no less than 3,000 fighting men, but of late years they have been much weakened by feuds with the Bozdars, the Khetrans, and the Marris, and their fighting strength is now probably considerably less than the above. The Lunis are on friendly terms with their northern neighbours, the Musa Khels.

Sihani, Shahwani, Jalalani, Jafirani, and Rustamani clans. Their fighting strength is estimated at 2,700, and, unlike all other Biluchis, they fight with the matchlock rather than with the sword. They are more civilised than most of the trans-frontier tribes, and are of all the Biluchis the strictest Musalmans. They are great graziers, and their name is said to be derived from the Persian *buz*, a goat, as they were formerly famous for the immense number of sheep and goats which they possessed.

According to the last census, there are about 2,000 Bozdars in British territory; these live in scattered villages about Rajanpur and among the Lagharis, and have no connection with the parent tribe.

The Bozdar country is entirely mountainous, being formed of the outer spurs of the Suliman range. The main spurs run down from the parent range with a direction generally easterly, and instead of sinking gradually into the plains, they split into successive ridges, running north and south, connected with each other by a distinct water-shed, but having the appearance from the plains of forming three separate ranges. These curious parallel and knife-edged spurs are divided from each other by the main drainage lines of the country, which run east and west. These are called the Drug, Lundi, Saunra, Sori, and Vidor passes, of which only the Lundi extends beyond and to the west of the third range. The main ravines have generally more or less water in them, but the lesser ones seldom or never, except after rain. There is another peculiarity in the Bozdar hills, which, however, is common to the whole border from Sind to Bannu, namely, the narrow defiles called *tokhs*, running north and south between what may be described as enormous walls, so precipitously do the hills rise on either side. By these *tokhs* there is communication from the northernmost to the southernmost point of the Bozdar country, and it would be quite possible for a marauding band of northern Bozdars to go by them and raid in the southernmost part of the Khosa country without entering the plains at all in coming and going; but though continuous, the route is by no means direct, as the road follows the ravines, though preserving a general direction north and south.

The greater portion of the tribe are situated between the first and second ranges; the Ghulamani section inhabit the Majvel valley, north of, and contiguous to, the Khetran country. The road between the Majvel and the main valley is through a very narrow pass, called Saunra.

The language, dress, and food of the Bozdars are the same as of other Biluch tribes. Owing to their strictness with regard to their religious observances, a large number of priests and *Syads* reside in their lands, and consequently a few mosques, built of mud, or thatch, are to be seen here and there. They are, however, by no means fanatical, nor do they seem to have any hatred to the British rule.

The Bozdars are constantly at feud with their northern neighbours, the Ustaranas, and also with the Khetrans on their south.

In former times the Bozdars had always a turbulent character; and being so powerful, and living in such close proximity to the border, previous Governments found it politic to bestow a yearly allowance on the chiefs, in order to give them a certain hold over the tribe.

Thus it appears, as far back as the reign of Akbar, they received an allowance of eighty *maunds* of grain per annum. Under the Sikh rule, they repeatedly carried fire and sword into the Dera Ghazi Khan district. The Sikh ruler, Sawan Mal of Multan, in vain endeavoured to repel them by force:

Khosas.
Lagharis.

so he built a fort at Mangrotha, and granted an allowance to the Bozdar chief. In return for this, the chief was to guard his passes and to reimburse sufferers for any plunder of property conveyed by those routes. But such conditions could not be rigidly enforced under Sikh rule.

The *Khosas* are a Biluch tribe occupying territory within and beyond our border, having the Kasranis on the north, the Lagharis on the south, and the Bozdars on the west. Their territory in the plains extends from the foot of the hills nearly across to the river. They do not occupy all the land within these bounds, but are scattered about in patches. A certain number of this tribe are settled in Bhawalpur, and they also hold extensive lands in Sind, which were granted to them by Hamayun in return for military services.

The Khosas are divided into six clans, *Babelani*, *Jaggel*, *Jandani*, *Jarwar*, *Isani*, and *Mahrwani*, of which the Babelani and the Isani are the most important. The number of this tribe in the Dera Ghazi Khan district, according to the last census, was 11,308, and the total fighting strength of the tribe is estimated at 4,000. They are true Rinds, and were formerly one of the most powerful and influential tribes on this border. They are very independent of their chief, and are admitted to be among the bravest of the Biluchis. Many of their number have done good service in the ranks of the British army. Their internal disputes have, however, reduced the tribe to political insignificance, although their industrious habits make them one of the wealthiest tribes on this border.

The Khosas live almost wholly in the plains, and only the Halatis and the Jajelas—sections of the Isani clan—live beyond the border. The lands of the tribe depend entirely on the water in the mountain streams, with that collected in the different ponds, and on occasional rain, for irrigation; and in seasons of drought the tribe is under the necessity of deserting their own for other lands nearer to Dera Ghazi Khan. Some of the tribe are graziers, and have numerous flocks. Occasionally feuds break out between the Khosas and their neighbours, the Bozdars and the Lagharis; but they are friendly with the Khetrans. In 1848, when the Multan war broke out, Kaora Khan, the chief of this tribe, besieged and took Dera Ghazi Khan from the Sikhs, and handed it over to Lieutenant H. B. Edwardes. He accompanied that officer, with about 300 of his clansmen, to the siege of Multan, and behaved splendidly throughout.*

The *Lagharis* are located on our border to the south of the Khosas, extending as far as the Gurchani limits, and are bounded on the west by the Khetrans.

They are a Biluch tribe of pure Rind origin, and are divided into four sections, the *Hadiani*, *Aliani*, *Bughlani*, and *Haibatani*; of which the first inhabit the hills beyond our border, and the others are located within our territory. The Hadianis are nomadic, and inveterate thieves. They are a wild section, and difficult to manage, and their depredations extend far and wide in the neighbouring hills.

The chief of the Laghari tribe belongs to the Aliani clan. The famous

* See *A Year on the Punjab Frontier*, by Major Herbert B. Edwardes.

shrine of Sakhi Sarwar is within the Laghari limits. Their principal passes are the Sakhi Sarwar, Choti, and Kura. The fighting strength of this tribe is estimated at 3,700.

The Laghari and Khetran chiefs' families have been for many years connected by marriage; for which reason, among others, the Laghari chief possesses great influence with the Khetran tribe. The late chief, Jamal Khan, was a very enterprising man, and his services were largely utilised by successive district officers. He died in 1881, and was succeeded by his son, Muhammad Khan, who is now the most wealthy chief in the whole district.

During the Sikh rule, the Lagharis were greatly favoured by Sawan Mal as a counterpoise to the Khosas and Gurchanis, and consequently, when the rebellion broke out in 1848, they were found arrayed against the British, and amongst the warmest supporters of Mulraj, till, finding his the losing side, they deserted him.

The *Khetrans* are an independent tribe, living beyond the Lagharis. They are bounded on the north by the Luni Pathans, on the east by the Lagharis and Gurchanis, and on the south by the Marris. Their original settlement was at Vihowa, in the country of the Kasranis, where many of them still live and hold land between the Kasranis and the river. But the Emperor Akbar drove out the main body of the tribe, and they took refuge in the hills where they are now located. They are not pure Biluch, and are held by many to be Pathans; and they do in some cases intermarry with Pathans. But they confessedly resemble Biluchis in features, habits, and general appearance; the names of their sub-divisions, moreover, end in the Biluch termination, *ani*, and they are now for all practical purposes a Biluch tribe. They speak a language of their own, akin to Sindi and the Jatki dialect of the southern Punjab.

They are divided into four clans, *Gangura*, *Dariwal*, *Hasani*, and *Nahar*.* The fighting strength of the tribe is estimated at 2,250.†

The Khetrans are anything but a warlike tribe. They are all engaged in the cultivation of the soil; and the peculiar features of their country, which is composed of a succession of large valleys lying between parallel ranges of hills, the soil of which is of the most fertile description, renders their occupation a most remunerative one, and makes them one of the wealthiest tribes on the frontier. Grain is generally selling much cheaper with the Khetrans than it is in British territory: the consequence is that the neighbouring tribes buy from them; and hence it is that, although they sometimes have quarrels with them, they cannot afford to keep them up long.

The valleys in the Khetran country are dotted over with small mud forts, each the centre of a tract of cultivation; and wheat crops cover the country round.

* The *Hasanis* and *Nahars* are the remnants of old Biluch clans which have now ceased to exist as distinct tribes. The *Hasanis* were destroyed by perpetual wars with the Marris in the beginning of this century. In the map accompanying Pottinger's *Travels in Biluchistan* (1816) they are shown as occupying the northern part of the country now held by the Marris, and their ruined forts are still found there. The *Nahars* formerly occupied the country about Harrand, but having quarrelled with Ghazi Khan and the subsequent governors of Dera Ghazi Khan, they were at length defeated, and obliged to fly from the country, and took refuge with the Khetrans, where they have now settled down.

† Duke gives this number. MacGregor makes the number considerably greater, but he does not consider his estimate to be very trustworthy.

Khetrans.

The climate is considered good, being moderately hot and cold. In the spring and autumn a considerable amount of rain falls, which insures an ample supply of water for cultivation. Several streams also run through the Khetran country, most of which unite to form the Kaha, which issues from the mountains at Harrand.

They are not a plundering tribe themselves, but are the recipients of property stolen in British territory; and at one time, when there was a great deal of raiding going on, it was found that stolen camels were selling at Barkhan, or Haji Kot, their principal town, for Rs. 10 a head. They also afford protection to absconded criminals and others, whom they are glad to allow to fight and plunder for them. But the enforcement of pass responsibility on the Dera Ghazi Khan frontier has tended considerably to modify their conduct in these respects, and they are now fairly well behaved.

They have little or no intercourse with Sind, and the only raid they ever engaged in on that frontier was in conjunction with the Bugtis and Marris in the attack on Kasmor in April 1849.

The Khetrans, as already mentioned, are closely connected with the Lagharis, and they are also friendly with the Bugtis, but their relations with the Marris, Bozdars, Musa Khels, and Luni Pathans are not so good. They carry on a large trade with British territory by the Sakhi Sarwar and Choti passes, and this, combined with the fact that the country is completely open to the operations of troops, renders the coercion of the Khetrans an easy matter. Almost at any time a good seizure of the tribe could be made in British territory, and a blockade would in a short time paralyse their trade, and cause them great inconvenience.

Our relations with this tribe have been, since last year, carried on through the Governor-General's Agent in Biluchistan.

Expedition against the Kasranis, by a force under Brigadier J. S. Hodgson, in April 1853.

When the Multan outbreak took place in 1848, and Lieut. H. B. Edwardes took the field against Diwan Mulraj, Mita Khan, the Kasrani chief, took possession of the fort of Mangrotha, and ejected the *Diwan's* deputy. He then quietly waited to see how events would turn out, prepared to act his part accordingly; and when he saw the scale turning in favour of the British Government, he offered his services to Lieutenant Edwardes.

On annexation, he was confirmed in the grants which he had enjoyed under former rulers of the Punjab, which he seems to have done little to deserve; for he winked at raids and petty robberies by the hill portion of his tribe, and by his neighbours the Bozdars.

The conduct of the Kasranis after the annexation continued to be most unsatisfactory; the country round Dera Fateh Khan was continually harassed by them, and many hundred head of stolen cattle were conveyed through their passes into the interior.

At last the conduct of the tribe became so bad that, early in 1852, Major J. Nicholson, the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan, suggested that the Kasranis in the plains should be held responsible for the good conduct of their brethren in the hills.

Shortly after this, in March 1852, the Kasranis signalised themselves by

a most audacious attack on Dera Fateh Khan. One of their chiefs, named Yusaf Khan, held a village in British territory. From this village a subordinate (a fiscal *employé*) disappeared under suspicious circumstances. Yusaf Khan was summoned to answer, but did not appear. His brother was, however, found and sent in to the civil officer, when, in trying to escape from custody, he fell from a wall, and received injuries from which he died. Yusaf Khan then organised an expedition against Dera Fateh Khan, about twenty miles from the hills—a measure which had been once before adopted in the Sikh time—and, on the evening of the 16th of March 1852, about 300 Kasrani foot, with 40 horse, started from the Kaurah pass, and marching between the posts of Gurwali and Vihowa, arrived at Dera Fateh Khan at early dawn on the 17th. The force at the *thana* consisted of 14 horse and 19 foot, but it was not strong enough to offer much opposition; and the Kasranis plundered such portion of the *bazar* as was not under fire from the *thana*, and then retired, with the loss of three killed and one prisoner, but carrying off most of the cattle of the village. Our loss was five killed and three wounded, and in addition to this three horses were killed and five wounded.

The Kasranis in their retreat took a more southerly direction than in their advance, making for the road between Vihowa and Thata; to both of which posts, the most northerly of the Dera Ghazi Khan district, news of the attack had been sent by the *Thanadar*, who was following up the Kasranis, and collecting as many of the people of the country as he could as he went along. About seven miles south of Vihowa he was joined by the cavalry detachments from these outposts, when the force altogether mustered two native officers and 43 sabres of the 4th Punjab Cavalry and 39 horse and 60 foot of the levies.

The Kasranis had taken up a strong position behind an embankment, where they were out of fire. The *Thanadar* wanted to attack with the foot levies first, but the cavalry native officer determined to charge at once, which was done in a most gallant manner, although the attack was repulsed with the loss of one native officer* and three sowars killed, and six sowars wounded, besides three horses killed and nine wounded.

The enemy, it was believed, had many casualties, but they made good their retreat with their booty, except four *baniahs* they were carrying off for ransom to the hills, who managed to escape in the *mêlée*.

In the month of April following the Kasranis assembled and threatened British territory, but a force from Dera Ismail Khan, consisting of the 5th Punjab Cavalry and Sind Camel Corps, moved down during the night to Vihowa, where it was joined by a detachment of the 4th Punjab Cavalry and 200 men of the Police Battalion from Dera Ghazi Khan, and the enemy then dispersed.

The tribe, however, continued their depredations, and a blockade was accordingly imposed on the hill Kasranis.

Mita Khan, the chief, did not join in the attack upon Dera Fateh Khan, because he had too much at stake in the plains to commit himself openly against the Government; but he did not exert his influence to avert it, and he sent no intimation of the gathering or intentions of his tribe to any of our frontier officers or posts. On being taxed by Major Nicholson with his culpable neglect, he attempted to deny that he possessed any influence among his tribe, or knew anything of their intentions; but on it being recalled to his recollection that he had shown his influence a few years before by laying siege

Report of the Officer
commanding 4th
Punjab Cavalry.

* *Thanadar*
Gulab
Khara,
H. P. C.

*Expedition
against the
Kasranis in
1853.*

*Expedition
against the
Kasranis in
1853.*

to Dera Fateh Khan at the head of his tribe, and being told that he must either be with or against the Government openly, he changed his tone, and the next day, as an earnest of his intentions, sent in two men he had had seized, and promised to capture more.

Major Nicholson considered the infliction of summary punishment on the Kasranis desirable in every point of view; but he thought the chastisement of such a poor hill tribe, thinly scattered over a very rugged country, and without anything deserving the name of a village, extremely difficult.

In the meanwhile he considered that the posts of Vihowa and Thata should be increased to 50 cavalry each with a sufficient number of foot to enable the whole of the cavalry to take the field in an emergency; that a post should be established at Daulatwala of the same strength; and that at least 100 infantry should be left at Dera Fateh Khan, to reassure the people, who were much alarmed, and inclined to forsake their homes for some place of greater security. Until Yusaf Khan was captured or killed, or heavy retribution inflicted on the Kasrani tribe, he did not consider it safe to relax these precautionary measures.

In the spring of 1853, owing to Major Nicholson's representations, on the return of the expeditionary force from the Shirani hills (*see* Chapter XVII) the opportunity was taken to chastise the Kasranis.

Accordingly, a force, as per margin (*see* Appendix A), consisting of 954

Detachment, 4th Punjab Cavalry.
1st Punjab Cavalry.
6th Police Battalion.

of all ranks, under the command of Brigadier J. S. Hodgson, commanding the Punjab Irregular Force, and accompanied by Major J.

Nicholson, marched from Pehur towards the Bati pass (thirteen miles) at 10 P.M. on the night of the 11th of April 1853. The column reached the mouth of the pass exactly at daybreak the next morning, and found the enemy (who had evidently received intelligence of the approach of the troops) in position behind breastworks on the hills on both sides of the pass.

These hills were ascended and the breastworks taken by two companies, 1st Punjab Infantry, under Lieutenant C. P. Keyes, and two companies, under Lieutenant E. J. Travers, whilst the remainder of the force advanced up the pass for about a mile, when the village of Bati, the head-quarters of the tribe, was reached; it was defended by a very high stockade erected on the crest of a precipitous ridge above the village, the fire from which swept the gorge. As the right flankers had difficulty in enfilading this position, it was carried by a rush of the light company of the 6th Police Battalion and some twenty men of the 1st Punjab Infantry, under Lieutenant Keyes, supported by the remainder of the 6th Police Battalion. Bati consisted of some 80 or 90 well and substantially built houses, and it was, with two other hamlets, completely destroyed, with the exception of the mosque and the houses of a *malik* and his son, who had held aloof from the misconduct of the tribe.

The enemy had not had time to remove their property, a great quantity of which of all descriptions was found and destroyed; some of the Kasrani flocks were captured by the skirmishers, and two *zamburaks*, which the Kasranis had captured from Sawan Mal, with a number of matchlocks, were also taken.

The troops then retired in the same formation as they had advanced, and reached the mouth of the pass at 10 A.M., the enemy ineffectually trying to harass the retirement.

There was no water between Pehur and the hills, and the force had

Infantry

therefore to march back to its encampment at Pehur, where it arrived at 2 P.M.; the main body having marched thirty-four miles, whilst the skirmishers had marched some forty miles in all. *Expedition against the Kasranis in 1853.*

Whilst the troops were employed in the pass, the police and levies had destroyed the encampments of those portions of the tribe in the plain who were known to have joined the enemy as the troops approached, but two encampments in the neighbourhood, the inhabitants of which remained peaceably in their homes, were not molested.

The 4th Punjab Cavalry, under Captain G. O. Jacob, had patrolled between the Bati pass and Vihowa during the operations.

Our loss had been small (*see* Appendix B); that of the enemy was not known, though they acknowledged to have had five killed and wounded.

Brigadier Hodgson reported that the conduct of the troops had left nothing to be desired, and he expressed his thanks to Lieutenants C. P. Keyes and E. J. Travers, 1st Punjab Infantry, Lieutenant J. W. Younghusband, 6th Police Battalion, Captain W. R. Prout, Brigade Major, and Apothecary C. Hayes; and he said he was greatly indebted to Major J. Nicholson for the valuable information he had afforded.

The satisfaction of the Governor-General in Council with the conduct of all who were employed was subsequently communicated.

The Indian medal, with a clasp for the "North-West Frontier", was granted in 1869 to all survivors of the troops engaged in the above operations against the Kasranis under Brigadier J. S. Hodgson.

G.G.O. No. 812 of 1869.

After this expedition, raids for the most part ceased, and before the end of the year (1853), the chief of the plain Kasranis, Mita Khan, who had previously been lukewarm, and who, when called to account, had urged that he could not be responsible for the control of his hill neighbours unless the lost rights of retaliation were restored to him, engaged to guard the passes of the Kasrani hills, seven in number. He had formerly enjoyed perquisites and privileges under the Sikh rule, worth about Rs. 500 per annum. These had been continued since the annexation. He was now to receive Rs. 500 more in cash from the British Government in return for the responsibility undertaken.

This arrangement was so far successful, that the authorities were enabled in 1854 to remove the prohibition against hill Kasranis entering British territory.

Soon after, Yusaf Khan died, and his son was subsequently pardoned, and permitted to return to his village.

In the operations against the Bozdars in 1857, about to be described, Mita Khan, with some of his tribe, were employed with the levies.

Expedition against the Bozdars, by a force under Brigadier N. B. Chamberlain, in March 1857.

*Expedition
against the
Bozdars in
1857.*

After the annexation of the Punjab, the allowances which had been made to the Bozdar chief by the Sikhs were continued by the British Government; but, by way of evading the conditions, he arranged that his followers should plunder in places distant as well as near, and should carry their booty into the hills by passes other than their own. In 1850 they committed one raid on Umarkot, below Mithankot, far away to the south, the marauders being chiefly mounted; and another on the Khosa village of Yaru, to the north of Dera Ghazi Khan. Towards the close of the same year a party of 120 raiders attacked Vidor, a place of some importance on the frontier opposite Dera Ghazi Khan, but were stoutly resisted by the villagers. In 1852 a party of ninety Bozdars, having lifted the camels of the Bulani village, were pursued by a detachment, 4th Punjab Cavalry, from the Mangrotha post, when the camels were recovered,—the detachment having one horse killed by the fire from the hills up which the marauders had retreated.

In 1853 there were three forays by the tribe. Two of these incursions were successful as regards spoil, but no life was lost; in the third, however, though well mounted, they were pursued for many miles by a detachment, 4th Punjab Cavalry, and forced to disgorge their booty at the mouth of the Mangrotha pass. In 1853 it became necessary to prohibit any hill Bozdar from visiting the plains under pain of imprisonment if seized. At the beginning of 1854, the Bozdar chief was confirmed in the grant of his old allowances, amounting to Rs. 4,332 per annum, and the proceeds of some rent-free lands, amounting to Rs. 2,000 more, when he renewed his engagements to prevent plundering. For a time these pledges were kept. One of the Bozdar chiefs visited the camp of the Chief Commissioner in the winter of 1854. During 1854 no raids were reported; but, unfortunately, during 1855, the Bozdars returned to their bad habits, several raids occurred, even villages were plundered, and a large number of minor thefts were committed—no less than seventy-four in six months. In order to partially reimburse the sufferers, some Rs. 2,500 were escheated from the allowances of the chief. There was also a long list of robbers and murderers, refugees from British territory, sheltered in the Bozdar hills. The Bozdars crowned the list of their misdeeds of 1855 by a serious raid on the village of Kaleri, on the 1st of December, carrying off spoil, chiefly cattle, valued at Rs. 1,200, and murdering one man. The marauders were 200 strong. All the chiefs were then summoned, under safe conduct, to answer for the grievous misconduct of their tribe, and to offer such explanations as they could.

But nothing satisfactory appears to have come of this, and in March 1856 the Governor-General sanctioned the discontinuance of the cash allowance of Rs. 4,332 to the tribe, who were to be warned that on the occurrence of any further raids or forays their rent-free lands would also be confiscated, and a rigorous embargo laid on them. In recommending that the cash allowance should cease, the Chief Commissioner, Sir John Lawrence, had stated he could not recommend it to be continued, even on the condition that the value of plundered property should be retrenched from it. The allowance was granted on the condition that tranquillity should be preserved;

this failing, it seemed unreasonable that the Government should continue to subsidise people who committed forays into its territories. Even if the value of the property plundered was deducted, the arrangement would still be tantamount to this, that the Government were to pay for the losses suffered by its subjects at the hands of its enemies. Under such circumstances, the credit of granting an allowance would be lost, and the Chief Commissioner believed that the continuation of it to the Bozdars on any conditions, after their recent misconduct, would be a pernicious example to other tribes on the border.

*Expedition
against the
Bozdars in
1857.*

Up to the middle of 1856 no serious outrage was committed by the Bozdars, although there were cases of cattle stealing, highway robbery, etc.; but in June of that year the outposts had to be reinforced, as it was reported that the Bozdars were collecting for an attack on Mangrotha, and from that time up to the close of the year they made eleven forays into British territory, generally in large parties of from 20 to 200 men. Most of these cases were attended with bloodshed; numerous others were planned, but were baffled by the action of the outposts. On two occasions (in the month of December) the detachments of the 2nd Punjab Cavalry and 4th Punjab Infantry had skirmishes with the Bozdars on the hills near the border; in the latter of these (on the 27th of December) the enemy were driven from four different positions, which they successively occupied, our loss being one sepoy killed and two sowars wounded.

At the beginning of January 1857 the whole of the 2nd Punjab Cavalry was moved to the frontier; and on the 17th of January a reconnoitring party of one non-commissioned officer and eight sowars of that regiment was surrounded by a party of 150 Bozdars, and lost two men in cutting their way through the enemy.

The Chief Commissioner, Sir John Lawrence, now strongly urged that an expedition should be sent against them, as the only effectual way of putting a stop to the harassing annoyances to which the villages and posts were exposed. The Commissioner of Leiah, Lieutenant-Colonel D. Ross, had represented "that the Bozdars carried on these forays in the vain hope that they would lead to the restoration of the money payment, which they had forfeited through their own misconduct, and that it was evident they would not cease to give trouble until a force was sent to chastise them, when the destruction of their crops would reduce them to great straits, and bring about a state of things which the mere interdiction of their intercourse with the plains had failed to effect." Sanction for the despatch of an expedition was therefore accorded by the Supreme Government in February 1857, and the confiscation of all the rent-free lands of the Bozdars was ordered.

The spring was considered the best time for punishing the tribe, when the crops were ripening. Accordingly, on the 5th of March 1857, the troops, as

No. 1 Punjab Light Field Battery...	4 field guns.
No. 2 Punjab Light Field Battery...	4 mountain guns.
No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery ...	4 " "
2nd and 3rd Punjab Cavalry ...	113 sabres.
Sappers and Miners ...	58 bayonets.
1st Sikh Infantry ...	443 "
3rd Sikh Infantry ...	445 "
1st Punjab Infantry ...	471 "
2nd Punjab Infantry ...	476 "
4th Punjab Infantry ...	484 "

per margin (*see* Appendix C), forming the expeditionary force, were assembled at Taunsa,* under Brigadier N. B. Chamberlain. Captain F. R. Pollock, Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khan, was to accompany the force as Political Officer.

* *See* Map of the N.W. Frontier at the beginning of this work.

*Expedition
against the
Bozdars in
1857.*

Eight hundred levies were also collected, at Brigadier Chamberlain's request, from the district, to be used as guides and to keep open communications with the plains, and as foraging parties to search for the grain and cattle which the enemy, it was reported, had hidden or driven off to the higher hills.

Arrangements were made by the district officer for supplies for ten days for man and beast (*ata*, *ghi*, salt, *dal*, barley, and gram). Four days' supplies were to be carried regimentally, and six days' supplies for the whole force by the civil authorities.

The orders for the force were, that sick and weakly men were to be left behind at Mangrotha as the troops advanced; three *doolies* with all the *dandies* and *kahars*, and also *kajawahs*, were to accompany the force. All superfluous baggage, camp followers, and animals, were to be left at Taunsa. Officers were to be restricted to one *pal* each, and one mess tent per regiment. The whole of the bullock ammunition boxes attached to regiments were to be carried on mules and *yabus*.

There were three main passes by which the Bozdar country might be entered from the plains, and which are termed by the Brigadier Chamberlain's despatch. Biluchis, *nais*. They are simply empty channels, which have been cut through the hills, at right angles to the strata, by the rain which falls in the mountains, forcing a passage for itself to the plains before flowing into the Indus.

These passes were—

- 1st. The *Vihowa*, in front of the village and military post of that name.
- 2nd. The *Sangarh*, opposite Taunsa, and immediately in front of the fort of Mangrotha.
- 3rd. The *Mahoi*, twelve miles to the south of the Sangarh, and in front of the Mahoi outpost.

The first mentioned was not only circuitous, but was reported to be impracticable for guns; and in addition to the disadvantage of its passing through the lands of other tribes, it entered the Bozdar country at one corner near the Drug valley, from which access to other parts was very difficult.

The second was the principal entrance, and the only one in ordinary use. It was practicable for wheeled carriages, and it was stated that after that portion of the defile known as the Khan Band was passed, the more open and cultivated lands were at once entered upon, whence there was access to every part of the Bozdar country.

The third and last-named pass was reported difficult in the extreme, if not impracticable when defended; and so far from there being any gun road, it was affirmed that at one place the path skirted a precipice commanded from above, along which a single horse had to be led with care. Lieutenant J. Watson, who returned by this route after the operations, confirmed the truth of the report of its difficulties.

Under these circumstances, the Sangarh pass was in every way the best, if not the only one, suited for the troops to enter by. The strong places where the enemy were likely to make a stand were reported to be—

first, at the mouth of the Drug *nai* or *nullah*, where it was said a strong breastwork of stones had been erected; and

secondly, at the Khan Band, about twelve miles from the mouth of the Sangarh pass, which position, it was anticipated, would be the

Lieutenant
Medley's report.

enemy's main one. It was here that, in an attempt to force the passage in front, Sawan Mal, in the time of the Sikhs, had met with considerable loss. *Expedition against the Bozdars in 1857.*

As no real advantage was to be gained by making a false attack by the Mahoi pass, the Brigadier thought it best to let it become generally known beforehand that he intended to enter by the Sangarh defile; for, whilst it could make no difference as to the result of our attack if there were a few more or a few less of the enemy, there was no doubt that the value of our success would be greatly enhanced by encountering the tribe on its own ground, and by thus not admitting of any excuse being afterwards made by the Bozdars to explain away defeat, and the example upon all the neighbouring tribes would be so much the more beneficial.

Having strengthened the frontier posts considerably, and provided for the safety of Dera Ghazi Khan, so as to give confidence to the people during the absence of the troops, Brigadier Chamberlain marched from Taunsa on the ~~evening~~ of the 6th of March, and, after proceeding across the plain for seven miles, reached the mouth of the Sangarh pass at daybreak. A few Bozdars were seen on the heights, but no attempt at opposition was made, and the shots fired were evidently only intended as signals to announce the arrival of the force.

The march was continued up the stony bed of the Sangarh *nai* (which was the only road) for about four miles, when a convenient place for encamping (Dedachi Kach) was reached, and the force halted there for the day.

Towards noon a party of the enemy made some show of driving in one of the picquets, but on its being supported by Captain G. W. G. Green, commanding the 2nd Punjab Infantry, they retired. One sepoy of this regiment was severely wounded.

In the afternoon a reconnaissance of the Khan Band (*see* sketch, p. 608) and the approaches to it was made by Brigadier Chamberlain, with a force consisting of 300 men of the 3rd Sikh Infantry and 1st Punjab Infantry. About eight miles from its mouth the Sangarh *nai* was joined by the Drug *nai*, which flowed from a small valley of that name some twenty miles to the north-west, in the Bozdar country, and from this point of junction to its opening out at the Haranbore Kach, a distance of about three miles and a half, the Sangarh pass presented a route the most formidable. From this junction to the point where the Sangarh *nai* turned at right angles to the west, it was bounded on either side by scarped hills of considerable height, which completely commanded the road, a matchlock fired from one hill reaching to the foot of the other; and beyond this again the hills had to be passed at right angles to their strata, when, instead of having one range on either side to deal with, a series of precipitous spurs, rising one after another in close succession, had to be crossed, which completely commanded the road below.

It was to this particular portion of the defile that the term Khan Band was generally applied, though, strictly speaking, the name applied only to that one spot across which a mound of stones and earth had at some former period been raised to add to the natural defences.

On arriving at the point where the defile turned to the west, a view of the Khan Band was obtained, and the enemy were seen clustered on every ridge and pinnacle commanding the defile; the position was so strong a one, that it was evident that to carry it in front would be a very doubtful operation, and one certainly not to be accomplished except at a large sacrifice of life; but it was possible to turn the position by its left, and Brigadier Chamberlain

Morning

*Expedition
against the
Bozdars in
1857.*

therefore determined upon attacking the Khan Band from that side, after assuring himself, both by conversation with the guides and by observation of the practicability of the hills from the Drug *nullah*. During the reconnaissance a duffadar of the mounted police (on orderly duty with the Deputy Commissioner) was killed, and one man of the 1st Punjab Infantry was wounded. By sunset the Brigadier returned to camp, and the night passed undisturbed.

At daybreak on the following morning, the 7th of March, the force continued its advance up the Sangarh *nullah*, and by 7 A.M. it was halted in front of the enemy's position. Some short delay then took place in making the necessary arrangements for the protection of the baggage and camp followers, and, this being accomplished, the troops moved to the attack.

The plan of attack was as follows:—The 4th Punjab Infantry, under Captain A. T. Wilde, was to ascend (by its northern spur) the hill which commanded the Sangarh *nullah* from the west, covered by the fire of the four field guns of No. 1 Punjab Light Field Battery and the four mountain guns of No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery. The 1st Punjab Infantry, under Major J. Coke, with the four mountain guns of No. 2 Battery, were to advance up the Drug *nai*, in the hopes of finding a practicable spur by which to ascend the heights south of the *nullah*, in support of the 4th Punjab Infantry, and to acquire firm possession of those heights, for this was indispensable to success.

The 3rd Sikh Infantry and the 2nd Punjab Infantry were placed in support at the junction of the two *nullahs*, whilst a portion of the 1st Sikh Infantry, under Major G. Gordon, was sent to crown the hill which closed in the Sangar *nai* to its east, with instructions to move along its summit so as to keep parallel with the 4th Punjab Infantry.



The enemy on the left of his position had failed to occupy the spurs to the north side of the Drug *nai*, and this was, of course, turned to immediate account by parties of Major Coke's men, who occupied these spurs as they advanced.


Becoming alive, however, to the object we had in view, the Bozdars lost no time in strengthening their left flank, and numbers of them at once crossed the Drug *nai* and took up a very strong position on its northern side. A hill on the southern side of the *nullah* was also strongly held by the enemy, whilst the *nullah* itself between these positions was closed by a breastwork. The fire the Bozdars were thus able to bring to bear from three sides was more than Major Coke could hope successfully to oppose, more especially as the hills were knife-edged, with the faces next the *nullah* a steep wall, and the Brigadier therefore supported Major Coke with the 2nd Punjab Infantry, under Captain G. W. G. Green, and withdrew Lieutenant Mecham's four guns from Captain Wilde, sending them to Major Coke's assistance.

On the arrival of this support, the 1st and 2nd Punjab Infantry, well aided by the fire of the eight mountain guns (against which the enemy stood their ground most determinedly), at once attacked the enemy's position on the left of the Drug *nullah*, Captain Green advancing against the right, and Major Coke against the left, of the position; and the gallantry displayed by the officers and men of both regiments was the admiration of all who witnessed it. It was in this attack that almost the whole of our casualties took place, and where the Bozdars suffered most. Major Coke received a severe wound in the shoulder, although he continued to exercise his command throughout the day. His native adjutant, Mir Jaffir, was wounded at his side, and received another bullet through his shield and clothes.

EXPLANATORY SKETCH
OF THE
FORCING OF THE KHAN BAND
HELD BY THE BOZDAR TRIBE
against
A FORCE UNDER
BRIGADIER GENERAL N. CHAMBERLAIN, C.B.,
ON THE
7th March 1857.

REFERENCES.

British Forces + + + + 
Bozdars „ 
Routes taken by British Forces - - - -



On the Bozdars being driven from this position, they crossed to the southern side of the Drug *nullah*, followed by the 2nd Punjab Infantry and a portion of the 1st Punjab Infantry, whilst the remainder of the latter regiment, with the mountain guns, had to move up the bed of the stream, as the hills were too precipitous to admit of the mountain guns being taken up. *Expedition against the Bozdars in 1857.*

Whilst these events were passing on our right, Captain Wilde's regiment had gradually ascended, and carried the enemy's position on the left bank of the Sangarh near its junction with the Drug. This had been done with little loss, under cover of the artillery, and Captain Wilde then pressed along the ridge of the hill overlooking the Sangarh *nai*, his advance being greatly facilitated by the correct practice of Lieutenant J. R. Sladen's field guns.

Major G. Gordon, with the 1st Sikh Infantry, had been enabled in the meanwhile to crown the heights on the east of the Sangarh *nullah* without loss, as the few Bozdars who had at the outset occupied this range fell back without offering any opposition.

The heights on both banks of the Sangarh having been thus seized, the guns of No. 1 Punjab Light Field Battery, with the 3rd Sikh Infantry and the detachment of cavalry, were enabled to advance up the bed of the *nullah* without opposition; and the artillery, taking up successive positions, covered Captain Wilde's advance along the left bank. As these troops reached the point where the defile turned to the west, it became evident from the movements of the enemy, who were holding the Khan Band, as well as from the sound of firing on their left rear, that the Bozdars were giving way, and that the time had come to threaten the Khan Band in front.

Whilst Lieutenant J. R. Sladen plied the enemy with shell, Captain R. Renny, with a company of the 3rd Sikh Infantry, carried the nearest ridge with a loss of only three men wounded; and Captain J. P. W. Campbell, with two companies, moved on their next breastwork. But by this time portions of the 1st and 2nd Punjab Infantry, which had ascended from the Drug *nullah*, were crossing the hills in pursuit of the Bozdars they had defeated; the Khan Band was thus threatened from the rear, and the flight became general. To add to the enemy's embarrassment, the detachment of cavalry under Captain S. J. Browne, 2nd Punjab Cavalry, was ordered to dash through the defile, and after reaching the more open ground, to go on as far as the nature of the country permitted.

Success was now complete, and arrangements were made for pitching the camp at Haranbore Kach, at the western entrance of the Khan Band defile.

Major J. Coke was the only British officer wounded in this affair, but there were five men killed and three native officers and forty-five men wounded (see Appendix D).

Taking into consideration the difficulty of the ground, the Brigadier considered the smallness of our casualties a matter of congratulation.

The Bozdars, whose numbers were estimated at 1,700 men, lost from twenty to thirty killed, and from fifty to seventy wounded. Their chiefs afterwards admitted that they had entertained no doubt that they would be able to hold the pass against us. As our troops were advancing they had called to Brigadier Chamberlain from the hills, asking, in a jeering manner, why we did not come on; and so far from expecting that their position would be turned from the Drug *nai*, the Bozdars stated that it had been arranged that the body of men which had been in position on the right of that

*Expedition
against the
Bozdars in
1857.*

nullah was to have attacked the rear of the column whilst the head of it was engaged at the Khan Band.

Nor was this self-reliance to be wondered at, for they had seen General Ventura and Jemadar Khusial Singh, with a large Sikh army, retire from before this stronghold, and they claimed to have killed, on another occasion, 1,200 of Diwan Sawan Mal's soldiers, and to have plundered his baggage.

The conduct of the whole of the troops, Brigadier Chamberlain stated, had been excellent; they exhibited the highest spirit, and well maintained the reputation of our arms.

The services of Major J. Coke, Lieutenant W. H. Lumsden, and Assistant Surgeon J. R. Jackson, of the 1st Punjab Infantry, and of Captain G. W. G. Green, Lieutenants T. Frankland, W. P. Fisher, and Assistant Surgeon W. F. Clark, of the 2nd Punjab Infantry, together with the native officers of both these regiments, called, Brigadier Chamberlain said, for special mention, and he begged to recommend them to the favourable notice of the Government.

The Brigadier added that the artillery which supported Major Coke's attack had likewise earned distinction; and he brought to notice the services of Lieutenants G. Maister and R. Meham, commanding Nos. 2 and 3 Punjab Light Field Batteries, and the officers and men employed with the mountain guns.

On the march of the force from Taunsa, the levies had been left at Mangrotha in charge of the reserve supplies, for it was an object not to employ them in concert with the troops before our ability to chastise the Bozdars without any other assistance had been shown to all, and they were now ordered forward; and to Mita Khan and his Kasranis was assigned the task of occupying the Khan Band, and keeping open the communications with the plains. The duty was one he was able to discharge if loyal, and he fortunately became sufficiently impressed with the penalty of failure to do this, although his course was doubtful until convinced that he had more to fear from the displeasure of the British Government than from that of his other neighbours, the Bozdars.

After the troops had emerged from the Khan Band, it became evident from the ruggedness of the country that there was little chance of hemming in the tribe, or capturing their cattle, without the aid of greater numbers; and, in communication with the Deputy Commissioner, arrangements were made by Brigadier Chamberlain, during the evening of the 7th, to send off to the Ustarana tribe to invite them to come down and plunder their enemies on the north, whilst the force closed in upon them from the south.

The invitation was accepted with alacrity, and a portion of the tribe, entering by the Drug valley, had commenced to plunder and lay waste, when they were stopped and ordered to return home, in consequence of the subsequent submission of the Bozdars.

During the 8th the troops remained halted, to admit of the wounded being sent to Mangrotha under a strong escort of infantry, assisted by a portion of the foot levies.

A detachment, consisting of the 2nd Punjab Cavalry and the 3rd Sikh Infantry, was employed during the day in reconnoitring the Sangarh *nai* as far as Bharti, and the course of this detachment was marked by the smoke of the huts and stacks of forage it set fire to as it marched along. The country was found abandoned, and only a few Bozdars were seen on the summit of the hills, who appeared to be occupied with simply watching the movements of the troops.

During the 9th, also, the force remained halted, awaiting the return of the empty *doolies*, which arrived in the evening. On this day, as on the previous one, a reconnoitring party was employed in penetrating the country, and doing the enemy as much injury as possible. *Expedition against the Bozdars in 1857.*

On the 10th the force marched to Bharti, distant about six miles. It was considered one of the principal places of the Bozdars, and presented a fine sheet of luxuriant vegetation, and with its pretty clumps of date trees somewhat resembled the scenery in the neighbourhood of Dera Ghazi Khan. The road, as heretofore, was up the stony bed of the Sangar *nai*, but during the march five or six richly cultivated spots were passed.

The house of Naorang Khan, the chief of one section of the tribe, on the summit of one of the hills near Bharti, was destroyed.

Reconnoitring and other parties were always accompanied by some of the levies, who exhibited great skill in discovering concealed property. When our sepoys failed to find anything, a Biluch ally would follow up the track of a man's or woman's feet, and speedily return with plunder of some kind or another, which had been hidden in the hurry of flight.

During the 11th and 12th the force had to halt, to enable supplies to be brought up from the rear, for it was not considered prudent to enter further into the hills without having ten days' supplies in camp. On both days the country in advance, both to the right and left, was patrolled by reconnoitring parties, and everything come across was destroyed. The column of smoke which rose into the air over a circumference of some miles must have been a distressing spectacle to the Bozdars; but it was no more than they deserved, and to have spared their crops and property would have been to neutralise the object of the expedition, and to withhold the punishment most likely to have a lasting impression.

Of all the frontier tribes none were less deserving of consideration, for to plunder and murder had been the avocation of the Bozdars for years past, and but for our military posts the country in their front must have been abandoned. Nor did they confine their raids simply to the plains, for they plundered all their neighbours, and it may truly be said that their hand was against every man, and every man's hand against them.

The secret of their success in this course of plundering was attributable to the inaccessibility of their country, for nature had made it equally unapproachable on all four sides, and within it was found to be nothing but a network of hills and ravines, and quite unassailable except by disciplined bodies. The Bozdars had ample cultivation to support them, were rich in flocks, and well-to-do, and had, therefore, the less excuse for living on their neighbours.

On the 13th the force continued its march up the Sangar *nai* for about ten miles, and encamped in a well-cultivated hollow at the entrance of the Saunra pass.

Just before descending into the cultivation, a few horsemen and footmen were seen, but they disappeared in the defile as the force approached. On this day's march the enemy sustained much loss in the destruction of numbers of their hamlets and stock, and as they belonged to the section of the tribe most given to plundering on our border, there was the greater reason for not sparing anything.

The Saunra pass, or, more properly speaking, defile, is to the Bozdars on the west what the Khan Band is to them on the east. One section—the Ghulamani—possess lands to the west of the defile: and the tribe claim

*Expedition
against the
Bozdars in
1857.*

the country, and feed their cattle and flocks up to the hills which separate them from the Luni Pathans on the west, and the Khetrans on the south-west; but when at feud with these tribes, and obliged to act on the defensive, the Bozdars retire, and hold the Saunra pass, thereby closing the only entrance from the west.

Brigadier Chamberlain had expected, from all that the guides had stated, to find this defile difficult, for the natives had always pronounced it impracticable for artillery, and had adverted to its strength and the necessity for holding it if the force went beyond it into the Ghulamani lands; but although he had looked for a strong position, it far exceeded his anticipations; indeed, he said he had never yet seen in Afghanistan anything to be compared with it, for it might be pronounced impregnable from the west, and, according to the reports of trustworthy persons, was not to be turned on the north nearer than by the Vihowa pass, thirty miles off, or on the south nearer than by the Vidor pass, distant forty-five miles. From the east side it was difficult but practicable, and the Bozdars, having failed at the Khan Band, appeared to have thought it was useless to defend it. Its inaccessibility from the west arose from the mountain being scarped on that side, presenting at its summit a precipice of from one to several hundred feet in height, which scarp was said to run north and south as far as the Vihowa and Vidor passes.

In the days of the Moghals, this road was one of those used for keeping open the communications between the southern part of the Punjab and Kandahar; and when Shah Shuja was defeated by Dost Muhammad Khan at the latter place, a remnant of his followers returned by this route.

Late on the evening of the 13th two Bozdars came into camp, stating that they had been sent by the chiefs of the tribe, who wished to be allowed to come in and sue for terms, and begging that the work of destruction might meanwhile be stayed. The chiefs were ordered, in reply, to present themselves in camp the next day, when our demands upon the tribe would be made known to them; but that, if they failed to attend within the prescribed time, hostilities and the work of destruction would recommence, and that in the meantime the force would halt, and cease to cut their crops and burn their property.

On the following evening, the 14th of March, Naorang Khan and Ashak Muhammad Khan, the two chiefs of the tribe, made their appearance; but it was too late to transact business, and the meeting was deferred until the next morning.

At a *darbar* held on the following day, the reasons for our invasion of their country, and the terms demanded from them, were publicly made known. These terms were—

- 1st. Compensation at the rate of Rs. 125 for the life of every man killed or wounded in British territory during the previous year.
- 2nd. Restitution of, or compensation for, all cattle killed, or stolen, or injured, or property carried off or destroyed during the previous year, the restitution or compensation to be completed within two months.
- 3rd. The immediate expulsion of all refugee criminals. Not to afford an asylum to refugees from British territory, or to harbour thieves or bad characters of any tribe; nor to allow anyone to pass through their country to plunder or commit acts of violence; nor to permit stolen cattle or property of any kind to be taken through their passes.

4th. To pay a fine of 200 sheep in consideration of the remainder of the crops being spared, with 100 additional sheep from the Ghulamani Bozdars, whose country beyond the Saunra pass had escaped injury. The sheep were to be given to the troops.

*Expedition
against the
Bozdars in
1857.*

5th. To give approved hostages, for twelve months, as security for good conduct, and to have a *vakil* always at the Mangrotha *tehsil*.

A ready assent was given to every demand, and the whole demeanour of the Bozdars was that of men thoroughly subdued. Doubtless much more might have been demanded, and would have been acceded to, at the time, but it seemed to the Brigadier and to the Deputy Commissioner that the future peace of the frontier was more likely to be secured by dealing leniently with them, and it was hoped that, having now felt our ability to punish, the Bozdars, like the Shiranis and Kasranis, would become peaceable neighbours.

Had they not given in, they would in all probability have suffered considerable loss in cattle, for the Ustaranas had closed in upon them, and they could only have escaped by finding refuge among the Pathan tribes further to the west.

After the affair at the Khan Band, a detachment, as per margin, under Lieutenant G. A. P. Younghusband, 5th Punjab Cavalry, had proceeded from Mangrotha up the Mahoi pass, destroying the cultivation there without opposition, and orders were now sent to the officer commanding at Mangrotha to stop all further punitive operations.

2nd Punjab Cavalry, 17 sabres.
3rd Punjab Cavalry, 28 "
5th Punjab Cavalry, 29 "
4th Punjab Infantry, 66 bayonets.

On the 16th the force commenced to retrace its steps, a portion returning by the road by which it had advanced, the remainder by the *Lundi nai*. Both columns united again on the 17th at Haranbore Kach. This course was adopted in order that more of the country might be seen, and to admit of the completion of a map by Lieutenant J. G. Medley, Bengal Engineers.

From the 18th to the 21st, inclusive, the troops remained halted, the sheep not having been brought in, for the Brigadier felt that it was both just and necessary to exact the fulfilment of this simple stipulation before relieving the tribe of our presence. The reason assigned by the chiefs for the delay was the distance the flocks had been driven to avoid capture—an excuse Brigadier Chamberlain did not think reasonable, and which was overcome as soon as the Bozdars understood the alternative, and saw their crops decreasing; for though they were not wantonly destroyed, it was necessary to feed the cattle.

The required number of sheep having been completed on the afternoon of the 21st, the force returned through the Khan Band on the 22nd, and having encamped during the night at Dedachi Kach, re-entered the plains the following morning after an absence of seventeen days.

Brigadier Chamberlain, in his final despatch on the above operations, considered that nothing could have been better than the conduct of the troops, and he stated his obligations to Captain F. R. Pollock for his arrangements with regard to supplies.

In January 1858 the thanks of the Governor-General in Council were conveyed to Brigadier N. B. Chamberlain, and to the officers and men who had been engaged in the expedition.

The Indian medal, with a clasp for the "North-West Frontier", was granted in 1869 to all survivors of the troops engaged in the above operations against the Bozdars under Brigadier Chamberlain.

G.G.O. No. 812 of
1869.

*Conduct of the
tribes on this
border from
1861 to 1863.*

The Bozdars evidently profited by the lesson they had received in 1857, and their conduct subsequent to the expedition above described showed a very marked improvement.

In January 1861 an attack was made on the Bozdars by the Khetrans, Isots, Ustaranas, and Jafars,* who attacked their stronghold, the Khan Band, on the western side, and drove them from their fastness. Their women and children then took refuge in the plains, bringing their cattle with them. Captain C. J. Godby, commanding the 4th Punjab Cavalry, was at Mangrotha at the time; taking the detachment from the post with him, he at once rode to the mouth of the pass, and met the messengers from the Khetrans, who professed that they had no intention of following the Bozdars into British territory, but that, having sufficiently punished the tribe, their camp would break up. The Isots, Ustaranas, and Jafars accordingly returned home at once. The Khetrans imprudently determined to return by the shortest route, which led past the Mahoi pass, and encamped for the night. An old Bozdar woman watched them, and gave information to the chief, Ashak Muhammad Khan, pointing out that the Bozdars might easily invest a pass beyond Mahoi, through which the Khetrans would have to pass, and so obtain their revenge. The advice was taken. Early the next morning, when the Khetrans, quite unsuspecting of the trap laid for them, attempted to pursue their journey, they fell into the ambushade, and were routed with great loss, only effecting their escape by rushing into the plains and making the best of their way to the Sakhi Sarwar, and returning home through the Siri pass.

On the 15th of March 1861 the Bozdars, with some Hadianis, etc., raided on some flocks belonging to the Nasir *Pawindahs* in British territory and carried off some 12,000 sheep and goats. The Nasirs afterwards retaliated, and a fight took place in which twenty-four men were killed on the side of the Bozdars and Lagharis, and twenty-two on that of the Nasirs.

In 1862 a party of Bozdars, Lagharis, Khosas, etc., combined to carry off a large herd of cattle belonging to the *Pawindahs*, which were grazing inside the passes opposite Chaudwan in the Dera Ismail Khan district. The *Pawindahs*, before returning, made arrangements with the Ustaranas to attack the Bozdars. The latter retired before them until a favourable opportunity occurred to make a night attack, in which both the Bozdars and Ustaranas suffered slight loss, but the *Pawindahs* escaped entirely. The following season the *Pawindahs* were informed that they would not be allowed to enter British territory except on condition that they would abstain from all hostilities while within our border. This at once put a stop to the feud.

On the 1st of June 1863 a small party of Bozdars lifted some camels from British territory, but were pursued up the Mahoi pass by a detachment of cavalry. The detachment, 17 sabres, was attacked on returning by 100 Bozdars; but they charged, and got out in safety.

In 1864 the Government sanctioned the restoration to the Bozdar chief of the rent-free wells which had been confiscated in 1857, and he also received a certain number of *balgirs* in the frontier militia.

In the autumn of 1868 Lieutenant L. J. H. Grey, Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan, was carried off into the hills by Kaora Khan of Tibi, one

* A small and insignificant tribe living on the north-west of the Bozdar hills.

of the principal headmen of the Kasranis. Lieutenant Grey had gone down to Tibi to inquire into a murder case, supposed to have been committed by this man's son. Kaora Khan was pursued, but he kept Lieutenant Grey in advance, and he himself covered the retreat, threatening, if brought to bay, to kill Lieutenant Grey first, and then sell his own life dearly; which threat kept the pursuers at a distance. Meanwhile, Mehr Shah, a priest of the Biluchis, had sent to the Bozdars to close the exit from the Kasrani country. *Misconduct of a portion of the Kasranis in 1868.*

Fazl Ali Khan, the chief of the Kasranis (who had succeeded his father, Mita Khan, in 1861), with the principal Kasranis of Mangrotha and that neighbourhood, joined actively in the pursuit. Kaora Khan and his party were at length brought to bay some thirteen miles beyond Bati, where, after prolonged negotiations, he released Lieutenant Grey.

During the day that he was in restraint, Lieutenant Grey was hard pressed for terms, but he succeeded in turning the matter off by expressing his conviction that the Commissioner would ratify no conditions that he made, and Kaora Khan had to content himself with a promise that all the grain then in his house should be sent to him, and, as he pressed it, that Government should be informed of his contrition; and lastly, that in the event of Government summoning him, he should have a safe conduct, or that if Government refused, he should be informed.

Meanwhile, on the news of this outrage reaching Dera Ismail Khan, the 1st Punjab Cavalry, under Captain A. Vivian, accompanied by Mr. Beckett, Assistant Commissioner, at once turned out, and marched towards Vihowa, arriving at Miran, thirty-three miles, by the morning; but before they could get further, intelligence was received that Lieutenant Grey had been given up, and so, except one troop, which was ordered into Tibi, the regiment returned. The 1st Punjab Infantry, under Captain F. J. Keen, and the 4th, under Lieut.-Colonel J. Cockburn-Hood, were embarked in boats, and the latter had actually started before the news of Lieutenant Grey's release arrived.

Lieutenant Grey returned to Dera on the evening of the 13th, and on the 14th he, in company with the Commissioner, Lieutenant-Colonel S. F. Graham, and escorted by a company of infantry, went down in boats to Tibi to take steps for the capture of Kaora Khan. Sultan Muhammad of Vihowa was deputed to induce the chiefs of the neighbouring tribes to refuse him an asylum; and an attempt was made through the Ustaranas to cut off his retreat, but without success. The Commissioner then sent a deputation to induce or compel him to come in. Kaora Khan received the deputation at the head of 100 men, but, after a long conference, they utterly failed in their object. After this second unsuccessful attempt, the Commissioner summoned the tribes to his assistance. His call was readily responded to. From the north the Ustaranas brought 500 men, and were placed under the Gandapur chief, Kalu Khan; and there came also 120 Babar horse and foot and 120 Mian Khels;* and from the south the Bozdars came 1,000 strong, followed by the Hadianis 700, Lundst† 400. To these forces was

* The *Mian Khels* are a Pathan tribe of the Dera Ismail Khan district. They hold some 260 square miles of plain country between the Gundapur and Babar tribes. The greater number of them still engage in the trans-Indus trade, and they are said to be the richest of all the *Pawindahs*, dealing in the more costly descriptions of merchandise. They are a peaceable people, with pleasant faces, and are more civilised than most of the *Pawindah* tribes. They seldom take military service, and cultivate but little themselves, leaving the business of agriculture to their Jat tenants.

† The *Lunds* are a Biluch tribe (or rather two tribes) of the Dera Ghazi Khan district. The *Tibi Lunds* occupy a small area in the midst of the Gurchani country. They are a compact, well-

*Misconduct of
a portion of
the Kasranis
in 1868.*

entrusted the duty of blockading the hill Kasranis on the north, south, and west. The principal men of the plain Kasranis were also summoned, and ordered to bring in the criminal under the following penalties:—1st, forfeiture of allowances for guarding the hill passes; 2nd, confiscation of standing crops as a fine; 3rd, deportation of the plain chiefs to Dera Ghazi Khan; 4th, blockade of the hill portion of the tribe.

The chiefs at once took up their responsibilities, and collecting their clansmen in the plains, entered the hills, and returned in a few days with twenty-two families, including about forty women and children belonging to the rebels.

The Kasranis were again despatched to the hills to perform the essential duty of bringing in Kaora Khan, and with them were associated, as advisers and supporters on the part of the Government, a chief of the Khosas with fifty men, and one of the Gurchanis with the same number. The tribe returned again, after some days, with five of the principal rebels, but with the intelligence that Kaora Khan, his son, and others, escorted by about eighty of the hill Kasranis, had escaped, and sought shelter with the Musa Khels.

To guard against such escape, or to make such shelter more difficult, the Commissioner had proclaimed a reward of Rs. 10,000 on the heads of the four principal offenders; and to provide the means of payment of the reward, of feeding the tribes who had assembled, and of meeting the fines which would hereafter be inflicted on the criminals, the movable property of Kaora Khan, and a few of his chief abettors, had been seized and sold, producing upwards of Rs. 20,000.

The pressure being continued, Painsa Khan, the chief of the Musa Khels, at last brought Kaora Khan into Mangrotha, and delivered him up to Captain R. G. Sandeman on the 27th of October. A *darbar* was then held by the Commissioner, at which he thanked the assembled chiefs, and distributed the following rewards:—

	Rs.
To the Bozdars, who brought 1,000 fighting men,	2,500
„ Hadianis, „ 700	2,000
„ Lunds, „ 400	1,000
„ Ustaranas, „ 500	1,000
„ Khosas, „ 50	700
„ Babars, „ 120	750
„ Mian Khels, „ 120	750
„ Isots, „ 100	300
„ Gurchanis, „ 50	300
„ Nutkanis,* „ 50	500
„ Gandapurs, „ 40	200
	<hr/>
	3,130
	<hr/>
	10,000

organised little tribe. They have always taken an active and loyal part on the side of the British Government, and have never given trouble to the local authorities. The *Sori Lunds* are a small tribe which has only lately risen to importance. Their territory divides that of the Khosas into two parts and extends to the bank of the Indus. They are not pure Biluchis.

* The *Nutkanis* are a Biluch tribe of the Dera Ghazi Khan district, which hold a compact territory stretching eastward to the Indus and between the Khosas and the Kasranis. The tribe once enjoyed considerable influence and importance, but it no longer possesses a political organisation, having been crushed out of tribal existence in the early days of Ranjit Singh's rule. But the event is so recent that it still retains much of its tribal coherence and of the characteristics of its race.

At the same time *khilats* were bestowed on the chiefs and others who had given assistance. The political expenses of the above measures amounted, in round numbers, to Rs. 15,000; and this sum, as well as the Rs. 10,000 reward, was charged to the criminals and to the Kasrani tribe generally, the cost of the *khilats* to the Government.

Conduct of the tribes on this border from 1869 to the present time.

The Bozdars have always been at feud with the Ustaranas, and this in 1869 caused some anxiety, as the latter formed an alliance with the Kasanis, and an attack was made on the Bozdars beyond the border. The chiefs of the Kasranis and Ustaranas were fined, and further required to pay the Bozdars compensation for the raid; while the Bozdars made amends for the injuries which the Kasranis complained of, and the dispute was thus satisfactorily adjusted.

In October 1871 a party of 100 Biluch marauders, said to be Hadianis, committed a raid on twenty flocks of sheep and herds of cattle grazing within the limits of the Shirani village of Drazand, in independent territory, but belonging to Nasir *Pawindahs* encamped within and on the confines of British territory in the direction of the Gandapur and Babar villages of Zarakni and Chaudwan. Upwards of ten herdsmen were killed by the plunderers before they secured their spoil. On news reaching the Nasirs in their camps, they immediately started in pursuit, and overtaking the raiders, they forced them to abandon possession of the plundered cattle and sheep.

In 1874 the Bozdars were attacked by their northern neighbours, the Ustaranas, but both parties abstained from molesting British territory.

In December 1875 the Khetrans violated British territory, in pursuance of a quarrel with the Bozdars. On the evening of the 12th of that month a large detachment of Khetran horsemen emerged by the Sakhi Sarwar pass and proceeded from Sakhi Sarwar, taking the road along the foot of the nearest range of low hills by Vidor and Matti (Khosa), to the mouth of the Mahoi pass, which they appear to have reached, by the light of the full moon, about dawn on the 13th. Their object was to take the Bozdars by surprise, and to secure as much spoil as possible. In the pass, just beyond the British border, five Ghulamani Bozdars, returning to their hills from Dera Ghazi Khan with ten camels laden with grain, had passed the night, and some Jats from the village of Mahoi, near the outpost of that name, were engaged filling their donkey *massaks* at a well close by. The advent of so large a body of horsemen naturally frightened all these. The Ghulamani, at once perceiving their tribal enemies, managed to slip away into the hills, leaving their laden animals a prey to the Khetrans, who at first stripped the Jats, and were appropriating their animals, when being assured that these Jats were Government subjects, they restored to them their property, and set them all at liberty, with the remark that the Khetrans were not at enmity with the Government, but with the Bozdars.

Proceeding further into the pass, the Khetran horsemen were seen by some Bozdar cultivators, who retired to their village to give the alarm. Massu Khan, the Bozdar *mukadam*, probably unaware of the strength of the invading force, hastily got together seventeen armed villagers on foot, whom he headed to meet the Khetrans. The small body of Bozdars, finding the Khetrans scattered in various directions, scouring the ravines and side valleys for spoil, made some resistance, at a spot within the Mahoi pass, about three miles beyond the British boundary. The firing attracted the main body of the Khetrans, who pursued the Bozdars up the slope of a spur protruding into

Conduct of the tribes on this border from 1869 to the present time.

the pass, and cut them down, one by one, without mercy, as they retreated, still fighting, to the crest. Sixteen Bozdars, including their brave leader, Massu Khan, were killed; two only, one of whom was dangerously wounded, escaping to the hamlet.

The Khetrans, having met with so bold a resistance, immediately after their entrance into the pass, resolved to return with their plunder by the same route by which they had come, carrying two dead and three or four wounded men of their tribe with them. They were, however, intercepted on their return by our troops and militia, and compelled to disgorge their spoil, which was restored to the Bozdars, and a fine was also realised from the Khetrans for their violation of British territory.

Shortly after this, during the same month (December 1875), the Bozdars themselves similarly misbehaved, on a smaller scale, in proceeding surreptitiously, to the number of 35 or 40, *via* Hajipur, a British village, to surprise a small party of Shambani Bugtis, grazing their flocks unauthorisedly just within the British border on the Rajanpur frontier. Two Bugtis were killed, and three mares carried off (but abandoned in the subsequent flight), the Bozdar party returning without casualty to their hills. In consequence of this outrage, the offending section of the Bozdars, the Chakranis, were debarred from entering British territory, and the allowances of the tribe were stopped. On the 30th of August 1876 the tribe came in to the district officer, and agreed to the Government demands. They undertook to pay blood-money on the regulated scale for the two Bugtis killed, to surrender unconditionally, within six weeks, a notorious offender named Tangi of the Lashari (Gurchani) tribe, who had for some time obtained shelter in the Bozdar hills, and who had been the guide in the raid against the Bugtis; and finally to make restitution in all cases of theft from British limits then outstanding against them. The blockade against the Chakrani section was then removed. Tangi, the man whose surrender had been promised, was, however, murdered by a Bozdar in the hills, in pursuance of a private quarrel, before the promise could be fulfilled.

In 1876 a raid was made by Hadianis on a Khosa village, but the raiders were followed up and full reparation obtained; and in August of that year a settlement of the disputes between the Khosas and Hadianis on the one hand, and the Khetrans and the Hadianis on the other, was effected.

The Bozdars continued to give trouble by carrying off cattle and other property from our border, and the Jalalani and Ladwani sections of the tribe were especially guilty of continued acts of misconduct and theft. Accordingly, at the end of January 1878, Mr. F. W. R. Fryer, the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khan, accompanied by Mr. C. E. Gladstone, Assistant Commissioner of Rajanpur, visited the Bozdar hills, and was very successful in obtaining redress for past grievances on the part of British subjects, not, however, until he declared a temporary blockade of the tribe during a time of comparative scarcity, which obliged the Bozdars to submit to the terms imposed on them, in addition to restitution of all property stolen, or its value.

In March 1879 the Musa Khel Pathans, who live beyond the Bozdars, made a threatened demonstration against Vihowa at the instigation, it is believed, of the Kasranis. Timely precautions were taken, and the excitement did not end in any overt act of hostility. On their return, however, the Musa Khels plundered their old enemies, the Bozdars, with whom they were angry for having given information of the intended raid.

In December 1880 the Bozdars plundered two large trading caravans

beyond the border, in one of which twenty-seven Kakars were killed; in the other, Kakars and Khetrans were the sufferers. In the latter case it was decided that the Khetrans should be compensated for the losses inflicted on them. To enforce this a blockade was imposed on the Bozdars, and in ten days the tribal representatives came in and paid up Rs. 2,680, the compensation demanded.

Conduct of the tribes on this border from 1869 to the present time.

The Bozdars gave every assistance, when, on the retirement of the British forces from Kandahar, a column under Brigadier-General Wilkinson marched through their hills, in December 1882, on its way to Dera Ghazi Khan.

During that year also a satisfactory settlement was come to with the Bugti tribe, with whom the Bozdars were at feud, on the basis of a mutual renunciation of claims, at a meeting of the tribal leaders, in conjunction with the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khan and the Assistant Agent of the Governor-General, Biluchistan, under whose management the Bugtis were. A set of rules ensuring the maintenance of amicable relations between the two tribes for the future was also drawn up and agreed to by them both.

With the Musa Khels the Bozdars are still at enmity, but their disputes do not affect British territory, and the tribe is now well behaved under the control of its chief, Sirdar Muhammad Husen Khan.

The Hadianis, the hill section of the Lagharis, still give trouble, owing to their feuds with the Musa Khels, Gurchanis, and Ustaranas, but it is hoped that Muhammad Khan, the Laghari chief, will soon be able to acquire a firmer hold over his tribe, and be able to curb the lawless instincts of this section. During the past year the blood-feud between the Hadianis and the Isot tribe was settled by the Deputy Commissioner.

The Kasranis and the Khosas are now easily managed; they are at present well behaved, and are well under the control of their respective *tumandars*, Sirdars Fazl Ali Khan and Bahadur Khan.

APPENDIX C.

Composition of the force employed against the Bozdars, in March 1857.

Brigadier N. B. Chamberlain, commanding.

Staff.

Captain J. P. W. Campbell, Staff Officer.

Lieutenant J. G. Medley, Bengal Engineers, Field Engineer.

Artillery.

No. 1 Punjab Light Field Battery, Lieutenant J. R. Sladen, commanding.

No. 2 Punjab Light Field Battery, Lieutenant G. Maister, commanding.

No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery, Lieutenant R. Mecham, commanding.

Cavalry.

Detachment, 2nd Punjab Cavalry, Captain S. J. Browne, commanding.

Detachment, 3rd Punjab Cavalry, Lieutenant J. Watson, commanding.

Infantry.

1st Sikh Infantry, Major G. Gordon, commanding.

3rd Sikh Infantry, Captain R. Renny, commanding.

1st Punjab Infantry, Major J. Coke, commanding.

2nd Punjab Infantry, Captain G. W. G. Green, commanding.

4th Punjab Infantry, Captain A. T. Wilde, commanding.

Political Officer.

Captain F. R. Pollock, Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazi Khan.

Detail of troops.

Corps.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	Non-Commissioned Officers.	Rank and file.	Ordnance.				Remarks.
					Field.		Mountain.		
					Howitzers.	Guns.	Howitzers.	Guns.	
Staff	3	This does not include the detail, 5th Punjab Cavalry, or troops left at Mangrotha or in the outposts.
No. 1 Punjab Light Field Battery	3	2	12	69	2	2	
No. 2 Punjab Light Field Battery	2	1	6	41	2	2	
No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery	2	1	7	40	2	2	
2nd and 3rd Punjab Cavalry ...	7	7	12	94	
Sappers and Miners	2	8	50	
1st Sikh Infantry	3	12	65	378	
3rd Sikh Infantry	2	10	60	385	
1st Punjab Infantry	3	8	50	421	
2nd Punjab Infantry	4	11	48	428	
4th Punjab Infantry	4	10	52	432	
Total	33	64	320	2,338	2	2	4	4	

APPENDIX D.

Return of Killed and Wounded in the force under BRIGADIER N. B. CHAMBERLAIN, in the forcing of the Khan Band, on the 7th of March 1857.

Corps.	Killed.					Wounded.					Remarks.
	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	
No. 1 Punjab Light Field Battery	1	1	*Major J. Coke severely.
No. 2 Punjab Light Field Battery	1	1	
3rd Sikh Infantry	1	...	2	3	
1st Punjab Infantry	3	3	*1	1	7	12	21	
2nd Punjab Infantry	1	1	2	...	1	3	16	20	
4th Punjab Infantry	3	3	
Total	1	4	5	1	3	10	35	49	

ABSTRACT.

Killed	5
Wounded	49
Total	54

CHAPTER XIX.

DERA GHAZI KHAN BORDER.

GURCHANI, MAZARI, MARRI, AND BUGTI TRIBES.

THE *Gurchanis* own the Mari and Dragal hills, the Sham plain, and half the Phailawar plain beyond our frontier, and are also located in the Dera Ghazi Khan district in the neighbourhood of Harrand. Beyond the border they are bounded on the north by the Lagharis and the Khetrans, on the west by the Marris, and on the south by the Bugtis and Mazaris. *Gurchanis.*
Mazaris.

They are divided into eleven clans, of which the chief are the *Durkani*, *Shekhani*, *Lashari*, *Petafi*, *Jiskani*, and *Sabzani*. The last four are true Biluchis; the remainder of the tribe are said to be descended from Gorish (from whom they derive their name), a grandson of Raja Bhimsen, of Hyderabad, who was adopted by the Biluchis, and married among them. He is said to have accompanied Hamayun to Delhi, and on his return to have collected a Biluch following, and ejected the Pathan holders from the present Gurchani territory.

The whole of the *Durkani*, and about half of the *Lashari*, clans live beyond our border, and are independent, the remainder of the tribe being located in British territory. The *Gurchanis* are said to number 2,600 fighting men. They are not found in any other part of the Punjab, except Dera Ghazi Khan.

In 1848, when Mulraj, the Governor of Multan, rebelled, Lieutenant H. B. Edwardes arrived in the Dera Ghazi Khan district on his way to Multan, and sent a summons to Ghulam Haidar Khan, the Gurchani chief, to attend him. Ghulam Haidar Khan came with 200 horsemen, and was with Lieutenant Edwardes until Dera Ghazi Khan was taken. The Gurchani chief was then sent with Lieutenant Young against Harrand, but he afterwards again joined Lieutenant Edwardes before Multan, where he remained until the siege was over. After the conclusion of the war he was made a jemadar of horse, ten *balgirs* in the militia were given to him, and he was presented with a *khilat* of Rs. 1,000 for his services. For the first years after the annexation, the *Gurchanis* had an exceedingly bad reputation as robbers and raiders, and their border was always disturbed.

The *Mazaris* are a Biluch tribe occupying the extreme south of the Dera Ghazi Khan district, their western boundary being the hills, and their eastern the river. Rojhan is their head-quarters. They formerly occupied the hill country to the west now held by the Bugtis, but, obtaining grants of land in the lowlands, gradually shifted eastward towards the river.

Mazaris.
Marrisi.

The tribe is divided into four clans—*Rustamani*, *Masidani*, *Balachani*, and *Sargani*; of which the first two are the most numerous, though the chief is a Balachani. The fighting strength of the Mazaris is probably not more than 2,000. The majority of the tribe reside in British territory, where they own a large number of villages, only a few families being located beyond our border. In independent territory they have the Gurchanis on the north and the Bugtis on their west. For some years after the annexation, the Mazaris had perhaps the worst reputation of any tribe on this border. Elphinstone, in his *History of India*, mentions them as famous for their piracies on the Indus, their robberies on the highway, and for their depredations into the country of all their neighbours. They have, however, now settled down peaceably as cultivators of the soil.

The *Marris* are a Biluch tribe of Rind origin, who inhabit the hills to the west of the Gurchanis. They are wholly independent, or rather nominally subject to the Khan of Kelat, not being found within the Punjab. They are bounded on the north-east by the Khetrans, on the east by the Gurchanis, on the south by the Bugtis, on the west by the plains of Kachi, and on the north by Afghanistan. They are the most powerful and the most troublesome of all the Biluch tribes.

They are divided into four clans—the *Ghazani*, *Loharani*, *Mazarani*, and *Bijarani*; of which the Mazarani live beyond Sibi and the Bolan, and are almost independent of the rest of the tribe. The fighting strength of the Marris is estimated at 3,000. The country inhabited by this tribe is for the most part barren hill, but it contains some extensive valleys and fertile spots. There are two main rivers, which rise to the east of the Marri country and flow westward, emerging into the plains of Kachi at Tali and Lehri respectively.

The Marris are rich in cattle of all kinds, and have a good many horses. Their habits are altogether predatory, and they plunder their neighbours on all sides. There is a considerable traffic now through their hills, and the roads of late years have been much improved.

The drainage of the Marri country runs east and west, between very abrupt, impracticable hills, and the communications in this direction are comparatively easy, while those from north to south are very difficult. The whole country was, however, traversed by our troops with artillery in 1880. Cultivation is very scanty, and is only found near Kahan and on the immediate banks of the streams; all the rest of the country has a barren, parched-up, desolate appearance, and produces nothing. No supplies could be reckoned on in these hills. Grass would probably be found after rain, wood would be everywhere scarce, and water only found at certain spots, which it would always be necessary to ascertain beforehand.

The Marris are inveterate robbers. Their hand is against every man, and every man's hand is against them. They lead a nomadic life, and have no villages except a few mud forts, and, with the exception of those members of the tribe who live about Mandai, depend very little on agriculture. They are able, at the shortest notice, to leave any particular tract and move off their herds and encampments twenty miles distant. Their nominal allegiance to the Khan of Kelat has not prevented them from committing constant raids into his territories; and coercive measures have from time to time been used to keep them in order.

The Marris are now under the management of the Biluchistan Agency.

The *Bugtis*, like the *Marris*, are a Biluch tribe of Rind origin. They *Bugtis* occupy the angle between the frontiers of the Punjab and Upper Sind. They are bounded on the north by the *Marris*, on the east by the *Mazaris*, on the south by British territory (Sind), and on the west by *Kachi*.

The *Bugtis* are divided into six clans—*Kaheja*, *Nuthani*, *Musuri*, *Kalpur*, *Phong*, and *Shambani*, or *Kiazai*. The fighting strength of the tribe is estimated at 1,500. The *Bugti* country is chiefly rugged and barren, but contains much good pasture-land and some fertile valleys. The regular occupation of the tribe was, till lately, plundering, which was carried on systematically and on a large scale. Every man of the tribe was a robber. The Khan of Kelat claimed sovereignty over them, but they paid revenue to no one, and, protected by their rocky fastnesses, maintained a stormy independence, usually at war with the *Marris*, and perpetually plundering their neighbours.

The wealth of the people consists in cattle, which they bring down to British territory to sell. They carry on a direct trade with *Rojhan*, *Rajanpur*, and *Harrand* in the Punjab, and with *Kasmor* and *Jacobabad* in Sind. In return for their cattle and wood they take away with them cloth, salt, *gur*, sugar and grain; a few of their traders get cloth, etc., at *Multan* and *Jhang*. Although the tribe is not dependent on British territory for subsistence or for food, yet a blockade would put them to great inconvenience. When their trade is stopped, they are indirectly dependent either on Kelat or on the *Marris* and *Khetrans* for these things. A large number of the *Bugtis* now occupy land in British territory. They are, like the *Marris*, under the political management of the Governor-General's Agent in Biluchistan.

The first occasion on which the British Government came into contact with any of the tribes treated of in this chapter was in 1839, when operations were undertaken against the *Marri* and *Bugti* tribes to punish them for their predatory attacks on the line of communications of the British army in Afghanistan. Any detailed account of these operations would be beyond the scope of the present work, which specially deals with our relations with the different border tribes since the annexation of the Punjab. A brief *résumé*, however, of our dealings with these tribes prior to 1849 is here given to make the subject complete, and for a detailed account, the reader is referred to MacGregor's *Gazetteer*, and other works in which the military operations are more fully described.

In 1839, after Sir John Keane's army had passed through the Bolan pass, the attacks on the communications through *Kachi* became so dangerous and frequent that, after all other means had been tried, a force, consisting of a detachment of the 1st Bombay Grenadiers, one company, 5th Bombay Native Infantry, two howitzers, a small detail of Artillery, and some Sappers and Miners, was sent under the command of Major T. R. Billamore to punish the offending tribes and render the road more safe for the passage of convoys for the army. This force marched from *Sukkur* *via* *Shikarpur* and *Lehri* to *Pulaji* (see General Map) on the 20th of October 1839, and it was intended first to punish the *Dumkis* and *Jakranis** in the plains, but they fled to the

* The *Dumkis* and *Jakranis* are tribes inhabiting the eastern part of *Kachi*. They were formerly most active and formidable marauders, but are at the present time peaceful and well-behaved. The *Dumkis* now occupy the land about *Lehri*, and the *Jakran* cultivate the ground near *Shahpur*. After Major-General Sir Charles Napier's campaign in 1845, a large number of these tribes were removed to Sind.

*Operations
against the
Marris and
Bugtis in
1839-40.*

Bugti hills, under their leader, Bijar Khan, and abandoned all their villages.

The force therefore advanced from Pulaji into the Bugti hills. As the British troops approached the stronghold of Dera, the Bugtis seemed at first disposed to be submissive and friendly; but the smallness of the force tempted them to hostilities, and they attacked Major Billamore with their whole strength.

They were twice signally defeated with great loss; their chief, Bibrak, was captured and sent as a prisoner to Sind; the town of Dera was taken and plundered, and great loss was inflicted on the tribe generally. After punishing the Bugtis, the force proceeded against Kahan, the Marri capital, arriving before it on the 29th of December 1839.

The Marris, on the arrival of the force, totally deserted Kahan, and retired with all their families and property to the northern part of their country, and a detachment of 100 men of the 1st Bombay Grenadiers was left to garrison it, under Ensign E. T. Peacocke. They once assembled in full force to oppose us, but, being outmanœuvred, changed their minds and did not venture to engage in a struggle. They offered some slight opposition to the work of making the road over the Naffusak pass (*see* Map, p. 646), but did not seriously obstruct the troops in marching through their country. The British force left the hills in February 1840, and in the month of April a detachment was sent, under the command of Captain L. Brown, 5th Bombay Native Infantry, to occupy Kahan permanently.

This detachment assembled at Pulaji on the 8th of April 1840, and consisted of 300 bayonets, 5th Bombay Native Infantry, under Ensign W. W. Taylor; two 12-pounder howitzers, under Lieutenant D. Erskine; and 50 Sind Horse, under Lieutenant W. H. Clarke; besides 50 Pathan mounted levies. This detachment was to convoy 600 camels with four months' supplies to Kahan, and Lieutenant Clarke was then to return with 80 infantry and 50 horse to escort up supplies for another four months. Owing to delays of the Commissariat Department, the detachment did not start until the 2nd of May.

On the 20th of April Lieutenant Clarke made a raid into the hills against a party of Kalpur Bugtis, who had been engaged in plundering excursions. The attempt failed, owing to the treachery of the guide, and the detachment, which consisted of 50 Sind Horse and 100 Biluch levies, suffered terribly from heat and want of water when crossing the desert on their return to Pulaji. The Biluch levies alone left twenty-five men behind them, of whom three died.

On the 27th of April Captain Brown was ordered to send back the guns and go on without them, but, hearing of the intention of the Marris to oppose him at the Naffusak pass, he, on his own responsibility, took on one gun.

On the 2nd of May he started, leaving behind one gun and the Pathan mounted levies, whom he did not trust; he could, however, march but slowly; the thermometer ranged to 116°, and the gun kept them back. The march proved trying, and Ensign Taylor had to be sent back sick.

On the 8th the force reached the Sartaf pass, about seven miles from the Naffusak. The road up the pass was very steep, and the gun was dragged up by the men. Here the Marris first showed themselves, but did not offer any opposition.

On the 10th the detachment crowned the Naffusak. The convoy took twelve hours going up the pass, which is only a quarter of a mile in length. They were attacked by the Marris, but succeeded in beating them off.

On the 11th the force descended into the Kahan plain, and the Marris, *Operations against the Marris in 1840.* seizing the summit of the pass at once, kept up a fire at a respectful distance. Kahan was found deserted, and was occupied without opposition. On the 16th Lieutenant Clarke started for Pulaji with 160 bayonets, 5th Bombay Native Infantry, and 50 sabres, Sind Horse. Having surmounted the first hill, he sent back 80 of the infantry, and proceeded with the cavalry and the remaining 80 bayonets, and 700 unladen camels (100 having been captured from the Marris a few days previously). On seeing the last of the camels over the hill, Subadar Bagu Jadao, the native officer in command of the detachment left behind, returned. Half-way down the hill they fell into an ambush of 2,000 Marris, and, though the men fought very gallantly, the numbers were too many for them, and at last the whole party was cut up, only one *doolie* bearer escaping.

Captain Brown was thus left with 140 bayonets and one gun to defend the fort, which had 900 yards of wall to man.

Lieutenant Clarke, meanwhile, had made his way to the Sartaf pass, thirteen miles from Kahan, where he found the Marris assembled in large numbers on the crest. After placing his convoy to the best advantage, he advanced to drive them off with 30 bayonets, but the task was too great; there were 2,000 of the enemy against him, with the command of ground in their favour, and so, after fighting nobly for two hours, and expending his last cartridge, the whole of the infantry were cut up with the exception of twelve men. The cavalry escaped to Pulaji, and all the camels were captured. The Marris lost 300 killed.

On hearing of this fresh disaster, Captain Brown quickly set to work to put the fort in a state of defence. On the 4th of June he received an express to say that no reinforcements could be sent him, but that Captain J. D. D. Bean, the Political Agent at Quetta, had been asked to send some Kakars to his assistance; but this was not of much use, for these very Kakars soon after attacked Captain Bean himself.

The Marris constantly hovered about, coming down on any helpless grass-cutters or followers who strayed too far; but they never attempted the faintest approach to an assault. Bad water and food, and hard work, soon began to tell on the men, and on the 14th of July Captain Brown records that 90 out of his 140 men were unable to put on their belts from ulcers.

He then commenced putting all his camp followers through a course of drill. The Marris continued their respectful blockade, stationing small picquets all round out of range, till about the 10th of August, when they began to be more energetic in their harassing, upon which Lieutenant Erskine dropped a shell in the middle of them, killing and wounding fifteen. On this day the garrison managed to capture three hundred sheep and fifty-seven goats, which were grazing too near the fort.

On the 12th of August 1840 a detachment, consisting of 464 bayonets, 1st and 2nd Bombay Grenadiers, a detail of 34 gunners, and three 12-pounder howitzers, marched for Kahan, under Major T. Clibborn.

It had been intended to send a detachment of Her Majesty's 40th Regiment, but for some reason this was countermanded. The force had charge of 12,000 camels and 600 bullocks. At Pulaji it was increased by 200 sabres, Poona Horse and Sind Horse, under Lieutenants W. Loch and G. Malcolm respectively. The detachment entered the hills on the 24th, and reached the foot of the Sartaf pass in five marches. It took fourteen hours to get the convoy and guns up this pass, and the troops suffered much from

*Operations
against the
Marris in
1840.*

the burning heat of an August sun; but they bore it cheerfully, without a complaint. The night was passed on the table-land on the summit with no water nearer than the foot of the pass. The men had little rest, as the picquets were much harassed during the night. At 2 A.M. on the morning of the 31st of August the march was continued to the Naffusak pass (see Map, p. 646); the road was very bad, and it was 10 A.M. before the foot of the defile was reached. The crest was seen to be crowded with the enemy. The troops were wearied and exhausted, and the heat was fearfully oppressive. A letter from Captain Brown in Kahan on the 27th reported that abundance of rain had fallen, and that no doubt a sufficiency of water would be found at the encamping ground below the Naffusak pass. It was found, however, on arrival that there was no water, and the supply with the troops was exhausted; under these circumstances it was evident that the whole force must perish from thirst, unless the pass of Naffusak was carried. Beyond, water was said to be procurable, and the fort of Kahan was only distant about six miles. Major Clibborn waited anxiously till half-past one for the arrival of the rear guard. At 2 A.M. the dispositions for attacking the pass were concluded, and the storming party moved up the steep face of the mountain. The road had been destroyed by the enemy, and breastworks had been constructed at different points to stop the advance. These were surmounted, and the crest was almost gained, when the enemy opened a tremendous fire, and rushed down with a wild shout, sword in hand, on the advancing troops. Hundreds and hundreds poured over the ridges of the mountain, and, leaping into the midst of the men, bore all before them. The attack of the Marris was carried out with such gallantry and impetuosity that it was not until they arrived almost at the muzzles of the guns that their advance was checked. Here, being exposed to a brisk infantry fire, and to the fire of the howitzers, which were pouring grape into them, they were repulsed with great slaughter, dispersing in all directions, and numbers falling in the flight. The loss on the mountain side was now found to have been very severe; nearly half the storming party had fallen, including their gallant commander, Captain C. B. Raitt, 1st Bombay Grenadiers, and three other officers.

The enemy had been repulsed, and most of their influential men were lying dead around; but the pass remained in their possession, and their numbers were still very great.

To follow up such a success was impossible; the heat was intense, and the sufferings of the men and cattle from exhaustion and thirst were dreadful.

The men grew clamorous for drink, and the cries of the wounded and dying for water! water! were increasing. The few bottles of beer among the officers' baggage, given to allay the wants of the greatest sufferers, gave rise to scenes of frenzy and despair. Men of all castes rushed and struggled for them, and many a miserable wretch, on getting hold of a bottle and finding it empty, dropped lifeless on the ground. The scene was agonising to behold. Parties were sent to search for water; and, on receiving a report that there was some in a ravine at some little distance, all the *pakhal* camels and the *bhistis* were ordered there, under the escort of the Irregular Horse, and were accompanied by the artillery horses, which were too exhausted to be fit for any work. The evening was spent in collecting and bringing off the wounded, and about sunset it was reported that no water had been found, and that the whole party sent for it had been surrounded in a ravine, the greater part cut to pieces, and the horses carried off. To add to the difficulties of the situation,

most of the camel men and *doolie* bearers had absconded after the action. In order to save the remainder of the troops and followers, no other course remained but to make a rapid retreat to the water at Sartaf, abandoning the guns and stores, and also the garrison of Kahan. *Operations against the Marri in 1840.*

Accordingly, at 11 o'clock, having spiked the guns, the detachment moved off, the wounded men being carried on the few camels that it was possible to take with them. Nearly everything else was abandoned—guns, stores, camp equipage, etc., as there was no means of removing them. The top of the Sartaf pass was reached, fortunately, without opposition. Here all discipline was at an end; the men, rushing down the hill, leaped into the pools of water like madmen. The rear guard was attacked by a large body of the enemy, and the slaughter among the camp followers was immense. As soon as the men could be got from the water, they were formed into square, as the enemy were reported to have shown themselves on all sides, and daybreak was awaited. When daylight broke it was found that the detachment was absolutely without food, and nothing remained for it but to make a forced march to Pulaji, distant more than fifty miles. The sufferings of all on this march from the intense heat, rendered more insupportable by the reflection of the sand, is not to be described. Captain A. C. Heighington, of the 1st Bombay Grenadiers, died the day after the force reached Pulaji, from the effects of the sun and fatigue, and many of the men died on the march. Major Clibborn's exertions were untiring, and his courage and self-possession through these trying scenes were most conspicuous, and were the admiration of all. In his official despatch he deservedly noticed the gallant bravery of Lieutenant W. Loch, of the Poona Irregular Horse, and Lieutenant G. Malcolm, of the Sind Horse. The officers killed in the disastrous attack on the pass were Captain C. B. Raitt, Lieutenant R. R. Moore, Jemadar Jewrakeen Singh, of the 1st Grenadiers, and Lieutenant H. Franklin, Ensign A. Williams, and Subadar Guru Bakhsh, of the 2nd Grenadiers; and of the non-commissioned officers and men, 179 were killed and 92 wounded, out of a force of about 650 men.

In the meanwhile the gallant little detachment at Kahan remained in suspense; they had witnessed the attack on the pass, but it was not for seven days that they had the slightest idea that any disaster had happened; they thought that Clibborn, finding the Naffusak too strong, had gone round by the Dera route. On the 7th of September the truth was known, and Captain Brown accordingly began to make preparations for the worst. On the 17th a letter reached him from the Brigade-Major at Sukkur informing him of the disaster, and leaving him to his "own resources, it being impossible to send any further relief."

The number of sick, and the weakly state of the rest of the detachment, gave little chance of an escape by a night march. Still, Captain Brown put the best face on the matter, and, making a calculation, found they could hold out until the 15th of October on quarter rations and the gun bullocks; he therefore decided on holding out unless he got honourable terms.

On the 22nd a messenger came from Doda, the Marri chief, to say that if Captain Brown would leave his fort he was willing to make terms. To this he received answer that his fort would be given back to him on condition that he would give security for the safe arrival of the detachment in the plains. These terms were agreed to, and on the 28th of September the little garrison left the fort, taking with them their gun. It is unnecessary to describe the details of that return march; suffice it to say that, after overcoming great difficulties and enduring much suffering, the little band

*Operations
against the
Bugtis in
1845.*

arrived at Pulaji on the 1st of October, emaciated, ragged, hungry, and destitute, yet bringing with them their gun and their honour.

From the date of Captain Brown's leaving the Marri hills there was little communication between the British Government and this tribe until Major-General Sir Charles Napier's expedition against the Bugtis in 1845. It was then an object of great importance to cut off the retreat of the latter tribe to the north, and Sir Charles Napier, in a characteristic letter to Captain J. Jacob, the officer in political charge of the frontier of Upper Sind, asked him to undertake to gain over the Marris. This was not an easy task, as the Bugtis tried to get up the belief that, directly they were destroyed, the British would serve the Marris in the same manner. Captain Jacob, however, sent messengers, who found that the Marri chief with all his people had deserted Kahan, and had retreated to the next valley on the north, and consequently there was considerable difficulty in gaining them round. However, the chiefs were at last persuaded to wait on Captain Jacob at Lehri, and having explained the wishes of the Major-General to them, he induced them to visit him at Dera and give the necessary co-operation. This they did effectually, and thus closed two lines of retreat to the Bugtis. Sir Charles Napier treated the chiefs with favour, and gave them handsome presents.

To turn now to the operations against the Bugtis. At the beginning of 1845, provoked by repeated acts of lawlessness on the part of the Dumkis, Jakranis, and Bugtis, Major-General Sir Charles Napier, G.C.B., commanding in Sind, determined on undertaking a campaign, with a view of exterminating or capturing them all. The force assembled for this purpose consisted of four 9-pounder guns, nine howitzers, three mortars, and a siege train of twenty-one pieces; 2,000 cavalry; and 2,500 infantry, besides the forces of Amir Ali Morad and other auxiliaries, amounting to 2,000 men and 10 guns. The plan of operations was to drive the enemy into the hills in front of Pulaji, Uch, and Shahpur (*see General Map*), and then to advance from Sind by Zarani, and, while the enemy was engaged in front, to send a force from the left to cut them off from the Marris.

Before entering the Bugti hills, Sir Charles Napier issued a proclamation to the neighbouring tribes, stating that his object was to punish the Dumki, Jakrani, and Bugti robbers, who had hitherto plundered unchecked in British territory. On the night of the 15th of January 1845 an advanced column surrounded the village of Shahpur, and captured sixty-two Biluchis, three men being killed and three wounded on our side.

At the same time a force was detached to Uch, to try and cut off the retreat of the Bugtis; this force came on the enemy in position, 700 strong, under Daria Khan, the Jakrani chief, and immediately charged and dispersed them, capturing 3,000 head of cattle. In the meanwhile the levies had occupied Pulaji, the enemy retreating to the hills to the east. A magazine was formed at Shahpur, and supplies for fourteen days were collected there.

A column was now ordered to advance from Pulaji on Bugti Dera, a distance of seven marches; and at the same time the Major-General, with a second column, advanced by the passes to the south of Dera. The enemy, however, alarmed by the movement in their rear, did not wait to meet our troops, but abandoned their position, and effected their escape to the east. On the 30th of January the force from Pulaji reached Dera, which was occupied

without opposition, and the following day Sir Charles Napier opened communication with this column.

*Operations
against the
Bugtis in
1845.*

The enemy having thus escaped to the east, the Major-General halted and sent foraging parties in various directions to scour the country and bring in cattle. These were more or less successful; but the enemy now commenced to harass the communications, the post was twice intercepted, sixty camels were carried off and several followers murdered, and, a panic arising among the camel men, they deserted, with five hundred camels from Shahpur.

In this state of affairs intelligence was received that the confederate chieftains, having ensconced themselves in a fastness only twenty miles distant, were starving, and the next day a message was received to say that their leader, Bijar Khan, the Dumki chief, wished to surrender. To this, the Major-General sent back the answer, "Let the *Khan* lay down his arms at my feet, and be prepared to emigrate with his followers to a district which I will point out on the left bank of the Indus, and he shall be pardoned. If he refuses these terms he shall be pursued to the death."

On the 5th of February a patrol discovered and killed several armed hill men between the passes. But famine now menaced the army, owing to the difficulty in getting camels, and Sir Charles Napier, in his extremity, detached the Sind Camel Corps,* which formed part of the force, to fetch food from Shahpur. In one night, after a march of fifty miles, they reached Shahpur, and, having loaded their camels with forty-five thousand pounds of flour, they regained the camp on the morning of the 8th, having taken but two days and three nights for the whole expedition.

On the very day this supply came, another message was received to say that not Bijar Khan only, but all the chiefs, were ready to surrender; but the following day a treacherous attack was made on the *dak*, and several men of the escort were killed, and another attack was made on a small reconnoitring party, which was, however, repulsed with loss to the enemy.

Negotiations having failed, orders were given for active operations to be resumed, and the right of the force was moved forward to within a short distance of the Mazari frontier, the extreme left being at Dera.

At the same time the Mazaris were warned against giving the Bugtis any assistance. Fortunately, the latter, just before the commencement of the campaign, had plundered some hill Mazaris, and that, combined with the Major-General's warnings, induced them to send in several chiefs with three hundred followers as hostages for their good behaviour.

On the 18th news was brought in that the enemy's camp was at a place on the Mazari frontier, about twenty miles distant, and it was accordingly determined to surprise them. For this purpose the troops were secretly put in motion on the 19th, but, by an accident, the enemy discovered this intention, and fled from their position. A large quantity of grain and a hundred and fifty camel loads of baggage were, however, captured, and the last was given as a prize to the soldiers. The extreme fatigue of the troops, who had been twenty-two hours under arms, prevented any attempt being made to pursue the enemy.

The Bugtis and their allies had now retreated to the north-east corner of the Bugti country, to the Khetran frontier; but they were refused an asylum in the Khetran and Sikh territories, and were delivered over to the British

* Transferred to the Bengal Presidency in 1849, and now the 6th Punjab Infantry.

*Operations
against the
Bugtis in
1845.*

operations. At last they took refuge in Traki, a natural fortress to the north-east of Dera, and here they were surrounded by the British troops, and preparations were made to storm their fastness. On the 4th of March, however, Bijar Khan, Dumki; Islam Khan, Bugti; and Daria Khan, Jakrani, the principal chiefs of the enemy, came in to make their submission. They demanded terms, and were told that these were—submission, transportation from their hills, and settlement in the plains.

To these, after much discussion, the chiefs would not agree; so the Major-General sent a number of small columns to scour the interior of the fastness. Two brothers of Bijar Khan were captured on the 7th, but the chief himself eluded our troops till the 9th, when he surrendered, and was transported to Sind. Islam Khan, Bugti, escaped to the Khetrans. The campaign, after fifty-four days of incessant exertion, having thus been brought to a conclusion, the force left the hills on the 15th of March, and returned to Shikarpur, where it was broken up.

The above operations against the Bugtis do not seem, however, to have had much effect, for, on the 8th of August 1846, the Collector of Shikarpur issued the following proclamation:—

“Know all men living in the British territories of Sind, that it has become necessary to make arrangements for keeping off the Bugtis and other mountain robbers, and putting a stop to their robberies. Therefore, it is hereby ordered, that whoever will seize any of the Bugti mountaineers, and deliver them to the British horsemen, shall receive a reward of Rs. 10 for each man of the mountaineers so seized and delivered up.”

That there was some reason for this proclamation was soon shown, for on the 10th of December 1846 the Bugtis assembled a force of some 1,500 armed men, mostly on foot, and marched into Sind; they passed through the British outposts to within fifteen miles of Shikarpur, remained twenty-four hours in British territory, secured every head of cattle in the country round, and returned to their hills, seventy-five miles, with all their booty—15,000 head—in perfect safety. They conducted their proceedings with the greatest coolness and system, bringing with them, besides the armed force above mentioned, nearly 500 unarmed followers to drive the cattle. This inroad was thought to be in too great force for the detachments at the outposts to attempt any resistance to it. Timely information reached the Shahpur post, but no troops moved out from it against the invading Bugtis. A regiment of cavalry and 200 bayonets were sent from Shikarpur to repel the invaders. The cavalry came on them at Hudi, some forty-five miles from Shikarpur,—their unarmed attendants meanwhile diligently continuing to drive on the cattle towards the hills. However, the British troops being ignorant of the ground, and thinking the robbers too strong to be attacked, returned to Shikarpur without attempting anything further; the Bugtis ultimately reaching their hills with all their prey, and without the loss of a man.

Major Jacob was now ordered up from Hyderabad with the Sind Irregular Horse, and from the date of his arrival a new era commenced, and the Bugtis found that their master had come on the scene. Raids, however, did not cease at once, and several were committed during 1847, and on the 1st of October of that year occurred the famous raid in which Lieutenant W. L. Merewether, Sind Irregular Horse, killed nearly 600 of the marauders.

In this affair, a large body of Bugtis having entered the plain and

attacked some villages, Lieutenant Merewether, with a party of the Sind Irregular Horse, amounting to 133 of all ranks, started in pursuit from Shahpur at 1.30 A.M. on the 1st of October, and came up with the enemy soon after daybreak, as they were entering the low hills. By means of a feint, Lieutenant Merewether succeeded in drawing the enemy out into the open, and then, suddenly changing front to the left, charged the Bugtis, who had formed a solid mass to receive him, with irresistible effect. The enemy were overthrown with great loss, and as they attempted to regain the hills, they were charged repeatedly, and a small body of the cavalry eventually got in between them and the hills, and forced them back again into the open plain. Though repeated offers of quarter were made to them, they obstinately continued to fight, until their numbers were reduced to about 120, many of whom were wounded. At last, seeing resistance utterly hopeless, they were induced to throw down their arms and surrender. Two horsemen alone out of the total force of 700 (including 25 horsemen) escaped to the hills. Among the slain were many of the headmen of the tribe. Our loss in this affair was comparatively small, viz., nine killed and wounded, besides sixteen horses killed. On the following day the force returned to Shahpur, bringing with them the prisoners and the wounded.

*Affair with
the Bugtis in
1847.*

The whole tribe, broken and disheartened, fled for refuge to the Khetrans. The Bugti chief, Islam Khan, was married to a sister of Mir Haji, the Khetran chief. These two tribes then united, and attacked the Marris, and at first had some success, but the Marris eventually defeated the Bugtis with trifling loss to themselves, but with a loss of 500 to their opponents.

Notwithstanding these losses, the Bugtis endeavoured to make one more effort in Sind, but without success. Still the chief did not surrender, and, in order to bring matters to a crisis, Major Jacob managed to have it believed he was going to Dera in person to seize Islam Khan. When this intelligence reached that chief, he at once made up his mind to surrender, and he accordingly came into British territory and gave himself up, and he and a number of the tribe, who also made their submission, were located in British territory. Islam Khan, however, shortly after decamped with his family, and returned to the hills.

In spite of the severe lessons they had received, this border continued to be harassed by parties of Bugtis.

With the Marris we had had little communication since 1845, and although they carried on their depredations without check over Kachi, as far south as Kanda, yet they took care to avoid encroaching on British territory until 1849, when, becoming bold by long impunity, and instigated by the gold and promises of Diwan Mulraj of Multan, they commenced predatory incursions into British territory, and on the 7th of April of that year they joined the Bugtis and the Khetrans in an attack on the Kasmor post.

The detachment of the Sind Irregular Horse (40 sabres) at that place, had been relieved by a similar party. The relieved party, under the command of Naib-Ressaldar Karam Ali Khan, marched from Kasmor towards Kumbi about 2 o'clock on the morning of the 7th of April, and had only departed about one hour, when the party at Kasmor, which had not yet gone into the lines, but was encamped outside, was surrounded and attacked on all sides. A duffadar going his rounds first fell in with the enemy and was killed; the hillmen, immensely outnumbering the men of the Sind Horse, rushed in among the

*Raid on the
Kasmor post
in 1849.*

horses, and a desperate hand-to-hand conflict ensued, which, after a violent struggle, ended in the enemy being beaten off with some loss, leaving many of their number dead on the ground. On our side in the Sind Horse, one duffadar and three sowars were killed, and four sowars were severely wounded; and among the Biluch Guides two sowars were killed. When the attack commenced on the party at Kasmor, Naib-Ressaldar Karam Ali Khan was about four miles distant on the road to Kumbi; but, hearing the firing in the direction of Kasmor, he galloped back with his party towards that place, and as he approached, he came on a body of 300 or 400 horsemen driving off 1,000 camels. He at once charged and dispersed them with severe loss, and then following them up for a considerable distance, recovered and brought back the whole of the plunder they were carrying off. He then returned to Kasmor.

The attacking party, it was afterwards ascertained, had assembled for this raid in Bugti territory, and consisted of about 500 men of the Bugti, Marri, and Khetran tribes. Their loss was forty killed, more than that number wounded, and a great number of their mares killed, wounded, and taken. The party was led by Mir Haji, the Khetran chief, and others.

This attack on the Kasmor post was merely a blind for a more serious attempt to the westward, some 1,500 Marris having, at the same time, entered the plain country by the Lehri river. Owing to the activity on the part of the troops on the frontier, this threatened raid led to nothing.

After the attack on Kasmor, two other raids were made by the Bugtis during the year 1849, but in both of these the camels carried off were recovered, although the raiders themselves escaped.

On the 24th of December 1850 a party of Bugtis carried off a number of camels from the jungle near Kand Kot. Durga Singh, the native officer of the Kand Kot detachment of Sind Horse, started in pursuit, and, after a ride of sixty miles, arrived, with only three men, in the face of the robbers, who numbered one hundred. Notwithstanding, this officer gallantly charged and killed a great number, losing, however, his own life and that of two of his troopers. The place of his death is pointed out still with unfeigned admiration by the Biluchis, and is known as *Durga Kushta*.

With regard to the conduct of the Mazaris and Gurchanis after the annexation. Both these tribes gave much trouble on our border, and up to 1853 armed parties of the former continued to carry on their plundering expeditions in British territory. About this time an Assistant Commissioner was appointed to Mithankot, and thenceforward the reclamation of the Mazaris commenced; so that those who were once such inveterate plunderers are now peaceable and useful subjects. During the troubled times of the Mutiny the chief of this tribe showed his loyalty by doing good service for the Government.

The Gurchanis, however, after the Mazaris had settled down into peaceful subjects, continued to be turbulent. The sections of the tribe which gave most trouble were the Petafis and Lasharis. They were inveterate thieves, and their highway robberies in Harrand, Dajal, and Fazilpur became notorious. The Lasharis lived mostly in the hills, but they used to come down to graze their flocks along the border, and had connections and accomplices in the plains. They also aided the Marris on several occasions in raiding on the Punjab frontier.

In January 1852 a great calamity overcame the Marri tribe; a very

severe shock of earthquake occurred at Kahan. One side of the fort wall was thrown down, the remainder much shattered, and the greater number of the houses inside were overthrown, burying beneath the ruins many men, women, and children, with some cattle, and a great deal of property. *Misconduct of the Marris in 1852-53.*

At the same time that this disaster occurred at Kahan, another even more fearful calamity overtook a portion of the tribe living with their cattle in a large cave some little distance to the northward. The hill (in which the cave was) was violently shaken and fell, burying nearly every living being at that time within it. The road by Naffusak to Kahan was completely closed by the hill falling and filling up the pass through which it formerly went; two hundred and sixty Musalmans, including women and children, were killed, and upwards of eighty Hindus, with a large quantity of cattle.

On the 11th of December 1852 a large body of Marris, said to have been the whole assembled tribe, horse and foot, suddenly issued from the hills and attacked the town of Pulaji, occupied by Kaihiris, a small Biluch tribe friendly to the British. The Marris killed forty of them, chiefly unarmed cultivators and herdsmen, and wounded many more, without apparently suffering any loss themselves. They then carried off all the cattle from the country round, and returned to their hills. This raid was committed with the connivance and assistance of some of the principal Kelat *Sirdars*, headed by the *Wazir*, Muhammad Hassan. Major Jacob accordingly wrote a strong remonstrance to the Khan of Kelat.

On the 3rd of April 1853 a party of Marri marauders carried off some cattle from near Kasmor. Ressaldar Shekh Karim, of the Sind Horse, in command of the post, went in pursuit, and came on the enemy, 80 horse and 80 foot, the latter strongly posted on a hill. The troops at once attacked them, though they only numbered 32 sabres. After a hard fight, the enemy fled. The loss of the Sind Horse was one native officer, seven sowars, and nine horses killed, and two men wounded. A great many of the enemy were killed, but in the darkness of the night the number could not be ascertained.

On the 18th of May 1853, 180 Marris and Lasharis attacked a small detachment of the 4th Punjab Cavalry on the Dera Ghazi Khan border, and cut up six grass-cutters and five of the escort.

After this the Marris carried on their depredations chiefly in Kachi, and avoided making any attacks on Sind territory, although their raids on the Punjab frontier did not altogether cease. They were also engaged in a war with the Bugtis, which was carried on with varying fortunes.

In consequence of Major Jacob's representations, the traitor *Wazir*, Muhammad Hassan, was at length dismissed, and the Khan of Kelat then roused himself, and endeavoured to transact the business of his state in person. A treaty was made with him in 1854, by which he bound himself, in consideration of an annual payment of Rs. 50,000, to protect traders going through his dominions. Out of this amount the *Khan* paid subsidies to the chiefs of the Marris and Bugtis to abstain from plundering. He also placed posts at the head-quarters of these tribes, and made other arrangements for the protection of the frontier. Unfortunately for the success of these measures, the *Khan* died suddenly in 1856, and was succeeded by his brother, who was then a boy of 17 years of age.

From 1854 to 1857 the Gurchanis continued to give much trouble, and in the latter year a party of them acted as guides to a large body of Marris in a formidable attack on the Punjab frontier. This raid was made on the 17th August by a party of 220 horsemen. The marauders, on emerging from

*Raid by
Marris and
Gurchanis on
the Asni plain
in 1857.*

the hills, divided into two parties; one party taking the road towards Drigi, and carrying off all the cattle they could lay hands on; the other scouring the plain in front of Muhammadpur and Fatehpur, and collecting all the herds they could find; the parties then united again on the plain opposite Fatehpur, and made for the hills. In the meanwhile, Bijar Khan, the Drishak* chief and also commandant of Asni, who with about 60 horse and foot was patrolling in that direction, heard from a villager that the Marris were making for the hills with their booty. The chief immediately sent notice to the neighbouring posts, and being reinforced by 56 horse and foot, he proceeded to attack the enemy; but the latter were more than double the number of our levies, who were ultimately defeated with great slaughter, the marauders making good their retreat with their immense booty, only sixty goats and four or five mares being recovered. In this engagement, the chief, Bijar Khan, his eldest son, and twenty-six of the party were killed, besides several wounded, the loss being chiefly among the Drishak tribe, who rallied round their chief, and fell fighting by his side; of the twenty-six killed, twenty-four were Drishaks, the other two being Bugtis. The loss of property was estimated at Rs. 6,000.

The success of this raid was principally due to the absence of all regular troops from the Rajanpur frontier, owing to the 1st Punjab Cavalry having been withdrawn for service in Hindustan.

On the 28th of March 1858 a party of 40 police and levies, following up some stolen cattle into the hills, were attacked by a party of 100 Marris, and defeated with some loss.

In addition to their raids on the Dera Ghazi Khan frontier, the Marris continued their inroads into Kachi, and their conduct in that direction had become so intolerable, that, in 1858-59, Khoadad Khan, the young Khan of Kelat, on the advice of Brigadier-General J. Jacob, C.B., the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind frontier, collected the whole forces of the Khanate to punish them. Just at this time Brigadier-General Jacob died, and was succeeded by Major W. H. R. Green, who accompanied the expedition with an escort consisting of a squadron of the Sind Irregular Horse, under the command of his brother, Major Malcolm S. Green.

The forces of the *Khan* assembled at Bhag on the 21st of January 1859, to the number of 4,000 horse and 4,000 foot, and marched on the following day. Dera was reached on the 3rd of February, and Kahan was occupied without opposition on the 7th. Here the fort was destroyed, and the force halted till the 24th, to await the arrival of a convoy of provisions from Kachi. This convoy arrived on the 23rd, and on the following day the force moved from Kahan to the north, in which direction the Marris had retreated.

On the 28th the Marri chief came into the camp with a number of his followers, and tendered his submission to the Khan of Kelat, and begged for mercy for his tribe. Negotiations were accordingly opened with the Marris, who professed their willingness to accede to any terms offered to them, to acknowledge the *Khan* as their lawful prince, and also to give hostages for their future good behaviour.

To this arrangement Major W. H. R. Green was most averse, for though

* A Biluch tribe of the Dera Ghazi Khan district, whose head-quarters are at Asni. The tribe, however, is much scattered in the district.

there was little doubt that the tribe had met with most severe punishment, their fields and forts having been destroyed, their supplies of grain and 1,800 head of cattle captured, yet his knowledge of the innate love of plunder of these robber tribes made him fear that if some very severe example was not made of them when within the *Khan's* grasp, they would soon again return to their old habits. However, His Highness considered they had been sufficiently punished, and the same opinion appeared to prevail among many of the other chiefs. As the *Khan* had been the principal sufferer by the Marri depredations, Major Green considered that it would not be proper to attempt to force further hostilities. He therefore informed the *Khan* that he was at liberty to act as he pleased, but that he would be held strictly responsible for any depredations made by this tribe on British territory at any future time.

*Operations
against the
Marris by the
Khan of Kelat
in 1859.*

Accordingly, having taken hostages for the future good conduct of the tribe, the force again marched for Kachi by the Chakar pass, which was a most difficult one, and re-entered the plains on the 14th of March.

One result of this expedition was to prove to the Marris how even their most inaccessible strongholds can be entered and destroyed. Since the disaster which befel the detachment of British troops under Major T. Clibborn in 1840, the Marris had regarded themselves as invincible; but this campaign completely destroyed their prestige.

One of the guns lost by Major Clibborn in 1840 was recovered during the expedition, and was sent down to Jacobabad, where it arrived safely.

After the raid on the Asni plain in August 1857, already narrated, the Lashari clan of the Gurchanis, who had acted as guides to the Marris on that occasion, absconded to the hills, and the greater part joined the Marris, with whom they continued to raid in the plains. At last, in March 1858, Captain F. R. Pollock, the Deputy Commissioner, with the consent of the Government, determined, under cloak of an expedition by the Survey Department to the Mari hill, just beyond our border, to surprise some Lashari villages in the vicinity. The attempt was not, however, successful, as the Lasharis, having obtained intelligence of the intention, had moved off to the mouth of a small pass within our territory, sending at the same time a party to follow and annoy the surveyors.

It appears, however, that the spot to which the Lasharis had removed was within a convenient distance of the Shambani Bugtis and Mazaris, and these tribes, thinking the opportunity a good one to punish their common foe and enrich themselves, made an attack on them, and carried off 2,000 cattle. In this affair seven Lasharis and two Bugtis were killed. The conduct of the Mazaris and Bugtis was undoubtedly reprehensible, but there were several circumstances of an extenuating character to be taken into consideration, and it was well known that we desired to punish the Lasharis.

The first attempt to reclaim the Lasharis was made in 1860, and although the process was a slow one, yet gradually a change for the better took place.

After the expedition against the Marris in 1859, described above, there was a long discontinuity of raids, till February 1862, when they again offended, and after this they committed several raids on the Punjab border, and also attacked the Bugtis in their hills. The conduct of this latter tribe with regard to the British, from 1852 to 1861, was most exemplary, but in that year, owing to internal dissensions, the tribe became disorganised, and

Raid on Harrand in 1867.

raids were again commenced on the Sind frontier. The offenders belonged chiefly to the Kalpur and Musuri clans.

On the 26th of January 1867 occurred the great raid on Harrand by 1,200 Marris, Bugtis, and Khetrans, under the leadership of a noted free-booter, Ghulam Husen, Musuri Bugti. Timely information of the intended raid was conveyed to Major W. H. Paget, commanding at Rajanpur, by the Bugti chief. On the morning of the 26th the hillmen came out of a pass, about ten miles north of Harrand, and their horsemen at once swept round to try and collect the cattle, but they met with little success, as these had been driven off to the rear on receiving warning of the intended raid. The footmen had in the meanwhile fired some of the hamlets, and the whole then retired towards the hills.

The news of the raid immediately spread, and the Gurchanis, numbering some 350 horse and foot, assembled under their *tumandar*, Ghulam Haidar Khan. The detachment of the 5th Punjab Cavalry, from Harrand, numbering 27 sabres, under Jemadar Imam Khan, turned out most promptly; and as the burning of the hamlets showed the outposts the position of the raiders, they were enabled to lose no time in arriving on the scene of action. The force came up with the enemy, who had formed a line close to the hills. The ground was very bad for cavalry, and Ghulam Haidar Khan wished to wait for reinforcements; but the native officer insisted that he must advance, as the enemy would get into the hills and the cavalry would be unable to act; and accordingly, the 5th Punjab Cavalry detachment, followed by Ghulam Haidar Khan and the mounted Gurchanis, broke into a trot. The sight of the cavalry thus advancing was too much for the raiders; they moved forward for a short distance, then wavered, and all attempts of Ghulam Husen to rally them being useless, they fled as soon as the cavalry got within carbine range. They were followed by the Gurchani footmen up the hillside, and the pursuit was continued towards the Dragal mountain, under which a body of twenty-three Marris and twelve Musuri Bugtis were surrounded, and the latter, refusing to surrender, were killed. The enemy's loss in this affair was two hundred and fifty-eight killed (ninety-three Bugtis, seventy Marris, and ninety-five Khetrans and Pathans) and twenty-four prisoners, and among the killed were Ghulam Husen and several noted criminals. The loss on our side was one duffadar, two sowars, and about fifty Gurchanis wounded.

For his gallant conduct on this occasion, Jemadar Iman Khan received the Order of Merit. As a reward for his services, the grants which had previously been confiscated were restored to Ghulam Haidar Khan, and also the privilege of collecting his share in kind.

After this raid the Marris and the Bugtis refrained from molesting the Punjab frontier, although the former tribe continued to carry on depredations in Kachi and in the Bolan pass. In 1871, after consultation between the Punjab and Sind authorities at Mithankot, arrangements were made for the better management of these tribes, and allowances were granted to them to induce them to desist from raiding on the British border. The system of policy toward these tribes on the Sind and Punjab frontiers was at the same time made uniform, and since then their management has been much simplified. The attitude of both the Marris and the Bugtis, instead of being one of continued hostility, became friendly, and their chiefs showed a readiness to assist the British officers entrusted with the management of this border.

But, although they respected British territory, their inter-tribal feuds continued. In 1873 the Marris raided in Kelat territory, and in December of

that year they made an attack, headed by their chief in person, on the Khetrans, quite close to the British border in front of Dera Ghazi Khan. The Khetrans lost seven killed, and a number of cattle and sheep were carried off. The Marris had two men killed. In January 1874 they made a similar attack on the Musa Khel Pathans, sixteen of whom were killed, the loss of the Marris being only two. In this case, also, a large amount of booty was carried off. In the beginning of 1874 the Commissioner of Sind proposed that the Marris should be punished by a blockade, and in the event of that failing, by a punitive expedition. This course, however, was not sanctioned by the Government, and it was decided to settle matters, if possible, peaceably, without resorting to coercive measures.

Conduct of the Marris and Bugtis subsequent to 1871.

In the meanwhile fresh complications occurred. The Bugti tribe, aided by some Marris, committed a serious outrage in Sind territory, and carried off some 2,000 head of cattle. The effect of this raid was to embroil the two tribes directly with the British Government; whereas previous to this occurrence there was no complaint against the Bugtis, and the culpability of the Marris consisted in the contumacious attitude assumed by the chief and tribe towards their superior, the Khan of Kelat.

There is little doubt that the cause of the Marris assuming this line of conduct was the facility existing of playing off the Sind and Punjab authorities one against the other. Comparatively tractable to the latter, they had justly rendered themselves obnoxious to the former by violating openly and repeatedly their nominal subjection to the Khan of Kelat. The Government therefore determined to deal directly with the tribe in future, so as to render it impossible for them to evade their responsibilities. Eventually, a satisfactory settlement was effected, both with the Marris and also with the Bugtis.

At the beginning of 1877 the Lashari section of the Gurchani tribe showed a tendency to revert to their old marauding habits, but measures were taken with much success to recover property stolen by them, and to prevent a recurrence of such misdeeds.

Expedition against the Marris, by a force under Brigadier-General C. M. MacGregor, C.B., C.S.I., C.I.E., in 1880.

On the outbreak of the Afghan War in 1878, the Marris began to commit petty outrages on the line of communications between Dadar and Lehri; but the tribe as a whole attempted no open hostilities until August 1880.

On the receipt of the news of the disaster at Maiwand on the 27th of July 1880, the troops on the line of communications were ordered to be concentrated at the points of strategical importance, and with this object, the detachments along the line of railway, under construction, between Sibi and Harnai were directed to fall back and concentrate at the former place, for the protection of the Bolan communications.

On this portion of the railway there were employed at the end of July some 5,000 or 6,000 *coolies*, guarded by detachments principally drawn from the 23rd Bombay Native Infantry. At Spin Tangi was a post of 75 men, under Lieutenant F. J. Tobin, of that regiment, strengthened to about 100 bayonets by a small detachment which came in from an adjacent station. When it became known that the works were to be abandoned, a panic took place among the labourers; some 3,000 of them poured into Sibi at once, while about 1,800 crowded

*Expedition
against the
Marris in
1880.*

into Spin Tangi, just as Lieutenant Tobin's detachment, with treasure to the amount of a *lakh* and a half, started on the 6th of August on its retreat to Sibi. The road was very difficult, and the mass of *coolies* greatly hampered the march as well as the defensive power of the little force, which was attacked by large bodies of Marris, who saw a good opportunity for plunder, and it was only by abandoning the treasure that the detachment could make its way to Sibi, with the loss of its baggage and tents, several clerks and *coolies* being killed, and Lieutenant Tobin himself being wounded. This raid was followed up by depredations on the line of communications. An attack on Mal, however, failed, and the Marris were driven off by the troops with a loss of twelve to fifteen killed and twenty wounded, and this affair seems to have deterred them from raiding on Kachi.

In order to punish the Marris for these outrages, and also to place our political relations with them on a sounder and surer basis, it was decided to offer them the following terms, and in the event of their refusing to accept them, to send an expedition into their country to enforce them :—

- 1st. Restitution of treasure and property plundered.
- 2nd. Twenty thousand rupees fine.
- 3rd. Blood-money, according to tribal custom, for those killed.
- 4th. British troops to march through the Marri country by Kahan to Harrand.
- 5th. Approved hostages to be given for the future good conduct of the tribe.

11-9th Royal Artillery.
2-60th Rifles.
3rd Punjab Cavalry.
2nd Sikh Infantry.
3rd Sikh Infantry.
4th Gurkha Regiment.
5th Gurkha Regiment.

The command of the expedition was entrusted to Brigadier-General C. M. MacGregor, C.B., C.S.I., C.I.E., and a force, as per margin, of 393 sabres and 2,496 bayonets, numbering in all 3,074 of all ranks, was placed at his disposal. Of these troops, 11-9th Royal Artillery, the 4th Gurkhas, and one company, 2-60th Rifles, were at Harnai, and the remainder, under Brigadier-General MacGregor, were concentrated at Sibi. The whole force, after uniting, was ordered to proceed in the first instance to Quat-Mandai, there to await the result of the negotiations which were being carried on by the political authorities with the chiefs of the Marri clan.

By the 13th of October the entire force was concentrated at Babar Kach, and on the following day the united force marched eight miles and a half to Quat-Mandai (*see Map, p. 646*).

Here the country was well watered and fertile, and the standing crops furnished ample forage; the villages had been deserted, and no opposition was met with, although the roads had been flooded by the Marris, who were reported to have been joined by the Luni Pathans, and to have thrown off the authority of their chief, Mir Ulla Khan, who did not wish to fight. It had been Brigadier-General MacGregor's original intention to march straight upon Kahan from Quat-Mandai, but as such a step would have had the effect of driving the Marris to the hills, and thus putting off all chance of an understanding with them, he now decided to cut in between them and their northern neighbours, the Lunis, and by heading the Marris themselves in the direction of Kolu, inflict on them one crushing blow, and thus end the campaign.

During the 15th and 16th of October the force halted at Quat-Mandai, in order to allow a few days' grace to the Marri chiefs; but as then no intimation had been received of the result of the negotiations, the Brigadier-General

determined to advance, in accordance with the original orders he had received. *Expedition
against the
Marris in
1880.*

On the 17th the force marched to Dalujal (fourteen miles and a half), leaving at Quat-Mandai the 2nd Sikhs, two guns, 11-9th Royal Artillery, and one squadron, 3rd Punjab Cavalry, all under the command of Major W. C. Anderson, of the last-named regiment. On the following day the force (less Anderson's detachment) marched to Spin Kach, the Spin Tangi being traversed without opposition, which was probably partly due to the movement being unexpected. Owing to the difficulties of the road, the rear guard did not reach camp till twenty-four hours after the commencement of the march, which was

No. 2 Bombay Mountain Battery, 2 guns.
2nd Bombay Light Cavalry, 129 sabres.
15th Bombay Native Infantry, 309 bayonets.

five miles in length. At Spin Kach the troops as per margin, under Colonel G. S. Morris, which were destined to form the garrison of Thal-Chotiali, joined

Brigadier-General MacGregor's column, and the whole force marched on the 19th to Kuriak (eight miles), and the next day to Kandi (eleven miles).

No opposition was met with, and the road was fairly good, except in a few places where the 3,000 baggage animals had to march in single file, on which account the rear guard on the 20th took ten hours to cover the eleven miles.

At 6 A.M. on the 21st the column marched for Sembar. The pass bearing this name, though affording the strongest possible defensible position, was found to be unoccupied by the enemy; the road, however, presented the most formidable obstacles. At about ten miles from the start, Sembar (which is nothing but a name) was reached.

Here there was scarcely any water, and the force was compelled to push on over another *kotal* (4,000 feet), the road becoming worse and worse. The Brigadier-General and staff halted for some hours near the crest, the advanced guard pressing on down the northern slopes, and finally encamping at about 5 P.M. near a well lying in the Thal plain, about two miles from its southern edge. Meanwhile, the baggage and rear guard was much delayed, but, fortunately, the opposition was of the slightest, a few shots only having been fired near the eastern debouchure of the pass.

It was not, however, until 10 A.M. on the morning of the 22nd that the rear guard reached the camping ground, having been on the road, and almost without water, for twenty-eight hours. The total distance was twenty miles, and during the march 240 transport animals were lost.

On the following day a detachment of two squadrons of the 2nd Bombay Cavalry, which had been unable to catch up the head-quarters of the regiment before, came through the pass, and found four bodies of camp followers, who had been murdered on the previous day. A few shots were fired at this detachment, and one sowar was wounded.

On the 22nd the column marched to Thal (eight miles and a half) across the level plain. The effect of the adoption of this route was now proved to be in accordance with the Brigadier-General's expectations, and the Lunis, alarmed for the safety of their own villages thus directly threatened, broke off their alliance with the Marris, and their headmen came into the British camp at Thal to offer their services to fight against their former allies if required.

The Brigadier-General was still without any intimation of the results of the negotiations with the Marri chiefs, and he was thus placed in a false position, being uncertain whether he was entering an enemy's country or not. As,

*Expedition
against the
Marris in
1880.*

however, any apparent hesitation might have a bad effect, he decided, after halting a day at Thal in order to fill up his supplies, to push forward into the Marri country.

To prevent any mistake, however, he wrote to Mir Ulla Khan, the chief of the Marris, as well as to Karam Khan of Kolu, the chief of the Bijarani (the most hostile) section, inviting them to come in and hear the terms of the British Government.

On the 25th, after leaving all the sick and the surplus transport at Thal, the force marched to Chotiali. From this place two roads lead to Kolu—one by Burg, which was said to be bad and to be without water, and the other, which was the route selected, by Bala Dhaka, somewhat longer, but easier.

From Chotiali it was four marches by this route to Kolu, thence three more to Mamand, and from there four to Kahan, making a total of eleven marches.

Supplies were therefore filled up for eleven days. Leaving the troops under Colonel Morris to occupy the posts of Thal and Chotiali, the Bengal troops advanced on the 26th to Paniali. Here a final message was sent to Mir Ulla Khan and Karam Khan, to the effect that if they did not come in at once, Kolu, Mamand, and Kahan would be treated as hostile districts. On the 27th the force marched thirteen miles to Baniwali, and the following day continued its march to Bala Dhaka and Gusra (nine miles).

At early dawn on the 29th, two regiments were sent on to seize the Khuba Wanga pass, leading to the Kolu valley, with orders to render the road through it practicable. This was effected by 10 A.M. The pass was found to be very difficult, and the baggage took all day to accomplish the march, the rear guard not reaching the new camp at Nikra until 10 P.M.

The Marris were now completely headed; there was no longer any fear of their joining the Lunis, or of their seeking an asylum in the Khetran country, and unless they opposed the column, they must withdraw to the westward. Karam Khan had already deserted his fort in Kolu, and the force marched thither on the 30th. It was at this time reported that one portion of the Marris advocated a general assembling at Sawar, to the west, while others were in favour of concentrating near Kahan, on the south-west. Brigadier-General MacGregor's object was to prevent any tendency to assembling in separate bodies, and as the Sawar direction appeared to be that in which they would most probably prefer to make their principal stand, the Brigadier endeavoured to manœuvre so as to compel them to abandon the Kahan position. This was effected by an announcement that he intended to march direct on Kahan by the Dowla Wanga pass; the result of the announcement being that the following day the enemy were reported to be abandoning the Kahan position, and retreating towards the Chakar Tangi and Nili with their flocks, and women, and children.

On this day (the 30th) Major Anderson was instructed to postpone for the present the destruction of Mandai, which he had originally been ordered to carry out on the 1st of November.

On the 31st the force advanced through the Dowla Wanga pass, twelve miles in the direction of Mamand. There were two or three difficult places, and some delay occurred in the pass, so that the rear guard did not arrive in camp till 6.30 P.M. On this day the Brigadier-General received information that the negotiations with the Marris had been broken off, and that he was at liberty to carry out the instructions he had received to enforce the terms on the tribe. On the receipt of this message, Brigadier-

General MacGregor sent to inform the Marri chief, Mir Ulla Khan, that if he wished to come in he must do so at once. On the 1st of November the force marched sixteen miles to Kui. During the afternoon, Mir Ulla Khan arrived in the British camp, and was informed of the terms which the Government demanded, to which a straightforward answer must be given on the following day at Mamand. *Expedition against the Marri in 1880.*

The next day the march was continued to that place, and Mir Ulla Khan and Karam Khan both came into camp. After recapitulating the terms and explaining what he proposed to do in the event of their not being accepted, the Brigadier-General addressed a few words to them, somewhat as follows:—"I have now read to you the orders of Government in regard to the terms which they have been pleased to require from you. I have also told you what I propose to do, and I have now only to say this: you must give me a straight answer—'Yes' or 'No'—in one hour. You must either fight or obey the orders of Government. For myself I do not care much which you do; my troops will be very glad if you fight. Now go away and settle matters." This short address had the desired effect, and within the hour Mir Ulla Khan and Karam Khan came to give in their unreserved submission. Brigadier-General MacGregor then demanded three hostages—one from the Ghazani section, one from the Bijaranis, and one on the part of the chief. He also demanded the immediate payment of Rs. 50,000, and that Mandai should be held until the rest of the fine imposed by Government was realised. This was agreed to, and the chiefs themselves consented to accompany the British troops to Kahan. On the 3rd of November, leaving Mamand on the left, the force marched three miles to the westward, in order to profit as far as possible by the standing crops.

The Brigadier-General's intention, in the event of the non-submission of the Marri, had been here to divide his force into two columns, one to advance by Safed Tok to Nili (four marches), the other to the Chakar Tangi. At the same time Major Anderson, at Mandai, was to be ordered to advance towards Nili (where the principal body of the enemy was assembled), and effect a junction with the Lunis and the Thal Chotiali garrison from the north, and thus surround the enemy.

On the 4th of November the column marched by the Ghora Dand to Khanki (seven miles) *en route* to Kahan, and on the 5th the advance was continued to Ghar Daf (fourteen miles), the chief going on from this place to Kahan, to endeavour to have the fine ready on the arrival of the British troops. Kahan was reached on the 6th of November. About four miles from the capital the Brigadier-General was met by Mir Ulla Khan, Karam Khan, and other leading men of the Marri, who, on approaching, dismounted and advanced on foot to meet him.

Mir Ulla Khan, acting as spokesman, asked for forgiveness in the name of the tribe in most humble terms; he promised on their behalf to pay up the rest of the fine, and to fulfil all the other conditions, and as an earnest of their intentions he said he had brought with him Rs. 50,000 in cash and the hostages that had been demanded. The Brigadier-General replied in a few words, and said:—"I am glad you have the sense to see that such a wretched band of robbers as you are cannot cope with the British Government. I accept the money and the hostages that you have brought as a token of your real submission, and I shall therefore not destroy Kahan."

The troops then advanced and encamped on the west of the town. Kahan lies in a magnificent plain, well watered, well wooded, and highly

*Expedition
against the
Marris in
1880.*

cultivated. During the day arrangements were made for the return of the expeditionary force to India.

The total fine and compensation was fixed at two *lakhs*, the blood-money at Rs. 60,000, and the hostages were,—a brother of Mir Ulla Khan, on behalf of the *Sirdars* of the tribe generally; Karam Khan, as the representative of the Bijarani; and Mir Hazar, as that of the Ghazani section. The hostages were taken to Khanpur, and then sent in charge of Lieutenant R. H. Jennings by rail to Sibi.

The force halted near Kahan on the 7th of November, but the town was not entered by any of the troops, in deference to the feelings of the inhabitants. On the 8th Brigadier-General MacGregor left Kahan, and marched twenty miles over easy country to Suji Kach, crossing the Marri eastern frontier during the march.

On the 9th of November the force marched from Suji Kach to Ketchi Kot (four miles and a half), and on the following day to Chatt, by the Burzen pass. On the 11th the march was continued to Kalchas, and the next day Bet Bakshah, in British territory, was reached.

On arriving at Drigi the force was broken up, and the regiments ordered to march for their respective stations.

The expedition had thus been brought to a successful issue as regards the submission of the majority of the Marris; but the Mandai Marris had not been adequately dealt with, and it will be necessary to refer to them again.

In submitting his report on the above operations, Brigadier-General MacGregor stated that the country traversed by the troops was of the most difficult nature, that on two occasions the troops were out for twenty-four and on one occasion for thirty-six hours, and that the conduct of all, British and native, was excellent. The despatch ended with a recognition of the services of commanding officers of regiments and of the staff officers attached to the column, especially Captain C. R. Macgregor, Transport Officer; Captain A. T. S. A. Rind, Commissariat Officer; Lieutenant R. H. Jennings, Royal Engineers, Political Officer; Captain M. C. Brackenbury, Royal Engineers, Field Engineer; Captain R. Chalmer, Brigade-Major; Captain H. M'L. Hutchison, Deputy-Assistant Quarter-Master General; Surgeons-Major G. C. Chesnaye and E. C. Markey; and the personal staff, including Captain W. J. Gill, Royal Engineers, acting as Survey Officer.

In acknowledging the report of the above operations, the Government of India considered that credit was due to Brigadier-General C. M. MacGregor, and the officers and men under his command, for the manner in which these operations were conducted through a difficult country, and that the marching, endurance, and soldierly qualities displayed by the troops were all that could be desired.

The settlement of the Marri question appeared to be not wholly satisfactory, as already stated, with regard to the Mandai portion of the tribe, and on the 6th of December following, Major Sir R. G. Sandeman, the Governor-General's Agent, Biluchistan, made a requisition on the Brigadier-General in command of the communications for the escort allowed him by Government, *viz.*, two mountain guns, one troop of cavalry, and 160 bayonets, as he intended to move towards the Marri country.

The troops as per margin were accordingly placed at his disposal, and orders were received for these to be increased by 250 bayonets of the 29th Bombay Native Infantry, the whole escort being under the command of Colonel O. V. Tanner, of that regiment.

11-9th Royal Artillery ... 2 guns.
8th Bengal Cavalry ... 1 troop.
29th Bombay Native Infantry, 2 companies.

Settlement with the Marri in 1881.

On the 18th of December Major Sir R. G. Sandeman marched for Mandai, with the intention of entering the Marri hills for four or five marches, in order to support Sirdar Mir Ulla Khan, who was endeavouring to recover from the Mandai Marri their share of the fine which had been imposed on the tribe. Up to that time he had only succeeded in recovering from them Rs. 25,000, and five cart-loads of property looted during the outrage on the 6th of August. The escort was to be supported by the garrison of Mandai, now consisting of two mountain guns, one regiment of Bombay Infantry, and one squadron of Madras Cavalry, which had relieved Major Anderson's detachment after the termination of Brigadier-General MacGregor's operations.

The Mandai Marri, however, overawed by this display of force, did not wait to be coerced, but came in and tendered their submission to Sir R. G. Sandeman, and agreed to pay in full the whole fine of Rs. 50,000.

On the 6th of January 1881 a final settlement was effected with the whole Marri tribe, by which it was stipulated, among other things, that all roads through the Marri country should remain open to traffic; that in the event of thefts or offences being committed either in British territory or on the trade routes, the *tumandar* and chiefs should be responsible for the restoration of the stolen property or for the production of the actual offenders; that when summoned by the political officer, the *tumandar* or any of the chiefs should at once attend; that approved hostages with one *ressaldar* and ten sowars should remain, till further orders, present at Sibi; and that the Marri tribe should not wage war or attempt to inflict retribution on any other people or tribe without the permission of the British Government.

The tribe appear, up to the present time, to have acted fairly well up to this agreement, with the exception of the last stipulation, which they have broken by carrying on feuds with several of the neighbouring tribes, such as the Khetrans, Mazaris, and Bugtis; these feuds, however, have not affected the peace of the British border.

In 1880 the Durkanis, one of the hill sections of the Gurchanis, gave some trouble by their lawless behaviour. They became involved in a feud with the Khetrans, and were joined by a few of their brethren from British territory. In December 1880 this feud had so spread as to threaten the whole border. The matter was taken up by the local British authorities, who, in January 1881, succeeded in patching up a peace between the two tribes at Harrand. The Durkanis, however, in March violated their agreement, and committed a serious raid on the Khetrans. For this offence a blockade was imposed on them, and shortly afterwards they came in, made their submission, and adjusted the claims against them, and the blockade was removed on the 29th of July 1881. They, however, did not cease to make reprisals and plunder their neighbours in the hills beyond the border. The main reason for their restlessness is doubtless the reduced condition of this clan, many of whose members are in poor and straitened circumstances. A grant of land has just been made to the Durkani headmen, on condition of its being cultivated by

Conduct of the Gurchanis and Mazaris at the present time. their clansmen, in order to induce them to take to more settled habits. The Lasharis, the other hill section of the Gurchanis, have lately behaved fairly well.

The Gurchani *tumandar*, Sirdar Ghulam Haidar Khan, who has been the chief of the tribe since the annexation, and who has gradually been failing in health, died on the 23rd of March 1884. His son, Jalal Khan, succeeds him.


The Mazari tribe continues to be well managed by its *tumandar*, Nawab Imam Bakhsh Khan, who has now had the control of the tribe for more than thirty years.

MAP OF MARRI COUNTRY

TO ILLUSTRATE
THE MOVEMENTS
OF THE
EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
UNDER
BRIGADIER-GENERAL C. M. MAGGREGOR, C.B., C.S.I., C.I.E.,
October & November 1880.

REFERENCE,

Route of Column



CHAPTER XX.

APPENDICES.

APPENDIX I.

Composition of the Punjab Frontier Force at the present time.

Cavalry.

1st Punjab Cavalry.
2nd Punjab Cavalry.
3rd Punjab Cavalry.
5th Punjab Cavalry.

(Queen's Own) Corps of Guides (Cavalry and Infantry).

Artillery.

No. 1 (Kohat) Mountain Battery.
No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery.
No. 3 (Peshawar) Mountain Battery.
No. 4 (Hazara) Mountain Battery.
No. 5 Garrison Battery.

Infantry.

1st Sikh Infantry.
2nd (or Hill) Sikh Infantry.
3rd Sikh Infantry.
4th Sikh Infantry.
1st Punjab Infantry.
2nd Punjab Infantry.
4th Punjab Infantry.
5th Punjab Infantry.
6th Punjab Infantry.
5th Gurkha Regiment (Hazara Gurkha Battalion).

Each Regiment of Punjab Cavalry consists of 6 troops organised in 3 squadrons, with the following establishment.—Commandant—3 Squadron Commanders—4 Squadron Officers—1 Medical Officer—3 Ressaldars—3 Ressaidars—1 Woordie-Major—6 Jemadars—6 Kot Duffadars—48 Duffadars (including 1 Farrier-Major and 1 Salutri)—6 Trumpeters—477 Sowars (including 1 Assistant Salutri and 6 Farriers). Total, 550 natives of all ranks.

The Corps of Guides consists of Cavalry and Infantry with the following establishment.—Commandant—4 Wing and Squadron Commanders—4 Wing and Squadron Officers—1 Medical Officer.—*Cavalry*—4 troops, with 2 Ressaldars—2 Ressaidars—1 Woordie-Major—4 Jemadars—36 Duffadars—4 Trumpeters—280 Sowars—8 Camel Sowars and 1 Hospital Assistant.—*Infantry*—8 companies with 8 Subadars—8 Jemadars—40 Havildars—40 Naiks—16 Buglers—720 Sepoys and 2 Hospital Assistants. Total natives of all ranks, *Cavalry* 337, *Infantry* 832.

Each Mountain Battery has 4 guns, with the following establishment.—Commandant—2 Subalterns—1 Subadar—1 Jemadar—1 Havildar-Major—1 Pay and Quarter-Master Havildar—4 Havildars—4 Naiks—2 Trumpeters—60 Gunners—2 Havildars of Drivers—4 Naiks of Drivers—85 Drivers—8 Muleteers—1 Farrier. Total, 174 natives of all ranks.

No. 5, or Garrison Battery, has the following establishment.—1 Subadar—1 Jemadar—6 Havildars—6 Naiks—1 Bugler—60 Gunners. Total, 75 natives of all ranks.

1 Subadar-Major is allowed for the Artillery of the Force.

Each Regiment of Sikh Infantry and Punjab Infantry consists of 8 companies, with the following establishment.—Commandant—2 Wing Commanders—5 Wing Officers—1 Medical Officer—8 Subadars—8 Jemadars—40 Havildars—40 Naiks—16 Drummers—720 Sepoys. Total, 832 natives of all ranks.

The 5th Gurkha Regiment consists of 8 companies, with the following establishment.—Commandant—2 Wing Commanders—5 Wing Officers—1 Medical Officer—8 Subadars—8 Jemadars—40 Havildars—40 Naiks—16 Drummers—800 Sepoys. Total, 912 natives of all ranks.

APPENDIX II.

List of outposts on the North-West Frontier, held by troops of the Punjab Frontier Force and the Militia, on the 1st of January 1884.

HAZARA DISTRICT.

Haripur (Fort)
Ughi (Agror)	P. F. F.
Thandiani

YUSAFZAI DISTRICT.

Abazai	P. F. F.
Jhinda	"
Narai

KOHAT DISTRICT.

Fort Garnett	P. F. F.
Fort Muhammadzai	"
Gadda Khel
Lachi...	P. F. F.
Banda	"
Bahadur Khel...	"

BANNU DISTRICT.

Karrak
Latamar	P. F. F.
Barganattu	Militia.
Gumati Tower...	"
Gumati	"
Kuram	P. F. F. and Militia.
Baran	Militia.
Tochi	"
Burji...	"
Jani Khel	P. F. F. and Militia.
Walli	Militia.
Tajori	"
Khairu Khel	"

DERA ISMAIL KHAN DISTRICT.

Bain Pass	Militia.
Mullazai	"
Kot Nasran	"
Tank	P. F. F.
Tank Zam	P. F. F. and Militia.
Kot Khirgi	Militia.
Girni	P. F. F. and Militia.
Jatta	"
Manjhi	"
Luni...	Militia.
Zarakni	"
Draband	P. F. F. and Militia.
Shekh Budin

DERA GHAZI KHAN DISTRICT.

Vihowa	Militia.
Jhok Bodo	
Mangrotha	P. F. F. and Militia.
Mahoi	Militia.
Nurpur	
Vidor	P. F. F.

RAJANPUR DISTRICT.

Rajanpur	Militia.
Harrand	P. F. F. and Militia.
Drigi	" "
Muhammadpur	" "
Rumka Thul	Militia.
Sabzalkot	"
Toziani	"
Dilbar	"
Bandowala	P. F. F. and Militia.
Shekhwali	Militia.

APPENDIX III.

Extracts from orders issued to the Field Forces under his command by BRIGADIER-GENERAL SIR N. B. CHAMBERLAIN, K.C.B.*

ARTILLERY.

Every shot and shell is to be re-gauged before being taken on service.

CAMP AND BAGGAGE.

A *doolie* and a pair of *kajawals* are to accompany the rear guard. A guard is to be told off to prevent baggage crowding upon the road leading out of camp before the troops march.

The *doolies*, *dandies*, and *bhistis* of corps and detachments are to follow in rear of their own corps.

Soldiers and camp-followers are to be warned not to injure trees.

No soldier or camp-follower is on any account to go beyond the picquets.

No person in camp is to stir, or the least noise to be made, until the first bugle has sounded.

No baggage or followers of any kind are to move until the advance has sounded.

No dogs are to be allowed, as they disturb the camp at night.

Grass-cutters are never to go beyond the cavalry picquets.

Commanding officers are always to take measures to prevent any injury to houses, fields, or other property, and are responsible for the cultivation in the immediate vicinity of their camps.

Camp colour men are to march in rear of the advanced guard.

When camps are pitched on ground subject to irrigation, care is to be taken that the dams are well secured.

Great care is to be taken that the water near camps is not polluted, and animals are to be watered down stream.

No firing is to be allowed in camp or its vicinity without permission, or any unnecessary noise permitted.

Camp-followers and baggage are always to keep the highroad, and not to take short cuts through fields.

No soldier or camp-follower is to enter a village on the line of march, or after reaching camp, without permission.

The desecration of shrines or burial-grounds is strictly prohibited.

All supplies are to be paid for on the spot; and plundering, however trifling, will be severely punished.

Every soldier or camp-follower, having occasion to go beyond the picquets, is to carry his arms; but none are to be permitted to roam about the country. When going to cut wood, they are to keep close to the picquets.

No person is to be allowed to go beyond the line of camp sentries after dark.

The greatest sanitary precautions in regard to the cleanliness of camps and their vicinity are enjoined.

The people of the country are not to be permitted to enter the camp armed.

No women or children, or superfluous followers, are to be allowed to accompany the troops. Shelter is to be provided for all followers.

* These orders were issued at different times to the troops employed under him in the several expeditions of which Sir Neville Chamberlain had the command. Some of them may seem obvious, and hardly worth reproducing in this way, but it must be borne in mind that the success or otherwise of these expeditions often depends on the way in which these details are observed.

ORDERLIES, GUARDS, AND PICQUETS.

The employment, by officers, of guards or orderlies with their baggage, whereby the services of a large number of soldiers are misapplied and lost, is strictly prohibited. The protection of the baggage is otherwise provided for, and officers are to leave their baggage to the care of their servants.

The infantry camp guards and sentries are to stand fast until all the baggage has left the ground, when they are to form up by regiments and follow the column in succession at intervals of a quarter of an hour, under the orders of the officer in command of the rear guard.

While the troops are employed on field service, four sentries are to be allowed to each post instead of three.

Cavalry picquets are to be withdrawn at dusk.

The outlying picquets are to stand fast until the whole of the baggage has moved off, when they are to be called in, and marched into camp, under the orders of the officer commanding the rear guard.

During rainy weather every sentry is to be posted under shelter as far as may be possible, for it is of the utmost importance to preserve the men in health; and standing in the rain for two hours, and then having to lie down in wet clothes, must be injurious.

The men are also to be instructed always to sling or secure their arms when exposed to the rain, and not to carry them at the shoulder or support. This order applies to sentries as well as others.

Tents are to be provided for guards and picquets.

The officer in command of the advanced guard is always to report overnight that he has made himself acquainted with the road leading out of camp.

INFANTRY.

The ammunition of regiments of infantry is to be completed to 200 rounds per man.

Such corps and detachments as are not provided with sickles for cutting green crops are to provide themselves with some. Every corps and detachment is also to have one or more adzes for the purpose of making new or re-pointing old tent pegs.

The men are to be allowed to wear what shoes they like, and are to be allowed to carry their native swords, but are not to take pistols with them on picquet.

Every man is to be provided with a haversack and canteen.

SICK AND HOSPITALS.

All sick and weakly men are to be left in cantonments.

All soldiers or camp-followers, who fall sick or are unable to travel previous to the force marching, are to be sent to the depot hospital.

Arrangements are to be made regimentally for the provision and carriage of hospital stores, medicines, *doolies*, etc.

Medical officers are to see that the *doolie* bearers are well provided with shoes.

CAMELS.

The officer in command of the grazing guard is to see that sufficient space is allowed for the camels to graze, and that they are not brought back *before* sunset. Unless the animals are properly fed, they cannot carry their loads. Camels are to be sent out of camp by sunrise to graze.

HORSES.

Strong head and heel ropes are to be provided, as well as hobbles for vicious horses, for hobbling them at night.

The artillery and cavalry horses are to be well found in horse shoes.

ELEPHANTS.

The elephants are to be all females, selected with regard to their docility and thorough soundness. They are to be equipped for the conveyance of a field battery, and are to be provided with leathern pads for kneeling on, shields or aprons for their foreheads, and an ample supply of chains. In selecting them, the feet are to be carefully examined.

SUPPLIES.

Every regiment and battery is to arrange to have carriage for four days' supplies for all men and camp-followers, as well as for that amount of grain for the transport animals.

BUGLE SOUNDING.

No regiment or detachment is to sound any bugle between the first bugle and the *Assembly*. Corps and batteries are to learn to have their horses saddled and harnessed and put to by verbal order, as a multiplicity of bugle calls causes confusion.

The *Assembly* and *Advance* are to be repeated by every corps and detachment. In like manner, the *Advance* and *Halt* are to be repeated by all on the line of march.

The *Assembly* is to be sounded one hour after the first bugle, when corps are to take up their places according to their order of march, ready to move off on the *Advance* being sounded from the head of the column by order of the commander of the force.

APPENDIX IV.

Table of Expeditions undertaken against the Frontier Tribes since the Annexation of the Punjab.

Year.	Tribes against which undertaken.	Name of Commander.	Number of troops employed.*	Total British casualties.
1849	Villages of British and Independent Baizai	Lieutenant-Colonel J. Bradshaw, C.B.	2,300	51
1850	Kohat Pass Afridis	Brigadier Sir Colin Campbell, K.C.B. (accompanied by the Commander-in-Chief, General Sir C. J. Napier, G.C.B.)	3,200	94
1851	Villages of British Miranzai	Captain J. Coke	2,050 (including 655 levies)	5
1851-52	Mohmands	Brigadier Sir Colin Campbell, K.C.B.	1,597	9
1852	Mohmands (Affair at Panjpao)	Brigadier Sir Colin Campbell, K.C.B.	600	10
1852	Ranizais	Brigadier Sir Colin Campbell, K.C.B.	3,270	40
1852	Utman Khels	Brigadier Sir Colin Campbell, K.C.B.	2,200	18
1852	Umarzai Waziris	Major J. Nicholson	1,500	28
1852-53	Hassanzais	Lieutenant-Colonel F. Mackeson, C.B.	3,800 (including Kashmir troops, levies, and police, but excluding the reserve)	15
1853	Hindustani fanatics	Lieutenant-Colonel F. Mackeson, C.B.	2,000 (including Kashmir troops)	Nil.
1853	Shiranis	Brigadier J. S. Hodgson	2,795	Nil.
1853	Kasranis	Brigadier J. S. Hodgson	954	11
1853	Bori Afridis...	Colonel S. B. Boileau	1,740	39
1854	Michni Mohmands	Colonel S. J. Cotton	1,782	17
1855	Aka Khel Afridis	Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. Craigie, C.B.	1,500	34
1855	Villages of British Miranzai	Brigadier N. B. Chamberlain	3,766	15
1855	Rubia Khel Urakzais	Brigadier N. B. Chamberlain	2,457	15
1856	Turis	Brigadier N. B. Chamberlain	4,896 (including 150 levies)	8
1857	Bozdars	Brigadier N. B. Chamberlain	2,755	56
1857	British villages on the Yusafzai border	Major J. L. Vaughan	400, in attack on Shokh Jana 990 (including 140 levies), in the first attack on N...	5

1858	Khudu Khels and Hindustani fanatics	Major-General Sir S. J. Cotton, K.C.B.	4,877	35
1859-60	Kabul Khel Waziris	Brigadier-General N. B. Chamberlain, C.B.	5,372 (including 1,456 police and levies)	20
1860	Mahsud Waziris	Brigadier-General N. B. Chamberlain, C.B.	6,796 (including 1,600 levies)	361
1863	Hindustani fanatics (Ambela expedition)	Brigadier-General Sir N. B. Chamberlain, K.C.B., and subsequently Major-General J. Garvock	9,000	908
1864	Mohmands	Colonel A. Macdonell, C.B.	1,801	19
1868	Bizoti Urakzais	Major L. B. Jones	970 (including 240 police and levies)	55
1868	Black Mountain tribes	Major-General A. T. Wilde, C.B., C.S.I.	12,544 (exclusive of a reserve of 2,218)	†98
1869	Bizoti Urakzais	Lieutenant-Colonel C. P. Keyes, C.B.	2,080 (including 419 police and levies)	36
1872	Dawarjis	Brigadier-General C. P. Keyes, C.B.	1,826	6
1877	Jowaki Afridis	Colonel D. Mocatta	1,750 (exclusive of levies)	11
1877-78	Jowaki Afridis	Brigadiers-General C. P. Keyes, C.B., and C. C. G. Ross, C.B.	7,400	61
1878	Utman Khels	Captain W. Battye	280	8
1878	Ranizais	Major R. B. P. P. Campbell	860	Nil.
1878	Utman Khels	Lieutenant-Colonel F. H. Jenkins	875	1
1878	Zakha Khel Afridis	Lieutenant-General F. F. Maude, V.C., C.B.	2,500	11
1879	Suliman Khel Pawindahs and others	Colonel H. F. M. Boisragon	640	13
1879	Zakha Khel Afridis	Lieutenant-General F. F. Maude, V.C., C.B.	3,750	18
1879	Mohmands (Affair at Kam Dakka)	Captain O'M. Creagh, and subsequently Major J. R. Dyce	600	24
1879	Zaimukhts	Brigadier-General J. A. Tytler, V.C., C.B.	3,226	5
1880	Mohmands	Brigadier-General J. Doran, C.B., and Colonel T. W. R. Boisragon	2,300	5
1880	Batanis	Lieutenant-Colonel P. C. Rynd	721	5
1880	Marris	Brigadier-General C. M. MacGregor, C.B., C.S.I., C.I.E.	3,074	5
1880	Malik Shahi Waziris	Brigadier-General J. J. H. Gordon, C.B.	800	Nil.
1881	Mahsud Waziris	Brigadiers-General T. G. Kennedy, C.B., and J. J. H. Gordon, C.B.	8,531	32

* The numbers given in this column are in some cases only approximate, it being impossible in those cases to discover from the records the exact number of troops employed.

† This number includes the casualties (64) in the Agror valley previous to the advance of the Hazara Field Force.

GLOSSARY

OF INDIAN WORDS USED IN THIS WORK, SOME OF WHICH ARE PECULIAR
TO THE PUNJAB FRONTIER.

- Abi*, irrigated.
Akhund (*akhun*), a teacher.
Akhundzada (*akhunzada*), a son or descendant of an *Akhund*.
Algad, a small stream.
Allah, the Muhammadan name of God.
Amir, a title of nobility, a ruler.
Angarka, a large, loose garment or tunic.
Anna (*ana*), a copper coin, the sixteenth of a rupee.
Arbab, a possessor, lord ; a chief, headman.
Ata, flour, meal.
- Badal*, retaliation.
Badi, devilry, mischief.
Badraga, safe-conduct, escort.
Badshah, a king.
Bajra, a species of millet.
Bala, upper, higher.
Balgir, a man nominated by a chief for duty in the frontier police or other Government service, the chief drawing the allowance granted for this service, out of which he pays the *balgir*.
Band, a dam.
Banda, a hamlet.
Baniah (*banya*), a grain seller, corn Chandler.
Bar, above, higher, upper.
Baramta, seizure of property or persons of an offending tribe in retaliation for injuries received.
Barani, rain land.
Bazar, a market, place of exchange.
Be iman, faithless.
Bhisti (*bhishti*), a water carrier.
Bhusa, chopped straw.
- Bigha*, a measure of land. A *pakka bigha* is equal to five-eighths of an acre, a *kachcha bigha* is from one-third to one-fourth of an acre.
Burj, a watch tower.
Buzurg, a saint, holy man.
Buzurgi, dignity, reverence, saintliness.
- Chadar*, a cloak, mantle.
Chalghozah, a species of pine tree.
Charas, a preparation of hemp used as an intoxicating drug.
Charpoy (*charpai*), a bedstead.
Chashma, a spring.
Chauk, the main thoroughfare of a city ; a square or open space ; a place of assembly.
Chaukidar, a watchman, guard.
China, a spring, fountain.
Chura, a long, heavy knife or sword used by Afghans.
Coolie (*kuli*), a native labourer or porter.
- Daftar*, registered landed property.
Daftari, the holder of a *daftar*.
Dak, the post.
Dakaiti, a highway robbery.
Dal, the split pea of different species of pulse.
Daman, the slopes or skirts of the hills.
Dana, a peak.
Dand, a tank.
Dandie (*dandi*), a canvas hammock swung on a pole and carried on men's shoulders.
Dara, a glen, defile.
Darwesh, a Muhammadan religious mendicant.
Deg, a metal cooking pot.

Dhaka, a hill, mountain.

Dharmasala, a rest house for travellers and pilgrims.

Diwan, a minister, officer of state.

Doaba, a tract of land between two rivers near their junction.

Doolie (*duli*), a palanquin swung on a long bamboo pole.

Duffadar (*duffadar*), a native cavalry non-commissioned officer.

Dun, a long tract of country under the foot of the hills; a valley.

Durbar (*darbar*), a court; the executive government of a native state; a native levee held by a high English officer.

Eed, see *Id*.

Ekka (*yakku*), a conveyance drawn by one horse, in common use among the natives of India.

Fakir, a religious mendicant; a dependent, vassal.

Farangi, a European.

Fatika, prayers offered up by Muhammadans for the deceased, on different days after their death.

Gakhai, a pass.

Galai, *gali*, a pass.

Gara, cave dwellings.

Garhi, a fortalice.

Ghar, a mountain.

Ghasha, a pass, narrow defile.

Ghaza, a religious war.

Ghazi, a Muhammadan who is victorious over infidels; a religious fanatic.

Ghi, clarified butter.

Ghulam, a slave.

Granth, the sacred scriptures of the Sikhs. It consists of a large collection of short, moral couplets, by Nanak and others, in Punjabi and Hindi.

Gundi, a faction.

Gur, treacle.

Haji, one who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca.

Hakim, a physician.

Hamsaya, a dependent, vassal.

Havildar (*havaladar*), a sergeant in the native infantry.

Hindki, a generic term applied to the people of the northern part of the N.W. Frontier who, being of Indian origin, have been converted to Muhammadanism in recent times.

Hujra, a place of assembly.

Id, a Muhammadan religious festival.

Imam, a spiritual head; the leader of the congregation in the mosque.

Jagir, a rent-free grant, freehold, fief.

Jagirdar, a holder of a *jagir*.

Jihad, a Muhammadan holy war against unbelievers.

Jat, a generic term applied to the agricultural Muhammadan tribes of Indian origin on the Biluch frontier.

Jazail, a long matchlock used by the Afghans.

Jazailchi, a corps of Pathan levies armed with *jazails*.

Jemadar (*jamadar*), a native subaltern officer in the cavalry or infantry.

Jhok, a grass village.

Jirga, an assembly, deputation, council.

Jowar (*juar*), Indian millet.

Kach, a stretch of alluvial land subject to inundation in a valley, or broad bed of a *nullah*.

Kafila, a caravan.

Kafir, an unbeliever.

Kahar, a Hindu caste who draw water, carry *doolies*, etc.; a *doolie* bearer.

Kajawah, a camel's pannier.

Kala, black.

Kalan, large.

Kalapani, a perennial spring.

Kundao, a pass or saddle back where a road crosses a range of hills.

Kandi, a sub-division, quarter.

Kangani, a small grain like millet.

Karez, a subterranean canal.

Kari, a precipice.

Kata, a ravine.

Khobar, news.

Khan, a title of Muhammadan nobles, especially when of Pathan or Persian descent; the chief of a tribe, or section of a tribe.

Khan Khel, the section of a tribe to which the chief's family belongs.

Kharif, the autumn crop.

Khatiri, a Punjabi *baniah* or grain seller.

- Khel*, a sub-division of a tribe ; a collection of tents.
Khilat, a dress of honour.
Khilak, a hard man.
Khurd, small.
Khwar, a stream.
Kila, kala, a fort.
Kiri, an encampment of nomads.
Koh, a hill, mountain.
Kor, khor, a section.
Koran (quran), the sacred scriptures of the Muhammadans.
Kot, a fort.
Kotal, a pass or saddle back where a road crosses a range of hills.
Kotwal, the chief officer of police for a city or town.
Kuchi, nomad.
Kui, ki, a well.
Kushta, a spot where a man has been killed (Biluch).
Kuz, small.

Lalmi, lalam, land dependent on rain.
Laman, the slopes or skirts of the hills.
Land, a tank.
Lar, a road.
Lashkar, an army ; used also of a gathering of armed hillmen.
Lungi, a scarf, sash (worn as a head-dress or waistband, or as a sash over the shoulders).

Maidan, a plain.
Maira, a waste plain.
Malik, a master, owner ; a headman of a section of a Pathan tribe.
Mash, a kind of pulse.
Massak (mashk), a waterman's or *bhisti's* bag.
Masur, a kind of pulse.
Maulvi, a Muhammadan professor or doctor.
Maund (man), a measure of weight which varies in different parts of India. In Bengal it is equal to 82·133 lb. avoirdupois.
Mazari, the dwarf palm.
Mela, a hamlet established by one man.
Mian, a title applied to descendants of holy men (not Pathans).
Morid, a disciple.
Moth, a kind of pulse.
Mowajib, pay, allowance, blackmail.
Muafi, a rent-free grant ; rent-free lands.

Mukadam, the headman of a *para*, or section of a tribe (Biluch).
Mulla, a priest.
Munshi, a writer ; a title of respect.
Musjid (masjid), a mosque.

Naddi, a river, stream.
Nagha, compensation for honour.
Nai, a stream (Biluch).
Naib, a deputy.
Naik, a protector ; a corporal in the native infantry.
Nar, a ravine.
Narai, a pass.
Nawab, a Muhammadan title.
Nazrana, a present, fee.
Nika, smaller.
Nila, blue.
Nullah (nala), a ravine.

Pagri, a turban.
Paijama, drawers, trousers.
Pakhal, a large leathern bag for holding water, generally carried on bullocks.
Pal, a small tent.
Palkie (palki), a kind of litter or sedan ; a palanquin.
Para, a section of a tribe (Biluch).
Pardah, a curtain screen ; a shelter.
Parganna, a sub-division of a *zila* or district.
Pat, a desert plain.
Pawindahs, the migratory tribes of warrior traders who come from Afghanistan to India in the autumn.
Phali, a sub-division of a *para* or section of a tribe (Biluch).
Pir, a descendant of saintly Pathans.
Pitao, sunny (applied to the sunny side of a hill).
Pukhtunwali, the Pathan code of manners and customs.
Purbeah (purbiya), a native of the eastern countries, extending from Cawnpore to Behar.
Putha, a kind of coarse grass.
Puttoo (pattu), a coarse woollen cloth.

Rabi, the spring crop.
Ressaidar, commander of a troop in the native cavalry, but of lower rank than *ressaldar*.
Ressaldar, commander of a troop in the native cavalry.
Rupee (rupiya), a silver coin, nominal value two shillings.

- Safed*, white.
Sahib-i-Dastar, Master of the Turban.
Sahibzada, a title applied to descendants of saintly men.
Sairai, free-gift lands to the priesthood.
Salutri, a native farrier.
Sam, a plain, lowland.
Sangar, a breastwork constructed of stones.
Sar, sir, a peak of a mountain.
Sarai (sarae), an inn; a caravansary.
Sarishta, a local term used for a coalition of tribes or other arrangement entered into for a fixed purpose.
Seer (ser), a measure of weight, about 2.2 lb. avoirdupois.
Sepoy (sipahi), a private in the native infantry.
Shahzada, a prince.
Sham, a water-shed.
Shamakha, an inferior species of millet.
Shekh, a disciple of a saint, one of the four classes into which Muhammadans are divided.
Shia, one of the two great Muhammadan sects; they venerate Ali, the son-in-law of Muhammad.
Shisham, the sissu tree.
Siah, black.
Sirdar, sardar, a representative of a community; a headman, chief; a title of nobility.
Smats, a cave.
Sowar (sawar), a trooper in the native cavalry or mounted police.
Spin, white.
Subadar, commander of company in the native infantry.
Suni, one of the two great Muhammadan sects; they revere equally the four successors of Muhammad.
Sur, red.
Sust, loose; lazy.
Sweri, shady (applied to the shady side of a hill).
Syad, a descendent of Ali, the son-in-law of Muhammad.
Syce (sais), a groom.
Takht, a throne.
Talao, a tank, pond.
Talib-ul-ilm, a seeker after wisdom, a wandering Muhammadan religionist.
Talwar, a sword, sabre.
Tangi, tangai, a narrow defile.
Tapa, a division.
Tappa, a fine.
Tarbur, a cousin; an enemy.
Tarla, below, lower.
Tehsil (tahsil), a sub-division of a *zila* or district.
Tehsildar (tahsildar), an officer in charge of a *tehsil*.
Thal, waste land at the foot of the hills.
Thana, a subordinate police station.
Thanadar, a petty police officer in charge of a *thana*.
Ting, firm.
Toi, a stream.
Tokh, a narrow ravine between hills (Biluch).
Tor, black.
Tuman, a tribe (Biluch).
Tumandar, chief of a tribe (Biluch).
Uch, dry.
Utla, upper.
Vakil, a deputy, agent.
Vel, bel, a valley (Biluch).
Vesh, periodical redistribution of lands.
Wahabi, a follower of the doctrines of an Arabian reformer of Muhammadanism—Shekh Abd-ul-Wahab.
Wali, a saint, holy man.
Wam, cultivation.
Wazir, a minister of state.
Woordie-Major (wardi-major), a native adjutant.
Yabu, a pony.
Yaghi, rebellious, independent.
Zai, a section of a tribe.
Zam, a river.
Zamburak, a native wall-piece.
Zamindar, a landholder.
Zao, zawo, zawa, a very difficult pass.
Ziarat, a shrine.

INDEX.

- Aba Khel (Utmanzais), 73.
 Abasikor (pass), 420.
 Abazai, 214, 216, 217, 219, 220, 222, 227, 242, 649.
 Abazai (district of Swat), 180.
 Abazais of Swat, 180.
 Abu, 39.
 Abbas Khan, 21.
 Abbott, Major J., 34, 35, 39, 40, 83.
 Abbott, Captain R. J., 398.
 Abbottabad, 22, 42, 45, 46, 47, 61, 106.
 Abdul Aziz Khel (Urakzais), 383, 386.
 Abdul Ghafur, *see* Akhund of Swat.
 Abdul Ghafur Khan, Tikariwal, 24.
 Abdul Khalik, 184.
 Abdul Majid Khan, Khalil, 293.
 Abdul Manan, *see* Mian Gul.
 Abdul Rahman Khel (Waziris), 545.
 Abdul Samand, Ressaldar, 539.
 Abdulla, Maulvi, 104, 112, 120, 121, 122, 138, 140, 155, 156, 157.
 Adam Khan, Waziri, 483, 573, 574.
 Adam Khel (Afridis), 271, 275, 285, 286, 316-373.
 Adam Khel Dara, 316.
 Adams, Captain R. R., 395, 456.
 Adkar, Mulla, 489, 490, 494, 540, 573.
 Admela, 414, 415, 416, 425.
 Adu, 420.
 Adul Beg, Ressaldar, 300.
 Adye, C.B., Colonel J. M., 147, 150.
 Afghans, 9.
 Afridis, 2, 5, 11, 227, 230, 231, 271-373, 440.
 Afzal Khan, Khatak, 193.
 Afzul, Havildar, 144.
 Agra (pass), 214.
 Agror, 15, 20, 23, 24, 27, 30, 32, 33, 34, 47, 61, 62, 63.
 Ahmad Ali Khan, Hassanai, 30, 64, 65.
 Ahmad Khan, Bunerwal, 120, 138, 139.
 Ahmad Khan, Bahadur, Subadar-Major, 206.
 Ahmad Khan, Subadar, 282.
 Ahmad Khel, 386.
 Ahmad Shah of Bareilly, *see* Syad Ahmad Shah.
 Ahmad Shah, 204.
 Ahmadzai (Waziris), 458, 463-466.
 Ahmadzai (Ustaranas), 581.
 Ahnai Tangi, 515, 517.
 Aimal Chabutra, 285, 317, 340, 341, 342.
 Aimal Khel (Waziris), 498, 529.
 Ainposh, 386.
 Aipi, 562, 569, 570.
 Aislabie, Captain W. B., 347, 369.
 Ajab Khan of Chargulai, 106, 120, 150, 151, 163.
 Ajun Khan of Tangi, 198, 215, 216, 218, 219.
 Aka Khel (Afridis), 271, 275, 278, 284-285, 291, 306, 312.
 " " Expedition in 1855 against the, 285-290.
 Akazai (Utmanzais), 72, 73.
 Akazais, 4, 23, 28, 29, 30-31, 32, 35, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 71. *See also* Black Mountain tribes.
 Akbar Khan, Khudu Khel, 161.
 Akbar Khan of Lalpura, 251, 260, 264, 265.
 Akbar Shah, 585.
 Akhel (Urakzais), 383, 385, 386, 389, 405, 406, 407, 408.
 Akhor, 286, 289, 317, 318, 320, 321, 323, 325, 330, 338, 372, 404.
 Akhund of Swat, 46, 82, 84, 105, 115, 119, 122, 123, 131, 133, 138, 140, 146, 156, 157, 183-185, 193, 194, 199, 202, 203, 204, 215, 218, 220, 349.
 Akhund Baba-ka-Chura, 26, 28.
 Akhund Khel (Allaiwals), 20.
 Akhund Khel (Chagarzais), 32.
 Akozai (Yusafzais), 180.
 Akram Khan of Amb, 42, 44, 60, 63, 64, 71.
 Alachi, 278, 280, 302.
 Aladad Khan of Agror, 42.
 Aladad-ki-kot, 537.
 Aladand, 182.
 Alamgudar, 278.
 Ala Mir, Sepoy, 128.
 Alam Khan, Khudu Khel, 88.
 Alam Khan, Subadar, 308.
 Alam Killi, 286, 288, 289.
 Alan Khan, Havildar, 128.
 Alazai (Utmanzais), 72, 73.
 Aldridge, Capt. R. B., 133.
 Alexander, Lieutenant G., 145.
 Ali Gauher Khan of Agror, 30.
 Ali Khan, 62.
 Alikhani (Waziris), 464, 465.
 Alikhel, 504.
 Ali Khel (Urakzais), 383, 384, 385, 387, 388, 389, 406, 407.
 Ali Muhammad, 547.
 Ali Musjid, 280, 293, 294, 296, 300, 301, 302, 304, 307, 308, 309, 310.
 Alisherzai (Shinwaris), 310.
 Alisherzai (Urakzais), 383, 385, 386, 387, 405, 406, 408, 414, 416, 417, 418, 419, 424, 425.
 Alizai (village in Kuram), 414, 415.
 Alizai (village in Samilzai), 387, 397.
 Alizai (pass), 387.
 Alizai (Turis), 432.
 Alizai (Urakzais), 383, 386.
 Alizai (Utman Khels), 212, 213.
 Alizai (Waziris), 498, 503, 527, 529, 530, 534, 540.
 Allai, 15, 16, 18-22.
 Allai Sirhan, 19.
 Allaiwals, 43, 54, 64, *see* Allai.
 Allan, Maj. A. T., 90, 91, 96.
 Allgood, Lieut.-Col. G., 138, 149.
 Ama Khel, 536.
 Amanzai (Waziris), 498.
 Amazais, 4, 49, 70, 71, 72, 107, 120, 146, 147, 148, 155, 156, 157, 158.

- Amb, 70, 71, 72, 104.
 Ambahar, 213, 214, 215.
 Ambela (pass), 77, 79, 105, 107-149.
 Ambela (village), 76, 110, 111, 123, 126, 132, 135, 140, 142, 144, 145, 147.
 Ambela expedition in 1863, 102-153.
 Amir Shah, 103.
 Amir Singh, Jemadar, 535.
 Amzani, 562.
 Anai (Afridis), 283, 308, 311.
 Andar (Pawindahs), 506.
 Anderson, Lieutenant W. C., 134, 138.
 " Major W. C., 641, 642.
 Anderson, Capt. D., 335.
 And Khel (Urakzais), 383, 384, 386.
 And Khel (village), 386.
 Angapur, 80.
 Anjanni, 386.
 Anjiri Kandao, 262, 263.
 Anup Singh, Sepoy, 131.
 Appleyard, C.B., Brigadier-General F. E., 302, 307.
 Arang, 213, 214.
 Arghund, 562.
 Arhanga (pass), 388.
 Armstrong, Lieut.-Colonel F. M., 302.
 Arsala Khan of Allai, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24.
 Ashak Muhammad Khan, Bozdar, 612, 614.
 Ashazai (Bunerwals), 77, 80, 138, 162, 163.
 Ashera (stream), 72.
 Ashera (village), 83.
 Ashlor Naror (Tikariwals), 23, 24.
 Ashpari, 538.
 Ashu Khel (Afridis), 317, 318, 332, 341, 349, 352, 353, 373.
 Asils (Utman Khels), 213, 214.
 Asni, 636.
 Aspalito Algad, 545.
 Ata Muhammad Khan of Agror, 30, 31, 41, 42, 43, 61, 62, 64.
 Ata Muhammad Khan, Bangash, 339, 371.
 Atchailai, 74.
 Atkins, Capt. W., 304.
 Atlay, Lieut.-Colonel E., 54, 59.
 Aytoun, Lieut. J. M., 520.
 Azakhel (British village), 339.
 Azakhel (Bangash village), 431.
 Azim Khan, Bunerwal, 156, 157.
 Azim Khan of Chardeh, 252.
 Azim, Shirani, 587.
 Aziz Khan of Sadum, 106, 120, 147, 148, 150, 151.
 Aziz Khel (Akazais), 30.
 Azmat, Waziri, 540, 544.
 Babakar Khel (Zaimukhts), 413, 416, 417, 424.
 Babar Kach, 640.
 Babars, 586, 615, 616.
 Babelani (Khosas), 598.
 Babinai, 74, 160.
 Babri, Jowaki, 344, 345, 346, 349, 365.
 Babujan Khel (Chargarzais), 31.
 Babuzai, 181, 185, 186.
 Bada, 74.
 Badabir, 286, 291.
 Badai (Afridis), 283.
 Badar (valley), 463, 545, 547.
 Badha Khel (Chargarzais), 31.
 Badinzai (Waziris), 498.
 Badi Shamberi, 249.
 Badrai (nullah), 75.
 Badshah, 401.
 Badshah Gul, Turi, 433, 453.
 Bagatukh, 407.
 Bagh (Khudu Khel village), 75, 91.
 Bagh (Jowaki village), 351, 366.
 Bagh (Zaimukht village), 414, 416, 422, 423.
 Bagra, 80.
 Bagrian, 34, 49.
 Bagu Jadao, Subadar, 627.
 Bahadur Khan, Khosa, 619.
 Bahadur Khel, 390, 442, 470, 471, 649.
 Bahadur Sher Khan, Bangash, 330, 340, 341, 390.
 " " Nawab, Bangash, 344, 345, 346, 371.
 Bahlolzai (Waziris), 498, 503, 527, 529, 530, 531, 532, 534.
 Bahram Khan, Mohmand, 251.
 Bain (pass), 531, 649.
 Bainbridge, Lieut.-Colonel F. T., 537, 538.
 Baisakha Singh, Jemadar, 536.
 Baizai (Mohmands), 229, 230, 249.
 Baizai (Bangash), 434.
 Baizai (district of Swat), 180.
 Baizai (British), 181, 182.
 Baizai, Expedition in 1849 against villages of British and Independent, 186-190.
 Baizais of Swat, 2, 4, 70, 180-182.
 Baja, 75, 161.
 Bajkatta, 80, 156, 157.
 Bajour, 119, 212, 213, 227, 229, 230, 234.
 Baka Khel (Waziris), 463, 468.
 Bala Dhaka, 642.
 Balamir, 389, 391.
 Balandra, 386.
 Baldwin, Capt. R. H., 198, 200, 201, 218.
 Balesh Khel, 414, 418, 419, 421.
 Bam Khel (Khudn Khels), 75, 161, 162.
 Bam Khel, 75.
 Bam Khel Totalai, 72, 162.
 Banda (village on Agror border), 44.
 Banda (village on Chamla border), 142.
 Banda (village on Mohmand border), 235.
 Banda (post on Kohat border), 649.
 Bandi, 19.
 Band-i-Sazin, 17.
 Band Khel (Waziris), 498, 529.
 Bandowala, 650.
 Bangash, 271, 327, 328, 329, 330, 431-454.
 Bangiwala Kach, 520.
 Baniwali, 642.
 Bannu (district), 1, 3.
 Bannu (town), 467, 468, 470, 503, 525, 536, 563.
 See also Edwardesabad.
 Bannuchis, 3, 465, 466.
 Bara (village on Gadun border), 159, 160.
 Bara, Fort, 286, 287, 404.
 Bara (valley), 274, 275, 277, 278, 280, 281, 301, 304, 306, 386, 387. See also Urakzai Bara.
 Bara Khel (Waziris), 462, 467, 562.
 Baramand, 550.
 Baran (pass), 564, 572.
 Baran (post), 574, 619.
 Barandu, 15, 72, 77, 79, 80, 105.
 Barang, 213, 214.
 Barari Tangi, 517, 518.
 Bararkas, 278, 296, 302.
 Barat Khel (Akazais), 30.
 Barber, Private F., 118, 138.
 Barbor, Lieut. G. D., 290.
 Barchar, 27, 51, 61, 63.
 Barganattu (pass), 468, 469.
 Barganattu (post), 649.
 Barganattu (stream), 464.
 Barhan Khel (Mohmands), 229, 230, 264.
 Baringan, 163.
 Barkai, 278, 281, 386.
 Barkhan, 600.
 Barkilli, 76, 80.
 Barkot, 19.
 Bar Muhammad Khel (Urakzais), 383, 386.
 Barmul, 182, 192, 193.
 Barnes, Major O., 253, 254, 257.

- Barron, Lieut. W., 117.
 Bartleman, Lieut. J., 118, 124, 127.
 " Lieut.-Colonel J., 426.
 Bartram, Lieut. G. W., 369.
 Barwan, 278, 386.
 Barwani, 512, 545.
 Basawal, 230, 252, 256, 264, 302.
 Basevi, Lieut. J. P., 526.
 Bashu, Afridi, 339.
 Basi Khel (Chagarzais), 31, 32, 33, 34, 80.
 Bassi Khel (Afridis), 284, 285, 286, 289, 291, 312, 327, 328, 330, 338, 400, 404.
 Batanis, 5, 489, 503-505, 525, 531, 532, 533, 538, 539, 552.
 " Affair in 1880 with the, 540-542.
 Bati (pass), 602.
 Bati (village), 602.
 Batkhela, 182.
 Batora, 80, 155, 156, 157.
 Battal, 21, 22.
 Battye, Lieut. A., 56.
 " Major A., 303, 307.
 Battye, Lieut. F. D., 223, 359.
 Battye, Lieut. W., 124, 126.
 " Capt. W., 206, 220-222.
 Bax, Capt. W. I., 370.
 Bazar (village in Yusafzai), 79.
 Bazar (valley), 276, 278, 280, 294-297, 301, 303-307.
 " Expeditions to the, see Zakha Khel Afridis.
 Bazdara, 181.
 Bazid Khan, Bannuchi, 466, 467.
 Bazid Khel (Mada Khels), 71.
 Bazid Khel (British village) 285, 332.
 Bazid Khel (Jowaki village), 366.
 Bazid Khel (*kotal*), 350, 351.
 Baz Khan, Khudu Khel, 85, 86.
 Becher, Major J. R., 94, 96, 97.
 " C.B., Colonel J. R., 156, 192, 193, 396, 528.
 Beckett, Lieut. S., 118, 134.
 Beckett, Mr., 615.
 Bedgali, 72.
 Begbie, Capt. F. R., 547.
 Bennett, Lieut. W., 50.
 Beresford, Capt. Lord W. L. De la P., 368.
 Bertie, Capt. F. A., 568.
 Bet Bakshah, 644.
 Bhag, 636.
 Bharti, 610, 611.
 Bhogarmang, 15, 18, 19, 20, 22.
 Bholu, 61, 62.
 Bibrak, Bugti, 626.
 Bihar, 28, 32, 56, 157.
 Bihzad Khel (Utmanzais), 73.
 Bijarani (Marris), 624, 642, 643, 644.
 Bijar Khan, Dumki, 626, 631, 632.
 Bijar Khan, Drishak, 636.
 Biland Khel, 436, 437, 449, 463, 472, 475, 491, 493.
 Bilankot, 29, 34, 50, 54, 56.
 Biliari, 30.
 Billamore, Major T. R., 625, 626.
 Biluchis, 5-7, 12.
 Bimbarai (Utman Khels), 213.
 Bimbul, 30.
 Bingham, Capt. H., 189.
 Birgallai, 72.
 Bisak, 74, 96, 154.
 Bishop, Lieut. St. G. M., 248.
 Bizand Khel (Waziris), 464, 465, 487.
 Bizoti (Urakzais), 322, 324, 327, 329, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 405, 408.
 " Affair in 1868 with the, 395-399.
 Bizoti (Urakzais), Expedition in 1869 against the, 399-405.
 Blackall, Capt. R., 243.
 Black Mountain, 15, 24, 26-29, 70.
 Black Mountain (tribes), 26-65.
 " Expedition in 1868 against the, 42-60.
 Blagrove, Captain T. C., 97.
 Blair, Lieut. H. F., 136.
 Blake, Lieut. R. P., 403.
 Blunt, Lieut. C. H., 240.
 Blyth, Brigadier-General F. S., 307.
 Bodin Khel (Waziris), 464, 465.
 Boileau, Colonel S. B., 332-336.
 Boisragon, Colonel T. W. R., 260, 261, 263, 264.
 Boisragon, Colonel H. F. M., 534, 536, 537.
 Boka, 159.
 Bokar (pass), 280, 304.
 Bolaki Khel (Afridis), 318, 338, 371.
 Bolan (pass), 638.
 Bond, Lieut. E. E. B., 514.
 Boota Singh, Sepoy, 144.
 Borakshahi, 562, 573.
 Bori (pass), 302.
 Bori (valley), 332, 353, 356, 358.
 Bori (villages), 316, 318, 353, 356.
 " Expedition in 1853 against, 330-336.
 Bori Afridis, Agreement with, 337-338.
 Bori Chena (pass), 354, 356, 358, 361.
 Bosti Khel, 317, 322, 325, 330, 338, 339, 372, 401.
 Boulnois, Lieut. A., 237.
 Boya, 562.
 Boyak Khan, Waziri, 540, 544.
 Boyd, Surgeon-Major W. C., 426.
 Boyes, Captain W. J., 369.
 Bozdars, 5, 11, 582, 596-598, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619.
 " Expedition in 1857 against the, 604-613.
 Brackenbury, Captain M. C., 645.
 Bradford, C.B., Lieut.-Colonel J. F., 189.
 Bradford, Ensign G. S., 244.
 Bradshaw, C.B., Lieut.-Colonel J., 188-190, 323.
 Branfill, Lieut. B. R., 526.
 Branson, Major C. E. D., 422.
 Bright, Colonel R. O., 339.
 " C.B., Brigadier-General R. O., 47, 50, 51, 52, 58, 59.
 " Major-General R. O., 264.
 Brind, Major J., 242, 243.
 Brooke, C.B., Lieut.-Colonel H. V., 200, 218.
 Broome, Lieut. A. P., 403, 405.
 Brosnan, Sergeant J., 138.
 Brougham, Captain T., 96, 242, 243, 290.
 Brown, Captain L., 626, 627, 629.
 Brown, Lieut. G. A., 96.
 Brown, Mr., 150.
 Browne, Capt. S. J., 86, 609.
 " V.C., C.B., Colonel S. J., 339.
 " K.C.S.I., C.B., Lieut.-Genl. Sir S. J., 251.
 Browne, Major S. J., 346, 347, 369.
 Browne, Capt. W. B., 96.
 Browne, Lieut. J., 112, 136, 150.
 Brownlow, Lieut. C. H., 38, 40, 97, 241, 242, 243, 244.
 " Major C. H., 110, 111, 112, 116, 117, 118, 122, 124, 125, 127, 128, 130, 137, 143, 149.
 " C.B., Lieut.-Colonel C. H., 50, 56, 58.
 Brownlow, Capt. C. C., 315.
 Brownrigg, Capt. H. S., 369.
 Bruce, Capt. F. F., 583, 585, 586.
 Bruce, Lieut. A. McC., 403.
 Bruce, Lieut. H., 586.
 Bruddur, 26, 27, 37, 39.
 Bryce, Lieut. J. H., 392.

- Bucha, 214, 222, 223.
 Buchanan, Colonel H. J., 352, 353, 356, 357, 358, 361, 362, 366, 369.
 Buckle, Surgeon H. B., 137, 153, 526.
 Bugtis, 5, 618, 619, 625-639.
 Bulani, 604.
 Bulwunt Singh, Subadar, 238.
 Buner, 30, 32, 70, 71, 72, 76, 77, 78, 79.
 Buner (pass), 76, 131, 144, 145, 146, 147.
 Bunerwals, 4, 77-80, 163-164. *See also* Ambela expedition.
 Burg (Afridi village), 278, 303.
 Burg (Marri village), 642.
 Burji, 649.
 Burlton, Major N. R., 369.
 Burlton-Bennet, Capt. J. R., 370.
 Burnaby, Major E. B., 303.
 Burrell, Lieut. E., 426.
 Burrell, Lieut. W. S., 426.
 Burroughs, Major F. W., 150.
 Burzen (pass), 644.
 Busk, Lieut. A. L., 586.
 Butkor (Utman Khels), 213, 214, 219.
 Butler, Lieut.-Colonel J., 35, 36, 37, 39, 40.
 Butler, V.C., Capt. T. A., 118.
 Butt, Lieut. F. R., 96.
 " Capt. F. R., 150, 476, 519, 520, 521.
 Caldwell, Surgeon-Major W. S., 370.
 Campbell, K.C.B., Brigadier Sir Colin, 195-201, 216-218, 233-238, 239-240, 320-323.
 Campbell, Capt. J. P. W., 609.
 " Major J. P. W., 114, 134, 399.
 " Lieut.-Colonel J. P. W., 570.
 Campbell, Lieut.-Colonel C., 200, 218.
 Campbell, Major H. L., 58.
 Campbell, Major R. B. P. P., 205, 206, 224, 346, 347, 354, 369.
 Campbell, Lieut. J. H., 150.
 Cardew, Lieut. F., 150.
 Carleton, Capt. H. A., 235.
 Carne, Mr., 12, 34, 35.
 Carr, Capt. F. S., 369.
 Carter, Lieut. T. T., 136, 147.
 Cavagnari, Lieut. P. L. N., 397, 398, 400, 401, 404, 405, 484.
 " Captain P. L. N., 205, 206, 220, 221, 222, 223, 341, 342, 343, 361, 370, 487.
 " C.S.I., Major P. L. N., 293, 301, 305.
 Cave, Lieut.-Colonel G. N., 54, 58.
 Cazalet, Lieut. W. H., 491.
 " Centre " picquet, 127, 128.
 Chagarzais, 4, 23, 28, 29, 30, 31-33, 64, 77, 80, 113, 155, 157. *See also* Black Mountain tribes.
 Chabar Khel (Waziris), 498.
 Chajri, 27.
 Chakar (pass), 637.
 Chakesar, 20.
 Chakrani (Bozdars), 596, 618.
 Chalmer, Capt. R., 644.
 Chalmers, Lieut. J., 522.
 Chamba, 103.
 Chamberi, 27, 35, 36, 37, 39, 41, 103, 104.
 Chamberlain, Brigadier N. B., 390-395, 439-442, 443-451, 472, 605-613.
 " C.B., Brigadier-General N. B., 475-483, 506, 507, 508-527.
 " K.C.B., Brigadier-General Sir N. B., 106-138, 151, 152.
 Chamberlain, Major C. T., 241, 242, 243.
 Chamberlain, Capt. C. F. F., 145, 149.
 Chambers, Lieut.-Colonel B. R., 369, 545.
 Chamkanis, 386.
 Chamla, 30, 70, 71, 72, 74, 76, 77, 88, 106, 107, 109, 110, 111, 144, 146-149.
 Chamlawals, 4, 76-77, 107, 120, 139.
 Chapman, Lieut. H. H., 133, 152.
 Chapra, 27.
 Chapri, 414, 417, 418, 419, 491.
 Charat, 339.
 Chardai (Turis), 431, 432.
 Chardeh, 230, 252, 260.
 Chargulai, 72.
 Charkhanai, 493.
 Charles, Capt. J., 571.
 Charsada, 197, 216.
 Charurai, 177.
 Chashmai, 563, 565.
 Chatar Singh, Naik, 128.
 Chatt, 644.
 Chaudwan (town), 580, 581, 586.
 Chandwan (pass), 579, 584, 586.
 Cheke, Assistant Surgeon G. N., 150.
 Chenar, 295, 302.
 Cherorai, 72, 105, 120.
 Chesnaye, Surgeon-Major G. C., 644.
 Chester, Capt. C. W. R., 125, 150.
 Chicharga, 17.
 Chilas, 15-16, 17, 18.
 China (Afridi village), 278, 280, 284, 296.
 China (Shirani village), 585.
 Chinarak, 414, 415, 421, 423, 425.
 Chingai (Mohmand village), 248.
 Chingai (Zaimukht village), 416, 425.
 Chinglai, 75, 77, 85, 91, 92, 162.
 Chippindall, Lieut.-Colonel E., 58.
 Chirmang, 29, 34, 56, 57.
 Chitral, 228.
 Chittabut, 15, 26, 27, 28, 51, 52, 53.
 Chomung, 32.
 Chor, 16, 17, 18, 20.
 Chor Banda, 163.
 Chordara, 17.
 Choti (pass), 599, 600.
 Chotiali, 642.
 Christie, Mr. A., 347.
 Christie, Mr., 342.
 Chuhar Khel (Shirani), 579, 588.
 Chura, 278, 280, 282, 294, 307.
 Chura Kandao, 280, 294, 302.
 Chur Khel (Chagarzais), 31.
 Chutta, 27, 35, 36.
 Clapperton, Private W., 118, 138.
 Clark, Assistant Surgeon W. F., 610.
 Clarke, Lieut. H. S., 149.
 Clarke, Lieut. W. H., 626, 627.
 Clibborn, Major T., 627, 628, 629.
 " Cliff " picquet, 128.
 Clifford, Major R. C. R., 369.
 Clifford, Captain R. M., 251.
 Clifford, Lieut. R., 117.
 Close, Capt. H. P., 149.
 " Major H. P., 50.
 " Lieut.-Colonel H. P., 422, 426.
 Codrington, Lieut. E. C., 150.
 " Capt. E. C., 44.
 Coke, Capt. J., 189, 199, 200, 216, 217, 218, 321, 323, 324, 326, 328, 329, 330, 337, 436, 437, 438, 442, 471.
 " Major J., 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 395, 438, 440, 449, 450, 608, 609, 610.
 " Conical " hill, 28, 113, 114, 141, 142, 144.
 Conolly, Lieut. E. R., 128, 130, 131.
 " Captain E. R., 342.
 " Major E. R., 254, 259, 419.
 Conolly, Captain A., 419, 420, 426.
 Cook, Lieut. J., 150.
 " Captain J., 298, 300.
 Cookson, Lieut. S. B., 35, 37, 38.
 Cooper, Capt. W., 97.
 Cordner, Lieut. J. E., 96.
 " Colonel J. E., 341.

- Corfield, Lieut.-Colonel W. R., 323.
 Cotton, Colonel S. J., 242-244, 334, 336.
 " K.C.B., Major-General Sir S. J., 90-97.
 Cotton, Capt. L. S., 91, 97.
 Coxe, Captain H. W. H., 511, 513, 515, 526.
 " Major H. W. H., 48, 150, 155.
 "Crag" picquet, 28, 33, 122, 123, 127, 128, 129,
 130, 131, 133, 134, 135, 141, 142.
 Craigie C.B., Major J. H., 285, 336.
 " " Lieut.-Colonel J. H., 288-290.
 Creagh, Major J., 426.
 Creagh, Capt. O'M., 254-259, 296.
 Cunliffe, Lieut. E. W., 542.
 Cunningham, Mr. A. F. D., 302.

 Dabb, 233, 235, 241, 242, 243.
 Dablai (pass), 387.
 Dabra (village), 530.
 Dabra (post), 535.
 Dabrai (pass), 20, 57.
 Dada Khel (Hassanzais), 29.
 Dado, Babar, 586.
 Dag, 585.
 Daggar, 80.
 Daghi Totalai, 75.
 Dajal, 634.
 Dakka, 228, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 260, 264,
 280, 294, 295, 296, 299, 302, 307.
 Dakka Kulan, 258.
 Dalazaks, 73.
 Dalmohat, 103.
 Dalujal, 641.
 Daly, Lieut. H., 324, 437.
 Dana Khula, 386, 387, 395, 400, 402.
 Dand, 419.
 Dandar, 75.
 Dand Kilai, 563.
 Dandoghar, 414, 415, 421.
 Dand Sar, 356.
 Daradar, 386.
 Daran (pass), 91, 92, 107.
 Darani, 414, 415.
 Darband (village in Hazara), 29, 30, 36, 46, 47,
 48, 103, 106.
 Darband (village in Miranzai), 387.
 Dargai (Ranizai village), 182, 196, 199.
 Dargai (pass), 359, 363.
 Dargai Sar, 358, 359, 360, 363, 364, 365.
 Daria Khan, 234, 319, 324.
 Daria Khan, Jakrani, 630, 632.
 Darpa Khel, 562, 565.
 Darri, 278.
 Darrevasta, 562, 565, 575.
 Darsamand, 389, 435, 437, 440, 442, 443, 445,
 450.
 Darwaza (pass), 446, 447.
 Darwesh Khel (Waziris), 458-494, 523.
 Datugrah, 159.
 Daud Khel (Chagarzais), 31.
 Daudzai (Zaimukhts), 413, 415, 417, 425.
 Daulat Khel, 562.
 Daulatwala, 3, 602.
 Daulatzai (Amazais), 72.
 Daulatzai (Bunerwals), 77, 80, 117, 162, 163.
 Daulatzai (Gaduns), 73, 74.
 Daulatzai (Urakzais), 382, 383, 385, 386, 388, 395,
 408.
 Davesta Sar, 480.
 Davidson, Major T. R., 419, 426, 491.
 Davidson, Capt. W. W., 35, 39, 40.
 " Major W. W., 243.
 Davidson, Capt. J., 368.
 Davidson, Lieut. J. P., 113, 114, 125, 128, 130,
 152.
 Dawal, 74.
 Dawar, *see* Dawaris.
 Dawaris, 5, 561-575.
 " Expedition in 1872 against the, 566-571.
 Dawezais, 229, 230.
 Deacon, Major C. C., 189.
 DeBude, Capt. F. R., 116, 117, 137, 145, 149, 476,
 519.
 " Major F. R., 59, 452.
 Dedachi Kach, 607, 613.
 Delafosse, Major, H. G., 134.
 deLautour, Lieut. E. J., 150.
 " Capt. E. J., 369.
 Dera Bugti, 626, 630, 631, 636.
 Dera Fateh Khan, 12, 600, 601, 602.
 Dera Ghazi Khan (town), 598, 607.
 Dera Ghazi Khan (district), 1, 3.
 Dera Ismail Khan (town), 591, 593, 615.
 Dera Ismail Khan (district), 1, 3.
 Derebina, 468, 469.
 Deshi, 15, 19, 23, 24-25, 33.
 Deshiwals, 24, 25, 29, 32, 34. *See also* Black Moun-
 tain tribe.
 Dhannas (Batanis), 504.
 Dickens, Lieut.-Colonel, A. D., 59, 60.
 Dihgan, 562.
 Dilbar, 650.
 Dilbori, 42, 43.
 Dingsar, 414.
 Dini Khel (Utman Khels), 214.
 Dir, 119, 228.
 Doaba (division of Peshawar district), 232.
 Doaba (village in Miranzai), 420.
 Doatoi, 277, 278, 280.
 Dobandi, 182, 199.
 Dobandi Paia, 200.
 Doda (peak of Black Mountain), 27, 28, 52, 53,
 54.
 Doda, Marri, 629.
 Dodal (Nandiharis), 23.
 Dolragha, 414, 416, 425, 426.
 Dor, 73.
 Doran, C. B., Colonel J., 352, 353, 356, 357, 358,
 361, 362, 366, 369.
 " Brigadier-General J., 261, 262, 263,
 264, 300.
 Dorward, Lieut. A. R. F., 263.
 Dosalli, 519.
 Dosirri, 80.
 Dotani (Pawindahs), 506.
 Do Toi, 522, 547.
 Dougal, Lieut. T. B., 125.
 Dowla Wanga (pass), 642.
 Draband (town), 578, 580, 582, 583, 584, 586, 587,
 591.
 Draband (post), 583, 585, 588, 649.
 Draband Zam (or pass), 579, 583, 584, 585, 586.
 Drabzai, 419.
 Dragal, 623, 638.
 Drake, Lieut. T. H. T., 117.
 Drazand, 580, 584, 585, 586, 617.
 Drigi, 636, 644, 650.
 Drishaks, 636.
 Drozanda, 493.
 Drug (pass), 597, 606, 607, 608, 609.
 Drug (valley), 606, 610.
 Drund, 387.
 Dukara, 93.
 Dulani (Bozdars), 596.
 Duma, 77, 80.
 Dumail, 32.
 Dumbuki, 414, 415, 416.
 Dumkis, 6, 625, 630.
 Dunda, 28.
 Dunds, 2.
 Dunmore, Capt. W. R., 322.
 Dunsford, C.B., Brigr.-Genl. H. F., 192, 193.
 Duparzai (Turis), 432.

Durani, 415, 420.
 Durga Singh, 634.
 Durgalai, 75.
 Durkani (Gurchanis), 623, 645.
 Durnani, 478, 479.
 Dwa Warkha, 524, 548.
 Dyce, Major, J. R., 257.

"Eagle's Nest" picquet, 115, 116, 117, 118, 123.

Eardley-Wilmot, Capt. R., 369.
 Earle, Capt. J. M., 248.
 Edwardes, Lieut. H. B., 582, 598, 600, 623.
 " C. B., Major H. B., 241, 242, 326, 331, 336, 337, 438, 439, 472.
 " Lieut. Colonel, H. B., 90, 91, 96, 97, 103, 191, 202, 244, 245, 246, 247, 290, 291, 444, 451.

Edwardesabad, 486, 566, 567. *See also* Bannu.

Elai, 80.
 Eld, Major L. P. D., 286, 287, 288, 289.
 Ellerman, Capt. E. J., 97.
 Elles, Capt. W. K., 58.
 Elliot, Capt. M., 59.
 Elliott, Private F., 138.
 Erozhah, 182, 200.
 Erskine, Lieut. D., 626, 627.
 Evatt, Surgeon-Major G. J. H., 300.

Faichnie, Mr., 150.
 Faiz Muhammad Khan, Subadar, 394.
 Faiztalab Khan of Bajour, 119, 139, 140, 203.
 Fane, Capt. F., 97.
 Farrell, Surgeon G., 571.
 " Surgeon-Major G., 369.
 Faruza, 72.
 Fateh Jang Garhi, 386.
 Fateh Khan, Ressaldar, 75, 195, 232, 333.
 Fateh Khan, Sepoy, 131.
 Fateh Khan, Afridi, 323, 334.
 Fateh Khan, Mohmand, 232.
 Fateh Khan, Ustarana, 582.
 Fateh Khan of Panjtar, 75, 76, 82.
 Fateh Khan of Nara, 330.
 Fateh Khan of Alizai, 396.
 Fateh Khel, 492.
 Fateh Muhammad Khan, Khalil, 293.
 Fateh Namiji, 530.
 Fatehpur, 636.
 Fazilpur, 634.
 Fazl Ahmad, Jemadar, 422.
 Fazl Ali Khan, Kasrani, 615, 619.
 Ferozai (Chagarzais), 31, 80.
 Feroz Khan, 30, 62, 65.
 Feroz Khel (Urakzais), 327, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 396, 402.
 Feroz Shah, 156.
 Finnis, Major J., 537.
 Fisher, Major S., 234, 235, 237, 321.
 Fisher, Lieut. W. P., 519, 610. *495*
 Fitzgerald, Capt. R., 582.
 FitzHugh, Lieut. A., 248.
 " Capt. A., 570.
 " Major A., 369.
 Fitzpatrick, Private C., 138.
 Forbes, Mr. A., 300.
 Fordyce, Lieut. Colonel J., 189, 321, 323.
 Forlong, Lieut. W. J., 129.
 " Capt. W. J., 486.
 Forrest, Lieut. R. H., 536, 537.
 Fosbery, Lieut. G. V., 116, 118, 122, 123.
 Foujdar Khan, Bahadur, Nawab, 526.
 Fox, Lieut. E. S., 143.
 Frankland, Lieut. T., 610.
 Franklin, Lieut. H., 629.

Fraser, C. B., Colonel Honble. D. M., 307.
 Fraser, Captain C. R., 440.
 Fryer, Mr. F. W. R., 618.

Gabar (mountain), 504.
 Gadaizai (Bunerwals), 77, 80, 117.
 Gadda Khel, 649.
 Gaddia Khel (Afridis), 318, 338, 341, 342-344, 371, 372.
 Gadjai, 74.
 Gaduns, 2, 4, 70, 72, 73-74, 75, 95, 96, 102, 103, 105, 107, 113, 153, 154, 155, 158-161, 162.
 Gagalzai (Ustaranas), 581.
 Gagrai, 301.
 Gaisford, Lieut. G., 262, 350, 369.
 Gallai (Afridis), 317, 325, 327, 340, 341, 349, 361, 368, 371. *See also* Kohat Pass Afridis.
 Galleshabhi (Waziris), 498.
 Ganamgara, 278.
 Ganda Singh, Sepoy, 131.
 Gandao, 227, 228, 234, 236, 251, 252, 253, 265.
 Gandap, 74, 96, 154, 161.
 Gandapurs, 587, 616.
 Gandra Kach, 591.
 Gandghar, 28.
 Gandhairi, 214, 217, 218.
 Gandiali (village), 344.
 Gandiali (pass), 346, 349.
 Gandiawar, 406, 417, 418, 450.
 Gangi Khel (Waziris), 464, 465, 481.
 Gar (faction), 273, 434.
 Gara heights, Action on the, 260-264.
 Gara (pass), 261.
 Gara (Urakzai village), 386, 387, 395, 400, 402.
 Garai, 358.
 Garang, 468, 469.
 Gardiner, Lieut. Colonel P. F., 486.
 " Colonel P. F., 349, 350, 354, 359, 369, 452, 487.
 Garhi (Amazai village), 72, 76.
 Garhi (Pariari village), 57.
 Garhi (Ranizai village), 182.
 Garhi Ghandu, 348.
 Garhi Lalabeg, 278, 280.
 Garnett (fort), 649.
 Garnett, Lieut. A. W., 447.
 Garstin, Capt. J. F., 236, 336.
 Garvock, Major-General J., 139-150, 151, 152.
 Gaselee, Lieut. A., 403.
 " Capt. A., 347, 369.
 Gawakhi, 415, 419, 420.
 Gazai, 159.
 Gee, Assistant Surgeon A. J., 40.
 Gerard, Capt. M. G., 308.
 Ghabri (pass), 20.
 Ghakkars, 2.
 Ghani Khan, Mohmand, 265.
 Ghania, 63.
 Ghar Daf, 643.
 Ghariba, 318, 330, 354, 355, 359, 360, 362.
 Ghazani (Marris), 624, 643, 644.
 Ghazan Khan of Dir, 119, 140, 146, 191, 203.
 Ghazi Baba, 182.
 Ghilzais, 249.
 Ghora Dand, 643.
 Ghorapher (pass), 20.
 Ghorazais, 489, 532, 533, 539, 552.
 Ghorizai, 348.
 Ghulam Ali Khan, Jemadar, 582.
 Ghulamani (Bozdars), 596, 597, 611, 613.
 Ghulam Haidar Khan, Ghurchani, 623, 638, 646.
 Ghulam Haidar Khan, 63.
 Ghulam Husen, Bugti, 638.
 Ghulam Khan, Waziri, 573, 574.
 Ghulam Mohi-ud-din, Tehsildar, 221, 224.
 Ghundai, 386.

- Ghundi Khel (Turis), 432.
 Ghwalari (pass), 505.
 Gibson, Mr., 369.
 Gidarnao, 253.
 Gigai Khel (Waziris), 545.
 Gill, Capt. W. J., 644.
 Gillies, Lieut. W. A. B., 112.
 Girdi, 230.
 Girni (pass), 503, 530.
 Girni (post), 488, 530, 533, 534, 535, 649.
 Gladstone, Mr. C. E., 618.
 Godby, Capt. C. J., 614.
 „ Brigadier-General C. J., 537, 538.
 Gorai (Utman Khels), 213.
 Gordon, Colonel J. J. H., 369.
 „ C.B., Colonel J. J. H., 419, 421, 422, 423, 425, 426.
 „ Brigadier-General J. J. H., 492, 493, 543, 547-550.
 Gordon, Capt. G., 35, 37, 40.
 „ Major G., 242, 243, 244, 608, 609.
 Gordon, Major H. W., 357, 358, 361, 362.
 Gordon, Major A. H. A., 300.
 Goshta, 229, 230, 252.
 Gowan, Capt., B.E., 534, 535, 536, 537.
 Graham, Major, S. F., 528.
 „ Lieut-Colonel, S. F., 529, 615.
 Graham, Capt. J. H., 336.
 Graham, Lieut. G. A., 86.
 Grant, Capt. D. A., 426.
 Greaves, Lieut. G. R., 97.
 Green, Capt. G. W. G., 394, 607, 608, 610.
 „ C.B., Lieut-Colonel G. W. G., 519, 526.
 Green, Major W. H. R., 636, 637.
 Green, Major, M.S., 636.
 Grey, Lieut. L. J. H., 614, 615.
 Griffin, Capt. F. C., 134, 135, 137, 149.
 Griffiths, Major C. J., 369.
 Guada, 386.
 Gudar, 278.
 Gudjai, 159.
 Gugiani, 32.
 Gujar Garhi, 195, 200.
 Gujars, 2, 15, 20, 34, 71, 181.
 Gulab Pir, 573.
 Gul Azim, Khostwal, 571.
 Gulbadin, Sepoy, 128.
 Gul Khan, Afridi, 288.
 Gulderi, 61, 62, 63.
 Gulima Bori, 157.
 Gulomela, 387.
 Gulu Tangai, 361, 362.
 Gumal (pass), 503, 552.
 Gumal (village), 488, 539, 541.
 Gumal (valley), 465.
 „ „ Operations in 1879 in the, 533-537.
 Gumati (pass), 468, 469.
 Gumati (post), 467, 471, 649.
 Gumati (stream), 464.
 Gumati (village), 469, 487.
 Gumati Tower, 649.
 Gumbat, 346, 347, 348.
 Gumbela, 3.
 Gundah Khan, Mulla, 583.
 Gunthur, 27, 33.
 Gurbaz (Waziris), 458, 461.
 Gurbuz (Safis), 231.
 Gurchanis, 5, 616, 623, 634, 635, 638.
 Gurgarai, 414, 416.
 Gurgushti, 75.
 Guru (mountain), 28, 70, 76, 77, 109, 115, 116, 124, 132.
 Guru Bakhsh, Subadar, 629.
 Gusra, 642.
 Gutta Gudar, 228.
 Habib (Afridis), 283.
 Habib Gul, 57.
 Habib Khan, Subadar-Major, 347, 401, 405.
 Hadiani (Lagharis), 598, 614, 615, 616, 618, 619.
 Hafiz Ahmad, Tehsildar, 514.
 Hafizkor (Mohmands), 251.
 Haft Chah, 256, 261, 264.
 Haibat Khel (Afridis), 318, 344, 348.
 Haibat Khel (Waziris), 531, 545.
 Haidari Kach, 511, 545.
 Haidar Khel, 562, 564, 566, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573.
 Haji Kot, see Barkhan.
 Haji Sahib of Kunar, 131, 139.
 Hakim Kilai, 562, 573.
 Halati (Khosas), 598.
 Hall, Major C. McK., 548.
 Halimzai (Mohmands), 228, 229, 230, 232, 249, 252, 253.
 Hallett, Lieut.-Colonel, 189.
 Halwai (village), 278, 296, 304.
 Halwai (pass), 280.
 Hamilton, Lieut. W., 286.
 Hammond, Capt. A. G., 223, 365, 369.
 Hammond, Capt. H., 586.
 Hampton, Capt. W. P., 321.
 Hamsaya (Urakzais), 383, 387, 388.
 Hamza Khel (Turis), 432.
 Hanbury, Surgeon-Major J. A., 308.
 Hand, Lieut. T. M., 292.
 Hangu, 389, 390, 392, 435, 437, 444.
 Hanju Khel (Chagarzais), 31.
 Haramtalah, 504.
 Haranbore Kach, 607, 609, 613.
 Harban, 17.
 Harding, Capt. G. W., 96.
 „ Major G. W., 124, 125.
 Hardinge, Lieut. G. N., 216, 238.
 Harian, 63.
 Haripals, 578.
 Haripur (village), 73.
 Haripur (fort), 649.
 Harkai, 199.
 Harnai, 639, 640.
 Harrand, 600, 623, 625, 634, 638, 645, 650.
 Hart, Lieut. R. C., 306.
 Harvey, Capt. E., 347, 369.
 Hasanis, 599.
 Hashim Ali Khan, Hassanazai, 30, 65.
 Hassan, Jowaki, 367.
 Hassan Ali Khan, Hassanazai, 30, 36.
 Hassanbaz Khel (Mada Khels), 71.
 Hassan Khel (Afridis), 317, 318, 324, 327, 338-339, 341, 349, 371, 372.
 Hassan Khel (Mada Khels), 71.
 Hassan Khel (Shiranis), see Sen Khel.
 Hassan Khel (Waziris), 462, 478, 479, 490, 492, 561, 574.
 Hassan Khel (Zaimukhts), 413, 416, 425.
 Hassanzais, 4, 23, 27, 29-30, 31, 32, 41, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 71, 104, 113, 155, 158. See also Black Mountain tribes.
 „ Expedition in 1852-53 against the, 34-41.
 Hassu Khel, 562, 569, 570, 571, 572.
 Hatala, 534.
 Hatchell, Major G., 308.
 Hati Khel (Waziris), 463, 464, 467, 474, 475, 481, 494.
 Haughton, Major J., 426.
 Hawas, Urakzai, 407, 419.
 Hawes, Captain A. J. D., 351, 369.
 „ Major A. J. D., 593.
 Hawes, Captain C. W., 145, 149.
 Hawes, Lieut. H. J., 232, 336.
 Hayes, Apothecary C., 630.

- Haythorne, Major E., 238, 322.
 Hazara (district), 1, 2.
 Hazarnao, 230.
 Hazar Pir Ziarat, 446, 448.
 Hazrat Nur, Syad, 437, 473.
 Healy, Apothecary M., 324, 330.
 Heath, Lieut. H. H. R., 369.
 Heathcote, 294, 307.
 Heighington, Capt. A. C., 629.
 Henderson, Lieut. B., 586.
 " Capt. B., 291, 392, 395, 444, 445, 448,
 450, 451, 474, 478.
 Henderson, Lieut. W., 97.
 Herbert, Lieut. C., 426.
 Hervey, Lieut. H. De la M., 486.
 Hicks, Capt. R. H., 236, 240.
 Hidyat Khan, 253.
 Higginson, Capt. T., 403.
 Hilliard, Lieut. T. H., 322.
 Hindki (race), 9.
 Hindustani fanatics, 56, 81, 82, 84-89, 155-158,
 203. See also Ambela Expedition.
 " " Affair in 1853 with the, 83.
 " " Expedition in 1858 against
 the, 90-97.
 Hinis Tangi, 510, 541.
 Hira Sing, Havildar, 144.
 Hissar, 386.
 Hodding, Lieut.-Col. G. C., 263.
 Hodgson, Brigadier J. S., 584-586, 602-603.
 Hodson, Lieut. W. S. R., 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 332,
 334, 335, 336.
 Holdich, Major T. H., 548, 590, 591, 592.
 Holmes, Colonel John, 185.
 Holmes, Surgeon-Major A. P., 369.
 Holmes, Lieut. W. B., 58.
 Holmes, Lieut. H. R. L., 304.
 Hood, Lieut.-Colonel J. Cockburn, 402, 403, 615.
 Hope, C.B., Colonel W., 115, 123, 134, 136.
 Horne, Lieut. J. C., 85, 89, 90.
 Hoste, Lieut. W. D., 88, 89.
 " Captain W. D., 116, 117, 137.
 " Major W. D., 398, 399.
 Hudi, 632.
 Hughes, Capt. T. E., 114, 129, 130, 131, 133, 134,
 135, 137, 149, 514.
 " Major T. E., 44, 59.
 Hughes, Lieut. W. T., 200, 216, 218, 236, 237.
 Husain Shah, Syad, 388.
 Hussien, Dawari, 568.
 Hutchinson, Capt. R. C., 222.
 Hutchison, Capt. H. M'L., 644.
 Hyde, Lieut. H., 243.
 " Capt. H., 91, 93, 95, 97.
 Ibrahim Khan, Khan Bahadur, 224.
 Ibrahim Khan of Zeyda, 160, 161.
 Ibrahim Khel (Waziris), 462, 463.
 Ibrahimzai (village in Miranzai), 435.
 Ibrahimzai (village in Kuram), 448.
 Idak, 562, 571, 572, 573.
 Idal Khel, 562.
 Ilam (mountain), 28, 77, 80.
 Ilamgudar, see Alamgudar.
 Imamdara, 421.
 Imam Khan, Jemadar, 638.
 Inayat Ali Khan, Maulvi, 83, 85, 86, 87, 88, 92,
 120.
 Inglis, Lieut. A. D. C., 129, 130, 131, 133.
 Inzari (pass), 280.
 Irmuz, 562.
 Irwin, Capt. L. B., 370.
 Isa Khan, Gadun, 154.
 Isa Khel (Mohmands), 229, 230, 264.
 Isani (Khosas), 598.
 Isakali Toi, 414, 435.
 Islam Khan, Bugti, 632, 633.
 Ismailzai (Amazais), 72.
 Ismailzai (Urakzais), 383, 385, 386.
 Ismailzai (Utman Khels), 213.
 Isots, 581, 614, 616, 619.
 Jabagai, 301.
 Jabai, 27.
 Jabbar, 21.
 Jackson, Capt. G., 218, 233, 235, 236, 237.
 " Lieut.-Colonel G., 248.
 Jackson, Capt. C. S., 59.
 Jackson, Lieut. G. C., 150.
 Jackson, Assistant Surgeon J. R., 610.
 Jacob, Capt. J., 630.
 " Major J., 632, 633, 635.
 " C.B., Brigadier-General J., 636.
 Jacob, Capt. G. O., 393, 440, 603.
 Jacobabad, 625.
 Jador (Deshiwals), 24.
 Jafars, 614.
 Jafirani (Bozdars), 597.
 Jagat Singh, Ressaldar, 426.
 Jagat Singh, Jemadar, 222.
 Jagis, 433, 453.
 Jajela (Khosas), 598.
 Jakranis, 625, 630.
 Jalala, 197, 205, 220.
 Jalalabad, 2, 227, 228, 252.
 Jalalani (Bozdars), 597, 618.
 Jalala Sar, 339.
 Jalal Khan, Gurchani, 616.
 Jalal Khel (Waziris), 531, 545.
 Jalalpur, 181.
 Jalamoi, 415.
 Jalgali (pass), 49, 50, 56, 57.
 Jalkai, 32.
 Jalkot, 17, 18.
 Jamal Khan, Allaiwal, 19.
 Jamal Khan, Laghari, 599.
 James, Lieut. H. R., 232.
 " Capt. H. R., 86, 87, 88, 89, 201, 216, 218,
 239, 240, 241, 243, 286, 287, 288, 289, 326, 327,
 330, 332, 336, 451, 474.
 " C.B., Major H. R., 133, 138, 139, 140, 146,
 150, 152, 153, 154, 155.
 Jamieson, Lieut. C. J., 369.
 Jamrud, 231, 278, 280, 294, 301, 307, 309.
 Jamu, 318, 334, 350, 351, 360, 362, 363, 365, 366.
 Jana Garhi, 325, 404.
 Janakhwar, 316, 318, 335, 339.
 Jandula, 504, 510, 511, 541, 542, 544, 549.
 Jangi Khan, Waziri, 508, 512.
 Jani Khel (post), 463, 550, 649.
 Jani Khel (Waziris), 463, 468.
 Janimela, 386.
 Janjal, 521, 549.
 Jan Muhammad, 85, 86.
 Jarobi (pass), 280.
 Jarrett, Lieut. H. S., 138, 150.
 Jaskot, 61, 62, 63.
 Jat (race), 3, 9.
 Jatta (post), 488, 528, 535, 536, 537, 539, 541,
 619.
 Jehandad Khan of Amb, 34, 35, 36, 39, 82, 94.
 Jehangir Dara, 75.
 Jehangir Khan, Gadun, 154.
 Jenkins, Lieut. F. H., 108, 125, 126, 130, 131, 147,
 150, 476, 514.
 " Lieut.-Colonel F. H., 223-224.
 " Brig.-Genl. F. H., 255.
 Jenkins, Captain J. H., 137, 149, 153.
 Jennings, Lieut. R. H., 644.
 Jewrakeen Singh, Jemadar, 629.
 Jhanda, 159.
 Jhinda (post), 223, 649.

- Jhok Bodo (post), 650.
 Jiskani (Gurchanis), 623.
 Johnson, Major C. C., 20, 57, 58.
 Johnson, Surgeon-Major J. R., 369.
 Johnston, Surgeon-Major J. W., 347.
 Johnston, Capt. J. C., 469.
 Johnstone, Capt. H. C., 482, 526.
 " Major H. C., 147, 149.
 " Lieut.-Colonel H. C., 58, 60.
 Johnstone, Capt. J. W. H., 571.
 Jones, Capt. L. B., 97.
 " Major L. B., 397-399.
 Jones, Major H. T., 426.
 Jones, Capt. E. M., 150.
 Jones, Lieut. T. S. G., 133.
 Jones, Mr. Nigel, 369.
 Jowahir Singh, Sepoy, 131.
 Jowaki (Afridis), 316, 317, 318, 329, 330, 340, 341, 371, 373. *See also* Bori Afridis.
 " " Expedition in August 1877 against the, 343-347.
 " " Expedition in 1877-78 against the, 348-370.
 Jowala, Sepoy, 118.
 Jowar, 79.
 Judbai, 28, 32, 33, 56, 157.
 Juma, Havildar, 144.

 Kabbal (mountain), 28, 43, 44.
 Kabul (river), 2, 227, 228, 241, 242, 253, 254, 258, 260, 263.
 Kabul Khan, Hassanzai, 30.
 Kabul Khel (Waziris), 451, 463, 467, 484, 487, 489, 492, 493, 494.
 " " " Expedition in 1859-60 against the, 470-483.
 Kachai, 386.
 Kachi, 624, 625, 633, 635, 636, 637, 638.
 Kach Mazrai, 591, 593.
 Kadam, 278, 301.
 Kadam Khel, 182, 199.
 Kadura, 74.
 Kafirdap, 387.
 Kafirkot (mountain), 464, 469, 481.
 Kaghbanai, 74.
 Kaha (stream), 600.
 Kaban, 624, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 635, 636, 642, 643, 644.
 Kaheja (Bugtis), 625.
 Kahi Gali, 27.
 Kahu, 387.
 Kahudara, 277, 278.
 Kai (Miranzai village), 389, 394, 406, 435, 436, 437, 439, 444.
 Kai (Utmanzai village), 73, 94.
 Kaihiris, 635.
 Kaisarghar, 591, 592.
 Kaitu (stream), 462, 479, 480.
 Kajurai, 276, 277, 278, 281, 292, 385.
 Kaka Khel (Hassanzais), 29.
 Kaka Khels, 18.
 Kakars, 578, 593, 619.
 Kakhto, 318, 350.
 Kalabagh, 503.
 Kala Dhaka, *see* Black Mountain.
 Kalagar, 74.
 Kalamsada, 291, 318, 338, 341, 371, 372.
 Kalandar Bakhsh, Jemadar, 486.
 Kalandar Khel (Chagarzais), 31.
 Kalchas, 644.
 Kaleri, 604.
 Kalish, 32.
 Kalla Khel (village), 318.
 Kalla Khel (Afridis), 316, 318.
 Kalpani, 181.
 Kalpur (Bugtis), 625, 626, 638.

 Kaluch (Kohistanis), 18.
 Kalu Khan, Gandapur, 615.
 Kalu Khel (Waziris), 463.
 Kama, 252, 264.
 Kamal, Afridi, 311, 312, 408.
 Kamar, 348.
 Kamar Khel (Afridis), 271, 278, 279, 283, 292, 310.
 Kambar Khel (Afridis), 271, 278, 279, 282-283, 292, 301, 306, 310.
 Kam Dakka, 261, 263.
 " " " Affair in 1879 at, 251-260.
 Kam-Shilman (valley), 231, 258.
 Kanazai (Utmanzais), 72, 73.
 Kanda, 633.
 Kandali, 415, 421.
 Kandao, 318, 332, 333, 352, 353.
 Kandar, 318.
 Kandi, 641.
 Kandihari (Safis), 231, 264.
 Kand Kot, 634.
 Kangurai, 387.
 Kaniguram (town), 502, 508, 512, 521, 522, 540, 547, 551.
 Kaniguram, Syads of, 502, 521.
 Kanirogho, 562.
 Kaora Khan, Kasrani, 614, 615, 616.
 Kaora Khan, Khosa, 598.
 Karals, 2.
 Karam Ali Khan, Naib-Ressaldar, 633, 634.
 Karam Khan, Marri, 642, 643, 644.
 Karamna, 278, 280, 302.
 Karana, 278.
 Karbogha, 386.
 Karkanwam, 550.
 Karrak (post), 649.
 Karram Ali, Trumpeter, 238.
 Kasaba, 302.
 Kasan Khel (Chagarzais), 31.
 Kashai Dara, 386.
 Kashgar, 2.
 Kashmir, 2.
 Kasima, 181, 182.
 Kasim Gul, Dawari, 571, 572.
 Kasmor, 625, 633, 634, 635.
 Kasranis, 3, 5, 596, 615, 616, 617, 619.
 " " Expedition in 1853 against the, 600-603.
 Katal Khan, 582.
 Katokomela, 415, 421.
 Katsah, 386, 391, 392, 394.
 Katta Kani, 386.
 Katta Kushtia, 278.
 Keen, Lieut. F. J., 144.
 " Capt. F. J., 571, 615.
 Kelso, Capt. J. A., 347, 369.
 Kendall, Lieut. W., 189.
 Kennedy, Lieut. T. G., 97, 476.
 " Lieut.-Col. T. G., 567, 571.
 " C.B., Brigadier-General T. G., 543-550, 591-593.
 Ketchi Kot, 644.
 Keyes, Lieut. C. P., 585, 586, 602, 603.
 " Capt. C. P., 519, 520, 521.
 " Major C. P., 108, 113, 114, 122, 123, 128, 130, 131, 137, 143, 144, 149.
 " C.B., Lieut.-Col. C. P., 400, 401-405, 484.
 " " Colonel C. P., 452.
 " " Brigadier-General C.P., 345, 348, 349-730, 566-571.
 Khabal, 73, 93, 94, 155, 160.
 Khadakzai (district of Swat), 180.
 Khadakzais of Swat, 180.
 Khaddi, 562, 573.
 Khadizai (Urakzais), 383, 386.
 Khadrzai (Gaduns), 73, 74.
 Khadu Khel (Zaimukhts), 413, 416, 417, 423.
 Khagan, 1, 15, 16, 18.

- Khaibar, 228, 276, 278, 280, 308, 309-311.
Khaibar Afridis, 271-312.
Khairu Khel (post), 649.
Khairulla Khan, Allaiwal, 19.
Khaisttu, Jowaki, 367.
Khaistora, 512, 545, 546.
Khali Kala, 75.
Khali Khel (Waziris), 498.
Khalils, 293.
Khan Band, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 613, 614.
Khand-ka-Dana, 27.
Khan Khel (Deshiwals), 24.
Khan Khel (Hassanzais), 29, 30, 48, 61, 63.
Khan Khel (Nandiharis), 23.
Khanki, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 391, 394, 414.
Khanki (Marri village), 643.
Khanorai, 213.
Khanpur (village in Hazara), 103.
Khanpur (village in Sherdara pass), 124, 135.
Khan Singh Rosa, 185.
Khanzada Said Khan, 493.
Kharki, 182, 191.
Kharoti (Pawindahs), 506, 534, 537.
Kharsbah, 387.
Khasora, 524, 548, 565, 575.
Khasora (pass), 463, 468, 564.
Khataks, 2, 181, 182.
Khawas, Afridi, 295.
Khawas Khan, 21.
Khazina, 386.
Kheri Shekh Khan, 348.
Khetrans, 5, 581, 597, 598, 599-600, 612, 614, 617, 618, 619, 632, 634, 638, 639, 645.
Khidarzai (Shiranis), 587, 588, 590, 591.
Khoaddad Khan, Khan of Kelat, 636.
Khoidad Khel (Zaimukhts), 413, 416, 417, 418.
Khojal Khel (Waziris), 464, 465, 487, 489.
Khorshab, 414.
Khosas, 5, 598, 614, 616, 618, 619.
Khost, 527, 565, 573.
Khuba Wanga, 642.
Khudu Khels, 4, 70, 72, 73, 74-76, 85, 107, 161-162.
" " Expedition in 1858 against the, 90-97.
Khui (Gallai Afridi village), 317, 321, 366.
Khui (Hassan Khel Afridi village), 318, 335, 339, 352.
Khund, 30.
Khunia Khel (Waziris), 464, 465.
Khushalgarh, 330, 349.
Khushalgarh (road), 343, 344, 345, 371.
Khusrogi (Afridis), 283, 308, 309.
Khwaizai (Mohmands), 229, 230, 249.
Khwaja Khel (Chagarzais), 31.
Khwaja Muhammad Khan, Khatak, 329, 330, 389, 390, 392, 394, 395, 436, 437.
" " " " K.C.S.I.,
" Nawab Sir, 182.
Khwazozai (district of Swat), 180.
Khwazozais of Swat, 180, 182.
Kiara, 26.
Kiarkot, 49, 50.
Kiarzai (Bugtis), 625.
Kikrai (Waziris), 545.
Kilagai, 50.
Kimat Khel (Afridis), 318, 344, 348.
Kinloch, Major A. A. A., 300.
Kinloch, Lieut. F. B., 418, 424.
Kirpilian, 83, 103.
Kogah, 76, 77, 105, 110, 111, 113.
Kohat (district), 1, 2.
Kohat (town), 311, 320, 322, 330, 341, 366, 372, 387, 390, 399, 401, 403, 437, 439, 441, 451.
Kohat (pass), 276, 317, 320, 325, 338, 339, 340, 341, 366, 371, 372, 404.
Kohat (salt mines), 2, 274, 319, 325, 372.
Kohat (kotal), 317, 319, 321, 324, 326, 327, 328, 329, 400.
Kohat Pass Afridis, 318, 324-330, 371, 372, 400.
" " " " Expedition in 1850 against the, 319-324.
Kohat-Thal road, 417, 452.
Koh-i-Mohr, 212.
Kohistan, 15, 16-18, 19, 20.
Kohistan of Swat, 177.
Kohistanis, 21. See also Kohistan.
Koli, 17, 18.
Kolu, 640, 642.
Kongu, 62.
Konsh, 15, 20, 22, 23, 24, 58.
Kot, 387.
Kota, Mulla of, 105, 156.
Kotera, 17.
Koteri, 348.
Kot Guldad, 591.
Koti, Syads, 504.
Kotkai (Hassanzai village), 37, 39.
Kotkai (tower), 340.
Kotkai, see Drazand.
Kot Kasrani, 596.
Kot Kat, 548.
Kot Khirgi (post), 488, 510, 530, 541, 542, 544, 552, 649.
Kotla, Affair in 1853 at, 83.
Kot Nasran, 649. See also Nasran.
Kotwal Khel (Hassanzais), 29.
Krapa, 80.
Krappa, 386.
Krumb, 387, 414, 419.
Kubulgraon, 32.
Kuchelai (Deshiwals), 24.
Kudrat Shah, 34.
Kui (British Baizai village), 182, 191, 192, 193.
Kui (Marri village), 643.
Kui Bhara, 581.
Kukachana (pass), 346.
Kuki Khel (Afridis), 271, 278, 279, 281-282, 291, 293, 300, 301, 306, 310.
Kulachi, 3, 578, 580, 587.
Kulakka, 65.
Kulpanai, 80.
Kumbi, 633.
Kumesur, 27.
Kunar, 227, 228.
Kundi (Pawindahs), 506.
Kundighar, 511, 546.
Kundiwan, 546.
Kung, 230.
Kungali, 28, 32, 33, 49, 50, 51, 56, 63.
Kura (pass), 599.
Kuram (river), 3, 414, 446, 448, 449, 462, 463, 475, 481, 493.
Kuram (pass), 470, 485.
Kuram (fort), 447.
Kuram (post), 471, 485, 486, 649.
Kuram (valley), 431, 432, 434, 453.
" " Expedition in 1856 to the, 442-451.
Kuram, Syads of, 432, 433.
Kurghiband, 549.
Kuria, 76, 111, 147, 149.
Kuriak, 641.
Kuriez (hamlets), 387.
Kuriez Dara, 385, 386, 387.
Kur Khel Onair (Kohistanis), 18.
Kurmana, 384, 386, 387, 414.
Lachi (post), 649.
Lachipur, 230.
Ladwani (Bozdars), 596, 618.

- Lagharis, 5, 598-599, 614.
 Lalachena, 278.
 Lali (Waziris), 458, 461.
 Lalpura, 228, 230, 236, 250, 251, 253, 260.
 Lalu, 113, 127, 134, 140, 142, 144.
 Laman, 213, 214, 216, 219.
 Lambert, Major G. C., 150.
 Lambert, Major F. W., 476, 477, 481.
 Lambert, Lieut. W., 535, 536, 537.
 Lance, Major F., 346, 347, 348, 369.
 Land, 562.
 Landai, 585.
 Landi, 585.
 Landi Khana, 309.
 Landi Kotal, 254, 256, 259, 260, 261, 264, 280, 302, 309, 310.
 Landuki (pass), 385, 388.
 Lane, Private D., 138.
 Laram (mountain), 28.
 Larzan (pass), 504, 538.
 Lashari (Gurchanis), 623, 634, 635, 637, 639, 646.
 Lashkari Banda, 346.
 Lashkarzai (Urakzais), 383, 387, 419.
 Lashora, 278.
 Latamar, 390, 468, 474, 649.
 Law, Lieut. J. A., 334.
 Lawrence, Mr. John, 331, 333, 389, 506.
 " K.C.B., Sir John, 245, 506, 604, 605.
 Lawrence, Major G. St.P., 185, 186.
 " Lieut.-Colonel G. St.P., 187, 188, 190, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 325.
 Leach, Lieut. H. P., 298, 300, 426.
 Lehri, 624, 625, 630.
 Lena Singh, Sepoy, 118.
 Lewes, Capt. F. E., 401, 403.
 Lewis, Lieut. G. O., 514.
 Likpani, 192.
 Lindsay, Lieut. C. C., 206, 224.
 Loargai (valley), 231, 262.
 Loargai Sar, 565, 575.
 Loargai Shinwaris, 231, 310.
 Loch, Lieut. W., 627, 629.
 Lockwood, Lieut. J. E., 97.
 Loharani (Marris), 624.
 Loi Shilman, 258.
 Lonsdale, Capt. W., 298.
 Low, Lieut.-Colonel R. C., 303, 304, 307, 419, 421, 426.
 Lowarimela, 415.
 Lughman, 228.
 Lukman Khel (Chagarzais), 31.
 Lukman Khel (Hassanzais), 29.
 Lumsden, Lieut. H. B., 75, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 195, 196, 200, 218, 233, 234, 321, 330.
 " Major H. B., 85.
 " C.B., Lieut.-Colonel H. B., 478, 480, 482, 510, 511, 513, 514, 519, 520, 526.
 Lumsden, Ensign P. S., 201, 218, 240, 243, 336.
 " Lieut. P. S., 440, 447.
 Lumsden, Ensign W. H., 393.
 " Lieut. W. H., 450, 610.
 Lundi (pass), 597, 613.
 Lundkhwar (valley), 180, 187, 200.
 Lundkhwar (village), 181, 182.
 Lunds, 615, 616.
 Luni (post), 649.
 Lunis, 596, 612, 640, 641.
 Lyell, Assistant Surgeon R., 40, 334.
 Lyons, Assistant Surgeon R. T., 118.
 Macaulay, Capt. C. E., 339.
 " Major C. E., 488, 534, 535, 537, 542, 543, 544, 550.
 Macbean, Lieut. G. S., 336.
 Macdonald, Major H., 13, 251.
 Macdonald, Capt. D., 336.
 Macdonell, C.B., Col. A., 249-250.
 MacGregor, C.S.I., C.I.E., Colonel C. M., 300, 303, 306, 307.
 " C.B., C.S.I., C.I.E., Brigadier-General C. M., 640-644.
 Macgregor, Capt. C. R., 644.
 Macintyre, V.C., Lieut. Col. D., 296.
 Mackenzie, Lieut. F. J. N., 138, 150.
 " Capt. F. J. N., 567, 571.
 Mackeson, C.B., Lieut.-Col. F., 13, 34-41, 83, 195, 197, 199, 201, 216, 239, 330, 331.
 Mackeson, Fort, 286, 289, 329, 351, 404.
 Mackinnon, Lieut. C. K., 398, 399.
 " Major C. K., 591, 593.
 Mackinnon, Major W. C., 347, 368.
 Mackinnon, Lieut. W. A., 240.
 Maclean, Capt. C. S., 485.
 " C.B., Col. C. S., 547, 591, 592, 593.
 Maclean, Capt. J. G., 353, 369.
 MacLeod, Lieut. R. W., 365, 422.
 MacMahon, Mr., 467.
 Macnabb, Mr. D. C., 306.
 Macnaghten, Major W. H., 296.
 Macpherson, V.C., Lieut.-Colonel H. T., 58.
 " Brigadier-General H. T., 252.
 Macpherson, Major J. D., 536.
 Mada Baba Ziarat, 221.
 Mada Khel (Afridis), 284.
 Mada Khel (Allaiwals), 20.
 Mada Khel (Waziris), 462, 561, 574.
 Mada Khels, 4, 29, 30, 31, 41, 45, 48, 49, 65, 70, 71, 72, 77, 104, 107, 113, 120, 146, 147, 148, 155, 158.
 Madari, Bhisti, 259.
 Madat Shah, Syad, 388.
 Madmir, Waziri, 547.
 Mahaban (mountain), 28, 71, 72, 73, 74, 107.
 Mahabara, 77, 79.
 Mahmit Khel (Waziris), 462, 463, 490, 492, 524, 548.
 Mahmud, Syad, 388.
 Mahmudi, 318.
 Mahoi (pass), 606, 613, 614, 617.
 Mahoi (post), 650.
 Mah Singh, Jemadar, 144.
 Mahsud (Waziris), 458, 467, 483, 488, 498-552, 563.
 " Expedition in 1860 against the, 505-527.
 " Expedition in 1881 against the, 543-550.
 Maidan (of Tirah), 274, 276, 277, 278, 280, 281, 316, 388.
 Maidan (in Mahsud Waziri country), 521.
 Maidan (in Nandihar), 57.
 Maidani, 476, 477, 478, 491.
 Maini, 96, 154, 159, 160, 161.
 Maister, Lieut. G., 200, 218, 610.
 " Capt. G., 514.
 Majvel, 597.
 Makin, 502, 508, 523, 524, 545, 547, 548, 549.
 Mal, 640.
 Malakand (mountains), 182.
 Malakand (pass), 139, 179, 182, 196, 199, 202.
 Malandri (pass), 79.
 Malcolm, Lieut. G., 627, 629.
 Malcolm, Private W., 138.
 Malik Aman, 30.
 Malikdin Khel (Afridis), 271, 278, 279, 282, 292, 306, 310, 312.
 Malik Shahi (Waziris), 463, 474, 487, 489.
 " Expedition in 1880 against the, 492-494.
 Malizai, 207.
 Malka, 28, 72, 102, 105, 140, 146, 147, 148, 156.
 Malka Kadi, 74, 159.
 Malkhel (Tikariwals), 23, 24.

- Mallakh, 562, 573.
 Malla Khel (Urakzais), 383, 384, 387, 388, 407, 408.
 Mamand, 642, 643.
 Mamazai (Urakzais), 383, 386, 408.
 Mammazai (Zaimukhts), 413, 415.
 Mammu Khel (Hassanzais), 29.
 Mamozai (Urakzais), 383, 385, 387, 406, 407, 408, 416, 418, 419, 424, 425.
 Mana-ka-Dana, 28, 29, 32, 33, 34, 50, 51, 53, 54, 55, 56.
 Manakass, 277.
 Manatu, 414, 415, 420, 421.
 Manatuwal (Zaimukhts), 413, 415, 420.
 Manchura, 43, 44.
 Mandaber Sar, 351, 366.
 Mandai, 624, 642, 645. See also Quat-Mandai.
 Mandai Marris, 644, 645.
 Mandal (Utman Khels), 212, 213.
 Mandan (Afridi village), 287.
 Mandan (Zaimukht village), 414, 415.
 Mandana Kach, 515.
 Mandani (Zaimukhts), 413, 415, 421.
 Mandatti (pass), 424, 425.
 Mandawam, 550.
 Mandi, 82, 94, 154, 155.
 Mandu Khels, 578, 593.
 Manduri, 414, 415, 417, 425.
 Manduzai (Shinwaris), 310.
 Mandzaki, 414, 416, 425.
 Mangals, 432, 433.
 Mangal Thana, 75, 84, 85, 88, 92, 93, 105.
 Mangrotha, 598, 600, 604, 606, 613, 614, 616, 650.
 Mangrotha (pass), 604.
 Mani Khan, Waziri, 487.
 Mani Khel (Urakzais), 383, 386.
 Manjhi (post), 488, 533, 536, 539, 541, 649.
 Mann, Surgeon G. S., 97.
 Mansehra, 47.
 Mansfield, Lieut.-Colonel W. R., 200, 201, 218, 235, 236.
 Mansfield, Lieut. H., 426.
 Mansur (Gaduns), 73, 74, 154.
 Manzar Khel (Waziris), 462, 561, 574.
 Marai (pass), 387.
 Marai (village), 385, 387.
 Mardall, Lieut. F., 572.
 Mardan, 85, 107, 192, 205, 206, 220, 223.
 Marghat Khel (Afridis), 284.
 Mari (mountain), 623, 637.
 Markey, Surgeon-Major E. C., 644.
 Marris, 5, 624-639, 645.
 " Expedition in 1880 against the, 639-644.
 Marsh, Lieut. F. H. B., 145, 150.
 Maruf Khel (Afridis), 284.
 Marwatis, 3.
 Masand (Safis), 231.
 Mashak, Waziri, 540, 541, 544, 545, 547, 551, 552.
 Mashu Khel, 289.
 Massozai (Urakzais), 383, 386, 387, 406, 408, 416.
 Massu Khan, Bozdar, 617, 618.
 Mastu Khel (Turis), 432.
 Masturai, 384, 388.
 Mata, 181.
 Matanni, 285, 286, 320.
 Matin, Waziri, 540, 544.
 Matkanai, 182.
 Matkhawazai (Gaduns), 73, 74.
 Matta, 214, 228, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 239.
 Matti, 617.
 Maturighar, 387.
 Maude, V.C., C.B., Lieut.-General F. F., 254, 256, 259, 394-300, 301-308.
 Mauzamdin, 573.
 Mazam Talao, 407.
 Mazarani (Marris), 624.
 Mazaris, 5, 623, 624, 631, 634, 637, 645, 646.
 Mazulla, Waziri, 472, 473.
 Mazulla Khan, Sirdar, 551.
 Mazzeoghar, 385.
 McDougall, Lieut. C. A., 243, 244.
 McGregor, Surgeon A., 536, 537.
 McPherson, Major J. D., 336.
 McQueen, Major J. W., 350, 354, 359, 360, 362, 365, 369.
 Mecham, Lieut. R., 608, 610.
 " Capt. R., 13, 474.
 Medley, Lieut. J. G., 613.
 Mehtab Singh, Colonel, 185.
 Meiklejohn, Capt. W. H., 370.
 Merewether, Lieut. W. L., 632, 633.
 Merk, Mr. W. R. H., 264.
 Miami (Waziris), 448-451, 463, 487.
 Mian Gul, 184, 204, 207.
 Miani (Pawindahs), 506.
 Mianis, 488, 489, 532, 533, 539, 552.
 Mian Khan, 182, 192, 193.
 Mian Khel, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 241, 242.
 Mian Khel (Pawindahs), 506.
 Mian Khels, 615, 616.
 Mian Muhammad Shah of Ismaila, 151.
 Mian Rakan-ud-din, 219, 220, 221.
 Mitchell, C.B., Brigadier-General J. E., 307.
 Michni (Afridi village), 278.
 Michni (Mohmand village), 228, 234, 237, 241, 242, 245, 252, 253.
 Michni Mohmands, 232, 233, 244, 245, 246, 251, 265.
 " Expedition in 1854 against the, 240-244.
 Miller, Lieut. H. N., 218, 232, 234, 235, 236.
 Milne, Major H., 96.
 Mir Ahmad Khel (Afridis), 282.
 Mir Ahmad Khel (Hassanzais), 29.
 Mir Ahmad Khel (Utmanzais), 73.
 Mir Akbar, Syad, 388.
 Mir Ali Shah, Subadar-Major, 117.
 Miram Shah, 562.
 Miran, 615.
 Miranzai (Bangash), 434.
 Miranzai (valley), 383, 387, 435-436, 451, 452.
 " Expedition in 1851 to the, 436-437.
 " Expedition in 1855 to the, 438-442.
 " Expedition in 1856 to the, 442-451.
 Mir Baba of Sadum, 81, 185.
 Mir Bashir of Tirah, 308, 309.
 Mirdai, 199.
 Mir Haji, Khetran, 633, 634.
 Mir Hassan of Tangi, 220.
 Mir Hazar, Marri, 644.
 Mirian, 547.
 Miri Khel (Afridis), 284.
 Mir Jaffir, 608.
 Mirji Khan, 156.
 Mir Killi, 288, 289.
 Mir Muhammad, Havildar, 118.
 Mir Sunder Ali, Subadar, 40.
 Mir Ulla Khan, Marri, 640, 642, 643, 645.
 Mirzai, 234.
 Mishti (Urakzais), 383, 384, 387, 388, 389, 395, 407, 408.
 Misri Khel (Afridis), 372.
 Misri Koh, 578.
 Mita Khan, Kasrani, 600, 601, 603, 610.
 Mithankot, 634, 638.
 Mitthi (Pawindahs), 506.
 Mobaraz Khan, Khudu Khel, 85, 86, 88, 90, 91.
 Mocatta, Colonel D., 345-347, 349, 350, 359, 363, 364, 365, 369.

- Moghal Khan of Goshta, 251, 252, 260, 264.
 Moghal Khel, 547.
 Moghdara, 75.
 Mohabat, Waziri, 483.
 Mohmands (British), 2, 227.
 Mohmands (Independent), 2, 4, 11, 212, 215, 227-265, 271,
 " Operations in 1851-52
 against the, 232-238.
 " Affairs in 1863-64 with
 the, 247-250.
 " Operations in 1879
 against the, 251-260.
 " Operations in 1880
 against the, 260-264.
 Money, Major G. N., 369, 536.
 Money, Capt. E. A., 488.
 Moore, Lieut. R. R., 629.
 Mora (mountains), 77, 180, 181.
 Mora (pass), 179, 181.
 Mora Banda, 181.
 Morgan, Major W. D., 136, 149.
 Morgan, Capt. H. R. L., 369.
 Morland, Major J., 58.
 Morris, Colonel G. S., 641, 642.
 Morrison, Capt. C. S., 370.
 Morton, Deputy Inspector-General of Hospitals
 G.E., 58.
 Mosley, Capt. J. E. P., 542.
 Mosley, Lieut. W. F., 133.
 Mouza Khan, Amazai, 147.
 Mowaz, Sepoy, 144.
 McRae, Lieut. H. N., 298, 299, 300.
 Mubarak Khel (Amazais), 72.
 Muchai, 27, 28, 32, 33, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55.
 Mughal Khel (Afridis), 283.
 Muhammad Akram Khan, *see* Akram Khan.
 Muhammad Ali Khan, Sirdar, 250.
 Muhammad Amin Khan, 426.
 Muhammad Azim, Sirdar, 436.
 Muhammad Ghous, Akhundzada, 40.
 Muhammad Gul, Babar, 586.
 Muhammad Guldad Khan, Gandapur, 587, 588.
 Muhammad Hassan, Syad, 388.
 Muhammad Hassan, 635.
 Muhammad Husen Khan, Bozdar, 619.
 Muhammad Hyat Khan, 487, 567, 568.
 Muhammad Isak, 156.
 Muhammad Khan, Laghari, 599, 619.
 Muhammad Khan, Subadar, 324.
 Muhammad Khan, Sepoy, 128.
 Muhammad Khel (village in Dawar), 562.
 Muhammad Khel (Urakzais), 383, 384, 385, 386,
 405.
 Muhammad Khel (Waziris), 464, 465, 467, 484, 485,
 486, 487, 489, 566.
 Muhammad Khoja, 435.
 Muhammad Nasir Khan, Jemadar, 534.
 Muhammad Nur Khan, Turi, 421.
 Muhammadpur, 636, 650.
 Muhammad Sadik Khan of Lalpura, 250, 251, 260,
 264.
 Muhammad Shah, Urakzai, 407.
 Muhammad Shah Khan of Lalpura, 251, 260.
 Muhammad Yakub, 156.
 Muhammad Zaffar Khan of Teri, 494.
 Muhammadzai (post), 397, 649.
 Muhammadzai (village in Kuram), 449.
 Mukaram Khan, 187, 195, 196.
 Mukarrab Khan, Khudu Khel, 76, 84, 85, 90, 92,
 157, 161, 162.
 Mulcaster, Lieut.-Colonel W. E., 96.
 Mullagoris, Eastern, 214.
 Mullagoris of Tartara, 228, 229, 230, 231.
 Mulla Khalil, 207, 253, 260.
 Mulla Wali Khan, 308, 388, 406, 417, 418.
 Mullazai (post), 504, 536, 538, 649.
 Mulloghar, 385, 386.
 Mulraj, Diwan, 599, 600, 633.
 Munro, Capt. A. A., 126, 138, 150.
 " Major A. A., 567, 571.
 Munro, Surgeon W., 149, 153.
 Murga, 585, 587.
 Murga China, 386.
 Murghan, 387, 414.
 Murray, Capt. J., 242, 243.
 Murray, Lieut. A. R., 304.
 Murray, Ensign C., 323.
 Murray, Ensign C. B., 126.
 Murtaza (post), 540.
 Musadara, 318.
 Musakai, 562, 571, 572.
 Musa Khels, 581, 616, 618, 619, 639.
 Musa Maina, 199.
 Musazai (town in the Dera Ismail Khan district),
 580.
 Musazai (Gaduns), 73, 74.
 Mushki, Jowaki, 345, 354, 355, 367.
 Musuri (Bughtis), 625, 638.
 Mutakai (Utman Khels), 212, 213.
 Muzaffarabad, 42.
 Muzaffar Khan, 65.
 Muzaffar Khan of Hangu, 435.
 Muzaffar Khan of Nandihar, 22, 23.
 Mylne, Colonel W. C. R., 307.
 Nabi, Waziri, 516.
 Nadar Ali Khan, Ressaldar, 419.
 Naffusak (pass), 626, 628, 635.
 Nagrai, 72, 147, 148.
 Nahars, 599.
 Nain Shah, Afridi, 341.
 Namung (pass), 349.
 Nana Khel (Waziris), 498, 511, 512, 528, 529,
 530, 544, 545, 549.
 Nandihar, 15, 19, 20, 21, 22-23, 24, 27, 30, 48,
 54, 57.
 Nanu Khel (Hassanzais), 29.
 Naogiran, 103, 104.
 Naorang Khan, Bozdar, 611, 612.
 Napier, G. C. B., Major-General Sir C. J., 630-
 632.
 " General Sir C. J., 320, 322.
 Napier, Lieut.-Colonel R., 35, 37, 38, 39, 40,
 332, 336.
 Narai (post), 649.
 Narai Raghza, 546.
 Nara Khula (pass), 351, 360, 362, 363, 364, 365,
 366.
 Nari (post), 390, 471.
 Nariab, 389, 417, 435, 437, 440, 444, 445.
 Narinji (pass), 77.
 Narinji (village), 75, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 164.
 Nasar Khel (Chagarzais), 31.
 Nasin, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393.
 Nasir (Pawindahs), 506, 591, 614, 617.
 Nasir (Utman Khel village), 214, 223.
 Nasozai (Bunerwals), 77, 80.
 Nasran (post), 504, 536, 537.
 Nasrat Khel (Chagarzais), 31, 32, 63, 80.
 Nasrat Khel (Hassanzais), 29.
 Nasri Khel (Waziris), 463, 464.
 Nasr-ud-din Khel (Afridis), 283, 308.
 Nauroz Khan of Lalpura, 246, 248, 249, 250, 251.
 Nawab Khan, Bunerwal, 120, 156.
 Nawab Khan of Pandiali, 232, 246, 247, 250.
 Nawadan, 214, 216, 220, 222.
 Nawakila (British village), 105, 107, 108, 124,
 149, 154.
 Nawakila (Zaimukht village), 415, 424.
 Nawakili, 214, 220, 231.
 Nekzan Khel (Waziris), 545.

Newdigate, Colonel H. R. L., 302.
 Newnham, Capt. E. G., 253.
 Newton, Lieut. J. W. M., 426.
 Nicholson, Major J., 468-470, 583, 586, 600, 601, 602, 603.
 " Lieut.-Colonel J., 84, 202, 219.
 Nihal Singh Sepoy, 131.
 Nikai, 278, 296, 297.
 Nikapani, 63.
 Niki Khel, 278.
 Nikra, 642.
 Nila Naddi, 17.
 Nilban, 21.
 Nirarai, 415.
 Nixon, Lieut. J. E., 426.
 Norman, Capt. F. B., 149.
 " Lieut.-Colonel F. B., 254, 258, 259, 307.
 Norman, Lieut. H. W., 200, 218, 238, 240, 243, 323, 336.
 Norman, Lieut. C. B., 531.
 North-west frontier line, 1.
 Nott, Lieut. C. D. P., 145.
 Nowikilli, 80.
 Newsheera, 341.
 Nurazai (Bunerwals), 70, 77, 79-80, 158, 162, 163, 164.
 Nur Gul of Panjpao, 233.
 Nur Muhammad, Turi, 433, 453.
 Nurpur (post), 650.
 Nuthani (Bugtis), 625.
 Nutkanis, 616.
 Obcha Tangi, 303.
 Ogilvie, Capt. F. D., 150.
 Ogle, Mr., 426.
 Oldfeild, Capt. J. R., 233.
 Oliphant, Lieut. J. S., 126.
 Oliphant, Lieut. T. T., 144.
 O'Mealy, Lieut. W. A. D., 542.
 Ommauney, Lieut. E. L., 193.
 " Capt. E. L., 42, 44, 56, 57, 60.
 Orchard, Lieut. J. W., 519.
 Osborn, Lieut. H. R., 97.
 Osborne, Lieut.-Col. C. O. Creagh, 58.
 Oudu, Subadar, 118.
 Pabbi, 372.
 Paget, Ensign W. H., 584, 586.
 " Major W. H., 58, 638.
 Paiah, 318, 330, 349, 350, 354, 360.
 Paimal, 57.
 Painsai (Afridis), 283, 309.
 Painsai Khan, Musa Khel, 616.
 Painsai Khel Akazais, 30.
 Painsai Khel (Waziris), 464, 465.
 Painsai (village), 434, 447.
 Painsai (pass), 447.
 Pakhai (Afridis), 283, 284.
 Pakhai (Utman Khels), 214, 222, 223.
 Pakhi, 337.
 Pakhun, 32, 33.
 Pakka Killa, 385, 386, 388.
 Pakli, 43, 45, 47.
 Palali, 562, 573.
 Palas, 17, 18.
 Palli, 181, 186, 187, 189, 191, 193, 194.
 Palliser, Ensign C. H., 583.
 Palolai (Deshiwals), 24.
 Palosi, 158, 253, 260.
 Palosin Kach, 510, 511, 513.
 Pandiali, 215, 227, 228, 230.
 Pandiali Mohmands, 232, 244, 245, 265.
 Paniali, 642.
 Panjghol (Nandiharis), 23.
 Panji Gali, 26, 36, 37, 38, 39.

Panjhora (river), 177.
 Panjman, 72, 75, 159, 160.
 Panjmiral (Nandiharis), 23.
 Panjpan (Bunerwals), see Nasozai.
 Panjpao, 229, 232, 236, 237, 240, 241.
 " Affair in 1852 at, 238-240.
 Panjtar, 75, 82, 85, 86, 90, 91, 92, 93, 162.
 Parchao, 254, 263.
 Pariari, 27, 28, 33.
 Pariari, Syads of, 4, 23, 25, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33-34, 61, 64. See also Black Mountain tribes.
 Parker, Major A. C., 116, 117, 149.
 Parmali, 86, 88, 107, 124, 126, 133, 135.
 Parsons, Capt. N. T., 150.
 Pass Afridis, see Kohat Pass Afridis.
 Pastaoni (in Afridi country), 318, 334, 355, 356, 357, 358, 360, 361, 362.
 Pastaoni (in Zaimukht country), 421.
 Pathan (race), 5, 7-9, 12.
 Paton, Lieut. J. S., 323.
 Pattenson, Major C., 289, 290.
 Pawindahs, 505-506, 509, 533, 536, 538, 539, 614.
 Pazai, 591, 592, 593.
 Pazai (kotal), 591, 592.
 Peacocke, Ensign E. T., 626.
 Peacocke, Lieut. W., 300.
 Pearson, Major H. P., 293.
 Peghzai (Utman Khels), 213.
 Pehur, 602, 603.
 Pemberton, Lieut. S. E., 130, 131.
 Pennington, Major C. R., 420, 423, 426.
 Perkins, Lieut. J., 323.
 Peshawar (city), 2, 4.
 Peshawar (district), 1, 2.
 Pesh Bolak, 228, 297.
 Petafi (Gurchanis), 623, 634.
 Peyton, Lieut. F., 323.
 " Major F., 96.
 Phailawar, 623.
 Phillips, Major H. L. W., 257.
 Phong (Bugtis), 625.
 Phugora, 57.
 Pihur, 155, 159, 160.
 Pile, Assistant Surgeon W., 134.
 Pipal, 182, 192.
 Pipali (Waziris), 463.
 Pirdost Khan, Mohmand, 265.
 Pir Ghal (mountain), 522, 523, 547.
 Pirsai, 45, 46, 163.
 Pirwal Khel (Afridis), 318.
 Pitao Amazais, 72.
 Pitaomela, 386.
 Pitcher, Lieut. H. W., 114, 122, 123, 129, 130, 131, 480.
 " V.C., Lieut. H. W., 402, 403.
 Platt, Major J., 321, 323.
 Plowden, Capt. T. J. C., 347, 363, 369.
 " Major T. J. C., 419, 420, 426, 492, 493, 494.
 Pokul, 19.
 Pollard, Capt. C., 482, 522, 526.
 Pollock, Lieut. F. R., 322.
 " Capt. F. R., 605, 613, 637.
 " Major F. R., 33, 48, 54, 59, 60.
 " K.C.S.I., Colonel Sir F. R., 345, 347, 363, 369.
 Pollock, Lieut. C. E., 257.
 Pomung, 57.
 Poulett, Capt. W. H., 333, 335.
 Powlett, Lieut. P. W., 150.
 Prangarh, 214, 217, 219, 220, 222.
 Prang Dara, 303, 304.
 Probyn, V.C., C.B., Lieut.-Colonel D. M., 110, 137, 144, 145, 149.
 Prout, Capt. W. R., 586, 603.

- Prekri, 281.
 Pridi, 318.
 Pubbul Gali, 26, 27, 36, 39.
 Pulaji, 625, 626, 627, 629, 630, 635.
 Pul Darband, 394.
 Pulman, Capt. T., 96.
 Punjab frontier line, 1.
 Punjab Frontier Force, 4, 647-648.
 Puran (valley), 77.
 Pyab, Subadar, 401, 405.

 Quat-Mandai, 640, 641.
 Quin, Lieut. T., 95, 96.
 „ Capt. T., 189, 399.

 Radford, Lieut. O. C., 369, 538, 539.
 Ragha, 414, 422.
 Rahimdad Khan of Michni, 233, 241, 244, 246.
 Rahim Khan, 24.
 Rahmat Khan, Shirani, 585.
 Rahmat Khan, Urakzai, 326, 327.
 Rahmatulla Khan of Dir, 204, 207.
 Raitt, Capt. C. B., 628.
 Rajanpur, 597, 625, 638, 650.
 Rajgal, 276, 278, 280.
 Ramadan, 387.
 Rama Khel (Deshiwals), 24.
 Rambazai, Jowaki, 367.
 Ram Singh, Subadar, 398, 399.
 Rangmiana, 214, 223.
 Ranizai (district of Swat), 180.
 Ranizais of Swat, 2, 4, 70, 126, 138, 180, 182, 212, 213, 216, 219.
 „ „ Expedition in 1852 against the, 194-201.
 Ranwal, 537.
 Rargarh, 83.
 Rasal Khel, 562, 573.
 Rawlins, Major J. S., 50.
 Raza, Syad, 396, 400, 402.
 Razani, 524, 548, 549.
 Razmak, 524, 548, 549.
 Regah, 80.
 Regmiana, 248, 249.
 Rena, 254, 260, 261, 263.
 Renny, V. C., Lieut.-Colonel G. A., 59.
 Renny, Capt. R., 609.
 „ Lieut.-Colonel R., 143, 149.
 Renny, Lieut.-Colonel H., 90, 91, 92, 95, 96.
 Renny, Lieut. T. J. O'D., 423.
 Rice, Major H. C. P., 364, 369.
 „ Lieut.-Colonel H. C. P., 547.
 „ Colonel H. C. P., 591, 592, 593.
 Richards, Capt. H., 188, 189.
 Richards, Capt. R., 189.
 Richardson, Capt. G. L. R., 491, 492.
 Richmond, Lieut. G. M., 112, 117, 152.
 Rind, Capt. A. T. S. A., 644.
 Riza Khan of Lalpura, 250.
 Roberts, V. C., Major F. S., 147, 150.
 Robinson, Capt. G. A., 243.
 Rogers, Capt. R. G., 134.
 „ Lieut.-Colonel R. G., 340, 358, 366, 370.
 „ C.B., Lieut.-Colonel R. G., 419.
 „ „ Colonel R. G., 421, 426.
 Rogers, Capt. G. W., 299, 300.
 Rojhan, 623, 625.
 Ross, Capt. C. C. G., 334.
 „ Major C. C. G., 119, 127, 129, 130, 131, 133, 137, 149.
 „ C.B., Brigadier-General C. C. G., 222, 349, 351-370.
 Ross, Capt. A. G., 347.
 „ Major A. G., 364, 369.
 „ Lieut.-Colonel A. G., 546, 547.

 Ross, Lieut.-Colonel D., 605.
 Ross, Capt. G. C., 44.
 Rothney, Major O. E., 476, 479, 514, 515.
 „ Lieut.-Colonel O. E., 42, 43, 44, 45, 49, 59.
 „ C.S.I., Colonel O. E., 61.
 Rowcroft, Lieut. G. C., 96.
 „ Lieut.-Colonel G. C., 342.
 Rubia Khel (Urakzais), 383, 385, 386, 407.
 „ „ Expedition in 1855 against the, 389-395.
 Ruddell, Col. J. A., 303, 307.
 Rumka Thal (post), 650.
 Rustam, 72, 79, 108, 121, 124, 164.
 Rustamani (Bozdars), 597.
 Rustam-Bazar, see Rustam.
 Rustam Khan, Bangash, 401.
 Ruxton, Ensign A. U. F., 243, 333.
 „ Lieut. A. U. F., 476, 479, 480, 519, 521.
 „ Capt. A. U. F., 150, 398, 399.
 Rynd, Capt. P. C., 397, 398, 399.
 „ Major P. C., 538.
 „ Lieut.-Colonel P. C., 541-542.
 Ryves, Major W. H., 96.

 Saadat Khan of Lalpura, 232, 234, 235, 236, 238, 245, 246, 247, 248, 250.
 Saadat Khan, Ranizai, 204.
 Saadat Khan, Ressaldar, 507, 508.
 Sabzalkot (post), 650.
 Sabzani (Gurchanis), 623.
 Sada Khel (Waziris), 464, 465, 489.
 Sadat Garhi, 287.
 Sadda, 414, 415.
 Sadda Khel (Urakzais), 383, 386.
 Sadin, 241, 242, 243.
 Sadum, 72, 163, 164, 185.
 Saduzai (Utmanzais), 72, 73.
 Safed Koh, 271, 432.
 Safis, 229, 230, 231, 248, 249, 264.
 Sahib Chin, 252.
 Saidal, 586.
 Saidu, 184.
 Saidulla Khan of Maini, 160.
 Saifali (Waziris), 463, 491.
 Sakhi Sarwar (pass), 599, 600, 617.
 Salar (Gaduns), 73, 74, 154.
 Salarzai (Bunerwals), 45, 46, 70, 77, 79, 117, 138, 163, 164.
 Salim Khan, 75, 85, 86, 91, 92, 93, 159, 161, 162.
 Salt, Capt. T. H., 134, 135, 137, 149.
 Salushury, Lieut.-Colonel F. O., 123, 129, 130, 137, 149.
 Samandar Khan of Garhi Habibulla, 21.
 Sambalbut (spur of the Black Mountain), 27, 50, 51.
 Sambalbut (village), 61.
 Samil (faction), 273, 434.
 Samilzai (Bangash), 434.
 Sammanoghar, 384, 385, 386, 388, 391, 392, 393, 394, 413, 415.
 Sandalai Sar, 363.
 Sandasur, 199.
 Sandeman, Lieut. R. G., 111, 150.
 „ Capt. R. G., 616.
 „ K.C.S.I., Major Sir R. G., 644, 645.
 Sanderson, Ensign A. R., 134.
 Sandwakhe (mountains), 384, 385.
 Sandwakhe (pass), 388.
 Sangar, 390, 391, 392, 393.
 Sangarh, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611.
 Sanghao, 182, 188, 191, 192, 193.
 Sangi Sarai, 230.
 Sangroba or Sangrab (stream), 414, 415, 416.

- Sangroba (village), 414, 415, 425.
 Sangu Khel (Shinwaris), 306, 310.
 Sanizai (Utman Khels), 213.
 Sanzal Khel (Afridis), 284.
 Sapari, 464, 468, 469, 481.
 Sapparai (Jowaki village), 351.
 Sapparai (Afridi Urakzai village), 386, 388.
 Sapparai (Massozai Urakzai village), 387.
 Sapri (Mullagori village), 214, 219, 220, 221, 222, 224, 231.
 Sapri (Urakzai village), 386.
 Saraghar, 504.
 Sarfaraz Khan, Bangash, Nawab, 312.
 Sargalli (Turis), 431, 432.
 Sarghasha (pass), 332, 333, 352, 353, 362.
 Sarghasha (ridge), 333, 335, 352, 353, 357, 358, 361, 366.
 Sariobe, 387, 414.
 Sarki, 278.
 Saroba, 524, 548.
 Sarpatti (mountain), 72, 75, 76.
 Sartaf (pass), 626, 627, 629.
 Saunders, Lieut. G. N., 89.
 Saunders, Lieut. H. W., 240.
 Saunra (pass), 597, 611, 612.
 Sawan Mal, Diwan, 597, 599, 607, 610.
 Sazin, 17, 18.
 Scott, Lieut. A., 150.
 Scott, Mr. G. B., 20, 22, 252, 253, 361, 362, 370, 420, 426.
 Sein (pass), 468.
 Sembar (pass), 641.
 Sen Khel (Shiranis), 579, 587, 588.
 Sereverge, 421.
 Shabara, 57.
 Shabkadar, 228, 232, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 242.
 " Affairs with Mohmands in 1863-64 near, 247-250.
 Shabi Khel (Waziris), 498.
 Shadipur, 316, 348, 349.
 Shagai (in Khaibar), 280, 293, 300.
 Shagai (Zaimukht village), 415.
 Shah Alam (post), 537, 588.
 Shah Alam (in Waziri country), 546, 547.
 Shahdad Khan of Hund, 160, 161.
 Shahdad (Utman Khels), 214.
 Shahgai, 228.
 Shahi Khel, 351.
 Shakkot (pass), 180.
 Shahkot (village on Jowaki border), 348.
 Shah Mansur Khel, 241, 242, 243, 245.
 Shah Nawaz Khan of Tank, Nawab, 507, 525.
 Shabpasand Khan, Tehsildar, 253.
 Shahpur, 625, 630, 631, 632, 633.
 Shahu Khel (Chagarzais), 31.
 Shahu Khel (Miranzai village), 389.
 Shahur (valley), 545.
 Shahur Kot, 512.
 Shahur Zam, 511, 515, 545.
 Shahwani (Bozdars), 597.
 Shahzada Ibrahim Saduzai, 51.
 Shahzada Zamhur, 401.
 Shaikhan (Urakzais), 383, 384, 385, 387, 388, 389, 395, 408.
 Shakai (valley), 463.
 Shaktu (pass), 550.
 Shaktu (valley), 545, 549.
 Shalbandi, 80.
 Shal Khan, 57.
 Shalozan, 431, 434.
 Sham (plain in Gurchani country), 623.
 Sham (plain in Waziri country), 549.
 Shaman Khel (Waziris), 498, 503, 527, 529, 530, 531, 534, 540.
 Shambani (Bugtis), 618, 625, 637.
 Shamuzai (village in British Baizai), 181.
 Shamuzai (Utman Khels), 213, 214.
 Sham Shattu, 348, 351.
 Shangir, 278.
 Shanilo, 228, 252.
 Shan Khel (Afridis), 283.
 Shaonkauri (tribe), 386.
 Sharaf Khan, Sepoy, 131.
 Sharn, 585.
 Shatut, 31, 50, 54, 61, 62, 63, 64.
 Shawal, 463.
 Sheen, 18.
 Shekh Aladad Ziarat, 346.
 Shekhani (Gurchanis), 623.
 Shekh Budin, 649.
 Shekh Haidar (pass), 578, 579, 584, 590.
 Shekh Husain Bakhsh, Havildar, 238.
 Shekh Jana, 85, 86, 90.
 Shekh Karim, Ressaldar, 635.
 Shekh Khan, 366.
 Shekmela, 585.
 Shekhwali (post), 650.
 Shepherd, Capt. T., 535, 536, 537.
 Sheraki, 317, 321, 322, 325, 330, 340, 372.
 Sher Ali Khan, Amir of Kabul, 250.
 Sherania, 562, 563, 574, 575.
 Sherdara (pass), 77.
 Sherdara (stream), 277, 278.
 Sherdara (village), 124, 131.
 Sherdil Khan, Ranizai, 120, 202, 204, 205, 207.
 Shergarh (Tanawali village), 35, 36, 103.
 Shergarh (British Baizai village), 139, 182, 195, 196, 198, 199.
 Sher Khana, 181, 189, 191, 193, 194.
 Sher Khel (Afridi), 284.
 Sher Naz, Sepoy, 144.
 Sher Singh, Sepoy, 131.
 Sheru, Jowaki, 367.
 Shewa, 88.
 Shikarpur, 625, 632.
 Shilman (valley), 227, 228, 254, 258.
 Shilman Gakhai, 262, 263.
 Shilmani Mohmands, 228, 231.
 Shilobar Toi, 277, 278.
 Shimaki, 387, 414.
 Shinak, 414.
 Shinawarai, 384, 387.
 Shindand, 318.
 Shindih, 318, 330, 350, 359, 366.
 Shingari, 19.
 Shingi (Waziris), 498, 511, 527, 528, 529, 530, 549.
 Shingi Kot, 510, 517, 549.
 Shingur, 39.
 Shin Khel (Waziris), 463.
 Shinki (kotal), 561, 564, 567, 568, 570.
 Shinpok, 253.
 Shinwaris, 215, 227, 230, 231, 271, 281, 299, 310.
 Shipley, Colonel R. Y., 139, 149.
 Shiranis, 5, 578-593.
 " Expedition in 1853 against the, 582-586.
 Shir-i-Talla (plain), 481.
 Shiwa, 478, 479.
 Shuidar (mountain), 523, 548, 562.
 Shuldanna, 280, 301.
 Shuldham, Lieut. A. I., 289.
 Shulgarhi, 299.
 Shundahna, 278, 280.
 Shundarra, 44.
 Shunglai, 27, 35, 36, 37, 41, 103, 104.
 Shuza (pass), 503, 504, 536, 538.
 Sibi, 639, 640, 644, 645.
 Sidurra, 386, 388.
 Sihani (Bozdars), 597.

- Sikandar Khan, Subadar-Major, 131.
 Sikandar Khan of Matta, 236.
 Sillery, Lieut.-Colonel C. J. C., 258.
 Sim, Lieut. C. A., 403.
 „ Capt. C. A., 567, 568, 569, 571.
 „ Major C. A., 307.
 Simeon, Lieut. E., 236.
 Simister, Lance-Corporal G., 138.
 Simpson, Capt. R. S., 323.
 Simpson, Surgeon W., 137, 153.
 Sinawar (mountains), 77.
 Sipah (Afridis), 271, 278, 279, 284, 290, 292, 306, 310, 312.
 Sipah (Shinwaris), 310.
 Sipah (Urakzais), 329, 383, 384, 385, 386, 396, 397, 405.
 Siri, 102, 158.
 Sirki Khel (Waziris), 463, 464, 465.
 Sisobi (pass), 294, 295, 303, 307.
 Sisobi (village), 231, 295, 303.
 Sittana, 73, 82, 83, 88, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 102, 103, 105, 106, 155.
 Sittana, Syads of, 94, 96, 103, 104, 120.
 Sitwell, Ensign W. H., 322, 323.
 Skakot, 182, 195, 196, 198, 199.
 „ Expedition against the village of, 205-206.
 Sladen, Lieut. J. R., 394, 395, 437, 609.
 Smatsai, 158.
 Smith, Capt. C. F., 133.
 Smith, Lieut. C. H. M., 346, 364, 369, 572.
 Smith, Lieut. F. H., 289, 290.
 Smith, Surgeon J. A., 341.
 Smyth, Lieut. O. S., 300.
 Smyth, Surgeon W. B., 13, 417, 421.
 Sobat Khan, Ranizai, 120, 126, 138, 202.
 Sohrab Khan, Dumki, 9.
 So Khel, *see* Hassu Khel.
 Sorai Amazais, 72.
 Sori (pass), 597.
 Sori Lunds, 616.
 Sosni, 35, 36.
 Spankhara, 219.
 Spargai, 318.
 Sparkhwait, 414, 416, 418, 424, 425.
 Sparling, Mr., 426.
 Spedara, 386.
 Spina Tangi, 585.
 Spin Kach, 641.
 Spinkana, 86.
 Spin Raghza, 549.
 Spin Takki, 359.
 Spin Tangi, 639, 640, 641.
 Spinwam (on Bannu border), 525, 548.
 Spinwam (on Kaitu stream), 479, 480, 481.
 Spirkai (Waziris), 463, 464, 465.
 Spragge, Lieut. B. E., 308.
 Srakilli, 231.
 Stallard, Capt. S., 96.
 "Standard" bill, 128.
 Staples, Capt. J., 323.
 Stevens, Major G. B., 426.
 Stevens, Ensign T. P., 150.
 Stewart, C.B., Brigadier-General D. M., 404, 405.
 Stewart, Lieut. C. E., 116, 117.
 „ Major C. E., 350, 369.
 Stewart, Major G., 205, 206, 369.
 Stewart, Private G., 118, 138.
 Stir Killa, 387.
 St. John, Lieut. F. A., 188, 189.
 Stockley, Ensign C. M., 133.
 Stokes, Lieut. S. W., 586.
 Strong, Capt. D. M., 256, 257, 259.
 Stuart-Wortley, Lieut. E. J., 426.
 Sturi Khel (Urakzais), 277, 278, 383, 385, 386, 408.
 Sudan Khel (Waziris), 464, 465, 487, 489.
 Suji Kach, 641.
 Sukailai, 74.
 Sukhi, 486.
 Sukkur, 625.
 Sulala (mountains), 213, 223.
 Suliman Khel (Pawindahs), 506, 534, 535.
 Sulimanzai (Gaduns), 73, 74.
 Sultan Khel (Zakha Khel hamlet), 278.
 Sultan Khel (Jowaki hamlet), 366.
 Sultan Khel (Afridis), 284.
 Sultan Muhammad Khan of Lalpura, 247, 248, 249, 250.
 Sultan Muhammad of Vihowa, 615.
 Sultanzai, 386, 387.
 Surah, 76.
 Sura Mela Algad, 549.
 Sur Billend, Sepoy, 144.
 Surghar, 277, 280.
 Surimanja Kach, 549.
 Suri Raghza, 545.
 Surizai, 435.
 Surkhawai (pass), *see* Ambela pass.
 Surkhawai (village), 107, 108, 109.
 Surkass, 278.
 Surmai, 414, 416, 423.
 Susal (pass), 43, 49, 61.
 Swabi, 85, 104, 105, 107.
 Swabi-Manairi, *see* Swabi.
 Swat, 20, 32, 70, 76, 77, 79, 84, 86, 88, 105, 119, 177-207, 228.
 Swat (river), 2, 177, 212, 214, 221, 228.
 Swat canal outrage, 219, 220, 224.
 Swat Baizais, *see* Baizais.
 Swat Ranizais, *see* Ranizais.
 Swatis, Cis-Indus, 4, 19, 20.
 Swawai, 75, 92.
 Sweny, Ensign W. F., 334.
 Swiney, Capt. H. B., 351.
 Swinley, Capt. G., 369.
 Syad Abbas, 93.
 Syad Ahmad Shah of Bareilly, 81, 82, 194.
 Syad Akbar Shah, 82, 84, 194, 202, 215, 218.
 Syad Amir, 245.
 Syad Amran, 103, 112.
 Syad Gul Mian, 337.
 Syad Khan, Sepoy, 131.
 Syad Khel (Amazais), 72.
 Syad Mubarak Shah, 84, 94, 103, 119, 120, 157, 202, 204.
 Syad Muhammad Shah, 120, 156.
 Syad Nur Khan, Hospital Assistant, 259.
 Syads, Assi, 23.
 Syads, Tirimzai, 20.
 Syad Umar, 94.
 Sylvester, Assistant Surgeon J. H., 149.
 Sym, Capt. J. M., 347.
 Tabai (pass), 297.
 Tagbrai (*tangi*), 561, 562, 564.
 Tajori (post), 649.
 Tajori (village), 537.
 Takht-i-Suliman, 578, 579.
 „ „ Survey expedition in 1883 to the, 589-593.
 Tala Gorrang, Subadar, 334.
 Talanj, 347.
 Tali, 624.
 Tambal (hills), 346.
 Tanaki, 193.
 Tanawal, 27. *See also* Amb.
 Tanda, 386.
 Tangi, 195, 214, 215, 219, 220.
 Tangi, Gurchani, 618.
 Tangi Raghza, 545.
 Tangor, 80, 155, 156.

Tank, 12, 503, 507, 509, 533, 534, 537, 538, 544, 549, 649.
 Tank Zam, 503, 504, 510, 513, 533, 537, 538, 549.
 Tank Zam (post), 533, 534, 544, 649.
 Tanner, Col. G. V., 645.
 Taoda Mel, 302.
 Tapai (Zamukhts), 413, 416, 425.
 Tapiye, 562, 573.
 Tapp, Mr., 12, 34.
 Tarai, 414, 416, 425.
 Tarakai, 214, 222, 223.
 Tarakki (Pawindahs), 506.
 Tarakzai (Mohmands), 228, 229, 230, 249, 250, 252, 253.
 Tarali, 92.
 Tarbatta, 414, 416.
 Tartara (mountain), 228, 231.
 Tartara (road), 228, 231.
 Taruni (pass), 335.
 Taruni (village), 318, 333, 335, 353.
 Tasan Khel (Akazais), 30.
 Tatang, 387, 414, 420.
 Tattas (Batanis), 504.
 Taunsa, 605, 606, 607.
 Tawi, 103.
 Taylor, Lieut.-Colonel R. G., 102, 481, 482, 483, 507, 508, 509, 511, 515, 516, 526, 527.
 " C.B., Colonel R. G., 103, 106, 107, 110, 118, 125, 133, 138, 141, 147, 148, 150, 152, 153.
 Taylor, C.B., Lieut.-Colonel A., 111, 124, 132, 135, 136, 137.
 Taylor, Capt. J. H. G., 290.
 Taylor, Lieut. F. S., 89, 92, 97.
 Taylor, Ensign W. W., 626.
 Tazagram, 181, 182.
 Tazi Khel (village), 386.
 Tazi Khel (Urakzais), 383, 384, 386.
 Tazi Khel (Waziris), 464, 465, 484, 487.
 Terri, 387.
 Terry, Major F. S., 426.
 Thakail, 74.
 Thakot, 19, 22, 23, 24, 26, 158.
 Thakot Swatis, 27, 54, 55, 57.
 Thakthaki, 278, 283.
 Thal (in Biluchistan), 641, 642.
 Thal (in Miranzai), 415, 417, 421, 426, 435, 436, 437, 441, 445, 448, 452, 463, 472, 473, 475, 484, 487, 491, 493.
 Thal-Banna (road), 487, 490, 573.
 Thal-Kuram (road), 418, 425, 490, 491, 573.
 Thana (Baizai village), 180, 181.
 Thana (Zaimukht village), 414, 416, 425.
 Thandiani, 649.
 Thandul, 19.
 Thata (post), 601, 602.
 Thelwell, Capt. J. B., 91, 95, 97.
 Thompson, Col. G. H., 302, 304, 307.
 Thorburn, Mr. S. S., 591, 593.
 Tibi (village), 615.
 Tibi Lunds, 615.
 Tierney, Lieut. E., 97.
 Tikari, 15, 20, 22, 23-24, 27, 28, 30, 33, 48, 54, 56, 57, 64.
 Tilli, 37, 39.
 Tilli, Syads of, 29, 63. *See also* Black Mountain tribes.
 Tindai, 562.
 Tindoh, 387, 414, 419, 420.
 Tirah, 276, 309, 382, 385, 388.
 Tirah, Syads of, 388, 406, 432, 433.
 Toada Chini, 524.
 Tobin, Lieut. F. J., 639, 640.
 Tochi (pass), 461, 463, 564, 566, 567, 568, 572.
 Tochi (post), 563, 649.

Tochi (stream), 561, 562, 563, 575.
 Togh (village on the Afridi border), 324.
 Togh (village in Miranzai), 389, 394, 435, 439, 444.
 Tompson, Lieut.-Colonel W. D., 300.
 Tonnochy, Capt. V., 97.
 Tonnochy, Lieut. V. C., 537.
 Topi, 94, 104, 106, 107, 159, 160.
 Torabela, 278.
 Torawari, 414, 415, 416, 418, 419, 421, 424, 435, 436, 437, 439, 440, 444, 445, 450.
 Torbela, 15, 34, 103, 106.
 Tori Khel (Waziris), 462, 463, 479, 490, 492, 524, 548, 561, 562.
 Torsappar, 317, 330, 334, 355, 359, 362, 363, 372.
 Tor Tam (hill), 223.
 Tortang (pass), 345, 346, 349.
 Totai, 182, 213, 214, 218, 219.
 Totakhan, 182.
 Totalai, *see* Bam Khel.
 Totalaiwals, 85, 90, 92.
 Tottenham, Lieut. F. R., 238.
 Tovey, Lieut. J. T., 92, 97.
 Toziani (post), 650.
 Traki, 632.
 Tras, 213.
 Travers, Lieut. E. J., 393, 440, 585, 602, 603.
 Trotter, Capt. J. M., 361, 369.
 Troup, Lieut.-Colonel H., 200, 218, 237.
 Trund, 24, 28, 34.
 Tsirai (plain), 562.
 Tucker, Lieut. L. H. E., 136, 145, 149.
 " Capt. L. H. E., 256, 281, 294, 302, 305, 370, 387.
 Tulloh, Capt. J. S., 123, 137, 149.
 Turabaz, Duffadar, 221, 222.
 Turabaz Khan of Lalpura, 232.
 Turan China, 512, 515, 545.
 Turangzai, 195, 197.
 Turis, 5, 431-454, 463, 478, 479, 484.
 Turkai, 318, 330, 346, 349, 350, 359, 365, 366.
 Turki Khel (Afridis), 283.
 Turner, C.B., Colonel W. W., 140, 141, 142, 144, 145, 149, 152.
 Turner, Ensign F. McC., 37, 38, 40.
 " Lieut. F. McC., 334, 336.
 Tursak, 80, 164.
 Tyler, Ensign J. H., 333.
 Tyndall, Capt. H., 44, 401, 403.
 Tyrwhitt, Lieut. E., 286.
 Tytler, V.C., Capt. J. A., 149.
 " C.B., Brigadier-General J. A., 252, 294, 295, 296, 297-300, 302, 304, 307, 418-426.
 Uba Khel (Shiranis), 579, 587, 588.
 Ubashta, *see* Kaisargbar.
 Ublan (kotal), 387, 398, 401, 402, 403.
 Ublan (pass), 397, 400, 401.
 Uch, 630.
 Uchalgadda, 318.
 Uchbori, 361.
 Uchpal (pass), 281, 387.
 Uchwala, 234.
 Udney, Mr. R., 548, 550.
 Ugarai, 76.
 Ughi, 31, 33, 34, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 49, 58, 60, 649.
 Umar Khan, Waziri, 532, 533, 534, 540, 541, 544.
 Umar Khel (Utman Khels), 213.
 Umar Khel (Utmanzais), 73.
 Umar Khel (Waziris), 545.
 Umarmot, 604.
 Umarzai (Waziris), 463, 464, 481, 487, 489.

- Umarzai (Waziris), Expedition in 1852 against the, 466-470.
- Umber Shah, Waziri, 480.
- Unwin, Lieut. W. H., 124, 143, 144.
" Major W. H., 369.
- Urakzai Bara, 278, 384, 385, 386, 387.
- Urakzais, 5, 271, 281, 306, 324, 330, 382-408, 440.
- Uraspuns (Batanis), 504.
- Urmegi, 414, 415, 416, 424, 425.
- Urmston, Lieut. H. B., 369, 426.
- Urmurs, 498, 502, 521.
- Usuri, 562, 564, 572.
- Usman Khan, 426.
- Usman Khan (Urakzai), 386.
- Usman Khel (Khudu Khels), 75.
- Usman Khel Garhi, 199.
- Ustaranas, 5, 580-582, 593, 610, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617.
- Utazai (Gaduns), 73, 74.
- Utmanama, 73, 75.
- Utman Khels, 2, 4, 212-224.
" Expedition in 1852 against the, 215-218.
" Operations in 1878 against the, 219-224.
- Utman Khels of British Baizai, 120, 131, 181, 182, 187, 191.
- Utman Khel (Urakzais), 324, 327, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 396, 397, 400, 404, 405.
- Utmanzais, 4, 70, 72-73, 74, 94, 96, 103, 155, 158, 160.
- Utmanzais (affiliated to the Mohmands), 229, 230.
- Utmanzai (Waziris), 458, 462-463.
- Utterson, Lieut-Colonel A. H., 300.
- Vallings, Lieut. A., 144.
- Vaughan, Major J. L., 85, 86, 87, 88, 89.
" Lieut.-Colonel J. L., 108, 115, 116, 117, 118, 132, 134, 135, 136, 141, 149.
" C.B., Brigadier-General J. L., 47, 49, 50, 56, 58, 59.
" Vaughan's " picquet, 118.
- Vezhda Sar, 548.
- Vidor (pass), 597, 612.
- Vidor (post), 650.
- Vidor (village), 604, 617.
- Vihowa, 581, 596, 599, 601, 602, 618, 650.
- Vihowa (pass), 581, 606, 612.
- Vivian, Capt. A., 615.
- Wace, Lieut. E. G., 60.
" Capt. E. G., 61.
- Wader (Safis), 231.
- Waladin, 549.
- Walai (Zakha Khel Afridi village), 278, 280, 294, 295, 296.
- Walai (Jowaki Afridi village), 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 365.
- Wali Khel (Waziris), 463.
- Walik Khel, 278.
- Walker, Lieut. J. T., 189, 201, 218, 334, 336.
" Major J. T., 526.
- Walker, Captain J. L., 238.
- Walker, Mr. G. C., 420, 426.
- Waller, Major R., 235.
- Walli (post), 649.
- Walsh, Surgeon-Major T., 370.
- Walsh, Captain T. P., 467, 469.
- Wano (valley), 463, 465.
- Waran, 278, 285, 290, 385.
- Warburton, Capt. R., 205, 206, 224.
- Warojai (Deshiwals), 24.
- Warren, Capt. F. G. E., 150.
- Warter, 199.
- " Water " picquet, 133, 135, 141.
- " Water " ridge, 132.
- Waterfield, Capt. W. G., 161.
- Watson, Lieut. J., 606.
- Wattizai (Zaimukhts), 413, 415, 417, 420, 421.
- Wauchope, Major R. A., 369.
- Wazdana, 591.
- Waziris, 3, 5, 433, 436, 437, 441, 458-552.
- Wazir Khan, 574.
- Wazir Kot, 585.
- Webb, Capt. F. H., 261.
- Wedderburn, Lieut. J. A. C., 537, 538, 542.
- Wheeler, Major R., 426.
- Wheler, Major T., 145, 150.
- Whigham, Lieut. R., 97.
- White, Lieut. M. J., 97.
- Wilde, Capt. A. T., 86, 608, 609.
" C.B., Lieut.-Colonel A. T., 105, 107, 108, 109, 113, 115, 125, 126, 129, 130, 131, 135, 136, 140, 141, 142, 144, 145, 149, 152, 153, 154, 155, 510, 515, 519, 523, 526.
" C.S.I., Brigadier-General A. T., 42, 45.
" Major-General A. T., 47-60.
- Wilkinson, Lieut. O., 243.
- Williams, C.B., Colonel W. J., 369.
- Williams, Major B., 349, 369.
- Williams, Lieut. G. A., 298.
- Williams, Ensign A., 629.
- Williamson, Lieut. J., 95, 97.
- Willis, C.B., Colonel F. A., 46, 58.
- Wilson, Lieut.-Colonel H. M., 58.
- Wood, Lieut.-Colonel H., 548.
- Wood, Lieut. O. B., 491, 492.
- Woodcock, Lieut. S. C., 200, 218.
- Wright, Capt. T., 90, 97.
" Major T., 118, 138, 147, 149.
- Wright, Surgeon-Major T., 369.
- Wucha Ghakha, 387.
- Wuzi Khel (Waziris), 462.
- Wynne, Capt. A. S., 370.
- Yakhdand, 230.
- Yakub Khan, Sirdar, 250, 251, 260.
- Yarak, Waziri, 540, 541, 544, 551, 552.
- Yar Husain, 75, 86.
- Yaru, 604.
- Yassin Khan, Jemadar, 308.
- Yasta, 414, 416, 424.
- Young, Lieut. H. R., 129, 130, 131.
- Young, Lieut. W., 323.
- Younghusband, Lieut. J. W., 469, 585, 586, 603.
~~Younghusband, Lieut. G. A. P., 603.~~
- Yusaf Khan, Kasrani, 601, 602, 603.
- Zaidulla Khan, Bunerwal, 78, 120, 130, 139, 148, 156, 157, 163, 203.
- Zaimukhts, 5, 406, 413-427, 433, 440, 441, 443, 450, 453.
" Expedition in 1879 against the, 417-427.
- Zaitunak, 415, 421.
- Zaka (pass), 476, 478.
- Zakaiya Khel (Hassanzais), 29.
- Zakai, 415.
- Zakha Khel (Afridis), 271, 274, 278, 279, 283-284, 292, 293, 308, 310, 370.
" Expedition in 1878 against the, 293-300.
" Expedition in 1879 against the, 300-308.
- Zakhtan, 387.
- Zal Beg, Jowaki, 345.

- Zalli Khel (Waziris), 464, 465, 488, 489, 534, 535.
 Zam, see Tank Zam.
 Zam (post), see Tank Zam post.
 Zangi, Waziri, 416, 483.
 Zankai, 252, 253.
 Zao (pass), 590, 591.
 Zarakni (pass), see Shekh Haidar pass.
 Zarakni (post), 649.
 Zarani, 630.
 Zargarai, 384, 387, 389.
 Zargun Khel, 317, 321, 325, 330, 339, 372.
 Zarif Khan, Akazai, 62, 64.
 Zarif Khan, Sepoy, 131.
 Zawa, 278, 286, 289.
 Zawaghar, 385, 413, 414.
 Zawo, 414, 416, 417, 421-424.
 Zeman Khan of Bajour, 126.
 Zeraki, 562.
 Zeran, 431, 434.
 Zeriwam, 517.
 Zersappar, 362.
 Zhob (valley), 578.
 Zia-ud-din (Afridis), 283, 311.
 Zira, 364.
 Zirak, 214, 222, 223.
 Zirandmela, 386.
 Zmaraighar, 578.
 Zmarais, 578, 581.
 Zurmandai, 181, 189, 191, 193.

